Order Code RL31715
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Updated February 5, 2003
Raymond W. Copson (Coordinator)
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress
Summary
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S.
urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its
the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” During January 2003,
the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, amid reports that U.S. forces
would be ready to launch a war by mid-February or early March. President Bush,
other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have indicated that
Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors.
However, the inspectors themselves, with leaders of France, Germany, and other
countries, are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time. The
Administration asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions
requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Skeptics, including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is
exaggerating the Iraqi threat.
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of
the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and
to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). Some
Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Administration
consultation on Iraq, and suggested that the Administration should provide more
information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early military action.
Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly, and have
compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war. U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last 18 months or longer. Whether the overthrow of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein leads to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle
East, or promotes instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue
in debate. The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial
humanitarian crisis, including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend
on the length of the conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization. International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war. Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale
of the fighting and the length of any occupation. If war leads to a spike in the price
of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic
consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues. See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report. This report also provides
links to other sources of information and updated approximately one each week.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Military Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Diplomatic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Developments at the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Foreign Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Peace Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Policy Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Regime Change Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Nuclear Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Biological and Chemical Weapons Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Missile Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Inspections Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Secretary Powell’s Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Current Planning Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
War Crimes Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Burden Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Political and Military Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Direct and Indirect Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Post-conflict Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Implications for the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Humanitarian Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
War-Related Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Aid Agency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Potential Internal Humanitarian Consequences of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
International and Domestic Legal Issues Relating to the Use of Force . . . . 27
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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Security Council Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Cost Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Oil Supply Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Economic Effects of a War with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Economic Effects of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Economic Effects of Higher Oil Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Role of Confidence in the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Economic Effects of the First Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Information Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CRS Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Iraq Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
United Nations Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
List of Figures
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations
Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has
weapons of mass destruction programs. Powell released information from audio
intercepts, human intelligence sources, and satellite reconnaissance in describing
Iraq’s “active and systematic efforts” to evade U.N. weapons inspections. The
Secretary added that “Clearly, Saddam Hussein and his regime will stop at nothing
until something stops him.” Later, representatives of France, China, and Russia
called for the inspections to continue, and France argued for significantly
strengthening the inspection team. Secretary Powell also described what he said was
a “sinister nexus” between the Al Qaeda terror movement and Baghdad. According
to the Secretary, an Al Qaeda group had been given safe haven in northern Iraq and
was coordinating its activities from Baghdad.
The Washington Post reported on February 5 that Kuwait was setting aside the
northern half of the country as of February 15 for possible U.S. military operations
against Iraq. In a rare televised interview on February 4, Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein denied that his country had any weapons of mass destruction or links to Al
Qaeda terrorists. British Prime Minister Tony Blair met with French President
Jacques Chirac on February 4 but reportedly failed to persuade the French leader to
support early action against Iraq.
Reports on February 3 indicated that Hans Blix, chief U.N. weapons inspector,
and Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Agency, would travel to
Baghdad on the weekend of February 8 for meetings with Iraqi government officials.
Blix said on February 4 that he would be seeking clear measures from the Iraqi
government to fully detail its weapons of mass destruction programs. Blix wants Iraq
to accede to reconnaissance flights in support of inspections, which Iraq has been
resisting. U.S. officials reportedly do not support the Blix-ElBaradei mission.
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 2 that the space shuttle
disaster of February 1 would not affect U.S. planning on Iraq. On January 31,
President Bush and Prime Minister Blair held a joint press conference following a
meeting on Iraq. The Prime Minister expressed his country’s preference for a new
Security Council resolution on Iraq specifically authorizing military action. President
Bush said that any debate about such a resolution “needs to be resolved quickly. The
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimated on January 29 that post-
war rebuilding in Iraq would cost $30 billion in the first three years.

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Current Situation
Overview
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated February 5, 2003)
B a c k g r o u n d . B u s h
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
Administration concerns about Iraq’s
alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil”
nations in his January 2002 State of
the Union address. Vice President
Cheney, in two August 2002
speeches, accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons
of mass destruction to dominate the
Middle East and threaten U.S. oil
supplies.1 These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States
might act unilaterally against Iraq.
However, in a September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work
with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2
H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use
of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security
Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with its resolutions. On November 8,
2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving
Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under
previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”
Recent Developments. During January 2003, the U.S. military buildup in
the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts indicated that U.S. forces would be
positioned to launch an attack on Iraq by mid-February or early March. Officials
maintained that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of
summer, but military experts observed that conditions for fighting a war would be far
better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and other top officials during January and early February
expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with Security
Council disarmament demands. The President said on January 14, that “time is
1 “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103d National Convention,” August 26, 2002; and “Vice
President Honors Veterans of Korean War,” August 29, 2002. Available on the White
House web site at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
2 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].

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CRS-3
running out” for Iraq to disarm, adding that he was “sick and tired” of its “games and
deceptions.”3 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on January 19, that
“we are at the verge of an important set of decisions.”4 On January 26, 2003,
Secretary of State Powell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos,
Switzerland, that “multilateralism cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the
United States “continues to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against
Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing.” Powell also told the Davos meeting that
there are “clear ties” between Iraq and terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda.
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 29, 2003. “With nuclear arms of a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.” The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.” Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also
condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the
world.
Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed
confrontation remains limited. Chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix, in a report
to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, was much harsher than had been
expected with respect to Iraqi noncompliance with Security Council demands. (See
below, Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues.) Nonetheless, many Security Council
members, including France, Russia, and China, have urged giving the inspections
process more time. Whether a majority of the Council would support a new Council
resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq remains in question.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair argues that such resolution should be sought,
while continuing to give strong support to U.S. policy. Many other foreign
governments and observers are concerned, however, that U.N. inspectors have yet to
find a “smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs. U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the
inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections is to verify whether or not Iraq
has disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions. Iraq has not pro-actively
cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there has been
no such verification.5
Large public demonstrations against a possible war with Iraq occurred in the
United States and in cities overseas on the weekend of January 19-20. At that time,
polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the support of allies before the
United States launched a war against Iraq. The polls shifted on this point after the
State of the Union message, with a majority coming to favor a war even without
3 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003 [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
4 BBC report, January 19, 2003.
5 David Kay, “It was Never About a Smoking Gun,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003.

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CRS-4
explicit U.N. approval.6 Nonetheless, many remain opposed to war. Forty-one Nobel
laureates in science and economics released a declaration opposing war on January
27, and former President Jimmy Carter said on January 31 that President Bush has
“not made a case for a pre-emptive military strike against Iraq.”7 (For congressional
views, see below, Congressional Action.)
Options for the Future. Whether the Administration will choose to launch
a war against Iraq without broader international support remains to be seen. Some
may urge that policymakers accede to wishes of Security Council members who want
the arms inspection process to be given more time. Others argue that this approach
would reward Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics, and that there would be serious
economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large U.S. military force in the
Middle East indefinitely. It may be that dramatic evidence of Iraqi non-compliance
will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring stronger international backing
for a war. Another view is that if U.S. action against Iraq comes to appear inevitable,
other countries, such as Russia and France, will offer support in order to retain some
influence with Washington.
According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite their
denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other
Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of
guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through
with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.8 However, many
analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move.
Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power,
but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too firm to
permit such an event.
Military Situation
Steve Bowman, 7-7613
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the
Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these
deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of
the troop movements underway. The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted, are
not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) is reportedly approaching 90,000, and of these, approximately 45,000 are
ground troops. The deployment is reportedly expected to reach over 150,000 some
6 “Support for a War with Iraq Grows After Bush’s Speech,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003.
7 “Carter Says Bush Has ‘Not Made a Case’ for War.” Washington Post, February 1, 2003.
8 “Officials Support Exile for Hussein,” Washington Post, January 20, 2003.

