Order Code RL31144
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement:
Economic and Trade Policy Issues
Updated February 3, 2003
J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement:
Economic and Trade Policy Issues
Summary
On December 6, 2000, the United States and Chile began discussions on a
bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that was completed on December 11, 2002, two
years and 14 negotiation rounds later. President Bush formally notified the 108th
Congress on January 30, 2003 of his intention to sign the agreement, initiating a
legally required 90-day review period prior to congressional consideration of
implementing legislation, which is expected later in the year. This report provides
background and analysis on Chile’s economy, trade relations, and the new bilateral
FTA and will be updated periodically.
If the FTA is implemented, Chile would join a select group of only four other
countries that have an FTA with the United States (Canada, Mexico, Jordan, and
Israel). Although many point to the potential for trade growth between the two
countries, if passed, the significance of this FTA runs much deeper: 1) it would be
the first such agreement with a South American country; 2) it would be an agreement
with one of the most open and reformed economies in Latin America; 3) it would be
an example of how trade policy issues, including those with both social as well as
economic implications, can be resolved between a small developing country and a
large developed one; and, 4) it may prove to be a strategic step toward completing the
Free Trade Area of the Americas.
The United States and Chile are putting the finishing touches on the text. The
FTA is comprehensive, but despite the variety and complexity of issues negotiated,
increased market access would be the primary benefit for both countries. In time, all
goods traded between the two countries would receive duty-free access. Fully 85%
of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products would become duty-free
immediately, with other product tariff rates being reduced over time. Some 75% of
U.S. farm exports would enter Chile duty-free within four years and all duties would
be fully phased out within 12 years after implementation of the agreement. For
Chile, 95% of its export products would gain duty-free status immediately and only
1.2% would fall into the longest 12-year phase out period.
Other critical issues were resolved including environment and labor provisions,
capital controls, increased access for services trade, greater protection of intellectual
property, and creation of a new e-commerce chapter. No chapter on trade remedies
was included, hence there would be no anticipated change to the antidumping and
countervailing duty options currently available to both countries. Finally, there
would be a single dispute resolution process for the whole agreement. Commercial
cases would rely on standard remedies that could culminate in the suspension of tariff
benefits. For environment and labor disputes, remedies may include monetary
assessments or fines, which would be placed in a fund to address the problem that
generated the complaint. Nonpayment of any such fine could lead to other undefined
measures. Although sanctions were not ruled out, there is little anticipation of a
future problem that would result in such a response.

Contents
Why A U.S.-Chile FTA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Economic Reform in Chile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chile’s Trade Policies and Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The U.S.-Chile Bilateral Trade Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Review of Negotiations and Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Tariffs and Market Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Nontariff Barriers and Sectoral Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IPR and Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Labor and Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Postscript: A Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix 1. US-Chile Merchandise Trade, 1985-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix 2. Major U.S.-Chile Product Trade and Tariff Rates, 2001 . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix 3. Chile’s Multilateral, Regional, and Bilateral Trade Agreements . . 20
List of Figures
Figure 1. Growth in Chilean Trade with Major Partners, 1993-2001 . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2. Chile Direction of Trade, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 3. U.S.-Chile Merchandise Trade, 1991-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
List of Tables
Table 1. Chile: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement:
Economic and Trade Policy Issues
On December 6, 2000, the United States and Chile initiated discussions on a
bilateral free trade agreement (FTA). Two years and 14 negotiation rounds later, the
two countries announced on December 11, 2002 that an agreement had been reached.
President Bush formally notified the 108th Congress on January 30, 2003 of his
intention to sign the agreement, initiating a legally required 90-day review period
prior to congressional consideration of implementing legislation, which is expected
later in the year. This report provides background and analysis on Chile’s economy,
trade relations, and the new bilateral FTA.
Why A U.S.-Chile FTA?
Trade agreements evoke strong reactions from supporters and opponents alike.
Nowhere is this debate more alive than in the U.S. Congress, which for eight years
was at an impasse over passage of trade promotion authority (TPA) until it renewed
TPA in August 2002 as part of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210).1 Without TPA,
the politically charged nature of trade negotiations made passage of implementing
legislation for multilateral and regional agreements more uncertain. In addition to
complex multilateral trade arrangements, the United States has pursued simpler
bilateral agreements that were expected to be less politically sensitive and therefore
more likely to gain congressional approval, especially if TPA had not been renewed.
On September 28, 2001, for example, President Bush signed into law the
implementing legislation for the U.S.-Jordan FTA (P.L. 107-43). Bilateral FTAs
with Singapore and Chile were pursued with the expectation of similar support.
Opposition to bilateral FTAs, however, has heated up for both economic and
political reasons. Economists, even those who support free trade, point out that
bilateral (and regional) agreements are poor substitutes for multilateral arrangements.
Although both countries in a bilateral arrangement may see their welfare improve
through trade creation, the agreement may also cause trade (and investment)
diversion, which can negatively affect those both in and outside of the agreement.
1 Trade promotion authority, formerly known as fast-track trade negotiating authority, is an
expedited process for congressional consideration of trade agreements. It provides that
Congress will consider trade agreements within a mandatory deadline, under limited debate,
and with no amendments as long as the President meets requirements set in the law. See:
CRS Issue Brief IB10084, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade
Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress
, by Lenore Sek and CRS
Report RS21004, Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade Agreements and Trade
Promotion Authority: Chronology of Major Votes
, by Carolyn C. Smith.

