Order Code IB89005
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Global Climate Change
Updated February 25, 2003
John R. Justus and Susan R. Fletcher
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Global Climate Change: Science and Policy
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends
The Policy Context
Clinton Administration Policies
Bush Administration Policies
International Action
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate
COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change
COP-4, Buenos Aires
COP-5, Bonn, Germany
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands
COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco
Congressional Interest and Activities
LEGISLATION


IB89005
02-25-03
Global Climate Change
SUMMARY
There is concern that human activities are
fuels, reducing these emissions poses major
affecting the heat/energy-exchange balance
challenges and controversy.
between Earth, the atmosphere, and space, and
inducing global climate change, often termed
The 1992 United Nations Framework
“global warming.” Human activities, particu-
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
larly the burning of fossil fuels, have increased
which the United States has ratified, called for
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO ) and other
a “non-binding” voluntary aim for industrial-
2
trace greenhouse gases. If these gases con-
ized countries to control atmospheric concen-
tinue to accumulate in the atmosphere at
trations of green-house gases by stabilizing
current rates, most scientists believe global
their emissions at 1990 levels by the year
warming would occur through intensification
2000. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the
of Earth’s natural heat-trapping “greenhouse
UNFCCC goes further and, if it were to enter
effect.” Possible impacts might be seen as
into force, would commit the 38 major indus-
both positive and negative.
trialized nations to specified, legally binding
emissions reductions.
A warmer climate would probably have
far reaching effects on agriculture and for-
In March 2001, the Bush Administration
estry, managed and un-managed ecosystems,
rejected the Kyoto Protocol and chose to act
including natural habitats, human health,
only as observers, declining to participate in
water resources, and sea level depending on
discussions at international negotiations on the
climate responses. Although causal relation-
Protocol. In July 2001, major political agree-
ships between projected long-range global
ments were reached, led by the European
climate trends and record-setting warmth and
Union (EU), and parties agreed to seek ratifi-
severe weather events of the past two decades
cation and entry into force without the United
have not been firmly established, attention has
States Other parties continue to express hope
been focused on possible extremes of climate
that the United States will rejoin international
change and the need for better understanding
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In
of climate processes to improve climate model
May 2002, the European Union and member
forecasts.
states ratified the Protocol. Some 75 nations,

including 21 with binding obligations, had
The basic policy question remains:
ratified as of July 12, 2002.
Given scientific uncertainties about the mag-
nitude, timing, rate, and regional
President Bush concluded a cabinet-
consequences of potential climatic change,
level climate policy review with an announce-
what are the appropriate responses for U.S.
ment of a “new approach” for the United
and world decisionmakers?
States based on reducing the greenhouse gas
intensity (greenhouse gas emissions per unit
Fossil-fuel combustion is the primary
of GDP) of the U.S. economy. This and other
source of CO emissions, and also emits other
voluntary measures plus increased climate
2
“greenhouse” gases. Because the U.S. econ-
funding were announced February 14, 2002.
omy is so dependent upon energy, and so
much of U.S. energy is derived from fossil
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

IB89005
02-25-03
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Over the past year, intensive negotiations have taken place among the parties to the
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to finalize and
resolve major issues related to the legally binding reductions in greenhouse gases mandated
by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, while the United States position was
reformulated under the Bush Administration to repudiate and disengage from the Protocol.
In late March 2001, the Bush Administration declared the Kyoto Protocol a failed effort and
indicated that the United States would not continue to participate in negotiations related to
the Protocol. This caused widespread concern and dismay in certain diplomatic circles,
expressed primarily by European Union (EU) nations, Japan, and others. COP-6 negotiations
were resumed in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001. The United States attended, but for the most
part did not participate in discussions during 2001 related to the Protocol.
At the Bonn meeting, the UNFCCC parties reached agreement on the political elements
of the Protocol, including the key issues such as carbon sequestration and determinations to
proceed with emissions trading and compliance, and announced their decision to seek
ratification of the Protocol by enough parties to bring it into force, without the United States.
When parties resumed negotiations to finalize key issues at COP-7 in Marrakech, Morocco,
the United States continued to act as an observer, declining to participate in negotiations.
At the conclusion of the Marrakech negotiations, most major issues were resolved, and a goal
emerged of bringing the Kyoto Protocol into force, without the United States if necessary,
by the August-September 2002 meeting of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa. As of July 12, 2002, 75 countries had
ratified, including 21 of the Annex B countries with binding obligations under the Protocol.
These 21 nations represent 36% of the 1990 emissions baseline, with 55% being the amount
of emissions that must be accounted for by Annex B countries that have ratified in order for
the Protocol to enter into force. Most parties to the UNFCCC continue to express hope that
the United States will re-engage in international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
February 14, 2002, the President announced the policy framework that the United States
will use in addressing climate change. This included reducing climate intensity (greenhouse
gases per unit of production) of U.S. industry through voluntary measures, and several
measures to increase research on climate change and provide better methods of recording
voluntary changes undertaken by industry.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Global Climate Change: Science and Policy
A large number of scientists believe that human activities, which have increased
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO ) by one-third over the past 100 years,
2
may be leading to an increase in global average temperatures. However, the science of
“global warming” is not without challengers, who argue that scientific proof is incomplete
or contradictory, and that there remain many uncertainties about the nature and direction of
CRS-1

