Order Code IB94029
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
Updated April 1, 2003
Steven R. Bowman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
Ratifying Legislation (S.Res. 75, 105th Congress)
Implementing Legislation (P.L. 105-277)
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September 1989
U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
Universality
Verification
Impact on U.S. Industry
Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets)
Export Controls
Enforcement/Sanctions
Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The United States CW Demilitarization Program
Russian CW Destruction Program
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites

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Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
More than 100 years of international
for record-keeping and reporting requirements
efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated
relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions
January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemi-
on certain chemicals, depending on their
cal Weapons Convention (CWC). The Con-
likelihood of being used to produce chemical
vention entered into force April 29, 1997.
weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confi-
One hundred forty-eight of the 174 signatories
dential business information gathered from
have ratified the Convention. On April 24,
private corporations. The legislation also
1997, the Senate passed the CWC resolution
provides detailed procedures to be used for
of ratification (S.Res. 75, 105th Congress) by
on-site inspections by the OPCW, including
a vote of 74-26. President Clinton signed the
limitations on access and search warrant
resolution and the United States became the
procedures, should they be required.
75th nation to ratify the Convention.
Though supporting passage, CWC advo-
The CWC bans the development, produc-
cates expressed concerns over several sections
tion, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons
of the legislation which were added in Judi-
by members signatories. It also requires the
ciary Committee mark-up, and intended to
destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles
work for their revision before final enactment.
and production facilities. The Convention
Of particular concern are provisions that allow
provides the most extensive and intrusive
the President to block challenge inspections
verification regime of any arms control treaty,
and that prohibit the OPCW from sending
extending its coverage to not only governmen-
chemical samples outside the United States for
tal but also civilian facilities. The Convention
analysis. These provisions are intended to
also requires export controls and reporting
protect U.S. national security interests and
requirements on chemicals that can be used as
proprietary commercial information.
warfare agents and their precursors. The
CWC establishes the Organization for the
CWC supporters, however, believe that
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to
blocking a challenge inspection would violate
oversee the Convention’s implementation.
a basic premise of the convention, and that if
other nations adopt similar provisions it will
Chemical Weapons Convention imple-
weaken the convention's effectiveness. The
menting legislation (P.L. 105-277) provides
opportunity to address concerns in a House-
the statutory authority for domestic compli-
Senate conference did not arise, when S. 610
ance with the Convention’s provisions. It sets
was incorporated without amendment as
criminal and civil penalties for the develop-
Division I of the FY1999 Omnibus Appropria-
ment, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
tions Act (H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-277). Some
transfer, possession, or use of chemical weap-
suggested that these issues be dealt with new
ons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for
legislation, but none has been introduced.
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of contra-
band chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Chemical Weapons Conventions’s First Review Conference, marking the tenth
anniversary of the Convention’s entry into force, will be held April 28th -May 9th . The
conference will review implementation issues and seek to identify future potential
challenges. A provisional agenda included the following areas to be discussed: chemical
industry issues, compliance verification, national implementation, confidentiality of
information, and the administrative functioning of the OPCW.
The Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report shows an 80% increase in the
cost estimate for the chemical weapons demilitarization program, from $13.2 billion to $23.7
billion. Factors driving the increase were identified as: 1)revised destruction rates based
upon the experience at Johnston Atoll depot; 2) schedule extensions; 3) new environmental
regulations; 4) worse-than-expected stockpile condition; 5) increased equipment, labor, and
construction costs; and 6) higher emergency preparedness costs.
For FY2004, the Defense Department has requested $1.65 billion for the chemical
demilitarization program: R&D $251 million, Procurement $79 million, Operations &
Maintenance $1.19 billion, and Military Construction $119million.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the
Bush Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent in the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). In the 103rd, 104th, and
105th Congresses, an extensive series of 13 hearings were held by the Foreign Relations,
Armed Services, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees, complemented with classified
briefings from the intelligence community. (See For Additional Reading) Under a
unanimous consent agreement, the CWC ratification resolution was to have been brought to
the Senate floor in mid-September 1996. However, uncertain of sufficient votes to ensure
passage, it supporters postponed its consideration.
