Order Code IB93017
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Space Stations
Updated February 3, 2003
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
Space Station Freedom
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
September 1993-January 2001: the Clinton Administration
Cost Growth
Cost Caps
2001-Present: the Bush Administration
Cost Growth
“Core Complete” Configuration
Current Assembly Sequence
The IMCE (“Young”) Task Force
Concerns of the Non-U.S. Partners and U.S. Researchers
Crew Return Capability: CRV, CTV, and Orbital Space Plane (OSP)
The ReMaP and NRC Reports on ISS Scientific Research
Synopsis of November 2002 Amended Budget Request
Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation, and the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA)
Congressional Action
FY2002
FY2003
International Partners
The Original Partners: Europe, Canada, and Japan
Russia
Issues For Congressional Consideration
Cost and Cost Effectiveness
Operations and Commercialization Issues
Issues Related to Russia’s Participation
LEGISLATION

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Space Stations
SUMMARY
Congress continues to debate NASA’s
President Clinton’s 1993 decision to
International Space Station (ISS) program to
bring Russia into the program was a dramatic
build a permanently occupied space station in
change. Under the 1993 agreement, Phase I of
Earth orbit where astronauts live and conduct
U.S./Russian space station cooperation in-
research. NASA expects that research per-
volved flights of Russians on the U.S. space
formed in the near-zero gravity environment
shuttle and Americans on Russia’s Mir space
of the space station will result in new discov-
station. Phases II and III involve the con-
eries in life sciences, biomedicine, and materi-
struction of ISS as a multinational facility.
als sciences.
In 1993, when the current space station
The space station is being assembled in
design was adopted, NASA said the space
Earth orbit. Almost 90 launches are needed to
station would cost $17.4 billion for construc-
take the various segments, crews, and cargo
tion; no more than $2.1 billion per year. The
into orbit; more than two dozen have taken
estimate did not include launch or other costs.
place already. ISS has been permanently
NASA exceeded the $2.1 billion figure in
occupied by successive “Expedition” crews
FY1998, and the $17.4 billion estimate grew
rotating on 4-6 month shifts since November
to $24.1-$26.4 billion. Congress legislated
2000. “Expedition 6” is now onboard. The
spending caps on part of the program in 2000.
ISS crews are routinely visited by other astro-
Costs have grown almost $5 billion since.
nauts and cosmonauts on U.S. space shuttle or
NASA is canceling or indefinitely deferring
Russian Soyuz missions. The original date to
some hardware to stay within the cap.
complete ISS assembly, June 2002, slipped to
April 2006, with at least 10 years of opera-
Controversial since the program began in
tions expected to follow. Cost overruns in
1984, the space station has been repeatedly
2001 forced additional changes, and the cur-
designed and rescheduled, often for cost-
rent date for completing assembly is uncertain.
growth reasons. Congress has been concerned
Congress appropriated about $30 billion for
about the space station for that and other
the program from FY1985-2002. The FY2003
reasons. Twenty-two attempts to terminate the
request is $1.84 billion.
program in NASA funding bills, however,
were defeated (3 in the 106th Congress, 4 in
Canada, Japan, and several European
the 105th Congress, 5 in the 104th, 5 in the
countries became partners with NASA in
103rd, and 5 in the 102nd). Three other at-
building the space station in 1988; Russia
tempts in broader legislation in the 103rd
joined in 1993. Brazil also is participating,
Congress also failed.
but not as a partner. Except for money paid to
Russia, there is no exchange of funds among
Current congressional space station
the partners. Europe, Canada, and Japan
debate focuses on cost growth in NASA’s part
collectively expect to spend about $11 billion
of the program and the resulting possibility
of their own money. A reliable figure for
that portions of the space station may not be
Russian expenditures is not available.
built; and whether Russia can fulfill its
commitments to ISS.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On February 1, 2003, NASA’s space shuttle Columbia broke apart during its descent
from orbit following a 16-day science mission. CRS Report RS21408 discusses the
Columbia tragedy. The text of this issue brief will be updated shortly with relevant
information. Currently, it reflects activities through January 22, 2003.
The “Expedition 6” crew (Americans Ken Bowersox and Don Pettit, and Russian
Nikolai Budarin) continues its work aboard the International Space Station (ISS), which is
under construction in orbit.
The FY2003 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill is currently being considered as part of
the Omnibus Continuing Appropriations resolution, H.J.Res. 2. Last year, the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees reported out FY2003 VA-HUD bills (H.R. 5605/S.
2797), but they did not clear Congress. Although both committees originally approved
NASA’s FY2003 request for ISS—$1.839 billion ($1.492 billion to build it, plus $347
million for scientific research), in January 2003, the Senate committee revised its figures and
recommended a $35 million reduction to ISS. It also approved $115 million for the Orbital
Space Plane, instead of the $296 million proposed in a November 2002 budget amendment.
That amendment, submitted by the White House on November13, reflects changes that
NASA says will “ensure the [ISS] is properly financed and better positioned to achieve its
scientific research priorities.” ISS funding in FY2003 would not be affected by the
amendment, but for FY2004-2007, $706 million would be shifted into the program from
funding NASA had planned to spend on building a replacement for the space shuttle. The
amendment also would shift $882 million (FY2003-2007) into building an Orbital Space
Plane “to provide a crew transfer capability, as early as possible, to ensure access to and
from” ISS.
President Bush’s decision to truncate ISS construction at a stage called “core complete”
remains controversial. The decision responded to the revelation in 2001 of significant cost
growth ($5 billion above an existing $7 billion overrun) that raised the estimate for building
ISS to $30 billion, exceeding a legislated cap of $25 billion. The core complete configuration
would permit only three, instead of seven, crew members to live and work aboard ISS,
raising significant concerns for all the partners in the program (U. S., Europe, Canada, Japan,
and Russia). “Enhancements” to permit increased crew size may be added if NASA
demonstrates improved cost estimating and management practices. The Orbital Space Plane
may be one of those enhancements.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
NASA launched its first space station, Skylab, in 1973. Three successive crews were
sent to live and work there in 1973-74. It remained in orbit, unoccupied, until it reentered
Earth’s atmosphere in July 1979, disintegrating over Australia and the Indian Ocean. Skylab
was never intended to be permanently occupied. The goal of a permanently occupied space
station with crews rotating on a regular basis was high on NASA’s list for the post-Apollo
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years. In 1969, Vice President Agnew’s Space Task Group recommended a permanent space
station and a reusable space transportation system (the space shuttle) to service it as the core
of NASA’s program in the 1970s and 1980s. Budget constraints forced NASA to choose to
build the space shuttle first. When the shuttle was declared operational in 1982, NASA was
ready to initiate the space station program.