CRS-2
Although trade diversion is often difficult to assess, it is a real consideration in
pursuing negotiations below the multilateral level.2
In addition to economists’ questions over the trade effects of bilateral
agreements, there is vehement opposition by various interest groups. Perhaps first
among many are the import-competing industries that bear the brunt of the
adjustment costs of a trade agreement. Despite the welfare gains to society as a
whole (e.g. more efficient resource allocation, lower priced imports, greater selection
of goods), those industries subject to increased competition face potentially serious
pressure to adjust their operations to become more efficient, lower-cost producers.
Competition is generally accepted as a tenet of doing business in a market economy,
and on a national level, these adjustment costs may be small and lead to greater
productivity. When the rules change because of trade agreements, however, affected
workers and industries resist strongly and their concerns are a legitimate part of the
trade liberalization debate.
Strong criticism of virtually all trade agreements also arises from groups arguing
that any arrangement is unacceptable unless it includes strong provisions addressing
the impact of the trade agreement on labor and environmental conditions. When
joined with other groups protesting “globalization” in general, a formidable coalition
is created. Collectively, these interest groups raise the question of whether trade
agreements enhance the social welfare of participating countries. Given the intensity
of debate and amount of effort and resources needed to consummate an FTA, some
questioned whether the marginal gains from a U.S.-Chile bilateral agreement would
be justified given that Chile is a small and distant U.S. trade partner, and already has
a relatively open economy.
Advocates of the U.S.-Chile FTA responded that it offered both economic and
political gains, with Chile seen as a potential strategic foothold in South America, a
region historically linked closely with Europe and Asia. From an economic
perspective, U.S. business interests considered Chile a prime target for expanding
exports and repeatedly stressed the need to reduce the higher tariffs they faced
relative to Canada and other countries that already had FTAs with Chile. Lower-cost
U.S. imports from Chile also provided benefits to individual and business consumers.
Further, the major U.S. imports from Chile (copper, salmon, grapes, wine, wood) had
zero tariffs already, suggesting that the adjustment costs to import-competing firms
would be low (see appendix 2).3 U.S. investors also saw Chile’s political and
economic stability attractive for foreign investment.
From a trade strategy perspective, it was argued that a U.S.-Chile FTA would
support U.S. initiatives with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), currently
under negotiation, by encouraging greater Chilean support for U.S. issues and
2 For a discussion, see: CRS Report RL31072, Regional Trade Agreements: An Analysis of
Trade-Related Impacts
, by Gary J. Wells. August 3, 2001.
3 Grapes, copper, refined oil, and wine enter duty free under the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), which requires periodic congressional reauthorization. Presumably, one
important reason Chile pursued an FTA with the United States was to make these zero tariffs
a permanent rather than temporary arrangement.

CRS-3
perhaps even helping define key negotiating parameters (e.g. labor and environment
provisions) that could be precedent-setting.4 The U.S.-Chile FTA was also offered
as a compelling case for passage of TPA legislation, which would serve as a signal
to Latin America and the rest of the world of the U.S. commitment to pursue and
complete trade agreements.
Chile also saw a logic in prioritizing an FTA with the United States because
export promotion has been a building block of its growth and development strategy.
Chile also envisioned increased foreign investment as an attendant benefit of the
FTA, and argued that its well-established track record on economic and trade reform
made it the Latin American country most ready to negotiate a bilateral FTA. In short,
despite its relatively small economy, Chile presented itself as a country ready,
willing, and able to negotiate a mutually beneficial FTA with the United States.
In addition to the benefits that were expected to accrue to U.S. businesses,
investors, and consumers, an FTA with Chile was also seen as an opportunity for the
United States to support economic and trade reform in Latin America, for which
Chile had become a regional model. Trade was a big part of the economic growth
and development story in Chile, and linked directly to increased productivity, higher
standards of living, greater diffusion of technology, and overall modernization of the
country. Therefore, the United States, it was argued, should support these gains
because they are a foundation for continued economic, social, and political stability
and progress in the region. Trade agreements were also presented as playing a role
in development and have the added benefit of “locking in” reforms, lending a sense
of permanence to economic and political conditions that is conducive to attracting
and keeping foreign trade and investment.
Clearly, there were competing viewpoints on the desirability of a U.S.-Chile
FTA. A look at Chile’s economic development is one way of addressing many, if not
all, of the issues highlighted above precisely because Chile has been an early and
aggressive reformer of economic and trade policy in Latin America. In this light, to
the extent that the welfare of Chilean society has improved with economic openness,
it may be one indication that freer trade can support a broad array of economic and
political goals. It is with this approach in mind that this report integrates a discussion
of Chile’s economic growth and development with trade policy issues raised in both
the United States and Chile.
Economic Reform in Chile
Chile has become one of the most open, reformed, and developed economies
in Latin America, a rebuilding process initiated under the military dictatorship of
Augusto Pinochet (1973-90) and accelerated under civilian government following the
return of democratic rule in 1990. Chile transformed its state-dominated economy
into one grounded in market-based economic principles, first by stabilizing the
4 The FTAA would include 34 nations of the Western Hemisphere and is scheduled for
completion by January 2005. See: CRS Report RS20864, A Free Trade Area of the
Americas: Status of Negotiations and Major Policy Issues
, by J. F. Hornbeck.

