Order Code IB92117
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
Updated March 10, 2003
Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
1997-1998 Crises
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy
Resolution 1441
Nuclear Program
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Chemical Weapons
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Biological Weapons
Current Status
Older Unresolved Questions
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status
Unresolved Questions
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
War Crimes Trial
International Terrorism/September 11
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property
Reparations Payments
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
Jordan
Turkey
Iran
Syria
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW)
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch
Costs of Containment

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Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
SUMMARY
The United States is insisting on
the status of Iraq’s WMD programs. Many of
immediate enforcement of all U.N. Security
the questions about those programs remain
Council resolutions that require Iraq to rid
unresolved.
itself of WMD, and the Bush Administration
is preparing for military action against Iraq if
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
Iraq does not disarm. In the wake of the
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
September 11 attacks, there has been height-
Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
ened U.S. concern about the potential threat
as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has not detailed
posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
the fate of about 600 Kuwaitis still missing
programs and alleged ties to terrorist groups,
from the war and has not returned all Kuwaiti
to which Iraq might transfer WMD. However,
property taken. Iraq initially rejected a 1991
many governments say they would only sup-
U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program to
port U.S. military action to disarm Iraq if the
address humanitarian needs, but it later ac-
action is taken with U.N. authorization.
cepted a revised version of that plan, opera-
tional since December 1996.
Part of the debate over U.S. policy
centers on whether Iraq’s WMD programs can
Iraq has been widely deemed non-com-
be ended through U.N. weapons inspections.
pliant in other areas, especially human rights
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commis-
issues. A U.S.-led no-fly zone has provided
sion on Iraq (UNSCOM) made considerable
some protection to Kurdish northern Iraq since
progress in dismantling and monitoring Iraq’s
April 1991. Since August 1992, a no-fly zone
but was unable to finish verifying Iraq’s claim
has been enforced over southern Iraq, where
that it has destroyed all its WMD or related
historically repressed Iraqi Shiites are concen-
equipment. Iraq’s refusal of full cooperation
trated. The zone was expanded in August
with UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-
1996, but Iraq nonetheless maintains a sub-
British military action in December 1998. All
stantial ground presence in the south. Iraq
inspectors withdrew and Iraq was uninspected
has openly challenged both no-fly zones since
during 1998-2002, leaving uncertainty as to
December 1998.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 8, 2002, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441,
giving U.N. weapons inspectors new authorities; inspections began November 27. Following
the latest report by the inspectors on March 7, 2003, the U.N. Security Council remains
divided over whether to authorize military action to disarm Iraq. (For an overview of issues
related to possible war against Iraq, see CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War? Current Situation
and Issues for Congress.)
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In response to Iraq’s August 2, 1990 invasion of Kuwait, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
After the war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was declared in Security Council
Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire resolution is Security Council
Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), requiring Iraq – in return for a graduated easing of sanctions
– to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize Kuwait, account for missing
Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for terrorism. Iraq accepted the
resolution. Iraq was required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991) to end repression of its
people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance from the end of the Gulf
war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council maintained the comprehensive
international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed by Security Council
Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). After the breakdown of the original weapons inspections
regime in December 1998, two additional major resolutions (1284 of December 17, 1999 and
1441 of November 8, 2002) were adopted in an effort to resume U.N. disarmament efforts.
Including Resolution 1441, a total of 17 U.N. resolutions require Iraq’s complete
dismantlement of its WMD programs. (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food
Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to
Change the Regime and the Iraqi Opposition.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited
WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities
(Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in
November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under
Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), U.N. weapons inspectors are to monitor, at point of entry
and at end-use destination, Iraq’s imports of any dual use items.
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991)
requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers.
During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions,
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which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq
governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted
Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997)
demanding Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions
against Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997)
again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the
Americans. Resolution 1137 ( November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi
officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S.
military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71,
because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.)
In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume
inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight
“presidential sites” by weapons inspectors and diplomatic observers. Resolution 1154
(March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest consequences” if Iraq
reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings) during March 26-April
3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions reviews resumed.
Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting previously inspected facilities. The
Senate and House passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998),
declaring Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1194 (September 9, 1998) demanding full unfettered inspections access and
suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered an easing
of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded
an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi
action a “flagrant violation” of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14,
1998, with the United States about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, averting
airstrikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s cooperation,
UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-related
documents and that it was obstructing inspections. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour
U.S. and British bombing campaign followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19,
1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-capable facilities and military and security targets. After
almost one year of negotiations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December
17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing,
subject to a vote of the Security Council, for the suspension of most sanctions if Iraq “fully
cooperates” with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission), although Iraq’s revenues would be subject to undefined
financial controls, exports of dual use items to Iraq would still require U.N. approval, and
arms exports would remain banned. The resolution called for inspectors to determine within
60 days of reentering Iraq what WMD elimination tasks remain and to report to the Council
every three months. In January 2000, former IAEA director Hans Blix was named head of
UNMOVIC. In the absence of Iraq’s agreement to allow in-country inspections during 1999-
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2002, UNMOVIC’s staff of 63 – all employees of the United Nations and not their individual
governments – reviewed documents and imagery, interviewed informants, and reviewed
civilian contracts for goods purchased by Iraq to determine whether certain items subject to
review (“Goods Review List” items) were included.
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the
post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq, based partly on fears that Iraq would not
hesitate to use WMD or provide WMD to terrorist groups, in early 2002 President Bush
began to build a case that the United States must act preemptively to change Iraq’s regime
and prevent its re-emergence as a threat. In his January 2002 State of the Union speech he
described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. One month prior
to that speech, the House passed H.J.Res. 75 on December 20, 2001, by a vote of 392-12.
The resolution called Iraq’s refusal to readmit U.N. inspectors a “material breach” of its
international obligations and a mounting threat to peace and security. The resolution, not
taken up in the Senate, did not explicitly authorize U.S. military action.
Resolution 1441. After an internal debate, the Administration decided to work
through the U.N. Security Council to force Iraq to eliminate its suspected WMD. In a
September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implicitly threatened
U.S. military action, unilateral if necessary, if the United Nations did not enforce existing
resolutions on Iraq. Four days later, Iraq pledged to admit UNMOVIC inspectors without
conditions, reversing a position taken during several meetings with the United Nations in
2002: March 7, May 1-3, and July 4-5 (in Vienna). Iraq and UNMOVIC reached agreement
(October 1, 2002) on procedures for new inspections, but the Bush Administration called
the agreement insufficient and insisted on a new Security Council resolution specifying
consequences for non-compliance and enhancing inspection authorities. On October 11,
Congress completed work on a resolution (H.J.Res. 114, P.L. 107-243) authorizing the use
of U.S. armed forces against Iraq.
After several weeks of negotiations, on November 8, 2002 the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, with the following key provisions:
(1) declaring Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions;
(2) giving Iraq 7 days to accept the resolution and 30 days (until December 8) to provide a
full declaration of all WMD programs;
(3) requiring new inspections to begin within 45 days (December 23) and an interim progress
report within 60 days thereafter (no later than February 21, 2003);
(4) declaring all sites, including presidential sites, subject to unfettered inspections;
(5) giving UNMOVIC the right to interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside
Iraq, and to freeze activity at a suspect site;
(6) forbidding Iraq from taking hostile acts against any country upholding U.N. resolutions,
a provision that would appear to cover Iraq’s defiance of the “no fly zones;” and
(7) giving UNMOVIC the authority to report Iraqi non-compliance and the Security Council
as a whole the opportunity to meet to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance.
This has been interpreted by France and some other countries as requiring a second
resolution to authorize force, although the United States disputes that interpretation.
Iraq accepted the resolution on November 13 in a defiant letter, and inspections began
on November 27. Blix has said the inspectors have received full access thus far in their
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inspections of about 450 sites (over 300 by UNMOVIC and 140 by the IAEA). On
December 7, Iraq submitted its required declaration, but after comparing the Iraqi declaration
to U.S. intelligence assessments, the Bush Administration said on December 19, 2002 that
there were material omissions that constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations.
Blix criticized the declaration as failing to clear up outstanding questions, although he did
not call the declaration a material breach of Resolution 1441.
