Order Code RL31671
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Updated March 28, 2003
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Summary
From November 2002 to March 2003, U.N. inspectors combed Iraq looking for
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Under the threat of war from the United
States and a unanimous Security Council resolution (1441), Iraq was granted a final
chance to disarm. Many had low expectations for successful inspections. After 16
weeks, inspectors turned up some evidence of undeclared activities, but not enough
to convince a majority of the Security Council members that military force was
necessary. Nonetheless, on March 19, U.S. and British forces attacked Iraq to
forcibly eliminate its WMD. This report, which will be updated as events warrant,
analyzes the inspections, their outcome, and possible future tasks.
The U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted over 750 inspections
at 550 sites. These inspections seemed to benefit from strengthened authorities under
the new U.N. resolution, new technologies, a better relationship between UNMOVIC
and the IAEA, and pressure from the threat of military strikes. Nonetheless, most
observers agree that Iraqi compliance was superficial and oriented to facilitating the
process of inspections, rather than on providing cooperation in substantive matters.
In addition, new practical, technical, and political challenges arose. There were
allegations that not all actionable intelligence was shared with inspectors and that the
threat of war increased pressure on inspectors to produce some definitive knowledge
and helped politicize their investigations. Many alleged that Iraq might have hidden
weapons activities in more dual-use facilities over the last four years, thus
complicating inspections. Ultimately, judging Iraq’s compliance may have relied less
on thresholds of evidence, than on assumptions about the effectiveness and utility of
inspections at this point in time.
UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Blix and IAEA Director General ElBaradei
reported five times to the UN Security Council between December 19, 2002 and
March 7, 2003. Secretary of State Colin Powell additionally briefed the Security
Council on Iraq’s efforts to evade disarmament. Security Council members seem to
agree that Iraq failed to cooperate fully, particularly in the substance of disarmament,
but ultimately they disagreed on whether inspections should continue or whether war
was necessary to disarm Iraq. On the eve of war, inspectors withdrew from Iraq.
The future of inspections in Iraq is uncertain. The United States has not sought
UN assistance to help verify WMD evidence U.S. forces might uncover during the
war, but UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expects that inspectors will return to Iraq
after the war. Hans Blix, reportedly, will fulfill his UNMOVIC contract until June
2003.
Relevant congressional legislation includes resolutions related to the inspections
and authorization for war (S.Res. 28, S.Res. 32, H.Res. 55, H.Con.Res. 2, H.J.Res.
20) and S. 205, Iraqi Scientists Immigration Act of 2003, which would provide visas
for scientists involved in the WMD program. See also RL31715, Iraq War:
Background and Issues Overview.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A New Inspection Regime: Resolution 1441 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Protocols for Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Timeline for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Challenges of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Opportunities of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Milestones in the Inspection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Evaluating Iraq’s December 7 Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
January 27 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
February 5 Powell Briefing to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
February 14 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
March 7 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
“Clusters Document” & Key Disarmament Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.S. Assistance to Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introduction
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council gave Iraq “a final
opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the
Council” with the adoption of Resolution 1441. Iraq formally accepted the
resolution and inspectors began their work on November 27. On December 7, Iraq
provided a 12,000-page declaration of its current capabilities, which largely recycled
old declarations and maintains that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities. On December 19th, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),1
the two organizations charged with inspecting Iraq, reported that the declaration was
incomplete. UNMOVIC and the IAEA told the U.N. Security Council that Baghdad
“missed an opportunity” to come clean about new arms programs.
Between November 2002 and mid-March 2003, UNMOVIC and IAEA
inspectors conducted 750 inspections at 550 sites. They conducted unannounced
inspections, interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples, and collected documents.
Although Iraq initially objected to reconnaissance flights (by U-2, Mirage 4 and
Russian Antonov aircraft) and reportedly actively discouraged scientists from being
interviewed in private, by mid-February Iraq acquiesced to these rights of the
inspectorate. Both UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei generally characterized Iraqi cooperation as good on
process and lacking on substance.
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 states that “the Council has repeatedly
warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations” (emphasis added). Although four years had lapsed in
inspections since 1998, President Bush’s September 12th speech to the United
Nations and Congress’ authorization of the use of force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243)
in October 2002 combined to attach urgency to the inspections.2 In retrospect, a key
question is: What purpose did inspections serve? Were they a trip-wire for military
action to disarm Saddam Hussein, or were they part of an ongoing inspection and
disarmament process that will continue after the fighting ends?
1 See UNMOVIC’s and IAEA’s web sites: [www.un.org/Depts/UNMOVIC/] and
[www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/index.html]
2 See [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html] for text of President
Bush’s speech.

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In March 2002, before war against Iraq seemed imminent, National Security
Advisor Condoleeza Rice remarked in an interview that:
We need to be very clear on the purpose of weapons inspections. These are not
inspections for inspections’ sake. They are instrumental to make sure that ... Iraq
is not trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In fact they were supposed
to be the ability to give testimony that there are no such programs. And so when
we focus on weapons inspections in Iraq, we have to focus on weapons
inspections that would be effective enough to be sure that this man is not trying
to do what we know he has tried to do over the last 20 years. Ultimately, the
United States believes that regime change in Iraq is going to be best for the Iraqi
people and for the region. But clearly weapons inspections that are tough,
weapons inspections that cannot be challenged, weapons inspections in which
Saddam Hussein is not trying to soften the edges of them would be a helpful step
forward.3
Few doubt the difficulty of establishing confidence that Iraq is free of weapons
of mass destruction. On the one hand, inspections in Iraq have the logically
impossible task of proving a negative – that Iraq is not trying to acquire WMD. For
those who believe that inspections cannot provide such assurances, obstruction of
those inspections hints at (or to some, proves) the concealment of some WMD-
related activities.4 In this view, even cooperation in the process of inspections
provides few assurances of the absence of WMD programs, and the failure of
inspections to turn up evidence of WMD-related activities would, in this view, not
confer innocence, but illustrate the shortcomings of inspections.
For some observers who are opposed to inspections, a key assumption is that the
task of disarming Iraq is insurmountable without genuine Iraqi cooperation, which
requires the leadership in Iraq to give up its WMD aspirations. The Bush
Administration in January 2003 cited South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as
models of cooperative disarmament and contrasted Iraq’s actions with those of the
three models.5 The former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM (U.N. Special
Commission), Charles Duelfer, compared inspections in Iraq with those conducted
in Germany between World War I and World War II, which were ultimately
3 N e w s m a k e r I n t e r v i e w w i t h J i m L e h r e r , M a r c h 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 ,
[www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june02/rice_3-11.html]
4 In the same interview, Rice said: “We have a country that continues to flaunt its
international obligations undertaken in 1991 in the armistice, that continues to try to acquire
weapons of mass destruction. After all, there is a reason that Saddam Hussein does not want
weapons inspections in Iraq. It’s…obviously he’s got something to hide.”
[www.pbs. org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june02/rice_3-11.html]
5 “What Does Disarmament Look Like?” The White House, January 23, 2003. See
[www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/disarmament/]. These examples minimize key
differences in the situations. For one, Ukraine and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons
from the breakup of the Soviet Union and might not ever have had nuclear weapons
ambitions, and second, the South African government, according to many, acted to
dismantle its nuclear weapons when it became clear that regime change was inevitable.

