Order Code RS21376
Updated March 25, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Capable Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs)
Andrew Feickert
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report addresses Iraq’s missile and UAV programs and their employment of
missiles against Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The UN supervised the
destruction of a number of Al Samoud 2 missiles, but some of these missiles may be
deployed with Iraqi forces. Intelligence sources estimate that Iraq has illegally retained
up to 20 Al Hussein SCUD variant missiles and has fired a number of Ababil-100
missiles at coalition targets. Iraq has also been accused of modifying L-29 Czech jet
trainers to be used as UAVs to disseminate chemical or biological agents. This report
will be updated as events warrant. Additional information is provided in CRS Issue
Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons, Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy and
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq:UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Iraq’s Missile and UAV Program, 1991-1998
Since the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 and the subsequent imposition of
United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 687, United Nations Special Commission
on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors have either supervised the destruction of, or accounted
for:1
!
817 of 819 Russian-supplied SCUD missiles;
!
19 transporter/erector/ launchers (TELs); and
!
30 chemical/biological warheads.
Prior to the first Gulf War, Iraq experimented with a variety of ballistic missiles,
most based on the proven SCUD design, with ranges from 900 to 2,500 kms. Missiles
such as the Al Abid, Tammouz I, and Badr-2000 have been developed with varying
1 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, U.S. Government White Paper, February 13,
1998, p. 11.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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degrees of foreign assistance but either have failed during operational testing or the
programs were discontinued because of the first Gulf War, UN disarmament activities,
or lack of foreign assistance. These programs may have been resurrected after the
departure of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998.
Baghdad has allegedly attempted to convert a number of L-29 Czech jet trainers into
UAVs that can be fitted with aerial spray tanks for the dissemination of chemical or
biological agents over a wide area. This was not a new endeavor as Iraq conducted
experiments in converting Mig-21 aircraft into UAVs capable of carrying 2,000 liter
spray tanks prior to the first Gulf War.2 The L-29 UAV should not be confused with the
somewhat primitive UAV aircraft depicted in recent press photos.
It is important to note that this report covers only Iraqi systems that are known
through inspections to be WMD capable and not those systems that could be modified to
carry WMDs. This report also does not cover Iraqi WMD capable artillery, rockets, aerial
bombs, and mines.
Current Estimated Status of Iraq’s WMD Capable Missiles and
UAVs
Al Samoud II (Photo at [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/25/iraq/main541855.shtml])
The Al Samoud II missile is a liquid propellant, vehicle mounted missile that has
undergone extensive development and testing since the first Gulf War. The Al Samoud
II is estimated to have a payload capacity of 300 kilograms 3 and intelligence sources
believe that up to 50 missiles may already be deployed to units.4 UN weapons inspectors
suggested that Iraq’s Al Samoud IIs were in violation of the 93 mile (150 km) range
restriction imposed by UNSCR 687 after reviewing Iraqi flight test data. Al Samoud IIs
are assessed to be chemical/biological capable and it is also possible that the Iraqis might
have produced chemical/biological submunitions for this system. Press reports on March
3, 2003 stated that Iraq had destroyed 16 Al Samoud II missiles under UN supervision at
the Taji missile production and storage facility north of Baghdad.5
Al Hussein (Photo at [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/01_alhussein.jpg])
Western intelligence believes that Iraq has up to 20 Al Hussein missiles and about
a dozen TELs although, to date, coalition forces have been unable to verify these claims.
In 1999 UNSCOM reported that they could account for all but 9 Al Husseins (2 of the
modified Russian SCUDS and 7 domestically produced Al Husseins).6 The Al Hussein
missile is essentially an Iraqi-modified version of the former Soviet Union’s mobile
2 Ibid.
3 Iraq’s Missiles: A Brief History, Iraq Watch, November 7, 2002, p. 11.
4 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September
24, 2002, p. 27.
5 UN: Iraq Destroys More Missiles, CNN.com. March 3, 2003.
6 S/1999/94, UNSCOM Report on the Status of Disarmament and Monitoring, January 29, 1999.

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SCUD-B missile that was developed in the 1950s based on German World War II V-2
missile technology. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraq fired more than 500
SCUD-type missiles at Iranian military and civilian targets; 93 SCUD-type missiles were
fired at Israeli and Coalition forces during the first Gulf War.7
The Al Hussein can carry high explosive, chemical, or biological warheads. After
the first Gulf War, the Iraqis admitted filling at least 75 of their SCUD warheads with
either chemical or biological agents.8 Fifty chemical warheads were intended to carry a
mixture of Sarin and Cyclosarin nerve agents but technical analysis of warhead remnants
indicated that some of these warheads were likely filled with VX nerve agents.9 Iraq also
claimed to have unilaterally destroyed all 25 biological warheads (16 botulinum, 5
anthrax, and 4 aflatoxin) in mid-1991.10 UNSCOM later claimed that the alleged Iraqi
destruction of these biological warheads “could not be reconciled with the physical
evidence.”11 These warheads were bulk filled but it is possible that Iraq has developed
submunition chemical and biological warheads for their missiles since the cessation of
UN inspections in 1998.12 Upon the conclusion of inspections, UNSCOM reported that
between 40 to 70 chemical/biological capable warheads were unaccounted for.13
Ababil-100 (Photo at [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images/ababil-100.jpg])
The Ababil-100 missile is a solid propellant missile and is also believed to have
undergone engineering modifications to extend its range. The Ababil-100 is estimated to
have a 300 kg payload capacity14 and it is believed that it is currently being developed as
an unguided missile with the intent of eventually including a guidance package to enhance
its accuracy.15 There are no known unclassified estimates of the number of Ababil-100's
that Iraq might be able to operationally deploy and the Ababil-100 is also assessed to be
chemical/biological capable with submunition potential. UN inspection reports issued
prior to their recent departure from Iraq did not include production figures on Ababil-100
missiles or discuss what, if any, modifications may have been made to the missile in order
for it to achieve ranges greater than 150 kms.
7 Ibid.
8 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Unclassified CIA Report, October 2002, p. 18.
9 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September
24, 2002, p. 23
10 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Program, p. 11.
11 Ibid.
12 The efficacy of all missile systems would be significantly enhanced if Iraq employed chemical
or biological submunitions. Submunitions allow for a wider and more effective dispersion and
concentration of chemical or biological agents and also permit a larger portion of agent to survive
a missile intercept.
13 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Program, p. 11.
14 Iraq’s Missiles: A Brief History, Iraq Watch, November 7, 2002, p. 11.
15 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September
24, 2002, p. 27.

