Order Code IB94041
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated February 27, 2003
K. Alan Kronstadt
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Pakistan-India Rivalry
The China Factor
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments
Background
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts
Kashmir Dispute
Congressional Action
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts
Human Rights Problems
Economic Issues
Overview
Trade Issues
Narcotics
Terrorism
CHRONOLOGY

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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Major areas of U.S. concern regarding
important contributions to U.S.-led anti-terror
Pakistan include the proliferation of weapons
efforts, though recent months have seen re-
of mass destruction; counterterrorism; settle-
newed doubts about Islamabad’s commitment
ment of the Kashmir dispute; democratization
to core U.S. concerns in the region.
and human rights; and economic reform and
development. A potential Pakistan-India
Separatist violence in the disputed Kash-
nuclear arms race continues to be the focus of
mir region continues. India blames Pakistan
U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia
for the ongoing infiltration of Islamic militants
and a central issue in U.S. relations with both
into Indian Kashmir, a charge Islamabad
countries. This attention intensified following
denies. The United States has received a
nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in
pledge from Islamabad that all “cross-border
May 1998. South Asia is viewed by some
terrorism” in the region will be ended, and it
observers as an arena for the possible use of
encourages renewed bilateral dialogue be-
such weapons, as both countries have de-
tween Islamabad and New Delhi.
ployed nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and
institutionalized nuclear command structures.
The United States considers a stable,
India and Pakistan have fought three full-scale
democratic, economically thriving Pakistan as
wars since 1947.
key to U.S. interests in South, Central, and

West Asia. The history of Pakistani
Pakistan-U.S. cooperation began in the
democracy and constitutionalism is a troubled
mid-1950s as a security arrangement growing
one, with three full-scale military coups and
from U.S. concerns about Soviet expansion-
military regimes ruling the country for half of
ism and Pakistan’s fear of neighboring India.
its existence. Most recently, in October 1999,
Cooperation peaked during the 1979-89 So-
the government of Prime Minister Sharif was
viet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan-U.S.
ousted in an extra-constitutional coup led by
ties weakened following the October 1990
Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
cutoff of U.S. aid and arms sales to Islamabad,
Musharraf has since assumed the title of
which were suspended by President Bush
President, a move ostensibly legitimized by a
under Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assis-
controversial April 2002 referendum. The
tance Act (the so-called Pressler Amendment).
United States strongly urged the Pakistan
Further U.S. sanctions were imposed on
military government to restore the country to
Pakistan (and India) as a result of 1998 nu-
civilian democratic rule. National elections
clear tests.
held in October 2002 resulted in no clear
majority party emerging but were marked by
The uneven Pakistan-U.S. relationship
significant gains for a coalition of Islamic
has been on the upswing following Pakistan’s
parties. A civilian parliament and prime
enlistment as a frontline state in the U.S.-led
minister were seated in November 2002.
anti-terror efforts after September 2001 at-
tacks on the United States. Nuclear-related
Pakistan continues to face serious prob-
sanctions on Pakistan and India have been
lems, including a weak economy, corruption,
waived; Congress also has granted the Presi-
domestic terrorism, and poor governance.
dent authority to waive coup-related sanctions
Pakistan has received more than $1 billion in
on Pakistan. Islamabad continues to make
U.S. assistance since September 2001.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Although national leaders in both capitals emphasize that the United States and Pakistan
remain close allies, the bilateral relationship has come under significant strain in recent
months due to signs of growing U.S. frustration with the continued existence of Islamic
militants both along the Afghan-Pakistani border and infiltrating into Indian-held Kashmir;
doubts about the commitment of Pakistan’s intelligence service to Islamabad’s stated anti-
terrorism policies; “extreme” levels of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan; reports of
alleged Pakistani nuclear proliferation activities; new U.S. immigration regulations; and
continued antagonistic relations between Islamabad and New Delhi (in early February, a
diplomatic row further dampened hopes for renewed Pakistan-India dialogue) (see
chronology for details).
February senate elections established a full civilian Parliament and further strengthened
the position of the ruling coalition-leading PML-Q, which will oversee a simple majority in
the 100-seat body. The result makes it almost certain that the Chairman of the Senate – who
has powers to take over the post of President in the event of vacancy due to illness or sudden
death of the President – will be a pro-Musharraf PML-Q member.
On January 29, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri met with Secretary of State Powell
in Washington and was told that the United States is “very sensitive” to Pakistan’s concerns
about new immigration registration rules that affect Pakistani citizens. Secretary Powell
called the bilateral relationship “strong” and assured Kasuri of the “firm U.S. commitment
to the well-being and prosperity of Pakistan.” On February 5, the governments of Pakistan
and Russia ended 30 years of poor relations when the two countries’ presidents met in
Moscow to sign several economic, diplomatic, and cultural accords.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and
South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and
Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the
two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By the end of
1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts,
the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result
of these alliances and a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan cooperation agreement, Islamabad received more
than $700 million in military grant aid from 1955 to 1965. U.S. economic aid to Pakistan
between 1951 and 1982 totaled more than $5 billion.
Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties.
During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military
assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. In the
mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s apparent efforts to respond to India’s 1974
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underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited
U.S. military aid was resumed in 1975, but was suspended again by the Carter
Administration in April 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium
enrichment facility. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
Pakistan was again viewed as a frontline state in the effort to block Soviet expansionism.