CRS-4
economy and then restructuring it (e.g., lifting price controls, deregulating labor
markets, privatizing state enterprises, reducing trade and exchange rate restrictions).
As part of the process, Chile weathered some devastating domestic setbacks,
including the 1982 economic collapse, followed by the sudden onset of the Latin
American debt crisis. Chile survived it all, however, and eventually thrived
economically, although not without incurring significant social costs along the way.5
Table 1. Chile: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
GDP Growth (%)
7.4
6.6
3.2
-1.0
4.4
2.8
1.7
Inflation - CPI Avg. (%)
7.4
6.1
5.1
3.3
3.8
3.6
2.4
Unemployment Rate (%)
6.5
6.1
6.2
9.7
9.2
9.2
8.8
Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)
2.4
1.9
-0.1
-2.2
-0.9
-0.9
----
Current Acct Bal (% of GDP)
-5.1
-4.5
-5.2
-0.1
-1.3
-1.4
-1.8
Terms of Trade (% change)
-15.5
2.6
-12.6
0.9
-0.1
-8.0
----
Foreign Exchange Res. ($bil)
15.5
17.8
16.0
14.7
14.7
14.4
15.6
Data Source: International Monetary Fund and Central Bank of Chile.
Economic reform has continued into the 21st century and actually coincided with
a period of strong economic growth that held for most of the last decade (see table
1
). Currently, Chile is adjusting to the slower economic growth experienced both at
home and abroad over the past two years, including a prolonged recession and
financial crisis in neighboring Argentina. In 2002, Chile’s gross domestic product
(GDP) rose by only 1.7%, which was higher than many of its neighbors. Although,
this reflects a slower growth rate compared to average economic growth of over 5%
in the late 1990s, Chile’s economy has proven resilient in the face a global economic
downturn and contagion from the Argentine financial crisis.
Chile’s current macroeconomic management rests on three policy pillars: a
flexible exchange rate; inflation-targeting monetary policy; and strict fiscal discipline
aimed at generating a public sector surplus.6 On the positive side, tight fiscal control
has kept Chile’s public external debt position relatively low, helping restrain inflation
to 2.4% in 2002 and leaving room for monetary policy to support economic growth
as well as price stability. Productivity levels have been sufficient to see real wage
growth, as well. On the negative side, unemployment has remained around 9%, a
nagging problem facing Chilean policy makers.
Trade reform began in the 1970s and helped transform the economy. By
dismantling its multilevel tariff schedule and reducing nontariff barriers, Chile sought
to engage foreign markets more aggressively and open itself to international
5 A detailed summary of this process with an emphasis on trade policy may be found in:
CRS Report 97-56, Chilean Trade and Economic Reform: Implications for NAFTA
Accession
, by J. F. Hornbeck. October 17, 1997. pp. 1-9.
6 Presentation by Chilean Minister of Finance, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, February 28, 2001 and IMF, Chile: 2001 Article IV Consultation, p. 9.

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competition. The uniform average nominal import tariff rate fell from 105% in 1973
to 15% in 1988, and to 11% in 1991 under civilian government. Chile then reduced
the tariff rate by 1 percentage point each year until it reached 6% on January 1, 2003.
Although not without adjustment costs, the competitive pressures of trade reform
have clearly increased productivity and economic growth.
Continuing a trend since the mid-1980s, Chile has recently made a number of
simplifying capital market reforms, including abandoning its exchange rate band in
favor of a floating system, eliminating many controls on foreign capital, including the
one-year, non-remunerated reserve requirement, and reducing and equalizing capital
gains treatment of domestic and foreign investment.7 Changes in capital controls and
exchange rate management have been essential to spurring Chile’s export-led growth.
Privatization and deregulation have also progressed beyond financial services to
include telecommunications, energy, and selected public infrastructure, with Chile
also leading Latin America in the divestiture of public-owned enterprises.
Chile’s record of reform, growth, and development corresponds with increased
measures of income and social well being. In 2001, Chile’s per capita income level
was second only to Argentina’s in Latin America and will likely be first once data
reflect Argentina’s financial crisis. In addition, Chile’s human development index
(HDI) ranked third in Latin America behind Argentina and Uruguay and ahead of the
much larger economies of Brazil and Mexico.8 Welfare gains for the poorer
segments of Chilean society are also being seen, with a relatively low child mortality
rate and absolute measures of poverty declining over the past decade and registering
lower than most other Latin American countries.9 High unemployment and a skewed
income distribution in line with the rest of the region, however, point to the need to
increase the quality and quantity of workforce participation, which is related to
improving education, health care, and other public policies.
Chile’s Trade Policies and Relations
Over the past decade, Chile’s increasingly expansive and independent trade
policy portrays a strategy that is commonly referred to as “open regionalism.” This
approach combines unilateralism with the formation of sub-regional integration
groups open to future expansion, such as the Andean Community and the Southern
Common Market (Mercado Comun del Sur – Mercosur), among others, while also
7 Latin American Monitor: Southern Cone. June 2001, pp. 4-5 and Central Bank of Chile,
Press Release, April 16, 2001.
8 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure (education, income, and
life expectancy) of average achievement in human development. Worldwide, Chile ranked
39 compared to Argentina (34), Uruguay (37), Brazil (69), Mexico (51), and Venezuela (61).
Argentina’s rank may fall precipitously once corrected for its current financial crisis. See:
United Nations, Human Development Report 2001, p. 141.
9 Less than 2% of Chile’s population lives on less than $1.00 per day compared to 9% in
Brazil, 12% in Mexico, and 19% in Venezuela. The under-5 mortality rate for Chile is 12
per 1,000 compared to Argentina (22), Brazil (40), Mexico (36), and Venezuela (23). See:
The World Bank. 2002 World Development Report, pp. 234-35.

CRS-6
leaving open the possibility for bilateral and extra-regional trade agreements. As
pointed out in one study, it differs from earlier, fundamentally unsuccessful, attempts
at economic integration in Latin America by emphasizing trade opening rather than
collective sub-regional protectionism.10
The “open regionalism” policy took shape in the early 1990s when Chile signed
economic complementarity agreements (simplified free trade agreements) with
Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador under guidelines set out by the
Latin American Integration Association (Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion
– ALADI). Similar arrangements followed with Peru and Argentina. Chile has
signed FTAs with Canada, Mexico, and Central America. In April and October 2002
respectively, Chile completed negotiations for an FTA with the European Union and
South Korea. It is currently courting other countries including Japan, New Zealand,
and Singapore, and closing in on an agreement with the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), see appendix 3. All are considered part of a strategy to open
industrial economies further to Chilean exports. Chile joined Mercosur as an
associate member in 1996, limiting its commitment largely because of Mercosur’s
higher common external tariff. Chile is also an active participant in the World Trade
Organization (WTO), seeing it as the venue to settle controversial issues less suited
to regional or bilateral discussions.
Trade data reflect Chile’s open and independent trade policy. Its exports to the
world expanded by 89% over the eight years 1993-2001 (see figure 1) and imports
grew by 56%. Although Chile is not part of the Andean Community or a full partner
of Mercosur, its fastest export growth has been intra-regional, a testament to Chile’s
trade strategy that combines unilateral reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers with
an aggressive effort to enter into bilateral arrangements. From 1993 to 2001, Chilean
exports expanded by 126% to Latin America, compared to 100% to the United States,
43% to Japan, 70% to the rest of Asia, and 71% to the European Union. Chile’s
trade with Canada points to another interesting trend. Although the dollar value of
exports is very small, it grew by some 380%, an issue that was not lost on many U.S.
business advocates of a U.S.-Chile FTA, who argued that the Chile-Canada FTA put
U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage until a similar or better agreement could be
reached with the United States.
As seen in figure 2, Chile’s direction of trade is diversified, which not only
increases opportunities for trade, but also reduces dependence on a few markets and
thereby softens exposure to foreign shocks (e.g. Argentina). Its largest export market
is the European Union, which accounted for 26% of exports in 2001, followed by
Latin America, with 23%. The United States is the largest single-country trading
partner, capturing nearly 19% of Chilean exports in 2001, ahead of Japan with 12%.
These figures reflect some relative change since 1993, as seen in the growth patterns
in figure 1. There was a slight loss of Chilean export share to Japan and the
European Union, and a slight increase to Latin America. There was also a large
10 Weintraub, Sidney. Development and Democracy in the Southern Cone: Imperatives for
U.S. Policy in South America
. Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2000. pp. 2-3.

























































































































































































































