Order Code RL31715
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Updated March 11, 2003
Raymond W. Copson and Paul Gallis (Coordinators)
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress
Summary
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S.
urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its
the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” During January and
February 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, and analysts
speculated that mid-March seemed the most likely time for U.S. forces to launch a
war. President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
have repeatedly indicated that Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with
U.N. weapons inspectors. However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China,
are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time. The Administration
asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it
fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Skeptics,
including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is exaggerating the
Iraqi threat.
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of
the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and
to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). Some
Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Administration
consultation on Iraq, and suggested that the Administration should provide more
information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early military action.
Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly, and have
compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war. U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last two years or longer. Whether the overthrow of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East, or
promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue in debate.
The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial humanitarian crisis,
including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend on the length of the
conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization. International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war. Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale
of the fighting and the length of any occupation. If war leads to a spike in the price
of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic
consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues. See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report. This report also provides
links to other sources of information and is updated approximately once a week.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Diplomatic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Developments at the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Foreign Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Peace Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Military Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Policy Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Regime Change Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Biological and Chemical Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Missile Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Inspections Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
March 7 Briefings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
“Cluster Document” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Current Planning Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
War Crimes Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Burden Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Political and Military Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Direct and Indirect Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Post-Conflict Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Implications for the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Humanitarian Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
War-Related Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Contingency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

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International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Security Council Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Cost Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
War Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Related Aid to Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Economic Repercussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Oil Supply Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Information Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
CRS Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Humanitarian Aid Organizations and Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Iraq Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
United Nations Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
List of Figures
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Map of Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List of Tables
Table 1. Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

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Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
See CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Daily
Developments [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs/iraqdaily.shtml] for a
daily digest of Iraq-related developments.
On March 11, Bush Administration officials conceded that they lacked the votes
to secure passage of the proposed U.S.-UK-Spain resolution in the U.N. Security
Council. The resolution would give Iraq until midnight March 17 to demonstrate that
it had complied with U.N. Resolution 1441, requiring the Hussein regime to disarm
itself of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). British officials indicated that the
U.S.-UK-Spain resolution might be revised, with an extended deadline.
On March 10, French President Chirac said that his government would veto the
resolution. Russian officials indicated that Moscow would also veto the resolution.
The U.S., British, and French governments were lobbying their positions on the
resolution with other Security Council members.
The U.N.’s chief disarmament inspector, Hans Blix, filed a report with the
Security Council on March 7. His verbal presentation gave a mixed review to Iraq’s
disarmament efforts. The written report contained information that U.S. officials said
showed Iraq’s continued defiance of Resolution 1441.
On March 8, Hussein’s government countered with a claim that his country was
essentially disarmed of WMD and that Iraq’s progress on Resolution 1441 warranted
a lifting of the U.N.’s economic sanctions against Iraq.
On March 6, in a press conference, President Bush sounded a theme that Iraq
was a threat to the security of the United States and that Hussein’s government must
be disarmed. Several Democratic congressional leaders charged that the
Administration was failing to gain necessary broader international support for its
position and that it was neglecting the growing threat posed by North Korea and Iran.
Some former and current U.S. army officers reportedly expressed uneasiness
over the effort that might be required by the U.S. military to bring stability to Iraq,
should Hussein be overthrown. They cited the danger of possible civil war.

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CRS-2
Current Situation
Overview
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661, and Paul Gallis, 7-7679
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
B a c k g r o u n d . B u s h
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
Administration concerns about Iraq’s
alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil”
nations in his January 2002 State of
the Union address. Vice President
Cheney, in two August 2002
speeches, accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons
of mass destruction to dominate the
Middle East and threaten U.S. oil
supplies.1 These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States
might act unilaterally against Iraq.
However, in a September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work
with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2
H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use
of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security
Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. On November 8,
2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving
Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under
previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”
Recent Developments. During January-March 2003, the U.S. military
buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts speculated that mid-March seemed
a likely time for an attack to be launched. (See below, Military Situation.) Officials
maintain that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of summer,
but military experts observe that conditions for fighting a war would be far better in
the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, and other top officials during January, February, and March expressed
a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with Security Council
disarmament demands. The President said on January 14, that “time is running out”
1 “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103d National Convention,” August 26, 2002; and “Vice
President Honors Veterans of Korean War,” August 29, 2002. Available on the White
House web site at [http://www.whitehouse.gov] under “News.”
2 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].

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CRS-3
for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was “sick and tired” of its “games and deceptions.”3
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on January 19, that “we are at the
verge of an important set of decisions.”4 On January 26, 2003, Secretary of State
Powell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos, Switzerland, that
“multilateralism cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the United States
“continues to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or
in a coalition of the willing.” Powell also told the Davos meeting that there are
“clear ties” between Iraq and terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda.
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003. “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.” The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.” Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also
condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the
world. On February 5, 2003, as discussed below under Weapons of Mass
Destruction Issues, Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations
Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has
weapons of mass destruction programs. President Bush, in a February 6 statement,
predicted that Saddam would likely play a last minute “game of deception,” but
warned, “The game is over.” The President affirmed on February 18 that he would
continue to work for a United Nations Security Council resolution that would
broaden support for possible action against Iraq but told reporters “it’s not necessary
as far as I’m concerned.” The President added, “Saddam Hussein is a threat to
America. And we will deal with him.” He repeated these themes in a March 6 press
conference.
On February 26, President Bush gave a major address on Iraq. He said that the
end of Hussein’s regime would “deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron ....
And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be
tolerated.” He returned to an earlier Administration theme in declaring that post-
Hussein Iraq would be turned into a democracy, which would inspire reform in other
Middle Eastern states. Specialists challenged his assertion that transforming Iraq into
a democracy was a credible option. They cited the strong rivalries within its
ethnically and religiously diverse population and questioned whether the United
States could mount the resolve for a process of democratization that might take years
to accomplish. Some current and former U.S. military officers echoed this theme and
expressed concern that a post-war U.S. military occupation might have to confront
a civil war.5
Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed
confrontation remains limited. President Jacques Chirac of France has been a leading
3 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003 [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
4 BBC News, January 19, 2003.
5 “President Details Vision for Iraq,” Washington Post, February 27, 2003; “For Army, Fears
of Postwar Strife,” Washington Post, March 11, 2003.

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CRS-4
critic of the U.S. approach, and maintains that he is not convinced by the evidence
presented by Secretary of State Powell. On February 10, at a press conference in
Paris with President Putin of Russia, Chirac said “nothing today justifies war.”
Speaking of weapons of mass destruction, Chirac added “I have no evidence that
these weapons exist in Iraq.”6 France, Germany, and Russia advocate a strengthened
inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and China takes a
similar position. On March 10, Chirac said that his government would veto the U.S.-
UK-Spain resolution. Russian officials said that their government would likely
follow the same course. (See below, Diplomatic Situation.)
French foreign minister de Villepin criticized the manner in which the Bush
Administration had built its case against Iraq. He said that U.N. Resolution 1441
addressed only disarmament, but that now the Administration was seeking to move
forward with creating a democracy in Iraq and spreading democracy throughout an
unstable region with a limited history of representative governments. Such dramatic
change, he said, required discussion and approval by the United Nations.7
U.S. officials point out that a number of other countries support the U.S.
demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions on disarmament.
Many foreign observers point out, however, that U.N. inspectors have yet to find a
“smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs. U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the
inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections is to verify whether or not Iraq
has disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions. Iraq has not pro-actively
cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there has been
no such verification.8
In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the
support of allies before the United States launched a war against Iraq. The polls
shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with a majority coming to
favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.9 Polls shifted further in the
Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s February 5 presentation to
the Security Council.10 However, on February 14, 2003, the New York Times
reported that a majority again wanted to give U.N. weapons inspectors more time to
complete their work.11 A Washington Post-ABC News poll, reported on February 25,
showed a majority willing to wait for a U.N. resolution supporting military action
against Iraq, while overall support for military action stood at 63%, down from 66%
6 “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
7 “Disarmament, Not Strife, Is France’s Goal, Insists de Villepin,” Financial Times,
February 28, 2003.
8 David Kay, “It was Never About a Smoking Gun,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003.
9 “Support for a War with Iraq Grows After Bush’s Speech,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003.
10 “Poll: Bush Gaining Support on Invading Iraq,” CNN, February 10, 2003; “Most Support
Attack on Iraq, with Allies,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
11 “Poll Shows Most Want War Delay,” New York Times, February 14, 2003.

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CRS-5
two weeks earlier. In a Washington Post poll completed March 2, support slipped
further, to 59%, with growing ambivalence evident in the nature of support.12 Many
remain opposed to war. Forty-one Nobel laureates in science and economics released
a declaration opposing war on January 27, and former President Jimmy Carter said
on January 31 that President Bush has “not made a case for a pre-emptive military
strike against Iraq.”13 (For congressional views, see below, Congressional Action.)
Press reports noted that U.S. policy on Iraq was leading to a rise in anti-
Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls show strong
opposition to a war with Iraq.14 Large public demonstrations against a possible war
with Iraq occurred in the United States and in cities overseas on the weekend of
January 19-20, 2003. Demonstrations in western European cities and New York on
the weekend of February 15-16 were widely described as “massive.” In the two days
prior to the Turkish parliament’s March 1 refusal to allow U.S. forces to enter the
country, large demonstrations against war occurred in major cities. Polls showed that
approximately 90% of the Turkish population opposed war.15
In Britain and Spain, co-sponsors of the Bush Administration’s resolution,
public opinion remained opposed to war. In Britain, in a poll concluded March 2,
67% opposed war unless there is new proof of Iraqi violations and a new resolution
passed by the Security Council; 75%, however, would support British troops
participating in a war should there be both new proof of Iraqi violations and a new
U.N. resolution. In Spain, in a poll completed February 24, 94% were opposed to
war.16
Options for the Future. Analysts believe it likely that the United States will
soon move against Iraq, with or without the endorsement of the U.N. Security
Council. Some nonetheless urge that policymakers delay a war as long as possible
and accede to wishes of Council members who want the arms inspection process to
be given more time. In their view, going to war without Security Council permission
would be harmful to international institutions while threatening stability in the
Middle East and perhaps beyond. Others argue that further delay would reward
Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics and undermine U.S. credibility. They also maintain
that there would be serious economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large
U.S. military force in the Middle East indefinitely. It may be that dramatic evidence
of Iraqi non-compliance will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring
stronger international backing for a war. Another view is that if U.S. action against
Iraq appears imminent, other countries, such as Russia and France, will hesitate at
fracturing the international community and further alienating Washington through
continued opposition. Some expect they may eventually offer support or at least
12 “Public Backs U.N. Assent on Iraq,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003; “Doubts
Temper War Support,” Washington Post, March 4, 2003.
13 “Carter Says Bush Has ‘Not Made a Case’ for War,” Washington Post, February 1, 2003.
14 “Sneers from Across the Atlantic,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
15 “Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops,” New York Times, March 2, 2003.
16 “Few Shifts in World Public Opinion toward Iraq,”Office of Research, Dept. of State,
March 7, 2003.

