Order Code RL31671
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Updated March 13, 2003
Sharon A. Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Summary
U.N. inspections of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs
resumed in November 2002 after a 4-year hiatus. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441 granted Iraq a final chance to disarm. Given Iraq’s history of thwarting WMD
inspections, many have low expectations for the success of inspections. This report,
which will be updated, analyzes the challenges and opportunities of inspections in
light of new U.N. Security Council authorities and Congress’s authorization to use
U.S. force against Iraq (P.L. 107-243). The success of these inspections will have a
direct impact on whether U.S. military force is used to eliminate the threat of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
On the plus side, new inspections have strengthened authorities under the new
U.N. resolution, including unimpeded access to all sites and interviewing Iraqi
officials privately, and they utilize new technologies. There is also a better
relationship between U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) than there was
between its predecessor and the IAEA. Inspections, rather than military strikes, could
encourage defectors to provide critical information and might facilitate uncovering
links between WMD and terrorism. Inspections conducted under the threat of
military strikes have likely increased the pressure on Iraq to comply. On the negative
side, inspectors face new practical, technical, and political challenges. New
regulations for sharing intelligence and inspector recruitment may hinder inspections
and Iraq has had four years to potentially hide weapons activities in dual-use
facilities. The threat of war could increase pressure on inspectors to produce some
definitive knowledge and could potentially politicize their investigations. Ultimately,
judging Iraq’s compliance may rely less on evidence (or lack thereof) of obstruction,
than on assumptions about the effectiveness and utility of inspections at this juncture.
UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Blix and IAEA Director General ElBaradei
have reported five times to the UN Security Council since inspections began. On
December 19, 2002, Blix and ElBaradei reported that Iraq’s December 7th declaration
of its activities was inadequate. The chief inspectors delivered status reports on the
inspection effort on January 9, 2003, January 27, February 14, and March 7. Each
time, the reports noted that Iraqi cooperation on process was good, but that
substantive evidence of disarmament was lacking. On February 5, Secretary of State
Colin Powell briefed the Security Council on Iraq’s efforts to evade disarmament
using intelligence sources. Security Council members seem to agree that Iraq has
failed to cooperate fully, particularly in the substance of disarmament, but they
disagree on whether inspections should continue or whether war is necessary to
disarm Iraq.
See CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for
Congress, and other listings under “Iraq-U.S. Confrontation” in the Current
Legislative Issues section of the CRS products homepage.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A New Inspection Regime: Resolution 1441 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Protocols for Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Timeline for Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Challenges of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Opportunities of Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Milestones in the Inspection Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Evaluating Iraq’s December 7 Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
January 27 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
February 5 Powell Briefing to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
February 14 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
March 7 Report to UN Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
“Clusters Document” & Key Disarmament Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
U.S. Assistance to Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Congressional Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

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Iraq: U.N. Inspections for
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introduction
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council gave Iraq “a final
opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the
Council” with the adoption of Resolution 1441. Iraq formally accepted the
resolution and inspectors began their work on November 27. On December 7, Iraq
provided a 12,000-page declaration of its current capabilities, which largely recycled
old declarations and maintains that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
capabilities. On December 19th, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),1
the two organizations charged with inspecting Iraq, reported that the declaration was
incomplete. UNMOVIC and the IAEA told the U.N. Security Council that Baghdad
“missed an opportunity” to come clean about new arms programs.
Since mid-November 2002, UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors have conducted
750 inspections at 550 sites. They have conducted unannounced inspections,
interviewed Iraqi personnel, taken samples, and collected documents. Although Iraq
initially objected to reconnaissance flights (by U-2, Mirage 4 and Russian Antonov
aircraft) and reportedly actively discouraged scientists from being interviewed in
private, by mid-February Iraq acquiesced to these rights of the inspectorate. Both
UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei have generally characterized Iraqi cooperation as good on process and
lacking on substance.
UN Security Council Resolution 1441 states that “the Council has repeatedly
warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued
violations of its obligations” (emphasis added). The intense public debate on
inspections can be linked to the threat of war that hangs over Iraq if it does not
comply with all relevant UN resolutions. From March to September 2002, Iraq
repeatedly attempted to attach conditions to the return of inspectors (such as a
comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and the end of sanctions).
Following President Bush’s September 12th speech to the United Nations, and
passage of Congress’ resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq (P.L. 107-
243), however, the urgency attached to inspections increased dramatically.2 A key
1 See UNMOVIC’s and IAEA’s web sites: [www.un.org/Depts/UNMOVIC/] and
[www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/index.html]
2 See [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html] for text of President
Bush’s speech.

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CRS-2
question to consider is: what purpose do inspections now serve? Are they a trip-wire
for military action to disarm Saddam Hussein, or are they a continuation of an
ongoing inspection and disarmament process?
In March 2002, before war against Iraq seemed imminent, National Security
Advisor Condoleeza Rice remarked in an interview that:
We need to be very clear on the purpose of weapons inspections. These are not
inspections for inspections’ sake. They are instrumental to make sure that ... Iraq
is not trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In fact they were supposed
to be the ability to give testimony that there are no such programs. And so when
we focus on weapons inspections in Iraq, we have to focus on weapons
inspections that would be effective enough to be sure that this man is not trying
to do what we know he has tried to do over the last 20 years. Ultimately, the
United States believes that regime change in Iraq is going to be best for the Iraqi
people and for the region. But clearly weapons inspections that are tough,
weapons inspections that cannot be challenged, weapons inspections in which
Saddam Hussein is not trying to soften the edges of them would be a helpful step
forward.3
Few doubt the difficulty of establishing confidence that Iraq is free of weapons
of mass destruction. On the one hand, inspections in Iraq have the logically
impossible task of proving a negative – that Iraq is not trying to acquire WMD. For
those who believe that inspections cannot provide such assurances, obstruction of
those inspections hints at (or to some, proves) the concealment of some WMD-
related activities.4 In this view, even cooperation in the process of inspections
provides few assurances of the absence of WMD programs, and the failure of
inspections to turn up evidence of WMD-related activities would, in this view, not
confer innocence, but illustrate the shortcomings of inspections.
For some observers who are opposed to inspections, a key assumption is that the
task of disarming Iraq is insurmountable without genuine Iraqi cooperation, which
requires the leadership in Iraq to give up its WMD aspirations. The Bush
Administration in January 2003 cited South Africa, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as
models of cooperative disarmament and contrasted Iraq’s actions with those of the
three models.5 The former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM (U.N. Special
3 N e w s m a k e r I n t e r v i e w w i t h J i m L e h r e r , M a r c h 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 ,
[www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june02/rice_3-11.html]
4 In the same interview, Rice said: “We have a country that continues to flaunt its
international obligations undertaken in 1991 in the armistice, that continues to try to acquire
weapons of mass destruction. After all, there is a reason that Saddam Hussein does not want
weapons inspections in Iraq. It’s…obviously he’s got something to hide.”
[www.pbs. org/newshour/bb/white_house/jan-june02/rice_3-11.html]
5 “What Does Disarmament Look Like?” The White House, January 23, 2003. See
[www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/disarmament/]. These examples minimize key
differences in the situations. For one, Ukraine and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons
from the breakup of the Soviet Union and might not ever have had nuclear weapons
ambitions, and second, the South African government, according to many, acted to
(continued...)