President Bush and other senior U.S. officials maintain that Iraq is not actively
cooperating with the new disarmament effort. In briefings to the Security Council on
January 27, February 14, and March 7, Blix and IAEA head Mohammad Baradei have said
that Iraq has thus far failed to fully comply with Resolution 1441 but that Iraq has been
providing more active cooperation over the past month and that inspections were making
progress, including some substantive disarmament (destruction of the Al Samoud II missile).
In his State of the Union message on January 28, and in subsequent statements, President
Bush has used U.N. criticism, as well as citations of U.S. intelligence findings, to assert that
Iraq is not disarming voluntarily and would be disarmed, by force if necessary, with or
without U.N. authorization.
Maintaining that the inspections process will not lead to Iraq’s disarmament, the United
States, Britain, and Spain have called for a Security Council vote on a resolution naming
March 17 as a deadline for Iraq to clearly demonstrate full cooperation and voluntary
disarmament. A vote may come as early as March 11, with France and Russia appearing to
threaten a veto on the grounds that the inspections progress to date shows that Iraq can be
disarmed without war. It is also possible that the Council might agree to move the deadline
date in order to obtain agreement. As the Council debate has continued, new U.S.
deployments to the Gulf have brought U.S. forces there to over 200,000. At the same time,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other regional governments have been meeting to try to devise a
peaceful solution to the crisis, possibly including persuading Saddam Hussein to go into
exile. Turkey’s parliament has voted down a proposal to base 62,000 U.S. troops there in
preparation for an attack on Iraq from the north as well as the south, although Turkey’s
parliament might revisit the issue in time for the deployment to move forward.
The following summarizes outstanding issues on Iraq’s WMD. Some reports say Iraq
has illicitly imported conventional arms equipment, including from Belarus, Ukraine, and
the former Yugoslavia, possibly shipped through Syria.
Nuclear Program
Current Status. The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about
7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program. Administration
officials have pointed particularly to reputed attempts to purchase materials abroad, including
uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.
IAEA chief Mohammad Baradei said March 7 that the IAEA now believes the tubes were
for use in conventional rocket programs, although their importation was not legal under the
international sanctions regime. He also said documents alleging attempted procurement of
uranium from Niger were “not authentic.” The IAEA said on January 27 that it had found
no evidence Iraq had restarted a nuclear program, and it repeated that assessment March 7.
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Older Unresolved Questions. During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration
that it had no nuclear weapons facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA
uncovered and dismantled a previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research
facilities, including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic,
centrifuge, and chemical isotope separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation
program. Inspectors found and dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s nuclear weapons development
program, and they found evidence of development of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”),
which scatters nuclear material without an explosion. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all
discovered nuclear reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein
Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq
revealed it had launched a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as
quickly as possible by diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA
report of December 1, 1995 said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq
might have produced a nuclear weapon by December 1992.
In 1997, the IAEA said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been ended and that it had a
relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15, 1998 Security Council
statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file if Iraq cleared up
outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of some nuclear
equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still remained, and
the United States did not agree to close the file. In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear
centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991. In January 2002, as it has in each of the
past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed, acting
under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Chemical Weapons
Current Status. In January 2003, UNMOVIC and Iraq found 16 chemical artillery
munitions, believed empty. Iraq refused to yield an Air Force document, found in July 1998
by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq allowed UNSCOM to take notes
from it, and Iraq did include the document in its December 7 declaration. UNMOVIC said
on January 27 that the document indicates a discrepancy of 6,500 chemical bombs (13,000
bombs the document says were used versus 19,500 bombs Iraq previously said were used).
An October 2002 CIA assessment, released by the Administration, said Iraq has renewed
chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred tons of agent. An
UNMOVIC workplan on unresolved issues, submitted March 7, 2003, said UNMOVIC had
found in Iraq a previously undeclared type of cluster munition that could deliver chemical
or biological agents.
