Order Code RS21055
Updated February 13, 2003
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
NATO Enlargement
Paul E. Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement, then
analyzes recent events. The report analyzes the key military and political issues that
affect the current debate over seven prospective members named at NATO’s Prague
summit. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia on
enlargement, citing the important potential effects of the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of recent legislation on
enlargement. This report will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RS21354, The
NATO Summit at Prague, 2002, and CRS Report RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A
Status Report.
Background
Congress is now considering enlargement of NATO, an issue addressed at the allied
summit in Prague, in November 2002. During the last round of enlargement, the Senate
voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is necessary to admit new states
because enlargement is considered an amendment to the original North Atlantic Treaty.)
Other members of the alliance followed suit, and the three countries became members in
March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had admitted new states, with
membership increasing from the original 12 to 19 today.
At the previous NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were
open to further enlargement. They created a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining
structured goals for candidates, such as ending the danger of ethnic conflict, developing
a democratic society with transparent political and economic processes and civilian
control of the military, and pledging commitment to defense budgets to build military
forces able to contribute to missions from collective defense to peacekeeping.1
1 Washington Summit Communiqué, paragraph 7, NATO. April 24, 1999.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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At Prague, on November 21, 2002, the current members’ heads of state designated
the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and
Romania, as prospective members.
The Current Debate
In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as
costs, mission, and qualifications of the candidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly
been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary does not
appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries
have contributed to stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions
to the alliance in such matters as enhancing NATO’s understanding of central and eastern
Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members’ involvement with
these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes
forces to the NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend
its borders. Pentagon officials believe that Poland has made the greatest strides in
restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have
made considerably less progress.2 It should be noted that a period of years is normally
necessary to rebuild a military that has had an authoritarian tradition and convert it to one
having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform its training, and purchase
equipment compatible with a new set of allies.
There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate
states until democratic processes are firmly entrenched. For example, the recent
Hungarian government of Victor Orban was criticized for an ethnic “status law” that some
interpreted as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states having
Hungarian minorities.3 Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely
elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing more than a passing example of
nationalist politics before a close election. Nonetheless, it is possible that the period
between naming candidate states for accession negotiations at Prague in November 2002
and the moment when current NATO member governments decide whether to admit those
candidates (such as the vote in the U.S. Senate), could see debates over whether each
candidate continues to meet criteria for democracy, particularly if there is an election
bringing in a government that member states view as extremist.
Another factor for consideration could prove to be a prospective member’s efforts
to persuade its people that NATO membership is desirable. In Slovenia, for example, the
government supports enlargement, but public support for membership has fallen to under
50% as of November 2002. The Slovenian government is likely to hold a referendum on
NATO and EU membership on March 23, 2003. Some current member governments
believe that the Slovenian government has made minimal efforts to convince its
population of the value of NATO membership.
2 “NATO Pushes Czechs on Arms,” International Herald Tribune, Feb. 22, 2001, p. 5; and
Jeffrey Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum,
June 2000.
3 Jackson Diehl, “New NATO, Old Values,” Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p. A19.

