Order Code RL31339
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts,
the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq
Updated March 17, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts,
the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq
Summary
In his 2002 and 2003 State of the Union messages, President Bush characterized
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States because of its refusal to abandon
its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs as required by U.N. Security
Council resolutions and the potential for it to transfer WMD to terrorist groups.
Since September 2002, the President has said that unless Iraq fully disarms in
cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors, the United States would lead
a coalition to achieve that disarmament militarily. U.S. officials have made clear that
this would include the ouster of Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein’s regime.
Since February 2003, the Administration has stressed that regime change
through U.S.-led military action would yield benefits beyond disarmament, including
liberation from an oppressive regime for the Iraqi people and enhancement of the
prospects for peace and democracy throughout the Middle East. The goal of regime
change in Iraq has been declared U.S. policy since November 1998. Even before
then, U.S. efforts to oust Saddam had been pursued, with varying degrees of
intensity, since the end of the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily involved
U.S. backing for opposition groups inside and outside Iraq, some of which are now
receiving increased U.S. political and financial support and military training.
According to several experts, past efforts to change the regime floundered because
of limited U.S. commitment, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the
efficiency and ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping intelligence and security
forces. Currently, Iraq’s exiled opposition are stepping up their coordination, and
in some cases their military preparations, to be in position to benefit politically from
the collapse of the regime that is expected to result from U.S. military action.
Previous U.S. administrations ruled out major U.S. military action to change Iraq’s
regime, believing such action would be costly, risky, and not necessarily justified by
the level of Iraq’s lack of compliance on WMD disarmament.
Opponents of military action maintain that there is insufficient international
support for unilateral U.S. military action to change Iraq’s regime, that doing so
could destabilize the Middle East and hinder the broader war on terrorism, and that
action could lead to numerous U.S. casualties and a long-term presence in Iraq which
could subject U.S. occupation forces to years of attacks by feuding Iraqi factions and
remnants of Iraq’s military. Others believe that the threat from Saddam’s regime is
manageable through means currently in place, such as containment, especially now
that Iraq is allowing access to all sites by U.N. weapons inspectors. Countries that
oppose the U.S. position cite briefings from chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix
to argue that the inspections process is working and could result in disarmament of
Iraq, without war.
This report will be updated as warranted by major developments.

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Contents
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An Opposition Coalition Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Iraqi National Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Ansar al-Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SCIRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Fragmentation of the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rebuilding an Opposition Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Continued Debate Over Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Post-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Iraq and Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Regime Change Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Military Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Containment/Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Post-War Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
War Crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

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Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts,
the Iraqi Opposition, and Post-War Iraq
The United States has been attempting to change Iraq’s regime since the 1991
Persian Gulf war, although achieving this goal was not declared policy until 1998.
In November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the United States would
seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime. A regime change
policy was endorsed by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998).
Bush Administration officials have emphasized regime change as the cornerstone of
U.S. policy toward Iraq. This paper discusses past and current U.S. efforts to oust
Saddam Hussein and the current debate over the implementation of that policy.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions.1 The revolt in southern Iraq
reached the suburbs of Baghdad, but the well-trained and loyal Republican Guard
forces had survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior
to the U.S. ground offensive, and it defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991.
The Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991, were
able to drive Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and establish an autonomous
zone there; the Kurds remain largely free of Baghdad’s rule today.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Hussein; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose.2 The Administration apparently believed – and this view apparently still is
shared by many experts and U.S. officials – that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
1 Shiites constitute about 65% of Iraq’s population but historically have been repressed and
under-represented in governing bodies by the members of the Sunni Muslim sect. Kurds,
who are not Arabs, constitute about 20% of the population of about 20 million.
2 Tyler, Patrick. “Plan On Iraq Coup Told to Congress.” New York Times, Feb. 9, 1992.

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Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
An Opposition Coalition Emerges
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the postwar rebellions. At the same time, the
Kurdish, Shiite, and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and
diverse movement that appeared to be gaining support internationally. This
opposition coalition seemed to provide a vehicle for the United States to build a
viable overthrow strategy. Congress more than doubled the budget for covert
support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.3
The Iraqi National Congress
The growing opposition coalition took concrete shape in an organization called
the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The INC was formed when the two main
Kurdish militias — the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), headed by Masud
Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani —
participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens of opposition groups. In
October 1992, the major Shiite groups came into the coalition when the INC met in
Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Selected to chair the INC’s Executive Committee
was Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim and U.S.-educated mathematician who
had fled Iraq to Jordan in 1958, 10 years before the Ba’th Party took power in Iraq
(July 1968). He eventually chaired the Petra Bank there, but later ran afoul of
Jordanian authorities on charges of financial malfeasance and he left Jordan in 1989.
Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn
against him.
The INC appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying Iraqi
ethnic groups and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Ba’th Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
publicly united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, “federalism” (see below), the
preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Iraq.4 However, many observers doubted its commitment to
democracy, because most of its groups have an authoritarian internal structure, and
because of inherent tensions among its varied ethnic groups and ideologies.
3 Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
1992.
4 The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by
INC representatives, February 1993.