In September 1981, the Reagan Administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic
and military aid package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms
supplies to the Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees,
many of whom have yet to return home.
Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained
concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Concern was based in part on
evidence of U.S. export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to
acquire a nuclear capability. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the “Pressler amendment”) was
added to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the President to certify to Congress that
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is
to be provided. This amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress who
thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuing to
develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’s role in
opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A $4 billion, 6-year aid package for Pakistan
was signed in 1986.
With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear
activities again came under closer U.S. scrutiny, and in October 1990 President Bush
suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic
and all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipment
suspended. Narcotics assistance of $3-5 million annually was exempted from the aid cutoff.
In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L.480 food
assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
One of the most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the nondelivery of
some 71 F-16 fighter aircraft ordered by Pakistan in 1989. In December 1998, the United
States agreed to pay Pakistan $324.6 million from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury
– a fund used to settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government – as well as provide
Pakistan with $140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.
Pakistan-India Rivalry
Three wars – in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 – and a constant state of military preparedness
on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry between India and
Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India into two successor states
in 1947 and the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been major sources of tension. Both
Pakistan and India have built large defense establishments at the cost of economic and social
development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries to the former
princely state, divided since 1948 by a military line of control into the Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for supporting
a violent separatist rebellion in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has claimed more
than 60,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only to lending moral and political support
to the rebellion (for further discussion see below).
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The China Factor
India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and an oftentimes tense border
dispute remains unresolved. A strategic rivalry also exists between these two large nations.
Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have enjoyed a generally close and mutually
beneficial relationship over recent decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and
Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s.
China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s, and
included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying
complete weapons systems. In 1990, China agreed to supply Pakistan with components for
M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which brought warnings from the United States. Although
it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), China repeatedly has
agreed to abide by the restrictions of the regime. In 1993, the United States determined that
China had transferred to Pakistan prohibited missile technology and imposed trade sanctions
on one Pakistani and 11 Chinese entities (government ministries and aerospace companies)
for 2 years. The U.S. intelligence community reportedly has evidence of PRC provision of
complete M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. In 1996, leaked U.S. intelligence reports
alleged that in 1995 China sold ring magnets to Pakistan that could be used in enriching
uranium for nuclear weapons. Pakistan denied the reports (see CRS Report RL31555, China
and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues).
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments. Gen. Musharraf’s April 2002 assumption of the title of
President ostensibly was legitimized by a controversial referendum that many watchdog
groups claimed was marked by “excessive fraud and coercion.” In August, the Musharraf
government announced sweeping changes in the Pakistani constitution under a “Legal
Framework Order.” These changes provide the office of President and the armed forces
powers not previously available in the country’s constitutional history, including provisions
for Presidential dissolution of the National Assembly and appointment of the Army Chief
and provincial governors, among others. The United States expressed concerns that the
changes “could make it more difficult to build strong, democratic institutions in Pakistan.”
In October 2002, the country held its first national elections since 1997, thus fulfilling
in a limited fashion Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved
in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999. Opposition parties
contesting the elections – along with Pakistani rights groups and European Union observers
– complained that the exercise was “deeply flawed” and that the military government’s pre-
poll machinations skewed the results. No party won a majority of parliamentary seats,
though a pro-Musharraf alliance won a plurality while a coalition of Islamist parties made
a surprisingly strong showing. Low turnout rates caused many to identify significant levels
of voter apathy affecting Pakistan’s electoral politics.
On November 21, 2002, after more than five weeks of intensive maneuvering and
several delays, the new National Assembly chose Musharraf supporter and former
Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali to serve as Pakistan’s Prime Minster.
Jamali’s coalition later won a required vote of confidence. February 2003 senate elections
gave the PML-Q-led coalition a simple majority in that 100-seat body. Most analysts believe
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that the current pro-Musharraf coalition, while fragile and potentially unstable, likely will
mean continuity in Islamabad’s economic and foreign policy orientations.
In an unexpected outcome of the October elections, the United Action Forum (known
as MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition of six Islamic parties, won 60 seats –
nearly 18% of the total – in the national assembly and now controls the provincial assembly
in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads the coalition ruling the Baluchistan
assembly. These provinces are Pashtun-majority regions that border Afghanistan and where
important U.S. anti-terror operations are ongoing. This result has led to concerns that a
major shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy may be in the offing, most especially with growing
anti-American sentiments and renewed indications of the “Talibanization” of western border
regions (see CRS Report RS 21299, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments, and CRS
Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation).
Background. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 55 years
of existence, interspersed with periods of generally weak civilian governance. After 1988,
Pakistan had democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved
from its traditional role of “kingmaker” to one of power broker or referee. During the past
decade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served twice as prime minister. Bhutto was
elected prime minister in October 1988, following the death of military ruler Mohammad
Zia-ul Haq in a plane crash. Gen. Zia had led a coup in 1977 deposing Bhutto’s father, PM
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was later executed. Despite the restoration of democratic process
to Pakistan, the succeeding years were marred by political instability, economic problems,
and ethnic and sectarian violence. In August 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto
for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law and order. The president’s power to
dismiss the prime minister derived from Eighth Amendment provisions of the Pakistan
constitution, which dated from the era of Zia’s presidency.
Elections held in October 1990 brought to power Nawaz Sharif, who himself was ousted
in 1993 under the Eighth Amendment provisions. Ensuing elections returned Bhutto and the
PPP to power. The new Bhutto government faced even more serious economic problems
and, according to some observers, performance also was hampered by the reemergence of
Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, in a decisionmaking role. In November 1996, President
Farooq Leghari dismissed the Bhutto government for corruption and nepotism.
Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory in the February 1997 parliamentary
elections, which were judged by international observers to be generally free and fair. Sharif
moved quickly to consolidate his power by curtailing the powers of the President and the
judiciary. In April 1997, the Parliament passed the Thirteenth Amendment to the
constitution, removing the President’s Eighth Amendment powers to dismiss the government
and to appoint armed forces chiefs and provincial governors. After replacing the chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and seeing the resignation of President Leghari – and with the
PML in control of parliament – Sharif emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest elected leaders
since independence. Critics accused him of further consolidating his power by intimidating
the opposition and the press. In April 1999, a two-judge Bench of the Lahore High Court
convicted former PM Bhutto and her husband of corruption and sentenced them each to 5
years in prison, fined them $8.6 million, and disqualified them from holding public office.
Bhutto was out of the country at the time.
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Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including nuclear
weapons and missile proliferation; South Asian regional stability; democratization and
human rights; economic reform and market opening; and efforts to counter terrorism and
narcotics traffic. These concerns have been affected by several key developments in recent
years, including the cutoff of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, 1998, and 1999 over nuclear and
democracy issues; a worsening Pakistan-India relationship over Kashmir since 1989 and a
continuing bilateral nuclear standoff; Pakistan’s halting attempts to develop a stable
democratic government and strong economy; and, most recently, the September 2001
terrorist attacks against the United States.
On September 13, 2001, President Musharraf – under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure
– offered President Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”
Because of its shared border with Afghanistan and former close ties with the Taliban,
Pakistan is considered key to U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban
and Osama bin Laden enjoy strong support among a substantial percentage of the Pakistan
population, who share not only conservative Islamic views but also ethnic and cultural ties
with Afghanistan. A major issue facing the Administration is how to make use of Pakistan’s
support – including for military operations in Afghanistan – without seriously destabilizing
an already fragile, nuclear-armed state.
In an effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s
1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup were waived in the autumn of 2001. In October
2001, a State Department official pledged well over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance for
Pakistan and several billion dollars from international organizations to help strengthen it as
a key member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. Direct assistance programs will
include aid for health, education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination,
counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement, as well as trade preference benefits.
The United States also has supported grant, loan, and debt rescheduling programs for
Pakistan by the various international financial institutions, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank.
In September 2002, President Bush met with President Musharraf in New York City,
after both leaders had addressed the U.N. General Assembly. The U.S. President reportedly
urged his Pakistani counterpart to ensure that his government take all necessary steps to end
the movement of militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir, and also to ensure that the country
remain on the path to full democracy.
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. U.S. policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
for the future use of nuclear weapons. In May 1998, India conducted five underground
nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing. Despite U.S. and
world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed, claiming five tests of its own before
month’s end. The tests created a global storm of criticism, and represented a serious setback
for two decades of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. India currently is
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believed to have enough fissile material for 75-100 nuclear weapons; Pakistan is thought to
have approximately half that number. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear bombs. India’s military has inducted short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
while Pakistan itself possesses short- and medium-range missiles (allegedly acquired from
China and North Korea). All are assumed to be capable of delivering small nuclear warheads
over significant distances.
Press reports continue to suggest that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear
weapons program by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and
technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. It is also suggested
that Iran’s nuclear weapons program has benefitted from Pakistani assistance. If such
assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be
suspended, although the President has the authority to waive any sanctions that he determines
would jeopardize U.S. national security. Islamabad adamantly rejects as “baseless” such
reports, and Secretary of State Powell has been assured that no such transfers are occurring.
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries – India seeking to achieve
deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a larger and
conventionally stronger India. India began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, after its
1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s first nuclear test in 1964. Despite
a 1993 Sino-Indian troop reduction agreement and some easing of tensions, both nations
continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan’s nuclear program was prompted by
India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’s defeat by India in the 1971 war and consequent
loss of East Pakistan, now independent Bangladesh.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S. and Pakistani
officials have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards on Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Fears that Pakistan could become destabilized
by the U.S. anti-terrorism war efforts in Afghanistan have heightened U.S. nuclear
proliferation concerns in South Asia (see CRS Report RS21237, Indian and Pakistani
Nuclear Weapons Status, and CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile
Proliferation in India and Pakistan).
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. In May 1998, following the South Asian nuclear
tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on non-humanitarian economic and military
aid to both India and Pakistan as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control
Act (AECA). In November 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a list of
more than 300 Indian and Pakistani government agencies and companies suspected of
working on nuclear, missile, and other weapons programs. Any U.S. exports to these entities
required a Commerce Department license, and most license requests reportedly were denied.
In some respects, Pakistan was less affected by the sanctions than was India, since most U.S.
assistance to Pakistan had been cut off in 1990. At the same time, Pakistan’s much smaller
and more fragile economy was more vulnerable to the negative effects of aid restrictions.
During the latter years of the Clinton administration, the United States set forth five
nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan, including the following: halt further
nuclear testing and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halt fissile
material production and pursue Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refrain from
deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; restrict any and all exportation of
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nuclear materials or technologies; and take steps to reduce bilateral tensions, especially on
the issue of Kashmir. The results of U.S. efforts have been mixed, at best: Neither India nor
Pakistan are signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the CTBT. India has
consistently rejected both treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a global nuclear
disarmament regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign the NPT and
CTBT only when India does so. Aside from security concerns, the governments of both
countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs (see CRS
Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, and CRS Report
RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan).