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CRS-3
unsuccessful.6 Duelfer argued that this kind of coercive disarmament by an
international organization is doomed to failure. CIA Director George Tenet remarked
in a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 11,
2003, that “unless he [Saddam Hussein] provides the data to build on, provides the
access, provides the unfettered access that he’s supposed to, provides us with
surveillance capability, there’s little chance you are going to find weapons of mass
destruction under the rubric he’s created inside the country.”7
Other observers, in support of inspections, point to the knowledge gained from
1991 to 1998 by inspectors about the extent of Iraq’s WMD programs, to the
uncertainties of waging war against an opponent that may have and be inclined to use
WMD, and to the value in an approach that has broad international support. Some
questioned the ability of intelligence agencies alone to detect WMD programs, citing
reports of the CIA’s lack of knowledge about Iraq’s WMD programs prior to 1991
and the evident surprise about the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.8 In the
nonproliferation community, most agree that treaties and agreements ultimately
cannot stop a country that is determined to acquire WMD, but rather make the
process more difficult and costly, thereby buying time for political change. In the
case of Iraq, four years without inspections elapsed with relatively little public
debate, but the tragedies of September 11, 2001 seem to have convinced many
observers that delay in disarming Iraq could increase the threat to international
security. A relatively new concern in the debate on Iraq’s disarmament is the alleged
support Iraq might provide to terrorists. Some observers say there appears to be little
evidence linking Iraq to Al Qaeda, but some posit that Iraq might have incentives to
provide WMD materials or weapons to terrorists, which would call for quick
disarmament of Iraq.
6 “How Baghdad Divided the Conquerors,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2000.
7 Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, Hearing on “Threats to U.S. Security”
before the Senate Select Intelligence committee, February 11, 2003.
8 “The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003. “US intelligence did not detect Iraq’s nuclear program until it was uncovered after
Desert Storm in 1991. It did not find out about the Iraqi biological weapons program until
1995, with some help from the defection of Hussein Kamel.”

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Background9
The inspections conducted in Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War verified Iraq’s
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons
Convention, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of bacteriological or
chemical weapons warfare. From May 1991 to December 1998, UNSCOM and the
IAEA’s Action Team on Iraq conducted almost 300 inspections at over 1,000
facilities. Iraq’s programs to develop biological weapons, chemical weapons, and
nuclear weapons surprised even those knowledgeable in those areas. IAEA
inspections uncovered a Manhattan-Project-like nuclear program, which employed
thousands of scientists and explored many avenues of producing weapons-grade
material. Nonetheless, Iraq had not produced any real weapons-grade material,
although it did have a crash program to secretly divert highly enriched uranium under
IAEA safeguards for a warhead, as well as a crude weapons design. Inspections also
uncovered bulk biological weapons agent production capability and a rudimentary
delivery capability. Much about Iraq’s biological weapons program is still unknown.
In contrast, Iraq’s capabilities in chemical weapons and missiles were relatively well-
known. Inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents,
and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals (but the fate of about 31,600 chemical
munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, 4,000 tons of chemical precursors and Iraq’s
capabilities in producing VX agent are still unknown). Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq
had a robust missile force and production capability, most of which was destroyed
in the war. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles remained after the war;
inspectors accounted for all but two.10
The history of inspections in Iraq is well-known and well-documented. After
the first few years, most of the breakthroughs in knowledge about Iraqi WMD
programs either resulted from or benefitted from intelligence tips from governments
or from information provided by defectors.11 In particular, the defection of Hussein
9 The two official UN assessments of unresolved disarmament tasks in Iraq are the so-called
Amorim report, U.N. Security Council S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, Final Report of the
Panel on Disarmament and Current and Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification
I s s u e s a n d U N S C O M ’ s r e p o r t S / 1 9 9 9 / 9 4 ( b o t h a v a i l a b l e a t
[www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/index.htm]) For a comprehensive, unofficial assessment see
“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment,” (UK: International Institute for
Strategic Studies) September 9, 2002 and “Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Inspections and an
Assessment of Their Accomplishments,” in Arms Control Today, October 2002, Volume 32
Number 8. For unclassified assessments by the US and UK intelligence communities, see
“ I r a q ’ s W e a p o n s o f M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n P r o g r a m s , ”
[www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf] and “Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Dest r uct i on: T he Assessment of t he British Gover nment ,”
[www.news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdoss
ier.pdf]
10 See Kenneth Katzman, CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy and Steve Bowman, Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons
(CBW) Capabilities, CRS Report 98-129.
11 See “Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-
(continued...)

