Order Code RL31715
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Updated February 26, 2003
Raymond W. Copson (Coordinator)
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress
Summary
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S.
urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its
the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” During January and
February 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, and analysts
speculated that mid-March seemed the most likely time for U.S. forces to launch a
war. President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
have repeatedly indicated that Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with
U.N. weapons inspectors. However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China,
are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time. The Administration
asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it
fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Skeptics,
including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is exaggerating the
Iraqi threat.
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of
the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and
to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). Some
Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Administration
consultation on Iraq, and suggested that the Administration should provide more
information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early military action.
Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly, and have
compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war. U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last two years or longer. Whether the overthrow of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East, or
promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue in debate.
The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial humanitarian crisis,
including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend on the length of the
conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization. International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war. Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale
of the fighting and the length of any occupation. If war leads to a spike in the price
of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic
consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues. See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report. This report also provides
links to other sources of information and is updated approximately once a week.
Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Diplomatic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Developments at the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Foreign Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Peace Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Military Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
The Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Policy Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Regime Change Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Congressional Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Biological and Chemical Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Missile Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Inspections Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Current Planning Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
War Crimes Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Burden Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Political and Military Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Direct and Indirect Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Post-Conflict Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Implications for the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Humanitarian Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
War-Related Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Refugee Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Relief Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
International and Domestic Legal Issues Relating to the Use of Force . . . . 30
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Security Council Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Cost Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
War Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Related Aid to Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Economic Repercussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Oil Supply Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Information Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CRS Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Iraq Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
United Nations Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
List of Figures
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
BBC News reported on February 26, 2003, that only about half the British jets
being sent to the Persian Gulf had reached the region because some Middle Eastern
countries had refused overflight rights.
President Bush told reporters on February 25 that President Saddam Hussein of
Iraq had been “gaming the system,” but “we expect the Security Council to honor its
word by insisting that Saddam disarm. Now is the time.” Earlier, chief United
Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix, had said that Iraq had released new documents
offering details on outstanding issues. These included the disposal of weapons of
mass destruction materials and its possession of two bombs that could be filled with
chemical or biological agents. U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki told
a Senate committee on February 25 that his personal assessment was that “something
on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers” might be required to stabilize a
post-conflict Iraq.
Also on February 25, the Kurdish parliament in northern Iraq voted to ask the
United States to assure that Turkish troops not intervene in the region. Reports had
appeared indicating that a Turkish intervention might be permitted in a U.S.-Turkey
agreement that would permit as many as 62,000 U.S. troops to use Turkish bases. An
anticipated February 23 vote on the agreement in the Turkish parliament was delayed.
In an interview with CBS news reported on February 25, Saddam Hussein
denied that Iraq had any missiles with ranges exceeding the 150 kilometer limit set
by the United Nations. On February 21, Hans Blix had demanded that Iraq destroy
all of its Al-Samoud 2 missiles, as well as their warheads and other components, by
March 1. Despite Saddam’s defiance, some analysts speculated Iraq might comply
with the Blix demand at the last minute.
On February 24, the United States, Britain, and Spain introduced a resolution
at the U.N. Security Council stating that Iraq had “failed to take the final opportunity
afforded it” to disarm in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1441 of
November 8, 2002. At the same time, France and Germany circulated a
memorandum calling for at least four more months of U.N. weapons inspections.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said on February 21, that U.S. armed forces
were ready to launch military action against Iraq if a decision were made to do so.
For a chronology of Iraq-related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
CRS-2
Current Situation
Overview
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated February 25, 2003)
B a c k g r o u n d . B u s h
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
Administration concerns about Iraq’s
alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil”
nations in his January 2002 State of
the Union address. Vice President
Cheney, in two August 2002
speeches, accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons
of mass destruction to dominate the
Middle East and threaten U.S. oil
supplies.1 These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States
might act unilaterally against Iraq.
However, in a September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work
with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2
H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use
of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security
Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. On November 8,
2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving
Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under
previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”
Recent Developments. During January and February 2003, the U.S. military
buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts, as analysts speculated that mid-
March seemed a likely time for an attack to be launched. (See below, Military
Situation.) Officials maintain that it would be possible to attack later, even in the
extreme heat of summer, but military experts observe that conditions for fighting a
war would be far better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President
Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and other top officials during January and
February expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with
Security Council disarmament demands. The President said on January 14, that “time
1 “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103d National Convention,” August 26, 2002; and “Vice
President Honors Veterans of Korean War,” August 29, 2002. Available on the White
House web site at [http://www.whitehouse.gov] under “News.”
2 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
CRS-3
is running out” for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was “sick and tired” of its “games
and deceptions.”3 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on January 19,
that “we are at the verge of an important set of decisions.”4 On January 26, 2003,
Secretary of State Powell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos,
Switzerland, that “multilateralism cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the
United States “continues to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against
Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing.” Powell also told the Davos meeting that
there are “clear ties” between Iraq and terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda.
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003. “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.” The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.” Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also
condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the
world. On February 5, 2003, as discussed below under Weapons of Mass
Destruction Issues, Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations
Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has
weapons of mass destruction programs. President Bush, in a February 6 statement,
predicted that Saddam would likely play a last minute “game of deception,” but
warned, “The game is over.” The President affirmed on February 18 that he would
continue to work for a United Nations Security Council resolution that would
broaden support for possible action against Iraq but told reporters “it’s not necessary
as far as I’m concerned.” The President added, “Saddam Hussein is a threat to
America. And we will deal with him.”
Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed
confrontation remains limited. President Jacques Chirac of France has been a leading
critic of the U.S. approach, and maintains that he is not convinced by the evidence
presented by Secretary of State Powell. On February 10, at a press conference in
Paris with President Putin of Russia, Chirac said “nothing today justifies war.”
Speaking of weapons of mass destruction, Chirac added “I have no evidence that
these weapons exist in Iraq.”5 France, Germany, and Russia advocate a strengthened
inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and China takes a
similar position. France, Russia, and China have veto power at the United Nations
Security Council. (See below, Diplomatic Situation.)
U.S. officials point out that a number of other countries support the U.S.
demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions on disarmament.
Many foreign observers point out, however, that U.N. inspectors have yet to find a
“smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs. U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the
inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections is to verify whether or not Iraq
3 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003 [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
4 BBC News, January 19, 2003.
5 “U.S.-Europe Rifts Widen Over Iraq,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
CRS-4
has disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions. Iraq has not pro-actively
cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there has been
no such verification.6
In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the
support of allies before the United States launched a war against Iraq. The polls
shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with a majority coming to
favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.7 Polls shifted further in the
Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s February 5 presentation to
the Security Council.8 However, on February 14, 2003, the New York Times reported
that a majority again wanted to give U.N. weapons inspectors more time to complete
their work9. A Washington Post-ABC News poll, reported on February 25, showed
a majority willing to wait for a U.N. resolution supporting military action against
Iraq, while overall support for military action stood at 63%, down from 66% two
weeks earlier.10 Many remain opposed to war. Forty-one Nobel laureates in science
and economics released a declaration opposing war on January 27, and former
President Jimmy Carter said on January 31 that President Bush has “not made a case
for a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq.”11 (For congressional views, see below,
Congressional Action.) Press reports noted that U.S. policy on Iraq was leading to
a rise in anti-Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls
show strong opposition to a war with Iraq.12 Large public demonstrations against a
possible war with Iraq occurred in the United States and in cities overseas on the
weekend of January 19-20, 2003. Demonstrations in western European cities and
New York on the weekend of February 15-16 were widely described as “massive.”
Options for the Future. Analysts believe it likely that the United States will
soon move against Iraq, with or without the endorsement of the U.N. Security
Council. Some nonetheless urge that policymakers delay a war as long as possible
and accede to wishes of Council members who want the arms inspection process to
be given more time. In their view, going to war without Security Council permission
would be harmful to international institutions while threatening stability in the
Middle East and perhaps beyond. Others argue that further delay would reward
Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics and undermine U.S. credibility. They also maintain
that there would be serious economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large
U.S. military force in the Middle East indefinitely. It may be that dramatic evidence
of Iraqi non-compliance will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring
stronger international backing for a war. Another view is that if U.S. action against
6 David Kay, “It was Never About a Smoking Gun,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003.
7 “Support for a War with Iraq Grows After Bush’s Speech,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003.