IB89005
02-25-03
Earth’s climate. Nevertheless, concern is growing that human activities, such as the burning
of fossil fuels, industrial production, deforestation, and certain land-use practices are
increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO ) that, along with increasing
2
concentrations of other trace gases such as chlorofluorocarbons-CFCs, methane (CH ),
4
nitrous oxide (N O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur
2
hexafluoride (SF ), may be leading to changes in the chemical composition and physical
6
dynamics of Earth’s atmosphere, including how heat/energy is distributed between the land,
ocean, atmosphere and space.
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends
Scientists have found that the four most important variable greenhouse gases, whose
atmospheric concentrations can be influenced by human activities, are carbon dioxide (CO ),
2
methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Historically, CO has
4
2
2
been the most important, but over the past several decades other gases have assumed
increasing significance and, collectively, are projected to contribute about as much to
potential global warming over the next 60 years as CO . The 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol on
2
Climate Change, if it were to become a treaty in force, would also regulate three other trace
gases: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ),
6
whose limited concentrations in the atmosphere are anticipated to grow over the long-term.
Sulfate aerosols, a byproduct of air pollution, and other natural phenomena, are also viewed
as important for their transient and regional “climate cooling” effects in Earth’s atmosphere.
The amount of carbon cycling from naturally occurring processes each year through the
biosphere as CO is enormous — some 800 billion tons. Ice cores and other proxy climate
2
data, which also indicate CO concentrations in the atmosphere, have shown, in general, a
2
relatively stable global climate, at least over the past 10,000 years. As such, many scientists
suggest that the amount of CO generated by natural processes is about equal to the amounts
2
absorbed and sequestered by natural processes. However, human activity since the Industrial
Revolution (c.a. 1850), and primarily in the form of burning fossil fuels, is now generating
some additional 24 billion tons of CO per year. Available evidence shows that about half
2
this amount is absorbed by natural processes on land and in the ocean, and that atmospheric
concentrations of CO are now about 32% higher than they were some 150 years ago. Some
2
scientists believe that a large amount of CO may be stored in northern latitude soils and in
2
temperate and tropical forests, suggesting a greater importance of the role of natural
resources management and land-use practices in these regions, including burning of biomass
and deforestation. Scientists estimate that anthropogenic emissions of CO alone may
2
account for as much as a 60% increase in global mean temperatures of 0.9oF, since 1850.
The most recent projections of state-of-the-art computer models of the Earth’s climate
(global climate models–GCMs) have projected a globally averaged warming ranging from
almost 3 to 10.7degrees F over the next 100 years, if greenhouse gases continue to
accumulate in the atmosphere at the current rate. Climate scientists believe that such a
warming could shift temperature zones, rainfall patterns, and agricultural belts and, under
certain scenarios, and cause sea level to rise. They further predict that global warming could
have far-reaching effects — some positive, some negative depending how it may be
experienced in a given region — on natural resources; ecosystems; food and fiber
production; energy supply, use, and distribution; transportation; land use; water supply and
control; and human health.
CRS-2