In his January 25, 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan directed NASA
to develop a permanently occupied space station within a decade and to invite other countries
to participate in the project. On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo
landing on the Moon, President George H. W. Bush gave a major space policy address in
which he voiced his support for the space station as the cornerstone of a long-range civilian
space program eventually leading to bases on the Moon and Mars.
President Clinton was strongly supportive of the space station program, and
dramatically changed its character in 1993 by adding Russia as a partner to this already
international endeavor. Adding Russia made the space station part of the U.S. foreign policy
agenda to encourage Russia to abide by agreements to stop the proliferation of ballistic
missile technology, and to support Russia economically and politically.
President George W. Bush has not made a public statement about his position on the
space station program. However, he appointed Sean O’Keefe, former deputy director of the
Office of Management and Budget, to be Administrator of NASA, with a mandate that
apparently includes instilling management discipline in the ISS program.
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
NASA began the current program to build a space station in 1984 (FY1985). In 1988,
the space station was named Freedom. Following a major redesign in 1993, NASA
announced that the Freedom program had ended and a new program begun, though NASA
asserts that 75% of the design of the “new” station is from Freedom. The new program is
simply referred to as the International Space Station (ISS). Individual ISS modules have
various names, and the entire facility is informally referred to as ISS or “Space Station
Alpha.” ISS is a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity
(“microgravity”). Life sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations in space,
biomedical research, and materials processing research on new materials or processes are
underway or contemplated. From FY1985 through FY2002, Congress appropriated
approximately $30 billion for the space station program.
Space Station Freedom
When NASA began the space station program in 1984, it said the program would cost
$8 billion (FY1984 dollars) for research and development (R&D—essentially the cost for
building the station without launch costs) through completion of assembly. From FY1985-
1993, Congress appropriated $11.4 billion to NASA for the Freedom program. Most of the
funding went for designing and redesigning the station over those years. Little hardware was
built and none was launched. Several major redesigns were made. A 1991 redesign evoked
concerns about the amount of science that could be conducted on the scaled-down space
station. Both the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the
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Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council concluded that materials
science research could not justify building the space station, and questioned how much life
sciences research could be supported, criticizing the lack of firm plans for flying a centrifuge,
considered essential to this research. NASA subsequently agreed to launch a centrifuge.
Cost estimates for Freedom varied widely depending on when they were made and what
was included. Freedom was designed to be operated for 30 years. As the program ended
in 1993, NASA’s estimate was $90 billion (current dollars): $30 billion through the end of
construction, plus $60 billion to operate it for 30 years. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimated the total cost at $118 billion, including 30 years of operations.
In 1988, after 3 years of negotiations, Japan, Canada and nine European countries under
the aegis of the European Space Agency (ESA) agreed to be partners in the space station
program (two more since have joined). An Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on a
government-to-government level was signed in September, and Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and the other relevant space agencies were signed
then or in 1989. The partners agreed to provide hardware for the space station at their own
expense, a total of $8 billion at the time.
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
In early 1993, as President Clinton took office, NASA revealed $1 billion in cost growth
on the Freedom program. The President gave NASA 90 days to develop a new, less costly,
design with a reduced operational period of 10 years. A new design, Alpha, emerged on
September 7, 1993, which NASA estimated would cost $19.4 billion. It would have used
some hardware bought from Russia, but Russia was not envisioned as a partner. Five days
earlier, however, the White House announced it had reached preliminary agreement with
Russia to build a joint space station. Now called the International Space Station (ISS), it
superseded the September 7 Alpha design. NASA asserted it would be a more capable space
station and be ready sooner at less cost to the United States. Compared with the September
7 Alpha design, ISS was to be completed 1 year earlier, have 25% more usable volume, 42.5
kilowatts more electrical power, and accommodate 6 instead of 4 crew members.
In 1993, President Clinton pledged to request $10.5 billion ($2.1 billion a year) for
FY1994-1998. NASA said the new station would cost $17.4 billion to build, not including
money already expended on the Freedom program. That estimate was derived from the
$19.4 billion estimate for the September 7 Alpha design minus $2 billion that NASA said
would be saved by having Russia in the program. The $2.1 billion and $17.4 billion figures
became known as “caps,” though they were not set in law. (See Cost Caps below).
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
The International Space Station program thus began in 1993, with Russia joining the
United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada. The 1993 and subsequent agreements with Russia
established three phases of space station cooperation and the payment to Russia of $400
million, which grew to $473 million. (NASA transferred about $800 million to Russia for
space station cooperation through this and other contracts.)
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During Phase I (1995-1998), seven U.S. astronauts remained on Russia’s space station
Mir for long duration (several month) missions with Russian cosmonauts, Russian
cosmonauts flew on the U.S. space shuttle seven times, and nine space shuttle missions
docked with Mir to exchange crews and deliver supplies. Repeated system failures and two
life-threatening emergencies on Mir in 1997 (see CRS Report 97-685) raised questions about
whether NASA should leave more astronauts on Mir, but NASA decided Mir was
sufficiently safe to continue the program. Phases II and III involve construction of the
International Space Station itself, and blend into each other. Phase II began in 1998 and was
completed in July 2001; Phase III is underway.
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
As noted, ISS is being built by a partnership among the United States, Russia, Europe,
Japan, and Canada. Responsibilities are detailed in an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA)
among the respective governments. The IGA is a treaty in all the countries except the United
States, where it is an Executive Agreement. It is implemented through Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and each of its counterpart agencies. Brazil is also
a participant, through a bilateral agreement with NASA. Boeing is the U.S. prime contractor
for ISS.