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CRS-5
time in February. Another 100,000 personnel may be placed on alert for later
deployment should that be required.9 DOD has announced that, as of January 22,
2003, there are 78,906 National Guard and Reservists from all services now called
to active duty, an increase of over 20,000 in one week.10 In addition to U.S.
deployments, Britain is deploying an armor Battle Group with 27,000 personnel to
the Persian Gulf region.
Figure 2. Iraq
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf states of
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With the
possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of
cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations
Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of
force against Iraq. Outside of the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom,
Australia, Denmark, and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security
9 “Rumsfeld Doubles Carrier Groups in Gulf Region,” Washington Times, January 22, 2003;
“Main Developments Concerning Iraq,” Associated Press, January 22, 2003.
10 See the DOD website: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/d20030122ngr.pdf].

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Council does not act further. The White House press office announced in November
2002 that the United States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in
military operations against Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on
responses.11 The United States has also approached NATO Headquarters concerning
the use of certain NATO assets (e.g., AWACS aerial command aircraft). NATO
postponed action on the request, and French and German opposition to military
action against Iraq at this time makes a NATO commitment appear problematic in
the near term. Negotiations continue with Turkey over possible U.S. troop
deployments and the use of Turkish airbases. No clear commitment has been
obtained, but U.S. personnel have been allowed to begin surveying some Turkish
airfields to determine their potential usefulness for U.S. operations.
Though Administration spokesmen continue to maintain that no final decision
has been made regarding the use of force, press reports speculate that late February
is currently seen as the most likely time-frame for the onset of military operations.12
This would permit the completion of a large force deployment, with the possibility
of completing operations before the arrival of Iraqi summer weather.
News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction, has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S.
or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack
underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions.
Though shown to the press, NSDP 17 remains classified and Administration
spokesmen have declined comment on its content. The National Strategy document
does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all
options.” Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt
to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat. Critics are concerned that the
Administration is significantly lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-
held U.S. assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear
power.13
CRS Product
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations
11 White House press Conference, December 5, 2002.
12 “Russia Says War on Iraq Decided; Allies Urge Peace,” Reuters, January 22, 2003
13 As U.S. Girds for Worst in Iraq, Retaliation Isn’t Clear-Cut Issue; Nuclear Response to
Chemical or Bio-Attacks Has Pitfalls”, Washington Post. January 29, 2003. p. A14; “Bush
Signs Paper Allowing Nuclear Response “, Washington Times, January 29, 2003. p. A1.

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Diplomatic Situation
Carol Migdalovitz (7-2667)
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
Developments at the United Nations. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441 of November 8, 2002 gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations” under previous resolutions, and set up an enhanced
inspection regime to bring about the “full and verified completion of the disarmament
process.” Iraq was required to submit, within 30 days, “a declaration of all aspects
of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, and other delivery systems....” It also was required to provide the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional
access” to all sites they wish to inspect. Inspections began on November 27.
On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted a 12,000-page declaration. On January 9,
2003, Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, appeared at the Security
Council with Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, and
observed that the Iraqi declaration, “is rich in volume but poor in new information
about weapons issues ....” Blix added that although Iraq had “failed to answer a great
many questions,” inspectors had not found “any smoking guns.”14 He and ElBaradei
went to Baghdad on January 18-20 to consult with Iraqi officials.
On January 27, Blix reported to the Security Council that Iraq had not come to
a “genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of
it.” He called for cooperation on substance, not just on process. He stated that Iraq
had failed to account for anthrax, VX precursor chemicals, and 6,500 chemical
bombs as well as discrepancies in its reporting on missiles. He said that Iraq had
refused to guarantee the safety of U.N. U-2 surveillance planes, submit data on its
arms inspections, or consent to private interviews with scientists. ElBaradei reported
that inspectors had “found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons
program” and asked for a few more months of inspections. Blix later said that he had
not asked for more time because he did not feel confident that it would bring about
significant advances. Blix and ElBaradei will travel to Baghdad on February 8-9 and
report to the Council again on February 14.
After the report, French, Russian, Chinese, German, and other officials called
for continuing inspections, while the British said that Iraq clearly was in “material
breach” of its obligations to the U.N. French President Jacques Chirac also asserted
that “Iraq’s cooperation must improve.”15 Russian President Vladimir Putin warned
that his country may change its position if Iraq creates problems for the inspectors.16
14 “UN Inspection Report May Complicate U.S. Plan in Iraq,” Reuters, January 10, 2003.
15 “France and Germany Condemn U.S. Haste,” Financial Times, January 23, 2003.
16 Vladimir Isachenkov, Putin raises specter of Russia’s taking tougher line on Iraq,
Associated Press, January 28, 2003.

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Foreign Reactions. The buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf region has
prompted growing debate about the Iraq situation and its ramifications. Differences
have deepened in Europe. First, Germany and France called for restraint. German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said that his government could not vote for resolution
authorizing war. French President Jacques Chirac called for every decision to be
made by the Security Council, and his Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie said
that French military intervention would come only after “a showing that Iraq has
weapons of mass destruction and will under no circumstances eliminate them.” A
Gallup poll conducted in 10 EU member states in January found that over 50% of
those asked did not favor war in any circumstances.17
On January 30, the leaders of Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary,
Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain seemed to respond to the French and Germans in
a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece, cautioning “The transatlantic relationship must not
become a casualty to the current Iraqi regime’s attempts to threaten world security....”
They called for unity in insisting that Saddam Hussein’s regime be disarmed and that
the Security Council “maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its
resolutions.” Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, current holder of the rotating
European Union presidency, reflected the views of some other EU members when
he criticized the column because it was written without consultation and did not help
Europe have “a strong voice in the world.”18 On February 3, Prime Minister Tony
Blair said again that if inspectors report continuing Iraqi noncompliance, then there
should be a second U.N. resolution declaring Iraq in breach and authorizing use of
force. He would support military action if there were “an unreasonable blockage” of
such a resolution, impliedly by a French veto.

Unease also prevails in the Middle East, where leaders are concerned that war
would increase instability and terrorism and bring undesired results. Turkish Prime
Minister Abdullah Gul asserted that his government wants the crisis to end without
war but that “the prime responsibility for a peaceful solution lies with the Iraq
leadership.”19 President Hosni Mubarak also declared that a resolution of the crisis
depended on the behavior of the Baghdad government. Saudi Foreign Minister Sa’ud
said that should the U.N. decide to use force “we hope that there would be a grace
period left for Arab countries to intervene and resolve the crisis peacefully.”20 There
are unconfirmed reports that Arab governments are trying to negotiate a deal for
Saddam Hussein to go into exile, but these have been denied.
Peace Initiatives. There are no major peace initiatives at present, but there
is considerable diplomatic activity. A meeting chaired by Turkey with the foreign
17 Jane Wardell, Polls who divisions between Europe and U.S. on Iraq, Associated Press,
January 31, 2003.
18 Greece seeking special EU meeting no Iraq, Reuters, January 31, 2003.
19 Address by Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly in Strasbourg on January 27, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
Document EUP20030127000449.
20 Saudi Foreign Minister comments on Istanbul conference, BBC Monitoring SPA news
agency website, Riyadh, January 22, 2003.