CRS-7
increase (from 0.6% to 2.4%) in Chilean export share to Canada, although from a
very small base.
Figure 1. Growth in Chilean Trade with Major Partners, 1993-2001
Latin America is Chile’s largest importing area, accounting for 35% of imports,
followed by the EU with 19%, the United States with 17%, and Asia with 13%.
Japan and Canada follow at a distance with 3% and 2%, respectively. The EU trade
presence in Chile declined over the past decade, as it did with other Latin American
countries. The relative importance of the United States suggests that Chile has a
strong incentive to pursue a bilateral FTA, other than a general preference for
expanding its export base.
Chile’s open regionalism and export driven trade policy have been challenged,
however, for not focusing enough on diversifying the country away from minimally
refined agriculture and mining products (copper, fish, grapes, and wood).
Manufactured products account for less than 15% of total exports,11 suggesting two
potential problems. First, relying on traditional commodities can provide strong
export earnings, but earnings are unpredictable given the volatile nature of
commodity prices (see Chile’s swings in its terms of trade in table 1).
11 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Integration and Trade in the Americas:
Periodic Note, December 2000
. Washington, D.C. p. 14. At the other end of the spectrum,
manufactured goods account for 71% of Mexico’s exports, reflecting the large amount of
maquiladora trade with the United States.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CRS-8
Figure 2. Chile Direction of Trade, 2001
Second, little movement toward a manufacture-based, value-added approach to
export promotion can limit long-term economic growth, a point developed by an
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) study arguing that the relatively poor
income growth performance of commodity exporting countries can be traced to this
lack of export diversification. Although many Latin American countries have
expanded their intra-regional trade, deepening integration with developed economies
seems necessary to achieve greater export diversification. The large gains in export
manufactures of Mexico and the Central American countries in the 1990s, for
example, were related, in some measure, to preferential trade arrangements with the
United States. Other Latin American countries had much slower growth of
manufactured exports.12 Whether Chile will adopt export diversification as part of
its long-term development strategy is unclear, but Chile’s efforts to develop trade
relationships with developed economies, including the U.S.-Chile FTA, would seem
to be an important component of such a goal.
On Chile’s import side, most from developed countries are capital goods,
highlighting the link between an open trade policy (lower tariffs on capital goods)
and development (capital goods form the investment base for other production).
Importantly, there is strong competition in the Chilean capital goods market from
firms around the world. Given Chile’s many trade negotiations underway, there was
pressure exerted by U.S. firms to expedite the Chile-FTA. A closer look at the
structure of U.S.-Chile trade suggests there is potential for mutual benefit from
strengthening trade ties between the two countries.
12 Ibid., pp. 12-15.





































































































































































































































































































































































































CRS-9
The U.S.-Chile Bilateral Trade Relationship
The United States is Chile’s largest single-country trading partner, accounting
for 19% of Chilean exports and 17% of imports in 2001. By contrast, Chile is the
United States’ 32nd largest export destination and 37th largest import contributor,
accounting for 0.4% of U.S. trade. Chile’s relatively small share of U.S. trade has
actually slipped slightly in recent years, but its increasing openness to U.S. trade is
evident in the numbers. In 2001, Chile’s per capita imports from the United States
reached $203, up nearly 50% from a decade earlier and significantly higher than other
major South American countries considered less liberalized in their trade policies
such as Argentina ($108) and Brazil ($92).13
Figure 3. U.S.-Chile Merchandise Trade, 1991-2001
Trends in U.S.-Chile merchandise trade are shown in figure 3 (data appear in
appendix 1). U.S. exports grew by 70% over the past decade, slightly below the
73% growth seen in U.S. exports to the world, and farther behind the 93% growth to
Latin America as a whole, excluding Mexico. At a time when Chile continued to
open its trade policies, the trend line reflects a noticeable decline from 1997 to 1999,
coinciding with the precipitous fall in Chile’s economic growth from 7.4% in both
1996 and 1997 to 3.4 % in 1998 and -1.1% in 1999 (see table 1.) As economic
growth picked up again in 2000, rising to 5.4%, so too did the demand for U.S.
goods, but economic and U.S. export trends faltered again in 2001, with the United
States running a merchandise trade deficit with Chile for the first time since 1988.
13 See: CRS Report 98-840 E, U.S.-Latin American Trade: Recent Trends, by J. F.
Hornbeck, p. 4.