NASA originally stated that ISS would be operated for 10 years after assembly was
completed, with a possibility for 5 additional years if the research was considered
worthwhile. Using the original schedule, assembly would have been completed in 2002,
with operations through 2012. By 2001, that schedule had slipped by four years, and with
the new approach being taken by the Bush Administration, it is not clear when assembly will
be “complete.” Hence, while the operational period remains at 10 years, correlating that with
a specific year is difficult. Each U.S. module was designed with a 15 year lifetime (5 years
during the assembly period, plus 10 years thereafter). Spacecraft often exceed their design
lifetimes, however, so that also may not serve as a reliable benchmark.
ISS segments are launched into space on U.S. or Russian launch vehicles and assembled
in orbit. The space station is composed of a multitude of modules, solar arrays to generate
electricity, remote manipulator systems, and other elements that are too numerous to describe
here. Details can be found at [http://spaceflight.nasa.gov]. Six major modules are now in
orbit. The first two were launched in 1998: Zarya (“Sunrise,” with guidance, navigation, and
control systems) and Unity (a “node” connecting other modules). Next was Zvezda (“Star,”
the crew’s living quarters) in 2000. Destiny (a U.S. laboratory), Quest (an airlock), and Pirs
(“Pier,” a docking compartment) arrived in 2001. Among the other modules that will be
added are laboratory modules built by Russia, Europe, and Japan, and at least one more
“node” built by Europe. (Some of the European- and Japanese-built modules count as U.S.
modules because they are built under barter agreements with NASA.) The U.S. space shuttle,
and Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, take crews and cargo to and from ISS. A Soyuz
is always attached to the station as a lifeboat in the event of an emergency.
The schedule for launching segments and crews is called the “assembly sequence” and
has been revised many times. At the end of the Clinton Administration, the assembly
sequence showed completion of assembly (“assembly complete”) in April 2006. The most
recent assembly sequence is discussed below.
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Three-person “expedition” crews occupy ISS on a rotating basis. They remain for 4-6
months and are composed alternately of two Russians and one American, or two Americans
and one Russian. The number of astronauts who can live on the space station is limited in
part by how many can be returned to Earth in an emergency by lifeboats docked to the
station. Currently, only Russian Soyuz spacecraft are available as lifeboats. Each Soyuz can
hold three people, limiting the space station crew size to three if only one Soyuz is attached.
Each Soyuz must be replaced every 6 months. The replacement missions are called “taxi”
flights since the crews bring a new Soyuz up to ISS and bring the old one back to Earth.
Therefore the expedition crews are regularly visited by taxi crews, and by the space shuttle
bringing up additional ISS segments. The shuttle also is used to exchange expedition crews.
NASA planned to build a U.S. Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) for at least four more crew
members. NASA actually was designing a CRV capable of accommodating six to seven
crew members in case Russia was not financially able to provide Soyuzes in the future. The
CRV would have had a lifetime of 3 years, instead of 6 months like the Soyuz, reducing
operational costs. NASA also planned to build a Habitation Module to accommodate the
larger crew, and a Propulsion Module to provide fuel in case Russia was not able to provide
all the Progress spacecraft it promised. Europe also was to provide Node 3, another
connection point between modules. As discussed below, the Bush Administration canceled
or deferred these ISS elements.
September 1993-January 2001: the Clinton Administration.
Cost Growth. From FY1994-FY2001, the cost estimate for building ISS grew from
$17.4 billion to $24.1-26.4 billion, an increase of $6.7-$9 billion. The $17.4 billion (called
its “development cost,” “construction cost,” or “R&D cost”) covered FY1994 through
completion of assembly, then scheduled for June 2002. That estimate did not include launch
costs, operational costs after completion of assembly, civil service costs, or other costs.
NASA estimated the program’s life-cycle cost (all costs, including funding spent prior to
1993) from FY1985 through FY2012 at $72.3 billion. A more recent, comparable, NASA
life-cycle estimate is not available. In 1998, GAO estimated the life-cycle cost at $95.6
billion (GAO/NSIAD-98-147).
Cost growth first emerged publicly in March 1996 when then-NASA Administrator
Daniel Goldin gave the space station program manager control of money allocated for (and
previously overseen by) the science offices at NASA for space station research. Congress
gave NASA approval to transfer $177 million from those science accounts to space station
construction in the FY1997 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act (P.L. 104- 204). A similar
transfer was approved for FY1996 ($50 million). NASA changed its accounting methods
so future transfers would not require congressional action, and transferred $235 million from
space station science into construction in FY1998. (“Space station science” funding is for
scientific activities aboard the space station. It is separate from NASA’s other “space
science” funding, such as Mars exploration, astrophysics, or earth sciences.)
One factor in the cost growth was schedule slippage related to Russia’s Zvezda module.
As insurance against further Zvezda delays, or a launch or docking failure, NASA decided
to build an “Interim Control Module” (ICM). To cover cost growth associated with the
schedule delay and ICM, NASA requested permission to move $200 million in FY1997 from
the space shuttle and payload utilization and operations accounts to the space station
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program, and to transfer $100 million in FY1998 from unidentified NASA programs to the
space station program. The appropriations committees approved transferring the $200
million in FY1997, but not the FY1998 funding.
In September 1997, NASA and Boeing revealed that Boeing’s prime contract would
have at least a $600 million overrun at completion, and that NASA needed $430 million
more than expected in FY1998. Boeing’s estimate of its contract overrun grew to $986
million in 1999, where it remained. In 2001, NASA estimated that overrun at $1.14 billion.
The contract runs through December 31, 2003.
In March 1998, NASA announced that the estimate for building the space station had
grown from $17.4 billion to $21.3 billion. In April 1998, an independent task force
concluded that the space station’s cost through assembly complete could be $24.7 billion and
assembly could take 10-38 months longer. NASA agreed its schedule was optimistic and
there would be about $1.4 billion in additional costs, but Mr. Goldin refused to endorse the
$24.7 billion estimate. By 2000, the cost estimate had increased to $24.1-$26.4 billion.
Cost Caps. The $2.1 billion per year figure the White House and Congress agreed
to spend on the space station, and NASA’s $17.4 billion estimate to build the station, became
known as “caps,” although they were not set in law. Both were exceeded in 1997-1998. As
costs continued to rise, Congress voted to legislate caps on certain parts of the ISS program
in the FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391). The caps are $25 billion for
development, plus $17.7 billion for associated shuttle launches. The act also authorizes an
additional $5 billion for development and $3.5 billion for associated shuttle launches in case
of specified contingencies. The caps do not apply to operations, research, or crew return
activities after the space station is “substantially” complete, defined as when development
costs consume 5% or less of the annual space station budget. GAO reported in April 2002
that it could not verify whether NASA is complying with the cap because NASA cannot
provide the data GAO requires (GAO-02-504R).