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The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no
apparent consensus. The seven candidates that received invitations at Prague have begun
negotiations with NATO for membership; two candidates, Albania and Macedonia, did
not receive invitations.4 Each of these countries is small, with comparably small
militaries potentially capable of specialized functions, such as transport or medical care,
for example, but only minimally capable of building forces able to contribute to high-
intensity conflict. In the view of some observers, to adhere to the letter of the military
qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit communiqué, requiring new members to
contribute to missions from peacekeeping to collective defense, would be tantamount to
excluding their entry.
Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect
the current political situation in Europe, where Russia is no longer a military threat but
ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In such circumstances, they
contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border
defense and to peace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell
seemed to suggest such a standard in his confirmation hearing when he stressed a need
for candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen their democratic structures.5
An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all
with an agreement on what types of out-of-area threats, such as terrorism, proliferation,
or a disruption of the flow of oil, should be met with a possible military response. At that
point, enlargement should be considered, with a determination about which prospective
members might contribute to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about
enlargement, note that the United States flew over 60 percent of combat missions in the
Kosovo conflict. They prefer prospective members that could relieve the U.S. burden.
Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense
(high-intensity conflict undertaken in response, for example, to the attacks of September
11, 2001) and collective security (peace operations and humanitarian assistance). In this
view, countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and
preventing “black holes,” such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root.
Countries involved in peace operations, then, are contributing to the prevention of
terrorism, and thereby to collective defense.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting
the enlargement debate. A likely part of the enlargement debate will be how prospective
members might contribute to the conflict against terrorism or act to stem the flow of
weapons of mass destruction. NATO seemed partially to settle one aspect of the debate
over its mission shortly after the attacks when member states invoked Article V, the
alliance’s collective defense clause, to come to the aid of the United States in the conflict
against terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any statement that Article
V should be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism. At a NATO ministerial
meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, the allies agreed that they must be able “to carry out
4 For a review of developments in 9 states seeking admission to NATO, see CRS Report
RL30168, NATO Applicant States: A Status Report, by Steven Woehrel, Julie Kim, and Carl Ek.
5 Confirmation hearing of Colin Powell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1st sess., 107th
Congress, Jan. 18, 2001.

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the full range of... missions, ... to field forces wherever they are needed, sustain operations
over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”6
However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained
forces for the current tasks in Afghanistan, for example. Few allies besides the United
States have special forces with the potential to contribute meaningfully to the conflict.
At the same time, a number of allies have an intelligence capability, transport, medical
units, and political influence that might assist in the conflict. It is possible that future
aspects of the conflict against terrorism will require larger, more conventional forces,
depending upon the location and terrain where terrorists base themselves, or if the
government of a state should fall into the hands of terrorists.
As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine how prospective
members might be able to contribute. Contributions might include political influence and
support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia or Muslim states, and not
simply or necessarily military potential. They might also examine the level of internal
security in the candidate countries and ability to control borders, disrupt terrorist financial
networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on their soil. Elements of the MAP that
emphasize an end to corruption may be increasingly underscored, given the post-
September 11 importance of preventing money-laundering, and combating a black
economy.
Since late 2002, the alliance has experienced sharp divisions over whether to use
military force against Iraq should it fail to destroy stocks of weapons of mass destruction.
In January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the decision of the 7 candidate
states (and others) to sign a letter that, in general, endorsed the U.S. position on Iraq; the
Administration at the same time criticized France, Germany, and Belgium for blocking
NATO efforts to provide preliminary allied assistance to Turkey, in the event of an attack
by Iraq. Some candidates state representatives complained that they had been bullied by
the Administration into signing the letter. Officials from some governments are privately
questioning the wisdom, particularly of the United States, France, and Germany, of
pursuing a highly public argument over allied unity, rather than working quietly to build
a consensus over Iraq in NATO and in the UN Security Council.7
Views of the Allies
The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998,
several European allies strongly supported enlargement. Today, most member states
couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms.
Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in
addition, Hungary urges Slovenia’s membership, once NATO criteria for entry are met,
for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any other NATO state. Slovenia’s
entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear
advantage given neutral Austria’s refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO
6 Communiqué, NATO Ministerial, May 14, 2002.
7 “Lock horns,” Financial Times, Feb. 10, 2003; interviews of officials in allied governments.