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The Kurds/KDP and PUK. In committing to the concept of federalism,
the INC platform assured the Kurds substantial autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq,
although some fear the Kurds might seek outright independence. Turkey, which has
a sizable Kurdish population in the areas bordering northern Iraq, particularly fears
that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would likely touch off an effort to unify into a
broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been fighting intermittently for autonomy
since their region was incorporated into the newly formed Iraqi state after World War
I. In 1961, the KDP, then led by founder Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Masud Barzani’s
father, began an insurgency that has continued until today, although interrupted by
periods of autonomy negotiations with Baghdad. Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris,
commanded Kurdish forces against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war but was killed in
that war. The PUK split off from the KDP in 1965; the PUK’s members are
generally more educated, urbane, and left-leaning than those of the KDP. Together,
the PUK and KDP have about 40,000-60,000 fighters, some of which are said to be
increasingly well-trained in conventional military tactics.
Ansar al-Islam. In the mid-1990s, the two main Kurdish parties enjoyed
good relations with a small Kurdish Islamic faction, the Islamic Movement of Iraqi
Kurdistan (IMIK), is headed by Shaykh Ali Abd-al Aziz. Based in Halabja, Iraq,
the IMIK has publicized the effects of Baghdad’s March 1988 chemical attack on that
city, and it allied with the PUK in 1998.
A radical faction of the IMIK split off in 1998, calling itself the Jund al-Islam
(Army of Islam). It later changed its name to Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam).
This faction, led by Mullah Krekar (who was detained in Europe in August 2002 and
now lives in Norway), reportedly is associated with Al Qaeda and has hosted in its
northern Iraq enclave Al Qaeda fighters who fled the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
The leader of the Arab contingent within Ansar al-Islam is said by U.S. officials to
be Abu Musab Zarqawi, an Arab of Jordanian origin who reputedly fought in
Afghanistan. Zarqawi has been linked to Al Qaeda plots in Jordan during the
millenium celebration, as well as to recent attempts to spread the biological agent
ricin in London and possibly other places in Europe. There are about 8,000 in the
Ansar al-Islam enclave, located near the town of Khurmal, including about 600
fighters.5 Mullah Krekar reportedly studied under Shaykh Abdullah al-Azzam, an
Islamic theologian of Palestinian origin who was the spiritual mentor of Osama bin
Laden. Fighters of Ansar al-Islam clashed with the PUK around Halabja in
December 2002, and Ansar gunmen were allegedly responsible for an assassination
attempt against PUK prime minister Barham Salih in April 2002. In his
presentation before the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, Secretary of State
Powell tied Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam to the Iraqi regime, which might view Ansar
al-Islam as a means of pressuring Baghdad’s Kurdish opponents, although many
experts believe those links are tenuous or even non-existent. Some believe the
Ansar enclave is supported by Iran.
SCIRI. Some outside experts have concerns about the alliance between Iran
and another INC component, the Iraqi Shiite Islamic fundamentalist group called the
5 Chivers, C.J. Repulsing Attack By Islamic Militants, “Iraqi Kurds Tell of Atrocities.”
New York Times, December 6, 2002.

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Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was set up in
1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups in Iraq and the Persian
Gulf states. Its leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was the late Ayatollah
Khomeini’s choice to head an Islamic Republic of Iraq. Hakim and his family,
most notably his brother Abd al-Aziz, were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party,
which allegedly was responsible for a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir
of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in
Kuwait. They are sons of the late Ayatollah Muhsin Al Hakim, who was a
prominent Shiite leader in southern Iraq and an associate of Ayatollah Khomeini
when Khomeini was in exile in southern Iraq during 1964-1978. (Another Hakim
brother, Mahdi, was killed in Sudan in May 1990, allegedly by agents of Iraq’s
security services.) Members of the Hizballah organization in Lebanon that held
U.S. hostages in that country during the 1980s often linked release of the Americans
to the release of 17 Da’wa Party prisoners held by Kuwait for those offenses. The
Da’wa Party was founded in the 1960s by an Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqr Al Sadr, a like-minded associate of Ayatollah Khomeini. Baqr Al
Sadr was hung by the Iraqi regime in 1980 for the Da’wa’s alleged responsibility in
fomenting Shiite anti-regime unrest following Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.
SCIRI has about 5,000 fighters organized into a “Badr Corps” (named after a
major battle in early Islam) that conducts forays from Iran into southern Iraq to attack
the Iraqi military and officials there. Although Iran has improved relations with Iraq
over the past few years, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard – which is politically aligned
with Iran’s hard line civilian officials – reportedly continues to provide the Badr
Brigade with weapons and other assistance. However, many Iraqi Shiites view SCIRI
as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Brigade operations in southern Iraq have not
been known to spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi regime. SCIRI has
periodically distanced itself from the INC. Until August 2002 when Abd al-Aziz
al-Hakim joined other opposition figures for meetings in Washington, it had publicly
refused to work openly with the United States or accept U.S. assistance. Press
reports in late 2002 said that factions in Iran differ over whether SCIRI should be
cooperating with the United States and that some Iranian factions are supporting rival
Shiite Islamist groups less inclined to work with Washington. In March 2003, it
was reported by a number of press outlets that a few hundred Badr Brigade fighters
are moving into the Kurdish controlled areas of northern Iraq, possibly to help seize
territory if Saddam Hussein’s regime collapses at the hands of a U.S.-led offensive.
The Fragmentation of the Opposition
The differences within the INC led to its near collapse in the mid-1990s. In
May 1994, the KDP and the PUK began clashing with each other over territory,
customs revenues levied at border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish
enclave’s government based in Irbil. The PUK lined up support from Iran while the
KDP sought and received countervailing backing from its erstwhile nemesis, the
Baghdad government. The infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive
against Iraqi troops in March 1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last
minute. Although it was repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of the less
well-trained and poorly motivated Iraqi units on the front lines facing the Kurds.

