Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress

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Raymond W. Copson (Coordinator)
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
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Summary

On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” During January 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, amid reports that U.S. forces would be ready to launch a war by mid-February or early March. President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have indicated that Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors. However, the inspectors themselves, with leaders of France, Germany, and other countries, are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time. The Administration asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Skeptics, including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is exaggerating the Iraqi threat.

In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). Some Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Administration consultation on Iraq, and suggested that the Administration should provide more information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early military action. Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly, and have compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.

Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation in Iraq after any war. U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the country that could last 18 months or longer. Whether the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein leads to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East, or promotes instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue in debate. The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial humanitarian crisis, including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend on the length of the conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.

Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization. International legal issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war. Estimates of the cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale of the fighting and the length of any occupation. If war leads to a spike in the price of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.

This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues. See the CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related products, which are highlighted throughout this report. This report also provides links to other sources of information and updated approximately one each week.
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Most Recent Developments

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has weapons of mass destruction programs. Powell released information from audio intercepts, human intelligence sources, and satellite reconnaissance in describing Iraq’s “active and systematic efforts” to evade U.N. weapons inspections. The Secretary added that “Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing until something stops him.” Later, representatives of France, China, and Russia called for the inspections to continue, and France argued for significantly strengthening the inspection team. Secretary Powell also described what he said was a “sinister nexus” between the Al Qaeda terror movement and Baghdad. According to the Secretary, an Al Qaeda group had been given safe haven in northern Iraq and was coordinating its activities from Baghdad.

The Washington Post reported on February 5 that Kuwait was setting aside the northern half of the country as of February 15 for possible U.S. military operations against Iraq. In a rare televised interview on February 4, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein denied that his country had any weapons of mass destruction or links to Al Qaeda terrorists. British Prime Minister Tony Blair met with French President Jacques Chirac on February 4 but reportedly failed to persuade the French leader to support early action against Iraq.

Reports on February 3 indicated that Hans Blix, chief U.N. weapons inspector, and Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Agency, would travel to Baghdad on the weekend of February 8 for meetings with Iraqi government officials. Blix said on February 4 that he would be seeking clear measures from the Iraqi government to fully detail its weapons of mass destruction programs. Blix wants Iraq to accede to reconnaissance flights in support of inspections, which Iraq has been resisting. U.S. officials reportedly do not support the Blix-ElBaradei mission.

White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 2 that the space shuttle disaster of February 1 would not affect U.S. planning on Iraq. On January 31, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair held a joint press conference following a meeting on Iraq. The Prime Minister expressed his country’s preference for a new Security Council resolution on Iraq specifically authorizing military action. President Bush said that any debate about such a resolution “needs to be resolved quickly. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimated on January 29 that post-war rebuilding in Iraq would cost $30 billion in the first three years.
Overview
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated February 5, 2003)

Background. Bush Administration concerns about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programs intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil” nations in his January 2002 State of the Union address. Vice President Cheney, in two August 2002 speeches, accused Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons of mass destruction to dominate the Middle East and threaten U.S. oil supplies.1 These speeches fueled speculation that the United States might act unilaterally against Iraq. However, in a September 12, 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2 H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with its resolutions. On November 8, 2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”

Recent Developments. During January 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts indicated that U.S. forces would be positioned to launch an attack on Iraq by mid-February or early March. Officials maintained that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of summer, but military experts observed that conditions for fighting a war would be far better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and other top officials during January and early February expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with Security Council disarmament demands. The President said on January 14, that “time is

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running out” for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was “sick and tired” of its “games and deceptions.” On January 26, 2003, Secretary of State Powell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos, Switzerland, that “multilateralism cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the United States “continues to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing.” Powell also told the Davos meeting that there are “clear ties” between Iraq and terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda.

President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2003. “With nuclear arms of a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the region.” The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours may lie ahead.” Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the world.

Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed confrontation remains limited. Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, in a report to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, was much harsher than had been expected with respect to Iraqi noncompliance with Security Council demands. (See below, Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues.) Nonetheless, many Security Council members, including France, Russia, and China, have urged giving the inspections process more time. Whether a majority of the Council would support a new Council resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq remains in question.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair argues that such resolution should be sought, while continuing to give strong support to U.S. policy. Many other foreign governments and observers are concerned, however, that U.N. inspectors have yet to find a “smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections is to verify whether or not Iraq has disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions. Iraq has not pro-actively cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there has been no such verification.

Large public demonstrations against a possible war with Iraq occurred in the United States and in cities overseas on the weekend of January 19-20. At that time, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the support of allies before the United States launched a war against Iraq. The polls shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with a majority coming to favor a war even without

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explicit U.N. approval. Nonetheless, many remain opposed to war. Forty-one Nobel laureates in science and economics released a declaration opposing war on January 27, and former President Jimmy Carter said on January 31 that President Bush has “not made a case for a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq.”7 (For congressional views, see below, Congressional Action.)

Options for the Future. Whether the Administration will choose to launch a war against Iraq without broader international support remains to be seen. Some may urge that policymakers accede to wishes of Security Council members who want the arms inspection process to be given more time. Others argue that this approach would reward Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics, and that there would be serious economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large U.S. military force in the Middle East indefinitely. It may be that dramatic evidence of Iraqi non-compliance will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring stronger international backing for a war. Another view is that if U.S. action against Iraq comes to appear inevitable, other countries, such as Russia and France, will offer support in order to retain some influence with Washington.

According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite their denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.8 However, many analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move. Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power, but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too firm to permit such an event.

Military Situation
Steve Bowman, 7-7613
(Last updated February 4, 2003)

The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq. The Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of the troop movements underway. The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted, are not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.