Ratifying Legislation (S.Res. 75, 105th Congress)
In his 1997 State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged he would make the
CWC a high priority in 1997, pressing for Senate consent early in the 105th Congress. After
extensive negotiations between the White House and key Senators, and within the Senate
itself, a unanimous consent agreement was reached to bring the Chemical Weapons
Convention ratification resolution (S.Res. 75) to the Senate floor on April 23, 1997. The
resolution contained 33 conditions, 28 of which were agreed to by the White House and
within the Senate. Under the unanimous consent agreement, these were not subject to further
amendment or motions. Five conditions were not agreed to, and each was struck by roll-call
vote during floor debate, prior to passage of the resolution. The summary of the conditions
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below provides only the general intent of each; the ratification resolution itself should be
consulted for a full understanding of the requirements each condition establishes.
The CWC ratification resolution, including agreed upon conditions:
! Asserts the Senate’s right under the Constitution to add reservations to the
Convention.
! Assures congressional oversight of all funds provided under the CWC.
! Requires Presidential certification that the OPCW has an Inspector-General
and specifies report requirements.
! Requires cost-sharing for R&D expenditures for verification.
! Establishes standards for U.S. intelligence sharing and reports to Congress.
! Requires submission of any CWC amendments to the Senate.
! Requires the President to obtain assurances from Australia Group members
that Article XI is consistent with continued export controls.
! Requires a report on the assurances offered to countries that forswear the use
of nuclear weapons.
! Requires Presidential certification that restrictions on Schedule 1 chemicals
do not adversely affect the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
industries.
! Requires annual country reports of CW activities, compliance, and
intelligence monitoring.
! Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Armed Forces are
effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised for operations in
CBW environments.
! Asserts the primacy of the U.S. Constitution.
! Requires the President to use the full range of his authority to enforce
compliance.
! Requires the United States to reject any Russian effort to make its
ratification contingent on U.S. financial assistance.Requires the United
States to limit its CW defensive assistance under Article X, to countries of
concern, to medical antidotes and treatments.
! Prescribes U.S. responses to unauthorized release of confidential business
information by the OPCW or other parties.
! States the sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to
treaties that bar reservations.
! Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States to
laboratories outside the United States.
! States the Senate finding that chemical weapons terrorism is still a threat.
! States the Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied its
vote in the CWC organization.
! Sense of the Senate that the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency should provide
assistance to facilities subject to routine inspection under the CWC.
! Limits U.S. assessment for OPCW to $25 million; ties increases to the
Consumer Price Index; provides for certain exceptions, e.g., verification
costs. Reaffirms the Senate’s role in treaty interpretation.
! Reaffirms the Senate’s role regarding arms control treaties.
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! Requires Presidential certification that the CWC does not restrict U.S. use
of riot control agents in certain specified circumstances. Requires
notification and consultation when a chemical is added to CWC Schedules.
! Requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Requires criminal search warrant
for challenge inspections and administrative search warrant for routine
inspections, if not permitted voluntarily.
Implementing Legislation (P.L. 105-277)
On May 23, 1997 the Senate unanimously passed S. 610. This legislation, as reported
by the Judiciary Committee, was an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the
Administration bill. CWC supporters with objections to provisions of S. 610 as reported
hoped they could be resolved before final enactment, perhaps in House-Senate conference.
(Congressional Record, May 23, p. S5078). However, S. 610's language was incorporated,
without amendment, by the House International Relations Committee as Title II of the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 (H.R. 2709), which passed the House by voice
vote , Nov. 12, 1997. The Senate passed H.R. 2709 on May 22, 1998 with no amendment
to the CWC-related element of the legislation. On June 9, 1998 the House concurred with
a Senate amendment to the Title I missile sanctions regime, permitting submission of the
legislation to the President, who vetoed the legislation on June 23. The veto stemmed from
the Administration's disapproval of the Iran sanction elements of the legislation, not the
CWC-related elements. In October 1998, the House incorporated S. 610's language, without
amendment, into the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act. This passed the House and
Senate, and was signed into law October 20th, 1998 (P.L. 105-277)
The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. These
penalties would also apply to anyone who assists, encourages, induces, attempts, or conspires
to carry out these proscribed activities. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure,
forfeiture, and destruction of contraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for
record-keeping and reporting requirements relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on
certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood of being used to produce chemical weapons;
and 4) a protective regime for confidential business information gathered from private
corporations. It also provides detailed procedures to be used for on-site inspections by the
OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures, should they be
required.