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Some INC leaders have pointed to the battle as an indication that the INC could
succeed militarily in the future if it were given additional resources and training.
The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the INC caused the
United States to briefly revisit the “coup strategy” by renewing ties to a separate
group, Iraq National Accord (INA).6 The INA, originally founded in 1990 with
Saudi support, consists of military and security defectors who were perceived as
having ties to disgruntled officials currently serving within their former
organizations. It is headed by Dr. Iyad Alawi, former president of the Iraqi Student
Union in Europe and a physician by training. The INA’s prospects appeared to
brighten in August 1995 when Saddam’s son-in-law Hussein Kamil al-Majid —
architect of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs — defected to Jordan,
suggesting that Saddam’s grip on the military and security services was weakening.
Jordan’s King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from there. The INA
became penetrated by Iraq’s intelligence services and, in June 1996, Baghdad dealt
it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100 INA sympathizers in the
military. Alawi claims that the INA continues to operate throughout Iraq, and it
apparently has rebuilt itself to some extent since the June 1996 arrests. Although it
is now cooperating with the INC, there is a history of friction between the two
groups; the INA reportedly bombed an INC facility in northern Iraq in October 1995.
Iraq’s counteroffensive against the opposition was completed two months later.
In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad to provide armed support for its capture
of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took advantage of the request to strike against the
INC base in Salahuddin, a city in northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA
operatives throughout northern Iraq. In the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq
reportedly executed two hundred oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others.
The United States evacuated from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United
States 650 oppositionists, mostly from the INC.
Rebuilding an Opposition Strategy
For the two years following the opposition’s 1996 setbacks, the Clinton
Administration had little contact with the opposition. In those two years, the INC,
INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations and their
ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998, then
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be “wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations”
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
Iraq’s obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-1998 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam
Hussein. A formal congressional push for a regime change policy began with a
FY1998 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that, among
other provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the
6 An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
coordinate and promote cohesion among the various opposition factions, and to
highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions. The remaining $2 million was used
to translate and publicize documented evidence of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the
documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes,
and translated and analyzed by experts under contract to the U.S. government. In
subsequent years, Congress has appropriated funding for the Iraqi opposition and for
war crimes issues, as shown in the appendix. Some of the war crimes funding has
gone to the opposition-led INDICT (International Campaign to Indict Iraqi War
Criminals) organization for publicizing Iraqi war crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
The clearest indication of congressional support for a more active U.S.
overthrow effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998 – the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998).
The ILA gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles
(and authorized $2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be
designated by the Administration. The Act’s passage was widely interpreted as an
expression of congressional support for the concept of promoting an insurgency by
using U.S. air-power to expand opposition-controlled territory. This idea was
advocated by INC executive director Ahmad Chalabi and some U.S. experts, such as
General Wayne Downing. President Clinton signed the legislation despite reported
widespread doubts within the Clinton Administration about the chances of success
in promoting an opposition insurgency inside Iraq.
The Iraq Liberation Act made the previously unstated policy of promoting
regime change in Iraq official, declared policy. A provision of the ILA states that
it should be the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein. In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly
articulated that regime change was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign
against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December
160-19, 1998). (For information on these crises, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq:
Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy.)
The First Eligibility Designations Under the ILA. Further steps to
promote regime change followed Operation Desert Fox. In January 1999, career
diplomat Frank Ricciardone was named as the State Department’s “Coordinator for
the Transition in Iraq,” – the chief liaison with the opposition. On February 5, 1999,
after consultations with Congress, the President issued a determination (P.D. 99-13)
that the following organizations would be eligible to receive U.S. military assistance
under the Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA; SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the

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Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the Movement for Constitutional
Monarchy (MCM), which is led by Sharif Ali bin al-Hussein, a relative of the
Hashemite monarchs that ruled Iraq from the end of World War I until 1958. The
IMIK and the MCM, in particular, are considered small movements that cannot
contribute much to an overthrow effort. Because of its possible role in contributing
to the formation of Ansar al-Islam, the IMIK is no longer receiving U.S. support,
although it has not formally been taken off the U.S. list of organizations eligible for
assistance under the ILA.
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. In late 1999, three opposition
members began civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in Florida and, in
June 2000, the Clinton Administration announced that another 145 oppositionists
would undergo similar training. The Defense Department-run courses provided civil
affairs training, including instruction in field medicine, logistics, computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficiently organized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. This
restriction reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq.
Continued Debate Over Policy
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s decision not to give the
opposition lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an
indication that the Clinton Administration was skeptical that a renewed overthrow
effort would fare better than previous attempts. Most of those who argued against
increased U.S. support for the opposition maintained that the Iraqi opposition would
not succeed unless backed by direct U.S. military involvement, and that direct U.S.
military action was risky and not justified by the threat posed by Iraq. Some
observers maintained that the potential threat from Saddam Hussein’s regime was
sufficiently grave that direct U.S. military action should be taken. Other critics
suggested the United States focus instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq by
threatening force against Iraq in order to obtain re-entry into Iraq of the U.N.
weapons of mass destruction inspectors that had been absent from Iraq since
December 15, 1998.