2001-Present: the Bush Administration.
Cost Growth. As President Bush took office, NASA revealed substantial additional
cost growth. In 2000, NASA’s estimate of the remaining cost to build ISS was $8 billion
(FY2002 to FY2006). In January 2001, however, it revealed that an additional $4.02 billion
was needed. That figure grew to $4.8 billion by June, and the IMCE task force (discussed
below) said another $366 million in growth was discovered between August and October.
Those increases would have raised the cost to over $30 billion, 72% above the 1993 estimate,
and $5 billion above the legislated cap. NASA explained that the cost growth became
evident as 2000 progressed and program managers realized they had underestimated the
complexity of building and operating the station. The agency thought it had sufficient
funding in program reserve accounts to cover contingencies, but in late 2000 and early 2001
concluded that funding was insufficient. The Bush Administration signaled it would not
provide additional funds, and NASA would have to find what it needed from within its
Human Space Flight account. The Administration said it supported the legislated cap. A
July 2002 GAO report (GAO-02-735) traces financial developments in the ISS program from
May 2000-November 2001 and concludes that NASA’s focus on managing annual budgets
resulted in NASA’s failure to heed indicators of future program cost growth.
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“Core Complete” Configuration. In its February 2001 “Budget Blueprint,” the
Bush Administration announced it would cancel or defer some ISS hardware to stay within
the cap and control space station costs. It canceled the Propulsion Module, and indefinitely
deferred the Habitation Module, Node 3, and the CRV. The decision truncates construction
of the space station at a stage the Administration calls “core complete.” The Administration
said that “enhancements” to the station might be possible if NASA demonstrates improved
cost estimating and program management, but is only committed to build the core complete
configuration. In 2001, NASA estimated that it would cost $8.3 billion from FY2002-2006
to build the core complete configuration, which was then described as all the U.S. hardware
planned for launch through Node 2 plus the launch of laboratories being built by Europe and
Japan. NASA subsequently began distinguishing between “U.S. Core Complete” (the
launches through Node 2, now scheduled for February 2004) and “International Partner
(IP)Core Complete” which includes the addition of European and Japanese laboratory
modules (through 2008).
The $8.3 billion estimate for FY2002-2006 was deemed “not credible” by the IMCE
task force (see below). NASA Headquarters directed the space station program office to
reassess its estimate, and had two independent groups conduct their own estimates. One was
an internal NASA group and the other was the Department of Defense’s Coast Analysis
Improvement Group (CAIG). Following those reviews, in November 2002 the
Administration submitted an amended FY2003 budget request that would shift $706 million
into the ISS program from FY2004-2007: $660 million to boost program reserves to ensure
sufficient funds to finish the core complete configuration, and $46 million in FY2004 for
“long-lead” items to preserve the option of increasing crew size beyond three. The $46
million would be spent on Node 3 and an Environmental Control and Life Support System
(ECLSS), which are enhancements that might be pursued. The amended request would also
fund another potential enhancement, an Orbital Space Plane (see below), and increase the
annual shuttle flight rate to ISS to five per year beginning in FY2006.
At a December 2002 “Heads of Agency” meeting in Japan, the international partners
agreed on a process for selecting a final ISS configuration by December 2003. Despite press
reports that the United States agreed to provide for crew size to increase in the 2006 time
frame, the Bush Administration remains committed to building only the core complete (three
person) configuration at this time.
Current Assembly Sequence. The most recent revised version of the “Rev F”
(Revision F) assembly sequence was released in October 2002. Unlike the many earlier
versions, this edition does not show a date for completion of assembly (“assembly
complete”). The immediately prior version showed assembly complete in April 2006. This
version instead is based on the Bush Administration’s “U.S. Core Complete” and
“International Partner (IP) Core Complete” configuration. It shows IP Core Complete
occurring in January 2008. More than two dozen launches needed to assemble and occupy
ISS already have occurred. The October 2002 assembly sequence shows 26 more launches
from November 2002 through January 2008, of which all but two are U.S. space shuttle
launches. The assembly sequence does not list expected Russian launches of Soyuz “taxi”
flights (2 per year) or Russian Progress cargo missions (3-6 per year). It shows only the first
launch of Europe’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Japan’s H-II Transfer Vehicle
(HTV), both of which are automated cargo missions (akin to the Russian Progress flights).
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Additional ATV and HTV flights are expected. Hence, the total number of launches is much
higher than the 26 shown in the October 2002 assembly sequence.
The IMCE (“Young”) Task Force. At the urging of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), NASA created the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task
Force in July 2001. Headed by retired Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, the task
force evaluated ISS program management and cost estimates. IMCE was a subunit of the
NASA Advisory Council (NAC). The task force released its report on November 2, 2001
[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/youngrep.pdf], concluding that NASA’s estimate
for FY2002-2006 of $8.3 billion to finish the U.S. core complete stage was not credible. The
task force called on NASA to make significant management and cost estimating changes by
June 2002. IMCE viewed the next two years as a period for NASA to demonstrate
credibility. If it does, a decision could be made to restore the CRV and Habitation Module
(or something similar) as “enhancements.” See CRS Report RL31216 for more on IMCE.
In December 2002, IMCE issued a status report concluding that NASA was making needed
changes both in management and cost estimating. It declared the new program plan credible.
Concerns of the Non-U.S. Partners and U.S. Researchers. The non-U.S.
partners, and U.S. scientists who plan to conduct research on ISS, have expressed deep
concern with the core complete configuration (see CRS Report RL31216). Concerns focus
on the decision to indefinitely defer a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). Without CRV, the space
station can accommodate only three permanent crew members, not seven as planned. Since
2 ½ crew members are needed to operate and maintain the station, this leaves only one-half
of one person’s time to conduct research. Research is ostensibly one of the major reasons for
building the space station. For U.S. researchers, another issue is that NASA also has reduced
the space station research budget by 37.5% over the FY2002-2006 period, necessitating a
reassessment of U.S. research priorities on ISS. For Europe, Canada, and Japan, the “core
complete” configuration also poses problems because the additional four permanent crew
member slots were to be allocated, in part, to their astronauts. Without those positions,
European, Japanese, and Canadian astronauts could work aboard ISS only for short durations
as part of visiting crews on the U.S. space shuttle or Russian Soyuz “taxi” missions.