Older Unresolved Questions. UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel
uncovered — 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of
precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces of production equipment items — and the destruction
operation formally ended on June 14, 1994. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that
shells taken from Iraq in 1996 contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly
produced. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical shells, 550 mustard gas bombs, and
4,000 tons of chemical precursors remains unknown. The primary remaining chemical
weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which Iraq did not include in its initial postwar
declarations and of which no stockpile was ever located. Iraq has not proven it destroyed the
chemical precursors. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to
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force Iraq to admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had
imported enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late
June 1998, UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army
lab, contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in
stabilizing the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of
VX. In March 2003, Iraq proposed a technical method to prove its assertions that it
destroyed its VX in 1991. About 170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq
has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997.
Biological Weapons
Current Status. Biological weapons is the area with more unresolved issues than any
other weapons area; Iraq’s biological declarations during 1991-1998 were considered neither
credible nor verifiable, and very little new was apparently included in Iraq’s December 7,
2002 declaration. The October 2002 CIA assessment said that Iraq had reactivated its
biological program and that most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than
they were before the Gulf war. U.S. officials say Iraq has been developing unmanned aerial
vehicles that could be used to deliver biological or chemical weapons, and Secretary of State
Powell showed an artist’s sketch, based on intelligence information, of a mobile biological
weapons production facility in his February 5, 2003 briefing to the Security Council. Blix
said on March 7 that it had found mobile labs used for food testing, but no biological
weapons labs. The White House said in late December 2001 that the anthrax used in the
October 2001 mailings appeared to be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military
laboratory. Since February 2003, Iraq has dug up, under UNMOVIC’s supervision,
fragments of over 100 R-400 biological bombs (anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin) destroyed
in 1991 and declared in August 1995.
Older Unresolved Questions. Iraq did not initially (1991) declare any biological
materials, weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever
uncovered. UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and
development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first
inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research
program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive
biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters
of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. According to UNSCOM,
Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing biological agents during the
1980s, of which 4 tons remained unaccounted for. Iraq did not give UNSCOM information
on its development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological weapons. UNSCOM
had 86 biological sites under long-term monitoring. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled
the Al Hakam facility on June 20, 1996.
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status. Iraq is making progress in developing permitted-range missiles – the
Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002 CIA report to Congress and,
prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63 missile sites and 159 items of
equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles. In early May 2002, the United States
presented to the U.N. Security Council evidence that Iraq is developing missiles of ranges
beyond the permitted 150 km. Iraq’s December 7 declaration said some flight tests of these
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missiles did exceed the allowed range by about 50 km, and Blix ordered the destruction of
the Al Samoud (about 120 missiles) and related production equipment. Iraq began the
destruction by the deadline of March 1. Iraq’s “Fatah” program is being studied to see if
its range exceeds allowed limits.
Unresolved Questions. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires the
destruction of all Iraqi ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. UNSCOM
accounted for 817 of 819 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war,
as well as all 14 declared mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads. U.S. analysts believe
Iraq might be concealing as many as 12 Scud-like missiles and that it is manufacturing
propellants for missiles of ranges longer than those allowed. UNSCOM’s October 1998
report said it had been able to account for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological
(CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed in 1991. (The warheads were unearthed
in mid-1998.) An additional 30 chemical warheads were destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision. UNSCOM also accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads and said
it made progress establishing a material balance for Scud engine components. Unresolved
issues include missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile propellant, and
indigenous missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).
There is evidence of past Iraqi cheating on missile issues. In December 1995, after
Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance components allegedly bound for
Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile components since 1991, a violation of
sanctions. (That month, UNSCOM retrieved prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes,
suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s Tigris River, apparently procured from
Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.) UNSCOM also had evidence that Iraq was
conducting secret flight tests and research on missiles of prohibited ranges.
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq
as a gross violator of human rights. In 1994, the Clinton Administration said it was
considering presenting a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948
Genocide Convention. U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report
said that Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in
southern Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live. In February 2002, Iraq
allowed the U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis of Cyprus, to visit
Iraq, the first such visit since 1992. On October 20, 2002, Saddam Hussein granted an
amnesty and released virtually all prisoners in Iraq, calling the move gratitude for his
purported “100%” victory in a referendum on his leadership on October 15, 2002.
