Order Code RL31701
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations
Updated March 3, 2003
Steve Bowman
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq: Potential Military Operations
Summary
While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be used
against Iraq, military contingency planning is underway. This report focuses
primarily on these contingency preparations, notably potential military options
available and the military preparations that have been undertaken. It addresses
elements of the over-arching political debate only when immediately relevant to
military planning. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21325, Iraq:
Divergent Views on U.S. Military Action) Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons programs, together with long-range missile development, and alleged
support for terrorism are the justifications put forward for military action. Though
initial emphasis was on the ouster of Saddam Hussein, the Administration has more
recently pointed to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament as its prime
objective.
In 2002 the Administration considered a range military of operational plans
ranging from a so-called “lite” option involving primarily special operations forces
and indigenous opposition groups to a “heavy”, large-scale invasion option put
forward by U.S. Central Command. The Administration initially rejected the heavy
option as depending too heavily on regional cooperation and requiring too long to
deploy the necessary forces, even though it offered the surest possibility of success.
However, the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council
has provided the necessary time to deploy over 225,000 U.S. personnel to the Persian
Gulf region, and to continue negotiations on international cooperation.
Press reports indicate that almost the full range of military forces would be
brought to bear against Iraq, with an emphasis upon simultaneous air power and
ground force attacks against the Iraqi leadership, command and control nodes, and
seizure of suspected CBW storage sites and oil fields.
Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are reportedly in
place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Negotiations continue with Saudi
Arabia and Turkey. The extent of cooperation may, however, depend heavily upon
the results of the UN arms inspections and Security Council action. The United
Kingdom and Australia remain the only nations committed to contribute forces.
Though costs remain very difficult to predict, several estimate have been put forward,
ranging from $50 billion to $1.2 trillion depending on the factors included (e.g.,
occupation costs, economic consequences).
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Factors for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Improved U.S. Military Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iraqi Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Conventional Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-War Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

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Iraq: Potential Military Operations
Background
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi
long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary
justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq
originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little
information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal,
however Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant
capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice-President
Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that
“regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power by force, was the
only way to eliminate the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.1 Although the
Administration has voiced strong skepticism of United Nations weapons inspections
in Iraq, it nevertheless negotiated the drafting and passage of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1441, which returned inspectors to Iraq. The resolution requires the
inspectors to provide periodic reports on their findings. 2 Later in 2002, WMD
disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme,
President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on August 12, specified the
following conditions that the Administration believes Iraq must meet to forestall
military action against it:
! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy
all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material.
! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it.
! Cease persecution of its civilian population.
! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel.
! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations
administration of its funds.3
While a very active debate continues over whether military force should be
used against Iraq, military contingency planning and substantial force deployment are
underway. This report focuses primarily on these contingency preparations, notably
potential military options available and the military preparations that have been
1Vice-Presidential speeches, August 26 and 29, before the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the
Veterans of the Korean War. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/]; Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,, Associated Press interview, September 10, 2002; Secretary
Rumsfeld, BBC interview, September 13, 2002.
2For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy.
3President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002.

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undertaken. It addresses elements of the over-arching political debate only when
immediately relevant to military planning.
Military Planning and Preparations
The Department of Defense has officially released limited official information
concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq. There have been, however,
frequent and significant news leaks which provide a range of details. News reports
have indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied
significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness
of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military
resources that would be required.
Options Considered
In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban,
some Administration officials advocated a similar operation., entailing extensive use
of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces,
coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable
Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This
approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could
even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this,
significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or
“psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders,
persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.4
While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some
regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally
considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces
and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and
predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This
option also does not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard
units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict
occupation.
This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by
U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen.
Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command commander who first briefed it to the
President and White House Staff calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News
reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the
support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the
reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the
4“Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals'
Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1