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ministers of Syria, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in Istanbul on January 23,
called on Iraq to display “a more active approach” in providing information “in full
conformity” with 1441.21 Foreign Minister George Papandreou of Greece, is now
leading an EU mission to Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to encourage them
to be more active in mediating between the United States and Iraq. His Arab
interlocutors, however, advised Papandreou that Saddam is not convinced that war
is imminent. South Africa, current chair of the Non-Aligned Movement and the
Africa Union said that it will send an envoy to urge Saddam Hussein to cooperate
with U.N. inspectors.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31629, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: International Attitudes.
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the Iraq
Crisis: A Brief Overview, by Marjorie M. Browne.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Resolutions –
1992-2002
U.S. Policy
The Administration
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the
Middle East region. Iraq’s WMD programs, according to the Administration, could
be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s long-term goal of dominating the Middle East,
they could be used directly against the United States, or they could be transferred to
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration says that the United States
cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront Iraq, since Iraq
would then be stronger and the United States might have fewer military and
diplomatic options. The Administration asserts that Iraq is in breach of 17 U.N.
Security Council resolutions – including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002 –
that, among other requirements, mandate that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. President Bush has stated that Iraq
must immediately and pro-actively cooperate with a new U.N. disarmament effort,
or the United States will lead a coalition to disarm it.
Policy Debate. Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions
within the Administration on Iraq policy. Secretary of State Powell had been said to
typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program of unfettered
21 Six States’ Communique, MENA, FBIS Document GMP20030123000272.

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weapons inspections could succeed in containing the WMD threat from Iraq.22 He
reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations
to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally. However, as of late January
2003, Secretary Powell has said Iraq’s failure to fully cooperate with the latest
weapons inspections indicate that inspections would not succeed in disarming Iraq
and that war may be required, with or without U.N. authorization. The Secretary is
reportedly highly critical in private of U.S. allies, particularly France, that oppose
war with Iraq. Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, among others, have consistently been skeptical that inspections
can significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been
in favor of military action against Iraq. These and other U.S. officials reportedly
believe that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not
only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. Those
who favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active WMD programs and
will eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States unless it is completely
disarmed. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that the Administration is
exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an attack might goad
Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda
organization, among other terrorist groups. According to the Administration, Iraq
has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical
weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime. A
faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-
Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration. President
Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from intelligence
sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in custody, reveal
that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.”
However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was not uniform
within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence community
discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie as only a possibility. Another view is that there may
have been occasional tactical cooperation between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq
intelligence agents.23 Others are said to believe that there might have been some
cooperation when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that
any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off later on, after bin Laden was expelled from
in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.
Regime Change Goal. The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq
under a U.N. umbrella has led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that
the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime. The purpose of downplaying this
goal may be to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note that
regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq. However, in practice,
the United States draws little separation between regime change and disarmament;
22 Lynch, Colum and Karen DeYoung. U.S. Officials Meet to Take Stock of Iraq Policy.
Washington Post, October 16, 2002.
23 Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Unknown: The CIA and the Pentagon Take Another Look at Al
Qaeda and Iraq. The New Yorker, February 10, 2003.

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the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad would be required
to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD. Press reports in October 2002 said
that the Administration is recruiting an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using
equipment and training funds ($92 million remaining) authorized by the Iraq
Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This force, which will undergo
training at an air base in Hungary, could support a U.S. attack or work on its own to
destabilize Saddam Hussein. The Administration is working with Iraqi exile groups
to determine future policies and priorities in a post-Saddam Iraq as part of its “Future
of Iraq Project.”
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role
in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and
trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions
against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime
from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991,
Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L.
102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. The statute conferred broad authority on the
President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expressed
Congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the level of consultation and
communication between Congress and the White House since the signing of P.L.
107-243. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle has stated that the Bush

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Administration has failed to report to Congress on its diplomatic efforts and military
preparations within 60 days, as he said was required by P.L. 107-243.24 In response,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not believe that the resolution
required a written report, and that his verbal briefings should suffice. Over the past
few weeks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell have given
several closed-door briefings to Members of Congress. After the briefings, some
Members have commented that the Administration has evidence on Iraq’s weapons
programs “that can change people’s minds.”25 Other lawmakers have commented
that the evidence against Iraq is less compelling, characterizing it as a “building
block in making the case for going forward.”26 Some Members have asked that the
Administration give weapons inspectors in Iraq more time, and several later
commented that the Administration should do a better job of explaining why Iraq
poses an immediate threat to the United States.27 On January 30, 2003, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Iraq. Senator Joseph Biden urged the
Bush Administration to “make it easier” for international allies to join the United
States in pressuring Iraq to comply with United Nations resolutions.
Since the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers have drafted several resolutions
relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. In early January, Representative Sheila
Jackson-Lee introduced H.Con.Res. 2, which called on Congress to repeal the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.” The
Jackson-Lee resolution has been referred to the Committee on International
Relations. After the President’s January 29 State of the Union Address, Senator
Edward Kennedy introduced S.Res. 32 stating the sense of the Senate that the
President should seek new legislation authorizing the use of force to disarm Iraq.
S.Res. 28, sponsored by Senator Robert Byrd, states the sense of the Senate that
weapons inspectors be given sufficient time to carry out their tasks in Iraq and that
the Administration should seek a United Nations Security Council resolution
specifically authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Both resolutions have been
submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Biden has
resubmitted legislation (S. 205), which passed the Senate in November 2002, on the
granting of visas and the admission of residency to Iraqi scientists, who would be
willing to provide the United States with vital information on Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction programs. The bill has been placed on the Senate’s legislative calendar.
Following a war or significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will
likely seek to influence future internal political and economic developments in that
country. Congress may be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance
programs that would facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq. The extent and
cost of U.S. programs would depend on the post-war scenario. The Administration
24 Janet Hook, “New Anxiety Over Bush’s Foreign Policy Some members of Congress –
including Republicans – criticize the president’s handling of simultaneous crises in Iraq and
North Korea.” The Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2003.
25 Michael Hedges & Karen Masterson, “Congress Given a Peak at Case Against Saddam,”
Houston Chronicle, January 29, 2003.
26 Ibid.
27 “Hill Pressures Bush on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 25, 2003.

