Order Code IB89140
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
Updated March 21, 2003
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Past Settlement Efforts
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique
1984 Proximity Talks
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise
1988-89 Talks
March 1990 - April 1992
“Set of Ideas
Confidence-Building Measures
Developments, 1997-2001
1997 Talks
1999-2001 Proximity Talks
Developments, 2002-2003
November 11, 2002 Settlement Plan
Established Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
Policies of Greece and Turkey
European Union Membership
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
U.S. Policy

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Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974.
The prospect of Cyprus’s European
Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population,
Union accession triggered heightened interna-
live in the southern two thirds of the island.
tional attention to Cyprus and complicated
Turkish Cypriots live in the “Turkish Republic
settlement efforts. The U.N. hosted inconclu-
of Northern Cyprus” (recognized only by
sive talks in July and August 1997. Denktash
Turkey), with about 30,000 Turkish troops
demanded that the TRNC be recognized as a
providing security. U.N. peacekeeping forces
state equal to the Greek-Cypriot side in a
maintain a buffer zone between the two.
confederation and concluded a declaration of
Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S.
partial integration with Turkey to parallel
support, has promoted negotiations aimed at
Cyprus’s integration with the EU.
creating a federal, bicommunal, bizonal repub-
lic on Cyprus. The two sides would pledge

Clerides and Denktash participated in
not to move toward union with any other
five rounds of U.N.-mediated proximity (indi-
country. This reflects concerns that Greek
rect) talks beginning in December 1999. On
Cypriots would like to unite with Greece and
November 8, 2000, the Secretary General gave
that Turkish Cypriots seek to partition the
the two leaders his “observations” on sub-
island, linking the north to Turkey.
stance and procedure. In reaction, Denktash
withdrew from talks. He and Clerides met on
The Secretary General’s April 5, 1992
Cyprus on December 4, 2001, and began
“Set of Ideas” was a framework for negotia-
holding direct talks on January 16, 2002. On
tions for an overall settlement. The Security
November 11, the Secretary General submit-
Council implied that Turkish Cypriot leader
ted a comprehensive settlement plan based on
Rauf Denktash was responsible. It then called
Swiss and Belgian models. Greek Cypriots
for confidence-building measures (CBMs).
and Turkish Cypriots failed to agree on it at an
Glafcos Clerides was elected president of the
EU summit in Copenhagen, December 12-13.
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993. Both
Negotiations resumed on January 15, 2003,
sides eventually accepted CBMs in principle,
with the U.N. On March 12, Annan
but did not agree on Secretary General’s
announced that his efforts to get the two sides
proposed method for recording clarifications.
to agree to simultaneous referenda on the plan
had not been successful. Cyprus is expected
A January 4, 1997 confirmation that
to sign an accession treaty to join the EU on
Greek Cypriots would acquire Russian S-300
April 16.
missiles prompted the United States to deplore
the purchase and Turkey to threaten military
Members of Congress have urged the
action to prevent deployment and to bond
Administration to be more active, although
closer to Turkish Cyprus. The missiles were
they have not proposed an alternative to the
the focus of intense crisis prevention efforts.
U.N.-sponsored talks. Some Members seek
On December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not
increased pressure on Turkey to withdraw its
to deploy the missiles on Cyprus.
troops from Cyprus.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On March 10, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan met in The Hague with (Greek)
Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to get
their responses to his request that they permit separate, simultaneous referenda on March 30
on the Foundation Agreement or third version of his settlement plan. (For text, see
[http://www.pio.gov.cy/other/final_un_plan.htm].) On March 11, Annan announced that
his efforts had been unsuccessful. He stated that Papadopoulos wished to be sure that gaps
regarding federal legislation and constituent state constitutions would be filled, and that
Greece and Turkey would commit to security provisions. Papadopoulos also felt that more
time was needed for a campaign on the referendum. Papadopoulos was prepared not to
reopen substantive provisions of the plan if Denktash did the same. Denktash was not
prepared to put the plan to a referendum. He had fundamental objections to the plan’s basic
points and believed that further negotiations should begin on a new starting point and that
the parties had to agree on basic principles. Annan suggested that negotiations continue until
March 28 and that the referenda be held on April 6. This did not sway the parties. Annan
announced, “we have reached the end of the road” and that it was not possible to achieve a
comprehensive settlement before Cyprus signs the accession treaty to become a member of
the European Union on April 16. Afterward, Papadopoulos said that he had said yes to a
referendum as long as the documents required for the whole package were ready in time,
especially legislation related to the functioning of the government of the common state.
Denktash said the “plan is not acceptable.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been
divided since 1974. The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic origin, and 19% of
Turkish ethnic origin. (Less than 5% of the population is Maronites, Armenians, Roman
Catholic Latins, and others.) At independence, the republic’s constitution defined elaborate
power-sharing arrangements. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president; each elected by his own community. The Treaty of Alliance among the
Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help
defend the island. The two sides aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots
favored union (of the entire island) with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots preferred
partition of the island (taksim) and uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’ success as a new republic lasted from 1960-63. After President Makarios
proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations
between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating
into enclaves in larger towns. In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national
institutions and began to administer their own affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred in
1963-64, and again in 1967. On both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including
that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have
been a buffer between the two communities.