The provisions, now enacted into law, which raise concerns from CWC supporters and
the OPCW include:
! Section 213 — sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the
U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information
through the actions of OPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that,
as worded, this section does not place a high enough burden of proof on the
claimants, and consequently could lead to excessive and unfounded claims
against the government. Sections 237 — grants the President the right to
deny a request for inspection if it “may cause a threat to U.S. national
security interests.” The CWC contains no provision permitting denial of an
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inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the United States in
non-compliance. They maintain that even if never exercised, this section’s
existence will encourage other nations to enact similar exemptions, thereby
weakening the CWC verification regime.
! Section 253 — exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control
lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting
and inspection requirements. This is intended to ease the potential burdens,
particularly on paper manufacturers, but critics believe the exemption is too
broadly worded and would rule out an effective non-intrusive sampling
technique for inspectors. Sections 212 & 238 prohibit requiring that
government contractors waive any constitutional rights for any purpose
related to the CWC. Some believe that this could hinder the CWC routine
inspection regime.
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September
1989. In 1989, as the multilateral negotiations slowed, the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks took
on greater importance and assumed a much higher public profile. On September 23, 1989,
the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) agreeing to data declarations on CW stockpiles and trial inspections. U.S.
intelligence officials believe that Russian declarations have been incomplete, particularly in
the area of binary chemical weapons and novel chemical agents. High level consultations
continue to try to resolve these discrepancies. Compliance with this agreement is a factor
in the Bush Administration’s decision not to provide the certification of Russia’s
commitment to arms control upon which further Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is
contingent. The Russian chemical weapons destruction program is a beneficiary of this aid
program.
U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990. On
June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia signed an agreement covering the production of
chemical weapons and the destruction of current CW stockpiles. This agreement, as yet not
implemented, would permit bilateral routine monitoring and challenge inspections of the CW
destruction process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Russia has communicated to the Administration that the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) described below has “outlived its usefulness”, and should be superseded
by the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, however, still support the BDA and
are continuing talks on the issue. Russian cost estimates have concluded that the BDA
verification regime would be more expensive than OPCW monitoring and inspections.
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated
January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United
States was one of the original signatories of the Convention and has been joined by 173 other
nations. The Clinton Administration submitted the Convention to the Senate on November
23, 1993. The United States ratified the convention May 25, 1997. The Convention came
into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days after the 65th ratification was received. One hundred
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forty-eight nations have ratified the Convention: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana,
Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia,
Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania,
Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Santa Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St.
Vincent and the Grenedines, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons
(CW) by its signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and
production facilities. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification
regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also
civilian facilities. The verification package includes instrument-monitoring, both routine and
random onsite inspections, and challenge inspections for sites suspected of CW storage or
production. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on
chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors.
Administratively, the Convention establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation. It is a permanent
international organization charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention, and
monitoring the chemical industry worldwide. The OPCW has three components: 1) the
Conference of States Parties, comprising all signatories; 2) the Executive Council, composed
of 41 signatories chosen in a rotation based upon geographic region and significance of
commercial chemical production; and 3) the Technical Secretariat, which will conduct
day-to-day administration of the Convention. Each signatory will also designate a National
Authority that will be the liaison with the OPCW, and will administer the implementation
of the CWC domestically. On June 25, 1999 President Clinton issued an Executive Order
designating the State Department as the National Authority for the implementation of the
CWC, and establishing an interagency group [http://www.cwc.gov/] comprising the
Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, and the Attorney-General to
coordinate the implementation.
Declarations required from each state party by the CWC include:
! Location and detailed inventory of all chemical weapons storage sites.
! Location and capacities of all chemical weapons production and research
facilities.
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! All transfers of chemical weapons and CW production equipment since
1946.A detailed plan and schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons
and CW production facilities. Location and activities of any facilities using
or producing controlled chemicals.
Destruction of chemical weapons agents, munitions, and production facilities must be
completed within 10 years of the Convention’s entry into force (1997) or a State Party’s
ratification date, whichever is earlier. In extraordinary circumstances, this deadline can be
extended for up to 5 years, with the approval of two-thirds of the states parties. Russia has
applied for such an extension, and the United States may also need an extension, depending
upon the progress of the CW stockpile demilitarization program.
The Convention establishes three lists (Schedules) of chemical warfare agents and their
precursor chemicals arranged in order of their importance to CW production and range of
legitimate peaceful uses. These chemical Schedules will be updated as needed by the OPCW
Technical Secretariat. Above certain quantitative thresholds, these chemicals’ production,
use, or transfer must be projected and subsequently reported annually to the OPCW. All
facilities capable of producing, or that use scheduled chemicals must be registered. In
addition, all facilities that produce over 30 metric tons of a discrete chemical containing
phosphorous, sulphur, or fluorine must be registered.