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may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to support coalition
partners in the Middle East, who may suffer economically in the event of regional
instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of assistance specific
to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) that
authorized aid to the former Soviet Union or the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress will have to weigh aid
to Iraq against other budget priorities.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21324, Congressional Action on Iraq, 1990 - 2002.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
Issues for Congress
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, along with its
long-range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the
justifications put forward for the use of U.S. military forces. Iraq had varying
capabilities in all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War.
The inspections conducted between 1991 and 1998 destroyed or otherwise eliminated
much of those capabilities, but certain aspects of the programs that were unresolved
in 1998 remain so today. In addition, current inspections seek to uncover what Iraq
might have produced since 1998.
Nuclear Program. Iraq had a well-financed and broad-based nuclear weapons
program but did not succeed in producing enough fissile material for a weapon before
the 1991 Gulf War shut down the program. On January 27, 2003, IAEA Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei reported to the U.N. Security Council that inspectors
had found no sign of a renewal of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless,
questions remain about Iraq’s nuclear weapons design work, the alleged procurement
of uranium from Niger (which Iraq denies) and scientists’ work on
nuclear-weapons-related projects. Bush Administration officials have also pointed
to Iraq’s procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes as evidence of a clandestine
program to produce weapons-grade uranium with centrifuges, but ElBaradei disputed
that conclusion, stating that Iraq’s reported use of the material for conventional
rockets seemed credible.
Biological and Chemical Weapons Program. Much less is known about
Iraq’s biological weapons program. Iraq apparently produced anthrax, aflatoxin and
the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Questions remain about the production and
destruction of anthrax, although new information on biotechnology developments
since 1998 was included in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 weapons declaration to the

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United Nations Security Council. Iraq’s capabilities in chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles, in contrast, are well known. Iraq produced blister agents (“mustard
gas”) and both persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). While
inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8
million liters of precursor chemicals in inspections from 1991 to 1998, significant
questions remain. For example, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 500
mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors are still unknown, as are
Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent. In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced 4
tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it had imported enough
precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons. There is also evidence that VX agent was
weaponized, although Iraq has not declared this. In October 2002, the Central
Intelligence Agency assessed that Iraq had renewed chemical weapons production
and probably had stockpiled a few hundred tons of agent. In addition, the discovery
in late January 2003 of 16 empty chemical munitions shells not previously declared
points to further discrepancies in Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration of all its
capabilities.
Missile Program. Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production
capabilities prior to the Gulf War, but much of this was destroyed during that war and
in inspections from 1991 to 1998. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles
remained after the war and inspectors accounted for all but two. Iraq is permitted to
produce missiles with ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in
producing Ababil and Samoud missiles of permitted ranges. In its December 7
declaration, Iraq admitted that some flight tests of those missiles did exceed the
150km-range by 50km. U.S. analysts believe that Iraq may be concealing 12 Scud
missiles and is manufacturing propellant for longer-range missiles. Key unresolved
issues include documentation of missile programs, the fate of 300 tons of special
missile propellant, and indigenous missile production.
Inspections Status. The U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA conducted over 400 inspections between
mid-November 2002 and mid-January 2003. Both UNMOVIC and the IAEA
repeatedly have stressed that Iraq must actively cooperate with the investigation and
voluntarily provide accurate information. Since November 2002, few new details
have been uncovered through inspections, apart from the discovery in mid-January
of empty chemical weapons shells not previously declared and of 2000 pages of
undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private home.
In his report to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, 2003, Chairman Blix
distinguished between cooperation on process and on substance. On the first, Blix
said that Iraq has cooperated “rather well,” but then detailed areas in which
cooperation on substance was lacking. He suggested specifically that Iraq needed
to cooperate in finding items and activities (e.g., 122mm chemical warheads); in
finding documents, particularly those in private homes; in providing names of
personnel; and in ensuring that interviews are credible. Director General ElBaradei’s
report noted that inspections since November 2002 have identified no prohibited
nuclear activities but urged states to continue to provide intelligence information.
ElBaradei specifically suggested that the inspection process “should be allowed to
run its natural course” and that credible assurances could be provided within the next
few months. The Bush Administration has interpreted the January 27 report as a

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definitive statement of UNMOVIC and the IAEA’s findings to date, and the White
House spokesman has said that the “report...clearly shows Iraq is not complying.”
Blix and ElBaradei will report again to the U.N. Security Council on February 14,
2003.
Secretary Powell’s Address. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State
Powell addressed the U.N. Security Council and shared significant information
related to Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions. These included audiotapes of
Iraqi military officers discussing hiding modified vehicles from inspectors and orders
to eliminate talk of “nerve agents” in wireless communications. Secretary Powell
shared anecdotes regarding documents in cars driven by Iraqi intelligence officers,
the removal of hard drives from computers, and the sanitizing of the sprawling
presidential palaces of traces of WMD. These anecdotes were derived from human
intelligence sources. Secretary Powell also showed satellite photos of bulldozed
chemical weapons sites and the removal of telltale vehicles and equipment from
chemical weapons bunkers at the Taji facility before the December 22, 2002
inspections. In addition, Secretary Powell cited four human intelligence sources with
regard to the existence of about 18 mobile biological weapons laboratories. Powell
noted that it would be virtually impossible to find these mobile labs without Iraqi
cooperation. In the nuclear area, Secretary Powell reported on Iraqi attempts to
procure magnets and high-speed balancing machines from companies in Romania,
India, Russia, and Slovenia to support assertions that Iraq is pursuing a centrifuge
uranium enrichment program. With respect to missiles, Secretary Powell reported
that Iraq had continued to import SA-2 rocket engines as late as December 2002 but
did not provide further evidence. Finally, Secretary Powell showed a satellite
photograph depicting a racetrack-shaped flight path of an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) that was tested for a distance of 500km without refueling. Iraq’s December
7 declaration had claimed that its UAVs had ranges of just 80 kms.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S.
Policy.
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: U.N. Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
CRS Report RS21376, Iraq: WMD-Capable Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs).
Post-War Iraq
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated January 21, 2003)
Background. The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation of and instability
in a post-Saddam Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current
debate over Iraq policy. One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush
Administration for ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-
Saddam Iraq could dissolve into chaos. It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims,

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the majority but under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into
warring ethnic and tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran,
Turkey, and Syria. Because of the complexities of planning for a post-war Iraq, and
the potential for major inter-ethnic and factional feuding if Saddam falls, some
observers believe that the Bush Administration would prefer that Saddam Hussein
be replaced by a military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to
democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. Administration
statements, however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq.
Some regional governments that fear destabilizing effects on their own regimes from
a war, including Saudi Arabia, are said to be trying to persuade Saddam to go into
exile in order to prevent war.
Current Planning Efforts. The Administration is planning for a post-
Saddam regime. The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts
the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a
stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N.
resolutions. Some press reports say that the Administration is planning for an
approximately 18 month occupation of Iraq led primarily by U.S. military officials,
working in concert with Iraqis to build a democratic post-war Iraq.28 Other reports
indicate that some military planners would prefer that the United Nations and U.S.
allies play a major role in governing post-war Iraq on an interim basis. In September
2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that U.S. occupation force levels
would range between 75,000 and 200,000 personnel, at a cost of $1 billion to $4
billion per month. (See below, Cost Issues.)
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power
after Saddam is overthrown.
As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.29 The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure. Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (1) education; (2) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
28 “U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq,” New York Times, January 6,
2002.
29 “State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.