Crew Return Capability: CRV, CTV, and Orbital Space Plane (OSP). As
noted, crew size aboard ISS is limited in part by the number of occupants that could be
accommodated in a “lifeboat” in the event of an emergency such as a catastrophic hull
depressurization or a fire. One Soyuz spacecraft, which can accommodate three people, is
always docked at ISS today to provide this lifeboat function. Instead of building a U.S.
CRV, one option is to procure additional Soyuzes, so two could be docked at the station at
a time. That would allow crew size to expand to six. What price Russia would charge for
additional Soyuzes is not known. Whether NASA could pay for them is complicated by the
Iran Nonproliferation Act (see below) which prohibits NASA from making payments to
Russia in connection with the ISS program unless the President certifies that Russia is not
proliferating certain weapons technologies to Iran. Whether another ISS partner would pay
is under discussion.
NASA indefinitely deferred its plans to build a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). A CRV
would be able only to return crews to Earth from the space station (it would be taken into
orbit, unoccupied, via the space shuttle). A Crew Transfer Vehicle (CTV), by contrast, could
take people both to and from the space station. In its FY2003 amended budget request,
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NASA is proposing to build a CTV, which NASA calls an Orbital Space Plane (OSP).
NASA proposes shifting $882 million (in FY2003-2007) into OSP from funding it had
planned to spend on building a replacement for the space shuttle (the Space Launch
Initiative, or SLI, program). The OSP concept involves using a traditional rocket (an
“expendable launch vehicle”) rather than a reusable launch vehicle for launch, akin to how
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft were launched. NASA has not released details
about the OSP, such as how many people it could accommodate.
NASA would account for the OSP program not within the space station budget, but
under the Space Launch Initiative in the Office of AeroSpace Technology. That decision
could be controversial, since OSP’s purpose is to take crews to and from the space station,
and it replaces the CRV program, which was carried in the space station account. The $4.8
billion ISS cost growth announced in 2001 included required funding for the CRV, and was
ameliorated in part by the termination of CRV. Starting a replacement program, but putting
it elsewhere in NASA’s budget, might be considered misleading.
NASA plans to conduct design studies for OSP through FY2004, after which it would
decide whether to develop it or not. NASA includes “placeholder” funding in the amended
budget request (For FY2003-2007) of $2.45 billion. Until the design is firm, NASA says
it cannot estimate the cost of building such a vehicle, but some suggest the cost is $9-13
billion. NASA says OSP would be available first in a CRV mode in 2010, and in 2012 (after
the launch vehicle it will use is “man-rated”) as a CTV.
That would mean that Soyuz spacecraft would be needed until 2010 as lifeboats for
Expedition crews. In the existing international ISS agreements, Russia agreed to have one
Soyuz (replaced every 6 months) docked to ISS through the lifetime of the station. A 1996
U.S.-Russia agreement stipulates that through “assembly complete” (then expected in 2006),
Russia would provide crew return capability for the three Expedition crew members. Eleven
Soyuz spacecraft were specified for this purpose. According to NASA, that requirement
ends in the spring of 2006. By 2006, the U.S. CRV was expected to be available, allowing
crew size to increase. The U.S. CRV was required to support at least four more crew
members. In the event the U.S. CRV is not yet available, the agreement simply calls on the
parties to “discuss appropriate action.” Since NASA’s current plan is not to have such a
capability until 2010, there is a four year gap (2006- 2010) when Americans might be
limited to residency aboard ISS only when the U.S. space shuttle is docked. (Russia
presumably would continue to have one Soyuz docked at the station, but would control who
could use it, with no guarantee that Americans would be included.) As noted, the Iran
Nonproliferation Act prevents NASA from paying to use Soyuz unless Russia does not
proliferate certain technologies to Iran. Some argue that NASA should focus on building a
vehicle that could be ready by 2006, rather than 2010, and a vehicle as elaborate as a
spaceplane is not needed for ISS.
The ReMaP and NRC Reports on ISS Scientific Research. On July 10, 2002,
the Research Maximization and Prioritization (ReMaP) task force reported to the NASA
Advisory Council (NAC) on its efforts to reprioritize NASA’s ISS scientific research
program in light of the decision to scale back the space station’s capabilities; the report is
available at [ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/2002/REMAPrept.pdf]. ReMaP focused
on research intended to be conducted on ISS through NASA’s Office of Biological and
Physical Research (OBPR). ReMaP recommended that OBPR’s ISS research plan be
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reconfigured with an interdisciplinary approach, identified research priorities, reemphasized
the need for a centrifuge, and stressed the need for a strategy for conducting research. It also
recommended that if NASA does not build ISS beyond the core complete configuration, then
the agency should cease characterizing ISS as a science-driven program. ReMaP noted that
there may be other valid justifications for building ISS, however.
The National Research Council (NRC) released a study of how the ISS program
restructuring would impact scientific research in September 2002. Its overall conclusions
parallel those of ReMaP. Both NRC and ReMaP emphasized that the negative impact on
science is due not only to inadequate crew time, but to limits on the amount of “upmass”
(e.g., scientific equipment and experiments) that can taken to ISS because shuttle flights were
reduced to four per year (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062).
Synopsis of November 2002 Amended Budget Request. As discussed
throughout this report, on November 13, 2002, the Bush Administration submitted an
amended NASA budget request to Congress covering the 5-year period FY2003-2007. The
amended request would shift funding in FY2004-2007 from NASA’s Space Launch Initiative
program to develop a replacement for the space shuttle (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062) into
the ISS program (and elsewhere). FY2003 ISS funding would not change. A total of $706
million would be shifted directly into the ISS program: $660 million to boost program
reserves, and $46 million for long-lead items for Node 3 and ECLSS to preserve the option
of expanding the crew to more than three people. The decision to take money from SLI and
give it to the ISS program contradicts an earlier Bush Administration position wherein
NASA was directed to find any additional funds it needed for ISS from within the Human
Space Flight budget. In addition, the amended request proposes development of an Orbital
Space Plane to take crews to and from ISS. A total of $2.45 billion is envisioned for the OSP
program for FY2003-2007, though that figure is a “placeholder” that would be revised after
NASA further designs the vehicle. NASA accounts for the OSP program as part of its Space
Launch Initiative activity under the Office of AeroSpace Technology. OSP is not a launch
vehicle, however. It is a spaceplane to be used for the ISS program. Its placement under
another part of the NASA budget may be controversial. NASA proposes spending $296
million on the OSP in FY2003. Finally, the budget amendment proposes adding another
shuttle flight to ISS per year, beginning in FY2006.
Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation, and the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA)
For many years, controversy over the ISS program focused on Russia’s participation in
the program. Among the issues were the extent to which successful completion of ISS is
dependent on Russia, Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments, and whether the
United States should provide funding to Russia if it proliferates missile technology to certain
countries. While there is no exchange of funds among the other ISS partners, the United
States (and other partners) provide funding to Russia. By 1998, the United States had paid
approximately $800 million to Russia for space station cooperation. Although attention is
currently focused on NASA’s budgetary problems, the issues concerning Russia’s role
remain as important today as they were in the past.
Following the Clinton Administration’s decision to bring Russia into the program,
Congress stated that Russian participation “should enhance and not enable” the space station
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(H.Rept. 103-273, to accompany H.R. 2491, the FY1994 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill—
P.L. 103-124). The current design, however, can only be viewed as being “enabled” by
Russian participation. It is dependent on Russian Progress vehicles for reboost (to keep the
station from reentering Earth’s atmosphere), on Russian Soyuz spacecraft for emergency
crew return, and on Russia’s Zvezda module for crew quarters (which allows ISS to be
permanently occupied).
Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments is a major issue. The launch of
Zvezda, the first module Russia had to pay for itself, was more than two years late. (Zarya
was built by Russia, but NASA paid for it.) Since Zvezda’s launch in 2000, Russia has met
its commitments to launch Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, but it is reassessing what other
modules and hardware it will build at its own expense. At the end of 2002, Russian Aviation
and Space Agency (RAKA, or Rosaviakosmos) director Yuri Koptev expressed concern as
to whether his agency will be able to provide Soyuz spacecraft in 2003 due to budget
constraints. Mr. Koptev estimated in 1997 that Russia would spend $3.5 billion on its
portion of the ISS (later he said $6.2 billion if launch costs were included), but it is not clear
at this point how much money Russia will put into the program.
Political issues also are crucial. The overall relationship between the United States and
Russia is one major factor. Another is the linkage between the space station and Russian
adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) designed to stem proliferation
of ballistic missile technology. Getting Russia to adhere to the MTCR appears to have been
a primary motivation behind the Clinton Administration’s decision to add Russia as a
partner. The United States wanted Russia to restructure a contract with India that would
have given India advanced rocket engines and associated technology and know-how. The
United States did not object to giving India the engines, but to the technology and know-how.
Russia claimed that restructuring the contract would cost $400 million. The 1993 agreement
to bring Russia into the space station program included the United States paying Russia $400
million for space station cooperation. At the same time, Russia agreed to adhere to the
MTCR. The question is what the United States will do if Russia violates the MTCR. Some
Members of Congress believe Russia already has done so. The Clinton Administration
sanctioned 10 Russian entities for providing technology to Iran. Neither Rosaviakosmos nor
any major Russian ISS contractors or subcontractors were among those sanctioned.
On March 14, 2000, President Clinton signed into law (P.L. 106-178) the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA). The law, inter alia, prohibits NASA from making payments
after January 1, 1999 in cash or in kind to Russia for ISS unless Russia takes the necessary
steps to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems to Iran and
the President certifies that neither Rosaviakosmos nor any entity reporting to it has made
such transfers for at least one year prior to such determination. Exceptions are made for
payments needed to prevent imminent loss of life by or grievous injury to individuals aboard
ISS (the “crew safety” exception); for payments to construct, test, prepare, deliver, launch,
or maintain Zvezda as long as the funds do not go to an entity that may have proliferated to
Iran and the United States receives goods or services of commensurate value; and the $14
million for hardware needed to dock the U.S. ICM (see above). President Clinton provided
Congress with the required certification with regard to the $14 million on June 29, 2000, but
no certification was forthcoming for the remaining $24 million. Without such a certification,
NASA would only be able to spend more money in Russia for ISS by meeting one of the
remaining exceptions— maintenance of Zvezda (further defined in the law) and crew safety.
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At a House International Relations Committee hearing on October 12, 2000, Members
sharply criticized NASA’s legal interpretation of the crew safety exception.
Another benefit cited by the Clinton Administration also is in question—financial
savings. Clinton Administration and NASA officials asserted repeatedly that a joint space
station would accelerate the schedule by 2 years and reduce U.S. costs by $4 billion. This
was later modified to one year and $2 billion, and an April 1, 1994 letter to Congress from
NASA said 15 months and $1.5 billion. NASA officials continued to use the $2 billion
figure thereafter, however. A July 1994 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD 94-248) concluded that
Russian participation would cost NASA $1.8 billion, essentially negating the $2 billion in
expected savings. In 1998, a NASA official conceded that having Russia as a partner added
$1 billion to the cost. Other benefits cited by the Clinton Administration were providing
U.S. financial assistance to Russia as it moves to a market economy, keeping Russian
aerospace workers employed in non-threatening activities, and the emotional impact, historic
symbolism, and potential long term significance for future space cooperation, of the two
former Cold War adversaries working together in space.
Congressional Action
FY2002
The FY2002 VA-HUD-IA appropriations Act (P.L. 107-73) approved $2.093 billion
for ISS— reducing funding for ISS construction by $75 million, while increasing funding for
space station science by $55 million. The budget figures are difficult to track, however.
NASA’s original request for ISS was $2.087 billion, all within the Human Space Flight
(HSF) account. That amount was $229 million over what NASA had said the previous year
would be needed for FY2002. In total, the 5-year budget runout shown in the FY2002
budget request included about $1 billion more for FY2002-2006 than had been planned last
year. The increase was offset by redirecting the funding that had been planned for the Crew
Return Vehicle, previously carried in a different part of NASA’s budget. Subsequently,
NASA made revisions to its request, resulting in a request of $1.83 billion in the Human
Space Flight (HSF) account, plus $283.6 million in the Science, Aeronautics, and
Technology (SAT) account—a total of $2.114 billion.