The OPCW inspection regimes will vary, depending on the type of facility:
! Declared CW production, storage, or destruction sites: systematic on-site
inspection and continuous instrument monitoring.
! Declared non-CW chemical facilities: routine or random inspections,
depending on the Schedule and amounts of chemicals produced or used.
! All other facilities: on-site challenge inspections upon request of a state
party.
Scheduled chemicals may not be exported to non-States Parties.
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
The CWC raises a variety of issues for congressional consideration. Although the vast
majority of the world’s nations have signed the CWC, some nations suspected of having
chemical weapons have not — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria. What effect does this
lack of universality have upon the value of the Convention? The CWC’s verification
provisions are extensive, but they have not stilled the debate over whether they will be
effective enough to deter violations. And, if violations are detected, are enforcement
procedures and sanctions sufficiently stringent? Because the CWC extends its provisions to
the civilian sector, the impact of inspections, reporting requirements, and export controls on
commercial enterprise raises concerns unique to arms control treaties. The destruction of
chemical weapon stockpiles, though congressionally-mandated independently of the CWC,
presents technical, environmental, and financial challenges at home and abroad. Issues
deserving attention in consideration of the CWC and its implementing legislation can be
grouped in six general areas: 1) universality; 2) verification; 3) impact on U.S. industry; 4)
enforcement; 5) technology transfer; 6) destruction of chemical weapons; and 7) cost.
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Universality
How many nations are willing to ratify the CWC and, more importantly, which nations
are not? As noted, 173 have signed, and 148 have ratified the Convention. Examining the
signatory list, most are heartened to see China, Iran, and Israel — nations believed to have,
or be developing, significant CW capability. However, Israel has not ratified the
Convention, and both Iran and China remain under suspicion with regard to compliance.
Some particularly troublesome nations, such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have not
signed. In addition, a number of middle eastern states, notably Egypt and Jordan, have
refused to sign, linking their participation to the removal of Israel’s suspected nuclear
capability.
Indicative of the difficulties that lack of universality brings is the continued concern
about Iraq’s intentions. In an effort to have the United Nations maintain economic sanctions
on Iraq, the United States has shown Security Council members satellite photographic
evidence that Iraq has rebuilt a plant formerly used to produce chemical weapons. U.S.
analysts believe that Iraq could resume CW production almost immediately if monitoring
ceased. U.S. officials also provided evidence that Iraq continues to try to import ballistic
missile fuel and guidance system components. It is assumed that a resurgence of Iraq’s
missile program will see a continuance of its previous efforts to develop CW warheads.
Critics of the CWC believe that its value is significantly reduced if all nations with the
capability to develop and use chemical weapons are not parties, particularly in a region as
volatile as the Middle East. The rationale is that even one nation having chemical weapons
will create an incentive for its neighbors to follow suit. ” They believe that it is unwise for
the United States to relinquish its chemical weapons capability while other nations retain
theirs. They also generally maintain that the possibility of retaliation in kind, i.e. with
chemical weapons, is an important component of CW deterrence.
CWC supporters, while agreeing to the importance of persuading all CW-capable
nations to join, believe that a small number of hold-outs does not pose a sufficient threat to
justify not ratifying the Convention. They note that in the Persian Gulf War, the United
States forswore retaliation with chemical weapons, even if Iraq used them against coalition
forces. This decision was based on the assessment that the U.S. arsenal was adequate for
both limited or massive retaliation without the use of chemical weapons. CWC supporters
further argue that without the Convention there would be even greater incentive to acquire
chemical weapons, and it would be easier to accomplish. The CWC would provide an
international regime of export controls and a widely accepted international norm, to which
all nations — signatories or not — could be held.
Verification
Verification is undoubtedly the thorniest issue. Devising an acceptable verification
regime was the most difficult task for CWC negotiators and will be the most challenging for
those implementing the Convention. The CWC provides for the most intrusive and extensive
verification regime of any arms control agreement to date. The regime, for the first time in
arms control, provides for routine monitoring and inspection not only of military facilities
but also of certain civilian chemical facilities . In addition, challenge inspection provisions
expand compliance verification to suspect facilities of any sort. The Organization for the
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Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will oversee the Convention’s compliance verification.