Kashmir Dispute. Bilateral relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked
on the issue of Kashmiri sovereignty. The prospects for India-Pakistan detente suffered a
severe setback in mid-1999, when the two countries teetered on the brink of their fourth full-
scale war, once again in Kashmir. In the worst fighting since 1971, Indian soldiers sought
to dislodge some 700 Pakistan-supported infiltrators who were occupying fortified positions
along mountain ridges on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) near Kargil. Following
a meeting between then Pakistan PM Sharif and President Clinton in Washington on July 4,
1999, the infiltrators withdrew across the LOC.
Tensions between India and Pakistan remained extremely high in the wake of the Kargil
conflict, which cost more than 1,100 lives. Throughout 2000-2002, intermittent cross-border
firing and shelling has caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. New Delhi
accuses Pakistan of sponsoring the movement of “terrorists” into Indian Kashmir; Islamabad
accuses India of human rights violations there. The United States strongly urged India and
Pakistan to create the proper climate for peace, respect the LOC, reject violence, and return
to the Lahore peace process. A 6-month-long unilateral cease-fire and halt to offensive
military operations in Kashmir was undertaken by India in 2000-2001, and the Pakistani
government responded by announcing that its forces deployed along the LOC in Kashmir
would observe “maximum restraint.” Kashmir’s main militant groups, however, rejected the
cease-fire as a fraud and continued to carry out attacks on military personnel and government
installations. As security forces conducted counter-operations, deaths of Kashmiri civilians,
militants, and Indian security forces continued to rise.
In May 2001, the Indian government announced that it was ending its unilateral cease-
fire in Kashmir but that Prime Minister Vajpayee would invite President Musharraf to India
for talks. A July summit meeting between Musharraf and Vajpayee in Agra failed to produce
a joint communique, reportedly as a result of pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future
talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.”
In October 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Pakistan and India in an
effort partly aimed at easing the escalating tensions over Kashmir. Yet a terrorist attack on
the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly during the same month was followed by a December
2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Both incidents were blamed on
Pakistan-based militant groups. The Indian government responded by mobilizing hundreds
of thousands of troops to forward stations along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatening
war unless Islamabad put an end to all cross-border infiltrations of Islamic militants. Under
significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India’s use of possibly massive
force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence of terrorist entities on
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Pakistani soil and upwards of 2,000 radicals were jailed (many of these have since been
released).
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued, and a
May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women
and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and
caused Islamabad to recall army troops from both patrol operations along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border as well as from international peacekeeping operations. Pakistan also
tested three ballistic missiles in late-May 2002, sending an implicit message to India that it
would employ nuclear weapons in a conflict.
A flurry of intensive diplomatic missions to South Asia appears to have reduced
tensions during the summer of 2002 and prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S.
diplomats were involved in this effort. As of January 2003, both Pakistan and India
reportedly are in the process of redeploying their troops to peacetime barracks. The latter
months of 2002 saw an apparent reduction of militant infiltration across the line of control,
though such movements are ongoing and may be taking place with the active support of
Pakistani security services. The U.S. government continues to strenuously urge the two
countries to renew a bilateral dialogue that has been moribund since the summer of 2001.
New Delhi refuses to engage such dialogue until it is satisfied that Pakistan has ended all
militant infiltration into its Jammu and Kashmir state (for further reading, see CRS Report
RS20277, Recent Developments in Kashmir and U.S. Concerns, and RL31587, Kashmiri
Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict).
Congressional Action. Through a series of legislative measures, Congress has
incrementally lifted sanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests.
In October 1999, Congress passed H.R. 2561, the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2000, and it was signed by the President as P.L. 106-79 on October 29 of that year.
Title IX of the act gives the President authority to waive sanctions applied against Pakistan
and India in response to the nuclear tests. In a presidential determination on Pakistan and
India issued on October 27, 1999, the President waived economic sanctions on India.
Pakistan, however, remained under sanctions triggered under Section 508 of the annual
foreign assistance appropriations act as a result of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign
Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Agencies Act, 2001 provided an
exception under which Pakistan could be provided U.S. foreign assistance funding for basic
education programs (P.L. 106-429; Section 597).
After the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and in recognition
of Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition being assembled, policymakers
searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan. President Bush’s issuance of
a final determination on September 22, 2001, removed remaining sanctions on Pakistan and
India resulting from their 1998 nuclear test, finding that denying export licences and
assistance was not in the national security interests of the United States. Also, on October
27, President Bush signed into law S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57), which gives the President 2-year
waiver authority to lift sanctions on foreign assistance imposed on Pakistan following the
1999 military coup if he determines that such a waiver would facilitate the transition to
democratic rule in Pakistan and is important to U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism.
The law not only gives the president authority to waive sanctions related to democracy but
to waive sanctions imposed on Pakistan for its debt servicing arrearage to the United States
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under the terms of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. At the end of 2000,
Pakistan’s international debt was estimated at $38 billion. P.L. 107-57 allowed for an
agreement of Pakistan to reschedule $379 million of its debt to the United States thereby
enabling it to cancel its arrearage. After President Musharraf’s visit to Washington, D.C. in
February 2002, President Bush wrote a letter to Congress stating that he had ordered $220
million in emergency funds that had been given to the Defense Department for warfighting
and to the State Department for security upgrades, be reallocated to Pakistan “for costs
incurred in aiding U.S. military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom” (for details, see CRS
Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions).