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CRS-5
Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, in 1995, provided an intelligence windfall
about nuclear and biological weapons programs. (Kamel was subsequently lured
back to Iraq and killed.)
The shortcomings of the inspections between 1991 and 1998 are also well-
known. Iraqi officials frequently delayed inspections, spied on inspectors (bugging
hotels and offices), harassed inspectors and lied about its capabilities.12 Major
problems included interviewing scientists and engineers with Iraqi “minders” in the
room, tip-offs of short-notice inspections, and exclusion from “sensitive sites.” The
eight presidential palaces became a lightning rod for obstruction, with Iraq
complaining of violated sovereignty and accusing inspectors of spying.13 Former
inspectors have also detailed stories of confrontation and intimidation, including
shooting over the heads of inspectors, telephone threats, ransacking of hotel rooms,
verbal and physical abuse, as well as Iraq’s efforts to infiltrate the inspection regime
with spies.14 In addition, Iraqis systematically destroyed or removed evidence to
mislead inspectors about the capabilities of certain facilities. Over the 7 years,
however, inspectors developed their own techniques for getting around obstacles that
the Iraqis placed in their way. They made better use of intelligence resources,
developed tactics to mislead the Iraqis about intended destinations, and improved
interviewing techniques.
Two other features of the inspections from 1991 to 1998 were political friction
between UNSCOM and the IAEA, and increasing dissent among the permanent five
members (P-5) of the UN Security Council. According to some observers,
UNSCOM and the IAEA clashed over several issues, including sharing of
information, conduct of inspections, and approach to inspections. There were also
reports of friction between Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and Hans
Blix, then-Director General of the IAEA.15 Most apparent was a difference in how
aggressively inspections were conducted. Critics of UNSCOM suggest that an overly
aggressive approach is ultimately ineffective because inspectors cannot force Iraq to
cooperate; supporters suggest that UNSCOM inspectors were appropriately
aggressive in their techniques and approach, unburdened by any past relationship
with Iraq (unlike the IAEA).
11 (...continued)
Year Review,” Sponsored by the Institute for Science and Security, “Uncovering the Secret
Program – Initial Inspections, talk by Demetrius Perricos, Former Deputy Leader of the
IAEA Action Team. [www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/perricos.html] . See also Gary
Mi l hol l i n , “ T h e Ir a q i B o mb , ” N e w Y o r k e r , F e b r u a r y 1, 1993.
[www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/1993/iraqibomb.html]
12 See October 8, 2002 briefing by DIA official John Yurechko to Pentagon reporters, at:
[www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2002/iraq-021008-dod01.htm]
13 Although inspectors were allowed to visit one of those sites, Iraq’s control of access
reportedly made the visit worthless.
14 Jonathan Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment:
Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996,
pp. 1-14.
15 Gary Milhollin, “The Iraqi Bomb,” New Yorker, February 1, 1993.

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CRS-6
On the U.N. Security Council, “sanctions fatigue,” among other things, helped
weaken resolve over Iraq, which Iraq exploited. By the mid-1990s, UNSCOM
Chairman Ekeus was unable to get the Security Council to agree that Iraq was in
material breach of resolutions and in 1996, he compromised for the first time on the
modalities of visits. In October 1997, within days of China, France and Russia
abstaining on UNSCOM’s determination that Iraq was violating UNSCR 1115,
which required immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites and
records, Iraq demanded U.S. personnel be withdrawn from UNSCOM. Iraq’s
obstruction intensified in 1998, and UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in December 1998
on the eve of U.S. and British air strikes (which became known as Operation Desert
Fox). Although their work of uncovering, destroying or rendering harmless Iraq’s
WMD capabilities was far from complete, they had reached an impasse.16
A New Inspection Regime: Resolution 1441
When the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR 1441, it sought to redress
some of the previous problems in inspections. UNSCR 1441 reaffirms the rights and
responsibilities of the inspectors and their Iraqi counterparts, but there are a few new
details, discussed below. A key issue in drafting the resolution was the question of
what would constitute a new material breach of Iraq’s obligations, since a low
threshold might make war more likely. UNSCR 1441 states that Iraq is currently in
material breach of its obligations and that “false statements or omissions in the
declarations and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach.”17 To
some, omissions in Iraq’s declaration by themselves would constitute a material
breach; to others, evidence of a lack of cooperation would additionally be required.
In the end, however, the UN Security Council did not vote on another resolution to
declare Iraq in material breach.
Protocols for Inspections
UNSCR 1441 attempted to enhance the previous inspection regime with a
reiteration of the inspections teams’ rights and responsibilities. It incorporated
agreements among Blix, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, and General
Amir H. Al-Saadi, an advisor on technical issues to President Saddam Hussein,
established in meetings on September 30 and October 1, 2002 in Vienna, Austria.
Those agreements are contained in an October 8 letter appended to the resolution.
In short, these include:

16 See CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, for a concise summary of inspections. See also SIPRI’s 2000
Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Appendix 9b, “The
future of chemical and biological weapon disarmament in Iraq: from UNSCOM to
UNMOVIC,” by Maria Wahlberg, Milton Leitenberg, and Jean Pascal Zanders, pp. 560-576.
[www.projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/cbw-yb20009b.pdf]
17 See website for full text of UNSCR 1441. [www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm]

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! UNMOVIC and the IAEA “will be granted immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was
termed ‘sensitive sites’ in the past.” Notwithstanding the 1998
memorandum of understanding on special procedures for the eight
presidential sites, the letter states that these sites may be subject to
the same access requirements.
! No restrictions on the size of inspection teams, on people to be
interviewed, as well as where and when they are interviewed, and on
communications modalities.
! Iraq must ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or
other relevant items are destroyed except by request of UNMOVIC
and/or IAEA inspectors and in their presence (as appropriate).
UNSCR 1441 states that the contents of the annexed letter would be binding
upon Iraq and outlined further authorities for UNMOVIC and the IAEA. UNMOVIC
and the IAEA have the right to:
! provision of the names of all personnel currently and formerly
associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and the associated research, development and
production facilities;
! be guarded by UN security;
! declare exclusion zones around facilities in order to “freeze” the area
so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site; and
! free import and export of any equipment, materials or documents,
without search.
Timeline for Action
Resolution 1441 detailed a time-line of events, similar to earlier UN Security
Council resolutions.18 Within 7 days of UNSCR 1441 adoption on November 8,
2002, Iraq had to accept the resolution (Iraq accepted on November 13). Within 30
days, Iraq was required to provide a full declaration of all WMD programs (Iraq
provided on December 7). Within 45 days, inspections were to start (inspections
began on November 27), and within 60 days, UNMOVIC and the IAEA were
required to provide a progress report to UN Security Council ( provided on January
27, 2003).
Since November 2002, both UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Blix and IAEA
Director General ElBaradei noted on multiple occasions that verification could be a
lengthy process and that it could take years to untangle information on what Iraq has
done. When inspectors were withdrawn on March 18, Blix expressed his
disappointment that they were not given more time to complete their task.19
18 UNSCR 687 gave IAEA and UNSCOM 45 days to plan inspections and 45 days to
implement inspections.
19 “US Reaps New Data on Weapons,” Washington Post, March 20, 2003.