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CRS-6
abstain on any U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force. Others argue that
France, at least, has gone too far in opposing force for this to be an option until U.N.
inspections have continued for months into the future.
According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite their
denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other
Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of
guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through
with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.17 However, many
analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move.
Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power,
but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too firm to
permit such an event.
CRS Products
CRS Video MM70039, Disarming Iraq, Issues and Views, available in cassette or
online at [http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/sem_di-030219.shtml]
Diplomatic Situation
Carol Migdalovitz (7-2667)
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
Developments at the United Nations. The U.N. Security Council is the
stage for the diplomatic end game to resolve the crisis over Iraq’s disarmament. It
also has become the setting for a conflict between United States, Britain, and Spain
who demand that the U.N. reestablish its credibility and relevance by enforcing
resolutions that have required Iraq’s disarmament, and others, notably France and
Russia, who seem to believe that restraining U.S. power by rejecting a preventive war
has become more important.
On February 24, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain tabled
a succinct resolution that would have stated that the Council “Decides that Iraq has
failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441” to disarm.18 The
three allies aimed to convince six nonpermanent Council members to support the
resolution and then challenge France, Russia, or China to veto it. In response,
France, Germany, and Russia circulated an informal memorandum, supported by
China, arguing that “the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled” and
calling for reinforced weapons inspections, with inspectors reporting every three
weeks and presenting an overall assessment in four months.19 The two factions are
competing to influence the rotating members’ votes.
Canada tried to bridge the gap between the two sides by circulating an informal
compromise plan to give Iraq a March 28 deadline to show compliance with key
17 “Officials Support Exile for Hussein,” Washington Post, January 20, 2003.
18 “Text of U.K. Draft Resolution on Iraqi Disarmament”, Reuters, February 24, 2003.
19 “Text of French Proposals to U.N. Security Council,” Reuters, February 24, 2003.

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CRS-7
disarmament demands or “all necessary means” to force it to comply could be used.20
Several nonpermanent Council members liked the idea, but the United States,
Britain, and Spain rejected it. However, on March 7, to address nonpermanent
members’ concerns, Britain, with U.S. support, proposed an amendment to give Iraq
until March 17 to demonstrate cooperation with its disarmament obligations. France
objected, saying it could not accept an ultimatum as long as the weapons inspectors
report Iraqi cooperation. On March 6, President Bush had called for a Council vote
on the resolution. By March 11, however, the United States and Britain had failed
to find the votes to pass the resolution, and France and Russia, which have veto
power, had said that they would oppose it. Britain is now seeking a compromise that
might appeal more to nonpermanent members. It would test Iraqi compliance by
establishing performance benchmarks and extend the deadline. The nonpermanent
members also are developing a compromise formula.
The United States and Britain reserve the right to take military action against
Iraq without a resolution, but British Prime Minister Tony Blair needs a resolution
to obtain international legitimacy for a war in order to overcome domestic opposition.
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has said that the legitimacy of action taken
without Council approval would be “seriously impaired.”21 However, such approval
may be impossible to obtain because French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac has
declared, “No matter what the circumstances, France will vote ‘no.’ There is no cause
for war to achieve ... the disarmament of Iraq.”22
The weapons inspectors are Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix and the Director
General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei who
have reported to the Security Council several times. (For details, see below,
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues.) They are assessing Iraq’s compliance with
U.N. Security Council resolutions that require it to disarm, especially Resolution
1441 of November 8, 2002, which gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations” and set up an enhanced inspection regime to bring about
the “full and verified completion of the disarmament process.” It also warned Iraq
that it would face “serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations.”23 Aspects of the inspectors’ reports have supported all views on the
Security Council.
Foreign Reactions. International public misgivings about the possibility of
war are much in evidence, such as in massive anti-war protests around the world on
February 15-16. A February 17 European Union summit aimed to bridge internal EU
differences between countries resisting the U.S. approach and those supporting it.
The summit communique reiterated that the objective is the “full and effective
disarmament” of Iraq. It declared that “force should be used only as a last resort” but
20 “Canada Floats Plan to set New Deadlines,” Reuters, February 25, 2003.
21 “Annan warns against War without U.N.,” Reuters, March 10, 2003
22 “Facing almost Certain Defeat, U.S. and Britain delay Vote,” Associated Press, March 11,
2003.
23 Text available at U.N. web site [http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm].

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CRS-8
put the burden on Baghdad to end the crisis by complying with the Security Council’s
demands.24 The EU said that inspectors must be given time and resources, but
“inspections cannot continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi cooperation.”
Thirteen acceding and candidate countries aligned themselves with the summit
conclusions. On February 18-19, the Security Council gave more than 60 non-
Council members an opportunity to express their views; most favored continuing
inspections. A conference of the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in
Kuala Lumpur on February 24 provided another forum for a succession of leaders to
endorse inspections and oppose war. The Security Council is holding another open
debate on Iraq on March 11-12.
Unease also prevails in the Middle East, where many leaders are concerned that
war would increase regional instability and terrorism and produce other undesired
results, such as the disintegration of Iraq or the demise of their regimes. On February
17, Arab foreign ministers condemned unilateral action against Iraq, called on
Baghdad to abide by U.N. resolutions, and called on Arab states “to refrain from
offering any kind of assistance or facilities for any military action that leads to the
threat of Iraq’s security, safety, and territorial integrity.”25 However, Arab leaders did
not repeat that statement at the end of a divisive summit on March 1. They urged
“complete rejection of any aggression on Iraq” and more time for inspections.
Peace Initiatives. There is considerable diplomatic activity seeking to avert
a war. The Pope, who considers military action against Iraq an “unjust” war, has
met world leaders and sent a personal envoy to meet President Bush. South Africa,
which eliminated its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons under U.N.
supervision, sent a team of disarmament experts to Iraq on February 23 to assist it
with the mechanics of cooperating with weapons inspections.
Concrete proposals have emerged from the region. The President of the United
Arab Emirates proposed that the Iraqi leadership give up power and leave Iraq within
two weeks in exchange for a binding guarantee that it would not be subject to legal
action. The Arab League and the U.N. would then supervise the situation in Iraq for
an interim period until the return of normality.26 Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have
agreed with the proposal. Meanwhile, Iran called for a U.N.-supervised referendum
to allow the Iraqi people to bring about a peaceful power transition. It also urged
“national reconciliation” between the Iraqi opposition and the Iraqi regime.
24 “Conclusions of the European Council, February 17, 2003,” available at
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/ec170203.htm].
25 “A New Power in the Streets,” New York Times, February 17, 2003.
26 Text of Emirates ruler Sheik Zayed’s letter, Associated Press, March 1, 2003.

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CRS-9
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq
Crisis: A Brief Overview, by Marjorie M. Browne.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Resolutions –
1992-2002.
Military Situation
Steve Bowman, 7-7613
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the
Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these
deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of
the troop movements underway. The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted, are
not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
Figure 2. Map of Iraq

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CRS-10
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) is reportedly nearing 225,000, and may total about 250,000 by mid-
March. CENTCOM commander Gen. Tommy Franks has stated that sufficient
forces are in place and prepared to initiate military action upon the President’s
direction.27 DOD has announced that, as of March 5, 2003, more than 176,000
National Guard and Reservists from all services are now called to active duty, an
increase of about 8,000 in one week.28 DOD has not indicated which of these
personnel are being deployed to the Persian Gulf region and how many will be
“backfilling” positions of active duty personnel in the United States, Europe, and
elsewhere. In addition to U.S. deployments, Britain is dispatching an armor Battle
Group, a naval Task Force (including Royal Marines), and Royal Air Force units,
totaling about 47,000 personnel.29
Secretary Rumsfeld has activated the Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet (CRAF) to
transport troops to the Persian Gulf region. Under CRAF’s Phase One, 22 airlines
will provide up to 47 passenger airliners and crews for DOD use. An additional 31
cargo aircraft are also available under CRAF Phase One, but they will not be used
at this time.
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf
states of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With
the possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of
cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations
Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of
force against Iraq.
Outside the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security Council does not act
further. The White House press office announced in November 2002, that the United
States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in military operations against
Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on responses.30 After protracted debate,
NATO’s Defense Policy Committee approved Turkey’s request for military
assistance and directed NATO HQ to begin planning for the deployment of airborne
early-warning aircraft, air defense missiles, and chemical-biological defensive
equipment. Germany and Belgium reversed their early opposition to this effort, and
France’s anticipated opposition was obviated by acting within the Defense Policy
Committee of which France is not a member. Both the Netherlands and Germany
have deployed Patriot air defense missiles to Turkey. The U.S. CENTCOM
commander has downplayed the impact of the Turkish parliament’s rejection of a
proposal for basing U.S. troops in Turkey, stating that the use of Turkish territory is
not necessary for a successful operation. Lack of basing rights in Turkey will,
however, complicate efforts to secure the northern Iraqi oilfields and ensure the
stability of Kurdish-held areas. U.S. officials are hoping for a parliamentary
27 Department of Defense press briefing, March 6, 2003.
28 See the DOD web site: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030305ngr.pdf].
29 British Ministry of Defense website: [http://www.operations.mod.uk/telic/forces.htm].
30 White House press conference, December 5, 2002.