CRS-10
U.S. imports from Chile have grown steadily since 1991, reflecting continuing
U.S. interest in Chilean products and the extended expansion of the U.S. economy.
U.S. imports grew by 173% from 1991 to 2001, a higher rate of import growth than
from either Latin America, excluding Mexico (116%), or the world (134%). The
United States maintained a trade surplus with Chile from 1989 until 2000; in 2001
the trade balance turned to a deficit equal to 6% of total trade between the two
countries.
Major U.S. products exported to Chile are mostly capital goods (see appendix
2). These include: machinery (31%), particularly computers, office machinery, and
industrial equipment such as gas turbines and bull dozers; electrical machinery (16%)
including television and radio transmission apparatus, telephone equipment, spare
parts, integrated circuits, sound recording equipment and media; vehicles (8%)
mostly trucks and passenger cars; aircraft and parts (5%), and optical/medical
instruments (5%). In recent years, the U.S. export trends have exhibited a slowing
in transportation equipment such as airplanes and automobiles, and a significant
increase in computer and electronic equipment.
The top five U.S. imports from Chile are natural resource based goods that
reflect some refining of the basic resource, but little value-added manufacturing
activity. They account for nearly 70% of total imports from Chile and include:
copper articles (19%), mostly refined alloys; edible fruits and nuts (18%), most of
which are grapes; fish (15%), mostly salmon; wood (13%), various types of lumber;
and beverages (4%), virtually all wine. Recent trends have seen an increase in grape
and fish imports, with a steady level or slight decline in demand for copper, wood,
and wine products relative to other goods.
Review of Negotiations and Policy Issues
The U.S.-Chile FTA was completed on December 11, 2002, following two years
and 14 rounds of negotiations. President Bush formally notified the 108th Congress
on January 30, 2003 of his intention to sign the agreement, initiating a legally
required 90-day congressional review period prior to consideration of implementing
legislation, which is expected later in the year. The agreement as negotiated was
comprehensive, covering areas such as market access, investment, agriculture,
government procurement, intellectual property rights, subsidies/countervailing duties,
antidumping, services, environment, and labor provisions. The breadth of interests
negotiated made completing the agreement to the satisfaction of all parties difficult.
The overarching difficulty rests with reconciling the well-established benefits
of freer trade, which tend to be enjoyed broadly throughout society, with the costs
that fall more narrowly on import-competing sectors of the economy. Concerns of
special interest groups also come into play. Crafting the language that can balance
these interests falls to country negotiators. Negotiators at the office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR), with congressional guidance provided in TPA
legislation, presumably allowed for a broadly acceptable balance to be struck. This
section summarizes the major policy issues that had to be reconciled in the
negotiating process, followed by a section summarizing the FTA’s main features.

CRS-11
Tariffs and Market Access
For the United States, market access and particularly reducing tariff rates, was
a central goal of the negotiations. For countries that have trade agreements with
Chile, such as Canada, the uniform 6% tariff is being phased out on most goods, an
advantage the United States wanted to eliminate. On the other side, the primary U.S.
imports from Chile faced zero tariffs under normal trade relations or under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a preferential trade arrangement made by
developed countries for developing country imports (see appendix 3 for U.S. tariff
treatment of major Chilean exports). In fact, one of the benefits of the FTA for Chile
would be that its exports would not have to rely on periodic congressional
reauthorization of the GSP for reduced- or zero-tariff treatment.
The United States and Chile negotiated tariff reduction on a product-by-product
basis to establish a schedule, as in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), that would define the timetable to phase out tariffs on both sides. There
were numerous sensitive products, many of them agricultural, that required longer
periods of protection than others.
Nontariff Barriers and Sectoral Issues
In addition to tariff reductions, nontariff barriers (NTBs) presented negotiators
with significant challenges. In the United States, low tariffs on most products have
caused domestic industries to rely on trade remedy laws to fight import competition.
Perhaps the most controversial issue was the application of U.S. antidumping statutes
(investigations to determine if goods are being sold at less than fair value), which
Chile expressed a particular desire to address in the bilateral FTA. This was not a
new issue and was tackled in the Canada-Chile FTA, which provides for the
“reciprocal exemption from the application of anti-dumping laws,” except under
“exceptional circumstances.”14 The thrust of that agreement appears not to force the
elimination of antidumping remedies, but to make their use a last rather than first
recourse, under WTO guidelines.
Chile maintained that its sensitivity to U.S. antidumping investigations was
based on their “frequent and at times unjustified use,”15 and argued that just the filing
of dumping charges initiated a process with significant unrecoverable costs regardless
of the investigation’s outcome. In recent years, antidumping duty investigations were
concluded on Chilean salmon (July 1998), mushrooms (November 1998), grapes
(June 2001), and raspberries (July 2001). The International Trade Commission ruled,
although not always unanimously, that there was reasonable indication that material
injury was caused to U.S. producers in the cases of salmon, mushrooms, and
raspberries, but not for grapes.16
14 Government of Canada, Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, February 1997.
Antidumping was also addressed in the Chile-Mexico FTA.
15 On Chile’s trade agreements, see: [http://www.direcon.cl/acuerdos/index.htm]
16 ITC antidumping rulings may be viewed at: [http://www.usitc.gov/7ops/7opsindex.htm]