War Crimes Trial. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related atrocities to the
United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L. 102-138,
October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President should propose
to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation
was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House November 13, 1997);
S.Con.Res. 78, (passed the Senate March 13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation
Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998). For more information on the issue and on U.S.
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funding for Iraqi war crimes issues, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change
the Regime and the Iraqi Opposition.
International Terrorism/September 11
U.N. Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq
made a declaration that it would do so in 1991. FBI Director Robert Mueller said in early
May 2002 that, after an exhaustive FBI and CIA investigation, no direct link has been found
between Iraq and any of the September 11 hijackers, although some still assert that hijacker
Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. Senior U.S. officials
said in September 2002, and again in January 2003, that there are contacts between Al Qaeda
members and Iraq, that Iraq had helped Al Qaeda train with chemical weapons in the past,
and that the Ansar Islam faction in northern Iraq has contacts with Baghdad. In a February
5, 2003 briefing to the Security Council, Secretary Powell offered additional U.S.
intelligence of these linkages. Others believe that Baghdad has little contact with Al Qaeda
because it differs with Al Qaeda’s Islamist ideology and because doing so would hurt Iraq’s
efforts to improve relations with moderate Arab states that are threatened by Al Qaeda. Al
Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, in a February 12, 2003 audiotape, exhorted the Iraqi people
to resist a U.S. invasion but also criticized Saddam and his ruling Ba’th Party as socialist
“infidels.” The CIA told Congress on October 7, 2002 that Iraq would likely not conduct a
terrorist attack using WMD against the United States unless there were a U.S.-Iraq war.
Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and according to the State
Department’s reports on international terrorism (most recently the report for 2001, issued
May 21, 2002), continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation
Front of Abu Abbas. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died (committed suicide or was killed) as
Iraqi police went to arrest him for alleged contacts with foreign governments opposed to
Baghdad. Iraq says it is paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers $25,000, and
some press reports say Iraq is cultivating Palestinians that might unleash anti-U.S. or anti-
Israel terrorism in the event of a U.S.-led war against Iraq. (See CRS Report RL31119,
Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002.)
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below but, unlike Resolution
687, does not link the easing of any sanctions to Iraqi compliance on Kuwait-related issues.
Resolution 1441 does not impose any new Kuwait-related requirements on Iraq.
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty. Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its
annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N. Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait
border, and established a demilitarized zone 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into
Kuwait. Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992) endorsed border decisions taken by the
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (established May 2, 1991) that, in
November 1992, finished demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October
1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The border took effect January 15, 1993. The
new line deprived Iraq of part of Umm Qasr port and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which
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straddles the border. On March 18, 1993, the Commission determined the sea border,
allowing both countries access to the Gulf. Resolution 833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that
Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation. On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally
recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Hussein. At the Arab summit in Beirut
(March 27-29, 2002), Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to Kuwait’s territorial integrity and
pledged to cooperate to determine the fate of missing Kuwaitis (see below). On December
7, 2002, Saddam Hussein issued an “apology” to Kuwait for the invasion, but Kuwait
rejected it as insincere.
The 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by
Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), continues to monitor border violations. The United
States contributes 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which is considered a
U.N. peacekeeping operation. Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after Iraqi
incursions into the demilitarized zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member
Bengali troop contingent supplements the observer group. Kuwait furnishes two-thirds of
UNIKOM’s $51 million annual budget. The United States contributes about $4.5 million
per year to UNIKOM.
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687
require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian
Gulf crisis. Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608 are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May
2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi nationals. Iraq has admitted to having
arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not provide enough information to resolve their
fate. Only three cases have been resolved since 1995. Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait
were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and
Saudi representatives, but Iraq has boycotted the meetings since Operation Desert Fox. In
February 2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post
(created by Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons
and unreturned property. Iraq has not yet allowed him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and
August 2000, as well as in March, April, and June 2001, the Security Council has issued
statements of concern about the lack of progress. On December 12, 2002, Iraq publicly
invited Vorontsov to visit, but no visit has yet occurred. In January 2003, Iraq held a few
meetings with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the issue, pledging to bring forward new
information on the fate of the missing, but no outstanding cases were resolved. In April
2002, Iraq offered to receive a U.S. team to discuss the case of missing Gulf war Navy pilot
Michael Speicher, but Defense Department officials declined on doubts of the benefits of a
visit.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property
seized from Kuwait. In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti
civilian and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles,
and a June 2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did
note that Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.” However, since 1994, U.S.
officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was
never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers
during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border. The United Nations and
Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as
well as military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting
vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank
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missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq claims the materiel was
left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. In July 2002, an agreement was
reached on a “mechanism” for Iraq to return Kuwait’s state archives (six truckloads of
documents) to Kuwait. Iraq began the return of tons of documents on October 20, 2002,
although Kuwait says preliminary assessments suggest key archives were not returned. Iraq
returned some additional property in early February 2003.
Reparations Payments
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced
from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. As of June 21, 2002 –
following an award of $4.5 billion to Kuwait’s government and state-owned oil industry –
the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has approved claims worth about $43.6 billion, of
a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted. Following an April 2002 payout of
about $1 billion, which included $800 million in payments to Kuwait, the UNCC has paid
out about $14.8 billion. Awards to U.S. claimants thus far total over $666 million. In
September 2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion
for oil revenues lost because of the Iraqi occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning
oil wells), although current payment schedules will provide only a small fraction of that
award (about $50 million) until 2003. In June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in
payments to all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors (except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war
environmental damage. Of this amount, $5 million was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses
to counter the expected environmental reparations claims. Kuwait was awarded $700 million
in October 2002 to cover the cost of removing Iraqi mines laid in the Gulf war.
Several legislative proposals (“Iraq Claims Act”) to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about
$2.2 billion) in the United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not
enacted, because of differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority. In
the 107th Congress, H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S.
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some might argue that this group of claimants is
covered under the U.N. process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United
States should be used for those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion.
(See CRS Report 98-240, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people have grown, the United
States has had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions. The oil-
for-food program (OFF), established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) and in operation
since December 1996, has been progressively modified to improve Iraq’s living standards,
and the United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Of the
Security Council permanent members, the United States has set the highest standards for full
Iraqi compliance that would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The United States rules out direct
dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of compliance does not justify talks. (See
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CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade, which also
covers U.S. trade regulations for Iraq and Iraq’s illicit trade with its neighbors.)
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative. During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East,
Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to
Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq. The Bush
Administration portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing
differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion. After a year of debate
within the Council on the U.S. plan, on May 14, 2002, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1409, providing for goods to be exported to Iraq without Sanctions Committee
scrutiny, largely removing the opportunity for Sanctions Committee members to place
contracts for Iraq on “hold.” Military items remain banned outright and a defined list of
items (Goods Review List, GRL) remained subject to export after review by UNMOVIC.
The new export procedures were placed into effect in late July 2002. Resolution 1447
(December 4) rolled the program over for another six months and contained a pledge to add,
within 30 days, certain items to the GRL, items that the United States said could be used by
Iraq to counter a U.S. military offensive. The Security Council added 36 U.S.-suggested
items to the GRL on December 30, 2002 (Resolution 1454).
Comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since Iraq’s 1990
invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of August 6,
1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513). Since then, U.S.
trade regulations have been amended to align them with the OFF program. U.S. imports of
Iraqi oil have increased since 1999 and now account for almost half of Iraq’s oil exports,
amounting to about 1.1 million barrels per day as of January 2003. The imports are
purchased by U.S. refiners through other companies and are not bought directly from Iraq.
Prior to the OFF program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of U.N.
resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct contributions
— to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992). Total U.S.
transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other countries, reached
$200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778. These transfers were being
repaid to the United States from proceeds of the OFF program. Resolutions 1284 and 1302
(June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000; about $173 million was due
back to the United States. Repayments resumed in 2001.
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the
United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments to enforce the sanctions
regime. Improving sanctions enforcement by Iraq’s neighbors was dropped from the U.S.
targeted-sanctions proposals adopted in Resolution 1409 because of regional resistance.
With the exception of Kuwait, virtually all the neighboring governments want to avoid a
U.S.-led war against Iraq, fearing chaos inside Iraq and unintended political fallout.