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CRS-11
reconsideration of the proposal and are exploring whether it might be easier to obtain
overflight rather than basing rights. Some U.S. military equipment is being offloaded
at Turkish ports, despite the Turkish Parliament’s decision, though military officials
say these activities have to do with the improvement of Turkish bases already agreed
to and are not war-related preparations. (See also Burden Sharing Issues.)
News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction, has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S.
or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack
underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions.
Though shown to the press, NSPD 17 remains classified and Administration
spokesmen have declined comment on its content. The National Strategy document
does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all
options.” Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt
to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat. Critics are concerned that the
Administration is lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-held U.S.
assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power.31
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31701. Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations.
CRS Report RL31763. Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces.
U.S. Policy
The Administration
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the
Middle East region. The Administration maintains that Iraq has active weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s
long-term goal of dominating the Middle East. These weapons, according to the
Administration, could be used by Iraq directly against the United States, or they could
be transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration says that the
United States cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront
Iraq, since Iraq could then be stronger and the United States might have fewer
military and diplomatic options.
31 “As U.S. Girds for Worst in Iraq, Retaliation Isn’t Clear-Cut Issue,” Washington Post.
January 29, 2003; “Bush Signs Paper Allowing Nuclear Response,” Washington Times,
January 29, 2003.

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CRS-12
The Administration asserts that Iraq is in breach of 17 U.N. Security Council
resolutions – including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 – that, among other
requirements, mandate that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD programs.
President Bush has stated that Iraq must immediately and pro-actively cooperate
with a new U.N. disarmament effort, or the United States will lead a coalition to
disarm it. President Bush has reiterated that position despite recent opposition from
a number of U.S. allies and Security Council members, including France, Germany,
Russia, and China. These and several other countries believe that U.N. inspections
are working and should be continued as an alternative to war. The Washington Post
reported on February 24, 2003 that senior U.S. officials have begun telling their
foreign counterparts that a decision to go to war with Iraq has already been made,32
although it is possible that U.S. officials are conveying that message as part of an
attempt to persuade wavering governments to support a U.S. draft Security Council
resolution authorizing force. The Administration wants a vote on the new resolution
by the end of the week of March 10. In an attempt to achieve passage against
threatened French and Russian vetoes and insufficient declared Council votes, there
are reports the United States and Britain might be willing to alter the draft resolution
to lengthen the deadline for Iraqi compliance and possibly establish clear criteria to
judge Iraq’s cooperation. U.S. deployments and Administration statements indicate
the United States will begin building a coalition to go to war with Iraq shortly after
such a vote, whether or not it is adopted.
Policy Debate. Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions
within the Administration on Iraq policy. Secretary of State Powell had been said to
typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program of unfettered
weapons inspections could succeed in containing the WMD threat from Iraq.33 He
reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations
to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally. However, since late January
2003, Secretary Powell has been insisting that Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully with
the latest weapons inspections indicates that inspections would not succeed in
disarming Iraq and that war will likely be required, with or without U.N.
authorization. The Secretary is reportedly highly critical in private of U.S. allies,
particularly France, that oppose war with Iraq. Polls show that a majority of
Americans look to Secretary Powell as a trusted Administration spokesman on the
Iraq crisis, and Powell is working with British officials to draft a new U.N. resolution
declaring Iraq in further breach of U.N. requirements to disarm.
Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, among others, have consistently been skeptical that inspections can
significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in
favor of military action against Iraq. These and other U.S. officials reportedly believe
that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not only in
Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. In a speech
before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003, President Bush said
that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could lead to the spread
of democracy in the Middle East and a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
32 “U.S. Officials Say U.N. Future at Stake in Vote,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003.
33 “U.S. Officials Meet to Take Stock of Iraq Policy,” Washington Post, October 16, 2002.

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CRS-13
Those who favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active WMD
programs and will eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States unless it is
completely disarmed. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that the
Administration is exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an
attack might goad Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda
organization, among other terrorist groups. According to the Administration, Iraq
has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical
weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime. A
faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-
Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration. President
Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from intelligence
sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in custody, reveal
that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.”
However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was not uniform
within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence community
discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie as only a possibility.
Another view is that there may have been occasional tactical cooperation
between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq intelligence agents.34 Others are said to
believe that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was
based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off
later on, after bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.
Bin Laden issued a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12,
exhorting them to resist any U.S. attack. Secretary of State Powell cited the tape as
evidence of an alliance between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, although bin Laden
was highly critical of Saddam Hussein in the statement, calling his Baath Party
regime “socialist,” and therefore “infidel.”
Regime Change Goal. The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq
under a U.N. umbrella had led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that
the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime. The purpose of downplaying this
goal may have been to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note
that regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq. However, in
practice, the United States draws little separation between regime change and
disarmament; the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad
would be required to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD. In recent weeks,
the Administration has again raised regime change as a specific goal of a U.S.-led
war and has implied that only a change of regime could forestall a U.S.-led
offensive. Press reports in October 2002 said that the Administration is recruiting
an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using equipment and training funds ($92
million remaining) authorized by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31,
1998). This force, now undergoing training at an air base in Hungary, could support
a U.S. attack or work on its own to destabilize Saddam Hussein. The Administration
34 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Unknown: The CIA and the Pentagon Take Another Look at Al
Qaeda and Iraq.” The New Yorker, February 10, 2003.

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CRS-14
is working with Iraqi exile groups to determine future policies and priorities in a
post-Saddam Iraq as part of its “Future of Iraq Project.”
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31756, Iraq: the Debate over U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role
in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and
trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions
against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime
from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991,
Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L.
102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. The resolution conferred broad authority
on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The resolution expressed
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Congress has continued to play a role in formulating U.S. policy in Iraq even
after the passage of H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243). The range of congressional action
falls roughly into four broad categories:
! Many Members who voted in favor of the resolution have offered
strong support for President Bush’s attempts to force Iraq into
compliance with U.N. resolutions.
! Other lawmakers, including some who supported the resolution,
have commended the Administration for applying pressure on
Saddam Hussein’s regime but have called on the Administration to
be more forthcoming with plans for the future of Iraq and more

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CRS-15
committed to achieving the broadest possible international coalition
of allied countries.
! Still others, including some Members who voted in favor of H.J.Res.
114, have questioned the urgency of dealing with Iraq, particularly
in light of developments in North Korea and Iran.
! Finally, many Members who voted against H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-
243) have continued to look for ways to forestall the use of force
against Iraq, in part by proposing alternative resolutions that call for
a more comprehensive inspections process. In one instance, several
Members initiated a lawsuit to curtail the President’s ability to
authorize the use of force.
Congressional Oversight. Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the
level of consultation and communication between Congress and the White House
since the signing of P.L. 107-243. In January 2003, Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle stated that the Bush Administration has failed to report to Congress on its
diplomatic efforts and military preparations within 60 days, as he said was required
by P.L. 107-243.35 In response, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did
not believe that the resolution required a written report, and that his verbal briefings
should suffice. As the Iraq crisis has unfolded, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and
Secretary of State Powell have given several closed-door briefings to Members of
Congress. However, some lawmakers have continued to press the Administration for
more consultation. In February 2003, Representative Dennis Kucinich proposed a bill
to transmit Iraq’s declaration on its weapons of mass destruction that was provided
to the United Nations on December 7, 2002.
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5 briefing before the United Nations
Security Council received a positive response on Capitol Hill, though some Members
were still divided over the best approach to deal with Iraq. After the briefing,
Representative Nancy Pelosi stated that “the question is whether war now is the only
way to rid Iraq of these deadly weapons. I do not believe it is. Before going to war,
we must exhaust all alternatives, such as the continuation of inspections, diplomacy
and the leverage provided by the threat of military action.”36 Others, including
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, were more supportive of the use of force,
saying that “the evidence proves that Saddam Hussein has a loaded gun pointed at
the civilized world. It is time to take that loaded gun away from this evil tyrant.”37
In another hearing with Secretary Powell before the House International Relations
Committee on February 12, 2003, Chairman Henry Hyde challenged the United
Nations to deal effectively with the Iraq issue, saying that “in Iraq, the world’s fifty-
eight-year experiment with collective security is being put to the supreme test. If Iraq
is permitted to defy twelve years of United Nations resolutions demanding its
disarmament, then that fifty-eight-year experiment in collective security will be, for
35 “New Anxiety Over Bush’s Foreign Policy,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2003.
36 “Congressional Quotes: Reaction to Powell’s U.N. Briefing,” Associated Press, February
5, 2003.
37 Ibid.

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CRS-16
all intents and purposes, over.”38 Basing his judgements on information gleaned from
intelligence briefings given to congressional leaders, Senator Carl Levin remarked
that “I think we have a strong case (for war) in the Security Council ... but the
administration has undermined the inspection process and mocked the inspectors.
We have reduced the possibility that we catch the SOB with the stuff and galvanize
the world community.”39
After President Bush’s news conference on Iraq on March 6, 2003, Republican
lawmakers praised the President’s Iraq policy, while some Democratic lawmakers,
including some who had voted in favor of authorizing force, advocated a diplomatic
solution to the developing crisis. Some analysts have noted that Democratic
Members are becoming more vocal in their collective opposition to the Bush
Administration’s Iraq policy.40
Legislation. Since the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers have drafted
several resolutions relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. Some Members
opposed to a war in Iraq have proposed bills to repeal the “Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”41 Other lawmakers have drafted
legislation that would require the President to meet additional criteria such as
allowing additional time for weapons inspections and passing a second U.N. Security
Council resolution before authorizing the use of force against Iraq.42 Most observers
believe that these proposals will likely be put aside in their respective committees,
as there is an insufficient amount of support in Congress to place further
requirements on the Administration’s handling of the Iraq issue.
The Washington Post has reported that some Members of Congress are
considering measures, such as trade sanctions, that would retaliate against France and
Germany for their stance on Iraq. U.S. lawmakers, angry over French and German
opposition to the Administration’s Iraq policies, are considering retaliatory gestures
such as trade sanctions against French wine and bottled water. Some Members
reportedly also support proposals to move many U.S. troops based in Germany to
other locations.43 One lawmaker has proposed legislation that would prevent any
post-conflict assistance funding from being expended with a French-owned company.
In a legal challenge to President Bush’s authority to declare war under P.L. 107-
243, six House Members initiated a lawsuit against the Bush Administration to try
to prevent the President from launching an invasion of Iraq without an explicit
38 “Pathology of Success: Hyde’s Remarks at Hearing with Secretary Powell,” House
Committee on International Relations, February 12, 2003.
39 “Senator Says Best Intelligence Data not Given to U.N.,” USA Today, March 6, 2003.
40 “Republicans Back Bush’s Iraq Policy, Democrats Call it Rash,”New York Times, March
8, 2003.
41 For specific bills, see H.Con.Res. 2 and H.J.Res. 20.
42 See H.Res. 55, S.Res. 28, and S.Res. 32.
43 “U.S. Lawmakers Weigh Actions to Punish France, Germany,” Washington Post,
February 12, 2003.