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CRS-3
Commission), Charles Duelfer, has compared inspections in Iraq with those
conducted in Germany between World War I and World War II, which were
ultimately unsuccessful.6 Duelfer argues that this kind of coercive disarmament by
an international organization is doomed to failure. CIA Director George Tenet
remarked in a hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on
February 11, 2003, that “unless he [Saddam Hussein] provides the data to build on,
provides the access, provides the unfettered access that he’s supposed to, provides
us with surveillance capability, there’s little chance you are going to find weapons
of mass destruction under the rubric he’s created inside the country.”7
Other observers, in support of inspections, point to the knowledge gained from
1991 to 1998 by inspectors about the extent of Iraq’s WMD programs, to the
uncertainties of waging war against an opponent that may have and be inclined to use
WMD, and to the value in an approach that has broad international support. Some
question the ability of intelligence agencies alone to detect WMD programs, citing
reports of the CIA’s lack of knowledge about Iraq’s WMD programs prior to 1991
and the evident surprise about the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests.8 In the
nonproliferation community, most agree that treaties and agreements ultimately
cannot stop a country that is determined to acquire WMD, but rather make the
process more difficult and costly, thereby buying time for political change. In the
case of Iraq, four years without inspections elapsed with relatively little public
debate, but the tragedies of September 11, 2001 seem to have convinced many
observers that delay in disarming Iraq could increase the threat to international
security. A relatively new concern in the debate on Iraq’s disarmament is the alleged
support Iraq might provide to terrorists. Public opinion appears to be mixed on
whether there is proof that Iraq has links to Al Qaeda, but the fear that Iraq might
have incentive to provide WMD materials or weapons to terrorists, is viewed by
many as a reason to complete the task of Iraqi disarmament quickly.
The inspectors face multiple tasks. They must resolve outstanding issues that
remained in 1998 when inspectors left the country, they must investigate whatever
activities may have taken place between 1998 and 2002, and they must provide
assurances that no new activities related to WMD are ongoing. Just as inspections
may not give 100% confidence in a result, so might not military strikes. Much may
depend on follow-up verification.
Some key issues to consider in judging the efficacy of the inspections include:
5 (...continued)
dismantle its nuclear weapons when it became clear that regime change was inevitable.
6 “How Baghdad Divided the Conquerors,” Los Angeles Times, June 11, 2000.
7 Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, Hearing on “Threats to U.S. Security”
before the Senate Select Intelligence committee, February 11, 2003.
8 “The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003. “US intelligence did not detect Iraq’s nuclear program until it was uncovered after
Desert Storm in 1991. It did not find out about the Iraqi biological weapons program until
1995, with some help from the defection of Hussein Kamel.”

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CRS-4
! What constitutes evidence of noncompliance? To some,
noncompliance is equated with anything less than full cooperation
(i.e., unless compliance is proven, Iraq is noncompliant); to others,
there must be proof that Iraq is producing weapons of mass
destruction.
! What are the risks of continuing inspections? To some, continuing
inspections gives Iraq more time to produce weapons of mass
destruction; to others, continuing inspections makes it more likely
that any covert programs will be uncovered.
! If inspections uncover signs of Iraqi WMD activity, is this a sign of
the failure or the success of inspections?
! Can coercive inspections ever be effective? To some, only
cooperative inspections provide full assurances, while to others,
inspections provide an invaluable source of information that cannot
be gained from other means.
! What is the best means of preventing the transfer of WMD
technologies or capabilities from Iraq to terrorists? To some,
military force is the best way quickly and irrevocably to disarm Iraq
of its WMD capabilities to forestall such an action; to others,
military action could unintentionally create an environment
conducive to terrorist acquisition of WMD-related items.
Background9
The inspections conducted in Iraq following the Gulf War verified Iraq’s
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons
Convention, and the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of bacteriological or
chemical weapons warfare. From May 1991 to December 1998, UNSCOM and the
IAEA’s Action Team on Iraq conducted almost 300 inspections at over 1,000
facilities. Iraq’s programs to develop biological weapons, chemical weapons, and
nuclear weapons surprised even those knowledgeable in those areas. IAEA
inspections uncovered a Manhattan-Project-like nuclear program, which employed
thousands of scientists and explored many avenues of producing weapons-grade
material. Nonetheless, Iraq had not produced any real weapons-grade material,
9 The two official UN assessments of unresolved disarmament tasks in Iraq are the so-called
Amorim report, U.N. Security Council S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, Final Report of the
Panel on Disarmament and Current and Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification
I s s u e s a n d U N S C O M ’ s r e p o r t S / 1 9 9 9 / 9 4 ( b o t h a v a i l a b l e a t
[www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/index.htm]) For a comprehensive, unofficial assessment see
“Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment,” (UK: International Institute for
Strategic Studies) September 9, 2002 and “Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Inspections and an
Assessment of Their Accomplishments,” in Arms Control Today, October 2002, Volume 32
Number 8. For unclassified assessments by the US and UK intelligence communities, see
“ I r a q ’ s W e a p o n s o f M a s s D e s t r u c t i o n P r o g r a m s , ”
[www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.pdf] and “Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the Br itish Government,”
[www.news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdoss
ier.pdf]

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CRS-5
although it did have a crash program to secretly divert highly enriched uranium under
IAEA safeguards for a warhead, as well as a crude weapons design. Inspections also
uncovered bulk biological weapons agent production capability and a rudimentary
delivery capability. Much about Iraq’s biological weapons program is still unknown.
In contrast, Iraq’s capabilities in chemical weapons and missiles were relatively well-
known. Inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents,
and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals (but the fate of about 31,600 chemical
munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, 4,000 tons of chemical precursors and Iraq’s
capabilities in producing VX agent are still unknown). Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq
had a robust missile force and production capability, most of which was destroyed
in the war. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles remained after the war;
inspectors accounted for all but two.10
The history of inspections in Iraq is well-known and well-documented. After
the first few years, most of the breakthroughs in knowledge about Iraqi WMD
programs either resulted from or benefitted from intelligence tips from governments
or from information provided by defectors.11 In particular, the defection of Hussein
Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, in 1995, provided an intelligence windfall
about nuclear and biological weapons programs. (Kamel was subsequently lured
back to Iraq and killed shortly thereafter.)
The shortcomings of the inspections between 1991 and 1998 are also well-
known. Iraqi officials frequently delayed inspections, spied on inspectors (bugging
hotels and offices), harassed inspectors and lied about its capabilities.12 Major
problems included interviewing scientists and engineers with Iraqi “minders” in the
room, tip-offs of short-notice inspections, and exclusion from “sensitive sites.” The
eight presidential palaces became a lightning rod for obstruction, with Iraq
complaining of violated sovereignty and accusing inspectors of spying.13 Former
inspectors have also detailed stories of confrontation and intimidation, including
shooting over the heads of inspectors, telephone threats, ransacking of hotel rooms,
verbal and physical abuse, as well as Iraq’s efforts to infiltrate the inspection regime
with spies.14 In addition, Iraqis systematically destroyed or removed evidence to
10 See Kenneth Katzman, CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy and Steve Bowman, Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons
(CBW) Capabilities, CRS Report 98-129.
11 See “Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-
Year Review,” Sponsored by the Institute for Science and Security, “Uncovering the Secret
Program – Initial Inspections, talk by Demetrius Perricos, Former Deputy Leader of the
IAEA Action Team. [www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/perricos.html] . See also Gary
M i l h o l l i n , “ T h e Ir a q i Bomb,” New Y o r k e r , F e b r u a r y 1 , 1 9 9 3 .
[www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/1993/iraqibomb.html]
12 See October 8, 2002 briefing by DIA official John Yurechko to Pentagon reporters, at:
[www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2002/iraq-021008-dod01.htm]
13 Although inspectors were allowed to visit one of those sites, Iraq’s control of access
reportedly made the visit worthless.
14 Jonathan Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment:
(continued...)