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length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.5 However, the
White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq
issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security
Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay
the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that
this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy
very substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military preparations today
appear to adhere closely to CENTCOM’s originally recommendations.
Current Planning and Preparations
Reportedly, this option would involve 250,000 troops, and would combine an air
offensive with up to four armored, mechanized, and/or Marine divisions. In essence,
it would be a smaller version of the 1991 Desert Storm operation, with the smaller
force reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as
capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more
capable. This option is greatly dependent upon the cooperation of regional nations
for substantial staging areas/airbases and has required months to deploy the necessary
forces. It is generally considered to offer the greatest certainty for a rapid victory
against even significant Iraqi resistance, and is in keeping with the so-called “Powell
Doctrine’s” concept of overwhelming force. It also would result in substantial forces
in place to maintain the occupation of Iraq until such time as a new government was
established.6
Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official
figures, it appears that over 225,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf
region (ashore and afloat) or en route. Five of the Army’s ten divisions have been
dedicated to the operation, as have six of twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups.
The Air Force has substantially augmented the units that have been maintaining the
“no-fly” zone over northern and southern Iraq since 1991, and now has
approximately 15 air wings in the region. Strategic bombers that are expected to play
a large role may be operating from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases
both in Europe and the United States. (For a detailed overview, see CRS Report
RL317563, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The United Kingdom is deploying an
armor task force of approximately 47,000 troops, and Australia has deployed an
undisclosed number of special operations forces.
5“The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866.
6 “Iraq War Plans IV: Desert Storm II”, STRATFOR.com September 12,
2002.[http://www.stratfor.com/corp/]

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Factors for Consideration
Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7
It appears that, unless there are major shifts in the international political scene,
U.S. military action against Iraq will not be in the context of a large coalition similar
to that formed for Desert Storm in 1991. To date, only the United Kingdom and
Australia have offered their armed forces’ participation. In 1991, 28 nations
contributed military units. Also, the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the
Gulf States provided extensive staging and transportation facilities, and multiple
fronts from which to launch attacks. Egypt, a 1991 coalition member, expedited
passage of naval forces and transport shipping through the Suez Canal. Aside from
their military force contributions, European allies also permitted use of U.S. airbases
in their countries and granted overflight rights. Though some European allies appear
to be less opposed to military action than previously, the extent and conditions of
possible assistance remain unclear. Depending upon how international events play
out – particularly the reports of U.N. arms inspectors and the actions of the U.N.
Security Council, this type of cooperation may or may not be available to the extent
it was in Desert Storm.
Considerations such as these, particularly in a fluctuating international political
environment, confront military planners with complex challenges. It has been
suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military action against Iraq does
not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations which indicate a greater
willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this could result in unacknowledged or
covert assistance, or perhaps overt cooperation after an attack has begun and a U.S.
victory appears assured.
Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, has now expressed some
willingness to permit the United States use of its facilities, upon condition of a
United Nations resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. Saudi
cooperation would provide a very significant boon to military planners, though there
may be some concern over what role in military decision-making the Saudi
government would play once an operation is underway.8
Knowing that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia may not be available for full
operations against Iraq, the United States has been establishing defense agreements,
and expanding or upgrading airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy
in the region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries has permitted use
of airbases to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia
7For a world-wide country-by-country overview, see CRS report Rlfkjre, Iraq: Foreign
Support of Current U.S. Policy.
8“Saudi Arabia Said to Have Assured U.S. on Use of Bases”, New York Times, December
29, 2002. p. 1
9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy,
2003.