For FY2003, the Bush Administration has requested a total of $305 million in assistance
to Pakistan, including $200 million in Economic Support Funds that Congress has authorized
Pakistan to use to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S.
government. Some members of the 107th Congress sought to reimpose restrictions on aid to
Pakistan in light of perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices by the Musharraf
government. Resolutions to repeal or modify the U.S. President’s authority to waive
economic sanctions (H.R. 5150 and H.R. 5267) were introduced in July 2002, but were not
voted upon. Other Members have urged reinstatement of proliferation-related sanctions in
response to reports of Pakistani assistance to the North Korean nuclear weapons program.
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. The close U.S.- Pakistan security ties of the
cold war era – which had come to near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff – appear to be in the
process of restoration as a result of Pakistan’s role in U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. In
the spring of 2002, U.S. military and law enforcement personnel reportedly began engaging
in direct, low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and apprehending
fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory. Press reports indicate that
Pakistan has remanded to U.S. custody more than 460 such fugitives to date.
In July 2002, Congress was notified of two Foreign Military Sales arrangements with
Pakistan reportedly worth $230 million. Under the deals, Pakistan is to receive 7 used C-
130E transport aircraft (one being for spare parts) and 6 Aerostat surveillance radars. These
mark the first notable arms sales to Pakistan in more than a decade and are intended to
bolster Islamabad’s counterterrorism capabilities. Islamabad continues to seek U.S. weapons
and technology, especially in an effort to bolster its air forces. Several Members of Congress
are reported to be supportive of these efforts. A revived high-level U.S.-Pakistan defense
consultative group – moribund for the past 5 years – met in late-September 2002 and
included high-level discussions of military cooperation, security assistance, and anti-
terrorism. The two countries also have planned regular joint military exercises (see CRS
Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation).
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts. There had been hopes that national elections in October
2002 would reverse Pakistan’s historic trend toward unstable governance and military
interference in democratic institutions. Such hopes were eroded by the passage of a number
of highly restrictive election laws – including those that prevented the country’s two leading
civilian politicians from participating – as well as President Musharraf’s unilateral
imposition of major constitutional amendments in August 2002. While praising Pakistan’s
recent electoral exercises as moves in the right direction, the United States has expressed
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concern that these seemingly nondemocratic developments may make the realization of true
democracy in Pakistan more elusive (see CRS Report RS21299, Pakistan’s Domestic
Political Developments).
Human Rights Problems. The U.S. State Department, in its Pakistan Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 2001 (issued in March 2002), noted that, although
Pakistan’s human rights record remained poor under the military government, there were
improvements in some areas, including freedom of the press. The government bureaucracy
continued to function but was “monitored” by the military. The State Department report
cites continuing problems of police abuse, religious discrimination, and child labor. Security
forces were cited for committing extrajudicial killings and for using arbitrary arrest and
detention, torturing and abusing prisoners and detainees, and raping women. Political and
religious groups also engaged in killings and persecution of their rivals and ethnic and
religious minorities. Politically motivated violence and a deteriorating law and order
situation reportedly continued to be a serious problem.
In recent years, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, Human Rights Watch, and
Amnesty International have issued reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms
and of the country’s alleged abuses of the rights of women and minorities. Discrimination
against women is widespread, and traditional constraints – cultural, legal, and spousal – have
kept women in a subordinate position in society in the areas of education, employment, and
legal rights. The adult literacy rate for men in Pakistan is more than 50%, while less than
one-quarter of women are literate. Religious minorities – mainly Christians, Hindus, and
Ahmadi Muslims – reportedly are subjected to discriminatory laws and social intolerance.
Blasphemy laws, instituted under the Zia regime and strengthened in 1991, carry a mandatory
death penalty for blaspheming the Prophet or his family. Blasphemy charges reportedly are
commonly brought as a result of personal or religious vendettas. Anti-Christian violence,
which peaked in the summer of 2002, has cost scores of lives.
Economic Issues
Overview. The long-term economic outlook for Pakistan continues to be rather bleak,
given a low national savings rate (10%) and high labor force growth rates (2.4%) in a country
that remains highly dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic commodities
(public debt is equal to more than 86% of GDP). In the middle-term, greater political
stability following October 2002 elections could brighten the outlook by providing President
Musharraf with a political base for the further pursuit of economic reform, but conflict with
India is an ever-present risk. In the short-run, substantial fiscal deficits and the still urgent
dependency on external aid donations counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax collection
system and what have been notable gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange, the world’s best
performer in 2002.
Output from both the industrial and service sectors grew in 2002, but the agricultural
sector’s output has been weak and significantly slowed growth overall (in part due to severe
drought). Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s work force. Pakistan’s
real GDP for the fiscal year ending June 2002 grew by some 3.6% over FY2001 (but 4.5%
for the calendar year). An industrial sector recovery and the end of a 3-year drought have
some foreseeing even more robust growth ahead, with predictions putting the FY2003 rate
at around 4.5%.