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Challenges of Inspections
For the approximately three months of inspections, inspectors reported that the
Iraq was cooperating, with a few minor delays. Dr. Blix noted in his March 7 report
that cooperation on process was better this time for UNMOVIC than it had been for
UNSCOM. It is possible that under the threat of war, Iraq assessed that cooperation
on process would help avoid war. It is likely that such cooperation helped delay war
but, probably, only full cooperation could have avoided war.
The four-year hiatus in inspections allowed Iraq to rebuild some facilities and
possibly relocate programs without UN inspectors in the country. Many observers
believe that Iraq has developed new methods of concealment and obstruction, and
some are concerned that Iraq may use tunneling under existing buildings to avoid
excavations being detected by satellites.20 As Blix noted in his March 6 working
document on disarmament task:
UNMOVIC now faces the same situation in all three disciplines that UNSCOM
and the IAEA faced in 1991 regarding biological and nuclear weapons issues.
There are no leads, such as stocks of proscribed items, or WMD production
facilities for UNMOVIC to inspect. Instead, UNMOVIC must verify the absence
of any new activities or proscribed items, new or retained.21
Further, Blix noted in four years without inspections, Iraq potentially could have
made considerable progress in biological weapons and chemical weapons. Although
the chemical weapons program began in the late 1960s, Iraq was able to build most
of its Al Muthanna chemical weapons plant and begin large-scale production of CW
agents and munitions in just three years. With a biological weapons program that
started in 1974, Iraq took just two years to build the Al Hakam BW production plant
and produce more than 27,000 liters of BW agent.22
Inspectors confronted significant logistics challenges in reestablishing
inspection support in Baghdad and in Cyprus, and updating information databases,
particularly on suppliers of WMD-related items from 1998 to the present. Helicopter
support became available in mid-December23 and U-2 and Mirage 4 reconnaissance
flights began only in late February. Procuring the requisite expertise was also a
challenge. Former inspectors have noted that in addition to a requirement for
knowledge of specific weapons, which is probably more limited in the biological
weapons and chemical weapons areas than in the missile or nuclear areas (or at least
more publicly sensitive), inspectors need a good grasp of weapons production
processes (particularly at dual-use sites) and a familiarity with Iraq’s WMD
20 Richard Butler, former UNSCOM executive chairman, suggested to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in its hearings in summer 2002 that Iraq might have attempted to
tunnel under buildings to avoid detection from satellite imagery. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Military Involvement in Iraq, July 31, 2002.
21 UNMOVIC Working Document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues, p. 11. See
[www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/cluster.htm]
22 Ibid.
23 “State-of-Art Gear Displayed,” Washington Times, November 27, 2002.

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CRS-9
programs. On the other hand, one former UNSCOM staffer in charge of training for
UNMOVIC remarked that: “You don’t need to be an expert in chemical or biological
weapons. You just need to be able to spot deviations from the norm.”24 In the past,
inspection teams were able to draw on weapons expertise from member countries.
Under UNMOVIC, inspectors were required to be U.N. employees under rules
adopted by the U.N. in 1999. This approach was adopted to help enhance the
objectivity and professionalism of inspectors (perhaps both in reality and in
appearance). Critics of these rules suggested the personnel system may not attract
the best expertise, since more highly qualified personnel may be unwilling to give up
their current job seniority and benefits for a short-term, non-career job at the UN as
an inspector. Others have suggested that this new, less flexible arrangement may
have a negative effect on intelligence sharing.25
On the process of intelligence sharing, there was some speculation that
UNMOVIC’s arrangement for information to flow through a top UN official from
member governments rather than to and from individual inspectors would have a
negative effect on intelligence sharing.26 Critics of this arrangement argued that the
UN was ill-equipped to handle information, particularly in the case of defector
information, because of lack of experience in debriefing and inability to resettle
defectors. This arrangement would ensure little information flow back to national
intelligence agencies, which could decrease incentives for member states’
intelligence services to share information. The impetus for establishing rules for
intelligence sharing came from Iraqi complaints in the 1990s that UN inspectors were
gathering intelligence, in some cases, for better targeting by air-strikes.27 Some of
these claims were substantiated. In practice, the U.N. established an Information
Assessment Unit (IAU) several years ago in New York, which, according to one
former inspector, became the locus of expertise and information on Iraq’s WMD
programs.28 The U.S. intelligence community in the 1990s worked on establishing
protocols for sharing sensitive information with international organizations, since it
was such a vital component of the inspection regime and a relatively new
phenomenon.
On the substance of intelligence sharing, UNMOVIC and the IAEA complained
early on that the United States had not provided “actionable information” to
inspections in Iraq.29 On January 9, 2003, Secretary Powell stated that the United
States began sharing significant intelligence information on Iraqi weapons programs
24 “To Catch a Cheat,” Time, November 25, 2002.
25 “UN Restricts Inspectors’ Use of Intelligence Reports,” USA Today, November 27, 2002.
See also “We’re Not Spies, Says Inspection Chief,” Guardian, November 11, 2002.
26 Gordon Corera, “Playing the Iraqi Inspection Game,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
November 2002, pp. 42-45
27 Ibid.
28 Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment,” p. 5.
29 In late December 2002, the U.S. provided satellite intelligence about chemical and
biological weapons. See “U.S. Is To Release Spy Data on Iraq to Aid Inspections,” New
York Times, December 21, 2002. See also “U.N. Nuclear Agency Gains a Bigger Profile,
and Bigger Problems,” New York Times, January 6, 2003.