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allowed only the use of the air operations command center on its territory. Given the
range of facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their
continued cooperation would be crucial to a military offensive against Iraq. As with
the European allies, the extent of cooperation from these nations will probably great
depend upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and the actions of the U.N. Security
Council. If they insist upon a second U.N. resolution specifically authorizing military
action against Iraq as a condition for their full cooperation, there are concerns that
this could delay operation beyond April, which is considered the latest date to avoid
having to conduct desert operations in the heat of the Iraqi summer.
The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding
prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and
the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the
United States has maintained a presence of 4,000-6,000 troops in Kuwait, rotating
ground force units in and out on training exercises, and has pre-positioned at least
a brigade’s equipment. Construction is complete on a new, expanded U.S. staging
facility. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali
al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative agreement, the Air Force has access to
four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait – which it has been
upgrading to handle a full range of air operations. Qatar has developed a very close
cooperative defense relationship with the United States, permitting the prepositioning
of enough equipment for three U.S. Army brigades and the construction of an
operations command center at al-Udaid airbase comparable to that located at Prince
Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has been extensively used to support
operations in Afghanistan, and 600 personnel from Central Command Headquarters
deployed there in mid-September, 2002. DOD described this deployment as a
training exercise, though most believed it to be connected to preparations for an Iraq
offensive. In the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities
and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra airbase. 10
The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq
is a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish
parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from
Turkey has delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, however there is the
possibility of the parliament’s reconsideration of that proposal, and the ships carrying
a mechanized infantry division’s equipment have not been diverted. CENTCOM
spokesmen have downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects
for a successful operation.11 U.S. officials are also exploring the possibility that
permission for overflight rather than basing rights could be easier to obtain.
Currently, the U.S. Air Force is carrying out the “no-fly zone” enforcement operation
Northern Watch from Incirlik airbase in Turkey under a detailed agreement which
limits flights and the number of U.S. aircraft that can be stationed there. There have
also been press reports that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located
inside northern Iraq. After a significant delay, Turkey has now allowed a U.S. Air
Force survey team to begin evaluating additional airfields inside Turkey. Aside from
1 0 “ C u r r e n t U . S . O r d e r o f B a t t l e ” , G l o b a l S e c u r i t y . O r g
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030120.htm]
11 “General Dismisses Rebuff by Turkey”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. 1

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permitting air operations from Incirlik, Turkish cooperation could also provide a
northern front for U.S. ground operations. Though very difficult, mountainous terrain
presents challenges in this area, if the United States intends to coopt the indigenous
Kurdish opposition forces as part of its attack strategy, access to northern Iraq would
be crucial. Complicating this issue are Turkish concerns about Kurdish opposition
groups’ desires for autonomy which could encourage Kurd separatist groups in
western Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds’ objections to any increase in the number of
Turkish troops in their region. With press reports varying from day to day, it still
remains to be seen whether the Turkish government will eventually endorse a
northern ground offensive.
Improved U.S. Military Technology
Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided
munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that an air campaign against Iraq
would be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation
Desert Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-
guided. That ratio could well be the inverse in an air campaign today. This would
allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer
aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage. U.S. military planners have paid
particular attention to the problem of Iraqi SCUD missiles. In 1991, the allied
coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile launchers, and U.S.
intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles, some possibly armed
with chemical or biological warheads. Using new equipment, such as the Tactical
Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense missiles, DOD hopes
to be able to greatly reduce the time from missile launch detection to intercept,
improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile
launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned
aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances
over Desert Storm capabilities.
The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for
attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain. There have
been some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan
campaign, but DOD has insisted they remain adequate for operations against Iraq.12
Military operations in an urban environment would ,however, limit the effectiveness
of air power and armor units. Timely targeting information, rules of target
engagement, and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties will remain prime concerns.
There is also, of course, the separate issue of the distinctive requirements of
“building-to-building” urban warfare.
Cyberwarfare is an area where U.S. technology could be brought to bear, but
still has unresolved policy issues. DOD is recommending penetration of Iraqi
computer networks to degrade communications and air defense capabilities, however
12“The Tools Of War Expecting a rerun of Gulf War I? Think again, thanks to high tech and
smart bombs”, Time, October 21, 2002.