The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore and afloat) is reportedly approaching 90,000, and of these, approximately 45,000 are ground troops. The deployment is reportedly expected to reach over 150,000 some

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time in February. Another 100,000 personnel may be placed on alert for later deployment should that be required. DOD has announced that, as of January 22, 2003, there are 78,906 National Guard and Reservists from all services now called to active duty, an increase of over 20,000 in one week. In addition to U.S. deployments, Britain is deploying an armor Battle Group with 27,000 personnel to the Persian Gulf region.

The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With the possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Outside of the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark, and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security

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Council does not act further. The White House press office announced in November 2002 that the United States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in military operations against Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on responses. The United States has also approached NATO Headquarters concerning the use of certain NATO assets (e.g., AWACS aerial command aircraft). NATO postponed action on the request, and French and German opposition to military action against Iraq at this time makes a NATO commitment appear problematic in the near term. Negotiations continue with Turkey over possible U.S. troop deployments and the use of Turkish airbases. No clear commitment has been obtained, but U.S. personnel have been allowed to begin surveying some Turkish airfields to determine their potential usefulness for U.S. operations.

Though Administration spokesmen continue to maintain that no final decision has been made regarding the use of force, press reports speculate that late February is currently seen as the most likely time-frame for the onset of military operations. This would permit the completion of a large force deployment, with the possibility of completing operations before the arrival of Iraqi summer weather.

News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the *National Strategy for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S. or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions. Though shown to the press, NSPD 17 remains classified and Administration spokesmen have declined comment on its content. The *National Strategy* document does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all options.” Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat. Critics are concerned that the Administration is significantly lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-held U.S. assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear power.

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**CRS Product**

Diplomatic Situation
Carol Migdalovitz (7-2667)
(Last updated February 4, 2003)

Developments at the United Nations. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” under previous resolutions, and set up an enhanced inspection regime to bring about the “full and verified completion of the disarmament process.” Iraq was required to submit, within 30 days, “a declaration of all aspects of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems....” It also was required to provide the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional access” to all sites they wish to inspect. Inspections began on November 27.

On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted a 12,000-page declaration. On January 9, 2003, Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, appeared at the Security Council with Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, and observed that the Iraqi declaration, “is rich in volume but poor in new information about weapons issues ....” Blix added that although Iraq had “failed to answer a great many questions,” inspectors had not found “any smoking guns.”14 He and ElBaradei went to Baghdad on January 18-20 to consult with Iraqi officials.

On January 27, Blix reported to the Security Council that Iraq had not come to a “genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it.” He called for cooperation on substance, not just on process. He stated that Iraq had failed to account for anthrax, VX precursor chemicals, and 6,500 chemical bombs as well as discrepancies in its reporting on missiles. He said that Iraq had refused to guarantee the safety of U.N. U-2 surveillance planes, submit data on its arms inspections, or consent to private interviews with scientists. ElBaradei reported that inspectors had “found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons program” and asked for a few more months of inspections. Blix later said that he had not asked for more time because he did not feel confident that it would bring about significant advances. Blix and ElBaradei will travel to Baghdad on February 8-9 and report to the Council again on February 14.

After the report, French, Russian, Chinese, German, and other officials called for continuing inspections, while the British said that Iraq clearly was in “material breach” of its obligations to the U.N. French President Jacques Chirac also asserted that “Iraq’s cooperation must improve.”15 Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that his country may change its position if Iraq creates problems for the inspectors.16

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Foreign Reactions. The buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf region has prompted growing debate about the Iraq situation and its ramifications. Differences have deepened in Europe. First, Germany and France called for restraint. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said that his government could not vote for resolution authorizing war. French President Jacques Chirac called for every decision to be made by the Security Council, and his Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said that French military intervention would come only after “a showing that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and will under no circumstances eliminate them.” A Gallup poll conducted in 10 EU member states in January found that over 50% of those asked did not favor war in any circumstances.\(^{17}\)

On January 30, the leaders of Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain seemed to respond to the French and Germans in a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed piece, cautioning “The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty to the current Iraqi regime’s attempts to threaten world security....” They called for unity in insisting that Saddam Hussein’s regime be disarmed and that the Security Council “maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions.” Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, current holder of the rotating European Union presidency, reflected the views of some other EU members when he criticized the column because it was written without consultation and did not help Europe have “a strong voice in the world.”\(^{18}\) On February 3, Prime Minister Tony Blair said again that if inspectors report continuing Iraqi noncompliance, then there should be a second U.N. resolution declaring Iraq in breach and authorizing use of force. He would support military action if there were “an unreasonable blockage” of such a resolution, impliedly by a French veto.

Unease also prevails in the Middle East, where leaders are concerned that war would increase instability and terrorism and bring undesired results. Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul asserted that his government wants the crisis to end without war but that “the prime responsibility for a peaceful solution lies with the Iraq leadership.”\(^{19}\) President Hosni Mubarak also declared that a resolution of the crisis depended on the behavior of the Baghdad government. Saudi Foreign Minister Sa’ud said that should the U.N. decide to use force “we hope that there would be a grace period left for Arab countries to intervene and resolve the crisis peacefully.”\(^{20}\) There are unconfirmed reports that Arab governments are trying to negotiate a deal for Saddam Hussein to go into exile, but these have been denied.

Peace Initiatives. There are no major peace initiatives at present, but there is considerable diplomatic activity. A meeting chaired by Turkey with the foreign

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\(^{19}\) Address by Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg on January 27, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document EUP20030127000449.

ministers of Syria, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in Istanbul on January 23, called on Iraq to display “a more active approach” in providing information “in full conformity” with 1441. Foreign Minister George Papandreou of Greece, is now leading an EU mission to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to encourage them to be more active in mediating between the United States and Iraq. His Arab interlocutors, however, advised Papandreou that Saddam is not convinced that war is imminent. South Africa, current chair of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Africa Union said that it will send an envoy to urge Saddam Hussein to cooperate with U.N. inspectors.