Two of the most salient verification concerns are its effectiveness and its impact on the rights
and property of the U.S. chemical industry.
The most serious question is whether the OPCW will be able to detect all clandestine
production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Ironically, the CWC’s supporters and
detractors generally agree: the answer is no. Acknowledging that the verification regime
will not be absolute carries differing significance for the Convention’s critics and advocates.
Those who question the Convention’s value believe that if compliance verification cannot
be guaranteed, and undetected CW possession may be possible, the Convention is not worth
the cost and effort. Worse, perhaps, they are concerned that the Convention would engender
a false sense of security. They point out that in certain circumstances, the selective use of
relatively small amounts of chemical weapons could be significant militarily, particularly
against unprotected personnel. Consequently, would-be violators need not produce or
stockpile vast amounts.
Advocates argue that, though CWC may be imperfect, it provides the most intrusive
and extensive verification regime in the history of disarmament and represents a notable
improvement over current CW non-proliferation regimes. For signatories, this fact could
change the cost/benefit analysis of CW production or stockpiling enough to deter violations.
Provision for challenge inspections creates the likelihood that violations would become
public breaches of the international norm, something not possible without the CWC.
The most difficult challenge would be to detect existing chemical weapons that a nation
does not declare and continues to store clandestinely. Detecting illicit transfers of controlled
chemicals may also prove a challenging task. Covert production of chemical warfare agents
and the subsequent manufacture of chemical munitions are higher-profile activities and
consequently more vulnerable to detection. This assessment assumes that the OPCW and
signatories’ national intelligence resources will seek to uncover Convention violators. The
extent of intelligence sharing will have a significant impact on the CWC’s effectiveness. It
can be anticipated that those nations with highly developed intelligence collection
capabilities, the United States particularly, will be depended upon to cooperate with the
OPCW.
Congress may wish to encourage the U.S. intelligence community explicitly to maintain
close liaison with the OPCW. Congress could also require that the intelligence community
provide periodic independent evaluations of the verification regime or that the President
certify to Congress that the regime is performing effectively. This could be made part of the
President’s annual report to Congress on proliferation currently required under the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182) or the
State Departments annual report, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control
Agreements.
Another factor that will affect the OPCW’s verification capabilities will be the amount
and reliability of its funding by the Convention’s signatories. Without adequate funding to
maintain the technological and personnel resources necessary to monitor the international
chemical industry and government activities, the rigor of the verification regime will
undoubtedly suffer. Budgetary difficulties have plagued the OPCW for the last two years,
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however with a new Director General and payment of delinquent dues and inspection cost
reimbursements, it is hoped that these difficulties may be overcome in 2003.
Concerns over verification have been heightened by press reports that U.S. officials
believe that Russia has withheld information on its chemical weapons research programs.
In a data exchange called for under a 1989 U.S.-Russian agreement, Russia acknowledged
no binary chemical research program. (Binary chemical weapons use two non-lethal
chemicals that combine to form a lethal agent after launching.) The United States worked
on developing binary weapons sporadically from the 1950s, ending the effort in 1992, when
the signing of the CWC became imminent. U.S. intelligence has long believed that Russia
was undertaking a similar program. In 1992, a Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, publicly
claimed that Russia had developed a binary agent significantly more effective than current
nerve agents. He also asserted that the Russian military leadership continued the program
after President Gorbachev declared Russia’s chemical weapons development at an end.
Concern over this Russian program rekindled with the leaking of a classified DOD report to
the press. Written at the U.S. Ground Intelligence Center, the report supposedly maintains
that the new agent can be manufactured in significant amounts in modified pesticide plants
from chemicals not covered by the CWC. (Washington Times, February 4, 1997, p.1) CWC
opponents believe this latest information highlights the difficulties of verification and the
lack of Russian trustworthiness. CWC supporters have responded that without the CWC
such a program is legal, but with the CWC and accession to it, it would be illegal and suspect
facilities would be subject to inspection.