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CRS-6
mislead inspectors about the capabilities of certain facilities. Over the 7 years,
however, inspectors developed their own techniques for getting around obstacles that
the Iraqis placed in their way. They made better use of intelligence resources,
developed tactics to mislead the Iraqis about intended destinations, and improved
interviewing techniques.
Two other features of the inspections from 1991 to 1998 were political friction
between UNSCOM and the IAEA, and increasing dissent among the permanent five
members (P-5) of the UN Security Council. According to some observers,
UNSCOM and the IAEA clashed over several issues, including sharing of
information, conduct of inspections, and approach to inspections. There were also
reports of friction between Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and Hans
Blix, then-Director General of the IAEA.15 Most apparent was a difference in how
aggressively inspections were conducted. Critics of UNSCOM suggest that an overly
aggressive approach is ultimately ineffective because inspectors cannot force Iraq to
cooperate; supporters suggest that UNSCOM inspectors were appropriately
aggressive in their techniques and approach, unburdened by any past relationship
with Iraq (unlike the IAEA).
On the U.N. Security Council, “sanctions fatigue,” among other things, helped
weaken resolve over Iraq, which Iraq exploited. By the mid-1990s, UNSCOM
Chairman Ekeus was unable to get the Security Council to agree that Iraq was in
material breach of resolutions and in 1996, he compromised for the first time on the
modalities of visits. In October 1997, within days of China, France and Russia
abstaining on UNSCOM’s determination that Iraq was violating UNSCR 1115,
which required immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to all sites and
records, Iraq demanded U.S. personnel be withdrawn from UNSCOM. Iraq’s
obstruction intensified in 1998, and UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq in December 1998
on the eve of U.S. and British air strikes (which became known as Operation Desert
Fox). Although their work of uncovering, destroying or rendering harmless Iraq’s
WMD capabilities was far from complete, they had reached an impasse.16
A New Inspection Regime: Resolution 1441
In many respects, inspections have begun where they left off. Inspectors are
trying to reestablish a baseline monitoring system to verify that nothing has changed
in previously inspected facilities, which may include reinstalling cameras, seals and
14 (...continued)
Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996,
pp. 1-14.
15 Gary Milhollin, “The Iraqi Bomb,” New Yorker, February 1, 1993.
16 See CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, for a concise summary of inspections. See also SIPRI’s 2000
Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Appendix 9b, “The
future of chemical and biological weapon disarmament in Iraq: from UNSCOM to
UNMOVIC,” by Maria Wahlberg, Milton Leitenberg, and Jean Pascal Zanders, pp. 560-576.
[www.projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/cbw-yb20009b.pdf]

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other kinds of monitoring equipment. They also seek to continue to resolve
outstanding issues, search for undeclared activities, and destroy equipment and
confiscate documents as appropriate under U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Inspectors continue to rely on the intelligence reports shared by members to aid in
this process.
When the U.N. Security Council adopted UNSCR 1441, it sought to redress
some of the previous problems in inspections. UNSCR 1441 reaffirms the rights and
responsibilities of the inspectors and their Iraqi counterparts, but there are a few new
details, discussed below. A key issue in drafting the resolution was the question of
what would constitute a new material breach of Iraq’s obligations, since a low
threshold might make war more likely. UNSCR 1441 states that Iraq is currently in
material breach of its obligations and that “false statements or omissions in the
declarations and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach.”17 To
some, omissions in Iraq’s declaration by themselves constitute a material breach; to
others, evidence of a lack of cooperation would additionally be required. In the end,
however, neither UNMOVIC nor the IAEA will determine that Iraq is in material
breach of its obligations; that responsibility lies with UN Security Council members.
However, the inspection teams have exclusive knowledge of the extent to which
Iraqis act in a cooperative or non-cooperative way, and thus have significant
influence in the assessment.
Protocols for Inspections
UNSCR 1441 attempts to enhance the previous inspection regime with a
reiteration of the inspections teams’ rights and responsibilities. It incorporates
agreements among Blix, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, and General
Amir H. Al-Saadi, an advisor on technical issues to President Saddam Hussein,
established in meetings on September 30 and October 1, 2002 in Vienna, Austria.
Those agreements are contained in an October 8 letter appended to the resolution.
In short, these include:

! UNMOVIC and the IAEA “will be granted immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted access to sites, including what was
termed ‘sensitive sites’ in the past.” Notwithstanding the 1998
memorandum of understanding on special procedures for the eight
presidential sites, the letter states that these sites may be subject to
the same access requirements.
! No restrictions on the size of inspection teams, on people to be
interviewed, as well as where and when they are interviewed, and on
communications modalities.
! Iraq must ensure that no proscribed material, equipment, records or
other relevant items are destroyed except by request of UNMOVIC
and/or IAEA inspectors and in their presence (as appropriate).
17 See website for full text of UNSCR 1441. [www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm]

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UNSCR 1441 states that the contents of the annexed letter would be binding
upon Iraq and outlined further authorities for UNMOVIC and the IAEA. UNMOVIC
and the IAEA have the right to:
! provision of the names of all personnel currently and formerly
associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic
missile programs and the associated research, development and
production facilities;
! be guarded by UN security;
! declare exclusion zones around facilities in order to “freeze” the area
so that nothing is changed in or taken out of a site; and
! free import and export of any equipment, materials or documents,
without search.
Timeline for Action
Resolution 1441 detailed a time-line of events, similar to earlier UN Security
Council resolutions.18 Within 7 days of UNSCR 1441 adoption on November 8,
2002, Iraq had to accept the resolution (Iraq accepted on November 13). Within 30
days, Iraq was required to provide a full declaration of all WMD programs (Iraq
provided on December 7). Within 45 days, inspections were to start (inspections
began on November 27), and within 60 days, UNMOVIC and the IAEA were
required to provide a progress report to UN Security Council ( provided on January
27, 2003).
Since November 2002, both UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Blix and IAEA
Director General ElBaradei have noted that verification can be a lengthy process and
that it could take years to untangle information on what Iraq has done. Hans Blix has
noted on several occasions that he is guided by UNSCR 1284, which created
UNMOVIC in 1999. Although the Bush Administration objected to this approach
and to Blix’s plan to brief the Security Council in March, Blix provided the report on
key disarmament tasks required by Res. 1284 to the Security Council on March 7.
It is apparent that some members of the Security Council believe that inspections
should continue, although no Security Council member has attached a preferred
duration to those inspections.
Challenges of Inspections
Thus far, inspectors have reported that the Iraq is cooperating, with a few minor
delays. In fact, Dr. Blix noted in his March 7 report that cooperation on process is
better this time for UNMOVIC than it had been for UNSCOM. It is possible that
under the threat of war, Iraq has assessed that cooperation on process is key to avoid
initiation of war. For some, this grey area of cooperation presents a particular
challenge in the disarmament process, because as long as the Iraqis are cooperative
18 UNSCR 687 gave IAEA and UNSCOM 45 days to plan inspections and 45 days to
implement inspections.