IB89005
02-25-03
Some skeptics of the global warming theory have called into question the reliability of
the computer climate models and their output used to make projections of future warming
that supported Kyoto Protocol negotiations. They also challenge some scientists’ assertions
that recent episodic weather events may seem more extreme in nature, and that this may be
indicative of long-term climate change.
Evidence of natural variability of climate is large enough that even the record-setting
warmth at the end of the 20th century does not allow a vast majority of knowledgeable
scientists to state beyond a reasonable doubt that weather extremes experienced over the past
two decades are attributable to “global warming,” at least at the present time. However, the
warming trend at the surface appears to be continuing. In some cases, causal relationships
between seasonal and inter annual climate changes and present-day severe weather events
are beginning to be recognized and even predicted, because of an improved ability to observe
the El Nino and La Nina phenomena. This notwithstanding, singular extreme weather events
have focused public attention on possible outcomes of potential long-term climate change
and a need for a better understanding of regional climates on decadal to century time scales.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) researchers reported that
the 12 warmest years (globally averaged) since historical records have been kept occurred
in the past two decades, with 1990 and 1998 among the warmest. At least some of this
warming, they concluded, is human-induced. On the other hand, satellite instruments —
which, through indirect methods, measure the average temperature of the atmosphere in a
deep column above the surface — for the past 20 years are hard pressed to demonstrate any
positive trends. A report issued in January 2000 by the U.S. National Research Council’s
Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Reconciling Observations of Global
Temperature Change
, attempted to resolve apparent disparities between temperature data
measured at the surface and those from satellites. Skeptics claim that disparate trends
invalidate the output of general circulation models (GCMs), many of which demonstrate
homogenous warming throughout all the levels of the Earth’s atmosphere. Panel scientists
concluded that there may be a systematic disconnect between the upper and near surface
atmosphere and cited physical processes which may have an unique impact on the upper
atmosphere that are not currently accounted for in GCMs. In addition, they acknowledged
that only long-term, systematic monitoring of the upper atmosphere could resolve the
differences in temperature trends.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), jointly established in 1988
by the United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), reported in its Second Assessment (1996) that “. . . [such]
a change is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin . . . [and that] the balance of evidence,
from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from changes in geographical,
seasonal, and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, suggests a discernible human
influence on global climate.” And now, the latest report (January 2001), the
Intergovernmental Panel’s Third Assessment, concluded that a firmer association between
human activities and climate seems to have emerged. That was news, because reservations
about the source of the past century’s warming and whether it bore a human fingerprint are
often cited in policy debates, usually in support of deferring actions aimed at mitigating
possible global warming. In addition, the IPCC reported a higher range of potential
warming – roughly between 2.7 and just under 11 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 100
years.
CRS-3

IB89005
02-25-03
As background, a November 2000 national assessment report, Climate Change Impacts
on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change,
released under the auspices of the U.S. Global Research Program received criticism from
many of those who were involved in its early review. Critics claimed that many of the
model-projected impacts of possible future climate changes were overstated and
unsubstantiated. The National Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), with overall authority
for the report, countered that much of the criticism it had received did not take into account
the time scales upon which the report was based; the report targeted the effects of climate
toward the middle of this century to the end of the next. Also, seemingly contradictory
outcomes were produced by the two climate models selected for making the climate
projections, casting some lingering doubt on the overall value and utility of the results for
decision makers at the local, regional, and national levels. Various regional and resource-
focused assessments are now available at the USGCRP website
[http://www.nacc.usgcrp.gov]. A final synthesis report by the NAST, of the same title and
consisting of an overview of all of the regional and sectoral studies, was released in
December 2000.
In August 2000, NASA scientist James Hansen suggested that climate change benefits
could be achieved through near-term regulation of non-CO greenhouse gases. He proposed
2
that reducing emissions of halocarbons (refrigerants), methane, nitrogen oxides, and carbon-
black aerosols (soot) could have the effect of reducing ozone (smog), in the troposphere,
which itself is a greenhouse gas. Non-CO greenhouse gases have relatively short
2
atmospheric lifetimes compared with CO ; however, most have a much larger global
2
warming potential (gwp). This would suggest that controlling emissions of these greenhouse
gases could reduce the rate and overall amount of climate warming from greenhouse gases,
leaving only that expected from long-term CO emissions whose full effects would not be
2
realized for another 75-100 years hence. Nevertheless, Hansen emphasized that any actions
to reduce emissions of these gases would need to be taken concomitantly with long-term
strategies to reduce CO . Hansen also noted that modest gains from reducing CO and non-
2
2
CO emissions in the near-term could be achieved primarily through cleaner energy
2
production.
On June 6, 2001, a Committee on the Science of Climate Change of the U.S. National
Research Council (NRC) released a report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some
Key Questions
, stating that global warming could well have serious societal and ecological
impacts by the end of this century. Commissioned by the Bush White House and prepared
by 11 of the nation’s leading climate scientists, the report summarized the current state of
knowledge on climate change and confirmed that the climatic changes observed during the
past several decades were most likely due to human activities. The committee members
warned, however, that they could not rule out the possibility that the climate’s natural
variability could be responsible for a significant portion of that trend. The authors agreed that
human-induced warming and sea level rise were expected to continue through the 21st
century and beyond, but they emphasized that current predictions of the magnitude and rate
of future warming “should be regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments (either
upward or downward).” The NRC report generally concurred with the latest conclusions of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which found that the Earth warmed by
about 1 degree Fahrenheit during the 20th century, and that most of the warming of the past
50 years was probably due to increases in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.
The full report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, is available
CRS-4