8 “Poll: Bush Gaining Support on Invading Iraq,” CNN, February 10, 2003; “Most Support
Attack on Iraq, with Allies,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
9 “Poll Shows Most Want War Delay,” New York Times, February 14, 2003.
10 “Public Backs U.N. Assent on Iraq,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003.
11 “Carter Says Bush Has ‘Not Made a Case’ for War,” Washington Post, February 1, 2003.
12 “Sneers from Across the Atlantic,” Washington Post, February 11, 2003.
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Iraq appears imminent, other countries, such as Russia and France, will hesitate at
fracturing the international community and further alienating Washington through
continued opposition. Some expect they may eventually offer support or at least
abstain on any U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force. Others argue that
France, at least, has gone too far in opposing force for this to be an option until U.N.
inspections have continued for months into the future.
According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite their
denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other
Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of
guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through
with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.13 However, many
analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move.
Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power,
but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too firm to
permit such an event.
CRS Products
CRS Video MM70039, Disarming Iraq, Issues and Views, available in cassette or
online at [http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/sem_di-030219.shtml]
Diplomatic Situation
Carol Migdalovitz (7-2667)
(Last updated February 25, 2003)
Developments at the United Nations. The U.N. Security Council is the
stage for final diplomacy to resolve the crisis over Iraq’s disarmament. On February
24, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain tabled a new resolution,
which President Bush said would allow the Council “to determine whether or not it’s
going to be relevant as the world confronts threats in the 21st century.”14 The succinct
resolution, if passed, would state that the Council “Decides that Iraq has failed to take
the final opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441” to disarm.15 The three allies
reportedly aim to convince nine Council members to support the resolution and will
then challenge France, Russia, or China to veto it. The United States and Britain
reserve the right to take military action against Iraq if the resolution is defeated.
The Security Council remains divided. Germany, a rotating member, and
France, a permanent member with veto power, believe that a new resolution is not
needed. French President Jacques Chirac declared on February 18 that “ France
13 “Officials Support Exile for Hussein,” Washington Post, January 20, 2003.
14 Address to Governors, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov] under “News.”
15 “Text of U.K. Draft Resolution on Iraqi Disarmament”, Reuters, February 24, 2003.
CRS-6
would have no choice but to oppose” (a new resolution), thereby threatening a veto.16
France, Germany, and Russia have circulated an informal memorandum, arguing that
“the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled,” and calling for
prioritizing key tasks for Iraq to complete, reinforced inspections, and timelines for
Iraqi performance. The inspectors would report every three weeks and present an
overall assessment in four months.17 Since these three governments maintain that a
new resolution is not needed, their ideas were not presented as a counter-resolution
to that backed by the U.S., UK, and Spain. China supports their proposal.
The Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix and the Director General of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei have reported to the Security
Council several times. (For details, see below, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Issues.) They are assessing Iraq’s compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions
that require it to disarm, especially Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002, which
gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” and set
up an enhanced inspection regime to bring about the “full and verified completion
of the disarmament process.” Iraq was required to submit “a declaration of all
aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons,
ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems....” It also was required to provide
UNMOVIC and the IAEA “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional access” to all sites
they wish to inspect. Finally, 1441 warned Iraq that it would face “serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.” Inspections
began on November 27. On February 21, 2003, Blix ordered Iraq to hand over to
inspectors “for verifiable destruction” all Al-Samoud 2 missiles that exceed U.N.
range limits, warheads, 380 illegally imported SA-2 missile engines, and other
components so that destruction can begin by March 1. Blix will deliver a report to
the Security Council on March 1, and he and ElBaradei will address it on March 7.
Secretary of State Powell has said that he expects the U.N. to decide on the resolution
that was introduced on February 24 soon after March 7.18
Foreign Reactions. International public misgivings about the possibility of
war continue to grow – as evidenced by massive anti-war protests around the world
on February 15-16. A European Union summit held in their wake on February 17
was aimed at bridging internal EU differences between countries resisting the U.S.
approach, such as France, Germany, and Belgium, and those supporting it, such as
Britain, Spain, Italy, and East European candidates for EU membership. The summit
communique reiterated that the objective is the “full and effective disarmament” of
Iraq. It declared that “force should be used only as a last resort” but put the burden
on Baghdad to end the crisis by complying with the Security Council’s demands.
The EU said that inspectors must be given time and resources, but “inspections
cannot continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi cooperation.”19 Thirteen
16 “EU Seeks to Patch up Iraq Rift,” Associated Press, February 18, 2003.
17 “Text of French Proposals to U.N. Security Council,” Reuters, February 24, 2003.
18 “World Unites to Warn Iraq to Meet March 1 Deadline,” Reuters, February 24, 2003.
19 “Conclusions of the European Council, February 17, 2003,” available at
(continued...)
CRS-7
acceding and candidate countries aligned themselves with the summit conclusions.
On February 18-19, the Security Council gave more than 60 non-Council members
an opportunity to express their views; most favored continuing inspections, not war.
A conference of the 116-member Non-Aligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur on
February 24 provided another forum for a succession of leaders to endorse
inspections and oppose war.
Unease also prevails in the Middle East, where many leaders are concerned that
war would increase regional instability and terrorism and produce other undesired
results, such as the disintegration of Iraq or the demise of their regimes. On February
17, an Arab foreign ministers meeting condemned unilateral action against Iraq,
called on Baghdad to abide by U.N. resolutions, and called on Arab states “to refrain
from offering any kind of assistance or facilities for any military action that leads to
the threat of Iraq’s security, safety, and territorial integrity.”20
Peace Initiatives. There is considerable diplomatic activity seeking to avert
a war. The Pope, who seeks a peaceful resolution to the crisis, has met Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. South Africa,
which eliminated its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons under U.N.
supervision, sent a team of disarmament experts to Iraq on February 23 to assist it
with the mechanics of cooperating with weapons inspections. Former Russian Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an expert on the Middle East and friend of Saddam
Hussein, briefly and unexpectedly visited Iraq on February 23 without disclosing the
details of his trip. It was assumed that Primakov was urging compliance with U.N.
mandates.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq
Crisis: A Brief Overview, by Marjorie M. Browne.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Resolutions –
1992-2002.
Military Situation
Steve Bowman, 7-7613
(Last updated February 25, 2003)
The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the
Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these
deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of
19 (...continued)
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/ec170203.htm].
20 “A New Power in the Streets,” New York Times, February 17, 2003.
CRS-8
the troop movements underway. The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted, are
not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
Figure 2. Iraq
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) is reportedly about 180,000, and may total about 250,000 by mid- March.
DOD has announced that, as of February 12 , 2003, there are more than 150,000
National Guard and Reservists from all services now called to active duty, an
increase of over 38,000 in one week.21 DOD has not indicated how many of these
personnel are being deployed to the Persian Gulf region, and how many will be
“backfilling” positions of active duty personnel in the United States and Europe who
are deploying. In addition to U.S. deployments, Britain is dispatching an armor Battle
21 See the DOD web site: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030205ngr.pdf].
CRS-9
Group, a naval Task Force, and Royal Air Force units, totaling about with 47,000
personnel.22
Secretary Rumsfeld has activated the Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet (CRAF) to
transport troops to the Persian Gulf region. Under CRAF’s Phase One, 22 airlines
will provide up to 47 passenger airliners and crews for DOD use. An additional 31
cargo aircraft are also available under CRAF Phase One, but they will not be used
at this time.
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf
states of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With
the possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of
cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations
Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of
force against Iraq.
