Order Code RS21376
Updated March 3, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Capable Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs)
Andrew Feickert
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report addresses Iraq’s post-Gulf-War missile and UAV programs, system
capabilities, and operational employment considerations. The UN has recently ordered
Iraq to destroy its Al Samoud 2 missiles and associated engines which the UN claims
are in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 687 and 715. Iraq is also
estimated to have illegally retained up to 20 Al Hussein SCUD variant missiles and may
have also attempted to extend the range of their Ababil-100 (also referred to as Al Fatah)
missiles to proscribed limits. Iraq has also been accused of modifying L-29 Czech jet
trainers to be used as UAVs to disseminate chemical or biological agents. This report
will be updated as events warrant. Additional information is provided in CRS Issue
Brief 1B92117, Iraq: Weapons, Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy and
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq:UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Iraq’s Missile and UAV Program, 1991-1998
Since the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991 and the imposition of UNSCR 687,
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspectors have either
supervised the destruction of, or accounted for:1
!
817 of 819 Russian-supplied SCUD missiles;
!
19 transporter, erector, launchers (TELs); and
!
30 chemical/biological warheads.
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq experimented with a variety of ballistic missiles, most
based on the proven SCUD design, with ranges from 900 to 2,500 kms. Missiles such as
the Al Abid, Tammouz I, and Badr-2000 have been developed with varying degrees of
1 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, U.S. Government White Paper, February 13,
1998, p. 11.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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foreign assistance but either have failed during operational testing or the programs were
discontinued because of the Gulf War, UN disarmament activities, or lack of foreign
assistance. These programs may have been resurrected after the departure of UNSCOM
inspectors in 1998.
Baghdad is allegedly attempting to convert a number of L-29 Czech jet trainers into
UAVs that can be fitted with aerial spray tanks for the dissemination of chemical or
biological agents over a wide area. This is not a new endeavor as Iraq conducted
experiments in converting Mig-21 aircraft into UAVs capable of carrying 2,000 liter
spray tanks prior to the Gulf War.2
It is important to note that this report covers only Iraqi systems that are known
through inspections to be WMD capable and not those systems that could be modified to
carry WMDs. This report also does not cover Iraqi WMD capable artillery, rockets, aerial
bombs, and mines.
Current Estimated Status of Iraq’s WMD Capable Missiles and
UAVs
Current Estimated Status of Iraq’s WMD Capable Missiles and UAVs
Al Samoud (Photo at[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/25/iraq/main541855.shtml])
In Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix’s report to the UN on January 27, 2003,
he suggested that Iraq’s Al Samoud II and Al Fatah (Ababil-100) missiles were in
violation of the 150 kilometer range limit set by the Security Council. Iraqi test reports
given to the UN inspectors revealed that of 40 documented tests of the Al Samoud II that
the missile exceeded the 150 km (93 miles) limit on 13 occasions - once out to 114 miles.3
Test documents also indicated that out of 33 Al Fatah flight tests, 8 tests violated the 150
km limit - once out to 100 miles.4 Blix also indicated that Iraq had expanded the diameter
of the Al Samoud II missiles to 760 mm despite UN directives limiting the missile’s
diameter to 600 mm or less.5 In addition, 380 SA-2 ( a Soviet-origin anti- aircraft missile
permitted under UNSCR 687) missile engines were also deemed as proscribed as they had
been modified for use in the Al Samoud II. While the Iraqi claim that neither missile
would have exceeded the 150 km range if payloads (both have an estimated 300 kg
payload) and guidance systems were installed for the flight tests has possible merit, such
a claim could only be proven if flight tests were conducted with payloads and guidance
systems.
While some analysts have characterized these as “minor” violations to Security
Council Resolutions, other analysts disagree. The increased diameter of the Al Samoud
II permits additional fuel and payload capacity which could permit a 70% increase in its
2 Ibid.
3 International Experts Study Iraqi Missiles, Associated Press, February 10, 2003.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