The United States, having specifically requested an accounting of the Russian binary
program and received inadequate responses, is continuing discussions to resolve these
discrepancies. Although the current data exchange is independent of the CWC, Russian
recalcitrance on this issue could adversely affect support for the Convention. If Russia is
unwilling to be forthright in what is generally judged to be an “open secret,” it raises the
question of how seriously it considers the prohibitions of the CWC and consequently places
greater emphasis on effective verification. The Bush Administration has highlighted this
point by its decision not to provide the certification of Russia’s commitment to arms control
upon which further Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is contingent, unless Russia provides
further information on these programs,
Impact on U.S. Industry
Many U.S. enterprises may not meet the threshold requirements for reporting, others
may have minimal obligations (e.g. one-page reports) because of the nature of the chemicals
they handle. For the most part, the heaviest burden (annual reports on
production/consumption/transfer and at least one initial inspection) will fall upon enterprises
that deal with substantial amounts of chemicals that could be very useful in the production
of CW warfare agents.
Implementing legislation for the CWC, addressed some issues that are novel for arms
control agreements. The Convention grants the OPCW inspection rights (routine, random,
and challenge) over purely civilian, privately owned facilities. These inspection rights are
harmonized with U.S. constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure
through procedures for obtaining administrative or criminal search warrants if necessary.
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Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets). Potential loss of trade secrets
is of great concern to private industry. And the question arises whether forced or incidental
disclosure of such information during a CWC inspection would constitute a “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment. Implementing legislation addressed this issue by restricting
information collection, providing non-disclosure protection, and penalties for unauthorized
disclosure of Convention-related information. Chemical industries contend that it is essential
to protect proprietary information (or trade secrets) to maintain a competitive advantage in
the marketplace. And, the CWC, through its enforcement and verification procedures, will
require a greater level of openness regarding production processes and rates, product
composition, and market distribution. However, the U.S. chemical industry represented
through the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Association, strongly endorsed the Convention’s confidentiality measures and supported the
CWC’s ratification. The National Federation of Independent Business, a small businesses
association, also extended its endorsement to the CWC, its spokesman noting that the NFIB
did believe its members would be affected. (Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1997, pp.
1,16)
Export Controls. The CWC requires restrictions on the export or transfer of
controlled chemicals to non-states parties. These restrictions vary in severity depending
upon the chemicals involved. Also, as an incentive for nations to sign the CWC, the
restrictions will tighten the years following the Convention coming into force. The United
States already has a variety of export controls on CW-related chemicals, equipment, and
technology. (See CRS Report RL3159, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and
Status.) The question arises as to what extent the United States will need to review and
revise its current export controls in light of the CWC regime. U.S. industry is hoping for
loosening of controls, particularly with regard to the transfer of chemicals and technology
to U.S. subsidiaries in other countries. Others believe that the U.S. must keep tight controls
in place until the CWC has demonstrated its effectiveness and the threat of CW proliferation
has demonstrably abated. Nevertheless, continued pressure can be expected from developing
countries and domestic industry to loosen export controls.
Enforcement/Sanctions
The question of sanctions was addressed late in the CWC negotiations. The
consultative nature of the Convention’s provisions and the lack of specificity regarding
sanctions to be levied reflect the difficulty of those negotiations. It is generally anticipated
that international sanctions would consist of trade and, perhaps, arms embargoes. CWC
critics believe that its enforcement sanctions are too vague to be an effective deterrent. They
question the effectiveness of economic and arms embargoes, maintaining that 1) embargoes
are almost impossible to enforce internationally; 2) they historically have seldom achieved
their foreign policy objectives; and 3) if they are effective at all, it is only over the long term.
CWC supporters argue that the lack of specificity regarding possible sanctions heightens a
potential violator’s uncertainty about breaking the Convention. They believe that this
uncertainty and the international approbation that would be generated by the enforcement
procedure will sufficiently affect the “cost/benefit” analysis of chemical weapons production
to deter a potential violator.
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Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The CWC mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production
facilities within 10 years of the Convention’s coming into force. This deadline is now 2007.
With the approval of the States’ Conference, this deadline can be extended up to 5 years.
This extension clause was included specifically in anticipation of Russia’s not being able to
meet the destruction deadline, given its current political and economic instability. There is,
however, the possibility that the United States could experience legal and regulatory
difficulties in meeting a 10-year deadline.
The United States CW Demilitarization Program. The United States is by far
the country most advanced in its CW destruction program. In the early 1980s, DOD declared
approximately 90% of the U.S. chemical stockpile (28,000 agent tons) obsolete. This
decision, coupled with a 1985 congressional directive to destroy these munitions, led DOD
to begin planning a destruction program over a decade ago. Nevertheless, it is not entirely
assured that the United States will be able to meet the 2007 CWC deadline. DOD estimates
have called for completing destruction on time, but a number of factors could intervene.
