Order Code RS21299
Updated March 27, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments:
Issues for Congress
K. Alan Kronstadt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In October 2002, Pakistan held its first national elections since 1997, thus fulfilling
in a limited fashion President Pervez Musharraf’s promise to restore the National
Assembly that was dissolved in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power in
October 1999. Opposition parties contesting the elections – along with rights groups
and European Union observers – complained that the exercise was “deeply flawed.” No
party won a majority of parliamentary seats, though a pro-military alliance won a
plurality while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing.
Musharraf supporter M.Z. Jamali is Pakistan’s new prime minister and has thus far
maintained Musharraf’s foreign and economic policies. Debate continues over
Musharraf’s August 2002 changes to the country’s constitution, many of which greatly
augment his already considerable powers and institutionalize a permanent governance
role for the military. The 1999 coup triggered restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance,
restrictions waived in October 2001 and again in March 2003 by President Bush.
Secretary of State Powell has indicated that the Administration will seek waiver
authority for upcoming years. In response to continued perceived anti-democratic
practices in Islamabad, there is legislation in the 108th Congress aimed at restoring aid
restrictions through the removal of the U.S. President’s waiver authority (H.R. 1403).
This report will be updated periodically.
On October 10, 2002, nearly three years to the day since Pakistani Chief of Army
Staff (COAS) Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless
coup, the people of Pakistan returned to the polls for their country’s first national
elections since 1997. In the wake of the October 1999 coup, Islamabad faced
considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to U.S. sanctions as a result.
The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and Musharraf’s ensuing
decision to withdraw support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, had the effect of
greatly reducing Pakistan’s international isolation. Direct U.S. aid to the country began
flowing again in the final months of 2001, rising from about $10 million in FY2001 to
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

CRS-2
more than $1 billion in FY2002.1 The United States considers Pakistan to be a crucial ally
in the international anti-terrorism coalition and has refrained from expressing any strong
public criticisms of the country’s internal political practices, while still asserting “it is of
vital importance that full democratic, civilian rule be restored in Pakistan.”2
Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of the country’s 55 years in
existence, and the majority of observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of
effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. From the earliest days of
independence, the country’s armed forces have thought of themselves as “saviors of the
nation,” a perception that has received significant, though limited, public support. The
country’s political history has been marked by an ongoing tripartite power struggle
between presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. The military, usually acting in
tandem with the president, has engaged in three outright seizures of power from civilian-
led governments: General Ayub Khan in 1958, General Zia ul-Haq in 1977, and General
Musharraf in 1999.
Constitutional Changes
In August 2002, President Musharraf took unilateral action in announcing that a
“Legal Framework Order” of constitutional changes had been finalized and would take
effect. The most important of these provide greatly enhanced powers to the Pakistani
President, a title assumed by Musharraf and ostensibly legitimized by a controversial
April 2002 referendum. Musharraf insists that the changes were necessary to bring “true
democracy” to the country. Critics contend that Musharraf (who has retained his position
as Army Chief) is seeking to legitimize and make permanent the military’s currently
extra-constitutional role in governance, as well as ensure his own continued power in
contravention of democratic principles.
Key changes to the constitution include the establishment of a military-dominated
National Security Council (NSC), provisions allowing the President to dismiss the
National Assembly, and provisions calling for presidential appointment of armed services
chiefs.3 The NSC will be authorized to oversee the country’s security policies, as well as
monitor the process of democracy and governance in the country. Given the body’s
significant military element and the military’s traditionally intimate ties to the presidency,
this is seen as providing the Pakistani armed forces with a permanent and unprecedented
1 Aid restrictions were triggered as a result of the military coup. In October 2001, President Bush
signed S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57), which exempted Pakistan from coup-related prohibitions on
assistance for FY2002 and authorizing the President to waive such prohibitions for FY2003 if
he determines that such a waiver would facilitate the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan and
is important to U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism. President Bush waived these aid
restrictions for FY2003 in March 2003. See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current
U.S. Sanctions, by Dianne Rennack.
2 U.S. State Department Spokesman Philip Reeker, “Excerpts: Musharraf’s Constitutional
Changes Concern U.S.,” USIS Washington File, August 22, 2002.
3 A well-received and more clearly progressive change is found in the reservation of 60 assembly
seats for women and non-Muslims.