Outside the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security Council does not act
further. The White House press office announced in November 2002, that the United
States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in military operations against
Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on responses.23 After protracted debate,
the NATO Military Committee approved Turkey’s request for military assistance and
directed NATO HQ to begin planning for the deployment of airborne early-warning
aircraft, air defense missiles, and chemical-biological defensive equipment. Germany
and Belgium reversed their early opposition to this effort, and France’s anticipated
opposition was obviated by acting within the Military Committee of which France
is not a member. Both the Netherlands and Germany have indicated they will deploy
Patriot air defense missiles to Turkey in the near future. (For military cooperation
issues involving Turkey and NATO, see below, Burden Sharing Issues.)
News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction, has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S.
or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack
underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions.
Though shown to the press, NSPD 17 remains classified and Administration
spokesmen have declined comment on its content. The National Strategy document
does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all
options.” Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt
to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat. Critics are concerned that the
Administration is lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-held U.S.
assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power.24
22 British Ministry of Defense website: [http://www.operations.mod.uk/telic/forces.htm].
23 White House press conference, December 5, 2002.
24 “As U.S. Girds for Worst in Iraq, Retaliation Isn’t Clear-Cut Issue,” Washington Post.
January 29, 2003; “Bush Signs Paper Allowing Nuclear Response,” Washington Times,
(continued...)
CRS-10
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31701. Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations.
U.S. Policy
The Administration
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated February 26, 2003)
The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the
Middle East region. The Administration maintains that Iraq has active weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s
long-term goal of dominating the Middle East. These weapons, according to the
Administration, could be used by Iraq directly against the United States, or they could
be transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration says that the
United States cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront
Iraq, since Iraq would then be stronger and the United States would have fewer
military and diplomatic options.
The Administration asserts that Iraq is in breach of 17 U.N. Security Council
resolutions – including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 – that, among other
requirements, mandate that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD programs.
President Bush has stated that Iraq must immediately and pro-actively cooperate
with a new U.N. disarmament effort, or the United States will lead a coalition to
disarm it. President Bush reiterated that position after a February 14, 2003 Security
Council meeting in which most Council members expressed the view that U.N.
weapons inspections should be given more time to produce additional results, and
following large anti-war protests in many cities worldwide on February 15. The
Washington Post reported on February 24, 2003 that senior U.S. officials have begun
telling their foreign counterparts that a decision to go to war with Iraq has already
been made.25 However, it is possible that U.S. officials are conveying that message
as part of an attempt to persuade wavering governments to support a U.S. draft
resolution authorizing force.
Policy Debate. Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions
within the Administration on Iraq policy. Secretary of State Powell had been said to
typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program of unfettered
24 (...continued)
January 29, 2003.
25 “U.S. Officials Say U.N. Future at Stake in Vote,” Washington Post, February 25, 2003.
CRS-11
weapons inspections could succeed in containing the WMD threat from Iraq.26 He
reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations
to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally. However, by late January
2003, Secretary Powell was insisting that Iraq’s failure to fully cooperate with the
latest weapons inspections indicate that inspections would not succeed in disarming
Iraq and that war may be required, with or without U.N. authorization. The Secretary
is reportedly highly critical in private of U.S. allies, particularly France, that oppose
war with Iraq. Polls show that a majority of Americans look to Secretary Powell as
a trusted Administration spokesman on the Iraq crisis, and Powell reportedly is now
working with Britain to fashion a follow-up U.N. Security Council resolution that
might declare Iraq in breach of Resolution 1441 and authorize the use of force.
Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, among others, have consistently been skeptical that inspections can
significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in
favor of military action against Iraq. These and other U.S. officials reportedly believe
that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not only in
Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. Those who
favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active WMD programs and will
eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States unless it is completely
disarmed. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that the Administration is
exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an attack might goad
Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda
organization, among other terrorist groups. According to the Administration, Iraq
has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical
weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime. A
faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-
Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration. President
Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from intelligence
sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in custody, reveal
that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.”
However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was not uniform
within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence community
discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie as only a possibility.
Another view is that there may have been occasional tactical cooperation
between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq intelligence agents.27 Others are said to
believe that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was
based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off
later on, after bin Laden was expelled from in 1996 and went to Afghanistan. Bin
Laden issued a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12, exhorting
them to resist any U.S. attack. Secretary of State Powell cited the tape as evidence
26 “U.S. Officials Meet to Take Stock of Iraq Policy,” Washington Post, October 16, 2002.
27 Goldberg, Jeffrey. “The Unknown: The CIA and the Pentagon Take Another Look at Al
Qaeda and Iraq.” The New Yorker, February 10, 2003.
CRS-12
of an alliance between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, although bin Laden was highly
critical of Saddam Hussein in the statement, calling his Baath Party regime
“socialist,” and therefore “infidel.”
Regime Change Goal. The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq
under a U.N. umbrella has led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that
the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime. The purpose of downplaying this
goal may be to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note that
regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq. However, in practice,
the United States draws little separation between regime change and disarmament;
the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad would be required
to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD. Press reports in October 2002 said
that the Administration is recruiting an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using
equipment and training funds ($92 million remaining) authorized by the Iraq
Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This force, which will undergo
training at an air base in Hungary, could support a U.S. attack or work on its own to
destabilize Saddam Hussein. The Administration is working with Iraqi exile groups
to determine future policies and priorities in a post-Saddam Iraq as part of its “Future
of Iraq Project.”
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31756, Iraq: the Debate over U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated February 24, 2003)
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role
in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and
trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions
against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime
from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991,
Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L.
102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
CRS-13
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. The resolution conferred broad authority
on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The resolution expressed
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Congress has continued to play a role in formulating U.S. policy in Iraq even
after the passage of H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243). The range of congressional action
falls roughly into four broad categories:
! Many Members who voted in favor of the resolution have offered
strong support for President Bush’s attempts to force Iraq into
compliance with U.N. resolutions.
! Other lawmakers, including some who supported the resolution,
have commended the Administration for applying pressure on
Saddam Hussein’s regime but have called on the Administration to
be more forthcoming with plans for the future of Iraq and more
committed to achieving the broadest possible international coalition
of allied countries.
! Still others, including some Members who voted in favor of H.J.Res.
114, have questioned the urgency of dealing with Iraq, particularly
in light of developments in North Korea and Iran.
! Finally, many Members who voted against H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-
243) have continued to look for ways to forestall the use of force
against Iraq, in part by proposing alternative resolutions that call for
a more comprehensive inspections process. In one instance, several
Members initiated a lawsuit to curtail the President’s ability to
authorize the use of force.
Congressional Oversight. Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the
level of consultation and communication between Congress and the White House
since the signing of P.L. 107-243. In January 2003, Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle stated that the Bush Administration has failed to report to Congress on its
diplomatic efforts and military preparations within 60 days, as he said was required
by P.L. 107-243.28 In response, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did
not believe that the resolution required a written report, and that his verbal briefings
should suffice. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell have
given several closed-door briefings to Members of Congress. After the briefings,
some Members have commented that the Administration has evidence on Iraq’s
weapons programs “that can change people’s minds.”29 Other lawmakers have
commented that the evidence against Iraq is less compelling, characterizing it as a
28 “New Anxiety Over Bush’s Foreign Policy,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2003.
29 “Congress Given a Peak at Case Against Saddam,” Houston Chronicle, January 29, 2003.
CRS-14
“building block in making the case for going forward.”30 Some Members have asked
that the Administration give weapons inspectors in Iraq more time, and several later
commented that the Administration should do a better job of explaining why Iraq
poses an immediate threat to the United States.31 On January 30, 2003, at a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iraq, Senator Joseph Biden urged the Bush
Administration to “make it easier” for international allies to join the United States in
pressing Iraq to comply with United Nations resolutions.