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CRS-9
and no WMD-related activities are found, there will be a presumption of
compliance.19
The four-year hiatus in inspections has allowed Iraq to rebuild some facilities
and possibly relocate programs without UN inspectors in the country. Many
observers believe that Iraq has used the opportunity to develop new methods of
concealment and obstruction, and some are concerned that Iraq may use tunneling
under existing buildings to avoid excavations being detected by satellites.20 As Blix
noted in his March 6 working document on disarmament task:
UNMOVIC now faces the same situation in all three disciplines that
UNSCOM and the IAEA faced in 1991 regarding biological and nuclear
weapons issues. There are no leads, such as stocks of proscribed items, or
WMD production facilities for UNMOVIC to inspect. Instead, UNMOVIC
must verify the absence of any new activities or proscribed items, new or
retained.21
Further, Blix noted in four years without inspections, Iraq potentially could have
made considerable progress in biological weapons and chemical weapons. Although
the chemical weapons program began in the late 1960s, Iraq was able to build most
of its Al Muthanna chemical weapons plant and begin large-scale production of CW
agents and munitions in just three years. With a biological weapons program that
started in 1974, Iraq took just two years to build the Al Hakam BW production plant
and produce more than 27,000 liters of BW agent.22
Inspectors have continue to confront the logistics challenges of reestablishing
inspection support in Baghdad and in Cyprus, and updating information databases,
particularly on suppliers of WMD-related items from 1998 to the present. Helicopter
support became available in mid-December23 and U-2 and Mirage 4 reconnaissance
flights began in late February. A continuing challenge is procuring the requisite
expertise. According to Nikita Smidovich, former UNSCOM staffer now in charge
of training for UNMOVIC: “You don’t need to be an expert in chemical or biological
weapons. You just need to be able to spot deviations from the norm.”24 Other former
inspectors have noted that in addition to a requirement for knowledge of specific
weapons, which is probably more limited in the biological weapons and chemical
weapons areas than in the missile or nuclear areas (or at least more publicly
19 In one view, obstruction of inspections is a useful signal that inspectors have come close
to uncovering noncompliance.
20 Richard Butler, former UNSCOM executive chairman, suggested to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in its hearings in summer 2002 that Iraq might have attempted to
tunnel under buildings to avoid detection from satellite imagery. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Military Involvement in Iraq, July 31, 2002.
21 UNMOVIC Working Document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues, p. 11. See
[www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/cluster.htm]
22 Ibid.
23 “State-of-Art Gear Displayed,” Washington Times, November 27, 2002.
24 “To Catch a Cheat,” Time, November 25, 2002.

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CRS-10
sensitive), inspectors need a good grasp of weapons production processes
(particularly at dual-use sites) and a familiarity with Iraq’s WMD programs. In the
past, inspection teams were able to draw on weapons expertise from member
countries. In the current regime, all inspectors must undergo five weeks of training,
and they are required to be U.N. employees under rules adopted by the U.N. in 1999.
This approach was implemented to help enhance the objectivity and professionalism
of inspectors (perhaps both in reality and in appearance). Critics of these rules
suggested the personnel system may not attract the best expertise, since more highly
qualified personnel may be unwilling to give up their current job seniority and
benefits for a short-term, non-career job at the UN as an inspector. Others have
suggested that this new, less flexible arrangement may have a negative effect on
intelligence sharing.25 Despite U.N. rules, however, some U.S. personnel reportedly
have been able to take a leave of absence from their government jobs to work
temporarily for the U.N., without losing benefits.26
Intelligence is as critical to this new set of inspections as it was to previous
inspections. On the process of intelligence sharing, media have reported that a new
arrangement has been implemented whereby information flows from member
governments through a top UN official, rather than to and from individual
inspectors.27 Critics of this arrangement argue that it may inhibit the flow of
information to UNMOVIC and the IAEA, particularly in the case of defector
information, because the U.N. does not have the ability to handle debriefing or
resettling defectors. In addition, no information will be allowed to flow back to
national intelligence agencies, which could decrease incentives for member states’
intelligence services to share information. The impetus for establishing rules for
intelligence sharing came from Iraqi complaints in the 1990s that UN inspectors were
gathering intelligence, in some cases, for better targeting by air-strikes.28 Some of
these claims were substantiated. In practice, the U.N. established an Information
Assessment Unit (IAU) several years ago in New York, which, according to one
former inspector, became the locus of expertise and information on Iraq’s WMD
programs.29 The U.S. intelligence community in the 1990s worked on establishing
protocols for sharing sensitive information with international organizations, since it
was such a vital component of the inspection regime and a relatively new
phenomenon.
On the substance of intelligence sharing, UNMOVIC and the IAEA complained
early on that the United States had not provided “actionable information” to
inspections in Iraq.30 On January 9, 2003, Secretary Powell stated that the United
25 “UN Restricts Inspectors’ Use of Intelligence Reports,” USA Today, November 27, 2002.
See also “We’re Not Spies, Says Inspection Chief,” Guardian, November 11, 2002.
26 Interview with State Department official.
27 Gordon Corera, “Playing the Iraqi Inspection Game,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
November 2002, pp. 42-45
28 Ibid.
29 Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment,” p. 5.
30 In late December 2002, the U.S. provided satellite intelligence about chemical and
(continued...)