As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least: $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation the remaining $5 million

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could be used to aid the seven groups eligible to receive assistance under the ILA.
Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC distribution of aid inside Iraq, on
September 29, 2000 the Clinton Administration reached agreement with the INC to
provide the organization with $4 million in FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark
available) to develop an aid distribution plan and to gather information in Iraq on
Iraqi war crimes. Three days before it left office, the Clinton Administration issued
a required report to Congress that noted that any INC effort to distribute aid in areas
of Iraq under Baghdad’s control would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to
Iraqi recipients of such aid, and to any relief distributors with which the INC
contracts.7
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq changed after the September 11
terrorist attacks, even though no hard evidence linking Iraq to those attacks has come
to light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in President
Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he characterized Iraq
as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued the basic
elements of Clinton Administration policy on Iraq. With no immediate consensus
within the new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow
strategy, Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq,
which the Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its
taking office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist
regional support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan – a modification of the U.N.
sanctions regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reaches Iraq. His plan
offered to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N.
restrictions on exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military
technology.8 The United States asserted that this step would alleviate the suffering
of the Iraqi people. Powell, who has sometimes openly expressed skepticism about
the opposition’s prospects, barely raised the regime change issue during his trip or
in his March 7, 2001 testimony before the House International Relations Committee,
at which he was questioned about Iraq.9 After about a year of negotiations among the
Security Council permanent members, the major feature of the smart sanctions plan
– new procedures that virtually eliminate U.N. review of civilian exports to Iraq –
was adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1409).
7 U.S. Department of State. Washington File. “Clinton Sends Report on Iraq to Congress.”
January 17, 2001.
8 For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program.
9 Perlez, Jane. “Powell Goes on the Road and Scores Some Points.” New York Times,
March 2, 2001.

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CRS-9
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the questions about the wisdom and difficulty of that strategy
that had faced previous administrations were debated early in the Bush
Administration.10 Aside from restating the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush
Administration said and did little to promote that outcome throughout most of its first
year. During his confirmation hearings as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a reported
strong advocate of overthrow, Paul Wolfowitz, said that if there were a real option
to overthrow Saddam Hussein, “I would think it was worthwhile,” although he also
stated that he did not yet see a “plausible plan” for changing the regime. Like its
predecessor, the Bush Administration declined to provide the opposition with lethal
aid, combat training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military help. It eliminated the
separate State Department position of “Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,”
further casting doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy. On February 2,
2001, the Bush Administration confirmed that, shortly after President Bush took
office, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) granted
the INC a license to proceed with only the information gathering portion of the
humanitarian aid distribution plan, thereby withholding U.S. backing for the INC
plan to rebuild its presence inside Iraq.

Many in Congress, on the other hand, continue to support the INC as the
primary vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference to congressional
sentiment, according to several observers, the Bush Administration continued to
expand its ties to the INC despite doubts about its capabilities. In August 2001, the
INC began satellite television broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV.
The station was funded by the ESF aid appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs
of $1 million and an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.11
Policy Post-September 11
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after
September 11, stressing regime change far more than containment. Almost
immediately after the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the Administration
might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force as part of a
“phase two” of the war on terrorism. As noted above, in his January 29, 2002 State
of the Union message, President Bush named Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along
with North Korea and Iran. Vice President Cheney visited the Middle East in March
2002 to consult regional countries about the possibility of confronting Iraq, although
the countries visited reportedly urged greater U.S. attention to the Arab-Israeli
dispute rather than confrontation with Iraq.
Iraq and Al Qaeda. Some in the Administration do not discount the
possibility that Iraq might have had a connection to the September 11 attacks or the
subsequent anthrax mailings, although that does not appear to be a mainstream view
in the Administration. Senior U.S. officials said in September 2002, and again in
10 One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in, Hersh,
Seymour. “The Debate Within.” The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.
11 Sipress, Alan. “U.S. Funds Satellite TV to Iraq.” Washington Post, August 16, 2001.

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CRS-10
January and February 2003, that there is evidence of Iraqi linkages to Al Qaeda,
although some observers have expressed skepticism about such connections because
of the ideological differences between Saddam Hussein’s secular regime and Al
Qaeda’s Islamist character. Secretary of States Powell, as noted above, has pointed
to intelligence information that Ansar al-Islam (see above for the origins of the
group) has links to the Iraqi government.12 Senior officials also have cited
intelligence information that Iraq has provided advice and training to Al Qaeda in the
manufacture and use of chemical weapons, although Administration information
appears to date to the early 1990s when Iraq was politically close to Sudan; bin Laden
and Al Qaeda was based in Sudan during that time (1991-1996).
On the other hand, Baghdad does not control Northern Iraq and some U.S.
officials have played down this theory.13 Others note that Al Qaeda founder Osama
bin Laden sought to raise an Islamic army to fight Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in
1990, arguing against the need for U.S. troops, and that he is more an enemy of
Saddam than a friend. In the Administration view, the two share similar anti-U.S.
goals, which might outweigh ideological differences and propel them into tactical or
strategic cooperation.