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5 briefing before the United Nations
Security Council received a positive response on Capitol Hill, though some Members
were still divided over the best approach to deal with Iraq. After the briefing,
Representative Nancy Pelosi stated that “the question is whether war now is the only
way to rid Iraq of these deadly weapons. I do not believe it is. Before going to war,
we must exhaust all alternatives, such as the continuation of inspections, diplomacy
and the leverage provided by the threat of military action.”32 Others, including
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, were more supportive of the use of force,
saying that “the evidence proves that Saddam Hussein has a loaded gun pointed at
the civilized world. It is time to take that loaded gun away from this evil tyrant.”33
In another hearing with Secretary Powell before the House International Relations
Committee on February 12, 2003, Chairman Henry Hyde challenged the United
Nations to deal effectively with the Iraq issue, saying that “in Iraq, the world’s fifty-
eight-year experiment with collective security is being put to the supreme test. If Iraq
is permitted to defy twelve years of United Nations resolutions demanding its
disarmament, then that fifty-eight-year experiment in collective security will be, for
all intents and purposes, over.”34
Legislation. Since the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers have drafted
several resolutions relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. Some Members
opposed to a war in Iraq have proposed bills to repeal the “Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”35 Other lawmakers have drafted
legislation that would require the President to meet additional criteria such as
allowing additional time for weapons inspections and passing a second U.N. Security
Council resolution before authorizing the use of force against Iraq.36
The Washington Post has reported that some Members of Congress are
considering measures, such as trade sanctions, that would retaliate against France and
Germany for their stance on Iraq. U.S. lawmakers, angry over French and German
30 Ibid.
31 “Hill Pressures Bush on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 25, 2003.
32 “Congressional Quotes: Reaction to Powell’s U.N. Briefing,” Associated Press, February
5, 2003.
33 Ibid.
34 “Pathology of Success: Hyde’s Remarks at Hearing with Secretary Powell,” House
Committee on International Relations, February 12, 2003.
35 For specific bills, see H.Con.Res. 2 and H.J.Res. 20.
36 See H.Res. 55, S.Res. 28, and S.Res. 32.
CRS-15
opposition to the Administration’s Iraq policies, are considering retaliatory gestures
such as trade sanctions against French wine and bottled water. Some Members
reportedly also support proposals to move many U.S. troops based in Germany to
other locations.37
In a legal challenge to President Bush’s authority to declare war under P.L. 107-
243, six House Members initiated a lawsuit against the Bush Administration to try
to prevent the President from launching an invasion of Iraq without an explicit
declaration of war from Congress. In a statement from Representative John Conyers,
a plaintiff in the lawsuit, the Congressman remarked that “the president is not a
king...he does not have the power to wage war against another country absent a
declaration of war from Congress.”38 However, on February 24, 2003, a federal judge
in Boston refused to issue a temporary restraining order against the Administration,
calling a potential war in Iraq a political rather than a legal issue, which was “beyond
the authority of this court to resolve.”39
Options for the Future. In the event of a war with Iraq, a supplemental
appropriations bill to provide funding is widely anticipated. Following a war or
significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will likely seek to influence
future internal political and economic developments in that country. Congress may
be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would
facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq. The extent and cost of U.S. programs
would depend on the post-war scenario. (See below, Cost Issues.) The
Administration may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to
support coalition partners in the Middle East, who may suffer economically in the
event of regional instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of
assistance specific to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992
(P.L. 102-511), which authorized aid to the former Soviet Union, or the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress
will have to weigh Iraq-related aid against other budget priorities.
CRS Products
CRS Current Legislative Issues, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Legislation in the 108th
Congress [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqleg.shtml]
CRS Report RS21324, Congressional Action on Iraq, 1990 - 2003.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
37 “U.S. Lawmakers Weigh Actions to Punish France, Germany,” Washington Post,
February 12, 2003.
38 “Anti-War Lawsuit Challenges Bush’s Authority,” USA Today, February 13, 2003.
39 “Judge Rejects Lawsuit to Block War Against Iraq,” Boston Globe, February 25, 2003.
CRS-16
Issues for Congress
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated February 25, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put
forward for the use of U.S. military forces. Iraq had varying capabilities in all
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War.40 The inspections
conducted between 1991 and 1998 destroyed or otherwise eliminated much of those
capabilities, but certain aspects of the programs that were unresolved in 1998 remain
so today. Current inspections seek to resolve those ambiguities as well as uncover
what Iraq might have produced since 1998.41
Nuclear Program. Iraq had a well-financed and broad-based nuclear weapons
program before the 1991 Gulf War, but did not produce enough fissile material for
a weapon. In 1998, questions remained about nuclear weapons designs and
centrifuge development, external assistance, and whether the nuclear program truly
had been abandoned. On February 14, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei again reported that inspectors have found no signs of a revived nuclear
weapons program. The IAEA is still examining the alleged procurement of uranium
from Niger (which Iraq denies) and has asked Iraq to explain the reasons for the
technical specifications of its high-strength aluminum tubes, which the IAEA initially
decided could plausibly have been for conventional rockets rather than uranium
enrichment. In addition, the IAEA is investigating allegations of Iraq’s attempts to
procure magnets and high-speed balancing machines for a possible clandestine
uranium enrichment program.
Biological and Chemical Programs. Iraq produced and weaponized
anthrax, aflatoxin and botulinum. Although UNSCOM destroyed facilities,
production equipment, and growth media, it never accepted Iraq’s declaration as “a
full account of Iraq’s BW program.”42 Iraq had a significant chemical weapons
program, producing blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). From 1991 to 1998, inspectors
destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8 million liters
of precursor chemicals. Nonetheless, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions,
500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors is still unknown, as
are Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent. In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced
4 tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it had imported enough
precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons. Iraqi officials provided documents on VX
agent to Blix and Elbaradei in Baghdad in February 2003, but again, there appears
40 See CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
41 See CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
42 Un Security Council S/1999/356, March 30, 1999, Final Report of the Panel on
Disarmament and Current and Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification Issues.
CRS-17
to be no new information. Blix reported that Iraq had offered suggestions for proving
the destruction of anthrax and VX precursors but that experts are not hopeful it will
be possible to prove that specific quantities were destroyed.
Missile Program. Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production
capabilities prior to the Gulf War, but much of this was destroyed during that war and
in inspections from 1991 to 1998. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles
remained after the war and inspectors accounted for all but two. Iraq is permitted to
produce missiles with ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in
producing Ababil and Samoud missiles of permitted ranges. UNMOVIC missile
experts concluded that the Al-Samoud-2 missiles exceeded the permitted range and
on February 22, Chairman Blix notified Iraq that it must destroy the missiles as well
as the SA-2 engines it imported for them. Blix gave Iraq a deadline of March 1 to
comply. Iraq admitted earlier that flight tests of those missiles did exceed the
150km-range by 50km but argued that, once weighed down with ordnance and
guidance systems, the missiles would not exceed the 150km range. The experts are
still considering whether the solid-fueled Al Fatah is a proscribed system but
concluded that Iraq’s missile test stand would not be recommended for destruction.
Inspections Status. The U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA have conducted over 577 inspections at 425
sites since November 2002 Few new details have been uncovered through
inspections, apart from the discovery in mid-January of empty chemical weapons
shells not previously declared and of 2000 pages of undeclared documents on
uranium enrichment in a private home. The ten mustard gas shells that were taken
for destruction on February 12 outside of Baghdad had previously been under seal
and scheduled for destruction. Progress on private interviews with scientists has
been mixed. On February 6, an Iraqi biologist agreed to be interviewed privately, and
three of five non-nuclear scientists that previously had rejected interviews agreed to
the inspectors’ terms. However, no further scientists have agreed to private
interviews. Blix characterized Iraq as beginning to adopt a “more serious attitude”
of cooperation, but would not call these developments a breakthrough. Iraq agreed
on February 10 to overflights of American U-2, French Mirage, and Russian Antonov
aircraft, and U-2 flights began on February 18.
Key Issues. Some key issues to consider with respect to Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction follow.
! What constitutes evidence of noncompliance? To some,
noncompliance is equated with anything less than full cooperation
(i.e., unless compliance is proven, Iraq is noncompliant); to others,
there must be proof that Iraq is producing weapons of mass
destruction.
! What are the risks of continuing inspections? To some, continuing
inspections gives Iraq more time to produce weapons of mass
destruction; to others, continuing inspections makes it more likely
that any covert programs will be uncovered.
! If inspections uncover signs of Iraqi WMD activity, is this a sign of
the failure or the success of inspections?