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In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios,
replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis. Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August
25, was in control of more than 36% of the island. The military intervention (often called
an invasion) had many byproducts. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the Cypriot
population and related refugee and property problems. The Athens junta fell, civilian
government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military
command to protest NATO’s failure to prevent Turkey’s action, and Turkey’s civilian
government entered an extended period of instability. U.S. relations with all parties suffered.
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities
separate in two sovereign states or two states in a loose confederation. In February 1975,
they declared their government the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983,
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
(TRNC) — a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of independence. Turkish
Cypriots have a constitution and a 50-seat parliament. Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots. He
ruled out a merger with Turkey, and pledged cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’ interests and
reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and ways to
implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities. Greek Cypriots emphasized the three freedoms –
movement, property, and settlement – envisioning a society with free movement of people.
Turkish Cypriots prefer two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact. They also
differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots want their internationally
recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then
join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would join, for the first time,
in a new federation. These views could affect resolution of property, citizenship of Turkish
settlers, and other legal issues. Since 1974, there have been several formal sets of U.N.-
sponsored direct negotiations as well as indirect talks:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting. Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each administration’s control over territory
will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights;
3)freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and
functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique. Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha,
demilitarization, and to eschew union in whole or part with any other country.
1984 Proximity Talks. After the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC,” both sides
proposed confidence-building measures and resolution through a comprehensive framework.
Proximity or indirect talks were conducted through U.N. representatives on constitutional
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arrangements, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of international treaties and
guarantees dating from 1959-1960.
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise. Denktash and Kyprianou met in
January 1985. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a draft U.N. document; Greek Cypriots
considered it only a basis for negotiations. The U.N. modified the document. Greek
Cypriots accepted an April 1985 version; Turkish Cypriots did not. Greek Cypriots opposed
a March 1986 revision and called for an international conference or a new summit to
revitalize the process.
1988-89 Talks. After futile informal direct talks, Cypriot President Vassiliou and
Denktash submitted papers that hardened positions. In April 1989, Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar discouraged the parties from writing positions and proposed separate meetings.
Denktash criticized the approach as substituting proximity talks for direct talks, but the U.N.
believed the parties had agreed to “separate and periodic joint meetings.” In June, Perez de
Cuellar circulated draft ideas for an agreement. Turkish Cypriots argued that the U.N. had
exceeded its good offices role; only a document drafted by the parties would be acceptable.
March 1990 - April 1992. Security Council Res. 649, May 13, 1990, reaffirmed the
Secretary General’s right to make suggestions. It referred to the federal solution as
bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial aspects — the
first U.N. reference to bizonality, a key concept for the Turkish Cypriots. In June 1991,
Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting. On August 2, President Bush
announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus. The
Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range of agreement first. The Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers were unable to find common ground. On October 8, the Secretary
General reported that a conference was not possible and blamed Denktash’s assertion that
each side possessed sovereignty, differing from U.N. resolutions attributing that
characteristic solely to the Republic.
“Set of Ideas.” Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s April 1992 report suggested a
bizonal federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international
personality and sovereignty. A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house. 7:3
ratio would prevail in the federal executive. Each state would be guaranteed a majority of
the population and of land in its area. Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty
of Alliance would withdraw. In June, Boutros-Ghali presented a “non-map.” A new U.N.
draft provided for a separate referendum by each community within 30 days of an agreement,
an 18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees consistent with
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek Cypriot
embargo, free movement, a time-table for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their
property, three constitutions (one for each community and one for the central government),
a 7:3 ratio in the executive, vice-presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an
island-wide referendum on EC membership, and the return of Varosha and about 30 villages
to Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation. Greek
Cypriots would get Morphou, home of about 11,000 Turkish Cypriots. Denktash said that
they and Turkish Cypriots to be displaced from other areas total 40,000 or about one-quarter
of the Turkish Cypriot population. Vassiliou estimated that 82,000 Greek Cypriots would
be able to return home and that Denktash’s 40,000 figure was inflated.
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On August 21, Boutros-Ghali reported that his map provided for two federated states,
the return of many Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot retention of the coastline and
traditional villages. He said that Denktash’s territorial proposals were not close to the
“non-map” and that arrangements would be made for displaced Turkish Cypriots. Vassiliou
was depicted as ready to negotiate an agreement based on the map. Denktash accepted the
right of return and right to property, provided practical difficulties were taken into account.
Boutros-Ghali concluded that an agreement was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw
territorial adjustment in line with his map. Denktash said the report was unacceptable.
Security Council Res. 774, August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map. The
Secretary General’s November 19 report implied Denktash’s responsibility for the lack of
progress. A February 14, 1993, election in Cyprus produced a new president, Glafcos
Clerides, and a delay. Clerides accepted the set of ideas only “in principle.”
Confidence-Building Measures. On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a reduction of Turkish troops in
exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control of
Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on
foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.-supervised
island-wide census; cooperation in U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha and
reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under U.N. control but unused since 1974.
Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash wanted to retain about
20% and/or have a U.N. security circle around it and an end to the Greek Cypriot embargo
of northern Cyprus. Greek Cypriots sought to avoid recognizing the TRNC. Denktash
claimed that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots. However,
U.N. experts determined that both sides would benefit, with relatively greater benefits for
Turkish Cypriots because of their smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them.