WMD Threat Perception. Other U.S. officials maintain that Iraq’s
purported commitment to developing WMD – coupled with its support for terrorist
groups to which Iraq might transfer WMD – constitute an unacceptable potential
threat to the United States and that major U.S. military action is justified if Iraq
refuses to disarm voluntarily. U.S. officials say the September 11, 2001 attacks
demonstrated that the United States cannot wait for threats to gather before acting,
but must instead act preemptively or preventively. In making a case for possible
military action, senior U.S. officials have asserted a WMD threat as follows:
! Iraq has worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years
since U.N. weapons inspectors left Iraq and has failed to comply
with 17 U.N. resolutions, including Resolution 1441 (November 8,
2002), calling for its complete elimination of all WMD programs.
In a presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003,
Secretary of State Powell presented intelligence information that Iraq
has sought to deceive the new U.N. inspections body by concealing
chemical and biological weapons and production facilities, and by
importing equipment for a nuclear program as well as banned
missile programs. However, recent statements by International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials indicate they believe Iraq
does not have an active nuclear weapons program, and some
maintain that the intelligence information presented by Powell is
open to a number of interpretations and is best verified by
inspections.

12 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Great Terror.” The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.
13 “U.S. Uncertain About Northern Iraq Group’s Link to Al Qaida.” Dow Jones Newswire,
March 18, 2002.

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CRS-11
! Iraq has used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds)
and against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran). The implication of this assertion
is that Iraq would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD
against the United States or its allies. Others note that Iraq has not
used such weapons against adversaries, such as the United States,
that have the capability of destroying Iraq’s government in
retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of massive retaliation, Iraq did not
use WMD against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. On the other
hand, Iraq defied U.S. warnings and did burn Kuwait’s oil fields.
Some believe that Saddam Hussein, faced with the prospect of
defeat and removal from office, might unleash any WMD
capabilities against U.S. forces or against Israel as a desperate
measure.
! Iraq could transfer its WMD to terrorists such as Al Qaeda who
could use these weapons to cause hundreds of thousands of deaths
in the United States or elsewhere. Critics of the Administration cite
presentations by CIA Director Tenet to Congress in late 2002,
stating the CIA view that Iraq is likely to transfer WMD to terrorists
if the United States were to attack Iraq. At that point, Saddam
Hussein would be left with little incentive not to cooperate with
terrorist groups capable of striking at U.S. interests.
Regime Change Scenarios. To counter what it sees as an unacceptable
threat from Iraq, the Administration demanded complete disarmament by Iraq under
Resolution 1441. The Administration downplayed the goal of regime change after
President Bush’s September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations General
Assembly, in which he focused on enforcing U.N. resolutions that require Iraqi
disarmament. However, the Administration has resumed stressing this goal since
February 2002 as diplomacy at the United Nations has run its course. Active
Administration engagement with the opposition since mid-2002 suggested that the
Administration was working actively toward the regime change goal, whether or not
there was major military action against Iraq. In the Administration view, a friendly
government in Baghdad is required if the international community is to rid Iraq of
WMD and links to terrorist groups.
Since mid-2002, the Administration has tried to broaden the Iraqi opposition
and build up its capabilities. In particular, the Administration has been expanding
its ties to Shiite Islamist groups and to groups composed of ex-military and security
officers, as well as to some ethnic-based groups. Some view the outreach to non-
INC figures, particularly ex-military officers, as a signal that the Bush Administration
wanted to return to the “coup strategy” pursued on several occasions in previous
administrations. The groups and individuals with which the Bush Administration
has had increasing contact with include the following:
! Iraqi National Movement. It formed in 2001 as an offshoot of the
INC. Its leaders include ex-senior military officer Hassan al-Naqib
(who was part of an early leadership body of the INC); Hatim
Mukhlis, who claims support of some in Saddam’s Tikriti clan; and
ex-senior military officer Khalid al-Ubaydi.