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CRS-17
declaration of war from Congress. In a statement from Representative John Conyers,
a plaintiff in the lawsuit, the Congressman remarked that “the president is not a
king...he does not have the power to wage war against another country absent a
declaration of war from Congress.”44 However, on February 24, 2003, a federal judge
in Boston refused to issue a temporary restraining order against the Administration,
calling a potential war in Iraq a political rather than a legal issue, which was “beyond
the authority of this court to resolve.”45
Surprisingly, a federal appeals court in Boston has recently revived the lawsuit.
Options for the Future. In the event of a war with Iraq, a supplemental
appropriations bill to provide funding is widely anticipated. Following a war or
significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will likely seek to influence
future internal political and economic developments in that country. Congress may
be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would
facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq. The extent and cost of U.S. programs
would depend on the post-war scenario. (See below, Cost Issues.) The
Administration may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to
support coalition partners in the Middle East, which may suffer economically in the
event of regional instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of
assistance specific to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992
(P.L. 102-511), which authorized aid to the former Soviet Union, or the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress
will have to weigh Iraq-related aid against other budget priorities.
CRS Products
CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Legislation in the 108th
Congress [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqleg.shtml]
CRS Report RS21324, Congressional Action on Iraq, 1990 - 2003.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
Issues for Congress
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put
forward for the use of U.S. military forces. Iraq had varying capabilities in all
44 “Anti-War Lawsuit Challenges Bush’s Authority,” USA Today, February 13, 2003.
45 “Judge Rejects Lawsuit to Block War Against Iraq,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003.

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CRS-18
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War.46 That war and the
inspections conducted between 1991 and 1998 destroyed or otherwise eliminated
much of those capabilities, but certain aspects of the programs that were unresolved
in 1998 remain so today. Current inspections seek to resolve those ambiguities as
well as uncover what Iraq might have produced since 1998.47
Nuclear Program. Iraq had a well-financed and broad-based nuclear weapons
program before the 1991 Gulf War, but did not produce enough fissile material for
a weapon. In 1998, questions remained about nuclear weapons designs and
centrifuge development, external assistance, and whether the nuclear program truly
had been abandoned. On March 7, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei again reported that inspectors have found no signs of a revived nuclear
weapons program. ElBaradei reported that documents from the UK on the alleged
procurement of uranium from Niger were deemed inauthentic. While continuing its
scrutiny of the high-strength aluminum tubes, which the United States and UK
believe were intended for use in uranium enrichment, the IAEA concluded that the
tubes were not likely to have been related to centrifuge manufacture and that it was
highly unlikely that Iraq could have redesigned the tubes for such purposes.
Likewise, the IAEA concluded that Iraq’s attempts to procure magnets and magnet
production capabilities were not related to a clandestine enrichment program,
although Iraq is “likely” to possess the expertise to manufacture such magnets on its
own. Therefore, the IAEA will continue to monitor and inspect such equipment.
Biological and Chemical Programs. Iraq produced and weaponized
anthrax, aflatoxin and botulinum. Although UNSCOM destroyed facilities,
production equipment, and growth media, it never accepted Iraq’s declaration as “a
full account of Iraq’s BW program.”48 Iraq had a significant chemical weapons
program, producing blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). From 1991 to 1998, inspectors
destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8 million liters
of precursor chemicals. Nonetheless, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions,
500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors is still unknown, as
are Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent. In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced
4 tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it had imported enough
precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons. Iraqi officials provided documents on VX
agent to Blix and ElBaradei in Baghdad in February 2003, but again, there appears
to be no new information. Blix reported that Iraq had offered suggestions for proving
the destruction of anthrax and VX precursors but that experts are not hopeful it will
be possible to prove that specific quantities were destroyed.
Missile Program. Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production
capabilities prior to the Gulf War, which was largely destroyed during that war and
46 See CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
47 See CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
48 U.N. Security Council S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, Final Report of the Panel on
Disarmament and Current and Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issues.

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in inspections from 1991 to 1998. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles
remained after the war and inspectors accounted for all but two. Iraq is permitted to
produce missiles with ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in
producing Ababil and Samoud missiles of permitted ranges. UNMOVIC missile
experts concluded that the Al-Samoud-2 missiles exceeded the permitted range and
UNMOVIC Chairman Blix notified Iraq that it must begin to destroy the missiles as
well as the SA-2 engines it imported for them. Iraq agreed, and destruction began
under U.N. supervision on March 1. As of March 11, fifty-five missiles (of a
possible 100), twenty-eight warheads, two launchers, and 5 engines have been
destroyed. UNMOVIC experts are still considering whether the solid-fueled Al Fatah
is a proscribed system but concluded that Iraq’s missile test stand would not be
recommended for destruction.
Inspections Status. The U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA have conducted over 750 inspections at 550
sites since November 2002. Thus far, inspections have uncovered: empty chemical
weapons shells not previously declared (mid-January); two complete R-400 aerial
bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally destroyed BW-filled aerial bombs (mid-
February); 2000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private
home (mid-February); and remotely piloted vehicles with wing spans of 7.5 meters
that Iraq had not previously declared (mid-February). Some destruction has taken
place, including ten mustard gas shells left over from inspections prior to 1998, and
over 50 Al-Samoud-2 missiles since March 1. Overflights of U-2 and Mirage IV
aircraft began in late February, but progress on private interviews with scientists
continues to be mixed. UNMOVIC so far has requested interviews with 38
individuals but interviewed just five privately in February and nine thus far in March.
The IAEA conducted more than 9 private interviews in February, mostly with
scientists connected to the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program.
March 7 Briefings. In advance of the March 7 briefing, Chairman Blix
provided UNMOVIC’s twelfth quarterly report (S/2003/232) to the Security
Council.49 The report highlighted several examples of Iraq’s cooperation on process,
including: helicopter and surveillance overflights; the two Iraqi commissions created
to help UNMOVIC find documents and proscribed items; provision of lists of
personnel to interview; and procedures to determine the disposition of anthrax and
VX agent. On substance, the document noted that there was a little new information
in the December 7 declaration, that Iraqis helped find the R-400 bombs, that Al-
Samoud-2 missiles had been destroyed, and that WMD-related activities had been
prohibited by presidential decree. Nonetheless, Blix noted that “Iraq could have
made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible
evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament
have been very limited so far.”
In his March 7 briefing to the Security Council, Blix’s remarks focused on the
process of investigation, noting that where documentary evidence is not available, it
may be possible to obtain evidence through interviews. He noted that “there has been
49 Twelfth Quarterly report of UNMOVIC, S/2003/232, available on the U.N. web site at
[http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/2003-232.pdf].

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CRS-20
an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January,” adding that
it is not yet clear how effective they would be in resolving outstanding issues. Blix
concluded that those initiatives did not constitute “immediate cooperation,” nor did
they cover all relevant areas, but that even with a “proactive Iraqi attitude,”
verification of disarmament would take months. In addition to refuting some of the
outstanding questions about the nuclear program suggested by intelligence reports,
ElBaradei reported an overall deterioration in industrial capacity, which he suggested
would affect Iraq’s capability to resume a nuclear weapons program (presumably
negatively).
“Cluster Document”. On March 7, Dr. Blix also provided Security Council
members with a draft document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed
Weapons Programs.50 Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284, which
established UNMOVIC in 1999, UNMOVIC must identify key remaining
disarmament tasks, which Blix has done in this 173-page document. This report
builds on the 1999 documents prepared by the U.N. on key disarmament tasks and
adds new data. Media reports have focused on two items reported in this document
that were not highlighted in Blix’s March 7 briefing: the discovery of undeclared
remotely piloted vehicles (or drones) and cluster bombs that could be used with
chemical or biological agents.51 Although Blix mentioned on March 7 that
UNMOVIC was investigating RPVs, these undeclared drones were first detected in
inspections at Samarra Airfield on February 10. The relevant issues are the range of
the RPVs, which should not exceed 150km, and their ability to deliver chemical or
biological agents. With respect to the cluster bombs, the cluster document reports
that in February 2003 (February 2 and 5) inspection teams found a component of a
122mm CBW cluster submunition at Al Nouman. When questioned during the visit,
Iraqi officials denied any knowledge of a connection between the cluster bombs and
the CBW program, although there is earlier evidence of Iraqi interest in developing
cluster munitions with CBW agents.
Key Issues. Some key issues to consider with respect to Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction follow.
! What constitutes evidence of noncompliance? To some,
noncompliance is equated with anything less than full cooperation
(i.e., unless compliance is proven, Iraq is noncompliant); to others,
there must be proof that Iraq is producing weapons of mass
destruction.
! What are the risks of continuing inspections? To some, continuing
inspections gives Iraq more time to produce weapons of mass
destruction; to others, continuing inspections makes it more likely
that any covert programs will be uncovered.
! If inspections uncover signs of Iraqi WMD activity, is this a sign of
the failure or the success of inspections?
! Can coercive inspections ever be effective? To some, only
cooperative inspections provide full assurances, while to others,
50 Available at [http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/cluster.htm].
51 “Blix Left Out Data from U.N. Testimony,” Washington Times, March 11, 2003.