---

CRS-3
institutional role in the country’s governance.4 Presidential powers to appoint individual
military chiefs and dismiss the National Assembly are viewed as supplementing this role.5
Pakistan’s major opposition parties unanimously decried Musharraf’s action as illegal,
claiming that only the Parliament has the power to amend the constitution. They also
demand that Musharraf retire from the military. A majority of Pakistanis reportedly
oppose most of the enacted amendments.6 In response to Musharraf’s imposition of
constitutional revisions, the United States indicated that full U.S. support for Musharraf
would continue, even if some of the changes “could make it more difficult to build strong,
democratic institutions in Pakistan.”7
The 2002 Elections
Background. The history of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan is a troubled
one. Since 1970, five successive governments have been voted into power, but not a
single time has a government been voted out of power – all five were removed by the
army through explicit or implicit presidential orders. Of Pakistan’s three duly elected
Prime Ministers, the first (Z.A. Bhutto) was executed, the second (Benazir Bhutto) was
exiled and her husband jailed on corruption charges, and the third (Nawaz Sharif) remains
in exile under threat of life in prison for similar abuses should he return. Given this
inauspicious record with democratic processes, many analysts lauded Musharraf for the
mere act of holding elections as promised.
The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is the country’s oldest political party and was
the only major party in existence at the time of national independence. Former PM
Nawaz Sharif led the offshoot PML-Nawaz, which dominated previous elections in 1997.
Most former (but still influential) Sharif loyalists recently moved to join the newly-
formed Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), a group widely seen to enjoy
both tacit and overt support from the Musharraf government. The Pakistan People’s Party
(PPP) was founded by former PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1967. His daughter and current
PPP leader Benazir Bhutto lives in exile under threat of imprisonment should she return
to Pakistan (she has thrice been convicted of corruption in absentia). In an effort to skirt
legal barriers to participation, the PPP formed a separate entity, the PPP Parliamentarians
(PPPP), that pledges to uphold Bhutto’s political philosophy. The PPP historically has
seen its greatest electoral successes in the southern Sind province. The United Action
Forum (MMA in its Urdu-language acronym) is a loose coalition of six Islamist parties
formed especially for the 2002 elections. While Pakistan’s religious parties have at times
4 The NSC is comprised of 13 members: the President, PM, Senate chair, Assembly speaker and
opposition leader, JCS Chair, three armed service chiefs, and four provincial Chief Ministers.
5 Pakistan’s 1973 constitution envisaged a sovereign parliament where most of the powers rested
with the Prime Minister, but subsequent changes under the military-dominated regime of General
Zia ul-Haq shifted power to the presidency. In 1997, then-Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif oversaw
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, repealing Zia’s Eighth Amendment
(1985) right to dismiss the government and appoint military chiefs (and thus restoring powers to
the PM’s office).
6 David Rohde, “Musharraf Redraws Constitution,” New York Times, August 22, 2002.
7 U.S. State Department Spokesman Philip Reeker, “Excerpts: Musharraf’s Constitutional
Changes Concern U.S.,” USIS Washington File, August 22, 2002.