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CRS-11
States began sharing significant intelligence information on Iraqi weapons programs
a few days before. Powell also said that the United States was withholding sensitive
information.31 Blix, in his February 14 report to the UN Security Council noted that
US intelligence had provided some assistance that was valuable, particularly in the
discovery of uranium enrichment documents in a private home on January 16, 2003,
but led nowhere in other cases. In testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence on February 11, 2003, Central Intelligence Director George Tenet said
that “we have given the UN inspectors and UNMOVIC every site that we have that
is of high or moderate value, where there is proven intelligence to lead to a potential
outcome.”32 In his March 7 briefing to the UN Security Council, Hans Blix noted
that he would rather have “twice the amount of high quality information about sites
to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.”33
A technical challenge for inspectors will be in “proving the negative” – that
there are no remaining WMD programs. Although the inspectorates are charged with
verifying Iraq’s declarations, their “seal of approval” is often interpreted as affirming
the absence of WMD programs. No one expects that inspections can provide 100%
confidence, and this is perhaps the reason for the insistence by many that only a
regime change can provide assurance that Iraq will give up its WMD programs.
Executive Chairman Hans Blix noted earlier this year that inspectors are now more
likely to find “smoke, rather than a smoking gun.” Blix suggested, in describing
Iraq’s December 7 declaration, that “the absence of evidence means, of course, that
one cannot have confidence that there do not remain weapons of mass destruction.”34
Environmental (soil, water, air samples) and material samples that yield evidence of
chemical, biological, or nuclear activity may be difficult to date (although this may
be less true of radioactivity signatures, which can be dated more easily.)
Another challenge presented by inspections is mainly political – that is, what is
the threshold for determining non-compliance? Anthony Cordesman raised a
question in hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about
whether the United States would be willing to go to war immediately if it found
evidence of a violation on missile testing or the existence of a biological facility.35
By raising the stakes of noncompliance to the conduct of war against Iraq, the
perception of some may be that the level of required evidence should be higher. At
30 (...continued)
biological weapons. See “U.S. Is To Release Spy Data on Iraq to Aid Inspections,” New
York Times, December 21, 2002. See also “U.N. Nuclear Agency Gains a Bigger Profile,
and Bigger Problems,” New York Times, January 6, 2003.
31 “US Is Sharing Iraq Data with Blix,” Washington Post, January 9, 2003.
32 George Tenet, Hearing on “Threats to U.S. Security” before the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, February 11, 2003.
33 “Oral Introduction of the Twelfth Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC,” available at
[www.un.org/app/news/printinfocusnews.asp?nid=414]
34 “Powell Says Iraq Raises Risk of War By Lying On Arms,” New York Times, December
20, 2002, p 1.
35 Discussion, July 31, 2002, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Military
Involvement in Iraq.

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CRS-12
one end of the spectrum is zero tolerance of noncompliance; at the other end of the
spectrum is caution about sufficient evidence to go to war.36
Opportunities of Inspections
A 4-year hiatus is a lengthy period of time if inspectors aim to reestablish
continuity. But in the context of what inspectors faced in 1991, the task may be
smaller. In 1991, with virtually no baseline data, inspectors were challenged with
documenting programs that had been in existence for close to 30 years. Operation
Desert Storm destroyed some facilities, but inspectors destroyed a lot more
subsequently.37 Operation Desert Fox destroyed even more. In addition, it is
possible that the scope of some programs may have been scaled back in the last 4
years; rather than spreading resources among many biological toxins or chemical
weapons or uranium enrichment processes, Saddam Hussein might have focused on
a select few. Of course, this could make the task of discovery more difficult since
there would be a narrower range of signatures.
Inspections, in contrast to military strikes, provide opportunities to interview
scientists involved with the weapons programs. However, the interview process thus
far has had mixed results. In general, the IAEA has had more success in conducting
private interviews than UNMOVIC, but even then, some interviews were conducted
with tape recorders in the room. UNMOVIC so far has requested interviews with 38
individuals but interviewed just five privately in February and nine thus far in March.
The IAEA conducted more than 9 private interviews in February, mostly with
scientists connected to the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program.
In addition to conducting interviews in private, UNSCR 1441 allows interviews
to be conducted outside Iraq. Iraq agreed by the end of December to let weapons
scientists leave the country (as a personal decision) and provided a list of 500 experts
to UNMOVIC and the IAEA.38 However, no one yet has been asked to leave the
country. Blix reported in his March 7 briefing that interviews outside Iraq might
provide assurances of the absence of undue pressures and that he planned to request
such interviews soon. Some observers believe that only interviews conducted
outside of Iraq will be effective because of the threat of retaliation by the Iraqi
government.39 Others go further, suggesting that Saddam Hussein’s record of
inflicting torture and abuse (including the murder of Hussein Kamel after he defected
and then returned to Iraq) means that interviews without promises of asylum do not
hold hopes of full disclosure.
36 In remarks on November 13, 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan cautioned the
United States that military action would have to be based on credible evidence of Iraq’s
obstruction, and not “flimsy excuses” to go to war. See “Annan Presses Bush to Avoid A
Rush to War,” New York Times, November 13, 2002.
37 See [www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Achievements/achievements.html] .
38 “US Sees Showdown over Iraqi Scientists,” Washington Post, December 13, 2002; “Iraq
Gives UN a List of 500 Weapons Experts,” New York Times, December 29, 2002.
39 See Stephen F. Hayes, “Negotiations, Pentagon Style,” Weekly Standard, November 25,
2002, and James Kitfield, “Disclosure, Defectors Key to Inspections,” National Journal,
November 16, 2002.

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CRS-13
Hans Blix has suggested that the U.N. is not in the business of enticing
defectors. In addition to practical considerations (for example, lack of experience in
assisting defectors), it is not clear that the inspection teams have anything to offer
scientists that would outweigh the coercive power of the Iraqi government over its
citizens. Charles Duelfer, former deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, has
suggested that the UN should offer “sanctuary or safe haven to those who find it a
condition for speaking the truth.”40 He has further suggested that “if UNSCOM had
100 green cards to distribute during inspections, it could have quickly accounted for
the weapons programs.” Over the long run, however, inspections indirectly could
provide incentives for defections if it appears that inspection teams are on the verge
of big discoveries. For example, some have suggested that Hussein Kamel’s
defection, which provided a treasure trove of information, was prompted by the
growing perception that U.N. inspectors were getting closer to the truth about Iraq’s
biological weapons program.41
With or without defectors, inspectors have new tools to use. Since the last
round of inspections, some equipment has been readied for field implementation (i.e.,
made portable), such as ground-penetrating radar (to detect hidden or underground
equipment or facilities) and ultra-sensitive gamma ray detectors (to detect radioactive
materials through shielding).42 ElBaradei noted in his February 14th report that
inspectors had used ground-penetrating radar. Rapid detection techniques for
biological agents, such as the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen Identification Device,
or RAPID, were not available 10 years ago, nor were detectors for specialized metal
alloys, like ALEX (alloy expert), or toxic industrial materials detectors (TIMs).
Inspectors are also using enhanced chemical agent monitors (ECAMS) and handheld
advanced nucleic acid analyzers (HANAA).43 The availability of satellite imagery
in digital format as well as digital photography should facilitate real-time analysis,
since it can be sent back to offices to be analyzed immediately.44
In actual operations, the cooperation between UNMOVIC and the IAEA now
appears closer than it was between UNSCOM and the IAEA from 1991 to 1998,
primarily because of the appointment of Hans Blix as the executive chairman of
UNMOVIC. A former inspector has noted that the “bureaucratic turf battles between
40 Charles Duelfer, “The Inevitable Failure of Inspections in Iraq,” Arms Control Today,
September 2002.
41 According to Jonathan Tucker, discrepancies in amounts of growth media procured by
Iraq provided strong circumstantial evidence for a biological weapons program. “The new
revelations also put senior Iraqi officials in the increasingly untenable position of being
caught telling outright lies, generating tensions within the regime that may have contributed
to the defection in August 1995 of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel al-Majid, the mastermind behind
Baghdad’s WMD programs.” See “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative
Environment: Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” p. 11.
42 Romesh Ratnesar and Andrew Purvis, “To Catch a Cheat,” Time, November 25, 2002.
See also IAEA web site [www.iaea.org/worldatom/press/news/2002/22-11-22170.html] .
43 S/2003/232, Twelfth Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC, February 28, 2003, p. 5.
44 “Iraq Set to Open Sites Previously Off-Limits,” Washington Post, November 27, 2002.