IB89005
02-25-03
online at [http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/] or may be downloaded as a PDF file
at [http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/climatechange.pdf]
President Bush made a speech on global climate change from the Rose Garden on June
11, 2001, following release of the NRC report and completion of a cabinet-level review of
climate change options. In that speech, timed just before his trip to Europe to meet with
leaders there, the President acknowledged that the world has warmed and that greenhouse
gases have increased, largely due to human activity, but emphasized that the magnitude and
rate of future warming are unknown.
The Policy Context
Clinton Administration Policies. Taking office the year after the UNFCCC was
completed, the Clinton Administration presided over early U.S. efforts to deal internationally
with climate change, and to participate in formulation of the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC.
On October 19, 1993, President Clinton released his Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP),
which proposed voluntary domestic measures to attain greenhouse gas emissions
stabilization as outlined by the UNFCCC, to stabilize U.S. emissions at 1990 levels by the
year 2000. The CCAP called for comprehensive voluntary measures by industry, utilities and
other large-scale energy users. CCAP stressed energy-efficiency upgrades through new
building codes in residential and commercial sectors, and other improvements in energy
generating or using technologies. Large-scale tree planting and forest reserves were
encouraged to enhance sequestration of carbon dioxide and to conserve energy. Other
aspects of the plan addressed mitigation of greenhouse gases other than CO . The CCAP
2
avoided mandatory command and control measures.
On November 12, 1998, President Clinton instructed a representative to sign the Kyoto
Protocol to “lock-in” U.S. interests achieved during negotiations. This act drew protest by
some in Congress. Some Members claimed Clinton action was in violation of the June 1997
Byrd/Hagel Resolution (S.Res. 98) that required an economic analysis of legally binding
emission reductions on the United States, as well as binding obligations for all UNFCCC
parties, including developing countries. The President announced he would continue to
pursue”meaningful” commitments from key developing countries before he would send the
treaty to the Senate for advice and consent.
The Clinton Administration released an economic analysis (July 1998), prepared by the
Council of Economic Advisors, that concluded that with emissions trading among the Annex
B/Annex I countries, and participation of key developing countries in the “Clean
Development Mechanism” — which grants the latter business-as-usual emissions rates
through 2012 — the costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol could be reduced as much as
60% from many estimates. Other economic analyses, however, prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office and the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), and
others, demonstrated a potentially large declines in GDP from implementing the Protocol.
On November 11, 2000, President Clinton issued a statement on “Meeting the
Challenge of Global Warming” in response to the results of the report: Climate Change
Impacts on the United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and
Change
(see [http://www.gcrio.org/National Assessment/]). In his statement, President
Clinton said he would promulgate new regulations for U.S. electric power plants, imposing
CRS-5

IB89005
02-25-03
emissions caps on sulphur, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and CO . He also called for
2
establishment of a domestic emissions trading program and promised a continued U.S.
leadership role in climate change to set an example for other industrialized countries.
President Clinton announced he would take such steps as necessary to keep the United States
on target for meeting Kyoto Protocol goals, if certain concessions were made regarding
international adoption of flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading, the clean
development mechanism (CDM), credit for carbon sinks, and accountable, legally-binding,
compliance mechanisms.