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chemical or biological payload capacity at a 150 km range.6 Inspectors have verified that
76 Al Samoud II missiles were produced and there could actually be up to 100 of these
missiles with approximately 50 of them deployed to units in the field.7 Even at a UN-
permissible 150 km range, the Al Samoud II and Al Fatah could deliver chemical or
biological payloads to targets in Kuwait, Jordan, and Turkey but Iraq would need to
deploy these missiles into the Northern No Fly Zone to hit Turkey and into the Southern
No Fly Zone to reach Kuwait.8 An additional benefit would be enhanced missile
survivability. If the Al Samoud II’s true range was near the 114 mile mark as indicated
by its maximum flight test, it could permit the missile to be hidden in an almost 50%
greater area (which would make it all the more difficult for U.S. and coalition forces to
find and destroy these missiles) and still hit selected targets outside of Iraq9. Because the
Al Samoud is a liquid propellant missile, its range could be increased fairly easily by
“stretching” the missile’s length to accommodate more propellant and some experts
believe that achieving a 200 to 300 km range would be a distinct possibility.10 Some
experts also fear that Al Samoud II and Al Fatah missiles could be combined in various
forms to create multi-stage missiles that could deliver chemical or biological payloads to
even far greater distances. Press reports on March 3, 2003 stated that Iraq had destroyed
16 Al Samoud II missiles under UN supervision at the Taji missile production and storage
facility north of Baghdad but would stop destruction if it appeared that the U.S. was ready
to commence offensive operations against Iraq.11
Al Hussein (Photo at [www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/01_alhussein.jpg])
Western intelligence believes that Iraq has up to 20 Al Hussein missiles and about
a dozen TELs although, to date, UN weapons inspectors have been unable to verify these
claims. In 1999 UNSCOM reported that they could account for all but 9 Al Husseins (2
of the modified Russian SCUDS and 7 domestically produced Al Husseins).12 The Al
Hussein missile is essentially an Iraqi-modified version of the former Soviet Union’s
mobile SCUD-B missile that was developed in the 1950s based on German World War
II V-2 missile technology. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, Iraq fired more than 500
SCUD-type missiles at Iranian military and civilian targets; 93 SCUD-type missiles were
fired at Israeli and Coalition forces during the Gulf War.13
6 The Great Iraqi Missile Mystery, by Anthony H. Cordesman, GulfWire Perspectives, February
26, 2003, p. 7.
7 Ibid.
8 Iraq’s Al Samoud: A Missile With Great Possibilities, by Richard Speier, Policy Watch 713,
The Washington Institute, February 21, 2003, p. 3.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 UN: Iraq Destroys More Missiles, CNN.com. March 3, 2003.
12 S/1999/94, UNSCOM Report on the Status of Disarmament and Monitoring, January 29, 1999.
13 Ibid.

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The Al Hussein can carry high explosive, chemical, or biological warheads. After
the Gulf War, the Iraqis admitted filling at least 75 of their SCUD warheads with either
chemical or biological agents.14 Fifty chemical warheads were intended to carry a mixture
of Sarin and Cyclosarin nerve agents but technical analysis of warhead remnants indicated
that some of these warheads were likely filled with VX nerve agents.15 Iraq also claimed
to have unilaterally destroyed all 25 biological warheads (16 botulinum, 5 anthrax, and
4 aflatoxin) in mid-1991.16 UNSCOM later claimed that the alleged Iraqi destruction of
these biological warheads “ could not be reconciled with the physical evidence.”17 These
warheads were bulk filled but it is possible that Iraq has developed sub munition chemical
and biological warheads for their missiles since the cessation of UN inspections in 1998.18
Upon the conclusion of inspections, UNSCOM reported that between 40 to 70
chemical/biological capable warheads were unaccounted for.19
Ababil-100 (Photo at [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images/ababil-100.jpg])
The Ababil-100 missile is also referred to as the Al Fatah missile by the UN and the
press. The Ababil-100 missile is a solid propellant missile and is also believed to have
undergone engineering modifications to extend its range. The Ababil-100 is estimated to
have a 300 kg payload capacity20 and it is believed that it is currently being developed as
an unguided missile with the intent of eventually including a guidance package to enhance
its accuracy.21 There are no known unclassified estimates of the number of Ababil-100's
that Iraq might be able to operationally deploy and the Ababil-100 is also assessed to be
chemical/biological capable with submunition potential. Current UN inspection reports
do not include production figures on Ababil-100 missiles or what if any modifications
were made to the missile in order for it to achieve ranges greater than 150 kms.
L-29 UAV (Photo at [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iraq/images/l-29.jpg])
A variety of intelligence sources report that Iraq is converting an unspecified number
of L-29 Czech jet trainers into UAVs designed to conduct long range chemical or
14 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Unclassified CIA Report, October 2002, p. 18.
15 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September
24, 2002, p. 23
16 Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Program, p. 11.
17 Ibid.
18 The efficacy of all missile systems would be significantly enhanced if Iraq employed chemical
or biological sub munitions. Sub munitions allow for a wider and more effective dispersion and
concentration of chemical or biological agents and also permit a larger portion of agent to survive
a missile intercept.
19 Ibid.
20 Iraq’s Missiles: A Brief History, Iraq Watch, November 7, 2002, p. 11.
21 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government, September
24, 2002, p. 27.