CRS-12
Chile is only one of many countries that criticize the U.S. trade remedy process
as being overly cumbersome and protectionist. There is even disagreement within
the United States, with some arguing that these laws, or at least their application,
should be put on the negotiating table, but there continues to be broad support in
Congress for these statutes.17 The United States indicated that trade remedy laws
would not be negotiated unless otherwise directed by Congress and the Bush
Administration, and extended an offer to Chile to make the process more transparent.
Chile responded with concrete proposals to make this suggestion operational.18
The United States also had NTB concerns. Chile’s price band system used to
maintain domestic agricultural prices amounts to duties being placed on imports
above the unified ad valorem tariffs. The USTR argues that even as the unified tariff
rates fall, these additional duties can serve to maintain high effective tariff rates. In
the meantime, the Chilean price band system was being challenged by Argentina in
the WTO. The United States also expressed concern over Chile’s sanitary and
phytosanitary regulations that restrict imports of U.S. agricultural and meat products.
Although some movement had been made in favor of certain U.S. agricultural goods
such as citrus, grapes, and apples, others were still restricted. U.S. poultry and red
meats still faced obstacles, including Chile’s refusal to accept U.S. inspection and
grading systems.19
IPR and Investment
Among the other issues of special interest to the United States were intellectual
property rights (IPR) and investment provisions. Chile has signed the Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, but its congress has not passed the
required implementing legislation. Until this happens, Chilean intellectual property
laws will not be fully consistent with WTO guidelines. Foreign investment and
capital control laws have been relaxed in recent years, but some restrictions remain.
Also, there are still some inconsistencies between Chilean law and WTO rules on
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). Given the potential for United States
investment to grow in Chile, these provisions were important to U.S. interests.
Labor and Environment
Labor and environment provisions have become accepted as legitimate, but
nonetheless, difficult issues to resolve in trade agreements. At the heart of the matter
is whether a difference in environmental and labor standards between developed and
developing countries creates economic and social issues that should be addressed in
17 See: Eiras, Ana I. and Felipe Ward. Time to Advance Free Trade with Chile. The
Heritage Foundation, July 18, 2001. Also, 61 Senators sent a letter to President Bush
expressing opposition to any agreement that would weaken U.S. trade remedy laws and there
are similar sentiments in the House.
18 Conversations with office of the USTR, August 17, 2001 and Embassy of Chile, May 9,
2002.
19 Office of the United States Trade Representative. 2002 National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers
. pp. 38-39.

CRS-13
trade agreements. This has led to a strong divergence of opinion, both among groups
within the United States, and between developed and developing countries.
Advocates of including labor and environment provisions in trade agreements
argue that developing countries enjoy an “unfair” competitive advantage because
their lower standards translate into lower costs, which in turn are reflected in lower
prices for goods that compete with those produced in developed countries.20 Over
time, the argument goes, the difference in standards leads to investment and jobs
moving abroad to take advantage of the lower production costs. On the other hand,
most studies show that these costs are usually not high enough to determine business
location, where productivity remains the primary factor.21 There are also social
concerns to the labor and environmental issue that relate directly to the human impact
of diminished health and living conditions caused by pollution, poverty, and unsafe
working conditions. Given countries’ different levels of development and therefore
capacities to address these issues, there is considerable disagreement over how far a
trade agreement should go in engaging these domestic policy issues.
Both labor and environmental groups believe that trade agreements can play a
role in addressing their respective concerns. While often linked in general
discussion, they have two separate and distinct sets of issues and goals. Labor groups
advocate: ensuring that all workers can exercise freely their fundamental rights at
work; requiring governments to respect and promote core International Labor
Organization (ILO) standards; and using the same dispute resolution and enforcement
provisions that apply to other provisions in a trade agreement.22
For environmental advocates, major goals include protecting and assuring strong
enforcement of existing domestic environmental standards, ensuring that multilateral
environmental agreements are not undermined by trade rules, promoting strong
environmental initiatives to evaluate and raise environmental performance,
developing a systematic program of capacity-building assistance, and assuring that
environmental provisions in trade agreements are subject to the same dispute
resolution and enforcement mechanisms as are other aspects of the agreements.23
20 The difference is that the social costs associated with environmental degradation,
pollution, poor working conditions, and low wages are not captured in the production
process. Through legal and regulatory measures, developed countries require that
businesses bear many of these costs, which are then reflected in the final (relatively higher)
price of the good or service in the market place.
21 See: CRS Report 98-742 E, Trade with Developing Countries: Effects on U.S. Workers,
by J. F. Hornbeck. September 2, 1998, pp 11-13. Productivity and wage levels are,
however, highly correlated. See: Rodrik, Dani. Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization
Debate. Foreign Policy. Summer 1997, Number 107. pp. 30-33.
22 See: [http://www.aflcio.org], Off the Fast Track–On the Right Track.
23 See: [http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/fastrack/letter.asp], Principles for Environmentally
Responsible Trade.
An important issue for the United States is ensuring that its higher
environmental standards defined in law and regulation not be compromised by protectionist
challenges. See: CRS Report RS20904, International Investor Protection: “Indirect
Expropriation” Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11
, by Robert Meltz. May 3, 2001.

CRS-14
Developing countries, including Chile, have expressed two basic concerns
regarding the inclusion of environmental and labor provisions in trade agreements:
1) that their sovereignty may be undermined if such agreements endorse higher
standards; and 2) that such provisions may be used to justify disguised protectionism.
Free trade advocates in the United States and other developed countries have
expressed similar sentiments in opposition to placing environmental and labor
provisions in trade agreements.
So far, however, the inclusion of labor and environment provisions has been
rather nonspecific. NAFTA’s side agreements set a precedent in both labor and
environment provisions that all parties: 1) not relax standards to attract investment
or reduce costs of exports; 2) strive to improve standards over time, and; 3) enforce
effectively their laws and regulations. Specific standards were left to each country
to set, although the labor side agreement requires that each country “promote”12
basic labor principles: five internationally recognized workers rights that encompass
ILO core labor standards and seven others. Dispute resolution rests on an
intergovernmental consultation process and relies on the imposition of a “monetary
enforcement assessment” to compel compliance. In the case of the labor agreement,
three provisions may be enforced by trade sanctions.24 As of mid-2001, enforcement
questions on labor and environmental provisions have been filed, but none have
reached the point of a formal dispute settlement panel.25
The U.S.-Jordan bilateral FTA, agreed to on October 24, 2000 and signed into
law by President Bush on September 28, 2001, took labor and environmental
provisions a step farther. It includes most key features of the NAFTA side
agreements, but moved the provisions to the main body of the text, thereby placing
these provisions under the dispute resolution process of the entire agreement.
Significantly, this includes language stating that an affected party may take “any
appropriate and commensurate measure,” including trade sanctions if the dispute
remains unresolved.26
Chile recognized the importance of labor and environment provisions when it
included them in the 1996 FTA with Canada, but kept them equally general in
NAFTA-like side agreements. The labor provisions included an agreement to: abide
by ILO “core” standards; enforce effectively and transparently domestic labor laws;
establish mechanisms for consultation and information sharing to resolve problems;
and use of a “monetary assessment” as a final dispute resolution tool. The
environmental provisions called for parties to: set their own levels of environmental
protection; enforce effectively and transparently their environmental laws; work
cooperatively to protect and enhance the environment; promote sustainable
24 See: CRS Report 97-861 E, NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Workers
Rights and Fast-Track Debate
, by Mary Jane Bolle. Updated January 19, 2001. pp. 3-7.
25 United States Government Accounting Office. North American Free Trade Agreement:
U.S. experience with Environment, Labor, and Investment Dispute Settlement Cases
. Report
No. GAO-01-933. July 2001, p. 4.
26 See: CRS Report RS20968. Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues, by Mary
Jane Bolle. pp. 2-3 and CRS Report RS20999. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement:
Analysis of Environmental Provisions
, by Mary Tiemann. pp. 2-3.