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle. He later contended that
a March 21 U.N. draft unbalanced equities in the CBMs. Clerides said that he would accept
the March 21 text if Denktash would. The Secretary General’s May 30 report, made known
on June 1, insisted that the March draft had not destroyed balance. Boutros-Ghali blamed
the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of political will for the lack of agreement. On May 31, Denktash
had said that he would accept the CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated.
Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document. Boutros-Ghali’s June 28 letter
to the Security Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement
CBMs based on the March paper and clarifications, and said that he intended to address an
identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and request the Security
Council to endorse the March 21 paper. Neither side accepted this procedure.
Developments, 1997-2001
On January 4, 1997, Cyprus signed a contract to purchase Russian S-300 (SA-10)
anti-aircraft missiles with a 90-mile range, that is, able to reach southern Turkey, at a cost
of about $400 million, to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by
Greece. The U.S. State Department criticized the decision. Turkish officials said that they
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would not allow the weapons to be deployed. The State Department declared that a threat
to use force was unacceptable. On January 20, Turkish President Demirel and Denktash
signed a joint defense declaration, stating that any attack on the TRNC would be an attack
on Turkey.
1997 Talks. In 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for indirect talks
followed by open-ended, face-to-face talks between Clerides and Denktash. His Special
Representative on Cyprus began proximity or indirect talks. As goodwill gestures, Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots exchanged visits to holy sites and held bicommunal events and
business and professional meetings. Greek planes did not overfly Cyprus during joint
Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises in May 1997 and for the next five months. Turkish
planes did not overfly Cyprus for as long as Greek aircraft did not do so.
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and
in Switzerland, August 11-15. Beforehand, Denktash said that he would not sign documents
until the European Union (EU) suspended its accession negotiations with the (Greek) Cypriot
government as the sole representative of Cyprus. (See European Union Membership,
below.) He refused to sign a joint declaration at the end of the talks. The U.N. Security
Council President said that the Turkish Cypriots’ preconditions had impeded progress.
Greece terminated its moratorium on military flights over Cyprus before joint exercises
with Cypriot forces on October 10, 1997. Turkey ended its parallel moratorium on October
14. During the exercises, Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus,
but neither side fired. Greece charged that Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister’s
plane. In October, Turkey conducted exercises in northern Cyprus, including the mock
destruction of missile launchers.
After the December 12, 1997, EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus,
Denktash informed the U.N. that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and that he would only
participate in talks between states having equal status. On December 27, the TRNC
suspended all bicommunal activities except religious pilgrimages.
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on
January 24, 1998. The S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. The Cypriot
government said that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or substantial progress
toward a settlement, then it would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel issued a communique
calling for negotiations only between sovereign, equal states. They said that the special
relationship between Turkey and the TRNC would be enhanced in every field.
On June 16, Greece sent four F-16 fighter planes and one C-130 cargo plane to the
Paphos air base. Turkey responded on June 18 by sending six F-16's to northern Cyprus.
Cypriot troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July with a test-firing. Secretary of
State Albright reportedly had asked Clerides to reconsider the S-300 purchase, to store the
missiles outside of Cyprus, or to replace the order with one for shorter range SA-15s.
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On August 31, Denktash proposed a Cyprus Confederation . The Greek Cypriot
government declared the proposal to be “unacceptable.” The U.S. Administration, the U.N.,
and others reiterated that the basis for a settlement is a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
On December 29, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. The EU,
United States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided a face-saving context for his decision. A
December 14 letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council
reported that his Special Representative was continuing shuttle talks and that he perceived
a “flexible approach by both sides.” On December 22, the Security Council approved
S/Res/1217, to renew the UNFICYP mandate, and S/Res/1218, requesting the Secretary
General to work on measures to build trust and cooperation.
On June 20, 1999, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and
Russia urged the Secretary General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiations, without
preconditions. On June 22, the Secretary General declared his readiness to do so. On June
29, the Security Council passed S/Res/1250, calling upon the two leaders to support a
comprehensive negotiation with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to negotiate in
good faith until a settlement is reached, with full consideration of all U.N. resolutions and
treaties. S/Res/1251 said that the goal is a Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises
two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot annual military exercise from October 2-7,1999, no Greek
planes landed at the Paphos air base; there were no incidents involving Greek and Turkish
planes; and Turkey’s objections to the exercise were milder than in previous years.
1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Secretary General Annan and his Special Advisor on
Cyprus, Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, began proximity or separate, indirect talks with
Clerides and Denktash in New York from December 3 to 14. In U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1283 (December 15, 1999), the Council reaffirmed “all its relevant resolutions
on Cyprus,” without specifying that a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single
sovereignty on the island is its goal. On December 15, Annan submitted an addendum,
noting that the governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Britain concurred with UNFICYP’s
extension. He also noted, “The Government of Turkey has indicated that it concurs with ...
the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can operate on both sides
of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties and that the Turkish Cypriot
authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work with them to develop modalities of
UNFICYP’s operation in northern Cyprus.” The Turkish Cypriots interpreted the wording
as a move toward recognition of their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset with this
Turkish Cypriot view. A second round of proximity talks was held in Geneva, January 31-
February 8, 2000. Bicommunal contacts among political parties, journalists, businessmen,
and environmentalists resumed.