---

CRS-4
enjoyed a high profile and were strengthened by Zia’s policies of the 1980s, their electoral
showing has in the past been quite limited. Islamists, most of whom hold anti-Western
sentiments and seek to institute Sharia (Islamic law) nationwide, typically find their core
support in Pakistan’s more sparsely-populated western provinces, but have recently made
some inroads in the country’s urban centers.
Results. Despite the Musharraf government’s insistence that the exercise was free
and fair, opposition parties, human rights groups, and independent observers from the
European Union called the election “flawed,” accusing the military-led regime of
manipulating such aspects as candidate eligibility and public demonstration ordinances
as a means of influencing the electoral outcome. Most widely asserted is the notion that
pre-election machinations substantively weakened the main secular opposition parties.8
The October 2002 turnout was estimated by the Pakistan Election Commission to have
been lower than any previous Pakistani national election, leading numerous observers to
identify a pervasive apathy among the country’s citizens with regard to national politics.
The PML-Q – also called the “king’s party” due to its perceived pro-military bent
– won 118 of the total 342 parliamentary seats, almost all of them from Punjab.9 The
affiliated National Alliance won 16 seats. This number gave the pro-government parties
a clear plurality in the National Assembly, but fell well short of the majority
representation needed to control the body outright. As expected, the PPP did well in Sind,
but was unable to form a working coalition in that province’s legislature. The PPP also
made a comeback of sorts in Punjab and attained runner-up status in the 2002 election
with a total of 81 seats in the National Assembly. Perhaps the most surprising outcome
of the 2002 elections was the strong third-place showing of the MMA Islamist coalition
that now controls the provincial assembly of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)
and leads a coalition in that of Baluchistan, as well as seating 60 legislators in the
National Assembly (up from only two previously).10
Coalition-Building. The new National Assembly met on November 16, 2002,
when 324 members took their oaths of office under the 1973 Constitution.11 The three
leading national parties – the PML-Q, PPP, and MMA – had engaged in five weeks of
convoluted coalition-building negotiations. Reports that the secular opposition PPP had
finalized an alliance with the Islamist parties were proven false. Such an alliance would
have set the pro-military parties in opposition, a possibility that reportedly sent the
8 Both of his predecessors as national leaders – Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif – were, by
Musharraf’s own decree, excluded from candidacy regardless of the status of criminal charges
against them. The two have long been the country’s leading civilian political figures.
9 Election figures come from the Associated Press of Pakistan, a government news service.
10 The PML-N suffered huge losses in 2002, winning only 19 national seats, all of them in
Punjab. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a regional party mainly comprised of the
descendants of pre-partition immigrants (Muhajirs) from what is now India who are almost
wholly found in Sindhi urban centers. Though it did well in Sind’s provincial elections, the
MQM collected only a small percentage of the national vote (winning 17 national seats). It has
since aligned itself with the PML-Q. Small parties and independents account for the remaining
31 seats.
11 On the same day, the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court swore Musharraf in to another
five-year term as president, a move that opposition parties called “unconstitutional.”

---

CRS-5
Musharraf regime into “panic.”12 Ensuing signals that a PML-Q-Islamist alliance was in
the offing likewise ended when President Musharraf refused to accept the MMA’s
demands that he resign his position as Army Chief.13 In an unexpected circumstance, the
pro-Musharraf parties succeeded in forming a thin working coalition without the
participation of either the PPP or the MMA, a development made possible by the
defection of several PPP members, some of whom were rewarded with high-profile
ministerships of their own. This splinter group, calling itself the PPP-Patriots, now boasts
some 21 members. On November 21, PML-Q favorite and former Baluchistan Chief
Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali was elected to serve as Pakistan’s Prime Minster.14
A constitutionally-mandated December 2002 vote of confidence was won by Jamali,
who garnered 188 votes, 16 more than needed. January 2003 by-elections further
strengthened the parliamentary positions of the PML-Q and the MMA, with each party
winning three of the 10 seats contested. In an added sign of the PPP’s difficulties, the
party led by Bhutto did not win any additional seats, and failed to take even a share of
power in any of Pakistan’s four provincial assemblies. February senate elections
bolstered the position of the ruling coalition-leading PML-Q, which now oversees a
simple majority in the 100-seat body. The new Chairman of the Senate – who has powers
to take over the post of President in the event of vacancy due to illness or sudden death
of the President – is a PML-Q member and Musharraf loyalist. Although a full National
Assembly is now seated, the body has yet to exert substantive impact on Pakistani politics
and appears to be stalled on constitutional issues.15
Issues for Congress
While near-term U.S. concerns regarding anti-terrorism operations seem to require
a stable and effectively governed Pakistan, many observers believe that broader U.S.
interests and future regional stability are best served through the establishment of a
sustainable and working system of democracy in Pakistan. According to them, this could
be the case even if such a system brings to power elements that do not fully countenance
U.S. policies. The anti-terrorism security interests of the United States may, however,
outweigh such considerations.
12 Rana Jawad, “Musharraf Regime Panicked by Surprise Secular-Islamist Deal: Analysts,”
Agence France-Presse, November 6, 2002.
13 Several senior political observers believe that the outcome in which no party secured a majority
serves President Musharraf’s interests by allowing him to retain preeminent power and may well
have been his intent (see, for example, Paula Newburg, “Musharraf’s Win, Pakistan’s Loss,” Los
Angeles Times, October 20, 2002). Speculation abounds over whether or not the Pakistani
President intended for the Islamist coalition to make as strong a showing as it did.
14 With 172 votes, Jamali beat out top MMA official Maulana Fazlur Rehman (86 votes) and PPP
contender Shah Mehmood Qureshi (70 votes) for the prime ministership.
15 Prime Minster Jamali and his PML-Q allies insist that the LFO amendments stand, but
opposition parties say the LFO represents a “new system of military-controlled democracy”
(“LFO Part of 1973 Constitution: Jamali,” Dawn (Karachi), March 7, 2003; “Pakistani Parliament
in Crisis,” BBC News, March 8, 2003; Zaffar Abbas, “Pakistan Senate in an Uproar,” BBC
News, March 12, 2003).