CRS-18
! Can coercive inspections ever be effective? To some, only
cooperative inspections provide full assurances, while to others,
inspections provide an invaluable source of information that cannot
be gained from other means.
! What is the best means of preventing the transfer of WMD
technologies or capabilities from Iraq to terrorists? To some,
military force is the best way to quickly and irrevocably disarm Iraq
of its WMD capabilities to forestall such an action; to others,
military action could unintentionally create an environment
conducive to terrorist acquisition of WMD-related items.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
CRS Report RS21376, Iraq: WMD-Capable Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs).
Post-War Iraq
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated February 26, 2003)
The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam
Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current debate over Iraq
policy. One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for
ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could
dissolve into chaos. It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims, the majority but
under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal factions, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Because of the complexities of planning for a post-war Iraq, and the potential for
major inter-ethnic and factional feuding if Saddam falls, some observers believe that
the President George W. Bush Administration would prefer that Saddam Hussein be
replaced by a military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to
democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. Administration
statements, however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq.
President Bush reaffirmed in his February 20, 2003 speech in Georgia that “if we
liberate the Iraqi people, they can rest assured that we will help them build a country
that is disarmed and peaceful, and united, and free.”43
Current Planning Efforts. The Administration is planning for a post-
Saddam regime. The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts
the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a
stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N.
43 “President Meets with Small Business Owners in Georgia.”
CRS-19
resolutions. Senior State Department and Defense Department officials testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003 that there
would likely be at least a 2-year period before governance of Iraq could be transferred
from the U.S. military to an Iraqi administration.44 Some analysts speculated that the
transition might last considerably longer. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 24 that as
many as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar occupation, although
other Administration officials, speaking on background, said that Shinseki was
expressing a personal assessment. A press report on February 21 indicated that a
prominent American civilian would likely be named to head an interim regime in Iraq
and direct the reconstruction effort.45 During the interim period, the United States
would eliminate remaining WMD, eliminate terrorist cells in Iraq, begin economic
reconstruction, and purge Baath Party leaders. Iraq’s oil industry would also be
rebuilt and upgraded. Some earlier reports indicated that some military planners
would prefer that the United Nations and U.S. allies play a major role in governing
post-war Iraq on an interim basis. In September 2002, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that U.S. occupation force levels would range between 75,000 and
200,000 personnel, at a cost of $1 billion to $4 billion per month. (See below, Cost
Issues.)
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power
after Saddam is overthrown. Nonetheless, the opposition is planning to meet in
northern Iraq by February 23, 2003 to plan their involvement in a post-Saddam
regime. On February 11, Iraqi exile opposition leaders reiterated their strong
opposition to the installation of a U.S. military governor in post-war Iraq.46
As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.47 The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
44 “American Officials Disclose 2-Year Plan to Rebuild Iraq,” New York Times, February
12, 2003.
45 “Full U.S. Control Planned for Iraq; American Would Oversee Rebuilding,” Washington
Post, February 21, 2003.
46 “Exile Group Leaders Fault U.S. Plan for Postwar Iraq,” Washington Post, February 12,
2003.
47 “State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.
CRS-20
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure. Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (1) education; (2) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (3) foreign and national security policy; (4) defense institutions
and policy; (5) free media; (6) civil society capacity-building; (7) anti-corruption
measures; and (8) oil and energy.
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects. It is widely assumed that Iraq’s
vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to
fund reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18,
2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a variety of means”... to shoulder
much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.” However, many observers believe
that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields. Iraq set
Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing from there in 1991. The Administration
reportedly is planning to try to secure Iraq’s oil fields early in any offensive against
Iraq to prevent this from happening. A related issue is long term development of
Iraq’s oil industry, and which foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference
for contracts to explore Iraq’s vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to
fear that the United States will seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal
participation of firms from other countries. Some press reports suggest the
Administration is planning to exert such control,48 although some observers speculate
that the Administration is seeking to create such an impression in order to persuade
Russia that it has an interest in participating in a coalition against Iraq.
War Crimes Trials. Analysts have debated whether Saddam Hussein and his
associates should be prosecuted for war crimes. The Administration reportedly has
reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military action that overthrows Saddam, he
and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq.49 The Administration is gathering data for
a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates, but at the same time, some
officials have indicated that Saddam and might be allowed a safe haven if he leaves
Iraq voluntarily before a war. The New York Times reports that U.S. intelligence has
catalogued and categorized about 2,000 members of the Iraqi elite, segmenting them
into those that might be tried as war criminals, those that might quickly defect to the
U.S. side in the event of war, and those that already could be considered opposed to
Saddam or whose expertise would be crucial to running post-war Iraq.50
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in
Japan and Germany.
48 “After Saddam, an Uncertain Future,” Insight Magazine, February 3, 2003.
49 “U.S. Seeks War Crimes Trial Data.,” Washington Post, October 30, 2002.
50 “U.S. Lists Iraqis to Punish, or to Work With,” New York Times, February 26, 2003.
CRS-21
Burden Sharing
Carl Ek (7-7286)
(Last updated February 26, 2003)
In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments
of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq. Several
governments have offered help of one kind or another; other countries, according to
Bush Administration officials, also intend to support the war effort but, for domestic
political reasons, would prefer not to publicize their contributions.51 Nevertheless,
it appears unlikely that a coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will
arise.
Political and Military Factors. On the international political front, analysts
contend that it is important for the United States to enlist allies in order to
demonstrate that it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm
Iraq has been endorsed by a broad global coalition. In most cases, foreign decisions
to participate or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms
inspections and further actions by the U.N. Security Council. Although the political
leaders of some Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush
Administration’s aims, they must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their
populations.
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the
United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only
small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries. Allied combat
and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been
defeated. Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because
the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating
and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the
utmost speed in command and communications.52 An opposing view is that the
United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for
an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism. During Operation Allied Force
in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for
allied consensus hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing
target approval process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces
conduct operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military
capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and
night vision equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to
achieve a swift victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
51 “NATO Allies Willing to Attack Iraq without U.N., Wolfowitz Says,” Bloomberg.com,
January 10, 2003; “U.S. Coalition For War Has Few Partners, Troop Pledges,” Washington
Post, January 25, 2003.
52 “On Iraq, Can Too Many Troops Spoil A War?” Christian Science Monitor, January 22,
2003.
CRS-22
Direct and Indirect Contributions. An Administration official recently
stated that “a core group of eight nations ... has pledged either combat forces or
support units ... .”53 Britain, the only other country that has had warplanes patrolling
the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to make contributions of ground, air, and naval
forces. Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it is believed that other
countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada, may support
coalition forces once a conflict begins. The Czech Republic has reinforced a
contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists in Kuwait, stationed there since
March 2002, and the Slovak parliament has approved the deployment of a similar
unit. Japan, constitutionally barred from dispatching ground troops, reportedly may
also help in the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, and has recently
reinforced its fleet of naval vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean. Sweden and New
Zealand have indicated that they might contribute medical support.
Other forms of support might prove valuable. For example, countries could
grant overflight rights, or back-fill for U.S. troops that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans. In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling, allow
aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force
calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria have
offered the use of their airbases and seaports. At the Bush Administration’s request,
the Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training of up to
3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant
interpreters and administrators.54
On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of
assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight
privileges; the request was deferred. On February 10, France, Germany and Belgium
vetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that it
would implicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder sought to
sharpen the distinction by announcing that his government would provide defensive
missiles and AWACS crews to help protect Turkey on a bilateral basis.55 A week
later, the impasse was broken by an agreement over language indicating that such
assistance “relates only to the defense of Turkey” and does not imply NATO support
53 “America’s Allies Pledge Array of Support,” Baltimore Sun, February 14, 2003. For
domestic political reasons, some countries wish to delay announcement of their support.
54 “Hungary Approves US Request For Training Base For Iraqi Exiles,” Agence France
Press, December 18, 2002.
55 “Germany To Ship Missiles To Turkey,” Washington Post, February 14, 2003.