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CRS-14
the two agencies ...made their collaboration tense, and, at times, openly hostile.”45
The overlap in personnel between the two organizations (for example, Demetrius
Perricos, now director of planning and operations for UNMOVIC, performed a
similar role for the IAEA in the 1990s) could help minimize conflicting inspection
styles and maximize information sharing. To some observers, particularly those who
feel that Blix was ineffectual as director-general of the IAEA and who criticized what
they saw as a complaisant approach toward Iraq from 1991 to 1998, however, greater
synergy between the two teams could be viewed as a negative development.46
Finally, inspections may offer an opportunity to gain insight into the connection,
if any, between Iraq’s WMD programs and support for terrorism. The process of
combing through documents and interviewing scientists and engineers could provide
a fuller picture of Iraq’s clandestine procurement system, thereby contributing to the
world’s knowledge base of potential connections for terrorists who want to acquire
or develop WMD. On the other hand, some have argued that although military
strikes might destroy information about capabilities, the capabilities themselves must
be destroyed before they fall into the hands of terrorists.
In the final analysis, the success of inspections is likely to rest more on the
political determination of the United States and its allies in eliminating Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction, rather than in modalities of inspections and technical
equipment. A Carnegie Endowment study on coercive inspections found three
factors of success for UNSCOM inspections in the first 5 years: the credible threat
of force from U.S. Desert Storm forces in the region, unity among the permanent five
members of the U.N. Security Council, and Saddam Hussein’s belief that he could
successfully hide what he had. In the current environment, the credible threat of
force has been reconstituted, and UNSCR 1441 demonstrates unity for the first time
since 1995 that Iraq was in material breach of its disarmament obligations.47
However, the Council is currently strongly divided on the latest phase of its oversight
of the inspections.
45 See Jonathan Tucker, “Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment:
Lessons from the UN Experience in Iraq,” p.12.
46 Criticism of the IAEA, and by extension, of Hans Blix, dates back to the IAEA’s failure
to detect the nuclear weapons program in Iraq, particularly when some activities took place
at sites where IAEA inspections were conducted. Some observers believe that IAEA and
Blix are far too diplomatic to be effective in Iraq. See, for example, Gary Milhollin’s 1993
New Yorker article previously cited, which criticizes Blix and ElBaradei, as well as
Maurizio Zifferero (now deceased) as head of the Action Team. Current critics have
stressed that Blix was clearly not the first choice to head UNMOVIC. See “Hans Blix’s
Third Try,” Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2002; “Nix Blix,” Washington Times,
November 27, 2002; “Hans the Timid,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2002; and Chris
Suellentrop, “Hans Blix: Incompetent Bureaucrat or Cowardly Diplomat,”at slate.msn.com,
November 26, 2002, for arguments opposing Blix. See also “Can Blix nix Iraq’s tricks?”
Guardian, November 8, 2002; “Chief Inspector’s Style: Be Thorough, But Fair,” USA
Today, November 15, 2002; and “Daunting Task Awaits UN Arms Chief, Boston Globe,
November 18, 2002, for more balanced assessments.
47 For a comprehensive discussion of political divisiveness over Iraq on the Security Council
see SIPRI’s 2000 Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,
Appendix 9b, pp. 560-576. [www.projects.sipri.se/cbw/research/cbw-yb20009b.pdf]

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CRS-15
Milestones in the Inspection Process
UNSCR 1441 did not specify the length of the inspection process or create
specific phases of inspection, in contrast to the UNSCR 687 and 715, which
distinguished between inspections to destroy WMD-related capabilities and the
ongoing monitoring inspections.48 Some milestones are evident in the 15 weeks of
inspections thus far.
Evaluating Iraq’s December 7 Declaration
Chairman Blix and Director-General ElBaradei reported preliminarily to the UN
Security Council on December 19, 2002 about Iraq’s December 7 declaration. There
was a strong consensus that Iraq had omitted significant information about its
weapons programs. In particular, Iraq failed to clear up the outstanding issues that
have existed from 1998 and which were detailed in UNSCOM document S/1999/94
and the so-called Amorim Report S/1999/356.49 Those issues, in Blix’s words, “do
not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude
that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise
question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed
and confidence to arise.”50 These include documentation of nuclear weapons design
and external assistance, the destruction of growth media for biological agents,
information about VX weaponization and stockpiles, accounting for special warheads
for missiles and for missile propellant production. As of January 27, 2003,
UNMOVIC was still preparing lists of “unresolved disarmament issues” and “key
remaining disarmament tasks” in accordance with UNSCR 1284.
The U.S. State Department issued a fact sheet on December 19, 2002 giving
illustrative examples of omissions in the declaration. These included:
! no verifiable account of growth media for biological agents
! no reasonable explanation for manufacturing rocket fuels for
missiles beyond its current limited capabilities
! no account of efforts to procure uranium from Niger
! no information about VX production
! no account of chemical and biological weapons destruction
! no account of empty munitions that could be filled with chemical
agents
! no explanation of a connection between unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) programs and biological agent dispersal.51
48 The IAEA began ongoing monitoring in 1994, while UNSCOM continued with two-track
inspections, both destruction-related and ongoing monitoring.
49 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/index.htm] for the documents.
50 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/recent%20items.html] for text of Blix’s January 27
report to the UN Security Council.
51 See [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/16118pf.htm]

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CRS-16
This fact sheet went beyond the unresolved issues of 1998 to include the range
of Iraq’s missiles (Al-Samoud-2 and the Al Fatah), alleged reports of uranium
procurement, and the ability of UAVs to disperse biological agents. These three
issues were among those detailed in the CIA October 2002 document, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs and the UK’s Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, both of which presumably
draw on intelligence sources.
January 27 Report to UN Security Council52
On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the UN
Security Council on the progress of their inspections. Although both gave ample
examples of Iraqi cooperation and non-cooperation, media generally interpreted the
reports as presenting evidence of Iraqi noncompliance. Inspections in the interim had
uncovered 12 empty chemical munition shells and over 2000 pages of documents on
uranium enrichment using lasers in the home of a scientist. In his report, Blix
distinguished between cooperation on process and on substance. On the first, Blix
said that Iraq has cooperated “rather well,” but then detailed areas in which
cooperation on substance was lacking. He suggested specifically that Iraq needed
to cooperate in finding items and activities (e.g., 122mm chemical warheads), in
finding documents, particularly those in private homes, in providing names of
personnel and in ensuring that interviews are credible. Director General ElBaradei
reported that inspections since November 2002 have identified no prohibited nuclear
activities but urged states to continue to provide intelligence information. ElBaradei
specifically suggested that the inspection process “should be allowed to run its
natural course” and that credible assurances could be provided within the next few
months. The White House spokesman said that the “report...clearly shows Iraq is not
complying.”
February 5 Powell Briefing to UN Security Council53
Secretary of State Powell addressed the UN Security Council on February 5 with
a briefing on Iraq’s attempts to evade disarmament. The briefing included
audiotapes of Iraqi military officers discussing hiding modified vehicles from
inspectors and orders to eliminate talk of “nerve agents” in wireless communications.
Secretary Powell shared anecdotes of documents in cars driven by Iraqi intelligence
officers, removing hard drives from computers, and sanitizing all of the presidential
palaces of traces of WMD, derived from human intelligence sources. Secretary
Powell also showed satellite photos of bulldozed chemical weapons sites and the
removal of telltale vehicles and equipment from chemical weapons bunkers at the
Taji facility before the December 22, 2002 inspections. In addition, Secretary Powell
cited 4 human intelligence sources about the existence of about 18 mobile biological
weapons laboratories. Powell noted that it would be virtually impossible to find
these mobile labs without Iraqi cooperation. In the nuclear area, Secretary Powell
52 See [www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Focus/IaeaIraq/unscreport_290103.html] for
ElBaradei’s report and [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm] for Blix’s report.
53 See [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html] for text of Powell’s
presentation.