CRS-15
development; and create the institutions for enforcement and dispute resolution,
including provisions to make a monetary assessment.27 The labor and environment
provisions differ from the Jordan model by their placement in a side agreement and
their reliance on less stringent dispute resolution options, emphasizing monetary
assessments over trade sanctions.
It was unclear whether the Chile-Canada, U.S.-Jordan, or some new or hybrid
model would work for the U.S.-Chile FTA. U.S. negotiators looked to congressional
action on TPA legislation for guidance and the core debate focused on dispute
resolution and enforcement mechanisms, particularly the use of trade sanctions in
cases of noncompliance. Chile was on record, however, as flatly rejecting inclusion
of any language that allows for the use of trade sanctions.28
Postscript: A Summary of the U.S.-Chile FTA
As the United States and Chile put the finishing touches on the text of the
recently completed FTA, public support for the agreement appears to be growing.
If the agreement is implemented, Chile would join a select group of only four other
countries that have an FTA with the United States (Canada, Mexico, Jordan, and
Israel). The United States is Chile’s largest single-country trading partner,
accounting for 18% of total Chilean merchandise trade. By contrast, Chile represents
less than one half of 1% of U.S. trade. Despite this disparity, the United States has
shown an equal enthusiasm for this agreement for many reasons, not the least of
which is the possibility for growth in those industries that trade with Chile, even if
such trade represents only a small portion of U.S. commerce.
Considerations other than trade growth, however, point to the importance many
attach to implementing the U.S.-Chile FTA. First, it would be the only such
agreement with a South American country. Second, it would be an agreement with
one of the most open and reformed economies in Latin America, a distinction that
makes Chile an interesting case study for investigating the relationship between
development and trade policy. Third, it would be an example of how trade policy
issues, including those with both social as well as economic implications, can be
resolved between a small developing country and a large developed one, which often
have different priorities. Fourth, it may prove to be a strategic step toward
completing the Free Trade Area of the Americas.
As a comprehensive agreement, the FTA dealt with a variety of complex issues,
but increased market access would be the primary benefit for both countries.29 Duty
free access was negotiated for all goods traded between the two countries. Fully 85%
27 Government of Canada. Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement. Article by Article
Chapter Summaries
. February 1997.
28 Discussions with Roberto Matus, Economic Counselor, Embassy of Chile, August 1,
2001 and office of the USTR, August 17, 2001.
29 The FTA text has not been finalized or released to the public. USTR summaries may be
found at its web site: http://www.ustr.gov.

CRS-16
of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products would become duty-free
immediately, with others receiving reduced tariff treatment over time. Some 75% of
U.S. farm exports would enter Chile duty-free within four years and duties on all
goods would be fully phased out within 12 years after implementation of the
agreement. Exports subsidies on agricultural products would be eliminated, but the
United States would be able to respond in-kind if it is damaged by third party export
subsidies. There is also a safeguards provision to address possible surges in
agricultural imports from Chile.30 For Chile, 95% of its export products would gain
immediate duty-free status and only 1.2% would fall into the longest 12-year phase-
out period. If implemented, other important market access gains would include
phasing out the luxury tax on U.S. automobiles over four years, less restrictive
treatment of textile and apparel products that meet rules of origin criteria (made with
U.S. and Chilean components), and reduction over time of Chilean price bands, a
provision not included in either of the FTAs Chile negotiated with Canada and the
European Union.
Other strides of particular importance to the United States include consolidating
and stabilizing rules governing openness of services trade, telecommunications,
intellectual property rights (IPR), e-commerce trade, and investment. These areas
were of much greater interest to the United States than Chile and reflect gains for
highly competitive U.S. industries. There would be few exceptions to the new
services rules, benefitting firms working in financial, telecommunications, computer,
and professional services. Chile’s approach to IPR would also be adjusted to
accommodate U.S. concerns over software, music, text, and videos. A new e-
commerce chapter addresses the growing trade in digital products. In an
unanticipated outcome, no chapter on trade remedies was included, hence there
would be no expected change to the antidumping and countervailing duty options
currently available to both countries.
Chile would retain the right to use capital controls under limited circumstances,
but rules governing free transfers of investment funds would be clarified and
strengthened to allow for freer flow of capital between the two countries, a major
concern of the United States and one of the last policy areas to be resolved. Dispute
settlement over investment would also be more transparent and available as part of
the overall dispute settlement provisions, although investor recourse would differ
between portfolio and foreign direct investment. Chile also would gain a concession
from the United States that eases restrictions on professional and business visas.
Language was agreed to covering environment and labor provisions that emphasizes
enforcement of local laws and regulations.
A key difficulty was defining dispute resolution language. Although the text has
not been released, reportedly, all provisions of the FTA, including environment and
labor, would be subject to a single dispute resolution process. The procedure would
emphasize resolving disputes cooperatively, through a panel process if needed. In
commercial cases where nonconformity to the FTA is found, the agreement would
rely on standard remedies that culminate in the suspension of tariff benefits (return
30 CRS Agriculture Policy and Farm Bill electronic briefing book, Agriculture in the U.S.-
Chile Free Trade Agreement
, http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebagr53.html.