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and migration policy; (3) foreign and national security policy; (4) defense institutions
and policy; (5) free media; (6) civil society capacity-building; (7) anti-corruption
measures; and (8) oil and energy.
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects. It is widely assumed that Iraq’s
vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to
fund reconstruction. However, many observers believe that an Iraqi regime on the
verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields. Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire
before withdrawing from there in 1991. The Administration reportedly is planning
to secure Iraq’s oil fields early in any offensive against Iraq to prevent this from
happening. A related issue is long term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and
which foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore
Iraq’s vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States
will seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms of other
countries. Some press reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such
control,30 although some observers speculate that the Administration is seeking to
create such an impression in order to persuade Russia that it has an interest in
participating in a coalition against Iraq.

War Crimes Trials. An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate
is whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes
and, if so, whether that should be pursued while Saddam is still in power. The
Administration reportedly has reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military
action that overthrows Saddam, that he and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq.31
The Administration is gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his
associates, but at the same time, some officials have indicated that Saddam and might
be allowed a safe haven if he leaves Iraq voluntarily before a war.32
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and
Illicit Trade.
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in
Japan and Germany.
30 “After Saddam, an Uncertain Future,” Insight Magazine, February 3, 2003
31 “U.S. Seeks War Crimes Trial Data.,” Washington Post, October 30, 2002.
32 “Exile for Hussein May be an Option, U.S. Officials Hint,” New York Times, January 20,
2002.

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Burden Sharing
Carl Ek (7-7286)
(Last updated February 5, 2003)
In November 2002, it was reported that the U.S. government had contacted the
governments of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq.
Press reports indicate that several governments have offered help of one kind or
another; other countries, according to Bush Administration officials, also intend to
support the war effort but, for domestic political reasons, would prefer not to
publicize their contributions.33 Nevertheless, at present it appears unlikely that a
coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will arise.
Political and Military Factors. On the international political front, analysts
contend that the United States will seek to enlist allies in order to demonstrate that
it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm Iraq has been
endorsed by a broad global coalition. In most cases, foreign decisions to participate
or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and
further actions by the U.N. Security Council. Although the political leaders of some
Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s aims, they
must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their populations.
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the United States initially
relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only small contingents of
special forces from a handful of other countries. Allied combat and peacekeeping
forces entered the fray in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been defeated.
Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because the unique
nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating and then
calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the utmost speed
in command and communications.34 An opposing view is that the United States lost
an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for an allied coalition
in the conflict against terrorism. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999,
some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for allied consensus
hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing target approval
process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces conduct
operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military capabilities
(e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and night vision
equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to achieve a swift
victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions. Britain, the only other country that has
had warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to make contributions
33 NATO Allies Willing To Attack Iraq Without U.N., Wolfowitz Says. By Paul Baskin.
Bloomberg.com. January 10, 2003. U.S. Coalition For War Has Few Partners, Troop
Pledges. By Glenn Kessler and Bradley Graham. WP. January 25, 2003.
34 On Iraq, Can Too Many Troops Spoil A War? By Ann Scott Tyson. CSM. January 22,
2003.

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of ground, air, and naval forces. Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it
is believed that other countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Canada, may support coalition forces once a conflict begins. Washington and Prague
have discussed the possibility of reinforcing Czech anti-chemical weapons specialists
in Kuwait, where they have been stationed since March 2002. Japan, constitutionally
barred from dispatching ground troops, reportedly may also help in the disposal of
chemical and biological weapons, and has recently reinforced its fleet of naval
vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean. Sweden and New Zealand have indicated that
they might contribute medical support. Although the German government has said
that it would not contribute troops to combat, Chancellor Schroeder has stated that
German AWACS crews might help patrol the Turkish-Iraqi border in the event of a
war.35
Other forms of support might prove valuable. For example, countries could
grant fly-over rights, or back-fill for U.S. troops that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans. In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling, allow
aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force
calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria have
offered the use of their airbases and seaports. On January 15, the United States
formally requested several measures of assistance from the NATO allies, such as
AWACS, refueling, and overflight privileges; the request was deferred.36 The Bush
Administration has reportedly sought permission from the Turkish government to
use Turkish bases and ports, and to move up to 75,000-80,000 U.S. troops through
southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq; the response is still
pending and is a key issue for U.S. planners. News reports on February 5, 2003,
however, indicated that the Turkish Prime Minister would seek the permission of
parliament for allowing U.S. troops to use Turkish bases. Subsequent reports
indicated that Turkey might permit only a much smaller U.S. contingent due to
domestic opposition to a war with Iraq. At the Bush Administration’s request, the
Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training of up to
3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant
interpreters and administrators.37
35 Australia Says Forces Ready For Any Iraq War. Reuters. December 19, 2002. Japan
May Send Troops To Scrap Iraq Weapons. Reuters. December 20, 2002. Uncle Sam
Wants You. By David Lague. Far Eastern Economic Review. January 16, 2003. Germany
Says Would Patrol Turkish Skies In Iraq War. Reuters. December 11, 2002.
36 NATO works on a consensus basis; France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg opposed
the U.S. request. NATO Blocked On Iraq Decision. By Keith Richburg. WP. January 23,
2003. On week later, however, nine European leaders signed an open letter supporting U.S.
efforts to disarm Iraq. European Leaders Declare Support For U.S. On Iraq. By Marc
Champion. WSJ. January 30, 2003. Who Stands With U.S.? Europe Is Of Two Minds.
By John Tagliabue. NYT. January 31, 2003.
37 Turkey, U.S. Near Accord On Troop Deployment. By Karl Vick. WP. January 17, 2003.
Hungary Approves US Request For Training Base For Iraqi Exiles. By Eszter Szamado.
AFP. December 18, 2002.

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CRS-20
Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public
statements, more than 90,000 U.S. troops currently are currently ashore or on ships
in the region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers.
Whether the United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in
carrying out an attack on Iraq remains unclear. U.S. troops based in Kuwait would
likely play a key role in any ground attack against Iraq.
Post-conflict Assistance. After the 1991 Gulf war, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq. However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces. Japan, Sweden, and Romania have indicated that they might
play a role.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.
Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and outcome –
could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic pressures,
stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and festering regional
disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of the Middle East.
Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along ethnic or sectarian
lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional boundaries as occurred
after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is highly unlikely; however,
political realignments could take place, along with new alliances and rivalries that
might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide
to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance,
political support, or both. Turkey, which says it has lost billions of dollars in trade
since sanctions were imposed against Iraq, is likely to press the United States for
compensation if it agrees to allow U.S. forces to stage operations against Iraq from
bases on Turkish territory. Similarly, Saudi Arabia, should it assent to U.S. use of
its bases or facilities, would be likely to push for political concessions, including a
stronger U.S. effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See below.)