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CRS-10
a few days before. Powell also said that the United States was withholding sensitive
information.30 Blix, in his February 14 report to the UN Security Council noted that
US intelligence had provided some assistance that was valuable, particularly in the
discovery of uranium enrichment documents in a private home on January 16, 2003,
but led nowhere in other cases. In testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on February 11, 2003, Central Intelligence Director George Tenet said
that “we have given the UN inspectors and UNMOVIC every site that we have that
is of high or moderate value, where there is proven intelligence to lead to a potential
outcome.”31 In his March 7 briefing to the UN Security Council, Hans Blix noted
that he would rather have “twice the amount of high quality information about sites
to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.”32
A final technical challenge faced by the inspectors was in “proving the negative”
– that there were no remaining WMD programs. No one expects that inspections can
provide 100% confidence, and this is perhaps the reason for the insistence by many
that only a regime change could provide assurance that Iraq had no WMD programs.
Executive Chairman Hans Blix noted earlier this year that inspectors were more
likely to find “smoke, rather than a smoking gun.” Blix suggested, in describing
Iraq’s December 7 declaration, that “the absence of evidence means, of course, that
one cannot have confidence that there do not remain weapons of mass destruction.”33
Another challenge presented by inspections was the wide divergence of views
on the threshold for determining non-compliance. Anthony Cordesman raised a
question in hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about
whether the United States would be willing to go to war immediately if it found
evidence of a violation on missile testing or the existence of a biological facility.34
In fact, almost all of the discoveries by UNMOVIC from November 2002 to March
2003 – empty chemical weapons shells not previously declared; two complete R-400
aerial bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally destroyed BW-filled aerial bombs; 2000
pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private home; undeclared
remotely piloted vehicles with wing spans of 7.5 meters; and cluster bombs that
could be used with chemical or biological agents – could have been interpreted as
evidence of noncompliance. But, by raising the stakes of noncompliance to the
conduct of war against Iraq, it seemed that some on the Security Council were
unwilling to place the bar so low.
30 “US Is Sharing Iraq Data with Blix,” Washington Post, January 9, 2003.
31 George Tenet, Hearing on “Threats to U.S. Security” before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, February 11, 2003.
32 “Oral Introduction of the Twelfth Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC,” available at
[www.un.org/app/news/printinfocusnews.asp?nid=414]
33 “Powell Says Iraq Raises Risk of War By Lying On Arms,” New York Times, December
20, 2002, p 1.
34 Discussion, July 31, 2002, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Military
Involvement in Iraq.

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CRS-11
Opportunities of Inspections
A 4-year hiatus is a lengthy period of time if inspectors aim to reestablish
continuity. But in the context of what inspectors faced in 1991, the task may be
smaller. In 1991, with virtually no baseline data, inspectors were challenged with
documenting programs that had been in existence for close to 30 years. Operation
Desert Storm destroyed some facilities, but inspectors destroyed a lot more
subsequently.35 Operation Desert Fox destroyed even more. In addition, it is
possible that the scope of some programs may have been scaled back in the last 4
years; rather than spreading resources among many biological toxins or chemical
weapons or uranium enrichment processes, Saddam Hussein might have focused on
a select few. Of course, this could make the task of discovery more difficult since
there would be a narrower range of signatures.
A key component of the inspections was interviewing scientists involved with
the weapons programs. The interview process had mixed results. In general, the
IAEA had more success in conducting private interviews than UNMOVIC, but even
then, some interviews were conducted with tape recorders in the room. UNMOVIC
requested interviews with 38 individuals but interviewed just five privately in
February and nine in March. The IAEA conducted more than 9 private interviews
in February, mostly with scientists connected to the gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment program.
Neither the IAEA nor UNMOVIC was able to take advantage of the rights under
UNSCR 1441 to interview scientists outside Iraq. Iraq agreed by the end of
December to let weapons scientists leave the country (as a personal decision) and
provided a list of 500 experts to UNMOVIC and the IAEA,36 but only in March were
Blix and ElBaradei preparing to ask them to leave the country. Blix reported in his
March 7 briefing that interviews outside Iraq might provide assurances of the absence
of undue pressures and that he planned to request such interviews soon. Some
observers believed that only interviews conducted outside of Iraq would be effective
because of the threat of retaliation by the Iraqi government.37 Others suggested that
Saddam Hussein’s record of inflicting torture and abuse (including the murder of
Hussein Kamel after he defected and then returned to Iraq) means that interviews
without promises of asylum do not hold hopes of full disclosure.
Hans Blix suggested that the U.N. is not in the business of enticing defectors.
In addition to practical considerations (for example, lack of experience in assisting
defectors), it is not clear that the inspection teams had anything to offer scientists that
would outweigh the coercive power of the Iraqi government over its citizens.
Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, suggested that the
35 See [www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Achievements/achievements.html] .
36 “US Sees Showdown over Iraqi Scientists,” Washington Post, December 13, 2002; “Iraq
Gives UN a List of 500 Weapons Experts,” New York Times, December 29, 2002.
37 See Stephen F. Hayes, “Negotiations, Pentagon Style,” Weekly Standard, November 25,
2002, and James Kitfield, “Disclosure, Defectors Key to Inspections,” National Journal,
November 16, 2002.

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CRS-12
UN should offer “sanctuary or safe haven to those who find it a condition for
speaking the truth.”38 He further suggested that “if UNSCOM had 100 green cards
to distribute during inspections, it could have quickly accounted for the weapons
programs.”
Inspectors were able to avail themselves of new technology. This included
ground-penetrating radar (to detect hidden or underground equipment or facilities)
and ultra-sensitive gamma ray detectors (to detect radioactive materials through
shielding).39 Rapid detection techniques for biological agents, such as the
Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device, or RAPID, were not available
10 years ago, nor were detectors for specialized metal alloys, like ALEX (alloy
expert), or toxic industrial materials detectors (TIMs). Inspectors also used enhanced
chemical agent monitors (ECAMS) and handheld advanced nucleic acid analyzers
(HANAA).40 The availability of satellite imagery in digital format as well as digital
photography helped facilitate real-time analysis, since it can be sent back to offices
to be analyzed immediately.41
The appointment of Hans Blix, former Director General of the IAEA, as chief
UNMOVIC inspector probably helped cooperation between the UN agencies, in
sharp contrast to the friction of the 1991-1998 inspections. A former UNSCOM
inspector noted that the “bureaucratic turf battles between the two agencies ...made
their collaboration tense, and, at times, openly hostile.”42 The overlap in personnel
between the two organizations (for example, Demetrius Perricos, now director of
planning and operations for UNMOVIC, performed a similar role for the IAEA in the
1990s) probably helped minimize conflicting inspection styles and maximize
information sharing. To observers who felt that Blix was ineffectual at the IAEA and
who criticized what they saw as a complaisant approach toward Iraq from 1991 to
1998, however, greater synergy between the two teams might not be viewed as a
positive development.43
38 Charles Duelfer, “The Inevitable Failure of Inspections in Iraq,” Arms Control Today,
September 2002.
39 Romesh Ratnesar and Andrew Purvis, “To Catch a Cheat,” Time, November 25, 2002.
See also IAEA web site [www.iaea.org/worldatom/press/news/2002/22-11-22170.html] .
40 S/2003/232, Twelfth Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC, February 28, 2003, p. 5.
41 “Iraq Set to Open Sites Previously Off-Limits,” Washington Post, November 27, 2002.
42 See Jonathan Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment:
Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” p.12.
43 Criticism of the IAEA, and by extension, of Hans Blix, dates back to the IAEA’s failure
to detect the nuclear weapons program in Iraq, particularly when some activities took place
at sites where IAEA inspections were conducted. Some observers believe that IAEA and
Blix are far too diplomatic to be effective in Iraq. See, for example, Gary Milhollin’s 1993
New Yorker article previously cited. Current critics have stressed that Blix was clearly not
the first choice to head UNMOVIC. See “Hans Blix’s Third Try,” Wall Street Journal,
November 22, 2002; “Nix Blix,” Washington Times, November 27, 2002; “Hans the Timid,”
Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2002; and Chris Suellentrop, “Hans Blix: Incompetent
Bureaucrat or Cowardly Diplomat,”at slate.msn.com, November 26, 2002, for arguments
(continued...)