CRS-17
to MFN treatment) if the issue cannot be resolved. For environment and labor
disputes, unresolved problems may result in monetary assessments or fines, and the
proceeds would be placed in a fund to be used to remedy the problem that generated
the complaint. Nonpayment of any such fine could lead to other undefined measures.
Although sanctions were not ruled out, there is little anticipation of a future problem
that would result in such a response.
To summarize, the agreement so far has received broad public support, in part
because it was able to address the key concerns of both countries, yet make
improvements that advocates of freer trade find compelling. As the details emerge,
this agreement will be an important document to understand in its own right and
because of its potential to influence other negotiations planned or in progress.

CRS-18
Appendix 1. US-Chile Merchandise Trade, 1985-2001
(in US $ millions)
Year
U.S.
U.S.
Trade
Trade
% Growth in
% Growth in
Exports
Imports
Balance
Turnover
U.S. Exports
U.S. Imports
1985
682
745
-63
1,427
------
------
1986
823
820
3
1,643
20.7%
10.1%
1987
796
981
-185
1,777
-3.3%
19.6%
1988
1,066
1,181
-115
2,247
33.9%
20.4%
1989
1,414
1,292
122
2,706
32.6%
9.4%
1990
1,664
1,313
351
2,977
17.7%
1.6%
1991
1,839
1,302
537
3,141
10.5%
-0.8%
1992
2,466
1,388
1,078
3,854
34.1%
6.6%
1993
2,599
1,462
1,137
4,061
5.4%
5.3%
1994
2,774
1,821
953
4,595
6.7%
24.6%
1995
3,615
1,931
1,684
5,546
30.3%
6.0%
1996
4,132
2,256
1,876
6,388
14.3%
16.8%
1997
4,368
2,293
2,075
6,661
5.7%
1.6%
1998
3,979
2,453
1,526
6,432
-8.9%
7.0%
1999
3,078
2,953
125
6,031
-22.6%
20.4%
2000
3,455
3,228
227
6,683
12.2%
9.3%
2001
3,131
3,555
-424
6,686
-9.4%
10.1%
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.

CRS-19
Appendix 2. Major U.S.-Chile Product Trade and
Tariff Rates, 2001
(% of total dollar value)
Major U.S.
% of
Tariff
Major U.S.
% of
NTR
Free
Exports
Total
Rate
Imports*
Total
Tariff
under
Rate**
GSP#
Machinery:
31%
7%
Edible Fruit and
18%
- Computers,
(7%)
Nuts:
- Office mach.
(7%)
- grapes (0806)
(11%)
$1.13-
yes
parts
(3%)
1.80/m3
- bulldozers
(14%)
- fruit (0809)
(3%)
$.002-
yes
- other
.005/kg
Electrical
15%
7%
Copper:
21%
machinery
- refined (7403)
(18%)
1%
yes
- unref. (7402)
( 3%)
free
Vehicles (new)
7%
7%
Fish (mostly
salmon):
13%
- fillet (0304)
(11%)
free
- fresh (0302)
( 1%)
free
- frozen (0303)
(1%)
free
Aircraft
6%
7%
Wood (lumber)
free
- (4407, 4409,
13%
4411)
Medical
5%
7%
Beverages:
4%
instruments
- wine (2204)
(4%)
$.063/lit.
yes
Plastic
5%
7%
Organic
4%
Chemicals:
- methanol(2905)
(4%)
8%
yes
Organic
2%
7%
Oil:
chemicals
- not crude(2710)
3%
$.525/bbl
yes
Other
29%
7%
Other 24%
Total
100%
Total
100%
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
*By HTS number = Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. Note, HTS numbers are not
provided on U.S. exports, which are subject to Chile’s 7% nominal uniform import tariff rate. This
rate will fall to 6% on January 1, 2003, where it is scheduled to remain under current law.
**NTR is the general or normal tariff rates (also known as most favored nation rates) applied to
products not given preferential tariff treatment. It is provided to show the tariffs that would be
imposed if products were not given preferential treatment under GSP (see below).
#GSP = Generalized System of Preferences or preferential tariff treatment given to select developing
country imports by developed countries.

CRS-20
Appendix 3. Chile’s Multilateral, Regional, and
Bilateral Trade Agreements
Agreement
Date Effective
Type
WTO (GATT)
January 1995
multilateral free trade agreement
(FTA)
APEC
November 1994
regional association
Mercosur
October 1, 1996
regional customs union
(associate member)
FTAA
negotiating (January 1,
regional FTA
2005 deadline)
LAIA
January 1980
regional association

Bolvia
July 1, 1993
economic complementarity
agreement#, FTA to be negotiated

Venezuela
July 1, 1993
economic complementarity agreement

Colombia
January 1, 1994
economic complementarity agreement

Ecuador
January 1, 1995
economic complementarity agreement

Peru
July 1, 1998
economic complementarity agreement

Argentina
signed May 19, 2000
economic complementarity agreement
Canada
July 5, 1997
bilateral FTA
Mexico
1998
bilateral FTA
Central America*
signed October 18,
FTA framework agreement
1999
European Union
negotiations concluded
FTA
April 2002
European Free
under negotiation
FTA
Trade Association
Japan
pre-negotiation impact
bilateral FTA
studies completed
Singapore
under discussion
bilateral FTA
New Zealand
under discussion
bilateral FTA
South Korea
negotiations concluded
bilateral FTA
October 24, 2002.
United States
negotiations concluded
bilateral FTA
December 11,2002
# limited trade agreement negotiated under guidelines see forth by the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), known in Spanish as the Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion
(ALADI).
* Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica (ratified January 2002).
Data source: Organization of American States. Foreign Trade Information System. This may be
found at: [http://www.sice.oas.org] and Embassy of Chile.