Indeed, in August, 1999, an independent analysis commissioned by DOD and conducted by
the Arthur Anderson firm estimated that the program has less than a 1% chance of meeting
the 1997 deadline. This assessment is based on the assumption that incineration facility
construction would be halted while alternative technologies are examined. Opponents to
incineration do not regard the 2007 deadline as particularly significant, pointing to the
CWC’s provisions for extending it, if necessary.
The controversy over whether the United States will be able to complete destruction of
its CW stockpile even by 2012 was rekindled by an internal Army report Operations
Schedule Task Force 2000-Final Report obtained by the Appropriations Subcommittee on
Defense. The report detailed the actual munition destruction rates at the Johnston Atoll
depot, showing them to be much lower than previous official estimates, and indicated that
substantially the same destruction rates should be expected at other incineration facilities.
If so, the CW stockpile destruction program could extend beyond 2014. DOD initially
contended that the report was a “worst case scenario”, but the most recent DOD Selected
Acquisition Report, released in April, shows an 80% increase in the program costs owing
specifically to “revised destruction rates” and “schedule extensions.”
An unpredictable factor is the length of time that will be required to obtain the necessary
Federal and State permits to build and operate the destruction facilities, and this has been
cited as another reason for the 80% program cost increase. Destruction facilities are to be
built at each of the eight CW storage depots. These storage facilities are located in Aberdeen
Proving Ground, MD; Anniston Army Depot, AL; Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY;
Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN; Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; Pueblo Depot Activity, CO;
Tooele Army Depot, UT; Umatilla Depot Activity, OR; and Johnston Atoll Depot in the
South Pacific. For each site, the U.S. Army must obtain separate permits under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. In
addition, environmental impact statements are required under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.
Adding to the Federal requirements, the destruction program will face additional
obstacles at the state level. In the last few years, public concern in the regions where
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destruction facilities are planned or under construction has heightened considerably. The
primary fears are of toxic emissions from the destruction process and the possibility of
catastrophic accident. The Chemical Weapons Working Group, an alliance of citizens’
groups in communities with CW stockpiles, vigorously opposes incineration as a means of
disposal.
The Army’s chosen method (called “baseline”) is to drain the munitions and incinerate
the chemical agent and munition parts. Although the choice of this method came after
extensive study of alternatives, incineration has still raised objections from some who oppose
incineration. As a consequence, Congress directed the Army to reconsider alternative
technologies. In the FY1997 DOD Appropriations Act ( P.L. 104-208) Congress created the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program (ACWA) to evaluate alternative
approaches to incineration. Legislative provisions included:
! prohibiting obligation of funds for incinerator construction at the Pueblo,
CO and Blue Grass, KY sites pending a report to Congress on the feasibility
of alternative technologies, specifying that the ACWA program manager be
independent of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
! allocating $40 million to “identify and develop at least two possible disposal
alternatives”requiring a report to Congress no later than April 1999 on the
initial safety and environmental assessments for the alternative technologies.
ACWA initially identified six possible alternative technologies; and, in the summer
1998 selected three for demonstration and possible pilot programs. This met the statutory
requirement for at least two alternative pilots, but continuing public and congressional
pressure has led DOD to undertake demonstrations for five alternatives. The ACWA program
is currently preparing engineering design studies for two technologies (The contractors are
General Atomics and Parsons/Honeywell), On August 24, 1999, the National Research
Council submitted its own report to Congress on alternative technologies, Review and
Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical
Weapons. [http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9660.html] The report does not recommend any
specific technology, but rather identifies the strengths and weaknesses, and assesses their
potential for full-scale development.
As a result of these efforts, it has been decided that the Newport, IN and Aberdeen, MD
stockpiles, which are mustard agent in bulk containers, will be destroyed through a chemical
neutralization process rather than incineration.
Cost estimates for the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program have grown steadily
since its inception. In 1985, for example, DOD estimated the total program cost would be
between $1.2 to $2.0 billion. The cost estimates routinely increased, with the 2001 estimate
reaching $13.2 billion. Then, in April 2002, the Department of Defense Selected Acquisition
Report announced a new 80% increase in the cost estimate, raising it from $13.2 billion to
$23.7 billion. Factors driving the increase were identified as: 1)revised destruction rates
based upon the experience at Johnston Atoll depot; 2) schedule extensions; 3) new
environmental regulations; 4) worse-than-expected stockpile condition; 5) increased
equipment, labor, and construction costs; and 6) higher emergency preparedness costs.