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CRS-13
Finally, the ability of the inspections process to gain insight into the connection,
if any, between Iraq’s WMD programs and support for terrorism was left largely
untapped. Some maintained that the process of combing through documents and
interviewing scientists and engineers could have provided a fuller picture of Iraq’s
clandestine procurement system, thereby contributing to the world’s knowledge base
of potential connections for terrorists who want to acquire or develop WMD. On the
other hand, some argued that although military strikes might destroy information
about capabilities, the capabilities themselves must be destroyed before they fall into
the hands of terrorists.
Milestones in the Inspection Process
UNSCR 1441 did not specify the length of the inspection process or create
specific phases of inspection, in contrast to the UNSCR 687 and 715, which
distinguished between inspections to destroy WMD-related capabilities and the
ongoing monitoring inspections.44 Some milestones are evident in the 16 weeks of
inspections.
Evaluating Iraq’s December 7 Declaration
Chairman Blix and Director-General ElBaradei reported preliminarily to the UN
Security Council on December 19, 2002 about Iraq’s December 7 declaration. There
was a strong consensus that Iraq had omitted significant information about its
weapons programs. In particular, Iraq failed to clear up the outstanding issues that
have existed from 1998 and which were detailed in UNSCOM document S/1999/94
and the so-called Amorim Report S/1999/356.45 Those issues, in Blix’s words, “do
not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude
that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise
question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed
and confidence to arise.”46 These include documentation of nuclear weapons design
and external assistance, the destruction of growth media for biological agents,
information about VX weaponization and stockpiles, accounting for special warheads
for missiles and for missile propellant production.
The U.S. State Department issued a fact sheet on December 19, 2002 giving
illustrative examples of omissions in the declaration. These included:
43 (...continued)
opposing Blix. See also “Can Blix nix Iraq’s tricks?” Guardian, November 8, 2002; “Chief
Inspector’s Style: Be Thorough, But Fair,” USA Today, November 15, 2002; and “Daunting
Task Awaits UN Arms Chief, Boston Globe, November 18, 2002, for more balanced
assessments.
44 The IAEA began ongoing monitoring in 1994, while UNSCOM continued with two-track
inspections, both destruction-related and ongoing monitoring.
45 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/index.htm] for the documents.
46 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/recent%20items.html] for text of Blix’s January 27
report to the UN Security Council.

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CRS-14
! no verifiable account of growth media for biological agents
! no reasonable explanation for manufacturing rocket fuels for
missiles beyond its current limited capabilities
! no account of efforts to procure uranium from Niger
! no information about VX production
! no account of chemical and biological weapons destruction
! no account of empty munitions that could be filled with chemical
agents
! no explanation of a connection between unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) programs and biological agent dispersal.47
This fact sheet went beyond the unresolved issues of 1998 to include the range
of Iraq’s missiles (Al-Samoud-2 and the Al Fatah), alleged reports of uranium
procurement, and the ability of UAVs to disperse biological agents. These three
issues were among those detailed in the CIA October 2002 document, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs and the UK’s Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, both of which presumably
draw on intelligence sources.
January 27 Report to UN Security Council48
On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UN
Security Council on the progress of their inspections. Although both gave ample
examples of Iraqi cooperation and non-cooperation, media generally interpreted the
reports as presenting evidence of Iraqi noncompliance. Inspections in the interim had
uncovered 12 empty chemical munition shells and over 2000 pages of documents on
uranium enrichment using lasers in the home of a scientist. In his report, Blix
distinguished between cooperation on process and on substance. On the first, Blix
said that Iraq has cooperated “rather well,” but then detailed areas in which
cooperation on substance was lacking. He suggested specifically that Iraq needed
to cooperate in finding items and activities (e.g., 122mm chemical warheads), in
finding documents, particularly those in private homes, in providing names of
personnel and in ensuring that interviews are credible. Director General ElBaradei
reported that inspections since November 2002 have identified no prohibited nuclear
activities but urged states to continue to provide intelligence information. ElBaradei
specifically suggested that the inspection process “should be allowed to run its
natural course” and that credible assurances could be provided within the next few
months. The White House spokesman said that the “report...clearly shows Iraq is not
complying.”
47 See [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm]
48 See [www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html] for
ElBaradei’s report and [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm] for Blix’s report.