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CRS-12
! Iraqi National Front. Another grouping of ex-military officers,
founded in March 2000 by Tawfiq al-Yasseri. Yasseri, a Shiite
Muslim ex-military officer, headed Iraq’s military academy and
participated and was wounded in the anti-Saddam uprisings
immediately following the 1991 Gulf war.
! Iraqi Free Officers and Civilians Movement. Established in 1996 by
ex-military officer Najib al-Salhi. This group works closely with
the INC. Salhi defected in 1995 after serving as commander of
several tank units in the Republican Guard and regular military.
! Higher Council for National Salvation. Based in Denmark, it was
formally established on August 1, 2002. It is headed by Wafiq al-
Samarra’i, a former head of Iraqi military intelligence. Ex-chief of
staff of Iraq’s military (1980-1991) Nizar al-Khazraji, who is based
in Denmark since fleeing Iraq in 1996, may also be a member.
Khazraji was placed under travel restrictions by Danish officials in
late November 2002 after saying he wanted to leave Denmark. He
is under investigation there for alleged involvement in Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1988. Danish authorities
said on March 17, 2003 that Khazraji had unexpectedly left his home
there, raising questions about whether he is defying the travel
restrictions placed on him. His whereabouts are unknown, but some
believe he might be trying to go to Iraq to play a part in a post-
Saddam regime there.
! Iraqi Turkmen Front. A small, ethnic Turkomen-based grouping,
generally considered aligned with Turkish policy on Iraq.
Turkomens number about 350,000 and live mainly in northern Iraq.
! The Islamic Accord of Iraq. Based in Damascus, this is another
Shiite Islamic Party, but it is considered substantially less pro-
Iranian than SCIRI or the Da’wa Party (see above), other Shiite
Islamic parties with which the Administration has had contact. The
Islamic Accord is headed by Jamil Wakil. Many Accord members
are followers of Ayatollah Shirazi, an Iranian cleric who was the
spiritual leader of a group called the Islamic Front for the Liberation
of Bahrain (IFLB), which allegedly attempted to overthrow the
government of Bahrain in the early 1980s.
! The Assyrian Democratic Movement, an ethnic-based movement
headed by Secretary-General Yonadam Yousif Kanna. Iraq’s
Assyrian community is based primarily in northern Iraq. There is a
strong diaspora presence in the United States as well. After building
ties to this group over the past year, the Bush Administration
formally began incorporating the Assyrian Democratic Movement
into its meetings with the Iraqi opposition in September 2002.

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CRS-13
The Administration has sought to bring the groups above, as well as the more
well established opposition organizations, into its broader effort to confront Iraq.
On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002, President Bush
authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations forces to
destabilize Saddam Hussein. In early August 2002, the State and Defense
Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups – the INC, the INA, the
KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM – to Washington for meetings with senior
officials, including a video link to Vice President Cheney. The meetings were held
to show unity within the opposition and among different agencies of the U.S.
government, which have tended to favor different opposition groups. In advance of
the visit, the Defense Department agreed to fund the information gathering portion
of the INC’s activities; the State Department had refused to fund those activities,
which are conducted inside Iraq, because of strains between the INC and other
opposition groups and questions about INC use of U.S. funds. On December 9,
2002, the Bush Administration added six of the factions discussed above (all except
the Higher Council for National Salvation) to the list of “democratic opposition
organizations” eligible to receive drawdowns under the ILA. The Bush
Administration has applauded efforts over the past year by these groups to hold
meetings to coordinate with each other and with the INC and other groups. One such
meeting, in July 2002 in London and jointly run with the INC, attracted over 70 ex-
military officers.
Possibly in anticipation of a coming war against Iraq, on December 9, 2002,
President Bush issued a determination to draw down the remaining $92 million in
defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act for the INA,
the INC, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM “and to such other Iraqi
opposition groups designated by me under the Act before or after this determination.”
This latter phrase suggested that some of the draw downs might go to the six groups
designated - also on December 9 - as eligible to receive ILA draw downs (see above).
The announcement appeared to be part of reported plan to train about 5,000
oppositionists in tasks that could assist U.S. forces, possibly including combat units.14
An initial group of 3,000 reportedly has been selected, and some or all of this group
is undergoing training at an air base (Taszar) in Hungary, according to press reports.15
Very few observers within or outside the Administration believe that military or
covert action by the opposition alone will bring about a change of regime,
considering Saddam Hussein’s strong grip on the military, the security service, and
Iraq’s ruling Ba’th Party.
During December 14-17, 2002, with U.S. officials attending, major Iraqi
opposition groups held a conference in London. In advance of the meeting, the
Bush Administration appointed NSC official Zalmay Khalilzad to be a liaison to the
Iraqi opposition. The conference was organized by the same six groups whose
leaders visited Washington in August 2002, but included other groups as well, and
they discussed whether the opposition should declare a provisional government. The
14 Deyoung, Karen, and Daniel Williams. “Training of Iraqi Exiles Authorized.”
Washington Post, October 19, 2002.
15 Williams, Daniel. U.S. Army to Train 1,000 Iraqi Exiles. Washington Post, December
18, 2002.