However, in deference to their strategic ties to the United States, most of the Gulf states
(with the apparent exception of Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Turkey, and Jordan are hosting
varying numbers of U.S. forces that might participate in an offensive against Iraq.
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Jordan. Since 1992, despite Jordan’s economic linkages with Iraq, the United States
has determined that Jordan’s compliance with the U.N. sanctions regime on Iraq is
satisfactory. Every year since FY1994, foreign aid appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L.
103-306, P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118, P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, P.L. 106-
429, and P.L. 107-115), have denied U.S. aid to any country that does not comply with the
sanctions against Iraq, though these laws do not mention Jordan specifically. The
Administration has routinely waived sanctions in order to provide aid to Jordan, which is a
key U.S. ally in the Middle East peace process. Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the
Sanctions Committee “takes note of” Jordan’s purchases of discounted Iraqi oil which is
exchanged for Jordanian goods and write-downs in Iraqi debt to Jordan. (See CRS Issue
Brief IB93085, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues.)
Turkey. Turkey estimates that it has lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions, and,
in addition to fearing further economic fallout from a new war, is concerned that a war
against Iraq will embolden Iraq’s Kurds to become independent or attempt to control
additional territory in northern Iraq. This might explain why Turkey has demanded
substantial U.S. foreign assistance, as well as a clear operational role in northern Iraq, as a
condition for allowing U.S. forces to deploy to Turkey in preparation for possible war. The
Turkish government regulates and taxes the illicit importation of about $400 million per year
in Iraqi energy products by Turkish truck drivers. U.S. sanctions against Turkey for this
trade have been waived each year. Turkey returned its Ambassador to Iraq in January 2001.
Iran. In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships lead a Multinational Interdiction Force
(MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian Gulf to prevent the smuggling of oil
and other high-value exports. From its high of about $600 million in 2000, smuggling
through this route has fallen substantially since early 2001, indicating that Iraq may be
increasingly using the pipeline to Syria (see below). In June 2002, U.S. military officials
attributed the drop-off in part to more robust enforcement techniques by the MIF, but which
might also reflect Iran’s cooperation with sanctions enforcement. Iran’s cooperation with
the sanctions comes despite the substantial improvement in Iranian-Iraqi relations since
1995, and Iran’s public opposition to a U.S. offensive against Iraq. The two exchanged
6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and smaller batches of prisoners and
remains since. In early October 2000, the two agreed to abide by the 1975 Algiers Accords
that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister visited later in the month, a sign of
accelerating rapprochement. Press reports say Iran will likely tacitly cooperate with a U.S.
military offensive against Iraq, in part to gain greater participation in a post-Saddam regime
for Iranian-backed Shiite Islamist groups. Iran allowed Iraqi dissidents to cross from Iran
into northern Iraq for a meeting in February 2003.
Syria. Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by reopening their border in
1997; this trend has accelerated since the July 2000 accession of Bashar Assad to the
presidency of Syria. Since late 1998, the two countries have benefitted from the reopening
of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and Iraq has been sending about 180,000 -
250,000 barrels per day of oil through the line, under a “swap” arrangement in which Syria
uses the oil domestically and exports an equivalent extra amount of its own oil. In May
2001, Iraq and Syria reopened diplomatic missions in each others’ capitals, and there have
been unconfirmed reports that Iraq might have moved some WMD equipment into Syria to
avoid detection by UNMOVIC. Syria voted in favor of Resolution 1441, but Syria, a
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member of the U.N. Security Council, is strongly opposed to a new resolution authorizing
war against Iraq.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The current debate on Iraq policy includes the question of the role, if any, for the Iraqi
opposition in a U.S. military action against Iraq and in a post-Saddam Iraq. A Washington
Post report of June 16, 2002 said that in early 2002, President Bush, either as a prelude to
or alternative to a ground offensive, authorized stepped up covert action by the CIA and U.S.
special forces to destabilize Saddam. During August 9 and 10, 2002, senior members of six
major Iraqi opposition groups visited Washington for meetings with senior U.S. officials.