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The House passed its version of the FY2002 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.R.
2620, H.Rept. 107-159) on July 30. A Roemer amendment was defeated (voice vote) that
would have set a cap on space station funding and prohibited NASA from terminating or
deferring certain space station elements. Another Roemer amendment, to terminate the
program, was withdrawn. As passed, the bill fully funded the ISS request and conditionally
added $275 million for a Crew Return Vehicle as recommended by the House Appropriations
Committee. The Senate passed its version
of the bill on August 2 (S. 1216, S.Rept.
107-43), reducing space station funding by
Table 1. U.S. Space Station
$150 million as recommended by the
Funding
Senate Appropriations Committee.
(in $ millions)
In the conference report (H.Rept. 107-
Fiscal Year
Request
Appropriated
272), Congress added $55 million to the
1985
150
150
$283.6 million in the SAT account for
space station science; a total of $338.6
1986
230
205
million. The conferees provided $1,960
1987
410
410
million in the HSF account for ISS
1988
767
425
construction, but that actually was a
reduction of $75 million from the request
1989
967
900
because they included civil service salaries
1990
2,050
1,750
while NASA does not. The conferees did
not adopt the House position of adding
1991
2,430
1,900
$275 million for a Crew Return Vehicle
1992
2,029
2,029
(CRV), but directed NASA to spend $40
million on the X-38 program, a precursor to
1993
2,250
2,100
CRV. According to NASA’s FY2003
1994
2,106
2,106
budget estimate, ISS funding for FY2002 is
$2,093 million: $1,722 million for
1995
2,113
2,113
construction (the $1,960 million that was
1996
2,115
2,144
appropriated, minus civil service costs),
1997
2,149
2,149
$338.6 million for space station science
appropriated by Congress, and another $33
1998
2,121
2,441*
million for space station science that NASA
1999
2,270
2,270
reallocated in its operating plan.
2000
2,483
2,323
FY2003
2001
2,115
2, 115
2002**
2,114 2,093
For FY2003, NASA is requesting
$1.839 billion for the space station
2003
1,839
program: $1.492 billion in the HSF account
The numbers here reflect NASA’s figures for
for ISS construction, and $347 million in
“the space station program.” Over the years,
the SAT account for research. This is $254
what is included in that definition has changed.
million less than the comparable figure for
* NASA’s FY1999 budget documents show
$2.501 billion on the expectation Congress
FY2002, reflecting the fact that much of the
would approve additional transfer requests, but it
hardware has been built. In 2002, the
did not.
**See text for NASA’s derivation of this figure.
House and Senate Appropriations
Committees approved the requested
amounts (H.R. 5605/S. 2797), but those
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bills did not clear Congress. The funding is now part of the FY2003 Omnibus Continuing
Appropriations resolution, H.J.Res. 2. The Senate Appropriations Committee revised its
NASA funding recommendations in January 2003, cutting ISS by $35 million. As noted, in
the November 2002 budget amendment, NASA proposed spending $296 million in FY2003
on an Orbital Space Plane for the ISS program. The Senate committee recommended $115
million instead.
International Partners
The Original Partners: Europe, Canada, and Japan
Canada, Japan, and most of the 15 members of the European Space Agency (ESA) have
been participating in the space station program since it began. Formal agreements were
signed in 1988, but had to be revised following Russia’s entry into the program, and two
more European countries also joined in the interim. The revised agreements were signed on
January 29, 1998, among the partners in the ISS program: United States, Russia, Japan,
Canada, and 11 European countries—Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Representatives of the various governments signed the government-to-government level
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) that governs the program. (The United Kingdom signed
the IGA, but is not financially participating in the program so the number of European
countries participating in the program is variously listed as 10 or 11.) NASA also signed
Memoranda of Understanding for implementing the program with its counterpart agencies:
the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the Russian space
agency (Rosaviakosmos), and the Japanese Science and Technology Agency. The IGA is
a treaty in all the countries except the United States (where it is an Executive Agreement).
Canada is contributing the Mobile Servicing System (MSS) for assembling and
maintaining the space station. In February 1994, the new prime minister of Canada had
decided to terminate Canada’s role in the program, but later agreed to reformulate Canada’s
participation instead. The first part of the MSS (the “arm”) was launched in April 2001;
another part, the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator (the “fingers”), is scheduled for
2005. ESA is building a laboratory module called Columbus and an Automated Transfer
Vehicle (ATV). The major contributors are Germany, France, and Italy. Budgetary
difficulties over the years led ESA to cancel other hardware it was planning. ESA also is
building a cupola (a windowed dome) and paying for Italy to build two of the three “nodes”
(Node 2 and Node 3) in exchange for free shuttle flights to launch its ISS hardware. Node
3 is not included in NASA’s core complete configuration. Japan is building a laboratory
module, Kibo (Hope). One part will be pressurized and another part will be exposed to space
for experiments requiring those conditions. Japan also is building a large centrifuge and a
module (“CAM”) to accommodate it for NASA in exchange for free shuttle flights to launch
Kibo. Due to financial constraints, Kibo has been delayed until 2006. CAM is scheduled
for launch in 2007. NASA also has a bilateral agreement with Italy under which Italy is
providing three “mini-pressurized logistics modules” (MPLMs). They are attached to ISS
while cargo is transferred to the station, then filled with refuse or other unwanted material
and returned to Earth. Another bilateral agreement was signed with Brazil in October 1997
for Brazil to provide payload and logistics hardware. Brazil is restructuring its agreement
in light of financial constraints, however.
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According to Japan’s space agency, NASDA, Japan’s total spending on ISS is expected
to be $4.8 billion, of which $3.48 billion had been spent by the end of March 2001. CSA
reports that Canada’s total ISS funding is expected to be $1.3 billion (U.S.), of which $1.04
billion (U.S.) had been spent by October 2001. NASA reported in January 2002 that, as of
October 2001, ESA had spent $3.7 billion of an estimated total of $4.8 billion on its ISS
contributions. Russian figures are not available.