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CRS-14
Administration reportedly opposes that step on the grounds that it is premature and
would give the impression that outside powers are determining Iraq’s political
structure. The meeting ended with agreement to form a 65-member follow-up
committee, which some criticized as weighted heavily toward Shiite Islamist groups
such as SCIRI. The opposition met again during February 24-27, 2003 in northern
Iraq. Against the urging of U.S. representatives at the meeting, the opposition
agreed to form a six man committee that would prepare for a transition regime,
although it stopped short of declaring a provisional government. The six included
PUK leader Jalal Talabani, KDP leader Masud Barzani, SCIRI leader Mohammad
Baqr Al Hakim, Chalabi, INA leader Iyad Alawi, and a former Iraqi foreign minister
Adnan Pachachi. Iran allowed Iraqi oppositionists to cross from Iran into northern
Iraq to hold that session.
Military Options. The Administration asserted on March 17, 2003 that
diplomatic options to disarm Iraq peacefully had failed, and reportedly began turning
its attention to military action. Press accounts indicate that most U.S. military
planners believe that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the U.S. military, while
achievable, requires a major U.S. military effort. A U.S. military buildup in the
region, apparently complete, includes about 250,000 U.S. personnel joined by about
40,000 UK troops, all based primarily in Kuwait. However, the outlines of the U.S.
battle plan has not been made public, and it is not known if a U.S. attack would
involve all forces deployed.
A major issue in the debate over any military plan appears to be over whether
Iraq’s military would quickly unravel or rebel against Saddam Hussein in the face of
U.S. military action or whether it would fight hard to defend the regime. Some
maintain that Iraqi forces would likely defect or surrender in large numbers, as
happened in the 1991 Gulf war, when faced with a militarily superior force. Others
contrast the current situation with the 1991 war and argue that Iraqi forces would
hold together and fight fiercely because they are defending Iraq itself, not an
occupation of Kuwait. Some believe the Iraqi military would quickly retreat into
urban areas and hope to inflict large numbers of casualties on American forces. On
March 16, 2003, Saddam Hussein divided Iraq into four military regions to prepare
for conflict, with Baghdad and its environs headed by Saddam, and other regions
headed by his loyalists, including younger son Qusay. However, it is unclear what
Iraq’s battle strategy will be.
Containment/Deterrence. Some analysts had thought the Administration
would decide not to use military force to change Iraq’s regime or reduce its WMD
capabilities. Some Members of Congress, some outside experts, and reportedly
many senior military leaders believed Iraq is currently well contained by sanctions
and the U.S./British enforced no-fly zones and that, as long as Iraq continues to allow
access to U.N. weapons inspections under Resolution 1441, Iraq could not pose an
immediate threat to U.S. national security. Inspections resumed on November 27,
2002, and encountered few, if any, Iraqi obstructions in about 700 inspections of
about 400 different sites, as of mid March 2003. Others believe that, even if Iraq
were to acquire major new WMD capabilities, Iraq could be deterred by U.S. overall
strategic superiority, presumably including the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

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CRS-15
Although judging Iraq in non-compliance with an in further material breach of
its disarmament obligations, the Administration had said as late as February 2003
that war could be avoided if Iraq dramatically improved its cooperation and
voluntarily disarms. The possibility of war became clearer following the mid-March
breakdown of U.N. diplomacy over whether or not the U.N. Security Council should
authorize war against Iraq for failing to comply with Resolution 1441. The
diplomatic breakdown followed several briefings for the U.N. Security Council by
the director of the U.N. inspection body UNMOVIC (U.N. Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission) Hans Blix and the director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), most recently on March 7, 2003. The briefings were
generally critical of Iraq for failing to pro-actively cooperate to clear up outstanding
questions about Iraq’s WMD program, but the latter two briefings (February 24 and
March 7) noted progress in clearing up outstanding WMD questions. Security
Council opponents of war, including France, Russia, China, and Germany, said the
briefings indicated that Iraq could be disarmed peacefully and that inspections should
be given more time. The United States, Britain, Spain, and Bulgaria disagreed,
maintaining that Iraq had not fundamentally decided to disarm, and would continue
only to try to divide the Council and avert war, while preserving WMD capabilities.
Post-War Issues
Another major issue is that of the character of the regime that would replace the
current one. The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation of and instability in Iraq
that existed in prior years are present in the current debate over regime change.
Some observers believe that, in exchange for not acting militarily against Iraq, the
Bush Administration would accept a replacement of Saddam Hussein by a military
or Ba’th Party figure who is not necessarily committed to democracy but would
comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. The Administration said on March 17,
2003 that Saddam could avert war by going into exile along with his inner circle,
although there is no indication he is preparing to do so. The Administration
position indicates it would likely still move militarily if Saddam were to cede power
to one of his sons or longtime associates on the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC). (The RCC, chaired by Saddam, is Iraq’s highest governing body.) Over the
past 3 years, Saddam has given his younger son Qusay increasing authority over key
security bodies and he has been rising in the Ba’th Party structure as well. Saddam’s
elder son Uday controls some media organs but is considered hot-headed and
impulsive. Other key associates to Saddam that have long been considered by
experts as potential successors include Vice Chairman of the RCC Izzat Ibrahim and
first Vice President Taha Yasin Ramadan; their succession would not likely satisfy
U.S. demands for averting war.
The Administration is planning for a post-Saddam regime. The Administration
asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts the government of Saddam Hussein,
it will do what is necessary to bring about a stable, democratic successor regime that
complies with all applicable U.N. resolutions. Some press reports say that the
Administration is planning for an approximately 18-month occupation of Iraq led
primarily by U.S. military officials, working in concert with Iraqis to build a