Bush Administration Policies. Soon after taking office, the Bush Administration
had asked for a delay in resumption of the collapsed COP-6 negotiations (see COP-6
discussion below), in order to allow time for consideration of its approach and policies.
Talks were accordingly scheduled for the second half of July. However, in late March, the
Bush Administration indicated its opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, and created widespread
concern among the EU nations by essentially rejecting it, citing lack of developing country
participation and possible harm to the U.S. economy, especially in light of acute energy
problems that were evident in the first half of 2001. This followed extensive press attention
to, first, statements by the EPA Administrator that–pursuant to campaign statements by then-
candidate George W. Bush–carbon dioxide would be included in a multi-pollutant regulatory
effort; and then a repudiation of that position and clarification by President Bush and
Administration spokespersons that carbon dioxide would not be regulated.
President Bush made a policy statement in mid-June of 2001, resulting from a
continuing cabinet-level review of climate change options, in which he outlined the U.S.
approach as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary actions, increased scientific
research, and market mechanisms. President Bush also outlined a U.S. Climate Change
Research Initiative, and the National Climate Change technology Initiative. (See CRS report
RL30452, Climate Change: Federal Research, Technology, and Related Programs) This
preceded his trip to Europe for meetings with European heads of state, which ended with
statements that Europe and the United States “agree to disagree” on climate change
approaches.
The Europeans then announced their intentions to proceed with ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, while President Bush indicated the United States will continue to participate in
negotiations of the UNFCCC parties in order to pursue its own objectives. When talks
resumed among UNFCCC parties at “COP-6 resumed” in mid-July in Bonn, Germany, and
continued in the fall in Marrakech, Morocco at COP-7, the United States delegation did not
make new proposals and declined to participate in negotiations on issues of the Kyoto
Protocol. Agreement among the other parties was also found on the remaining Protocol
issues at COP-7, and they announced that they would seek ratification of the Kyoto Protocol,
and its entry into force–even without the participation of the United States–by
August/September 2002, the date of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa.
On February 14, 2002, apparently concluding the cabinet-level review of climate change
underway since early 2001, President Bush announced a U.S. policy for climate change: a
“new approach for meeting the long-term challenge of climate change.” The centerpiece of
this announcement was the plan to reduce greenhouse gas intensity of the U.S. economy by
18% over the next 10 years. Greenhouse gas intensity measures the ratio of greenhouse gas
CRS-6

IB89005
02-25-03
emissions to economic output, and has been declining in the United States over the past
several years. The Administration stated that the goal, to be met through voluntary action,
is to achieve efficiency improvements that would reduce the 183 metric tons of emissions
per million dollars of gross domestic product (GDP) to 151 in 2012. The plan notes that “if,
in 2012, we find that we are not on track toward meeting our goal, and sound science justifies
further policy action, the United States will respond with additional measures that may
include a broad, market-based program” and other incentives and voluntary measures to
accelerate technology development.
In addition, the plan directs the Secretary of Energy in consultation with other key
agencies, to “substantially improve the emission reduction registry” to upgrade the voluntary
emission reduction program under section 1605(b) of the 1992 Energy Policy Act, to bring
about enhanced measurement accuracy, reliability, and verifiability. Other measures include
providing for protected, transferable emission reduction credits, increased funding of $700
million in total climate-related spending, and a new management structure to coordinate
climate change and technology research. Domestic policies such as tax incentives for
renewable energy and new technology, development of fuel-efficient vehicles and cleaner
fuels, and carbon sequestration were also proposed, along with several international bilateral
initiatives and relatively modest increases in foreign assistance.
Some observers praised the plan for taking a practical, conservative approach to
government action and for relying on voluntary measures. Critics observed that voluntary
approaches by themselves have not historically often been effective and noted that the
reductions in energy intensity are very little different from current trends and would allow
for significant increases in over-all greenhouse gas emissions rather than reductions.
The Administration continues to encourage voluntary action rather than mandatory
requirements. On February 12, 2003, the Administration detailed a set of voluntary
agreements by various industry groups under an umbrella initiative titled Climate VISION
(Voluntary, Innovative Sector Initiatives: Opportunities Now). These initiatives by sectoral
groups involve actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency.