Russia
Issues associated with Russia’s participation in ISS are discussed elsewhere. This
section explains Russian space station activities from 1971 to the present. The Soviet Union
launched the world’s first space station, Salyut 1, in 1971 followed by five more Salyuts and
then Mir. At least two other Salyuts failed before they could be occupied. The Soviets
accumulated a great deal of data from the many missions flown to these stations on human
adaptation to weightlessness. The data were often shared with NASA. They also performed
microgravity materials processing research, and astronomical and Earth remote sensing
observations. Importantly, they gained considerable experience in operating space stations.
Russia’s most recent space station, Mir, was a modular space station built and operated
between 1986 and 2001. Crews were ferried back and forth to Mir using Soyuz spacecraft
A Soyuz spacecraft was always attached to Mir when a crew was aboard in case of an
emergency, and Soyuz capsules now are used as lifeboats for ISS.
Crews occupied Mir from 1986-2000. For almost ten of those years (1989-1999), Mir
was continuously occupied by crews on a rotating basis. Although occasionally crews
stayed for very long periods of time to study human reaction to long duration spaceflight,
typically they remained for 5-6 months and then were replaced by a new crew. From 1995-
1998, seven Americans participated in long duration (up to 6 months) missions aboard Mir,
and nine space shuttle missions docked with the space station. Individuals from Japan,
Britain, Austria, Germany, France, and the Slovak Republic also paid for visits to Mir.
Russia deorbited Mir into the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001.
Issues For Congressional Consideration
Cost and Cost Effectiveness
Cost effectiveness involves what can be accomplished with the facility that is ultimately
built versus its cost. In 1993, NASA said it would cost $17.4 billion to build the U.S. portion
of the space station. That rose to $24.1-$26.4 billion by early 2000, with $5 billion more in
cost growth announced in 2001. Cost estimates for the earlier Freedom design had risen
significantly as the years passed, and with each Freedom redesign, the amount of science
diminished. Scientific research is often cited as a major reason for building the station.
Many wondered whether Freedom’s fate awaited ISS, and now believe it has. In FY1996,
FY1997, and FY1998 NASA transferred a total of $462 million from the space station
science accounts into space station construction. In response to the cost growth revealed in
2001, NASA reduced the ISS research budget by 37.5% (FY2002-2006) and indefinitely
deferred building hardware that would enable a larger crew to live aboard the station,
meaning that the amount of research that can be conducted will be sharply reduced.
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Operations and Commercialization Issues
As ISS construction continues, attention is turning to who should operate the facility and
how to encourage commercial use of it. Congress declared economic development of Earth
orbital space as a “priority goal” of ISS in the 1998 Commercial Space Act (P.L. 105-303).
NASA supports space station commercialization, both in terms of getting the private sector
to use research facilities on ISS, and assuming space station operations. According to its ISS
commercialization Web site [http://commercial.hq.nasa.gov], NASA is committed to setting
aside approximately 30% of the U.S. share of ISS’s research capacity for economic
development. In 1998, NASA proposed creation of a non-governmental organization (NGO)
to oversee research on the space station that would be modeled after the Space Telescope
Science Institute at Johns Hopkins University that operates the Hubble Space Telescope. The
NGO would report to NASA. Others want the private sector, not the government, to manage
and operate the space station. Still others think there is a role for the private sector in
building, not just operating, the space station. However, efforts to do so have not materialized
as planned.
Language in the FY2000 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act (P.L.106-74) permitted NASA
to conduct a demonstration commercialization program for 5 years. Receipts collected from
commercial use of ISS would be used first to offset costs incurred by NASA in support of
commercialization, with any remainder retained by NASA for promoting further ISS
commercialization. NASA released a pricing policy for use of ISS by commercial entities in
February 2000. The chairs of the House and Senate Committees that authorize NASA
activities (House Science and Senate Commerce) both objected to including the language
because of concern that it would allow NASA to pick and choose winners. The FY2000-2002
NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391) limits the duration of the project to 3 years.
Another issue is the extent to which “tourists” should be allowed aboard ISS. The
Russians launched American millionaire Dennis Tito to ISS in 2001 after months of strenuous
objections from NASA and other ISS partners. They argued that he was insufficiently trained
and the space station was not yet ready to accommodate nonprofessional astronauts. Days
before the Russians were to launch Mr. Tito to ISS, NASA and the other partners agreed, on
the condition that guidelines be developed on necessary training before other “spaceflight
participants” visit ISS. Mr. Tito was a member of a crew of a Russian “taxi” mission. These
missions take place every 6 months to exchange Soyuz spacecraft (see above), so there are
several opportunities for nonprofessional astronauts to make such flights; the Russians
reportedly charge $12-20 million. The guidelines were released in January 2002, and another
spaceflight participant (South African Mark Shuttleworth) flew to ISS that April. U.S.
entertainer Lance Bass, of the band *NSYNC, was in training to be part of the October 2002
taxi flight, but requisite payments were not made and Russia terminated his participation.
Issues Related to Russia’s Participation
The risks and benefits of Russia’s participation in the program have been discussed. A
continuing issue is how to cope with the fact that the Russian government may not provide
the funding needed to fulfill its commitments to the program. Although U.S. funding
uncertainty is the focus of attention today, Russia’s financial circumstances remain a
challenge, too. NASA’s decision to cancel the Propulsion Module ensures ISS dependance
on Russia for reboost (except for the very limited reboost capabilities of the U.S. space
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shuttle) until Europe’s ATV is available (scheduled for 2004). ISS will remain dependent
on Russia for “lifeboat” spacecraft until another vehicle is available, currently expected no
sooner than 2010. As discussed earlier, the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) prohibits U.S.
payments to Russia for ISS, with some exceptions, unless the government of Russia prevents
Russian nuclear and missile technology from reaching Iran. The key question is what will
happen if Russia insists it cannot fund reboost or lifeboat missions yet NASA is not permitted
to transfer money to Russia for such missions because Russia is not in compliance with INA.
LEGISLATION
H.J.Res. 2 (Young)
FY2003 Omnibus Continuing Appropriations Act. Includes FY2003 funding for NASA
as part of the VA-HUD-IA portion of the resolution. Passed House January 8, 2003; Senate
consideration began January 16, 2003.
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