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overflights to Hungary. A weakness of Slovenia’s candidacy, already mentioned, is its
population guarded support for NATO membership. Slovakia is a credible candidate in
some NATO capitals, given the return in September 2002 elections of key elements of its
reform government. Some northern European allies, such as Poland, strongly support
membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic states have met OSCE and
EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries’ work to build stability
in the region and to establish better relations with Russia. U.S. officials state that the
Baltic states have made the most progress in meeting MAP requirements, although there
is some criticism of how Latvia has handled sensitive documents.
Italy, Greece, and Turkey are strong supporters of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry.
They contend that these two countries can contribute to stability in the Balkans, where
Europe’s greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that Romania and Bulgaria continue
to suffer from corruption in their governing structures, and that each must make stronger
efforts to modernize its military. Bulgaria has also had a succession of governments that
have followed an uncertain course towards political and economic reform.
The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Germany and several
allies, such as France, had held the view until recently that NATO enlargement and the
U.S. missile defense program had antagonized Moscow, and that a new round of
enlargement would only contribute more tension to the Russia-NATO equation. Putin’s
softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since the September 11 terrorist attacks has
allayed concerns in Berlin and Paris over Russia’s reaction. It is possible that Putin now
views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow’s ongoing conflict in
Chechnya, as more important than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement.
The Duma and much of Russia’s military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly
opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a military alliance
closer to their territory. Officials from allied states often counter such an argument by
underscoring that enlargement’s purpose in large part is to ensure stability in Europe, and
that the addition of new member states provides stability, and therefore security, to
Russia’s west. Putin may also view the entry of Estonia and Latvia into NATO (and the
EU, in 2004) as a means to protect Russian minorities in those countries, given NATO
and EU strictures over the treatment of ethnic minorities.
Congressional Views
NATO enlargement is likely to be an important issue in the 108th Congress. Some
individual Members have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has been
introduced. In the 107th Congress, Rep. Shimkus and others introduced H.Con.Res. 116,
which calls for NATO invitations to the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit,
as long as they satisfy the alliance’s qualifications. It passed by voice vote on October 7,
2002.
On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both Houses supporting further
enlargement. Representative Bereuter introduced H.R. 3167, the Freedom Consolidation
Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert and others cosponsored the bill. An identical Senate bill, S.
1572, with cosponsors including Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar, and McCain,
was also introduced. The bill recalled and approved legislation of the four previous
Congresses that urged enlargement and provided funding for particular candidates. The
bill designated Slovakia as eligible to receive U.S. assistance under section 203(a) of the

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NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of P.L. 103-447). This section gives the
President authority to establish a program of assistance with a government if he finds that
it meets the requirements of NATO membership.
In the 107th Congress, Representative Gallegly introduced H.Res. 468, which
describes NATO as key to U.S. interests in Europe and encourages a continued path of
improving relations with Russia. It strongly urges invitations to membership for the 7
countries ultimately invited at Prague. It passed the House 358-9 on October 7, 2002.
War with Iraq could influence the enlargement debate. Some countries, such as
Romania, are quietly indicating that they may send forces to fight with the United States;
officials from Latvia, given its rapid recovery from years of Soviet occupation, may
provide assistance and advice in returning civil society to a post-Hussein Iraq. Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld has stirred NATO waters by suggesting the presence of an “old” and
“new” Europe, the former consisting of such countries as France and Germany, the latter
consisting of recent new members and candidate states. Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested
that the alliance’s future belongs to the United States and the “new” Europe, with the
“old” Europe increasingly marginalized. European critics, some of them in the candidate
states, oppose such a categorization, noting that Germany has the largest economy in
Europe, and that only France, with Britain, has a military able to move its forces
considerable distances for engagement in combat. These critics express concern that a
divided NATO will not be effective in confronting threats that face each member state.8
Next Steps
In December 2002 NATO began accession negotiations with the 7 prospective
members. In the negotiations, NATO is requesting that specific steps be taken, such as
tightening of legislation handling classified information, stronger export controls on
sensitive weapons technologies, or removal of specific intelligence or military officials
with a checkered past. NATO officials expect accession negotiations to be completed by
March 26, 2003. At that point, formal documents (“protocols”) will be sent to the 19
member states, each of which will follow its constitutional procedures to amend the North
Atlantic Treaty to admit new members. All 19 members must agree on a prospective
member’s qualifications for it to enter NATO. The Bush Administration would like for
the Senate to vote on enlargement before that August 2003 recess. NATO hopes to admit
the successful candidates in May 2004.
8 Interviews of officials in allied states, January-February 2003.

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