The Cypriot and Greek governments succeeded in preventing an addendum similar to
that of December 1999 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1303, June 15, 2000. Denktash
linked his attendance at talks to measures that, he asserted, would prove that UNFICYP
needs Turkish Cypriot cooperation to fulfill its mission. He constrained UNFICYP activities
in the north and, on June 30, Turkish forces set up a three-man checkpoint outside Strovilia,
a small Greek Cypriot village in the no-man’s land separating the Turkish-Cypriot-
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administered area and a British base, which is an UNFICYP crossing point between north
and south, thereby blocking UNFICYP access.
A third round of talks was held from July 24 to August 4. At the outset of a fourth
round, September 12 to 26, Annan said that he had concluded that the equal status of the
parties “must and should be recognized” explicitly in a comprehensive settlement, noting that
in the negotiations each represents its side and no one else, as the political equal of the other.
Clerides boycotted the talks in protest until assured that they would take into account U.N.
resolutions that call for a federal solution. Denktash was pleased with Annan’s remarks.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises from October 19 to 23, Greek and
Turkish planes engaged in mock dogfights. Greek planes landed at Paphos air base for the
first time since it became operational in January 1998, and Greek Cypriot National Guard
TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missiles deployed at Paphos locked onto Turkish F-16 fighter planes.
Turkish planes landed on the island during Turkish-Turkish Cypriot exercises in November.
A fifth round of talks was held from November 1 to 10. On November 8, Annan gave
his “assessment.” Media leaks and statements by the parties suggest that he called for one
sovereign, indissoluble, common state with a single international legal personality; common
state law would overrule regional law; political equality would be defined as effective
“participation” in government, not numerically; component states would be to a great extent
self-governed; the return of an “appreciable amount of territory” to Greek Cypriots, with as
little dislocation of Turkish Cypriots as possible and return of as many Greek Cypriots as
possible; and a security regime including an international military force, police, and a
political mechanism. Clerides welcomed these views. Denktash rejected them and, at a
November 24 “summit” with Turkey’s President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces
General Staff, and other high officials, announced his withdrawal from the talks because no
progress could be made until two separate states are recognized. Turkey supported his
decision. Denktash refused to participate in a sixth round of talks in January 2001, labeling
the Secretary General’s November 2000 assessment an unacceptable precondition.
On September 5, de Soto said that Annan had invited the two leaders to hold separate
meetings with him on September 12 in New York. De Soto hoped that the meetings would
be followed by separate working meetings with him. Clerides accepted. Denktash did not
because, “The necessary foundation has not been established.” Denktash proposed a secret
face-to-face meeting with Clerides, but de Soto did not think it was a good idea.
On December 4, Clerides and Denktash met for the first time since August 1997. De
Soto also was present. The two leaders agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions,
all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement is achieved.
Clerides became the first Cypriot president to travel to the north since 1974 on December 5,
when he attended a dinner at Denktash’s residence. Denktash reciprocated by visiting
Clerides’ private home for dinner on December 29.
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Developments, 2002-2003
On January 16, 2002, Clerides and Denktash met in de Soto’s presence and agreed to
hold intensive peace talks beginning January 21 at the Nicosia airport, a U.N. base. Ground
rules provide that there will be no final agreement until all issues are agreed upon.
On April 29, Denktash presented a “non-paper” of his views on a solution, proposing
a Partnership State to be founded by the two now-existing states on Cyprus. Each partner
would retain authority over its domestic affairs. Together, they would set up a 12-member
Council consisting of two presidents and five representatives from each side. Each president
would chair the Council for 2 years. Council members would hold portfolios for foreign
affairs, economy, and EU relations. A joint parliament would have an equal number of
members from each side. Denktash insisted that the Turkish security guarantee continue.
The situation would be reviewed in 5 years, when new authorities could be given to the
partnership. Clerides’ spokesman charged that these views contravened U.N. resolutions.
Secretary General Annan visited Cyprus, May 14-16, and asked Clerides and Denktash
to focus on the core issues of governments (meaning structures and powers), security,
territory, and property. Annan looked to Greece and Turkey for support. According to
disclosures by both sides, security issues were discussed in May and June. Denktash claimed
that the Greek Cypriots want the U.N. to be a guarantor, while he wants it to observe.
Turkish Cypriot reports said that the Greek Cypriots conveyed views on territory, proposing
to reduce the Turkish Cypriot area to 24%. Denktash responded that “the territorial issue
cannot be discussed with percentages” because it is related to sovereignty, his overriding
demand. Denktash proposed that ideas from the Belgian constitution be discussed; Clerides
offered to discuss it in its entirety.
On August 27, Denktash warned that if that there is no settlement, then he would
“consider giving to Turkey ... our foreign affairs and defense ministries and monetary matters
under a protocol until Turkey enters the EU.” He later described possible Turkish-Turkish
Cypriot cooperation as similar to that which the Greek Cypriots would have with the EU.
On September 6, Annan met the two leaders in Paris. He noted that “though serious
differences remain, the elements of a comprehensive settlement that would meet the basic
needs of both sides do, in fact, exist,” and “that the gaps dividing the parties can be bridged.”