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L-29 UAV (Photo at [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images/l-29.jpg])
A variety of intelligence sources report that Iraq has converted an unspecified
number of L-29 Czech jet trainers into UAVs designed to conduct long range chemical
or biological spray attacks.16 The L-29 UAV’s estimated range is approximately 600 kms
and its payload is approximately 160 kgs. This UAV configuration would be best suited
for conducting biological spray attacks due to the L-29's relatively small payload capacity.
It is not known how the L-29 UAV would be controlled, either from fixed or mobile
ground sites or from an airborne platform.
Iraq’s Use of Missiles and UAVs in the Current Conflict
Despite some initial reports, the Iraqis are not believed to have fired any of their
suspected Al Hussein missiles at coalition targets or neighboring countries nor employed
UAVs to deliver WMD payloads. Iraq is suspected of firing no more than a dozen
shorter-range missiles and is believed to have hundreds of these missiles in southern Iraq
within range of U.S. forces and facilities in Kuwait.17 U.S. and coalition special
operations forces and aircraft have been unable to locate any ballistic missile launchers
in Western Iraq that are capable of striking Israel, according to Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman Richard Meyers.18 Some experts speculate that this may be due to an extensive
special forces presence in the western region well in advance of hostilities and the
employment of Coalition manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft.19 As coalition
forces advance on Baghdad, the Iraqis will probably find it more difficult to employ any
Al Hussein missiles that they might have, as suitable launch sites and the time needed to
set up and launch these missiles will likely become increasingly scarce.
Iraq is making use of their shorter-ranged missiles. Defense officials had confirmed
as of March 23rd, that Iraq had fired six Ababil-100 missiles at the 101st Airborne
Division, Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait, a command center, a large Marine logistics
facility, and other critical regional targets.20 C.I.A. analysts stated that telemetry data
indicated that some of the missiles that were fired exceeded the UN-mandated 150 km
range.21 Four of these missiles were reportedly intercepted by improved Patriot GEM-222
missiles and two Iraqi missiles were permitted to land harmlessly in the Persian Gulf and
16 Ibid., p. 23.
17 Hussein’s Worst Weaponry Is A No-Show, So Far, Paul Richter, Los Angeles Times, March
22, 2003., p. 1
18 U.S. Forces Haven’t Found Scuds in Western Iraq, Myers Says, Tony Capaccio,
Bloomberg.com, March 21, 2003, p. 1.
19 Richter, p. 2.
20 U.S. Says The Iraqis Are Repositioning Their Missile Sites, Michael R. Gordon, New York
Times, March 23, 2003, p. 1.
21 Ibid., p 3.
22 GEM - guidance-enhanced missile.

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the desert without being engaged.23 Some analysts suggest that the missile that landed in
the Persian Gulf may have been intended for Kuwait City or Camp Doha, a large U.S.
staging base near the city. Defense officials said that these attacks were not random but
were based on Iraqi intelligence on suspected U.S. positions.24 Inspections have shown
that all of the missiles that have been fired have had conventional high explosive
warheads.
Despite bombings by U.S. forces, these missile batteries were reported to be heading
north on the highway out of Basra, possibly to fire on the right flank of U.S. forces as they
advance on Baghdad.25 According to U.S. officials, the Iraqis seem to be shifting their
Ababil-100s from the Basra area towards Qurnah, an area where there are currently no
known coalition ground forces.26 The area around Qurnah includes palm groves, marshy
areas, and buildings which will make it easier to hide the Ababil-100s which are much
easier to move and hide than the liquid-fueled Al Hussein or Al Samoud II missiles.27
There are numerous theories as to why Iraq has not employed chemical or biological
weapons on Al Husseins, Al Samoud IIs, Ababil-100s, or UAVs. Some analysts speculate
that Baghdad will employ these weapons when coalition ground forces close in on
Baghdad. Other analysts believe that a broken chain of command or fears of post-war
prosecution as war criminals may be keeping Iraqi commanders from launching chemical
or biological-laden missiles. Another theory is that U.S. and British intelligence may have
overstated Iraq’s WMD and missile capabilities and Baghdad may not have enough of
these proscribed weapons to make any sort of battlefield operational impact. Some have
theorized that Hussein may have either hidden or destroyed these weapons to take
advantage of the international opposition to the war and to discredit the Bush
Administration’s position regarding Iraqi possession of prohibited weapons of mass
destruction. In this regard, even if the Iraqi regime falls, Iraq might claim a moral victory
over the U.S.-led coalition. Despite the limited use of missiles and the absence of WMDs
on the battlefield to date, coalition forces still could face the use of these weapons in the
days that lie ahead and will likely continue their efforts to attempt to locate and destroy
these weapons.
23 Gordon, p. 1.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 3.
27 Ibid.

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