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the inter-agency policy group that must approve military attacks against computer
networks has yet to grant such authority.13
Iraqi Military Capabilities
Conventional Forces. There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces
are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000.
Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700
armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.14 A number of factors are believed to
hamper Iraqi military effectiveness. A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much
equipment now being obsolete or inoperable. Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions
are undermanned and all comprise mostly conscripts. Large unit and combined arms
training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and
commanders are relatively few. Logistical support is not robust, and is vulnerable
to air interdiction.
Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a
paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military
effectiveness. The best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican Guard,
are kept near Baghdad for regime protection. The officer corps is subject to intense
scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges. The distribution of
weaponry and supplies is curtailed among regular army units to forestall attempts to
overthrow the regime. There also exist tensions, to some extent purposely
encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could hamper
coordination.15
These considerations notwithstanding, the Iraqi military still presents some
significant challenges for U.S. military planners. Given that any U.S. military
offensive operation will depend heavily upon “control of the skies”, U.S. planners
must ensure that Iraqi air defenses are neutralized early. Press reports have noted that
U.S. and British pilots in the overflight Operation Southern Watch have recently
stepped up attacks on Iraqi air defense sites. DOD maintains that these attacks have
been solely in response to hostile fire, though some have speculated that they
represent a “softening up” of Iraq’s southern air defenses.16
It cannot be assumed that a ground campaign would be simply a replay of 1991's
Operation Desert Storm. After that experience when Iraqi units deployed in the open
desert were subjected to devastating air attacks, Iraq’s military leadership may choose
13Fulgham, David. “War Preparations Reveal Problems”, Aviation Week and Space
Technology, December 9, 2002. p. 29
14 For a detailed examinations, see Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq’s Military Capabilities in
2002, Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 2002.; and The military
Balance 2002-2003. International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2002.
15 See also, CRS Report RL31339, U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, January 8, 2003.
16 “Airstrikes in Iraq Southern No-Fly Zone Grow”, Washington Post. January 15, 2003. P.
1

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an urban strategy to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower. By choosing to
defend only urban centers, Iraq would force the United States to commit troops to
urban combat – one of the most difficult types to conduct – and simultaneously
constrain U.S. Air Force targeting because of concerns over collateral damage and
casualties. The Iraqi government has shown no hesitation to locate military facilities
in civilian areas to exploit this concern. Republican Guard units in the environs of
Baghdad, as part of their regime protection mission, have trained for urban combat,
and could provide significant resistance mingled with Baghdad’s population of 4
million. There have been reports of underground tunnel systems in urban centers
specifically designed to facilitate urban defense.17
Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Though not yet judged to have
developed a nuclear weapons capability, Iraq is believed to have probably retained
chemical and biological (CB) stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and may
have continued covert CB development and/or production since. Some CB facilities
that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re-built. Iraq
is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include
anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Though unconfirmed,
it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural
outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide eradication in the early 1970s.
Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CB weapons,
including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and aerial sprayers for
both manned and unmanned aircraft. There have been some questions about the
effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain unanswered. 18
Though Iraq did not use CB weapons in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that
Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard will be not repeated. This view is based on
the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of
his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein
would have “nothing to lose” by their employment. The actual use of these weapons
will rest ultimately, however, upon the military commanders who control them, and
U.S. planners are focusing on ways to persuade these officers that using CB weapons
would be suicidal. In addition, known CB weapons sites will likely be very early
targets regardless of which invasion strategy is chosen. In attacking CB facilities –
particularly those with substantial amounts of munitions – military planners will have
to consider the possible effects on U.S. personnel and Iraqi civilians of the
inadvertent release of CB agents.
Given that Iraqi employment of CB weapons remains an open question, U.S.
forces must be prepared to operate in a CB contaminated environment. Though
perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces
have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I. U.S.
17 “Iraqi Strategy Centers on Cities”, Los Angeles Times, August 8, 2002. p. 1
18 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment. Center for International and
Strategic Studies. September 2002.
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Central Intelligence Agency. October
2002.