Clerides observed, however, “there appears to be no way of approach” on the issue of
sovereignty and whether there will be a new state or a continuation of the Republic of
Cyprus. On September 16, a new Denktash document revised his ideas of April 29,
strengthening central government authority to address some of Clerides’ objections but
retaining the concept of a new partnership state. He proposed Belgium as a model for
foreign affairs and Switzerland as a model for domestic affairs.
On September 30, the Secretary General said that settlement talks would continue after
an expected December 12 EU decision to accept Cyprus as a member. Annan met with
Clerides and Denktash in New York on October 3-4. The two agreed to establish bilateral
technical committees to deal with international treaties and legislation to be in effect in the
common state. Clerides said that “huge differences” about sovereignty prevented discussion
of other issues. Annan noted, “A comprehensive settlement has to be a complex, integrated,
legally binding and self-executing agreement, where the rights and obligations of all
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concerned are clear, unambiguous and not subject to further negotiations.” Denktash
underwent open-heart surgery on October 7. On October 26, Greece and Turkey agreed to
postpone their respective November military exercises on Cyprus.
November 11, 2002 Settlement Plan. (Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, presented by the Secretary General.) Secretary General
Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive plan for a Cyprus settlement. (See
[http://www.cna.org.cy/data/var/sxedioen.htm].) It called for a “new state of affairs” in
Cyprus, in which the “common state” government’s relations with its two politically equal
component states would be modeled on the Swiss federal example. It would have a single
international legal personality. Component states would participate in the formulation and
implementation of policy in foreign and European Union relations modeled on the Belgian
example. Parliament would have two 48-seat houses. Each state would have equal
representation in the Senate. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be allocated in
proportion to population, provided that no state would have less than 25% of the seats. A
Presidential Council would have 6 members. The offices of President and Vice President
would rotate every 10 months among members of the Council. No more than two
consecutive presidents could come from the same component state. Greek and Turkish
troops could not exceed a four-digit figure (9,999). A U.N. peacekeeping operation would
remain as long as the common state, with the concurrence of the component states, decides.
Cyprus would be demilitarized. A Supreme Court would have nine judges: three Greek
Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three non-Cypriot. During a three-year transition, the
leaders of the two sides would be co-presidents. The 1960 Treaties of Establishment,
Guarantee, and Alliance would remain in force. There would be a single Cypriot citizenship
and citizenship of a component state; residence in a component state could be limited by
citizenship, but such limits would have restrictions. There would be provisions for return
or compensation of property. Two maps of territorial adjustments reduced Turkish Cypriot
territory to 28.5% of the island.
On December 5, Clerides and Denktash submitted comments to Annan. Greek Cypriot
concerns included power-sharing, the length of the transition period, insufficient Greek
Cypriot repatriation, and the large Turkish settler population. Turkish Cypriots criticized
sovereignty provisions, the loss of water resources and territory, which would make many
Turkish Cypriots refugees, and the return of Greek Cypriot refugees.
On December 10, the U.N. presented a revised peace plan. (Available online at
[http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/54FA38968063BA09C2256C79004F5C72/$FILE/r
evised_un_plan.pdf].) Changes reduced the number of foreign troops and settlers allowed
to remain, increased the number of Greek Cypriot refugees allowed to return, but reduced the
numbers moving into Turkish Cypriot territory. The Secretary General asked both sides to
be available in Copenhagen during the EU summit. Clerides and his entire National Council
went to Denmark, but Denktash went to Ankara for medical care and sent his “foreign
minister.” Annan had wanted a Founding Agreement of a “common state” signed by
December 12, but it was not. He then hoped for a conclusion by February 28, 2003, with
simultaneous referenda to be held by both sides on March 30.

Large demonstrations of Turkish Cypriots in favor of EU membership for a reunified
island, negotiations for a settlement based on the U.N. plan, and Denktash’s resignation
occurred on November 28 and December 26, 2002, and on January 14 and February 27,
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2003. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Chairman of the ruling party in Turkey, took note and, on
January 2, stressed the need to heed the wishes of the people. He declared, “I’m not in favor
of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained on Cyprus over the past 30 to 40
years.... This is not Mr. Denktash’s private matter.” On January 8, the Turkish Armed
Forces Deputy Chief of Staff charged, “Injustices are being committed against Mr.
Denktash, both in Turkey and on Cyprus.” The General criticized elements of the U.N. plan,
including its maps. Denktash and Clerides resumed negotiations on January 15.
During a visit to Cyprus on January 27, Turkish Land Forces Commander General
Aytac Yalman expressed concern that a solution based on the U.N. plan would lead to a
recurrence of clashes similar to those after 1963 and pledged to protect the Turkish Cypriots
and Turkey’s rights on the island. After he visited the island the next day, Turkish Foreign
Minister Yakis said that Turkey would not accept anything that the TRNC would not accept.
Clerides and Denktash held talks on February 3, 5, 10, and 14, and discussed territory.
At the behest of the Secretary General, Greece and Turkey began talks on security issues
related to a settlement on February 21. They are discussing how many Turkish and Greek
troops would remain on the island, where they would be deployed, and how they will be
armed. Annan traveled to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, February 24-28, to present a revised
settlement plan. It included a British offer to transfer 45 square miles or almost half of its
sovereign base areas to Cyprus, 90% to the Greek Cypriots and 10% to the Turkish Cypriots,
if the two sides agree to the plan. The revisions also allowed Turkish Cypriots to retain the
Karpass Peninsula, but allow Greek Cypriots to settle there. Turkish Cypriot territory would
decrease to 28.2%, and the number of Greek Cypriots who could return north would increase
to 92,000, but numbers would be capped at 21% of the population of the region at the end
of 15 years, and the number of Turkish settlers allowed to remain on the island also would
increase. On February 27, Annan presided over a meeting on procedural issues between the
newly elected President of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Denktash.