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CRS-21
inspections provide an invaluable source of information that cannot
be gained from other means.
! What is the best means of preventing the transfer of WMD
technologies or capabilities from Iraq to terrorists? To some,
military force is the best way quickly and irrevocably to disarm Iraq
of its WMD capabilities to forestall such an action; to others,
military action could unintentionally create an environment
conducive to terrorist acquisition of WMD-related items.

CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
CRS Report RS21376, Iraq: WMD-Capable Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs).
Post-War Iraq
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated March 10, 2003)
The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam
Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current debate over Iraq
policy. One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for
ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could
dissolve into chaos. It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims, the majority but
under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal factions, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Because of the complexities of various post-war risks to stability in Iraq and the
region, some observers believe that the President George W. Bush Administration
would prefer that Saddam Hussein be replaced by a military or Baath Party figure
who is not necessarily committed to democracy but would comply with applicable
U.N. resolutions. Administration statements, however, continue to express a strong
commitment to democratizing Iraq.
Current Planning Efforts. The Administration is planning for a post-
Saddam regime. The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts
the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a
stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N.
resolutions. Senior State Department and Defense Department officials testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003 that there
would likely be at least a 2-year period before governance of Iraq could be transferred
from the U.S. military to an Iraqi administration.52 Some analysts speculated that the
transition might last considerably longer. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General
52 “American Officials Disclose 2-Year Plan to Rebuild Iraq,” New York Times, February
12, 2003.

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CRS-22
Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24 that as
many as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar occupation, although
other Administration officials have disputed the Shinseki assessment.
A press report on February 21 indicated that a prominent American civilian
would likely be named to head an interim regime in Iraq and direct the reconstruction
effort.53 Cable News Network reported on March 7, 2003 that the Administration
plans to administer post-war Iraq by appointing one administrator each for a northern,
southern, and a central region. During the interim period, the United States would
eliminate remaining WMD, eliminate terrorist cells in Iraq, begin economic
reconstruction, and purge Baath Party leaders. Iraq’s oil industry would also be
rebuilt and upgraded. Some earlier reports indicated that some military planners
would prefer that the United Nations and U.S. allies play a major role in governing
post-war Iraq on an interim basis. In September 2002, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that U.S. occupation force levels would range between 75,000 and
200,000 personnel, at a cost of $1 billion to $4 billion per month. Civilian leaders
of the three major U.S. armed services told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on March 6 that the cost of the occupation would likely exceed $50 billion. (See
below, Cost Issues.)
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power
after Saddam is overthrown. Nonetheless, the opposition met in northern Iraq in late
February 2003, with a White House envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad attending, to plan their
involvement in a post-Saddam regime. On February 11, Iraqi exile opposition
leaders reiterated their strong opposition to the installation of a U.S. military
governor in post-war Iraq54 and, at the northern Iraq meeting and against U.S. urging,
the opposition named a six-man council that is to prepare for a transition government
if and when Saddam Hussein is ousted. The six are Iraqi National Congress director
Ahmad Chalabi; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Jalal Talabani; Kurdistan
Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani; Shiite leader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim,
who heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI; Iraq
National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan
Pachachi.
As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
53 “Full U.S. Control Planned for Iraq; American Would Oversee Rebuilding,” Washington
Post, February 21, 2003.
54 “Exile Group Leaders Fault U.S. Plan for Postwar Iraq,” Washington Post, February 12,
2003.

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CRS-23
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.55 The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure. Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy; (11) defense
institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil society capacity-building; (14) anti-
corruption measures; (15) oil and energy; (16) preserving Iraq’s cultural heritage; and
(17) local government.
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects. On January 20, 2003, President
Bush ordered the formation of post-war planning office called the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of Defense.
The office is in the process of establishing links with U.N. agencies and non-
governmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq and forge links to
counterpart organizations in countries that participate in U.S. military action against
Iraq.
It is widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a
variety of means... to shoulder much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”
However, many observers believe that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could
destroy its own oil fields. Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing from
there in 1991. The Administration reportedly is planning to try to secure Iraq’s oil
fields early in any offensive against Iraq to prevent this from happening. A related
issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and which foreign energy firms,
if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s vast reserves. Russia,
China, and others are said to fear that the United States will seek to develop Iraq’s
oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other countries. Some press
reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such control,56 although some
observers speculate that the Administration is seeking to create such an impression
in order to persuade Russia that it has an interest in participating in a coalition against
Iraq.

War Crimes Trials. Analysts have debated whether Saddam Hussein and his
associates should be prosecuted for war crimes. The Administration reportedly has
reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military action that overthrows Saddam, he
and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq.57 The Administration is gathering data for
a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates, but at the same time, some
officials have indicated that Saddam and others might be allowed a safe haven if he
leaves Iraq voluntarily before a war. The New York Times reports that U.S.
55 “State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.
56 “After Saddam, an Uncertain Future,” Insight Magazine, February 3, 2003.
57 “U.S. Seeks War Crimes Trial Data.,” Washington Post, October 30, 2002.

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CRS-24
intelligence has catalogued and categorized about 2,000 members of the Iraqi elite,
segmenting them into those that might be tried as war criminals, those that might
quickly defect to the U.S. side in the event of war, and those that already could be
considered opposed to Saddam or whose expertise would be crucial to running post-
war Iraq.58
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in
Japan and Germany.
Burden Sharing
Carl Ek (7-7286)
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments
of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq. According
to Bush Administration officials, 26 countries have offered help of one kind or
another; others also intend to support the war effort but, for domestic political
reasons, prefer not to publicize their contributions.59 Nevertheless, it appears
unlikely that a coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will arise.
Political and Military Factors. On the international political front, analysts
contend that it is important for the United States to enlist allies in order to
demonstrate that it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm
Iraq has been endorsed by a broad global coalition. In most cases, foreign decisions
to participate or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms
inspections and further actions by the U.N. Security Council. Although the political
leaders of some Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush
Administration’s aims, they must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their
populations. Analysts have suggested that some countries have sided with the United
States out of mixed motives; former U.S. ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter
characterized the nations backing U.S. policy as “a coalition of the convinced, the
concerned, and the co-opted.”60
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the
58 “U.S. Lists Iraqis to Punish, or to Work With,” New York Times, February 26, 2003.
59 “NATO Allies Willing to Attack Iraq without U.N., Wolfowitz Says,” Bloomberg.com,
January 10, 2003; “U.S. Coalition For War Has Few Partners, Troop Pledges,” Washington
Post, January 25, 2003.
60 “U.S. Builds War Coalition With Favors – and Money,” USA Today, February 25, 2003.

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United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only
small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries. Allied combat
and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been
defeated. Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because
the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating
and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the
utmost speed in command and communications.61 An opposing view is that the
United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for
an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism. During Operation Allied Force
in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for
allied consensus hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing
target approval process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces
conduct operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military
capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and
night vision equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to
achieve a swift victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions. An Administration official recently
stated that “a core group of eight nations ... has pledged either combat forces or
support units ... .”62 Britain, the only other country that has had warplanes patrolling
the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to contribute up to 45,000 ground troops, as well
as air and naval forces. Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it is believed
that other countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Romania, and
Albania may support coalition forces once a conflict begins. The Czech Republic has
reinforced a contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists in Kuwait, stationed
there since March 2002, and Slovakia has deployed a similar, smaller unit.63 Japan,
constitutionally barred from dispatching ground troops, reportedly may also help in
the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, and has recently reinforced its fleet
of naval vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean.64 Sweden and New Zealand have
indicated that they might contribute medical support.
Other forms of support might prove valuable. For example, countries have
granted overflight rights or back-fill for U.S. forces that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans: Canada is sending nearly 3,000 troops to Afghanistan,
freeing up U.S. soldiers for Iraq. In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling, allow
aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force
calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria
have offered the use of their airbases and seaports. At the Bush Administration’s
61 “On Iraq, Can Too Many Troops Spoil A War?” Christian Science Monitor, January 22,
2003.
62 “America’s Allies Pledge Array of Support,” Baltimore Sun, February 14, 2003. For
domestic political reasons, some countries wish to delay announcement of their support.
63 Bratislava and Washington reportedly are discussing possible U.S. assistance in covering
some of the costs of Slovakia’s deployment. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February
26, 2003.
64 “We’ll Help, But um ... ah ...,” Economist, February 15, 2003.

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request, the Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training
of up to 3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant
interpreters and administrators.65
On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of
assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight
privileges; the request was deferred. On February 10, France, Germany and Belgium
vetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that it
would implicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder sought to
sharpen the distinction by announcing that his government would provide defensive
missiles and AWACS crews to help protect Turkey on a bilateral basis.66 A week
later, the impasse was broken by an agreement over language indicating that such
assistance “relates only to the defense of Turkey” and does not imply NATO support
for a military operation against Iraq.67 Despite the compromise, many observers
believe the temporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO.
In addition, the Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish
government to use Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through
southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq – a key issue for U.S.
planners. The negotiations over allowing U.S. troops proceeded in tandem with
discussions over a U.S. aid package.68 The two sides apparently reached an
agreement permitting as many as 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey; in return, the United
States reportedly may provide approximately $6 billion in direct aid (and more in the
form of loan guarantees) to Turkey. On March 1, however, the Turkish parliament
by a 3-vote margin failed to approve the deal. Ruling party leader Recep Erdogan
has urged the United States to wait a week, after which time a newly reorganized
government might ask the legislature to reconsider the accord; he has indicated
March 19 as a possible date for a second vote. Some U.S. Members of Congress and
other American policymakers have criticized Turkey, claiming it has leveraged U.S.
strategic needs to squeeze a large aid package out of Washington. However, Turkish
officials argue that more than 90% of their country’s population opposes a war and
that Turkey suffered severe economic losses from the 1991 Gulf War. Ankara also
65 “Canada Will Send 3,000 on Afghan Mission” Toronto Globe and Mail, February 13,
2003. “Hungary Approves US Request For Training Base For Iraqi Exiles,” Agence France
Press, December 18, 2002.
66 “Germany To Ship Missiles To Turkey,” Washington Post, February 14, 2003.
67 NATO works on a consensus basis; France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg opposed
the initial U.S. request. “NATO Blocked on Iraq Decision,” Washington Post, January 23,
2003. At the end of January, however, eight European leaders signed an open letter
supporting U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq. “European Leaders Declare Support for U.S. on
Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2003. That statement was followed by a declaration
of support by the ten countries aspiring to join NATO. “Who Stands with U.S.? Europe Is
of Two Minds,” New York Times, January 31, 2003. “East Europeans Line Up Behind
Bush,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2003. “NATO Agrees to Begin Aid to
Turkey,” Washington Post, February 17, 2003.
68 Israel, Jordan, and Egypt also reportedly have requested U.S. aid to offset possible effects
of to a war. “Deals For Allies’ War Support Are Likely To Cost U.S. Billions,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, February 20, 2003.