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CRS-16
democratic post-war Iraq.16 The Iraqi opposition, even those groups most closely
associated with the United States, opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running
a post-war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and
unified to rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. Some oppositionists said
on March 17, 2003 that they detected some softening of the U.S. position on the post-
war occupation and that the United States might try to turn over governance of Iraq
to an interim authority fairly soon after the fighting ends.
Some critics believe that U.S. occupation plans could face difficulties in Iraq.
Some believe that Iraq’s Kurds are likely to come into conflict with any Turkish
troops that might enter northern Iraq to secure Turkish interests. Others believe that
U.S. occupation forces might face protracted guerrilla from remnants of the Iraqi
military, possibly fighting alongside Iraqi civilians against U.S. forces. Others say
U.S. forces might become caught in the crossfire among ethnic and political factions
that might fight each other for power in post-war Iraq. Some experts fear that a post-
war Iraq will inevitably fall under control of SCIRI and other Shiite Islamist forces
who are the best organized opponents of the Iraqi regime. Shiites constitute about
60% of Iraq’s population, but have traditionally been under-represented in Iraq’s
Sunni Muslim-dominated government.
As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is running
a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are meeting in working
groups to address issues that will confront a successor government. The working
groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1) transitional justice; (2) public
finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic principles; (5) water,
agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human services; and (7) economy
and infrastructure. Phase two, which reportedly will begin soon, includes working
groups on (1) education; (2) refugees, internally-displaced persons, and migration
policy; (3) foreign and national security policy; (4) defense institutions and policy;
(5) free media; (6) civil society capacity-building; (7) anti-corruption measures; and
(8) oil and energy.
War Crimes. An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is
whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes and,
if so, whether that should be pursued while Saddam is still in power. The
Administration reportedly has decided that, if there is U.S. military action that
overthrows Saddam, that he and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq. The
Administration is gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his
associates. Those reportedly to be sought for trial include Saddam; his two sons
Uday and Qusay; Ali Hassan al-Majid, for alleged use of chemicals against the
Kurds; Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi; Taha Yasin Ramadan; first Vice President
and number three in the regime; Izzat Ibrahim, Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary
Command Council and formally number two in the regime; Barzan al-Tikriti,
Saddam’s half brother; Watban al-Tikriti and Sabawi al-Tikriti, both other half
brothers of Saddam and former leaders of regime intelligence bureaus; Tariq Aziz,
16 Sanger, David and James Dao. U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq.
New York Times, January 6, 2002.

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CRS-17
deputy Prime Minister and foremost regime spokesman; and Aziz Salih Noman,
governor of Kuwait during Iraq’s occupation of that country.
The war crimes issue has been addressed by previous U.S. administrations and
the international community. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29,
1990) calls on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related
atrocities to the United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1992 (P.L. 102-138, October 28, 1991, Section 301) stated the sense of Congress
that the President should propose to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal
for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137
(passed the House November 13, 1997); S.Con.Res. 78 (passed the Senate March
13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October
31, 1998).
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993,
after Clinton took office. Since April 1997, the Administration has supported
INDICT, a private organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the
arrest of 12 alleged Iraqi war criminals, including Saddam and his two sons.
Although apparently lacking international support, in August 2000 then U.S.
Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer said that the United States
wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established, focusing on “nine major
criminal episodes.” These include the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish
civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds) and the forced relocation
of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which an estimated 50,000 to
182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against Iran; post-war crimes
against humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes against Kuwait
(including oil field fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations. In FY2001 and
again in FY2002, the State Department contributed $4 million to a U.N. “Iraq War
Crimes Commission,” to be spent if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war crimes is formed.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, appears to have divergent views on the
mechanisms for promoting regime change, although there appears to be widespread
agreement in Congress that regime change is desirable and an appropriate U.S.
policy. However, there is substantial disagreement over whether a major military
offensive is the most desirable option for achieving that objective. On December 20,
2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to
readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States. The
resolution did not call for new U.S. steps to overthrow Saddam Hussein but a few
Members called for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in their floor statements in
support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In

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CRS-18
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members – Senators John McCain,
Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and Trent Lott
and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr. – wrote to
President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for operations
inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action increased in the fall of 2002,
Members debated the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result.
Congress adopted H.J.Res. 114, authorizing the President to use military force
against Iraq if he determines that doing so is in the national interest and will enforce
U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. The measure passed the House on
October 11, 2002 by a vote of 296-133, and the Senate the following day by a vote
of 77-23. The legislation was signed into law on October 16, 2002 (P.L. 107-243).
The 108th Congress was sworn in on January 7, 2003. It has held some hearings
on issues of post-war reconstruction and the effects of a war on the Middle East
region as a whole, as well as the likely costs of the fighting and reconstruction. Some
Members have made floor statements and given speeches and press conferences to
state their views on whether or not force should be used to obtain Iraq’s disarmament.

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CRS-19
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
Appropriated Economic Support Funds (E.S.F.)
to the Opposition
(Figures in millions of dollars)
Unspecified
War
INC
Broadcasting
Opposition
Total
Crimes
Activities
FY 1998
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
(RFE/RL)
FY 1999
3.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY 2000
2.0
8.0
10.0
(P.L. 106-113)
FY 2001
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
(P.L. 106-429)
(aid
(INC radio)
distribution
inside Iraq)
FY 2002
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
Total,
15.0
9.0
11.0
43.0
78.0
FY1998- FY 2002
FY2003
25.0
25.0
FY2004
0


0
(request)
Notes: The figures above do not include defense articles and services provided under the Iraq
Liberation Act. During FY1999-FY2000, approximately $5 million worth of services, out of the $97
million authorized by the Act, was obligated to the opposition, and $1 million of that has been spent,
as of late December 2002. The figures provided above also do not include any covert aid provided,
the amounts of which are not known from open sources. In addition, during each of FY2001 and
FY2002, the Administration has donated $4 million to a “U.N. War Crimes Commission” fund, to be
used if a war crimes tribunal is formed. Those funds were drawn from U.S. contributions to U.N.
programs.

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