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The Pakistani government has stabilized the country’s external debt at $36.5 billion and
the country’s total liquid reserves grew to $9.6 billion by February 2003 – an increase of
nearly $8 billion since October 1999. In December 2001, the Paris Club of creditor nations
agreed to reschedule $12.5 billion in repayments on Pakistan’s external debt – one-third of
the country’s total burden. Foreign remittances for 2001 exceeded $1.6 billion – nearly twice
the amount in 2000. Inflation, below 4%, is at the lowest level in three decades, largely as
a result of weak consumer demand. Interest on public debt and defense spending together
consume 70% of total revenues, thus squeezing out development expenditure, including
social spending.
Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s resources and comparatively well-developed
entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid economic growth and development
in coming years. This is particularly true for Pakistan’s textile industry, which accounts for
60% of Pakistan’s exports. Analysts point to the pressing need to broaden the country’s tax
base in order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Only 1.4% of Pakistanis
currently pay income taxes. Agricultural income has not been taxed in the past, largely
because of the domination of parliament and the provincial assemblies by wealthy landlords.
Attempts at economic reform historically have floundered due to political instability.
The Musharraf government has had some modest successes in effecting economic reform.
As of February 2003, the Islamabad appears to be maintaining general continuity in its
economic policies since the previous year’s elections, and the recent seating of a pro-
Musharraf ruling coalition in the Parliament has added to analysts’ confidence that reforms
will remain on track. Moreover, participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror
coalition had the effect of easing somewhat Islamabad’s severe national debt situation, with
many countries, including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts and large
amounts of external aid flowing into the country. In February 2003, the U.S. Congress
approved Pakistan’s using $200 million in FY2003 Economic Support Fund assistance to
cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government.
A June 2002 IMF report stated that Pakistan is making progress toward stated
macroeconomic objectives. It notes particular successes in the areas of tax administration,
fiscal transparency, and privatization. An October 2002 World Bank report commended
Pakistan for bringing about macroeconomic stability and implementing wide-ranging
structural reforms to spur economic growth, while also noting that the country’s poverty
levels are both high and static. A November 2002 IMF report identifies a “worrisome trend
of declining growth” linked in part to “a turbulent domestic and regional political
environment.” A December 2002 World Bank report claims that “Pakistan’s economic
revival program is beginning to produce good results,” but also notes numerous problems
that seem to require further implementation of structural reforms.
Trade Issues. During January-June 2002, total U.S. imports from Pakistan were
worth slightly more than $1 billion, nearly identical to the previous year’s amount. More
than half of this value came from the purchase of textiles and clothing. U.S. exports to
Pakistan during this period were worth only $316 million, but this represents a major
increase of 50% over the first half of 2001. Pakistan ranked as the 65th largest U.S. trade
partner in 2001, with the United States consuming $2.2 billion worth of Pakistani goods and
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exporting $556 million worth in return, for a negative trade balance of approximately $1.7
billion.
According to the report of the U.S. Trade Representative for 2002, Pakistan has made
progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. Some
items are either restricted or banned from importation for reasons related to religion, national
security, luxury consumption, or protection of local industries. The U.S. pharmaceutical
industry believes that Pakistan maintains discriminatory practices that impede U.S.
manufacturer profitability, while several U.S. companies have complained about Pakistani
violations of their intellectual property rights. The International Intellectual Property
Alliance estimated trade losses of $116 million in 2002, and widespread piracy, especially
of copyrighted materials (Pakistan is a world leader in the pirating of CDs), has kept Pakistan
on the U.S. Trade Representative’s “Special 301" watch list for 13 consecutive years.
Narcotics
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in
Afghanistan and western Pakistan, then distributed throughout the world by Pakistan-based
traffickers. The region has in the past supplied up to 40% of heroin consumed in the United
States and 70% of that consumed in Europe, and has been second only to Southeast Asia’s
Golden Triangle as a top source of the world’s heroin.
The U.S. Department of State calls “excellent” Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control
with the United States. In March 2002, Pakistan was among the countries certified by
President Bush as having cooperated fully with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts,
or to have taken adequate steps on their own. The Islamabad government has made
impressive strides in eradicating opium poppy cultivation. Estimated production in 2001 was
only 5 metric tons, down 59% from 2000 and less than one-thirtieth of the estimated 155 tons
produced in 1995.
Pakistan’s counter-narcotics efforts continue to be hampered by a number of factors,
including lack of total government commitment; scarcity of funds; poor infrastructure in
drug-producing regions; government wariness of provoking unrest in tribal areas; and
corruption among police, government officials, and local politicians. U.S. counter-narcotics
aid to Pakistan, administered by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, totaled more than $90 million in FY2002, including $73
million in emergency supplemental appropriation for border security projects that will
continue in FY2003. The request for FY2003 stands at $4 million, rising to $38 million for
FY2004.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and has
provided support for the U.S.-led anti-terror coalition effort. According to the U.S.
Departments of State and Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented
levels of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping
to identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In a landmark speech in January 2002, Musharraf vowed to end Pakistan’s use
as a base for terrorism of any kind, criticized religious extremism and intolerance in the
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country, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India. In the wake of the
speech, thousands of extremists were arrested and detained, though many of these have since
been released.
In February 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi
and was later found murdered. In May, a bomb blast in Karachi killed 14 people, including
11 French military technicians. One month later, a car bomb detonated outside the U.S.
consulate in Karachi, killing 12 Pakistani nationals. These attacks are widely viewed as
expressions of militants’ anger with the Musharraf regime for its cooperation with U.S. anti-
terror operations, and have raised fears that terrorist groups would further complicate the law
and order situation within the country. Both incidents were linked to Al Qaeda, as well as
to indigenous militant groups. In September 2002, Pakistani authorities announced a series
of high-profile arrests of those deemed responsible for the car bombings, and they claim to
have “broken the back” of the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan. Yet press reports indicate that
Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives still are numerous in Pakistan and may be attempting to re-
establish their organizations in Pakistani cities such as Karachi. Alleged Al Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden may himself be in Pakistan.