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CRS-27
is concerned over the possibility that a new conflict in Iraq could re-kindle the efforts
of Kurdish separatists to carve out a Kurdish state. Finally, Turkey has sought
assurances that Iraq’s 2-3 million ethnic Turkmen will be able to play a post-war role
in Iraq.69
In late February, Jordan’s prime minister acknowledged the presence of several
hundred U.S. military personnel on Jordanian soil; the troops were reportedly there
to operate Patriot missile defense systems and to conduct search-and-rescue missions;
the deployment marked a reversal from Jordan’s neutral stance during the 1991 Gulf
war.70 Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public
statements, approximately 180,000 U.S. troops are currently ashore or on ships in the
region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers.
Whether the United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in
carrying out an attack on Iraq remains unclear. U.S. troops based in Kuwait would
likely play a key role in any ground attack against Iraq. In addition, several U.S.
aircraft carriers will be positioned in the region.
Post-Conflict Assistance. After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq. However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces. Japan, Sweden, and Romania have indicated that they might
play a role.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.
Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and outcome–
could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic pressures,
stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and festering regional
disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of the Middle East.
Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along ethnic or sectarian
69 “Turkey Conditions Troop Deployment on More U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, February
19, 2003; “Turkey Seems Set To Let 60,000 G.I.’s Use Bases For War,” New York Times,
February 26, 2003. “Turkey Needs Week or More to Reconsider U.S. Request,” New York
Times, March 4, 2003; “Turkish Party Leader Hints At Conditions For U.S. Deployment,”
Washington Post, March 10, 2003.
70 “U.S. Troops Deployed In Jordan,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003.

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lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional boundaries as occurred
after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is highly unlikely; however,
political realignments could take place, along with new alliances and rivalries that
might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide
to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance,
political support, or both. Saudi Arabia, for example, should it assent to U.S. use of
its bases or facilities, would be likely to push for political concessions, including a
stronger U.S. effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as a possible
reduction in U.S. military presence in the long term. (See below.)
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain the support or acquiescence of
Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will
be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest
to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted Arab-
Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region. Two other
issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.
Democracy and Governance. Some commentators believe that a war with
Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic
revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has
repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the
Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have
authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort
to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort
to support democratization and development, although the Administration is
requesting significantly more funding for this initiative–$145 million–in FY2004.
Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the
United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more

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open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups,
who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other
groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior
experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the
Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. Administration officials and other
commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more
favorable climate for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations. Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush
Administration, which brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace
conference at Madrid in 1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
Many believe that the then Bush Administration secured wide Arab participation in
the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to
address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Officials of the present Bush Administration
continue to speak of their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after
eliminating current threats from Iraq. In a speech on February 26, 2003, President
Bush repeated earlier calls for a viable Palestinian state together with a commitment
on the part of all Arab states to live at peace with Israel.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to U.S. interests than a
largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led
coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab
and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli
issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate
in Arab-Israeli negotiations, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of
inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in
anti-U.S. terrorism.
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region. Large-scale deployment of
U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihood of a
continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on
Middle East governments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. Long-
lasting major U.S. military commitments in the region, however, could heighten
resentment against the United States from Islamic fundamentalists, nationalists, and
other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the Middle East; such resentment could
manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S. interests in the
region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a reduction in U.S.
military presence. According to a Washington Post report on February 9, 2003,
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah plans to request the withdrawal of U.S. armed
forces from Saudi territory after Iraq has been disarmed. U.S. and Saudi officials
declined to comment on this report, which an unnamed White House official
described as “hypothetical.” Periodic dissension within the Arab world could also

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affect future security arrangements in the Middle East, particularly any arrangements
involving the United States.71
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
Humanitarian Issues
Rhoda Margesson, 7-0425
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
Background. During 1991-1996, surveys and studies show a continuing
decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian population, especially
among children and the elderly. However, because much of the information available
on the conditions within Iraq is considered unreliable, it is difficult to determine how
much of the suffering is due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq and how much is due
to other factors.72 In general, there seems to be a consensus that the humanitarian
situation remains precarious, and to some observers, a humanitarian crisis could arise
from war.73
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies currently provide aid to Iraq through the
Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food
and medicines for the civilian population.74 Both bilateral and multilateral aid have
continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to
assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP. Since 1996, the
OFFP has alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian
crisis (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains serious
While some improvements have been seen in nutrition, health services, water supply
and sanitation, there is greater dependence on government services. Observers of the
Iraq situation have identified disturbing health and nutrition problems affecting the
civilian population. These have been tied to the consequences of war, sanctions,
shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate policies of the Iraqi regime.
71 Unprecedented strife erupted between several Middle East leaders at meetings of the 22-
member Arab League and the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference in early
March 2003, partly over the question of defense ties with the United States and its allies.
“An Arab House, Openly Divided,” Washington Post, March 9, 2003.
72 Some groups question the accuracy of statistics published by the government, but have
no independent sources of information. All estimates of the number of deaths due to lack
of food or medical care vary widely based on the source.
73 “U.N. Official Warns of Iraqi Food Crisis,” Washington Post, February 28, 2003.
74 For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), see CRS Report RL30472,
Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.

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War-Related Concerns. It is widely believed that the current humanitarian
situation inside Iraq could worsen during a conflict, though this would likely depend
on the nature of the conflict and the extent and quality of humanitarian assistance.
Problems could arise from malnutrition and lack of food security, inadequate
sanitation and clean water, and poor health and medical care. The impact of war in
Iraq could also include a potential humanitarian emergency with population
movements across borders or within Iraq itself. Although any predictions are highly
speculative without a sense of the extent and duration of a war, the United Nations
reportedly expects that 600,000 to 1.45 million refugees and asylum seekers might
flee Iraq, 2 million could become internally displaced, and that 4.5 to10 million
inside Iraq (nearly 40% of the Iraqi population) could require food assistance within
weeks.75 Some argue that supplies of water, food, medicine, and electricity are a
matter of urgent concern now.76
Iraq’s population is estimated to be between 24 and 27 million people, of which
60% receive monthly food distributions under the OFFP. Reportedly, families
cannot make their rations last the full month or they need to sell part of them for
other necessities – leaving them without any food stored in reserve and more
vulnerable, particularly if food distribution were to be interrupted. Furthermore,
most of the warehouses that store food in OFFP are now empty, which means there
are few reserves within Iraq. It is unclear what assumptions are being made about
estimates of food aid and the cost per Iraqi citizen: how much will be required for
how many people over what period of time? There is also concern about whether
food delivery will be dependent on keeping the OFFP distribution network in place
and to what extent contingency plans are being coordinated and implemented with
the OFFP.
Considering the potential scope of the conflict, in recent weeks questions have
been raised about the level of preparedness on the part of the United States and the
international community for the humanitarian consequences likely to result. There
are also concerns about the absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether
they can provide adequately for these populations, and the impact of refugee flows
on stability in the region. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have publicly stated
that they will prevent refugees from entering their countries.77 Iranian leaders have
stated that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but refugees would be
provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran in Afghanistan.78
However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in case. Turkey has
said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and is planning to
75 “Shortfall Imperils U.N.’s Iraq Aid; Funds Sought for Humanitarian Work,” Washington
Post, February 14, 2003.
76 “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of
Possible US War.” Turkish Daily News, December 27, 2002.
77 “Aid Groups Cagey on Contingency Plans for Iraq War,” Reuters, January 15, 2003.
78 Iranian police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf recently said, “No refugees will be allowed
into our territory if America attacks Iraq.” “Tehran Sends Mixed Signals on Iraqi Refugees,”
RFL/RL, January 16, 2003; “Iran Prepares for Possible Iraqi Refugee Influx,” Reuters,
January 16, 2003.

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build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five more camps
within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of 24,000 tents. The
Red Crescent team in Iraq is making preparations to accommodate up to 100,000
people and treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting.79 Kuwait’s government
has said it will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that displaced people
could be cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two countries. The
government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees. According to relief
agency officials, Jordanian authorities appear determined not to allow Iraqi refugees
into Jordan. Saudi Arabia has not publicly discussed the need for preparation for
refugees, but there have been reports that the government is making some plans.80
Contingency Planning. Given the challenge of current conditions in Iraq,
relief agencies acknowledge that a conflict there would disrupt critical infrastructure,
delivery of basic services, and food distribution. They are planning for humanitarian
needs amid great uncertainty about conditions in the aftermath of conflict. Although
the humanitarian issues in Iraq have in recent weeks been getting much more
attention in the United States and abroad, the state of preparedness for humanitarian
contingencies, degree of transparency over planning, and lack of funding have many
concerned about the impact of war and capacity of the international community to
meet the humanitarian needs on the ground.
On January 20, 2003, a presidential directive established the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in the Pentagon to prepare for war and
post-war aid needs. The Office, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M. Garner, is
set up under the Department of Defense (DOD) but staffed by officials from agencies
throughout the U.S. government, including the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the State Department. Civilian coordinators
in charge of three substantive areas – humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and civil
administration – and a fourth coordinator, responsible for communications, logistics,
and budgetary support, are expected to work on the planning and implementation of
assistance programs.
According to Pentagon planners, U.S. armed forces would initially take the lead
in relief and reconstruction, later turning to Iraqi ministries, NGOs, and international
organizations to assume some of the burden.81 The group has developed an
operational concept for the delivery of aid, relief coordination, and a transitional
distribution system. U.S. forces are pre-positioning food and relief aid near Iraq and
making plans to deal with a possible humanitarian crisis.
DOD is taking an inter-agency approach to the potential need for humanitarian
assistance. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated that
USAID and the Department of State were working with NGOs and international
79 “Turkey to Set Up 24,000 Tents at Iraq Border for Possible Refugee Influx,” Agence
France-Presse, January 15, 2003; “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’
War; As U.S. Military Prepares for Fighting, Relief Groups Mobilize to Save Lives,”
Washington Post, January 5, 2003.
80 Ibid.
81 “U.S. Military Lays Out Postwar Iraq Plan,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.