CRS-23
for a military operation against Iraq.56 Despite the compromise, many observers
believe the temporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO.
In addition, the Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish
government to use Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through
southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq – a key issue for U.S.
planners. The negotiations over allowing U.S. troops proceeded in tandem with
discussions over a U.S. aid package.57 The two sides apparently reached an
agreement permitting as many as 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey, although a vote on
the agreement in the Turkish parliament has been delayed. The United States
reportedly may provide approximately $6 billion in aid to Turkey.58 Some have
criticized Turkey, claiming it has leveraged U.S. strategic needs to squeeze a large
aid package out of Washington. However, Turkish officials argue that more than
90% of their country’s population opposes a war and that Turkey suffered severe
economic losses from the 1991 Gulf War. Ankara also is concerned over the
possibility that a new conflict in Iraq could re-kindle the efforts of Kurdish
separatists.
Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public
statements, approximately 180,000 U.S. troops are currently ashore or on ships in the
region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers.
Whether the United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in
carrying out an attack on Iraq remains unclear. U.S. troops based in Kuwait would
likely play a key role in any ground attack against Iraq. In addition, several U.S.
aircraft carriers will be positioned in the region.
Post-Conflict Assistance. After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq. However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
56 NATO works on a consensus basis; France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg opposed
the initial U.S. request. “NATO Blocked on Iraq Decision,” Washington Post, January 23,
2003. At the end of January, however, eight European leaders signed an open letter
supporting U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq. “European Leaders Declare Support for U.S. on
Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2003. That statement was followed by a declaration
of support by the ten countries aspiring to join NATO. “Who Stands with U.S.? Europe Is
of Two Minds,” New York Times, January 31, 2003. “East Europeans Line Up Behind
Bush,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, 2003. “NATO Agrees to Begin Aid to
Turkey,” Washington Post, February 17, 2003.
57 Israel, Jordan, and Egypt also reportedly have requested U.S. aid to offset possible effects
of to a war. “Deals For Allies’ War Support Are Likely To Cost U.S. Billions,”
Philadelphia Inquirer, February 20, 2003.
58 “Turkey Backs United States Plans For Iraq,” New York Times, February 6, 2003. Turkey
Conditions Troop Deployment on More U.S. Aid,” Washington Post, February 19, 2003;
“Turkey Seems Set To Let 60,000 G.I.’s Use Bases For War,” New York Times, February
26, 2003.
CRS-24
peacekeeping forces. Japan, Sweden, and Romania have indicated that they might
play a role.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.
Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated February 25, 2003)
A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and outcome–
could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic pressures,
stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and festering regional
disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of the Middle East.
Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along ethnic or sectarian
lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional boundaries as occurred
after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is highly unlikely; however,
political realignments could take place, along with new alliances and rivalries that
might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide
to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance,
political support, or both. Saudi Arabia, for example, should it assent to U.S. use of
its bases or facilities, would be likely to push for political concessions, including a
stronger U.S. effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as a possible
reduction in U.S. military presence in the long term. (See below.)
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain the support or acquiescence of
Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will
be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest
to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted Arab-
Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region. Two other
issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.
Democracy and Governance. Some commentators believe that a war with
Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic
revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has
repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the
Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have
authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort
to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
CRS-25
economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort
to support democratization and development, although the Administration is
requesting significantly more funding for this initiative–$145 million–in FY2004.
Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the
United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more
open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups,
who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other
groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior
experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the
Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. Administration officials and other
commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more
favorable climate for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations. Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush
Administration, which brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace
conference at Madrid in 1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
Many believe that the then Bush Administration secured wide Arab participation in
the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to
address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Officials of the present Bush Administration
continue to speak of their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after
eliminating current threats from Iraq, although the President alluded only briefly to
this issue in his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to U.S. interests than a
largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led
coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab
and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli
issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate
in Arab-Israeli negotiations, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of
CRS-26
inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in
anti-U.S. terrorism.59
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region. Large-scale deployment of
U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihood of a
continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on
Middle East governments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. Long-
lasting major U.S. military commitments in the region, however, could heighten
resentment against the United States from Islamic fundamentalists, nationalists, and
other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the Middle East; such resentment could
manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S. interests in the
region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a reduction in U.S.
military presence. According to a Washington Post report on February 9, 2003, Saudi
Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah plans to request the withdrawal of U.S. armed
forces from Saudi territory after Iraq has been disarmed. U.S. and Saudi officials
declined to comment on this report, which an unnamed White House official
described as “hypothetical.” At the same time, some friendly Middle East states,
particularly in Persian Gulf region, may prefer to continue relying on their bilateral
ties with the United States for long-term security guarantees.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy.
Humanitarian Issues
Rhoda Margesson, 7-0425
(Last updated February 26, 2003)
Background. Since the end of the 1991 war with Iraq, surveys and studies
show a continuing decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian
population, estimated at 24 million to 27 million, especially among children and the
elderly. But it is difficult to determine how much of the suffering is due to the
sanctions imposed on Iraq and how much is due to other factors. Imposition of U.N.
sanctions followed a nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran, during which
spending on the social welfare system declined. Decades of conflict and the bombing
during the Gulf War damaged or destroyed much of the public infrastructure such as
water and sewage plants and many public buildings. Some argue that supplies of
59 A former high U.S. official described the “Arab street” as “explosive”; however, many
observers point out that Middle East governments had little trouble containing incipient anti-
U.S. demonstrations during the Gulf War in 1990-1991.
CRS-27
water, food, medicine, and electricity are a matter of urgent concern.60 However,
much of the information available on the conditions within Iraq is also considered
unreliable. Some groups question the accuracy of statistics publicized by the
government, but have no independent sources of information. All estimates of the
number of deaths due to lack of food or medical care vary widely based on the
source.
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies provide aid to Iraq through the Oil-for-
Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and
medicines for the civilian population.61 Both bilateral and multilateral aid have
continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to
assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP. During the 1990s,
the OFFP alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian
situation (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains
serious and has continued to deteriorate over time. Some improvements have been
seen in nutrition, health services, water supply and sanitation, but there is now greater
dependence on government services. Health and nutrition problems have been tied
to the consequences of war, sanctions, shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate
policies of the Iraqi regime.
War-Related Concerns. The implications of war in Iraq include a potential
humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq
itself. Four issues are of critical interest to Congress in that context. First, how the
war will be fought and for how long; will it be a protracted, urban war with heavy
civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi people? Second,
what type of humanitarian assistance will be provided to displaced populations (aid
priorities, use of oil revenues) and the role of other donors? Third, how will
assistance programs be implemented – through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration,
or U.N./donor assistance? Fourth, what will be the impact of refugee flows on
stability in the region? And finally, what will be the role of neighboring countries in
contributing to post-war efforts?
On February 13, 2003, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan held a private
briefing for Security Council members on the likely humanitarian situation in Iraq in
the event of a war. Afterward, the chief U.N. emergency relief coordinator, Kenzo
Oshima, told reporters that the United Nations expected that 600,000 to 1.45 million
refugees and asylum seekers might flee Iraq, that 2 million could become internally
displaced, and that 10 million inside Iraq would require food assistance.62 Leaked
U.N. documents reportedly show that the organization is expecting 100,000
60 “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of
Possible US War.” Turkish Daily News, December 27, 2002.
61 For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), see CRS Report RL30472,
Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
62 “Shortfall Imperils U.N.’s Iraq Aid; Funds Sought for Humanitarian Work,” Washington
Post, February 14, 2003.
CRS-28
immediate casualties in Iraq and increased risk to children due to malnutrition.63 The
United Nations is appealing for $120 million to prepare for post-war Iraqi relief and
has received pledges of about $30 million. In addition to the United States, other
international donors are also responding to the U.N. request for support.
U.N. agencies continue to reiterate that contingency planning does not mean
they have given up hope of avoiding war; at the same time, given the challenge of
current conditions in Iraq, these agencies also acknowledge that a conflict in Iraq
would disrupt critical infrastructure, delivery of basic services, and food distribution
with the potential of severe humanitarian consequences. Nevertheless, relief agencies
are having to plan for humanitarian needs amid great uncertainty about conditions in
the aftermath of conflict.