U.S. Policy

The Administration
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated February 4, 2003)

The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the Middle East region. Iraq’s WMD programs, according to the Administration, could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s long-term goal of dominating the Middle East, they could be used directly against the United States, or they could be transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration says that the United States cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront Iraq, since Iraq would then be stronger and the United States might have fewer military and diplomatic options. The Administration asserts that Iraq is in breach of 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions – including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 – that, among other requirements, mandate that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. President Bush has stated that Iraq must immediately and pro-actively cooperate with a new U.N. disarmament effort, or the United States will lead a coalition to disarm it.

Policy Debate. Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions within the Administration on Iraq policy. Secretary of State Powell had been said to typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program of unfettered

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21 Six States’ Communique, MENA, FBIS Document GMP20030123000272.
weapons inspections could succeed in containing the WMD threat from Iraq. He reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally. However, as of late January 2003, Secretary Powell has said Iraq’s failure to fully cooperate with the latest weapons inspections indicate that inspections would not succeed in disarming Iraq and that war may be required, with or without U.N. authorization. The Secretary is reportedly highly critical in private of U.S. allies, particularly France, that oppose war with Iraq. Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, among others, have consistently been skeptical that inspections can significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in favor of military action against Iraq. These and other U.S. officials reportedly believe that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. Those who favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active WMD programs and will eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States unless it is completely disarmed. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that the Administration is exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an attack might goad Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.

In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda organization, among other terrorist groups. According to the Administration, Iraq has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime. A faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration. President Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.” However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was not uniform within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence community discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie as only a possibility. Another view is that there may have been occasional tactical cooperation between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq intelligence agents. Others are said to believe that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off later on, after bin Laden was expelled from in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.

Regime Change Goal. The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq under a U.N. umbrella has led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime. The purpose of downplaying this goal may be to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note that regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq. However, in practice, the United States draws little separation between regime change and disarmament;

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the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad would be required to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD. Press reports in October 2002 said that the Administration is recruiting an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using equipment and training funds ($92 million remaining) authorized by the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This force, which will undergo training at an air base in Hungary, could support a U.S. attack or work on its own to destabilize Saddam Hussein. The Administration is working with Iraqi exile groups to determine future policies and priorities in a post-Saddam Iraq as part of its “Future of Iraq Project.”

**CRS Products**


**Congressional Action**

**Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687**

*(Last updated February 4, 2003)*

Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991, Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L. 102-1).

On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.” The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. The statute conferred broad authority on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expressed Congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the level of consultation and communication between Congress and the White House since the signing of P.L. 107-243. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle has stated that the Bush
Administration has failed to report to Congress on its diplomatic efforts and military preparations within 60 days, as he said was required by P.L. 107-243. In response, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not believe that the resolution required a written report, and that his verbal briefings should suffice. Over the past few weeks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell have given several closed-door briefings to Members of Congress. After the briefings, some Members have commented that the Administration has evidence on Iraq’s weapons programs “that can change people’s minds.” Other lawmakers have commented that the evidence against Iraq is less compelling, characterizing it as a “building block in making the case for going forward.” Some Members have asked that the Administration give weapons inspectors in Iraq more time, and several later commented that the Administration should do a better job of explaining why Iraq poses an immediate threat to the United States. On January 30, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Iraq. Senator Joseph Biden urged the Bush Administration to “make it easier” for international allies to join the United States in pressuring Iraq to comply with United Nations resolutions.

Since the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers have drafted several resolutions relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. In early January, Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee introduced H.Con.Res. 2, which called on Congress to repeal the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.” The Jackson-Lee resolution has been referred to the Committee on International Relations. After the President’s January 29 State of the Union Address, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced S.Res. 32 stating the sense of the Senate that the President should seek new legislation authorizing the use of force to disarm Iraq. S.Res. 28, sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd, states the sense of the Senate that weapons inspectors be given sufficient time to carry out their tasks in Iraq and that the Administration should seek a United Nations Security Council resolution specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Both resolutions have been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Biden has resubmitted legislation (S. 205), which passed the Senate in November 2002, on the granting of visas and the admission of residency to Iraqi scientists, who would be willing to provide the United States with vital information on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The bill has been placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar.

Following a war or significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will likely seek to influence future internal political and economic developments in that country. Congress may be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq. The extent and cost of U.S. programs would depend on the post-war scenario. The Administration

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26 Ibid.

may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to support coalition partners in the Middle East, who may suffer economically in the event of regional instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of assistance specific to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) that authorized aid to the former Soviet Union or the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress will have to weigh aid to Iraq against other budget priorities.

### CRS Products


### Issues for Congress

#### Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues

**Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745**  
*Last updated February 4, 2003*

Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put forward for the use of U.S. military forces. Iraq had varying capabilities in all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War. The inspections conducted between 1991 and 1998 destroyed or otherwise eliminated much of those capabilities, but certain aspects of the programs that were unresolved in 1998 remain so today. In addition, current inspections seek to uncover what Iraq might have produced since 1998.

**Nuclear Program.** Iraq had a well-financed and broad-based nuclear weapons program but did not succeed in producing enough fissile material for a weapon before the 1991 Gulf War shut down the program. On January 27, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the U.N. Security Council that inspectors had found no sign of a renewal of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, questions remain about Iraq’s nuclear weapons design work, the alleged procurement of uranium from Niger (which Iraq denies) and scientists’ work on nuclear-weapons-related projects. Bush Administration officials have also pointed to Iraq’s procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes as evidence of a clandestine program to produce weapons-grade uranium with centrifuges, but ElBaradei disputed that conclusion, stating that Iraq’s reported use of the material for conventional rockets seemed credible.