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CRS-17
reported on Iraqi attempts to procure magnets and high speed balancing machines
from companies in Romania, India, Russia and Slovenia to support assertions that
Iraq is pursuing a centrifuge uranium enrichment program. With respect to missiles,
Secretary Powell reported that Iraq had continued to import SA-2 rocket engines as
late as December 2002 but did not provide further evidence. Finally, Secretary
Powell showed a satellite photograph depicting a racetrack-shaped flight path of an
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was tested for a distance of 500km without
refueling. Iraq’s December 7th declaration claimed that its UAVs had ranges of just
80kms.
Secretary Powell’s briefing highlighted the significant role intelligence can play
in determining Iraqi compliance. While most observers agree that the presentation
did not include a “smoking gun,” the information points to Iraqi practices to evade
detection. Since February 5th, there has been considerable debate on whether the
intelligence provided constitutes evidence of noncompliance. Although Blix’s report
on February 14th noted that “intelligence information has been useful for
UNMOVIC,” he also stated that we must recognize possible limitations and
misinterpretations. Blix took issue with the satellite photos of the chemical sites,
suggesting that the fact that the images were taken several weeks apart meant that the
movement of munitions could “just as easily have been a routine activity as a
movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent inspection.”54 Blix
also noted that in some cases, intelligence information led to discovery of documents,
whereas in other cases, intelligence led to sites with no proscribed items.
February 14 Report to UN Security Council55
Leading up to the February 14th report, there was some movement on
outstanding inspection issues. In meetings with Blix and ElBaradei in Baghdad on
February 8 and 9, 2003, Iraqi officials handed over documents on anthrax, VX, and
missile programs, although Blix and ElBaradei subsequently reported that there was
no new information in them. On February 6, an Iraqi biologist agreed to be
interviewed privately. Of five requests to meet with non-nuclear scientists, however,
only three have agreed to private interviews. Blix characterized Iraq as beginning to
adopt a “more serious attitude” of cooperation, but would not call these
developments a breakthrough. On February 10, Iraq notified the UN that it would
permit overflights of American U-2, French Mirage, and Russian Antonov aircraft.
President Bush has downplayed the significance of these developments, stating that
Iraq is stalling for time and that U-2 flights would not be necessary if Iraq were
complying. From the perspective of inspectors, however, imagery from U-2 flights
help mission planning and fills in gaps from noncontinuous satellite monitoring.
Thus, U-2 and other aircraft overflights could help detect Iraqi evasion efforts. U-2
overflights were conducted routinely under the previous inspection regime from 1991
to 1998.
54 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm] for Blix report.
55 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm] for Blix report and
[www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml] for ElBaradei report

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CRS-18
In his February 14 report, Blix reiterated many of his conclusions of January 27
about Iraqi cooperation, both good and bad. Of most importance, Blix stated that the
group of missile experts he had convened had concluded that the Al-Samoud-2
missile range exceeded 150km and that the missiles should be destroyed. For the
same reason, the 380 SA-2 engines should also be destroyed. The missile test stand
that US and UK officials maintained was proscribed was not necessarily connected
to proscribed activities and thus could remain. Blix did not touch on issues of
chemical or biological weapons except to say that experts were not hopeful that Iraq
could technically verify the destruction of anthrax or two VX precursors. Blix
reported positively on Iraq’s presidential decree outlawing importation and
production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and on the establishment of
a second commission to search for WMD-related documents.
ElBaradei’s report to the UN Security Council repeated his January 27
conclusions that IAEA inspectors had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited
nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq. He stressed the expanding capabilities
of the inspection team and the ability of inspectors “to assess the presence or absence
of a nuclear weapons program in a state even without the full cooperation of the
inspected state.”56 ElBaradei covered the specific issues raised by Secretary Powell’s
briefing, including Iraq’s purchases of uranium, aluminum tubes reportedly for
centrifuge enrichment of uranium, magnets and magnet production facilities. In all
cases, ElBaradei said the IAEA was reviewing additional information and has asked
Iraq specifically for more information on the high tolerances of the aluminum. In
addition, the IAEA is exploring the disappearance of 32 tons of HMX, an explosive
material with technical characteristics well-suited for nuclear weapons, which had
been under seal until 1998.
March 7 Report to UN Security Council
In advance of the March 7 briefing, Chairman Blix provided UNMOVIC’s
twelfth quarterly report (S/2003/232) to the Security Council.57 The report
highlighted several examples of Iraq’s cooperation on process, including: helicopter
and surveillance overflights; the two Iraqi commissions created to help UNMOVIC
find documents and proscribed items; provision of lists of personnel to interview; and
procedures to determine the disposition of anthrax and VX agent. On substance, the
document noted that there was little new information in the December 7 declaration,
that Iraqis helped find the R-400 bombs, that Al-Samoud-2 missiles were being
destroyed, and that WMD-related activities had been prohibited by presidential
decree. Nonetheless, Blix noted that “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find
any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of
such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far.”
In his March 7 briefing to the Security Council, Blix’s remarks focused on the
process of investigation, noting that where documentary evidence is not available, it
56 See [www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.shtml] for
ElBaradei February 14 report.
57 See [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/2003-232.pdf] for text of the Twelfth
Quarterly report of UNMOVIC,S/2003/232.