Refugee Preparations. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have
publicly stated that they will prevent refugees from entering their countries.64 Iranian
leaders have stated that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but
refugees would be provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran
in Afghanistan.65 However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in
case. Turkey has said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and
is planning to build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five
more camps within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of
24,000 tents. The Red Crescent team is making preparations to accommodate up to
100,000 people and treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting.66 Kuwait’s
government has said it will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that
displaced people could be cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two
countries. The government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees.
According to relief agency officials, Jordanian authorities appear determined not to
allow Iraqi refugees into Jordan. Saudi Arabia has not publicly discussed the need
for preparation for refugees, but there have been reports that the government is
making some plans.67
Relief Planning. The United Nations has an extensive infrastructure in Iraq
to oversee the OFFP,68 but expatriate staff would probably be withdrawn during a
63 “‘Grim Picture’ Seen for Iraqis,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 2003.
64 “Aid Groups Cagey on Contingency Plans for Iraq War,” Reuters, January 15, 2003.
65 Iranian police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf recently said, “No Refugees Will Be
Allowed into Our Territory if America Attacks Iraq.” “Tehran Sends Mixed Signals on Iraqi
Refugees,” RFL/RL, January 16, 2003; “Iran Prepares for Possible Iraqi Refugee Influx,”
Reuters, January 16, 2003.
66 “Turkey to Set Up 24,000 Tents at Iraq Border for Possible Refugee Influx,” Agence
France-Presse, January 15, 2003; “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’
War.”
67 Ibid.
68 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has four offices inside
Iraq, and works primarily with 100,000 Palestinians, 23,000 Iranians, and 13,000 Turks–all
of whom are refugees. “U.N. Seeks $37.4 Million Humanitarian Supplies in Case of Iraq
(continued...)
CRS-29
conflict and would not be available to administer assistance while the fighting lasted.
Few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have offices in Baghdad and only a
handful have a presence in Iraq. The Iraqi regime restricts NGOs: for example, those
that work in the North cannot have offices in the South. In addition, U.S.-based
organizations are required by the U.S. government to have a license to operate in
Iraq.69 Within Iraq, relief agencies are stockpiling supplies of food, water, hygiene
packets, and medical supplies for approximately 250,000 people.
According to Pentagon planners, U.S. armed forces would initially take the lead
in relief and reconstruction, later turning to Iraqi ministries, NGOs, and international
organizations to assume some of the burden.70 The Department of Defense (DOD)
has set up an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian assistance as a central point
for those involved in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. The group has
developed an operational concept for the delivery of aid, relief coordination, and a
transitional distribution system. U.S. forces are pre-positioning food and relief aid
near Iraq and making plans to deal with a possible humanitarian crisis.
DOD is taking an inter-agency approach to the potential need for humanitarian
assistance. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003, that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Department of State were engaged with
working with NGOs and international organizations, which would be “important
partners in addressing Iraq’s humanitarian needs,” adding “civilian and military
officials regularly consult and coordinate plans.” With funding from USAID, U.S.
NGOs have formed a consortium, the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative,
for better coordination. Grossman noted that the United States had allocated $15
million for planning, and $35 million was being made available from other
accounts.71
Over the past several months, USAID has been putting a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) together and is making preparations to deal with the basic
needs of one million people. There will be a core office in Kuwait City and three
mobile field offices. Planning has included assembling and training the response
team, stockpiling emergency supplies and commodities, and communicating with
U.S. and international organizations. According to USAID, so far it has spent $26
million from contingency planning funds. Another $56 million will be drawn from
existing funding sources within USAID. The President is expected to make decisions
shortly on follow-on funding.
68 (...continued)
War,” Dow Jones International News, December 23, 2002.
69 “U.S. Plans Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi People in Case of War,” January 16, 2003,
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq]. “Uncertainty Dogs Relief Groups’ Plans to Care
for Iraq Refugees,” Financial Times, January 6, 2003.
70 “U.S. Military Lays Out Postwar Iraq Plan,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.
71 Transcript provided by Federal Document Clearing House.
CRS-30
Nonetheless, among relief organizations there remains a concern that U.S. and
other military leaders have underestimated the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq72
and that military planners have not developed adequate plans for dealing with that
crisis. They complain that, despite U.S. statements to the contrary, they are not being
adequately consulted on relief plans and at present lack the resources to flow into Iraq
behind advancing U.S. forces, as projected by military planners.73 NGOs also
maintain that the U.S. government has delayed approval of the licenses required for
organizations not already present in Iraq to set up operations.74 Although the
humanitarian issues in Iraq have been getting more attention in recent weeks in the
United States, at the United Nations, and at international meetings such as the one
sponsored by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Geneva in mid-
February, the state of preparedness for humanitarian contingencies, degree of
transparency over planning, and lack of funding have many concerned about the
impact of war and capacity of the international community to meet the humanitarian
needs on the ground.
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, February 10, 2003)
The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises
a number of domestic and international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article
I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under
international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; and (3) the effect of United
Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter. The following subsections give
brief overviews of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters
in greater detail.
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The potential use
of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions
under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has
employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of
the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....” Because of these separate powers, and
because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue
of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often
arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without
congressional authorization. While all commentators agree that the President has the
72 AlertNet, “Agencies Should Resist Being Taken for Granted,” January 17, 2003,
[http://www.reliefweb.org].
73 “AID Groups Say U.S. Shut Them Out of Post-Invasion Plan,” Boston Globe, February
18, 2003.
74 Ibid.
CRS-31
constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without
congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent
to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated
against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional.
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.” Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force.
In the present circumstance these legal requirements seemingly have been met
and any controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force resolved. As noted
earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorizes
the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” As predicates for the use of
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism.
P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution” and requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on
matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expresses congressional
“support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and decisive action by the
Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all relevant Security Council
resolutions, but it does not condition the use of force on prior Security Council
authorization. The authorization does not contain any time limitation.
CRS Products
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Statutory Authority
for the Use of Force Against Iraq,” available online from the CRS site at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter226.html].
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Domestic Legal
Considerations” [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter126.html].
CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.
CRS-32
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question
that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the U.S. would be
deemed legitimate under international law. International law traditionally has
recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues to
be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right has also traditionally
included the right to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate,
preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be
imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces. But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. As
a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq
by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the
outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to
provide justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to
be a lawful preemptive use of force.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force
Against Iraq.
CRS Report RS21311, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force.
Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....” It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
CRS-33
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans. In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the “inherent right” of
States to use force in self-defense.
Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N.
authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable. It is at least arguable that the
authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect. In the wake of a number
of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678,
adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In Resolution
687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including
unconditional Iraqi disarmament and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop
or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related
to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire.
Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including
Resolution 678. It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the
conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the
authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.
Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security
Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit
authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990. On November 8, 2002, in
the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month
earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi
compliance with that resolution. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations. The resolution obligates the Council to
“convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise
fail to meet its disarmament obligations. Whether Resolution 1441 necessitates an
additional resolution specifically authorizing the use of force appears debatable.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the
Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Texts – 1992-2002.
CRS-34
Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated February 26, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and
the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using regular FY2003
funding with costs of $2.3 billion already incurred to activate reservists and deploy
and support troops and equipment in the region. According to recent press reports,
defense officials are estimating that the cost of a war in Iraq – including initial
occupation and aid to allies – could be more than $100 billion. A request for a
supplemental appropriations bill could be made shortly, according to observers.75
Debate within the Administration about the size and timing of the supplemental,
however, could delay that request. The FY2004 budget does not include any funds
to cover current or potential costs of a war with Iraq. The potential cost of a war and
related post-war costs are currently raising concerns.