---

CRS-6
Leading members of Pakistan’s Islamist coalition have been vocal antagonists of the
Musharraf government and critical of its alliance with the United States. Many demand
an immediate end to U.S. military and law enforcement efforts on Pakistani soil. The
MMA based its campaign on what largely was an anti-American stance, and MMA
leaders may bring about the “re-Talibanization” of western Pakistan. U.S. military
operations in Iraq have spurred hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis to demonstrate in
Islamist-organized marches and could strengthen Islamic radicalism across South Asia.
There also exist concerns about possible links between Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistani
Islamist parties, and Pakistani intelligence agencies.16 Thus far, however, Islamabad
repeatedly has insisted that its foreign policy orientation will remain unchanged, a claim
bolstered by the Islamist’s current status outside the ruling coalition. Reports indicate that
the military continues to dominate the country’s centralized decision making process.17
In 2002, some Members of the 107th Congress sought to reimpose restrictions on aid
to Pakistan in light of what are perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices by
the Musharraf government: H.R. 5150 sought to repeal the U.S. President’s authority to
waive economic sanctions and end assistance to Pakistan as a country whose elected head
of government was deposed by military coup; H.R. 5267 sought require Presidential
certification of Pakistan’s successful efforts to halt cross-border terrorism into India, that
the country’s national elections are conducted freely and fairly, and that waivers on aid
restrictions would facilitate both U.S. anti-terror efforts and the transition to democratic
rule in Pakistan. Neither resolution was voted upon.
In the 108th Congress, H.R.1403 (March 2003) seeks to remove the U.S. President’s
waiver authority with regard to democracy-related sanctions on Pakistan. The 108th
Congress faces other foreign aid issues with regard to Pakistan, including determination
of “satisfactory” levels of democratic governance, levels of transparency in Pakistan’s aid
expenditures, and the provision of continued security assistance in the face of the ongoing
and potentially destabilizing bilateral conflict between Pakistan and India. Moreover,
reports allege that Pakistan assisted North Korea’s covert nuclear weapons program as
recently as July 2002. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-
humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the
authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardize U.S. national
security.18
16 See CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. Leaders of the still-
fragile Kabul government have expressed their own concerns about the implications for Afghani
stability of MMA gains (“Afghan Paper Condemns Pakistan’s Pro-Fundamentalist Bias,” BBC
Monitoring South Asia, March 3, 2003).
17 Jean-Herve Deiller, “Behind Civilian Rule, Pakistan’s Army Looms Stronger Than Ever,”
Agence France-Presse, March 2, 2003; Amit Baruah, “Jamali Unable to Emerge as a Credible
Player,” Hindu (New Delhi), March 9, 2003; “Pakistan: Calm Before the Storm?,” Economist
Intelligence Unit, March 24, 2003.
18 Glenn Kessler, “Pakistan’s N. Korea Deals Stir Scrutiny,” Washington Post, November 13,
2002. In March 2003, the Administration announced that it had “carefully reviewed the facts
relating to the possible transfer of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea and decided
that they do not warrant the imposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws.” (Assistant
Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Kelly, “Letter to Sen. Daschle,” March 12, 2003).

---