Islamabad has been under continuous pressure from the United States and numerous
other governments to terminate the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistani Kashmir into
Indian Kashmir. Such pressure elicited an explicit promise from President Musharraf to U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that all such movements would cease. After
confirmations from both U.S. and Indian government officials that infiltration was down
significantly in the summer of 2002, the rate of infiltration reportedly rose again in the
autumn, and in December 2002 the U.S. envoy to New Delhi indicated that the problem in
Kashmir is “cross-border terrorism” that is “almost entirely externally driven.” President
Musharraf adamantly insists that his government is doing everything possible to stop such
movements. Critics contend, however, that Islamabad has renewed implicit, if not active,
support for the insurgents in Kashmir as a means to both maintain strategically the domestic
backing of Islamists who view the Kashmir issue as fundamental to the Pakistani national
idea, as well as to disrupt tactically the state government in Indian Kashmir and so seek to
erode New Delhi’s legitimacy there.
During a February 2003 visit to the United States, the Pakistani foreign minister
requested greater access to U.S. markets as a means of reducing poverty and thus also the
forces of extremism in Pakistan. He made a direct link between poverty and the continued
existence of Islamic schools (madrassas) that are implicated in teaching militant anti-
American values.
CHRONOLOGY
02/27/03 –– The pro-Musharraf PML-Q party and its allies won a simple majority of at
least 52 of the Pakistani senate’s 100 seats. The MMA, an alliance of
Islamist parties, won 21 seats, significantly less than had been expected.
Opposition parties complained that the PML-Q-led government skewed the
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election results through the use of payoffs and intimidation by intelligence
agencies.
02/25/03 –– An editorial in the Washington Post decried the “steady unraveling of
commitments by Pakistan’s president ... to support the United States in the
war on terrorism,” and ended by asserting that “the Bush Administration must
reconsider whether its attenuated alliance with the general is worth the
growing cost.”
02/23/03 –– A
New York Times report claims U.S. intelligence sources believe that Iran’s
nuclear weapons program has benefitted from Pakistani assistance.
02/22/03 –– Gunmen attacked worshipers in a Shiite mosque in Karachi, killing 9.
02/20/03 –– P.L. 108-7 includes authorization for Pakistan to use $200 million in FY2003
Economic Support Funds to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional
debt to the U.S. government.
02/19/03 –– The commander of Pakistan’s Air Force, Mushaf Ali Mir, died along with 16
others when his aircraft crashed in a remote area northwest of Islamabad.
The crash was blamed on technical problems.
02/13/03 –– Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Wolf met with a Pakistani
delegation in Washington to continue a bilateral dialogue on issues related to
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and export controls.
02/12/03 –– The two senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Sen.
Lugar and Sen. Biden – expressed “deep concern” that “elements of
Pakistan’s powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency might be helping
members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate
into Afghanistan.”
02/11/03 –– Rep. Pallone sent a letter to Secretary of State Powell urging “immediate
steps by the administration to ban all military sales to Pakistan and to re-
impose Symington sanctions on Pakistan for assisting [North Korea’s]
nuclear weapons program.” On the same day, C.I.A. Director Tenet stated
that “lawless zones” like those along the Afghan-Pakistani border are places
where “extremist movements find shelter and can find the breathing space to
grow,” while D.I.A. Director Jacoby noted the “continued cross-border
infiltration from Pakistan” into Indian-held Kashmir, that “Pakistan does not
completely control areas in the northwest where concentrations of Taliban
and Al Qaeda remain,” and warned that a “coup or assassination [of
Musharraf] could result in an extremist Pakistan.”
02/10/03 –– U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan Khalilzad stated that, “There are some
key Taliban figures in Pakistan ... some Al Qaeda people in the border areas”
and that the U.S. government “will not accept” these individuals being
allowed to “find refuge” in Pakistan.
02/08/03 –– India expelled Pakistan’s top diplomat from New Delhi after accusing him
of funneling money to separatist militants in Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan
denied the charge and ordered a tit-for-tat expulsion of the Indian ambassador
from Islamabad. On the same day, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee accused
Pakistan of failing on its 2002 promise to end cross-border terrorism. One
week later, Indian President Kalam repeated the accusation.
02/05/03 –– The governments of Pakistan and Russia ended 30 years of poor relations
when the two countries’ presidents met in Moscow to sign several economic,
diplomatic, and cultural accords.
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02/01/03 –– Reports indicate that the Pakistani Army has begun producing and deploying
its indigenously-built Ghauri medium-range ballistic missiles.
01/31/03 –– Tens of thousands of Pakistanis reportedly demonstrated against anticipated
U.S. military operations in Iraq.
01/30/03 –– The United States designated the Pakistan-based Lashkar-i-Jhangvi as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization under U.S. law. The group is being held
responsible for “numerous deadly attacks in Pakistan,” including the January
2002 kidnaping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.