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CRS-19
may be possible to obtain evidence through interviews. He noted that “there has been
an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January,” adding that
it is not yet clear how effective they would be in resolving outstanding issues. Blix
concluded that those initiatives did not constitute immediate cooperation, nor did
they cover all relevant areas, but that even with a “proactive Iraqi attitude,”
verification of disarmament would take months.
IAEA Director General ElBaradei’s March 7 report was notable for his
refutations of some of the allegations of clandestine nuclear activities by Iraq.
ElBaradei reported that documents on the alleged procurement of uranium from
Niger were deemed fraudulent. While continuing its scrutiny of the high-strength
aluminum tubes, which the United States and UK believe were intended for use in
uranium enrichment, the IAEA concluded that the tubes were not likely to have been
related to centrifuge manufacture and that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have
redesigned the tubes for such purposes. Likewise, the IAEA concluded that Iraq’s
attempts to procure magnets and magnet production capabilities were not related to
a clandestine enrichment program, although Iraq is “likely” to possess the expertise
to manufacture such magnets on its own. Therefore, the IAEA will continue to
monitor and inspect such equipment. In addition, ElBaradei began his briefing by
reporting an overall deterioration in industrial capacity, which he suggested would
affect Iraq’s capability to resume a nuclear weapons program, while not explicitly
stating it would have a negative impact.
“Clusters Document” & Key Disarmament Tasks
In the same week, Hans Blix provided Security Council members with a draft
document dated March 6, 2003, Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed
Weapons Programs.58 Under UN Security Council Resolution 1284, which
established UNMOVIC in 1999, UNMOVIC must identify key remaining
disarmament tasks, which Blix has done in this 173-page document. This report
builds on the 1999 documents prepared by the UN on key disarmament tasks and
adds new data. Media reports subsequently have focused on two items in this
document that were not highlighted in Blix’s March 7 briefing: the discovery of
undeclared remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs or drones) and cluster bombs that could
be used with chemical or biological agents.59 Although Blix mentioned on March 7
that UNMOVIC was investigating RPVs, these undeclared drones were first detected
in inspections at Samarra Airfield on February 17. The relevant issue is whether
these RPVs are associated with chemical or biological weapons, which is not yet
clear.60 With respect to the cluster bombs, the clusters document reports that in
February 2003 (February 2 and 5), inspection teams found a component of a 122mm
58 Available at [www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/cluster.htm]
59 “Blix Left Out Data from U.N. Testimony,” Washington Times, March 11, 2003.
60 UNSC Resolution 687 did not prohibit unmanned aerial vehicles; it prohibited ballistic
missiles with a range exceeding 150km. Likewise, the plans for ongoing monitoring and
verification do not specify unmanned aerial vehicles (S22871/Rev1 of 2 October 1991).
However, delivery vehicles associated with WMD would be captured under the provisions
of UNSC 707 that call for full, final, and complete disclosure by Iraq of “all aspects of its
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.”

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CBW cluster submunition at Al Nouman. When questioned during the visit, Iraqi
officials denied any knowledge of a connection between the cluster bombs and the
CBW program, although there is earlier evidence of Iraqi interest in developing
cluster munitions with CBW agents.
U.S. Assistance to Inspections
UNSCR 1441, paragraph 10, requests all member states to “fully support
inspections, including by providing any information related to prohibited
programmes or other aspects of their mandates, including on Iraqi attempts since
1998 to acquire prohibited items, and by recommending sites to be inspected, persons
to be interviewed, conditions of such interviews, and data to be collected.” In the
past, the United States provided significant assistance to inspection in Iraq, from the
provision of equipment, personnel, training, analysis, and funds, to providing U-2
overflight imagery. Unlike in the past, however, the U.N. now has more funds from
its Oil for Food Program and is contracting out many services that in the past may
have been provided by the United States. At present, the United States is providing
equipment and training, intelligence, and U-2 overflights. The FY03 authorization
for Defense Department spending contains $15 million for assistance to inspections,
but the real cost of assistance is likely to be higher. In addition to logistical support,
the United States provides limited assistance in providing U.S. inspectors.
According to UNMOVIC, half the U.N. inspectors are recommended by governments
and the other half apply independently. UNMOVIC’s staff, at the end of February
2003, totaled 202 personnel from 60 countries, including 84 inspectors.61 Early on,
about 27 U.S. inspectors were on board. By comparison, Britain provides 13
inspectors, France 25 and Russia, 22.62 The U.S. State Department has not released
details on the extent of U.S. support to inspections.
Congressional Role63
The most significant action of the 107th Congress with respect to Iraq was the
authorization for the use of force against Iraq, which President Bush signed into law
(P.L. 107-243) on October 16, 2002.64 Under this law, the President must determine
whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate to: (1) defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2)
enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. While there are
other UN Security Council resolutions with which Iraq has not complied, clearly the
61 S/2003/232, Twelfth Quarterly Report of UNMOVIC.
62 “We’re Not Spies, Says Inspection Chief,” Guardian, November 11, 2002; “Team of
‘Detectives’ Begins Hunt for Weapons,” USA Today, November 27, 2002.
63 For a full history of legislation related to Iraq, see CRS Report RS21324 by Jeremy
Sharp, Congressional Action on Iraq 1990-2002: A Compilation of Legislation.
64 CRS Report RL31596, Iraq: Authorization of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against -
Side-By-Side Comparison of Public Law 107-243 and Selected Legislative Proposals, by
Dianne Rennack.

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most important of those relate to Iraq’s WMD programs.65 The law requires that
President Bush report to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of
the Senate, within 48 hours of the exercise of his authority to use force, that U.S.
reliance on further diplomatic and other peaceful means is not adequate to protect the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, or
is not likely to lead to enforcement of U.N. resolutions.
The 108th Congress has already taken up issues related to Iraq as the public
debate heats up.
In the Senate, there are two resolutions related to inspections and
the authorization of war. Senator Byrd introduced S.Res 28, which expresses the
sense of the Senate that inspections should be given sufficient time for a thorough
assessment of Iraq’s compliance and that the United States should seek an additional
UN resolution authorizing force against Iraq. S.Res 28 was referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on January 29, 2003. Senator Kennedy introduced
S.Res 32, which expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should fully
support the work of UN weapons inspectors and obtain approval by Congress of new
legislation authorizing the use of all necessary means, including military force, to
disarm Iraq. S.Res 32 was also referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on January 29, 2003.
In the House, Rep. Alcee Hastings introduced H. Res. 55, which has provisions
similar to S.Res. 28 for more time for inspections and a second UN resolution. Rep.
Sheila Jackson-Lee introduced H.Con.Res. 2 on January 7, 2003, which expresses the
sense of Congress that the P.L. 107-243 should be repealed, and Rep. DeFazio
introduced H.J.Res 20 which also calls for the repeal of the authorization for the use
of force. H.Res 20 has 30 cosponsors; H.Con.Res. 2 has 11 cosponsors. All these
resolutions have been referred to the House International Relations Committee.
Of particular interest to the inspections is the introduction by Senator Biden of
S. 205, the “Iraqi Scientists Immigration Act of 2003" on January 23, 2003, which
is being prepared for the Senate floor. This bill would provide up to 500 visas for
workers in WMD programs and their families that are willing to and capable of
providing information to the United States or the UN. In the 107th Congress, Senator
Biden introduced S. 3079, the “Iraqi Scientists Immigration Act of 2002,” on October
8, 2002, which passed the Senate unanimously with an amendment and was referred
to the House Committee on the Judiciary on November 22, 2002. The bill would
have authorized immigrant visas for Iraqi WMD scientists, thereby providing some
assurances for defectors that they would be provided refuge if they left Iraq.
65 At least two other draft resolutions (Biden-Lugar and Levin) sought to narrow the
language to focus specifically on WMD violations. In a white paper available on the White
House web page, entitled “A Decade of Deception and Defiance,” the Bush Administration
has listed all the resolutions with which Iraq is in non-compliance. Reportedly a background
paper for President Bush’s September 12th speech to the UN General Assembly, it states that
Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated 16 UN Security Council Resolutions.

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