**Biological and Chemical Weapons Program.** Much less is known about Iraq's biological weapons program. Iraq apparently produced anthrax, aflatoxin and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Questions remain about the production and destruction of anthrax, although new information on biotechnology developments since 1998 was included in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 weapons declaration to the
United Nations Security Council. Iraq’s capabilities in chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, in contrast, are well known. Iraq produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). While inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals in inspections from 1991 to 1998, significant questions remain. For example, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors are still unknown, as are Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent. In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced 4 tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it had imported enough precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons. There is also evidence that VX agent was weaponized, although Iraq has not declared this. In October 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Iraq had renewed chemical weapons production and probably had stockpiled a few hundred tons of agent. In addition, the discovery in late January 2003 of 16 empty chemical munitions shells not previously declared points to further discrepancies in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration of all its capabilities.

**Missile Program.** Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production capabilities prior to the Gulf War, but much of this was destroyed during that war and in inspections from 1991 to 1998. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles remained after the war and inspectors accounted for all but two. Iraq is permitted to produce missiles with ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in producing Ababil and Samoud missiles of permitted ranges. In its December 7 declaration, Iraq admitted that some flight tests of those missiles did exceed the 150km-range by 50km. U.S. analysts believe that Iraq may be concealing 12 Scud missiles and is manufacturing propellant for longer-range missiles. Key unresolved issues include documentation of missile programs, the fate of 300 tons of special missile propellant, and indigenous missile production.

**Inspections Status.** The U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA conducted over 400 inspections between mid-November 2002 and mid-January 2003. Both UNMOVIC and the IAEA repeatedly have stressed that Iraq must actively cooperate with the investigation and voluntarily provide accurate information. Since November 2002, few new details have been uncovered through inspections, apart from the discovery in mid-January of empty chemical weapons shells not previously declared and of 2000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private home.

In his report to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, 2003, Chairman Blix distinguished between cooperation on process and on substance. On the first, Blix said that Iraq has cooperated “rather well,” but then detailed areas in which cooperation on substance was lacking. He suggested specifically that Iraq needed to cooperate in finding items and activities (e.g., 122mm chemical warheads); in finding documents, particularly those in private homes; in providing names of personnel; and in ensuring that interviews are credible. Director General ElBaradei’s report noted that inspections since November 2002 have identified no prohibited nuclear activities but urged states to continue to provide intelligence information. ElBaradei specifically suggested that the inspection process “should be allowed to run its natural course” and that credible assurances could be provided within the next few months. The Bush Administration has interpreted the January 27 report as a
definitive statement of UNMOVIC and the IAEA’s findings to date, and the White House spokesman has said that the “report...clearly shows Iraq is not complying.” Blix and ElBaradei will report again to the U.N. Security Council on February 14, 2003.

**Secretary Powell’s Address.** On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council and shared significant information related to Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions. These included audiotapes of Iraqi military officers discussing hiding modified vehicles from inspectors and orders to eliminate talk of “nerve agents” in wireless communications. Secretary Powell shared anecdotes regarding documents in cars driven by Iraqi intelligence officers, the removal of hard drives from computers, and the sanitizing of the sprawling presidential palaces of traces of WMD. These anecdotes were derived from human intelligence sources. Secretary Powell also showed satellite photos of bulldozed chemical weapons sites and the removal of telltale vehicles and equipment from chemical weapons bunkers at the Taji facility before the December 22, 2002 inspections. In addition, Secretary Powell cited four human intelligence sources with regard to the existence of about 18 mobile biological weapons laboratories. Powell noted that it would be virtually impossible to find these mobile labs without Iraqi cooperation. In the nuclear area, Secretary Powell reported on Iraqi attempts to procure magnets and high-speed balancing machines from companies in Romania, India, Russia, and Slovenia to support assertions that Iraq is pursuing a centrifuge uranium enrichment program. With respect to missiles, Secretary Powell reported that Iraq had continued to import SA-2 rocket engines as late as December 2002 but did not provide further evidence. Finally, Secretary Powell showed a satellite photograph depicting a racetrack-shaped flight path of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was tested for a distance of 500km without refueling. Iraq’s December 7 declaration had claimed that its UAVs had ranges of just 80 kms.

**CRS Products**

| CRS Report RS21376, *Iraq: WMD-Capable Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).* |

**Post-War Iraq**

**Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612**

*Last updated January 21, 2003*

**Background.** The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation of and instability in a post-Saddam Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current debate over Iraq policy. One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could dissolve into chaos. It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims,
the majority but under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Because of the complexities of planning for a post-war Iraq, and the potential for major inter-ethnic and factional feuding if Saddam falls, some observers believe that the Bush Administration would prefer that Saddam Hussein be replaced by a military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. Administration statements, however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq. Some regional governments that fear destabilizing effects on their own regimes from a war, including Saudi Arabia, are said to be trying to persuade Saddam to go into exile in order to prevent war.

Current Planning Efforts. The Administration is planning for a post-Saddam regime. The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N. resolutions. Some press reports say that the Administration is planning for an approximately 18 month occupation of Iraq led primarily by U.S. military officials, working in concert with Iraqis to build a democratic post-war Iraq. Other reports indicate that some military planners would prefer that the United Nations and U.S. allies play a major role in governing post-war Iraq on an interim basis. In September 2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that U.S. occupation force levels would range between 75,000 and 200,000 personnel, at a cost of $1 billion to $4 billion per month. (See below, Cost Issues.)