Established Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
(Greek Cypriot positions are on the left; Turkish Cypriot positions are on the right.)
Sovereignty and Powers
Greek Cypriots say that bicommunal, bizonal
The Turkish Cypriots say that each
federation of two states with one sovereignty
community should form a sovereign state as
should be established. A new federal
equals and join in a “partnership state,”which
constitution should come first, specifying the
would have a single international legal
powers of the central government and those
personality.
of the self administered states.
Presidency
The President will be elected by a common
A rotating presidency will prevent one
vote from Greek Cypriots and Turkish
community retaining control of the office.
Cypriots, but must have votes from the other
Each community separately must elect its
community.
own representative to fill the office of
president or vice president.
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Territory
The Greek Cypriots accepted the map in the
The Turkish Cypriots rejected the map
U.N. set of ideas, subject to marginal
included in the U.N. set of ideas. Denktash
changes. Turkish Cypriot territory on the
would not discuss territory before Turkish
island must fall under 29+% (optimally to
Cypriot sovereignty is accepted, adding that
24%) to allow the maximum number of
Turkish Cypriots have a “right” to more than
Greek Cypriot refugees to remain under
33% of the island.
Greek Cypriot administration.
Security/Turkish Troops/Guarantees
The island should be demilitarized. A
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whereby
permanent U.N. force should oversee
Turkey rightfully protects the Turkish
implementation of a settlement accord. No
Cypriot community, must not be diluted.
Turkish guarantee.
Turkish troop presence may be reduced if
Turkey retains its Treaty rights. Agrees that
island should be demilitarized. A U.N. force
may stay after a settlement, but without
permanent status which would contradict
sovereignty.
Displaced Persons and Property Rights
A majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees
The population exchange cannot be reversed.
must return to their homes under local Greek
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled should be
Cypriot administration; remaining refugees
compensated at the current value for the
must have the right to return. Turkish
property they occupy at the time of
Cypriots cannot be compensated for property
resettlement. Greek Cypriots unable to
they did not own in 1974. Turkish Cypriots
return to property they owned in 1974 will be
may opt to return to properties they owned in
compensated from the sale of Turkish
the south in 1974 or to be compensated for
Cypriot property in the south. The Turkish
them at 1974 values plus inflation. All
Cypriot property in the south roughly equals
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled will be
the Greek Cypriot property in the north.
c o m p e n s a t e d . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t
Deeds to Greek Cypriot properties in the
misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties
north allocated to Turkish Cypriots in the
is null and void. More recently, the
north since 1974 are legally valid. A Joint
European Union requires free movement of
Property Claims Commission should be
people and purchase of property; therefore,
formed to inventory property on both sides of
exchange of property and compensation will
the island, determine value, and seek
be on a voluntary basis.
resources to pay compensation.
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
The Cyprus talks have been vulnerable to changes in the atmosphere between the two
communities and within each community and to factors not part of the talks.
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
In the south, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Clerides was elected President of the
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993 and reelected in February 1997. A presidential election
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was held on February 16, 2003. Tassos Papadopoulos, the candidate of his right-wing
Democratic Party (DIKO), the Reformist Party of Working People (AKEL/communist party
that supports accession to the EU and has engaged leftist parties of the north), the Social
Democratic Movement (KISOS), and the Greens won the election. Papadopoulos is a
controversial nationalist whose law firm represented Serbian companies accused of violating
U.N. sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. In the 1990s, he was on the U.S. Office of Foreign
Assets Control list of “blocked persons.” Papadopoulos has vowed to continue negotiations,
calling for a “viable and functional solution.” He also said the U.N. plan must be improved
and promised to work for the right of all Greek Cypriot refugees to return to the north.
Papadopoulos is consulting closely with Clerides.
May 28, 2001 parliamentary elections produced a narrow victory for AKEL, which
received 34.71% of the vote and 20 seats in the 50-seat parliament. DISY dropped to second
place with 34% of the vote and 19 seats. DIKO won 14.84% of the vote and 9 seats; KISOS,
with 6.51% of the vote, holds 4 seats. Four other parties also won seats. Dimitris
Christofias, AKEL’s leader, is speaker of parliament, the second highest government official
and acts for the president when he is absent or incapacitated. There is no vice president.
In the north, Denktash was elected the first “President” of the TRNC in 1983, and
reelected subsequently. On April 15, 2000, Denktash won 43% of the vote to 30% for Dervis
Eroglu in the first round of the election for “President.” Eroglu withdrew on April 19, before
a second round, and Denktash was declared “President” again. In December 6, 1998,
elections for the 50-seat parliament, the National Unity Party (UBP) had won 24 seats; the
Democratic Party (DP) 13; Communal Liberation Party (TKP) 7; and CTP, 6. Eroglu
became Prime Minister and formed a coalition with the TKP. However, Eroglu and his TKP
Deputy Prime Minister, Mustafa Akinci, increasingly disagreed. Akinci criticized Denktash’s
withdrawal from the U.N. talks and non-participation in EU membership negotiations, and
Turkey’s influence over TRNC affairs. On May 19, 2001, the National Popular Movement
(UHH) announced its formation, vowing to strengthen ties with Turkey and to struggle
against “foreign forces and local collaborators.” A Denktash adviser is a UHH founder, and
Denktash supports it. On May 24, the UBP withdrew from the coalition with the TKP. On
the same day, the headquarters of a newspaper critical of Denktash was bombed. On June
5, Eroglu formed a new government with the DP.