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CRS-21
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain the support or acquiescence of
Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will
be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest
to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted
Arab-Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region.
Two other issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.
Democracy and Governance. Some commentators believe that a war with
Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic
revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has
repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the
Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have
authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort
to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort
to support democratization and development, although the Administration is
requesting significantly more funding for this initiative–$145 million–in FY2004.
Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the
United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more
open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups,
who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other
groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior
experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the
Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. The timing of further initiatives to move
forward with Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been among the issues covered in recent
debates over a possible war with Iraq. Administration officials and other
commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more
favorable climate in which Arab-Israeli issues can be addressed. Proponents of this
view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which brought Arabs and
Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in 1991, after first
disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Many believe that the then Bush
Administration secured wide Arab participation in the coalition to expel Iraq from
Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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CRS-22
Officials of the present Bush Administration continue to speak of their vision of
pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after eliminating current threats from Iraq,
although the President alluded only briefly to this issue in his State of the Union
address on January 29, 2003.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to the United States than a
largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led
coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab
and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli
issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate
in Arab-Israeli negotiation, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of
inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in
anti-U.S. terrorism.38 Regardless of priority, however, it is likely that a war with Iraq
will be followed by further pressures on the U.S. Administration to intensify its
efforts to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region. Changed conditions in the
Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of a war with Iraq could breathe new life into
long moribund proposals for a Gulf regional security organization, perhaps with the
participation of other U.S. regional allies in the region such as Egypt and Jordan.
Over time, such an organization, if effective, might help alleviate burdens that
currently devolve upon the United States in countering threats to regional stability
and might also play a useful role in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, the
departure of Saddam Hussein from the scene could remove a leading incentive for
Gulf states to expand their involvement in regional security arrangements.
Furthermore, a U.S.-led war that did not enjoy widespread acceptance among the
Middle East populace might make local governments reluctant to participate in a
regional organization if it were perceived as a U.S. creation. It is possible, too, that
Gulf states would prefer to continue relying on their bilateral ties with the United
States for security guarantees rather than moving toward a multilateral approach.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy.
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy.
38 A former high U.S. official described the “Arab street” as “explosive”; however, many
observers point out that Middle East governments had little trouble containing incipient anti-
U.S. demonstrations during the Gulf war in 1990-1991.

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CRS-23
Humanitarian Issues
Rhoda Margesson, 7-0425
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
Background. Since the end of the 1991 war with Iraq, surveys and studies
show a continuing decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian
population, estimated at 27 million,39 especially among children and the elderly. But
it is difficult to determine how much of the suffering is due to the sanctions imposed
on Iraq and how much is due to other factors. Imposition of U.N. sanctions followed
a nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran, during which spending on the social
welfare system declined. Decades of conflict and the bombing during the Gulf war
damaged or destroyed much of the public infrastructure such as water and sewage
plants and many public buildings. Some argue that supplies of water, food, medicine,
and electricity are a matter of urgent concern.40 However, much of the information
available on the conditions within Iraq is also considered unreliable. Some groups
question the accuracy of statistics publicized by the government, but have no
independent sources of information. All estimates of the number of deaths due to
lack of food or medical care vary widely based on the source.
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies provide aid to Iraq through the Oil-for-
Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and
medicines for the civilian population.41 Both bilateral and multilateral aid have
continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to
assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP. During the 1990s,
the OFFP alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian
situation (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains
serious and has continued to deteriorate over time. Some improvements have been
seen in nutrition, health services, water supply and sanitation, but there is now greater
dependence on government services. Health and nutrition problems have been tied
to the consequences of war, sanctions, shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate
policies of the Iraqi regime.
War-Related Concerns. The implications of war in Iraq include a potential
humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq
itself. Four issues are of critical interest to Congress in that context. First, how the
war will be fought and for how long; will it be a protracted, urban war with heavy
civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi people? Second,
what type of humanitarian assistance will be provided to displaced populations (aid
priorities, use of oil revenues) and the role of other donors? Third, how will
assistance programs be implemented–through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration,
39 Total population numbers for Iraq vary by source from 24 to 27 million people. “UNICEF
Humanitarian Action: Iraq Donor Update January 14, 2003.” See [http://www.reliefweb.int].
40 “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of
Possible US War.” Turkish Daily News, December 27, 2002.
41 For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) see CRS Report RL30472,
Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade by Kenneth
Katzman.

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CRS-24
or U.N./donor assistance? And finally, what will be the impact of refugee flows on
stability in the region and the role of neighboring countries in contributing to post-
war efforts?
A U.N. Task Force assembled to coordinate the U.N. response to a possible
conflict predicts a conflict in Iraq could cause 500,000 casualties, create 900,000
refugees, and displace 2 million people, leaving about 10 million Iraqi civilians
(nearly 40% of the Iraqi population) in need of emergency assistance.42 However,
U.S. military planners are reportedly planning a war strategy, including an initial
precision bombing campaign, that will attempt to minimize civilian casualties and
damage to infrastructure.43 The United Nations reportedly estimates that 4.5 million
to 9.5 million Iraqis would need food soon after the onset of hostilities.44
Refugees. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have publicly stated that
they will prevent refugees from entering their countries.45 Iranian leaders have stated
that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but refugees would be
provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran in Afghanistan.46
However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in case. Turkey has
said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and is planning to
build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five more camps
within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of 24,000 tents. The
Red Crescent team is making preparations to accommodate up to 100,000 people and
treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting.47 Kuwait’s government has said it
will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that displaced people could be
cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two countries. The
government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees. According to relief
agency officials, Jordanian authorities appear determined not to allow Iraqi refugees
42 “War in Iraq Will Have Major Impact on Global Economy, U.N. Says,” Deutsche Presse
Agentur, January 10, 2003. The U.N. report “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios” that contained
this information was originally kept strictly confidential, but a Mennonite organization
obtained a copy and posted it [http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/pr/pr030107undoc.html].
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Jordan had 1.64 million refugees at the end
of 2001; 350,000 Iraqis have settled there since the 1991 war. “Aid Groups Get Ready for
War–Nearby Nations Expect Flood of Iraqi Refugees,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
December 23, 2002.
43 “War Plan Calls for Precision Bombing Wave to Break Iraqi Army Early in Attack.” New
York Times, February 2, 2003.
44 “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’ War; As U.S. Military Prepares
for Fighting, Relief Groups Mobilize to Save Lives,” Washington Post, January 5, 2003.
45 “Aid Groups Cagey on Contingency Plans for Iraq War,” Reuters, January 15, 2003.
46 Iranian police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf recently said, “No Refugees will be
Allowed into our Territory if America Attacks Iraq.” “Tehran Sends Mixed Signals on Iraqi
Refugees,” RFL/RL, January 16, 2003; “Iran Prepares for Possible Iraqi Refugee Influx,”
Reuters, January 16, 2003.
47 “Turkey to set up 24,000 tents at Iraq border for possible refugee influx,” Agence France-
Presse, January 15, 2003; “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’ War.”