01/29/03 –– Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri met with Secretary of State Powell in
Washington and was told that the United States is “very sensitive” to
Pakistan’s concerns about new immigration registration rules that affect
Pakistani citizens. Secretary Powell called the bilateral relationship “strong”
and assured Kasuri of the “firm U.S. commitment to the well-being and
prosperity of Pakistan.”
01/28/03 –– On a visit to Islamabad, U.S. Central Commander Gen. Tommy Franks
expressed the U.S. government’s concern over the “slow pace of progress”
in finding and capturing remaining Al Qaeda fugitives in Pakistan.
01/24/03 ––
A State Department spokesman stated that the infiltration of Islamic militants
into India-held Kashmir “has gone down and come back up somewhat.” The
Islamabad government responded by denying that any infiltration is taking
place.
11/02
—
A fragile coalition of pro-military parties elected veteran politician and PML-
Q leader Mir Zafarullah Jamali to be the Pakistan’s new prime minister, the
first since Nawaz Sharif was ousted in an October 1999 military coup. The
coalition – which unexpectedly excluded both the Islamist MMA parties and
the secular PPP – was made possible by the defection of several PPP
members, some of whom were rewarded with high-profile ministerships of
their own.
10/02
—
Pakistan held its first national elections since an October 1999 military coup
brought President Gen. Musharraf to power. No party won a majority of
national assembly seats, but the pro-military PML-Q won a plurality while
the MMA, a coalition of Islamist parties, won a surprisingly large number of
seats and exerts considerable influence in the provincial assemblies of
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province along the border with
Afghanistan. The secular PPP of former PM Bhutto won 81 parliamentary
seats, but was shut out of both the national and four provincial ruling
coalitions. Upon completion of the elections, both India and Pakistan
announced major troop redeployments that signaled the apparent end of a
tense 10-month-long military face-off along their shared border.
09-10/02 —
State elections in India’s Jammu and Kashmir result in the ousting of the
long-ruling National Conference party of Farooq Abdullah and the seating of
a new government ruled by a coalition that vows to “soften” the policy
toward separatist militants. In boycotting the election, the Kashmiri
separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference – which has political ties to
Islamabad – found itself marginalized.
09/02
—
A moribund U.S.-Pakistan security relationship is revived when officials
from both countries meet in Islamabad for the first Defense Cooperation
Group session since 1997. A range of bilateral security-related issues are
discussed.
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07/02
—
The U.S. Congress is notified of two pending U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, the
first such sales in more than a decade. The 7 C-130 transport aircraft and 6
Aerostat surveillance radars reportedly are meant to bolster Islamabad’s
counterterrorism capabilities.
06/02
—
Intense international diplomatic pressure – including multiple visits to the
region by senior U.S. government officials – apparently was sufficient to
persuade New Delhi to refrain from taking military action against Pakistan.
Key to the effort are explicit promises by Pakistani President Musharraf to
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that all infiltration of militants
across the Line of Control and into Indian-held Kashmir will be halted. Also
in June, a car bomb exploded outside the U.S. consulate in Karachi, killing
12 Pakistani nationals. The attack was blamed on Islamic radicals who are
later arrested and who may have links to Al Qaeda.
05/02
—
A terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Jammu and Kashmir killed 34,
mostly women and children. New Delhi blamed the attack on the “cross-
border terrorism” of Pakistan-sponsored Islamic militants and vowed to fight
a “decisive war” against Pakistan. Also in May, a car bomb exploded outside
a Karachi hotel, killing 14 people, including 11 French military technicians.
The attack was blamed on Islamic radicals who are later arrested and who
may have links to Al Qaeda.
04/02
—
A controversial referendum ostensibly legitimized Gen. Musharraf’s status
as Pakistani President, though Musharraf later apologized to the nation for
acknowledged irregularities in the process.
Spring
—
U.S. military and law enforcement personnel began engaging in direct, but
low-profile efforts to assist Pakistani security forces in tracking and
apprehending fugitive Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters on Pakistani territory.
03/02
—
A major U.S. military offensive (Operation Anaconda) in Afghanistan’s
eastern Shah-i-Kot mountains – in the wake of a massive December 2002
aerial bombardment of Afghanistan’s Tora Bora region – apparently
prompted two waves of up to 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters fleeing into Pakistan.
Press reports indicated that Al Qaeda set up new bases of operations in
western Pakistan and in the city of Karachi.
01/02
—
President Musharraf delivered a landmark address in which he vowed to end
all Islamic extremism and terrorist activity originating from Pakistani soil.
Also in January, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl is kidnaped in
Karachi and later found dead. Four Islamic radicals with possible links to Al
Qaeda subsequently are arrested and convicted of murder.
12/01
—
A terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament complex in New Delhi left 14
people dead. India blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militants
and began a massive military mobilization along the Pakistan-India frontier.
Also in December, the United States designated two Pakistan-based militant
groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed – as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations under U.S. law.
10/01
—
A terrorist attack on the assembly building in India’s Jammu and Kashmir
state killed 34 people. New Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistan-backed
separatist militants and the J&K Chief Minister called for an Indian military
assault on training camps in Pakistan-held Kashmir.
09/01
—
Terrorist attacks on the United States, and ensuing U.S. diplomatic pressure,
substantively transformed the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and spurred the
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Islamabad government to sever ties with the Afghani Taliban and join in the
U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign as a key front-line state. Within one month,
all remaining proliferation- and democracy-related restrictions on U.S. aid to
Pakistan were removed or waived and large amounts of U.S. economic and
military assistance began flowing into the country.
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