In June 30, 2002, local elections, UBP won 16 out of 28 mayoral posts, but the pro-
settlement, pro-EU Republican Turkish Party (CTP), led by Mehmet Ali Talat, won the key
cities of Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta and polled second overall.
Policies of Greece and Turkey
The “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey, have widely different approaches to the Cyprus
problem. They defend and protect their ethnic kin, and their bilateral relations, strained over
Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.
On November 16, 1993, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Clerides
agreed to a joint defense doctrine whereby their governments would decide on the Cyprus
issue jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its defense plan, and any Turkish advance
would lead to war between Greece and Turkey. Clerides announced in April 1994 that
Greece would provide air cover for Cyprus, while Cypriot bases would prepare to refuel
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Greek Air Force planes, a naval base would be set up, and elite troops would bolster land
forces. In January 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded Papandreou and retained the doctrine.
Turkish governments argued that the Cyprus problem is not acute because Turkish
Cypriot security has been ensured since 1974, and that dialogue is the appropriate channel
for resolution. Turks support their armed forces on the island and agree that they should not
withdraw until Turkish Cypriots’ rights are guaranteed effectively. Turkey provides aid to
the TRNC. In January 2001, a 3-year, $350 million aid package was announced to help the
TRNC overcome a major financial crisis. It also brought increased Turkish supervision of
the Turkish Cypriot economy. On September 30, 2002, Turkey granted Turkish Cypriots
the right to obtain 5-year residence permits in Turkey.
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on “lesser” issues, excluding Cyprus
and the Aegean, that eventually led to bilateral accords. The rapprochement accelerated after
earthquakes in both countries produced mutual sympathy and good will. Greece’s decision
to allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December confirmed a
change in relations. In January 2000, George Papandreou made the first official visit by a
Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey in 37 years. Then Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem
visited Greece in February. On November 2, 2000, Papandreou asserted that the most basic
precondition for a full rapprochement is the solution of the Cyprus problem based on U.N.
resolutions. On March 12, 2002, Athens and Ankara began exploratory talks on the Aegean
Sea issues. Greece champions Turkey’s cause in the EU.
European Union Membership
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into
force in 1988. On July 4, 1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership, stating that it would
welcome Turkish Cypriot participation in technical negotiations. Turkish Cypriots objected
because EC acceptance of the application recognized the Republic’s government and not
their own. Greece’s EC membership and Turkey’s lack thereof led Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to view increased EC involvement in Cyprus as favoring Greek Cypriots.
The EU was to fix a date for Cyprus membership accession negotiations in January
1995. The EU preferred a prior intercommunal solution, but was willing to begin
negotiations without one. In December 1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs
union and some Europeans demanded that the veto be lifted before Cyprus’s application was
addressed. On March 6, 1995, the EU separately ratified the customs union accord and
scheduled accession talks with Cyprus. At Greece’s insistence, the Republic is the EU’s
interlocutor. Turkey said that if Greek Cypriots were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus
government, then Turkey would integrate with the “TRNC” to the same degree. Denktash
asserted that if Cyprus becomes an EU member while Turkey is not a member, then it would
weaken Turkey’s guarantees and mean surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.
On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with
Cyprus would open in 1998. On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit and
Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of
partial integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel that of Cyprus and the EU.
Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they “legitimize” an accession process
initiated “illegally” by the Greek Cypriots.
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Clerides said that Turkish Cypriots could participate as full members of the negotiating
team for accession if they accept the idea of EU membership and if their participation did not
suggest recognition of the TRNC. On September 25, 1997, then Greek Deputy Foreign
Minister Papandreou said that Greece would block the EU’s expansion eastward if Cyprus
were not accepted because it is divided. France withdrew its objection to accession talks
with a divided Cyprus when Greece withdrew its objection to talks with East European
candidates. On June 12, 1998, at an EU summit, however, France reiterated its opposition.
On November 9, the French, German, Dutch, and Italian foreign ministers warned of
“particular difficulties” linked to accession talks with a divided island. Greece again warned
that it would block EU expansion if Cyprus were excluded on these grounds. On November
10, the EU began substantive accession negotiations with Cyprus.
On May 14, 1999, then Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared, “It is
clear that Cyprus can become a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not
solved.... “ On July 10, he said that Greece would not object to Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy if assured that Cyprus’s accession would go ahead even without a resolution.
Greece later said that it would not veto Turkey’s candidacy if Turkey met conditions relating
to acceptance of borders in the Aegean and Cyprus’ EU accession. Turkey rejects linkage
between the Cyprus issue and its candidacy.