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CRS-25
into Jordan. Saudi Arabia has not publicly discussed the need for preparation for
refugees, but there have been reports that the government is making some plans.48
Aid Agency Planning. The United Nations has an extensive infrastructure
in Iraq to oversee the OFFP.49 Few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have
offices in Baghdad and only a handful have a presence in Iraq. The Iraqi regime
restricts NGOs–for example, those that work in the North cannot have offices in the
South. In addition, U.S.-based organizations are required by the U.S. Government
to have a license to operate in Iraq.50 Among NGOs, there is a concern that U.S. and
other military leaders have underestimated the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq.51
NGOs have also complained that the U.S. government has delayed approval of
licenses required for U.S. agencies in Iraq, Iran, and Syria because of U.S.
sanctions.52 As a result, according to Interaction (an alliance of U.S.-based
international development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations), very
few U.S. or international organizations are operating in and around Iraq, which
means that they have no network in place and little experience in the area.53
Furthermore, according to NGOs, Pentagon officials have suggested that aid
organizations should not expect to operate in much of Iraq for several months after
a start of hostilities.
Some international organizations, such as the International Committee for the
Red Cross, have stockpiled supplies in and around Iraq, but there is a reluctance to
do this because these organizations do not want to send a message that they believe
a conflict is inevitable.54 U.N. humanitarian agencies met with key donors in Geneva
on December 13, 2002, to develop possible humanitarian scenarios and contingency
plans. The United Nations has appealed for $37.4 million to provide humanitarian
assistance and food, increase staffing for relief operations, and develop joint services
for the aid community in Iraq.55 UNHCR has been putting together a contingency
plan to address the potential for large-scale population movements. The United
48 Ibid.
49 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has four offices inside
Iraq, and works primarily with 100,000 Palestinians, 23,000 Iranians and 13,000 Turks–all
of whom are refugees. “U.N. Seeks $37.4 million Humanitarian Supplies in Case of Iraq
War.” Dow Jones International News, December 23, 2002.
50 “U.S. Plans Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi People in Case of War,” January 16, 2003,
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq]. “Uncertainty Dogs Relief Groups’ Plans to Care
for Iraq Refugees,” Financial Times, January 6, 2003.
51 AlertNet, “Agencies Should Resist Being Taken for Granted,” January 17, 2003,
[http://www.reliefweb.org].
52 “Aid Agencies accuse US of Hindering War Relief Preparations in Iraq,” Agence France-
Presse, January 17, 2003.
53 Interaction, U.S. Relief and Development Organizations Concerned Over Potential
H u m a n i t a r i a n C o n s e q u e n c e s o f Wa r i n I r a q , N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 2 ,
[http://www.interaction.org/media/Hot_Iraq.html].
54 “This Time Around, War Would Hit Iraq Harder,” The Washington Post, Oct. 29, 2002.
55 “U.N. Appeals for $37.4 million in Iraq Aid.” AP On Line, December 23, 2002.

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CRS-26
Nations Department of Peacekeeping is reportedly planning to establish an office that
could help with the coordination and distribution of humanitarian aid.56
Potential Internal Humanitarian Consequences of War. The United
Nations has explored the ways in which the current poor humanitarian situation
inside Iraq could worsen during a conflict.57 With more than two thirds of the
country receiving food assistance and many suffering from malnutrition and other
health problems, this situation could get worse if parts of Iraq became isolated and
humanitarian agencies could not gain access to these areas. Food security is a critical
concern in Iraq. Reportedly, families cannot make their rations last the full month
or they need to sell part of it for other necessities–leaving them without any food
stored in reserve and more vulnerable, particularly if food distribution were to be
interrupted.58 Military destruction of roads or railways could also destroy the food
distribution systems within Iraq and those from the international community. If
power stations were hit, the already damaged water and sanitation systems could be
further damaged, which could lead to epidemics, such as cholera and hepatitis.
According to the United Nations, particularly with an increase in displaced
populations “the outbreak of diseases in epidemic if not pandemic proportions is very
likely.”59 Water and sanitation are of greatest concern. Shortages in medical
supplies, drugs and vaccines have also been reported, and current stocks are predicted
to last only 4 months at current consumption rates.
In the confusion of war or in the context of a power vacuum, some observers
have suggested that Iraqis may initiate revenge killings and seek to resolve grievances
through violence or some form of revolt. In 1991, some Shiites executed Baath party
officials. Such an environment with a breakdown of the social order could have
serious humanitarian impacts, such as large-scale deaths and serious human rights
abuses, particularly towards women.60
Depending on the type of warfare, many Iraqis could suffer the unintended
consequences of military action, or the effects of chemical and biological weapons
if used by their government. If units of the Iraqi army took a scorched earth policy,
as they did with the Kuwaiti oil wells in the Gulf War, there could be serious
environmental and health consequences.
56 “Iraq War Could Put 10 Million in Need of Aid,” The Washington Post, January 7, 2003.
57 “Strictly Confidential U.N. document “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios,” December 10,
2002, [http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/pr/pr030107undoc.html.]
58 “UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Donor Update,” January 14, 2003.
59 “Strictly Confidential U.N. Document.”
60 “Statement on War with Iraq,” Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
International Rescue Committee, [http://www.womenscommission.org].

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CRS-27
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, January 24, 2003)
The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises
a number of domestic and international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article
I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under
international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; (3) the effect of United Nations
Security Council resolutions on the matter; and (4) the implications of such a use of
force for the numerous statutes providing special emergency powers to the President.
The following subsections give brief overviews of these issues and provide links to
reports that discuss these matters in greater detail.
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The potential use
of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions
under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has
employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of
the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....” Because of these separate powers, and
because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue
of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often
arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without
congressional authorization. While all commentators agree that the President has the
constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without
congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent
to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated
against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional.
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.” Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force.
In the present circumstance these legal requirements have been met and any
controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force avoided. As noted earlier
in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the
President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” As predicates for the use of

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CRS-28
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism. P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is
“intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It also requires the President to make periodic
reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” Finally, the statute
expresses congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt
and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions; but it does not condition the use of force on
prior Security Council authorization.
CRS Products
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Statutory Authority
for the Use of Force Against Iraq,” available online from the CRS site at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter226.html].
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Domestic Legal
Considerations” [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter126.html].
CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question
that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the U.S. would be
deemed legitimate under international law. International law traditionally has
recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues to
be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right has also traditionally
included the right to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate,
preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be
imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces. But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. As

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a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq
by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the
outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to
provide justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to
be a lawful preemptive use of force.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force
Against Iraq.
CRS Report RS21311, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force.
Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....” It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans. In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the right of States to use
force in self-defense.
Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N.
authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable. It is at least arguable that the
authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect. In the wake of a number
of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678,
adopted November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary means
to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In Resolution
687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including
unconditional Iraqi disarmament, and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop
or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related
to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire.
Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including
Resolution 678. It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the
conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the
authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.
Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security
Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit
authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990. On November 8, 2002, in

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the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month
earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi
compliance with that resolution. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations. The resolution obligates the Council to
“convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise
fail to meet its disarmament obligations.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the
Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview.
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Texts – 1992-2002.
CRS Report 91-395, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council Texts and Votes –
1991.
CRS Report 90-513, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Texts and
Votes – 1990.
Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and
the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using regular FY2003
funding. The Administration is expected to request supplemental appropriations to
cover additional expenses of on-going counter-terrorism operations and of mobilizing
forces for Iraq some time in the spring. In the meantime, the FY2003 Omnibus
Appropriations bill, H.J. Res. 2, may include some interim measures to give the
Defense Department flexibility in paying for the buildup of forces in the Persian
Gulf. The House-passed version of H.J. Res. 2 includes a provision providing DOD
with $2.5 billion in additional general transfer authority – the regular FY2003
defense appropriations bill provided $2 billion, equal to amounts usually provided
in recent years.
The Defense Department has not provided any estimates of the potential costs
of a war with Iraq. The Office of Management and Budget has prepared an internal
estimate, which reportedly projects costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the
estimate publicly, and it has not explained the assumptions underlying its projections.
Two congressional estimates of costs are available, however.