The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. The opposition groups that have been active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power after Saddam is overthrown.

As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor government. The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1) transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human services; and (7) economy and infrastructure. Phase two, which began in late 2002, includes working groups on (1) education; (2) refugees, internally-displaced persons,


and migration policy; (3) foreign and national security policy; (4) defense institutions and policy; (5) free media; (6) civil society capacity-building; (7) anti-corruption measures; and (8) oil and energy.

**Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects.** It is widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund reconstruction. However, many observers believe that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields. Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing from there in 1991. The Administration reportedly is planning to secure Iraq’s oil fields early in any offensive against Iraq to prevent this from happening. A related issue is long term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and which foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States will seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms of other countries. Some press reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such control, although some observers speculate that the Administration is seeking to create such an impression in order to persuade Russia that it has an interest in participating in a coalition against Iraq.

**War Crimes Trials.** An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate is whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes and, if so, whether that should be pursued while Saddam is still in power. The Administration reportedly has reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military action that overthrows Saddam, that he and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq. The Administration is gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates, but at the same time, some officials have indicated that Saddam and might be allowed a safe haven if he leaves Iraq voluntarily before a war.

**CRS Products**


30 “After Saddam, an Uncertain Future;” *Insight Magazine*, February 3, 2003


Burden Sharing  
Carl Ek (7-7286)  
(last updated February 5, 2003)

In November 2002, it was reported that the U.S. government had contacted the governments of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq. Press reports indicate that several governments have offered help of one kind or another; other countries, according to Bush Administration officials, also intend to support the war effort but, for domestic political reasons, would prefer not to publicize their contributions. Nevertheless, at present it appears unlikely that a coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will arise.

Political and Military Factors. On the international political front, analysts contend that the United States will seek to enlist allies in order to demonstrate that it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm Iraq has been endorsed by a broad global coalition. In most cases, foreign decisions to participate or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and further actions by the U.N. Security Council. Although the political leaders of some Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s aims, they must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their populations.

From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical. NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries. Allied combat and peacekeeping forces entered the fray in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been defeated. Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the utmost speed in command and communications. An opposing view is that the United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for allied consensus hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing target approval process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces conduct operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and night vision equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to achieve a swift victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.

Direct and Indirect Contributions. Britain, the only other country that has had warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to make contributions


of ground, air, and naval forces. Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it is believed that other countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada, may support coalition forces once a conflict begins. Washington and Prague have discussed the possibility of reinforcing Czech anti-chemical weapons specialists in Kuwait, where they have been stationed since March 2002. Japan, constitutionally barred from dispatching ground troops, reportedly may also help in the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, and has recently reinforced its fleet of naval vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean. Sweden and New Zealand have indicated that they might contribute medical support. Although the German government has said that it would not contribute troops to combat, Chancellor Schroeder has stated that German AWACS crews might help patrol the Turkish-Iraqi border in the event of a war.35

Other forms of support might prove valuable. For example, countries could grant fly-over rights, or back-fill for U.S. troops that might redeploy to Iraq from Central Asia or the Balkans. In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling, allow aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria have offered the use of their airbases and seaports. On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight privileges; the request was deferred.36 The Bush Administration has reportedly sought permission from the Turkish government to use Turkish bases and ports, and to move up to 75,000-80,000 U.S. troops through southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq; the response is still pending and is a key issue for U.S. planners. News reports on February 5, 2003, however, indicated that the Turkish Prime Minister would seek the permission of parliament for allowing U.S. troops to use Turkish bases. Subsequent reports indicated that Turkey might permit only a much smaller U.S. contingent due to domestic opposition to a war with Iraq. At the Bush Administration’s request, the Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training of up to 3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant interpreters and administrators.37


Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public statements, more than 90,000 U.S. troops currently are currently ashore or on ships in the region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers. Whether the United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in carrying out an attack on Iraq remains unclear. U.S. troops based in Kuwait would likely play a key role in any ground attack against Iraq.

**Post-conflict Assistance.** After the 1991 Gulf war, several nations – notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a war against Iraq. However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as peacekeeping forces. Japan, Sweden, and Romania have indicated that they might play a role.

### CRS Products


### Implications for the Middle East

**Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626**

*(Last updated February 4, 2003)*

A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and outcome – could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic pressures, stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and festering regional disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of the Middle East. Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along ethnic or sectarian lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional boundaries as occurred after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is highly unlikely; however, political realignments could take place, along with new alliances and rivalries that might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.

The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely, U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance, political support, or both. Turkey, which says it has lost billions of dollars in trade since sanctions were imposed against Iraq, is likely to press the United States for compensation if it agrees to allow U.S. forces to stage operations against Iraq from bases on Turkish territory. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, should it assent to U.S. use of its bases or facilities, would be likely to push for political concessions, including a stronger U.S. effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See below.)
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain the support or acquiescence of Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted Arab-Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region. Two other issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.

**Democracy and Governance.** Some commentators believe that a war with Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace” initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.

Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort to support democratization and development, although the Administration is requesting significantly more funding for this initiative—$145 million—in FY2004. Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups, who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the Middle East.

**Arab-Israeli Peacemaking.** The timing of further initiatives to move forward with Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been among the issues covered in recent debates over a possible war with Iraq. Administration officials and other commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more favorable climate in which Arab-Israeli issues can be addressed. Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in 1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Many believe that the then Bush Administration secured wide Arab participation in the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Officials of the present Bush Administration continue to speak of their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after eliminating current threats from Iraq, although the President alluded only briefly to this issue in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2003.

Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with ongoing violence between Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to the United States than a largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiation, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in anti-U.S. terrorism. Regardless of priority, however, it is likely that a war with Iraq will be followed by further pressures on the U.S. Administration to intensify its efforts to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.

**Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region.** Changed conditions in the Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of a war with Iraq could breathe new life into long moribund proposals for a Gulf regional security organization, perhaps with the participation of other U.S. regional allies in the region such as Egypt and Jordan. Over time, such an organization, if effective, might help alleviate burdens that currently devolve upon the United States in countering threats to regional stability and might also play a useful role in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, the departure of Saddam Hussein from the scene could remove a leading incentive for Gulf states to expand their involvement in regional security arrangements. Furthermore, a U.S.-led war that did not enjoy widespread acceptance among the Middle East populace might make local governments reluctant to participate in a regional organization if it were perceived as a U.S. creation. It is possible, too, that Gulf states would prefer to continue relying on their bilateral ties with the United States for security guarantees rather than moving toward a multilateral approach.

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38 A former high U.S. official described the “Arab street” as “explosive”; however, many observers point out that Middle East governments had little trouble containing incipient anti-U.S. demonstrations during the Gulf war in 1990-1991.
Humanitarian Issues
Rhoda Margesson, 7-0425
(Last updated February 4, 2003)

Background. Since the end of the 1991 war with Iraq, surveys and studies show a continuing decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian population, estimated at 27 million,\(^{39}\) especially among children and the elderly. But it is difficult to determine how much of the suffering is due to the sanctions imposed on Iraq and how much is due to other factors. Imposition of U.N. sanctions followed a nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran, during which spending on the social welfare system declined. Decades of conflict and the bombing during the Gulf war damaged or destroyed much of the public infrastructure such as water and sewage plants and many public buildings. Some argue that supplies of water, food, medicine, and electricity are a matter of urgent concern.\(^{40}\) However, much of the information available on the conditions within Iraq is also considered unreliable. Some groups question the accuracy of statistics publicized by the government, but have no independent sources of information. All estimates of the number of deaths due to lack of food or medical care vary widely based on the source.

U.N. and other humanitarian agencies provide aid to Iraq through the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and medicines for the civilian population.\(^{41}\) Both bilateral and multilateral aid have continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP. During the 1990s, the OFFP alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian situation (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains serious and has continued to deteriorate over time. Some improvements have been seen in nutrition, health services, water supply and sanitation, but there is now greater dependence on government services. Health and nutrition problems have been tied to the consequences of war, sanctions, shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate policies of the Iraqi regime.

War-Related Concerns. The implications of war in Iraq include a potential humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq itself. Four issues are of critical interest to Congress in that context. First, how the war will be fought and for how long; will it be a protracted, urban war with heavy civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi people? Second, what type of humanitarian assistance will be provided to displaced populations (aid priorities, use of oil revenues) and the role of other donors? Third, how will assistance programs be implemented—through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration,


\(^{40}\) “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of Possible US War.” *Turkish Daily News*, December 27, 2002.

\(^{41}\) For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) see CRS Report RL30472, *Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade* by Kenneth Katzman.
or U.N./donor assistance? And finally, what will be the impact of refugee flows on stability in the region and the role of neighboring countries in contributing to post-war efforts?

A U.N. Task Force assembled to coordinate the U.N. response to a possible conflict predicts a conflict in Iraq could cause 500,000 casualties, create 900,000 refugees, and displace 2 million people, leaving about 10 million Iraqi civilians (nearly 40% of the Iraqi population) in need of emergency assistance. However, U.S. military planners are reportedly planning a war strategy, including an initial precision bombing campaign, that will attempt to minimize civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure. The United Nations reportedly estimates that 4.5 million to 9.5 million Iraqis would need food soon after the onset of hostilities.

Refugees. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have publicly stated that they will prevent refugees from entering their countries. Iranian leaders have stated that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but refugees would be provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran in Afghanistan. However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in case. Turkey has said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and is planning to build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five more camps within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of 24,000 tents. The Red Crescent team is making preparations to accommodate up to 100,000 people and treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting. Kuwait’s government has said it will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that displaced people could be cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two countries. The government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees. According to relief agency officials, Jordanian authorities appear determined not to allow Iraqi refugees

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47 “Turkey to set up 24,000 tents at Iraq border for possible refugee influx,” Agence France-Presse, January 15, 2003; “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’ War.”
Aid Agency Planning. The United Nations has an extensive infrastructure in Iraq to oversee the OFFP. Few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have offices in Baghdad and only a handful have a presence in Iraq. The Iraqi regime restricts NGOs—for example, those that work in the North cannot have offices in the South. In addition, U.S.-based organizations are required by the U.S. Government to have a license to operate in Iraq. Among NGOs, there is a concern that U.S. and other military leaders have underestimated the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq. NGOs have also complained that the U.S. government has delayed approval of licenses required for U.S. agencies in Iraq, Iran, and Syria because of U.S. sanctions. As a result, according to Interaction (an alliance of U.S.-based international development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations), very few U.S. or international organizations are operating in and around Iraq, which means that they have no network in place and little experience in the area. Furthermore, according to NGOs, Pentagon officials have suggested that aid organizations should not expect to operate in much of Iraq for several months after a start of hostilities.