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CRS-15
February 5 Powell Briefing to UN Security Council49
Secretary of State Powell addressed the UN Security Council on February 5 with
a briefing on Iraq’s attempts to evade disarmament. The briefing included audiotapes
of Iraqi military officers discussing hiding modified vehicles from inspectors and
orders to eliminate talk of “nerve agents” in wireless communications. Secretary
Powell shared anecdotes of documents in cars driven by Iraqi intelligence officers,
removing hard drives from computers, and sanitizing all of the presidential palaces
of traces of WMD, derived from human intelligence sources. Secretary Powell also
showed satellite photos of bulldozed chemical weapons sites and the removal of
telltale vehicles and equipment from chemical weapons bunkers at the Taji facility
before the December 22, 2002 inspections. In addition, Secretary Powell cited 4
human intelligence sources about the existence of about 18 mobile biological
weapons laboratories. Powell noted that it would be virtually impossible to find
these mobile labs without Iraqi cooperation. In the nuclear area, Secretary Powell
reported on Iraqi attempts to procure magnets and high speed balancing machines
from companies in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia to support assertions that
Iraq is pursuing a centrifuge uranium enrichment program. With respect to missiles,
Secretary Powell reported that Iraq had continued to import SA-2 rocket engines as
late as December 2002 but did not provide further evidence. Finally, Secretary
Powell showed a satellite photograph depicting a racetrack-shaped flight path of an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was tested for a distance of 500km without
refueling. Iraq’s December 7th declaration claimed that its UAVs had ranges of just
80kms.
Secretary Powell’s briefing highlighted the significant role intelligence can play
in determining Iraqi compliance. While most observers agree that the presentation
did not include a “smoking gun,” the information points to Iraqi practices to evade
detection. Since February 5th, there has been considerable debate on whether the
intelligence provided constitutes evidence of noncompliance. Although Blix’s report
on February 14th noted that “intelligence information has been useful for
UNMOVIC,” he also stated that we must recognize possible limitations and
misinterpretations. Blix took issue with the satellite photos of the chemical sites,
suggesting that the fact that the images were taken several weeks apart meant that the
movement of munitions could “just as easily have been a routine activity as a
movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection.”50 Blix
also noted that in some cases, intelligence information led to discovery of documents,
whereas in other cases, intelligence led to sites with no proscribed items.
49 See [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html] for text of Powell’s
presentation.
50 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm] for Blix report.

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CRS-16
February 14 Report to UN Security Council51
Leading up to the February 14 report, there was some movement on outstanding
inspection issues. In meetings with Blix and ElBaradei in Baghdad on February 8
and 9, 2003, Iraqi officials handed over documents on anthrax, VX, and missile
programs, although Blix and ElBaradei subsequently reported that there was no new
information in them. On February 6, an Iraqi biologist agreed to be interviewed
privately. Of five requests to meet with non-nuclear scientists, however, only three
agreed to private interviews. Blix characterized Iraq as beginning to adopt a “more
serious attitude” of cooperation, but would not call these developments a
breakthrough. On February 10, Iraq notified the UN that it would permit overflights
of American U-2, French Mirage, and Russian Antonov aircraft. President Bush
downplayed the significance of these developments, stating that Iraq was stalling for
time and that U-2 flights would not be necessary if Iraq were complying. From the
perspective of inspectors, however, imagery from U-2 flights could help mission
planning and fill in gaps from noncontinuous satellite monitoring. Thus, U-2 and
other aircraft overflights could help detect Iraqi evasion efforts. U-2 overflights were
conducted routinely under the previous inspection regime from 1991 to 1998.
In his February 14 report, Blix reiterated many of his conclusions of January 27
about Iraqi cooperation, both good and bad. Of most importance, Blix stated that the
group of missile experts he convened had concluded that the Al-Samoud-2 missile
range exceeded 150km and that the missiles should be destroyed. For the same
reason, the 380 SA-2 engines should also be destroyed. The missile test stand that
US and UK officials maintained was proscribed was not necessarily connected to
proscribed activities and thus could remain. Blix did not touch on issues of chemical
or biological weapons except to say that experts were not hopeful that Iraq could
technically verify the destruction of anthrax or two VX precursors. Blix reported
positively on Iraq’s presidential decree outlawing importation and production of
biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and on the establishment of a second
commission to search for WMD-related documents.
ElBaradei’s report to the UN Security Council repeated his January 27
conclusions that IAEA inspectors had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited
nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq. He stressed the expanding capabilities
of the inspection team and the ability of inspectors “to assess the presence or absence
of a nuclear weapons program in a state even without the full cooperation of the
inspected state.”52 ElBaradei covered the specific issues raised by Secretary Powell’s
briefing, including Iraq’s purchases of uranium, aluminum tubes reportedly for
centrifuge enrichment of uranium, magnets and magnet production facilities. In all
cases, ElBaradei said the IAEA was reviewing additional information and had asked
Iraq specifically for more information on the high tolerances of the aluminum. In
addition, the IAEA was exploring the disappearance of 32 tons of HMX, an
51 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm] for Blix report and
[www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml] for ElBaradei report
52 See [www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml] for
ElBaradei February 14 report.

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CRS-17
explosive material with technical characteristics well-suited for nuclear weapons,
which had been under seal until 1998.
March 7 Report to UN Security Council
In advance of the March 7 briefing, Chairman Blix provided UNMOVIC’s
twelfth quarterly report (S/2003/232) to the Security Council.53 The report
highlighted several examples of Iraq’s cooperation on process, including: helicopter
and surveillance overflights; the two Iraqi commissions created to help UNMOVIC
find documents and proscribed items; provision of lists of personnel to interview; and
procedures to determine the disposition of anthrax and VX agent. On substance, the
document noted that there was little new information in the December 7 declaration,
that Iraqis helped find the R-400 bombs, that Al-Samoud-2 missiles were being
destroyed, and that WMD-related activities had been prohibited by presidential
decree. Nonetheless, Blix noted that “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find
any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of
such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far.”
In his March 7 briefing to the Security Council, Blix’s remarks focused on the
process of investigation, noting that where documentary evidence was not available,
it may be possible to obtain evidence through interviews. He noted that “there has
been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January,”
adding that it is not yet clear how effective they would be in resolving outstanding
issues. Blix concluded that those initiatives did not constitute immediate
cooperation, nor did they cover all relevant areas, but that even with a “proactive
Iraqi attitude,” verification of disarmament would take months.
IAEA Director General ElBaradei’s March 7 report was notable for its
refutations of some of the allegations of clandestine nuclear activities by Iraq.
ElBaradei reported that documents on the alleged procurement of uranium from
Niger were deemed fraudulent. While continuing its scrutiny of the high-strength
aluminum tubes, which the United States and UK believe were intended for use in
uranium enrichment, the IAEA concluded that the tubes were not likely to have been
related to centrifuge manufacture and that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have
redesigned the tubes for such purposes. Likewise, the IAEA concluded that Iraq’s
attempts to procure magnets and magnet production capabilities were not related to
a clandestine enrichment program, although Iraq is “likely” to possess the expertise
to manufacture such magnets on its own. Therefore, the IAEA would continue to
monitor and inspect such equipment. In addition, ElBaradei began his briefing by
reporting an overall deterioration in industrial capacity, which he suggested would
affect Iraq’s capability to resume a nuclear weapons program, while not explicitly
stating it would have a negative impact.
53 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/2003-232.pdf] for text of the Twelfth
Quarterly report of UNMOVIC,S/2003/232.