(For full description of this announcement, see:
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html].)
International Action
The United States was involved in negotiations and international scientific research on
climate change prior to ratifying the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). This included passage of a National Climate Program Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-
367). These activities are discussed in CRS Report RL30522, Global Climate Change: A
Survey of Scientific Research and Policy Reports
, in which early aspects of the scientific
debate and a chronology of U.S. government involvement in climate change policy prior to
1992 are featured.
CRS-7

IB89005
02-25-03
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was
opened for signature at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED) conference in Rio de Janeiro (known by its popular title, the Earth
Summit). On June 12, 1992, the United States, along with 153 other nations, signed the
UNFCCC, that upon ratification committed signatories’ governments to a voluntary “non-
binding aim” to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of
“preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s climate system.” These
actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, with the intention of stabilizing their
emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000; and other responsibilities
would be incumbent upon all UNFCCC parties. The parties agreed in general that they would
recognize “common but differentiated responsibilities,” with greater responsibility for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the near term on the part of developed/industrialized
countries, which were listed and identified in Annex I of the UNFCCC and thereafter
referred to as “Annex I” countries.
On September 8, 1992, then-President Bush transmitted the UNFCCC for advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification. The Foreign Relations Committee approved the
treaty and reported it (Senate Exec. Rept. 102-55) October 1, 1992. The Senate consented
to ratification on October 7, 1992, with a two-thirds majority vote. President Bush signed
the instrument of ratification October 13, 1992, and deposited it with the U.N. Secretary
General. According to terms of the UNFCCC, having received over 50 countries’
instruments of ratification, it entered into force March 24, 1994.
Since the UNFCCC entered into force, the parties have been meeting annually in
conferences of the parties (COP) to assess progress in dealing with climate change, and
beginning in the mid-1990's, to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol to establish legally binding
obligations for developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. After
completion of the Protocol in 1997, COP meetings focused on formulating the operational
rules that would prevail as nations attempted to meet their obligations to reduce emissions.
These rules were essentially agreed upon at COP-7 (see below) in 2001. As of July 12, 2002,
75 countries had ratified, including 21 of the Annex B countries with binding obligations
under the Protocol. These 21 nations represent 36% of the 1990 emissions baseline, with
55% being the amount of emissions that must be accounted for by Annex B countries that
have ratified in order for the Protocol to enter into force. Most parties to the UNFCCC
continue to express hope that the United States will re-engage in international efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate
The UNFCCC Conference of Parties met for the first time in Berlin, Germany in the
spring of 1995, and voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries’ abilities to meet
commitments under the Convention. These were expressed in a U.N. ministerial declaration
known as the “Berlin Mandate,” which established a 2-year Analytical and Assessment
Phase (AAP), to negotiate a “comprehensive menu of actions” for countries to pick from and
choose future options to address climate change which for them, individually, made the best
economic and environmental sense. The Berlin Mandate exempted non-Annex I countries
from additional binding obligations, in keeping with the principle of “common but
CRS-8