Some international organizations, such as the International Committee for the Red Cross, have stockpiled supplies in and around Iraq, but there is a reluctance to do this because these organizations do not want to send a message that they believe a conflict is inevitable. U.N. humanitarian agencies met with key donors in Geneva on December 13, 2002, to develop possible humanitarian scenarios and contingency plans. The United Nations has appealed for $37.4 million to provide humanitarian assistance and food, increase staffing for relief operations, and develop joint services for the aid community in Iraq. UNHCR has been putting together a contingency plan to address the potential for large-scale population movements. The United

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48 Ibid.
49 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has four offices inside Iraq, and works primarily with 100,000 Palestinians, 23,000 Iranians and 13,000 Turks— all of whom are refugees. “U.N. Seeks $37.4 million Humanitarian Supplies in Case of Iraq War.” Dow Jones International News, December 23, 2002.
Nations Department of Peacekeeping is reportedly planning to establish an office that could help with the coordination and distribution of humanitarian aid.56

**Potential Internal Humanitarian Consequences of War.** The United Nations has explored the ways in which the current poor humanitarian situation inside Iraq could worsen during a conflict.57 With more than two thirds of the country receiving food assistance and many suffering from malnutrition and other health problems, this situation could get worse if parts of Iraq became isolated and humanitarian agencies could not gain access to these areas. Food security is a critical concern in Iraq. Reportedly, families cannot make their rations last the full month or they need to sell part of it for other necessities–leaving them without any food stored in reserve and more vulnerable, particularly if food distribution were to be interrupted.58 Military destruction of roads or railways could also destroy the food distribution systems within Iraq and those from the international community. If power stations were hit, the already damaged water and sanitation systems could be further damaged, which could lead to epidemics, such as cholera and hepatitis. According to the United Nations, particularly with an increase in displaced populations “the outbreak of diseases in epidemic if not pandemic proportions is very likely.”59 Water and sanitation are of greatest concern. Shortages in medical supplies, drugs and vaccines have also been reported, and current stocks are predicted to last only 4 months at current consumption rates.

In the confusion of war or in the context of a power vacuum, some observers have suggested that Iraqis may initiate revenge killings and seek to resolve grievances through violence or some form of revolt. In 1991, some Shiites executed Baath party officials. Such an environment with a breakdown of the social order could have serious humanitarian impacts, such as large-scale deaths and serious human rights abuses, particularly towards women.60

Depending on the type of warfare, many Iraqis could suffer the unintended consequences of military action, or the effects of chemical and biological weapons if used by their government. If units of the Iraqi army took a scorched earth policy, as they did with the Kuwaiti oil wells in the Gulf War, there could be serious environmental and health consequences.

59 “Strictly Confidential U.N. Document.”
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, January 24, 2003)

The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises a number of domestic and international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; (3) the effect of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter; and (4) the implications of such a use of force for the numerous statutes providing special emergency powers to the President. The following subsections give brief overviews of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters in greater detail.

The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The potential use of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States ....” Because of these separate powers, and because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without congressional authorization. While all commentators agree that the President has the constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional.

The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires, inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with Congress regarding uses of force.

In the present circumstance these legal requirements have been met and any controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force avoided. As noted earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” As predicates for the use of
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not “adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent” with the battle against terrorism. P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is “intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It also requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” Finally, the statute expresses congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions; but it does not condition the use of force on prior Security Council authorization.

**International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.** In his speech to the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that objective.

Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the U.S. would be deemed legitimate under international law. International law traditionally has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues to be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right has also traditionally included the right to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate, preemption had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat.

In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to the movement of enemy armed forces. But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. As
a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to provide justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to be a lawful preemptive use of force.

Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter was intended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To that end it mandates that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they “settle their disputes by peaceful means ....” It also creates a system of collective security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace and security, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans. In addition, the Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the right of States to use force in self-defense.

Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N. authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable. It is at least arguable that the authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect. In the wake of a number of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678, adopted November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In Resolution 687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including unconditional Iraqi disarmament, and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire. Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including Resolution 678. It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.

Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990. On November 8, 2002, in

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the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi compliance with that resolution. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if it continued to fail to meet its obligations. The resolution obligates the Council to “convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise fail to meet its disarmament obligations.

**Cost Issues**

**Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627**

*(Last updated February 4, 2003)*

Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using regular FY2003 funding. The Administration is expected to request supplemental appropriations to cover additional expenses of on-going counter-terrorism operations and of mobilizing forces for Iraq some time in the spring. In the meantime, the FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill, H.J. Res. 2, may include some interim measures to give the Defense Department flexibility in paying for the buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf. The House-passed version of H.J. Res. 2 includes a provision providing DOD with $2.5 billion in additional general transfer authority – the regular FY2003 defense appropriations bill provided $2 billion, equal to amounts usually provided in recent years.

The Defense Department has not provided any estimates of the potential costs of a war with Iraq. The Office of Management and Budget has prepared an internal estimate, which reportedly projects costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the estimate publicly, and it has not explained the assumptions underlying its projections.

Two congressional estimates of costs are available, however.
On September 30, 2002, the Congressional Budget Office prepared estimates of the costs of two illustrative campaigns – a heavy ground option involving 370,000 troops deployed to the region and a heavy air option involving 270,000 troops. It projected that costs of these options could range from $9 to $13 billion to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf, from $6 to $9 billion a month to fight a war, from $5 to $7 billion to return forces to their home bases, and from $1 to $4 billion a month for a continuing occupation.61

A week earlier, the Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee prepared an estimate based on costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Its estimates ranged from $31 billion for a conflict lasting 30 days with 125,000 troops to $60 billion for a conflict lasting 60 days with 250,000 troops. The estimate also calculated that interest costs of increasing the deficit to finance the war would total an additional $17 to $33 billion over 10 years. The study did not address occupation or reconstruction costs.62

CBO and the House Budget Committee Democratic staff estimated only the direct budgetary effects of a war. Neither considered the possible economic consequences, which could, in turn, affect federal revenues and outlays indirectly. In November 2002, William Nordhaus of Yale University prepared a study that estimated the total economic costs. Using the CBO and House Budget Committee staff estimates as a starting point, he calculated that total costs could range from a cumulative total of $120 billion on optimistic assumptions to $1.6 trillion on unfavorable assumptions over the next 10 years.63

**Oil Supply Issues**

*Larry Kumins, 7-7450*

*(Last updated February 4, 2003)*

The threat of an armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over its supply of crude oil to world markets. Iraq holds substantial proven oil reserves, but the country’s current rate of production is much below its ultimate potential. The *International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001* reports that Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s currently known reserves – second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.

Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have varied greatly; in some weeks nearly no oil has been exported, in others as much as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) enter world markets. During the past two months,

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63 See [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].
the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reports that exports have averaged 1.5 mbd under the oil-for-food program. Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq’s international oil flow, world oil markets rely on the Iraqi supply, and it is an important factor in the determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-purchaser arrangements.

Iraq accounts for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi exports are controlled by the U.N. under Resolution 986. Despite the U.N. restrictions, Iraq’s financial incentive to keep supplying the world market is strong, since crude prices have approached record levels due to an oil workers’ strike in Venezuela. The strike began on December 2, 2002, and has combined with uncertainty regarding a new Persian Gulf conflict to raise crude oil prices to levels that are 50% higher than the 2001 average. Current indications suggest the Venezuelan strike is winding down and that oil output is growing, but it is not clear how soon production will reach pre-strike levels. But were the strike to continue through spring – and events in the Persian Gulf cause a halt in Iraqi crude supply – OPEC members would not be able to make up the lost crude. With little surplus-producing capacity elsewhere in the world, a crude supply shortfall would likely happen, and oil prices could spike upward. If any conflict involving Iraq were to spread beyond its borders to Kuwait – as Saddam Hussein has threatened, or affect tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf – a greater oil shortfall could take place with more significant price impacts.

Iraq likely holds the potential to become one of the world’s top two or three oil producers, were investment and technology applied to its existing fields. Should it have a change of government, it could become a much larger oil producer, leading prices and supplies in the other direction. Such a large supply addition would change the basic crude oil price structure of the past 25 years. This eventuality could unleash a new set of political and economic forces affecting many countries.

Economic Effects of a War with Iraq
Marc Labonte, 7-0640
(Last updated January 24, 2003)

U.S. military operations in Iraq would potentially have two distinct effects on the economy. First, an increase in military expenditures, if deficit financed, could increase aggregate demand in the short run. Second, if military operations led to a sudden and persistent spike in the price of oil, economic growth could fall and inflation could rise in the short run. Specific economic estimates are hindered by uncertainty surrounding the scale and scope of operations, the effects of operations on oil prices, and the response of (and effect on) neighboring oil-producing countries.

Economic Effects of Military Expenditures. In the past, military conflicts have been financed through higher taxes, lower government spending in non-military areas, government borrowing from the public, or money creation. Higher taxes or lower government spending may play a small role in financing any U.S. operation in Iraq; money creation would almost certainly not play a role. Government borrowing from the public, through the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities to finance a larger budget deficit, appears likely to be the primary form of financing any military
operations in Iraq. If this were the case, the military outlays would boost aggregate demand in the short run. Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be directed to foreigners instead of domestic producers since the operations would occur abroad. Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be “crowded out” by higher interest rates, which reduce investment spending and other interest-sensitive spending, and dollar appreciation, which reduces exports and the production of import-competiting goods. If economic activity were still sluggish when an invasion took place, less of the boost in aggregate demand would be crowded out. In any case, even the highest cost estimates of the operations suggest that the outlays would be too small relative to GDP to have significant economic effects. Wars may shift resources from non-military spending to military spending, but since military spending is included in GDP, this would not by itself lead to a recession.

**Economic Effects of Higher Oil Prices.** Perhaps the greatest unknown economic factor in a military conflict with Iraq is the effect it would have on oil prices. Economic theory suggests that oil shocks lead to higher inflation, a contraction in output, and higher unemployment. Effective policy responses are difficult because expansionary policy would exacerbate the inflationary pressures while contractionary policy would exacerbate the contraction in output. Military operations against Iraq would be likely to reduce Iraqi oil output temporarily. Whether this led to a sustained spike in oil prices would depend on whether other oil producers increase their production to fill the gap or whether the military operations could accomplish their objectives quickly with little collateral damage to Iraqi oil facilities, topics beyond the scope of this report. Evidence suggests that an increase in the price of oil would have little effect on the economy if it is transient.

**The Role of Confidence in the Economy.** Many of the negative economic forecasts by private analysts concerning a potential conflict are being driven in large part by their assumptions that the conflict would reduce consumer and business confidence and stock market values. These effects are highly speculative, as they have not been important factors in many past American wars.

**Economic Effects of the First Gulf War.** Most economists do not attribute the 1990-1991 recession to the Gulf War. Rather, they attribute it to contractionary monetary policy, the spike in oil prices that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and problems in the U.S. banking sector. The Gulf War did not begin until the recession was almost over. As a percentage of GDP, military outlays actually fell during the Gulf War, unlike the typical war-time military buildup that expands aggregate demand.  

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**CRS Products**


Information Resources

This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a possible war with Iraq.

CRS Experts

A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at [http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].

Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles. Information research experts are also listed.

CRS Products

For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].

The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.

Chronology

For a chronology of Iraq related events since October 2002, see CRS Report RL31667, *Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events*.

Iraq Facts

For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the *World Factbook, 2002* published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.


Maps

For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, *Iraq: Map Sources*. The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of map resources.

Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products

This website includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq confrontation.

The following site focuses on official sources, including sources in both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government sources, and sources of information at international organizations. [http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].

United Nations Resolutions