The EU Helsinki summit’s conclusions on December 10, 1999, “underline(d) that a
political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no
settlement has been achieved by the completion of accession negotiations, the ... decision on
accession will be made without the above (i.e., a settlement) being a precondition. In this
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” Greece had insisted that Cyprus be
allowed to join the EU without preconditions and expressed satisfaction. Turkey focused on
the reference to “all relevant factors,” suggesting that the EU could consider a settlement or
lack thereof at that time as a factor in its decision-making. Greeks argue that the phrase
refers to overall EU membership criteria. The summit also affirmed Turkey’s EU candidacy.
In February 2001, Clerides suggested that Denktash’s intransigence may make Cyprus’s
entry into the EU easier because it will enable Cyprus to show it is not to blame for the lack
of a settlement. On April 5, Foreign Minister Kasoulides said that if Denktash accepts that
Cyprus’s accession is inevitable, then he may change his approach to a settlement because
it would be better for Turkey if a settlement were achieved before accession. If Cyprus enters
the EU before a settlement, then Greek Cypriots will vote on Turkey’s own accession.
Kasoulides argued that EU membership addresses concerns at the heart of a settlement,
especially security because, if Cyprus is in the EU, then there is less potential for instability
on the island and between Greece and Turkey.
In November, the European Commission said that it would support any constitutional
arrangements the two sides reached in a settlement, provided that Cyprus was “able to speak
with one voice in the EU decision-making process.” On June 22, Spain, as holder of the
rotating EU Presidency, called upon the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to
achieve a settlement before the conclusion of accession talks between the EU and Cyprus.
The EU then would accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession.
On August 23, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou said, “it is possible for Turkey to
secure a date for commencing accession negotiations at Copenhagen in December, but it
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cannot avoid its obligations on the Cyprus issue to continue the talks until the problem’s final
solution.” His statement provided a way to prevent the lack of a Cyprus settlement from
impeding Turkey’s EU prospects, but linked Turkey’s eventual EU accession to a Cyprus
settlement, allowing talks to continue for some time.
At its summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, the EU concluded accession talks with
Cyprus, which will sign the accession treaty on April 16, 2003, and become an EU member
on May 1, 2004. The EU confirmed its “strong preference” for accession by a united Cyprus,
and welcomed “the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue
to negotiate” on the basis of the U.N. Secretary General’s proposals.” On December 18, the
Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected the EU’s decision to admit Cyprus, but the government
supported further negotiations. The EU and NATO reached an agreement on EU use of
NATO assets at the summit, part of which stipulates that Cyprus will not take part in EU
military operations conducted using NATO assets once it becomes an EU member because
it is not a member of NATO nor of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The European
Commission said that it would organize an international donors’ meeting for northern Cyprus
when a settlement is reached. On March 12, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement said,
“the breakdown of the U.N. talks is an obstacle for Turkey on the path to the EU.”
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP (U.N.
Forces in Cyprus) is now 1,209 troops and 35 civilian police, with 15 countries participating.
On April 2, 1993, the Secretary General urged a change in financing from having costs borne
by UNFICYP participating countries, contributions, and assessments to assessments. On
May 27, the Council agreed that costs not covered by contributions would be treated as U.N.
expenses. UNFICYP cost about $45.6 million for the period from July 2002 through June
2003. The government of Cyprus contributes one-third of the cost and the government of
Greece contributes $6.5 million annually; the rest comes out of assessments.
U.S. Policy
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement.
The 1974-1978 period was marked by sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter
Administrations and Congress over Turkey’s role on Cyprus. A congressionally mandated
arms embargo was in place against Turkey until September 1978. In general, Congress has
favored measures to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and encourage concessions by
Denktash, while successive administrations have argued that pressures are counterproductive
and have preferred diplomacy. Although Members have not proposed an alternative to the
U.N. talks, they have advocated an active U.S. role. In response, President Reagan created
the State Department post of Special Cyprus Coordinator, and President Clinton named a
Presidential Envoy for Cyprus. The Bush Administration did not fill the position of
Presidential Envoy. Nonetheless, on February 14, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
affirmed that the Administration “fully supports the ongoing U.N. efforts to achieve a
comprehensive settlement” and declared “the U.S. will also remain engaged in efforts to
facilitate a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue.” The United States supports the
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accession of Cyprus to the EU. S.Con.Res. 122, November 18, 2002, expressed
congressional support for Cyprus’ EU membership. The United States strongly supported
the U.N.’s 2002 settlement plan and its revised versions, deeming it “fair,” and encouraged
the parties to put it to referenda.
Since 1978, Congress has appropriated $14 million or $15 million for scholarships,
bicommunal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to
reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on
Cyprus. The United States has been the principal donor for bicommunal projects on the
island. For FY2002, $15 million dollars were appropriated. The Administration has
requested $7.5 million for FY2004. In January 2003, the U.S. State Department’s Special
Cyprus Coordinator said that the United States would do whatever is necessary to ensure that
funds are ready for the implementation of an agreement. On January 20, Denktash claimed
that he had received an offer of U.S. financial aid to help Turkish Cypriots who might be
displaced under the U.N. settlement plan. He suggested that Washington offer the money
instead as compensation to Greek Cypriots if they agreed to stay in the south. He also
questioned whether Congress would approve the funds. The State Department said, on
January 24, 2003, that it is prepared to participate in an international donors’ conference and
to contribute financially in the context of a comprehensive settlement.
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