IB89005
02-25-03
differentiated responsibilities” established in the UNFCCC– even though, collectively, the
larger, newly industrializing countries were expected to be the world’s largest emitters of
greenhouse gas emissions 15 years hence.
COP-2, Geneva, Switzerland
The Second Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-2) met in July 1996 in
Geneva, Switzerland. Its Ministerial Declaration was adopted July 18, 1996, and reflected
a U.S. position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global
Affairs for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which 1) accepted the scientific
findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); 2) rejected uniform “harmonized policies” in favor
of flexibility; and 3) called for “legally binding mid-term targets.”
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
was adopted by COP-3, in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, after intensive–and
tense–negotiations. Most industrialized nations and some central European economies in
transition (all defined as Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6%-8% below 1990 levels between the years
2008-2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United States would be
required to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990 levels. (For more details,
see CRS Report RL30692: Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.) The Protocol
provides that it will enter into force when it has been ratified by 55 countries, accounting for
55% of developed country emissions in 1990. In 1997, prior to the completion of the Kyoto
Protocol, the U.S. Senate passed S.Res.98, which urged the President not to agree to a treaty
that did not include binding commitments for developing countries, or that would cause harm
to the U.S. economy. As noted above, although President Clinton did sign the Protocol in
1998, it was never submitted by the Clinton Administration to the Senate because it would
not have met the conditions of S.Res.98.
The Clinton Administration initiated funding efforts to address climate change; in the
FY2001 budget request funding was included for a Climate Change Technology Initiative
(CCTI) first introduced in his FY1999 budget. Somewhat reduced funding for the climate
technology initiatives was received in previous years. (See CRS Report RL30452. Climate
Change: Federal Research, Technology, and Related Programs
.)
COP-4, Buenos Aires
COP-4 took place in Buenos Aires in November 1998. It had been expected that the
remaining issues unresolved in Kyoto would be finalized at this meeting. However, the
complexity and difficulty of finding agreement on these issues proved insurmountable, and
instead the parties adopted a 2-year “Plan of Action” to advance efforts and to devise
mechanisms for implementing the Kyoto Protocol, to be completed by 2000.
CRS-9

IB89005
02-25-03
COP-5, Bonn, Germany
The 5th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
met in Bonn, Germany, between October 25 and November 4, 1998. It was primarily a
technical meeting, and did not reach major conclusions.
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands
When COP-6 convened November 13-25, 2000, in The Hague, Netherlands, discussions
evolved rapidly into a high-level negotiation over the major political issues. These included
major controversy over the United States’ proposal to allow credit for carbon “sinks” in
forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions reductions
in this way; disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by countries that did not
meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in resolving how developing countries
could obtain financial assistance to deal with adverse effects of climate change and meet
their obligations to plan for measuring and possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In
the final hours of COP-6, despite some compromises agreed between the United States and
some EU countries, notably the United Kingdom, the EU countries as a whole, led by
Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The Hague
collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of COP-6, suspended COP-6 without agreement, with the
expectation that negotiations would later resume. It was later announced that the COP-6
meetings (termed “COP-6 bis”) would be resumed in Bonn, Germany, in the second half of
July. The next regularly scheduled meeting of the parties to the UNFCCC - COP-7 - had
been set for Marrakech, Morocco, in October-November, 2001. (For more detailed
discussion of COP-6 issues, see CRS Report RL30692, Global Climate Change: The Kyoto
Protocol.
)
COP-6 “bis,” Bonn, Germany
When the COP-6 negotiations resumed July 16-27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany, little
progress had been made on resolving the differences that had produced an impasse in The
Hague. However, this meeting took place after President George Bush had become the U.S.
President, and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March; as a result the United States
delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the negotiations related to the Protocol,
and chose to act as observers at that meeting. As the other parties negotiated the key issues,
agreement was reached on most of the major political issues, to the surprise of most
observers given the low level of expectations that preceded the meeting. The agreements
included:
(1) Mechanisms – the “flexibility” mechanisms which the United States had strongly
favored as the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions trading; joint
implementation; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which provides
funding from developed countries for emissions reduction activities in developing
countries, with credit for the donor countries. One of the key elements of this
agreement was that there would be no quantitative limit on the credit a country could
claim from use of these mechanisms, but that domestic action must constitute a
significant element of the efforts of each Annex B country to meet their targets.
CRS-10