The full costs of a war with Iraq could include not only the cost of the war itself
but also the cost of aid to allies to secure basing facilities and to compensate for
economic losses (e.g. Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), post-war
occupation costs, reconstruction costs, and humanitarian assistance. Post-war costs
could be higher than the cost of the war itself, according to the estimates below.
Those estimates suggest that a 2-month war could cost between $27 billion and $60
billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and humanitarian
assistance could total as much as $68 billion in the first year, assuming an occupation
force of 200,000.
The Defense Department has not provided any official estimates of the potential
costs of a war with Iraq, although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in interviews
several weeks ago that $50 billion would be “on the high side.”76 The Office of
Management and Budget has prepared an internal estimate, which reportedly projects
costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the estimate publicly, and it has not
explained the assumptions underlying its projections. An earlier estimate by former
chief White House economist Larry Lindsey of $100 billion to $200 billion was
dismissed by the Administration.
War Costs. Predicting the cost of a war is uncertain and would vary with the
size of the force deployed and the duration of the conflict. Although most observers
predict that a war would be short, others predict that the war could last longer,
particularly if the U.S. encountered chemical or biological attacks, had to fight urban
warfare in Baghdad, or encountered more resistance than anticipated.
The Congressional Budget Office has published estimates of the costs of two
illustrative campaigns: a heavy air option involving 250,000 troops deployed to the
region and heavy ground option involving 370,000 troops based on factors from the
75 “Bush To Seek Up To $95 Billion to Cover Cost of War In Iraq,” Wall street Journal,
February 26, 2003; “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times,
February 26, 2003.
76 “Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.
CRS-35
individual services. In a war that lasted two months, the heavy air option would cost
$27 billion and the heavy ground option would cost $36 billion for the war itself.77
Using a methodology based on the costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the
Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee estimated that a two-month war
that deployed 250,000 troops would cost $53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer
to that used by Secretary Rumsfeld.78 A new estimate by the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) that blends the two approaches, suggested that a two
month war would cost about $35 billion. A six-month war, with the same force size,
could cost substantially more, ranging from $50 billion using CBO’s figures to $85
billion using CSBA’s approach.79
Related Aid to Allies. The cost of aid to allies to ensure access for U.S.
troops, as in the case of Turkey or to provide compensation for economic losses or
refugee costs, as in the case of Pakistan or Jordan and Egypt and Israel, is uncertain.
Discussions are reportedly underway. Press reports have mentioned requests from
allies of $15 billion in grants and loan guarantees from Turkey, $12 billion from
Israel, and major additions to current aid from Egypt and Jordan.80 Based on those
press reports, such aid to allies could add many billions to the cost of the war. It is
not clear to what extent, if at all, estimates of those costs are included in the
Pentagon’s new overall estimate of $95 billion.
Occupation. The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the
number of forces and the duration of their stay. Using factors based on the recent
experience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs would
range from $1.4 billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000 personnel,
a force size that was considered by the U.S. Central Command.81 A year-long
occupation employing 200,000 troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors.
That estimate was recently buttressed by testimony from the Army Chief of Staff,
General Eric Shinseki, stating his view that several hundred thousand troops could
be needed initially.82
An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged
the post-war occupation cost at $105 billion over 5 years, assuming an initial
peacekeeping force of 150,000 troops declining to 100,000 troops the second year
77 Congressional Budget Office, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M.
Spratt, Jr, concerning cots of a potential war with Iraq, September 30, 2002; see
[ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf]. CBO used costing methodology based on
cost factors used by the services and the scenarios described above.
78 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf]
79 See House Budget Committee, above, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, Backgrounder, Potential Cost of a War with Iraq and its Post-War Occupation
by Steven M. Kosiak, February 25, 2003 [http://www.csbaonlin.org].
80 “U.S. builds War Coalition With Favors And Money,” USA Today, February 25, 2003.
81 CBO, Letter cited. Costs would be higher if U.S. peacekeepers engaged in reconstruction
activities like rebuilding bridges.
82 “A Huge Postwar Force Seen,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.
CRS-36
and 65,000 troops for the following 3 years.83 If the peacekeeping role were shared
with the U.N. or other nations, the costs to the U.S. would be lower. Press reports
suggest that the Administration is considering an occupation of about 2 years.
Reconstruction. According to United Nations agencies, the cost of
rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years.84 Nobel
prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in
Iraq could cost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors,
to $75 billion over 6 years using the costs of the Marshall Plan as a proxy.85
If Iraqi oil fields are not damaged, some observers have suggested that oil
revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction. Most of those revenues,
however, are used for imports under the U.N. Oil for Food Program or for domestic
consumption. Although expansion of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time,
additional revenues would not be available for some time. The only additional
revenues available immediately might be those from the estimated 400,000 barrels
per day that Iraq currently smuggles and that generate about $3 billion a year.86
Humanitarian Assistance. Estimates of post-war humanitarian assistance
for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5 billion
the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq’s
population of 24 million needed help.87 If the number needing help were lower or
other nations or the U.N. contributed, the cost to the U.S. would be lower.
Economic Repercussions. Some observers have suggested that a war with
Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generated by a disruption in the supplies
that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession. (See below, Oil Supply Issues)
Such a scenario could increase the cost to the U.S, economy substantially. According
to recent press reports, however, the Saudis have promised to increase their
production to offset any potential shortfall caused by a drop or the cessation of Iraqi
oil production in the aftermath of a war.
83 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder. CSBA uses the same
factors as CBO.
84 “U.N. Estimates rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion.” New York Times, January 31,
2003.
85 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 66-67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].
86 CBO, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr, concerning
cots of a p o t e n t i a l w a r w i t h Ir a q , September 30, 2002; see
[ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].
87 American Academy of Arts & Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf]. This estimate
assumes a cost of $500 per person per year based on the experience in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the 1990s.
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CRS Products
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
Oil Supply Issues
Larry Kumins, 7-7450
(Last updated February 11, 2003)
The threat of an armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over its supply of crude
oil to world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that
Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s
currently known reserves – second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.
Despite holding such large reserves, Iraq’s current rate of crude oil production is
much below its ultimate potential. With investment in technology and better
operating methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could
change world oil market dynamics.
Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have
varied greatly; in some weeks virtually no oil has been exported, in others as much
as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) enter world markets. During the past two
months, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reports that exports have averaged 1.5
mbd under the oil-for-food program. Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq’s
international oil flow, the oil market relies on the Iraqi supply, and it plays a role in
the determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-purchaser arrangements.
Iraq accounts for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not
participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi
exports are controlled by the U.N. under Resolution 986. Iraq’s financial incentive
to keep supplying the world market is strong, since crude prices are at record levels
due mainly to an oil workers’ strike in Venezuela. The strike began on December 2,
2002. Combined with uncertainty regarding a new Persian Gulf conflict, the strike
has resulted in oil prices that are 50% higher than the 2001 average.
Current indications suggest the Venezuelan strike is winding down and that oil
output is growing. But it is not clear how soon production will reach pre-strike levels.
Were the strike to continue through spring – and events in the Persian Gulf cause a
halt in Iraqi crude oil supply – OPEC members would not be able to make up the lost
crude. With little surplus producing capacity elsewhere in the world, a crude supply
shortfall would likely occur, and oil prices could spike above their recent $35 per
barrel levels. If any conflict involving Iraq were to spread beyond its borders to
Kuwait – as Saddam Hussein has threatened – or affect tanker traffic in the Persian
Gulf, a greater oil shortfall could take place with a more significant impact on prices.
On the other hand, should Iraq experience a change of government, the country
could become a much larger oil producer, increasing world market supply, and
CRS-38
changing the oil price paradigm that has prevailed since the Iranian political upheaval
of 1978-79. This eventuality could unleash a new set of political and economic
forces in the region.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31676, Middle East Oil Disruption: Potential Severity and
Policy Options.
Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Chronology
For a chronology of Iraq related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
Iraq Facts
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
CRS-39
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources. The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This CRS web page includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation.
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html].
The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
For the draft “second resolution” introduced by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain on February 24, 2003, see
[http://www.un.int/usa/scdraft-iraq-2-24-03]
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1441, holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations. For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.