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planners will have to ensure that there are adequate supplies of protective and
decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and will again be confronted with
the problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that has led
to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of this latter problem, even though
production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-instated its
service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with the smallpox
vaccine. In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its concerns over
“serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability of
specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 19 With regard to GAO’s
concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that troops deployed
to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint Service Lightweight
Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the manufacturing defects
detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.20
One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a
small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the
casualties actually inflicted. Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and
can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed
by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of
persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return. Civilian ships
chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or
biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse
to enter the war zone. In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could
prove just as disruptive as their physical effects.
Another concern is the possibility of Iraq employing biological or toxin agents
as retaliatory terror weapons against the populations of cooperating countries, Israel,
or the United States itself. The spread of a contagious disease such as smallpox
could be the most devastating to civilian populations, though if used regionally, the
use of a contagious disease would run the risk of its re-introduction into the Iraqi
population.
The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if
WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled
references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.21 On the other
hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose”
attitude conducive to using CB weapons.
19 General Accounting Office. Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's
Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities GAO-03-137T, October 1, 2002
20 “U.S. Troops’ Chemical Suits Do Not Leak, Army Insists”, Washington Post, March 4,
2003. Department of Defense Press Briefing, March 3, 2003.
21National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. p. 5
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf]

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Post-War Requirements
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18,
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the military
requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam Hussein’s
ouster. On February 25, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki expressed the opinion that up to “several
hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation of Iraq. This
estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian leadership.22 This
controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the political and military
situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S. military presence would
be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government could be established.
The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety
of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and casualties, the demands
of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government
can be established. Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility,
it is likely that a continued deployment of substantial military ground force will be
necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment
and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a
deployment of about 60,000 troops. It is possible, however, that some nations
unwilling to participate in military action against Iraq may be willing to contribute
to a post-war stabilization force, thus alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces.
Given the current international political climate regarding U.S. military operations
against Iraq, it is difficult to estimate the possible extent of such assistance.
Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements
Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about
12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about
7,000. DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for
U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational
requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re-
fueling is possible. While the Department of Defense could meet the overall
manpower requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is
whether sufficient “low density-high demand” assets can be made available. These
include assets such as aerial re-fueling tankers, the EA-6B aircraft used to engage
air defense radars, the AWACS and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft,
unmanned aerial vehicles, Combat-Air-Search and rescue (CSAR), and all special
operations forces (SOF). Demands on special operations forces have been
particularly high over the last year. Most notably in Afghanistan, but there have also
been training/advisory missions in the Philippines, Georgia (Gruzia), and Yemen as
part of a world-wide antiterrorism campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in
Columbia. And, recently Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that he intended to increase
further the SOF commitment to the war on terrorism .23 It is in this context, that some
22 Secretary Rumsfeld, Defense Press Briefing, February 28, 2003.
23 See CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues
(continued...)

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have suggested that an invasion of Iraq would detract from the resources available
to continue efforts to pursue the world-wide war on terrorism, which they view as
currently a greater threat to U.S. security than Iraq.24
North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons
program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question
whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition
to a campaign in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources
are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have
strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.25
At a minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific
Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to
remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is
seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation.
Costs
Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake
prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and remains a highly
conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon
historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Secretary Rumsfeld has expressed his
opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost.”26
Nevertheless, some estimates have appeared. Michael O’Hanlon of the
Brookings Institution, has pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50
billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White
House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay has estimated the high limit on the cost
to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the
Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very,
very high”, and has stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no
specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.27 In response to a
request from Senator Conrad and Representative Spratt, members of the Budget
Committees of their respective chambers, the Congressional Budget Office prepared
a cost estimate with supporting documentation that divided the costs into three
segments: force deployment – $9 to $13 billion; combat operations – $6 to $9 billion
per month; and post-conflict occupation – $1 to $4 billion a month. This CBO
estimate includes only “incremental” costs, i.e. those over and above DOD’s normal
23(...continued)
for Congress.
24 Fulgham, David. “War Preparations Reveal Problems”, Aviation Week and Space
Technology, December 9, 2002. p. 29
25 Scarborough, Rowan. “U.S. Ability to Fight Two Wars Doubted”, Washington Times,
December 25, 2002. p. 1.
26“War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18,
2002
27 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York Times,
December 31, 2002. p. 1

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operations and maintenance costs.28 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences
has published a more wide-ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended
occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes
that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.29 For comparison,
the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately
$60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial
contributions.
28 Congressional Budget Office. Estimated Costs of a Potential Conflict with Iraq.
September 2002. http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=3822&sequence=0
29 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and
Sciences. December 2002.http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf

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