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CRS-18
“Clusters Document” & Key Disarmament Tasks
On March 6, Hans Blix presented Security Council members with a draft
document, dubbed the “clusters document.54 The clusters document identifies key
remaining disarmament tasks (grouped in clusters of issues), as called for by UN
Security Council Resolution 1284, which established UNMOVIC in 1999. The 173-
page report builds on the 1999 documents prepared by the UN on key disarmament
tasks and adds new data. Two items in this document were not highlighted in Blix’s
March 7 briefing: the discovery of undeclared remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs or
drones) and cluster bombs that could be used with chemical or biological agents.55
Although Blix mentioned on March 7 that UNMOVIC was investigating RPVs, these
undeclared drones were first detected in inspections at Samarra Airfield on February
17. It was not clear before the onset of war whether these RPVs were associated with
chemical or biological weapons.56 With respect to the cluster bombs, the document
reports that in February 2003 (February 2 and 5), inspection teams found a
component of a 122mm CBW cluster submunition at Al Nouman. When questioned
during the visit, Iraqi officials denied any knowledge of a connection between the
cluster bombs and the CBW program, although there is earlier evidence of Iraqi
interest in developing cluster munitions with CBW agents.
U.S. Assistance to Inspections
UNSCR 1441, paragraph 10, requests all member states to “fully support
inspections, including by providing any information related to prohibited
programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since
1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons
to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected.” In the
past, the United States provided significant assistance to inspections in Iraq,
including equipment, personnel, training, analysis, funds, and providing U-2
overflight imagery. However, the U.N. now has more funds from its Oil for Food
Program and is contracting out many services that in the past may have been
provided by the United States. For this round of inspections, the United States
provided equipment and training, intelligence, and U-2 overflights. The FY2003
Defense Department authorization bill contained $15 million for assistance to
inspections, but the real cost of assistance was probably higher. In addition to
logistical support, the United States also provided U.S. inspectors.
54 Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programs
[www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/cluster.htm]
55 “Blix Left Out Data from U.N. Testimony,” Washington Times, March 11, 2003.
56 UNSC Resolution 687 did not prohibit unmanned aerial vehicles; it prohibited ballistic
missiles with a range exceeding 150km. The initial plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification did not specify unmanned aerial vehicles (S22871/Rev1 of 2 October 1991) but
later versions did. Nonetheless, delivery vehicles associated with WMD would be captured
under the provisions of UNSC 707 that call for full, final, and complete disclosure by Iraq
of “all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.”

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CRS-19
Congressional Role57
The most significant action of the 107th Congress with respect to Iraq was the
authorization for the use of force against Iraq, which President Bush signed into law
(P.L. 107-243) on October 16, 2002.58 Under this law, the President must determine
whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate to: (1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2)
enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. While there are
other UN Security Council resolutions with which Iraq has not complied, clearly the
most important of those relate to Iraq’s WMD programs.59 The law requires that
President Bush report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, within 48 hours of the exercise of his authority to use force, that U.S.
reliance on further diplomatic and other peaceful means is not adequate to protect the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, or
is not likely to lead to enforcement of U.N. resolutions.
With the authorization for war undertaken by the 107th Congress, the weeks
leading up to the war witnessed little prolonged debate in the 108th Congress.
Nonetheless, Senator Byrd introduced S.Res 28 in January, which expressed the
sense of the Senate that inspections should be given sufficient time for a thorough
assessment of Iraq’s compliance and that the United States should seek an additional
UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq. S.Res 28 was referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on January 29, 2003. Senator Kennedy introduced
S.Res 32, which expressed the sense of the Senate that the United States should fully
support the work of UN weapons inspectors and obtain approval by Congress of new
legislation authorizing the use of all necessary means, including military force, to
disarm Iraq. S.Res 32 was also referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on January 29, 2003.
In the House, Rep. Alcee Hastings introduced H.Res. 55, which had provisions
similar to S.Res. 28 for more time for inspections and a second UN resolution. Rep.
Sheila Jackson-Lee introduced H.Con.Res. 2 on January 7, 2003, which expressed
the sense of Congress that the P.L. 107-243 should be repealed, and Rep. DeFazio
introduced H.J.Res. 20 which also calls for the repeal of the authorization for the use
of force. H.J.Res. 20 has 30 cosponsors; H.Con.Res. 2 has 11 cosponsors. All these
resolutions were referred to the House International Relations Committee.
57 For a full history of legislation related to Iraq, see CRS Report RS21324 by Jeremy
Sharp, Congressional Action on Iraq 1990-2002: A Compilation of Legislation.
58 CRS Report RL31596, Iraq: Authorization of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against -
Side-By-Side Comparison of Public Law 107-243 and Selected Legislative Proposals, by
Dianne Rennack.
59 At least two other draft resolutions (Biden-Lugar and Levin) sought to narrow the
language to focus specifically on WMD violations. The Administration maintains Iraq is
in violation of 17 UNSC resolutions, including 1441. See, for example, “A Decade of
Deception and Defiance” (available at [www.whitehouse.gov]).

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CRS-20
Of particular interest to the inspections is S. 205, the “Iraqi Scientists
Immigration Act of 2003," introduced by Senator Biden on January 23, 2003. S. 205
passed the Senate by unanimous consent on March 20 and was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary on March 24. This bill would provide up to 500 visas
for workers in WMD programs and their families that are willing to and capable of
providing information to the United States or the UN. Originally conceived of before
the war, Senator Biden has suggested that the bill’s authority could offer positive
inducements to scientists, if they are needed, to locate Iraqi WMD and to “keep Iraqi
weapons experts from selling their materials or knowledge to rogue states or terrorist
groups.”60 Senator Biden introduced a similar bill (S. 3079, the “Iraqi Scientists
Immigration Act of 2002”) in the 107th Congress, which passed the Senate
unanimously with an amendment and was referred to the House Committee on the
Judiciary.
60 “Weapons Scientists a Lingering Security Question for Postwar Iraq,” Inside Defense,
March 27, 2003 ([www.insidedefense.com/secure/specials2/Gulf_Scientists.asp])

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