These groups sponsored a major meeting in London ( December 13 - 17, 2002) that
established a 65-member “follow-up committee,” in which Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists
are heavily represented. The Bush Administration reportedly has decided to oppose the
formation of a provisional government in advance of Saddam’s overthrow. The “follow-up
committee” met in northern Iraq in late February 2003 and named a smaller six person
“leadership” committee, although it stopped short of declaring itself a provisional
government. The six are Iraqi National Congress director Ahmad Chalabi; PUK leader
Talabani (see below); KDP leader Masud Barzani (see below); Shiite leader Mohammad
Baqr Al Hakim, who heads the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI;
Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreign minister Adnan Pachachi.
Despite strains within the opposition, on December 9, 2002, President Bush announced
he had authorized the draw down of $92 million (the remainder of the $97 million total
authorized) of defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA,
P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) for the opposition. He also named six new groups as
eligible to receive such aid. Some Iraqis might receive combat training. More extensive
coverage is included in CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime and
the Iraqi Opposition.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Prior to the current U.S. military buildup in preparation for possible war, U.S.
deployments had been focused on containing Iraq. The United States and Britain have
enforced two “no fly zones” to provide a measure of protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority
and other objects of regime repression and to contain Iraq militarily. To enforce the no-fly
zones, the two allies invoke U.N. Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990, authorizing use of
force to expel Iraq from Kuwait), 687 (the main ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights),
and the Safwan Accords (the March 3, 1991 cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the
coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference with allied air operations). Resolutions 678
and 687 were written under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security,
and are interpreted as allowing military action to enforce these resolutions. Resolution 688
was not written under Chapter VII, nor does that or any other resolution specifically establish
no fly zones.
To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from
Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-
compliance. Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992,
signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve
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the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. (For information on the U.S. military
posture in the Gulf, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.)
In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other infractions, the Administration also has
cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of January 12, 1991), authorizing military
action to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW). The northern no fly zone was set up
in April 1991, to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The zone extends north of the 36th
parallel. After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects
of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation. In December 2002, Turkey
renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and
about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces). However, Turkey fears that ONW protects the
anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq,
and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997. The Defense
Department said on January 29, 2003, that some U.S. personnel had begun operating in
northern Iraq in preparation for possible war.
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Masud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government. With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force). The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for peacekeeping (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DoD drawdowns for vehicles
and communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).
Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United States, Britain,
Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. A tenuous cease-fire has held since
November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an agreement in Washington in
September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues
and control over the Kurdish regional government). Reconciliation efforts showed
substantial progress in 2002; on October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly
reconvened the Kurdish regional parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In
June 2002, the United States gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to help continue
the reconciliation process. Both parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi
National Congress, and both also maintain a dialogue with Baghdad. The Kurds have
threatened to fight against any Turkish forces that deploy inside northern Iraq as part of a
U.S.-led war.
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch. Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed. The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S.
containment strategy. The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded
the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely
after Desert Fox. In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994,
Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to
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threaten its neighbors. The United States and Britain interpret this as authorizing military
action if Iraq enhances (numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
Such enhancements include Iraq’s movement of air defense equipment into the zones.
During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied
aircraft enforcing both zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the
activated missile batteries. On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck
elements of that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing
ability to target U.S. aircraft. U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone. During 2002, Iraqi
air defenses and related infrastructure were bombed about 60 times in response to about 200
provocations, and U.S. strikes on Iraqi facilities have become more frequent since late 2002
in conjunction with U.S. preparations for possible military action against Iraq. The target list
reportedly has been expanded to include those systems, such as surface-to-surface missiles,
that could be used against U.S. ground forces. On December 23, Iraq shot down a U.S.
“Predator” drone.
Costs of Containment. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm,
all of which has been paid. From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2002, the
Defense Department has incurred about $10.5 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide
humanitarian aid to the Kurds. About $1.2 billion was spent in FY2002, and an additional
$2 billion has been spent to deploy U.S. forces to the Gulf in the current confrontation. The
Department of Defense, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22
U.S.C. 5859a), assisted UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since
the December 15, 1998 UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical
support, at a cost of about $15 million per year. (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040,
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement.)
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