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! On September 30, 2002, the Congressional Budget Office prepared
estimates of the costs of two illustrative campaigns – a heavy ground
option involving 370,000 troops deployed to the region and a heavy
air option involving 270,000 troops. It projected that costs of these
options could range from $9 to $13 billion to deploy forces to the
Persian Gulf, from $6 to $9 billion a month to fight a war, from $5
to $7 billion to return forces to their home bases, and from $1 to $4
billion a month for a continuing occupation.61
! A week earlier, the Democratic staff of the House Budget
Committee prepared an estimate based on costs of the Persian Gulf
War of 1991. Its estimates ranged from $31 billion for a conflict
lasting 30 days with 125,000 troops to $60 billion for a conflict
lasting 60 days with 250,000 troops. The estimate also calculated
that interest costs of increasing the deficit to finance the war would
total an additional $17 to $33 billion over 10 years. The study did
not address occupation or reconstruction costs.62
CBO and the House Budget Committee Democratic staff estimated only the
direct budgetary effects of a war. Neither considered the possible economic
consequences, which could, in turn, affect federal revenues and outlays indirectly.
In November 2002, William Nordhaus of Yale University prepared a study that
estimated the total economic costs. Using the CBO and House Budget Committee
staff estimates as a starting point, he calculated that total costs could range from a
cumulative total of $120 billion on optimistic assumptions to $1.6 trillion on
unfavorable assumptions over the next 10 years.63
Oil Supply Issues
Larry Kumins, 7-7450
(Last updated February 4, 2003)
The threat of an armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over its supply of crude
oil to world markets. Iraq holds substantial proven oil reserves, but the country’s
current rate of production is much below its ultimate potential. The International
Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven
crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s currently known reserves – second only to
Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.
Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have
varied greatly; in some weeks nearly no oil has been exported, in others as much as
3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) enter world markets. During the past two months,
61 The CBO report is at [ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].
62 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf].
63 See [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf] .

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the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reports that exports have averaged 1.5 mbd under
the oil-for-food program. Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq’s international oil
flow, world oil markets rely on the Iraqi supply, and it is an important factor in the
determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-purchaser arrangements.
Iraq accounts for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not
participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi
exports are controlled by the U.N. under Resolution 986. Despite the U.N.
restrictions, Iraq’s financial incentive to keep supplying the world market is strong,
since crude prices have approached record levels due to an oil workers’ strike in
Venezuela. The strike began on December 2, 2002, and has combined with
uncertainty regarding a new Persian Gulf conflict to raise crude oil prices to levels
that are 50% higher than the 2001 average. Current indications suggest the
Venezuelan strike is winding down and that oil output is growing, but it is not clear
how soon production will reach pre-strike levels. But were the strike to continue
through spring – and events in the Persian Gulf cause a halt in Iraqi crude supply –
OPEC members would not be able to make up the lost crude. With little surplus-
producing capacity elsewhere in the world, a crude supply shortfall would likely
happen, and oil prices could spike upward. If any conflict involving Iraq were to
spread beyond its borders to Kuwait – as Saddam Hussein has threatened, or affect
tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf – a greater oil shortfall could take place with more
significant price impacts.
Iraq likely holds the potential to become one the world’s top two or three oil
producers, were investment and technology applied to its existing fields. Should it
have a change of government, it could become a much larger oil producer, leading
prices and supplies in the other direction. Such a large supply addition would change
the basic crude oil price structure of the past 25 years. This eventuality could unleash
a new set of political and economic forces affecting many countries.
Economic Effects of a War with Iraq
Marc Labonte, 7-0640
(Last updated January 24, 2003)
U.S. military operations in Iraq would potentially have two distinct effects on
the economy. First, an increase in military expenditures, if deficit financed, could
increase aggregate demand in the short run. Second, if military operations led to a
sudden and persistent spike in the price of oil, economic growth could fall and
inflation could rise in the short run. Specific economic estimates are hindered by
uncertainty surrounding the scale and scope of operations, the effects of operations
on oil prices, and the response of (and effect on) neighboring oil-producing countries.

Economic Effects of Military Expenditures. In the past, military conflicts
have been financed through higher taxes, lower government spending in non-military
areas, government borrowing from the public, or money creation. Higher taxes or
lower government spending may play a small role in financing any U.S. operation in
Iraq; money creation would almost certainly not play a role. Government borrowing
from the public, through the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities to finance a larger
budget deficit, appears likely to be the primary form of financing any military

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operations in Iraq. If this were the case, the military outlays would boost aggregate
demand in the short run. Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be directed
to foreigners instead of domestic producers since the operations would occur abroad.
Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be “crowded out” by higher interest
rates, which reduce investment spending and other interest-sensitive spending, and
dollar appreciation, which reduces exports and the production of import-competing
goods. If economic activity were still sluggish when an invasion took place, less of
the boost in aggregate demand would be crowded out. In any case, even the highest
cost estimates of the operations suggest that the outlays would be too small relative
to GDP to have significant economic effects. Wars may shift resources from non-
military spending to military spending, but since military spending is included in
GDP, this would not by itself lead to a recession.
Economic Effects of Higher Oil Prices. Perhaps the greatest unknown
economic factor in a military conflict with Iraq is the effect it would have on oil
prices. Economic theory suggests that oil shocks lead to higher inflation, a
contraction in output, and higher unemployment. Effective policy responses are
difficult because expansionary policy would exacerbate the inflationary pressures
while contractionary policy would exacerbate the contraction in output. Military
operations against Iraq would be likely to reduce Iraqi oil output temporarily.
Whether this led to a sustained spike in oil prices would depend on whether other oil
producers increase their production to fill the gap or whether the military operations
could accomplish their objectives quickly with little collateral damage to Iraqi oil
facilities, topics beyond the scope of this report. Evidence suggests that an increase
in the price of oil would have little effect on the economy if it is transient.
The Role of Confidence in the Economy. M a n y o f t h e n e g a t i v e
economic forecasts by private analysts concerning a potential conflict are being
driven in large part by their assumptions that the conflict would reduce consumer and
business confidence and stock market values. These effects are highly speculative,
as they have not been important factors in many past American wars.
Economic Effects of the First Gulf War. Most economists do not attribute
the 1990-1991 recession to the Gulf War. Rather, they attribute it to contractionary
monetary policy, the spike in oil prices that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and problems in the U.S. banking sector. The Gulf War did not begin until
the recession was almost over. As a percentage of GDP, military outlays actually fell
during the Gulf War, unlike the typical war-time military buildup that expands
aggregate demand.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences.
CRS Report RL31176, Financing Issues and Economic Effects of Past American
Wars.
CRS Report RL31676, Middle East Oil Disruption, Potential Severity and Policy
Options.

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Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Chronology
For a chronology of Iraq related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
Iraq Facts
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources. The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This website includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation.
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html#ppos].

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The following site focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1441, holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations. For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.

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