IB89005
02-25-03
(2) Carbon sinks – credit was agreed to for broad activities that absorb carbon from the
atmosphere or store it, including forest and cropland management, and revegetation,
with no over-all cap on the amount of credit that a country could claim for sinks
activities. In the case of forest management, an Appendix Z establishes country-specific
caps for each Annex I country, for example, a cap of 13 million tons could be credited
to Japan (which represents about 4% of its base-year emissions). For cropland
management, countries could receive credit only for carbon sequestration increases
above 1990 levels.
(3) Compliance – final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that would address
non-compliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP-7, but included broad
outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets that would include a
requirement to “make up” shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1, suspension of the right to sell
credits for surplus emissions reductions; and a required compliance action plan for
those not meeting their targets.
(4) Financing – three new funds were agreed upon to provide assistance for needs associated
with climate change; a least-developed-country fund to support National Adaptation
Programs of Action; and a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund supported by a CDM levy
and voluntary contributions.
A number of operational details attendant upon these decisions remained to be
negotiated and agreed upon, and these were the major issues of the COP-7 meeting that
followed.
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco
At the COP-7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco October 29-November 10, 2001,
negotiators in effect completed the work of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, finalizing most
of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the Protocol. The United
States delegation continued to act as observers, declining to participate in active negotiations.
Other parties continued to express their hope that the United States would re-engage in the
process at some point, but indicated their intention to seek ratification of the requisite
number of countries to bring the Protocol into force (55 countries representing 55% of
developed country emissions of carbon dioxide in 1990). A target date for bringing the
Protocol into force was put forward–the August-September 2002 World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa. The main
decisions at COP-7 included: operational rules for international emissions trading among
parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint implementation; a compliance regime that
outlines consequences for failure to meet emissions targets but defers to the parties to the
Protocol after it is in force to decide whether these consequences are legally binding;
accounting procedures for the flexibility mechanisms; and a decision to consider at COP-8
how to achieve to a review of the adequacy of commitments that might move toward
discussions of future developing country commitments.
As noted above, the number of countries that had ratified as of July 12, 2002, was 75,
including 21 of those with binding emissions reductions obligations. [The European Union
and its member countries ratified the Protocol on May 31, 2002.] These 21 countries
represent some 36% of the 1990 emissions baseline. Thus, additional Annex B countries
CRS-11

IB89005
02-25-03
representing an additional 19% of the 1990 baseline would be needed to allow the Protocol
to enter into force.
Congressional Interest and Activities
In the 107th Congress, the key piece of climate change legislation was the Senate
version of H.R. 4, the comprehensive energy bill. This version would have established an
Office of National Climate Change Policy to develop a climate change response strategy.
Further, the Senate version of H.R. 4 would have, among other things, established a
voluntary greenhouse gas database and promoted research and development on climate
change. The House version of the bill contained reauthorization language for EPA's climate-
related programs. The Congress adjourned without reconciling these bills. It is expected that
a new version of a comprehensive energy bill will be introduced in the 108th Congress. Bills
were also introduced in the 107th Congress to regulate the emissions of sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, mercury, and carbon dioxide. These “multi-pollutant” bills are also
expected to be reintroduced in the 108th Congress. For more information on multi-pollutant
legislation, see CRS Report RL31326, Air Quality: Multi-Pollutant Legislation.
On January 8, 2003, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
held a hearing on a greenhouse gas reduction and emissions trading system. Further hearings
on this and other climate change-related topics are expected.
LEGISLATION
A number of bills on energy issues are relevant to climate change, especially those with
provisions encouraging or authorizing energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, but
are not included in this list unless they directly deal with climate change, per se, and go
beyond simply referencing climate/emissions side benefits. For additional information on
climate-relevant energy legislation not included in the list below, see the Legislation section
of CRS Issue Brief IB10041, Renewable Energy: Tax Credit, Budget and Electricity
Production Issues
; and the Legislation section of CRS Issue Brief IB10020, Energy
Efficiency: Budget, Oil Conservation, and Electricity Conservation Issues.

S. 17 (Daschle)
Establishes a mandatory greenhouse gas database. In addition, it establishes a
commission to help implement the UNFCCC. Authorizes $2 billion annually in grants to
state and local governments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It does not mandate
emissions reductions. Introduced January 7, 2003.
S. 139 (Lieberman)
Requires any entity that emits more than 10,000 metric tons of greenhouse gases
(carbon dioxide equivalent) to reduce emissions to year 2000 levels by 2010, and 1990 levels
by 2016. Allows: tradeable credits for reductions beyond those required, reductions from
non-covered entities, increases in carbon sequestration, increases in passenger vehicle fuel
economy, and emissions reductions in other countries. Introduced January 9, 2003.
CRS-12

IB89005
02-25-03
S. 194 (Corzine)
Establishes mandatory greenhouse gas registries, but does not require emission
reductions. Introduced January 17, 2003.
CRS-13