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biological spray attacks.22 The L-29 UAV’s estimated range is approximately 600 kms and
its payload is approximately 160 kgs. This UAV configuration would be best suited for
conducting biological spray attacks due to the L-29's relatively small payload capacity.
It is not known how the L-29 UAV would be controlled, either from fixed or mobile
ground sites or from an airborne platform.
Operational Considerations
Given the stated U.S. aims of “regime change and disarmament,” it is possible that
Iraq will employ their WMD missiles and UAVs, as well as any other delivery means
(rockets, artillery, aerial bombs, and mines) available to insure the survival of the regime.
If Iraq chooses not to use WMDs, Coalition forces would still need to take appropriate
protective measures and this, in and of itself, causes a degree of operational and logistical
degradation.
There are several schools of thought on the timing of possible Iraqi WMD use. The
first is that Baghdad would pre-empt U.S. force deployments. U.S. forces in the region
have taken well-publicized precautions to mitigate the effects of just such a pre-emptive
attack. Iraqi missiles and UAVs would also have to penetrate U.S. Patriot missile defenses
deployed to protect seaports, airports, equipment sites, and assembly areas. Given Iraq’s
limited inventory of systems, it would be difficult for them to overwhelm U.S. defenses.
However, a successful attack might slow U.S. deployment and ultimately operational time
lines but would probably have little effect on the ultimate outcome of the campaign.
Another theory is that these weapons would be used early on in the campaign. Targeting
airfields, naval formations, or troop concentrations with missiles is a possibility and there
is potential to cause a significant operational impact should one of these targets be hit.
Another effective tactic might be to conduct a biological or chemical spray attack against
one of the aforementioned targets using a UAV. Presumably, the UAVs could fly low
enough to avoid radar detection but terminal control and agent release from the UAVs
would be difficult unless there was an Iraqi ground controller present near the target. The
final school suggests that Saddam would only employ his WMD missiles and UAVs if
Baghdad or Tikrit were directly threatened late in the campaign. At this point of the
campaign when Saddam would likely have little breathing room left, it might be difficult
to launch a WMD-laden missile or UAV with U.S. forces in such close proximity.
Chemical and biological artillery, rockets, and bombs would be a better means of halting
US ground forces in this instance.
The primary operational limitation is that of scale: Iraq simply does not have enough
missiles and UAVs to cause widespread operational impact on Coalition forces. After
more than ten years of storage and possibly re-assembly, it is likely many missiles that
were hidden will not be functional. This may also be the case for Iraq’s remaining TELs.
During the Gulf War, Al Husseins had a significant accuracy problem and also tended to
break up upon reentry and it is unclear if these performance deficiencies have since been
rectified. Another limitation is the payload capacity of Iraqi Al Husseins. In 1991 the US
Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center estimated that a bulk-
filled SCUD could cover an area of about 7 sq km with 1.0 mg-min/m3 (the dosage level
at which Sarin nerve agent has a noticeable effect on unprotected humans) under optimal
22 Ibid., p. 23.

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weather conditions. Al Husseins fired at Tel Aviv and Riyadh had payload capacities of
100 to 400 lbs.23 This being the case, chemical coverage could have ranged from .56 sq
kms to 2.3 sq kms. In order to effectively cover a large target area target such as an
airfield, seaport, or troop concentration with these reduced payloads, the Al Husseins
would have to be extremely accurate and it would likely require more than one missile per
target to insure adequate coverage. In terms of Iraq’s shorter-range missiles, any deployed
Al Samoud II and Ababil-100 missiles might have a measurable effect on Coalition
ground forces, particularly if they are complemented with Iraqi chemical or biological
artillery or rockets. If properly amassed and coordinated, these systems could cause
casualties among improperly protected forces.
The means to interdict missile attacks has improved and would be a factor in any
conflict. Since 1991, U.S. forces have devoted significant resources to improve both the
Special Forces’ and the Air Force’s “SCUD-hunting” abilities. The U.S. Patriot system
has also seen significant upgrades, to include the limited deployment of PAC 3 “hit to
kill” missiles. When the limitations mentioned above are considered, along with an
unknown degree of attrition due to ground and air interdiction operations and Coalition
and Israeli missile defenses, Iraq’s limited inventory of longer- range missiles may be
militarily insignificant.
While Iraq has begun destruction of their Al Samoud II missiles, there is still cause
for concern. The presence of longer- range Al Hussein missiles and L-29 UAVs, which
U.S. and British intelligence believe are hidden somewhere in Iraq, has yet to be
confirmed or denied by UN inspectors. It is also not known if any Al Samoud II or
Ababil-100 missiles have been deployed to frontline units. These deployed missiles could
be easily hidden by Iraqi forces in the field for use against invading U.S. or Coalition
forces as well as for attacks on regional targets within their range. Well- documented
inconsistencies in Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons program declarations to the UN
makes the missile issue that much more worrisome. Despite these circumstances, Iraq’s
missile and UAV threat is limited by its scale, operational capabilities, and a
corresponding increase in U.S. capability to locate, intercept, and destroy these weapons.
23 US Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center Paper, Effects of Patriot
Interception on SCUD Warhead Dissemination, January 23, 1991.

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