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organizations, which would be “important partners in addressing Iraq’s humanitarian
needs,” adding “civilian and military officials regularly consult and coordinate
plans.” With funding from USAID, U.S. NGOs have formed a consortium, the Joint
NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative, for better coordination. Grossman noted
that the United States had allocated $15 million for planning, and $35 million was
being made available from other accounts.82
Since October 2002, USAID has been putting a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) together and is making preparations to deal with the basic needs of
one million people. According to USAID, so far it has spent $26 million from
contingency planning funds. Another $56 million will be drawn from existing
funding sources within USAID. Whether adequate preparations are being made to
meet the needs of enough people is difficult to predict. Still, the total amounts being
spent by the United States on contingency planning for humanitarian assistance and
the projected funds required are not yet readily available. The President is expected
to make decisions shortly on follow-on funding.
U.N. agencies have met with key donors to develop possible humanitarian
scenarios and contingency plans. The United Nations is appealing for $120 million
to provide humanitarian assistance and food, increase staffing for relief operations,
develop joint services for the aid community, and prepare for post-war Iraqi relief.
So far, it has received pledges of about $30 million.

The absence of international organizations and NGOs operating in and around
Iraq means there are no networks in place and there is little experience in the area.
The Pentagon has stated that humanitarian agencies may not have access to all of
Iraq immediately. In addition, U.S.-based organizations are required by the U.S.
government to have a license to operate in Iraq.83 The United Nations has an
extensive infrastructure in Iraq to oversee the OFFP, but expatriate staff are already
being withdrawn and those who leave before or during conflict would not be
available to administer assistance while the fighting lasts.84 Some NGOs are
concerned that the U.S. and other military leaders underestimate the potential
humanitarian crisis in Iraq85 and the large-scale humanitarian operation required in
the case of conflict. They complain that, despite U.S. statements to the contrary, they
are not being adequately consulted on relief plans and at present lack the resources
82 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, February 11, 2003. Transcript provided by
Federal Document Clearing House.
83 “U.S. Plans Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi People in Case of War,” January 16, 2003,
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq]. “Uncertainty Dogs Relief Groups’ Plans to Care
for Iraq Refugees,” Financial Times, January 6, 2003.
84 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has four offices inside
Iraq, and works primarily with 100,000 Palestinians, 23,000 Iranians, and 13,000 Turks–all
of whom are refugees. “U.N. Seeks $37.4 Million Humanitarian Supplies in Case of Iraq
War,” Dow Jones International News, December 23, 2002.
85 AlertNet, “Agencies Should Resist Being Taken for Granted,” January 17, 2003,
[http://www.reliefweb.org].

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to flow into Iraq behind advancing U.S. forces, as projected by military planners.86
NGOs also maintain that the U.S. government has delayed approval of the licenses
required for organizations not already present in Iraq to set up operations.87 Some
have also questioned whether military operational security will impair the
communication necessary to evaluate the humanitarian situation and provide
assistance.
How the war is fought and for how long – whether it will be a protracted, urban
war with heavy civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi
people – will in part determine the scale of the humanitarian problems. How
assistance is to be implemented–through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration, or
donor assistance could affect the response to humanitarian problems. Within this
context, the type of humanitarian assistance provided can also determine the scale of
the problems. DOD has clearly stated that it is not the lead agency for humanitarian
relief beyond “creating humanitarian space,” but it is not known how assistance will
be implemented in a postwar Iraq, the role of the U.S. government, U.N. agencies,
and NGOs, and what agency will coordinate this effort for the United States and the
international community.88
Congress has been concerned about burden sharing, about how much the United
States should pay in relation to other donors, the aid priorities, and the possible use
of oil revenues to offset humanitarian and reconstruction costs. Still to be
determined is the role of the international donor community and neighboring
countries in contributing to immediate post-war efforts. Another area of concern is
the time required to transition from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction.
Frustration with slow progress on the ground and growing disinterest on the part of
the international community are risks in any conflict, but particularly in Iraq where
there is less overall consensus for intervention in the first place.
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, March 10, 2003)
The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises
a number of domestic and international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article
I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under
international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; and (3) the effect of United
Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter. The following subsections give
brief overviews of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters
in greater detail.
86 “AID Groups Say U.S. Shut Them Out of Post-Invasion Plan,” Boston Globe, February
18, 2003.
87 Ibid.
88 “Pentagon News Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance for Iraq,” February 25, 2003.

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The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The potential use
of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions
under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has
employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of
the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....” Because of these separate powers, and
because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue
of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often
arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without
congressional authorization. While all commentators agree that the President has the
constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without
congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent
to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated
against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional.
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.” Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force.
In the present circumstance these legal requirements seemingly have been met
and any controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force resolved. As noted
earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorizes
the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” As predicates for the use of
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism.
P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution” and requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on
matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expresses congressional
“support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and decisive action by the
Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all relevant Security Council
resolutions, but it does not condition the use of force on prior Security Council
authorization. The authorization does not contain any time limitation.

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CRS Products
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Statutory Authority for the
Use of Force Against Iraq,” available online from the CRS site at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter226.html].
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Domestic Legal
Considerations” [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter126.html].
CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question
that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the United States
would be deemed legitimate under international law. International law traditionally
has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues
to be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right has also traditionally
included the right to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate,
preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be
imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces. But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. As
a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq
by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the
outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to
provide justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to
be a lawful preemptive use of force.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against
Iraq.
CRS Report RS21311, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force.

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CRS-37
Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....” It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans. In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the “inherent right” of
States to use force in self-defense.
Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N.
authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable. It is at least arguable that the
authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect. In the wake of a number
of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678,
adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In Resolution
687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including
unconditional Iraqi disarmament and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop
or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related
to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire.
Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including
Resolution 678. It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the
conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the
authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.
Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security
Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit
authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990. On November 8, 2002, in
the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month
earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi
compliance with that resolution. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations. The resolution obligates the Council to
“convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise
fail to meet its disarmament obligations. Whether Resolution 1441 necessitates an
additional resolution specifically authorizing the use of force appears debatable. The
Bush Administration has taken the position, however, that the United States is
prepared to take military action against Iraq to force its disarmament, even in the
absence of further authorization from the U.N. Security Council.

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CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq
Crisis: A Brief Overview.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Texts – 1992-2002.
Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated March 11, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and
the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using regular FY2003
funding with costs of over $2.3 billion already incurred to activate reservists and
deploy and support troops and equipment in the region. Recently, controversy erupted
in Congress over the Administration’s unwillingness to provide any estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq at a time when press reports cited unofficial Pentagon estimates
of between $60 billion and $95 billion.89 In a hearing before the House Budget
Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz refused to provide any
estimate.90
According to various sources in the executive branch, the Administration may
soon submit an FY2003 supplemental request that includes about $60 billion to cover
the cost of the war in Iraq and possibly also the cost of continued operations in
Afghanistan and enhanced security in the United States. (It is not clear whether the
$60 billion includes the remaining funding for FY2003 for Afghanistan and the
global war on terrorism that would be in addition to the $6 billion that was provided
in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 107-7/H.J.Res 2).) Funding for
aid to nations supporting the United States in Iraq could be about $4 billion plus
additional aid to other countries like Israel and Turkey where negotiations are still
underway. Funding of about $2 billion may be proposed for reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance.
Because of uncertainties about both the course of the war itself and postwar
needs, estimates of the total cost of war and war-related costs by observers outside
the Administration range widely (see Table 1 below). On the basis of the forces that
are currently deployed , CBO recently raised its estimate for the cost of the war alone
to $41 billion for a two-month war that relies heavily on ground forces.91 Some
89 “Bush To Seek Up To $95 Billion to Cover Cost of War In Iraq,” Wall street Journal,
February 26, 2003; “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times,
February 26, 2003; “War Tab Could Hit $95 Billion,” Dallas Morning News, March 3,
2003.
90 House Budget Committee, Transcript, Hearing on the FY2004 Defense Budget, February
27, 2003.
91 CBO, An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004, March
(continued...)

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observers have emphasized that the cost for the United States could be substantially
higher than in the first Persian Gulf war because U.S. allies are less likely to
contribute to either the cost of the war itself or to post-war occupation,
reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance.92 The role of allies in postwar
occupation is a particular concern of Army officials who worry that if a large postwar
occupation force is required, the readiness of U.S. forces could be taxed.93
Members of Congress have cited concern about the effect of war costs on the
deficit. If war costs reach $100 billion in the first year, the FY2003 deficit would
increase by one-third from about $300 billion to $400 billion, setting a new record
in real terms (i.e. when adjusted for inflation) though still a smaller percent of the
GDP than in 1983.94 The Administration may submit an FY2003 supplemental to
cover both the cost of a war with Iraq and additional funding for the cost of
Afghanistan and enhanced security at home in the next two weeks.
From press reports about Administration plans, it appears that the estimates of
$60 to $100 billion include not only the cost of a war with Iraq but also some
occupation costs, possibly aid to Allies as well as funds for Afghanistan and the
global war on terrorism. Based on testimony by DOD’s Comptroller, Dov Zakheim,
DOD could request as much as an additional $12.8 billion to cover the cost of
Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism for the rest of the year.95
The full costs of a war with Iraq could include not only the cost of the war itself
but also the cost of aid to allies to secure basing facilities and to compensate for
economic losses (e.g. Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), post-war
occupation costs, reconstruction costs, and humanitarian assistance. Post-war costs
could be higher than the cost of the war itself, according to the estimates below.
Those estimates suggest that a 2-month war could cost between $27 billion and $60
billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and humanitarian
assistance could range between $35 billion and $69 billion in the first year
depending on the size of the occupation force, the amount for aid to Allies, the scope
of humanitarian assistance, and the sharing of reconstruction aid (see Table 1
below).
91 (...continued)
2003, p. 4; see [www.cbo.gov].
92 Washington Times,. “Allies Unlikely to Help Pay for Second Iraq Invasion,” March 10,
2003.
93 Washington Times, “Shinseki Vs. Wolfowitz: Policy-makers should be wary when
counting costs of peace,” March 4, 2002.
94 Calculated based on U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), FY 2004 Historical
Tables; OMB, FY2004 Analytical Perspectives; and White House, Economic Report of the
President 2003.
95 This assumes that DOD continues to incur expenses of $1.6 billion monthly, as Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld testified. He also said that DOD is trying to lower these costs. House
Armed Services Committee, Transcript, Hearing on FY2004 Defense Budget, February 5,
2003.