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The FY2000 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2561) provided $1.029 billion for
chemical demilitarization, reducing the Administration’s request by $141 million, including
a $94 million cut in military construction funding. The Department of Defense submitted
an FY2001 budget request for $1.003 billion for the CW stockpile demilitarization program,
including: $607 million for operations and maintenance; $121.9 million for procurement, and
$274 for research and development. The DOD FY2001 Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-259)
provided $980 million, with the reductions owing to program delays and terminating some
contract services in the procurement and O&M accounts. For FY2002, DOD requested
$1.153 billion for the CW demilitarization program, including $200.4 million for R&D,
$164.2 million for procurement, and $789 million for operations and maintenance. The
FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act reduced this by $48 million primarily from the operations
and maintenance account. For FY2003, the Defense Department requested $1.49 billion for
the chemical demilitarization program: R&D $302 million, Procurement $213 million,
Operations & Maintenance $974 million, and Military Construction $167 million. Aside
from a $10 million reduction in military construction, Congress appropriated the full request.
For FY2004, the Defense Department has requested $1.65 billion for the chemical
demilitarization program: R&D $251 million, Procurement $79 million, Operations &
Maintenance $1.19 billion, and Military Construction $119million.

Russian CW Destruction Program.
Russia possesses the world’s largest
chemical weapons stockpile, estimated to be 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Its plans for a
destruction program are embryonic, and the country’s ongoing political and economic
turmoil leads most observers to believe it will not be able to meet CWC deadlines on its own.
Russia has established a commission to oversee the destruction program. Russian officials
have made it clear that Russia desires both technological and financial assistance to destroy
its chemical weapons. Russia is also seeking foreign assistance to fund infrastructure
improvements in the regions surrounding their CW depots, claiming that approval from local
authorities to build destruction facilities is dependent upon such assistance. In addition to
direct foreign assistance, Russia is considering establishing an investment bank to encourage
commercial participation and hopes to recycle some commercially valuable compounds from
the destruction process for sale.
Congress responded initially to Russia’s call for assistance, appropriating $55 million
in aid to be used for the initial planning and evaluation stages of the Russian program. In
addition, the United States agreed to share destruction technology and participate in the
exchange of technical experts. To facilitate these efforts, the United States has opened a
Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Office (CWDSO) in Moscow.
The Administration sought for two years to gain funding to assist Russia in construction
a CW demilitarization facility at Shchuch’ye. Both the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees expressed strong reservations about Russia’s ability to fund operation of the
facility if constructed, and noted the relative paucity of assistance from other nations for this
program. Consequently, the FY2000 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65, Sec. 1305)
forbids funding designing, planning, or construction a chemical weapons facility in Russia.
DOD’s efforts in the FY2001 budget considerations to have this provision repealed and $35
million appropriated for a Shchuch’ye facility met continued congressional skepticism.
House and Senate Armed Services Committee conferees accepted a Senate amendment in
the DOD FY2001 Authorization Act (H.R. 4205) which amends the existing statutory
prohibition to permit Shchuch’ye funding only after DOD certification that:
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! Russia has agreed to provide $25 million annually for construction and
operation.
! Russia has agreed to use the facility to destroy it four other nerve agent
stockpiles.
! The United States has obtained multi-year commitments from the
international community to assist infrastructure improvement around
Shchuch’ye.
! Russia has agreed to destroy it CW production facilities at Volgograd and
Novocheboksark.
These conditions were coupled with a DOD reporting requirement on Russian and
international financial contributions towards the safeguarding and destruction of Russia’s
nerve agent stockpiles. (H.Rept 106-945, Sec. 4205) For FY2002 and FY2003, Congress,
satisfied that sufficient progress has been made in meeting these conditions, approved
authorization of $35 million and $55 million for the Shchuch’ye facility.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention: A Message from the President of the
United States. Treaty Document 103-21. 103 Congress, 1st Session.
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-869.
U.S. Congress. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Report, House Committee
on International Relations, 105 Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 105-375
U.S. Congress. Military Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings,
Senate Armed Services Committee. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-835.
U.S. Congress. U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, S.Rept. 103-390.
U.S. Congress. Convention on Chemical Weapons. Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 104-668.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
[http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/cbwnp/index.htm]
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
[http://www.opcw.org/]
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