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CRS-40
Table 1. Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq
(in billions of dollars )
Category
Lower Enda
Higher Endb
Two month war
26.9
59.8
War Only Subtotal
26.9
59.8
Occupation Force
19.0
38.8
Reconstruction 5.0
10.0
Aid to Allies
10.0
18.0
Humanitarian aid
1.2
2.4
War-related Subtotal
34.6
69.2
Total
61.5
129.0
Notes and Sources:
a Lower end reflects CBO estimate of cost of a 270,000 force, a 10 month occupation of 100,000
troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.’s estimate of $30 billion for reconstruction over three
years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10 billion in aid to allies based on State
Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,”
February 26, 2003.
bHigher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force, a 10-
month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of reconstruction,
humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to allies based on State
Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,”
February 26, 2003.
The Defense Department has not provided any official estimates of the potential
costs of a war with Iraq, although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in interviews
several weeks ago that $50 billion would be “on the high side.”96 The Office of
Management and Budget has prepared an internal estimate, which reportedly projects
costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the estimate publicly, and it has not
explained the assumptions underlying its projections. An earlier estimate by former
chief White House economist Larry Lindsey of $100 billion to $200 billion was
dismissed by the Administration.
War Costs. Predicting the cost of a war is uncertain and would vary with the
size of the force deployed and the duration of the conflict. Although most observers
predict that a war would be short, others predict that the war could last longer,
particularly if the U.S. encountered chemical or biological attacks, had to fight urban
warfare in Baghdad, or encountered more resistance than anticipated.
The Congressional Budget Office has published estimates of the costs of two
illustrative campaigns: a heavy air option involving 250,000 troops deployed to the
region and heavy ground option involving 370,000 troops based on factors from the
individual services. In a war that lasted two months, the heavy air option would cost
96 “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.

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$27 billion and the heavy ground option would cost $41 billion for the war itself.97
Using a methodology based on the costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the
Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee estimated that a two-month war
that deployed 250,000 troops would cost $53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer
to that used by Secretary Rumsfeld.98 A new estimate by the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) that blends the two approaches, suggested that a two
month war would cost about $35 billion. A six-month war, with the same force size,
could cost substantially more, ranging from $50 billion using CBO’s figures to $85
billion using CSBA’s approach.99
Related Aid to Allies. The cost of aid to allies to ensure access for U.S.
troops, as in the case of Turkey or to provide compensation for economic losses or
refugee costs, as in the case of Pakistan or Jordan and Egypt and Israel, is uncertain.
Discussions are reportedly underway. Press reports have mentioned requests from
allies of $15 billion in grants and loan guarantees from Turkey, $12 billion from
Israel, and major additions to current aid from Egypt and Jordan.100 Based on those
press reports, such aid to allies could add many billions to the cost of the war. It is
not clear to what extent, if at all, estimates of those costs are included in the
Pentagon’s new overall estimate of $95 billion.
Occupation. The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the
number of forces and the duration of their stay. Using factors based on the recent
experience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs would
range from $1.4 billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000 personnel,
a force size that was considered by the U.S. Central Command.101 A year-long
occupation force of 100,000 troops would cost $22.8 billion and a force of 200,000
troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors. That estimate was recently
buttressed by testimony from the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stating
his view that several hundred thousand troops could be needed initially.102 Under
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz recently disavowed this estimate, suggesting that a
smaller U.S. force was likely and that Allies would contribute as well.
97 Congressional Budget Office, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M.
Spratt, Jr, concerning cots of a potential war with Iraq, September 30, 2002; see
[ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf]. CBO used costing methodology based on
cost factors used by the services and the scenarios described above; CBO, An Analysis of
the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004, March 2003, p. 4; see
[http://www.cbo.gov].
98 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf]
99 See House Budget Committee, above, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Backgrounder, Potential Cost of a War with Iraq and its Post-War Occupation
by Steven M. Kosiak, February 25, 2003 [http://www.csbaonline.org].
100 “U.S. Builds War Coalition With Favors And Money,” USA Today, February 25, 2003.
101 CBO, Letter cited. Costs would be higher if U.S. peacekeepers engaged in reconstruction
activities like rebuilding bridges.
102 “A Huge Postwar Force Seen,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.

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An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged
the post-war occupation cost at $105 billion over 5 years, assuming an initial
peacekeeping force of 150,000 troops declining to 100,000 troops the second year
and 65,000 troops for the following 3 years.103 If the peacekeeping role were shared
with the U.N. or other nations, the costs to the U.S. would be lower. Press reports
suggest that the Administration is considering an occupation of about 2 years.
Reconstruction. According to United Nations agencies, the cost of
rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years.104 Nobel
prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in
Iraq could cost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors,
to $75 billion over 6 years using the costs of the Marshall Plan as a proxy.105
If Iraqi oil fields are not damaged, some observers have suggested that oil
revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction. Most of those revenues,
however, are used for imports under the U.N. Oil for Food Program or for domestic
consumption. Although expansion of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time,
additional revenues would not be available for some time. The only additional
revenues available immediately might be those from the estimated 400,000 barrels
per day that Iraq currently smuggles and that generate about $3 billion a year.106
Humanitarian Assistance. Estimates of post-war humanitarian assistance
for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5 billion
the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq’s
population of 24 million needed help.107 If the number needing help were lower or
other nations or the U.N. contributed, the cost to the U.S. would be lower.
Economic Repercussions. Some observers have suggested that a war with
Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generated by a disruption in the supplies
that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession. (See below, Oil Supply Issues)
Such a scenario could increase the cost to the U.S. economy substantially. According
to recent press reports, however, the Saudis have promised to increase their
103 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder. CSBA uses the same
factors as CBO.
104 “U.N. Estimates rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion.” New York Times, January 31,
2003.
105 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 66-67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].
106 CBO, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr, concerning
cots of a potential war with Iraq, September 30, 2002; see
[ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].
107 American Academy of Arts & Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf]. This estimate
assumes a cost of $500 per person per year based on the experience in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the 1990s.

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CRS-43
production to offset any potential shortfall caused by a drop or the cessation of Iraqi
oil production in the aftermath of a war.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
Oil Supply Issues
Larry Kumins, 7-7250
(Last updated March 10, 2003)
The threat of an armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over its supply of crude
oil to world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that
Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s
currently known reserves – second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.
Despite holding such large reserves, Iraq’s current rate of crude oil production is
much below its ultimate potential. With investment in technology and better
operating methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could
change world oil market dynamics.
Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have
varied greatly; in some weeks virtually no oil has been exported, in others as much
as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) enter world markets. During the past two
months, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reports that exports have averaged 1.5
mbd under the oil-for-food program. In addition, Iraq likely supplies another 400,000
barrels to adjacent countries outside the U.N. run program. Despite the off-and-on
nature of Iraq’s international oil flow, the oil market relies on the Iraqi supply, and
it plays a role in the determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-purchaser
arrangements.
Iraq accounts for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not
participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi
exports are controlled by the U.N. under Resolution 986. Iraq’s financial incentive
to keep supplying the world market is strong. Crude prices recently touched $40 per
barrel, the record levels from 1990-1991. The price spike resulted from supply
difficulties due to an oil workers’ strike in Venezuela, as well as overriding concerns
about Persian Gulf oil supply. The Venezuelan strike – which began on December
2, 2002 – seems at least partially resolved; oil exports appear to be about half pre-
strike amounts.
When and if pre-strike output levels will be reached is uncertain. Were the
supply shortfall to continue through spring – and events in the Persian Gulf cause a
halt in Iraqi crude oil supply – OPEC members would be hard pressed to make up the
lost crude. OPEC members upped production in February 2003 by 1.3 million
barrels per day. With little surplus producing capacity elsewhere in the world, a crude
supply shortfall would likely occur, and oil prices could spike to new highs. If any
conflict involving Iraq were to spread beyond its borders to Kuwait – as Saddam

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CRS-44
Hussein has threatened – or affect tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf, a greater oil
shortfall could take place, resulting in more significant price and supply impacts.
On the other hand, should Iraq experience a change of government, the country
could become a much larger oil producer, increasing world supply, and changing the
oil price paradigm that has prevailed since the Iranian political upheaval of 1978-79.
This eventuality could unleash a new set of political and economic forces in the
region; it could also change the complexion of the world oil market.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31676, Middle East Oil Disruption: Potential Severity and Policy
Options.
Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Chronology
For a chronology of Iraq related events from October 2002 through March 10,
2003, see CRS Report RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and
Scheduled Events. CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Daily
Developments [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs/iraqdaily.shtml] covers
subsequent developments.

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CRS-45
Humanitarian Aid Organizations and Iraq
CRS Report RL31766, Iraq, United Nations and Humanitarian Aid
Organizations.
Iraq Facts
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources. The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This CRS web page includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation.
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html].
The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
For the draft “second resolution” introduced by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain on February 24, 2003, see
[http://www.un.int/usa/scdraft-iraq-2-24-03]
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1441, holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations. For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.

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