Order Code RL31715
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
January 29, 2003
Raymond W. Copson (Coordinator)
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress
Summary
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S.
urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its
the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.” During January 2003,
the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, amid reports that U.S. forces
would be ready to launch a war by mid-February or early March. President Bush,
other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have indicated that
Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors.
However, the inspectors themselves, with leaders of France, Germany, and other
countries, are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time. The
Administration asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 16 Security Council resolutions
requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Skeptics, including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is
exaggerating the Iraqi WMD threat.
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of
the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and
to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243). Some
Members of Congress have recently expressed dissatisfaction with the level of
Administration consultation on Iraq, and suggested that the Administration should
provide more information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early
military action. Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly,
and have compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war. U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last 18 months or longer. Whether the overthrow of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein leads to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle
East, or promotes instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is an issue
in debate. The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial
humanitarian crisis, including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend
on the length of the conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization. International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war. Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale
of the fighting and the length of any occupation. If war leads to a spike in the price
of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic
consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues. See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report. This report also provides
links to other sources of information and updated approximately one each week.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Options for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Military Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Diplomatic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Developments at the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Foreign Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Peace Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Regime Change Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Post-War Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Current Planning Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
War Crimes Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Burden Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Political and Military Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Direct and Indirect Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Post-conflict Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Implications for the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Democracy and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Humanitarian Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
War-Related Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Aid Agency Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Potential Internal Humanitarian Consequences of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Security Council Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Cost Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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Economic Effects of a War with Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Economic Effects of Military Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Economic Effects of Higher Oil Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Role of Confidence in the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Economic Effects of the First Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Information Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CRS Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Iraq Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
United Nations Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
List of Figures
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Figure 2. Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Iraq War? Current Situation and
Issues for Congress
Most Recent Developments
President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union message to Congress on
January 29, 2003, said that “With nuclear arms of a full arsenal of chemical and
biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the
Middle East and create deadly havoc in the region.” The President told members of
the armed forces that “some crucial hours may lie ahead.” He asked the United
Nations Security Council to convene on February 5, to hear Secretary of State Colin
Powell present information and intelligence about Iraq’s illegal weapons programs
and its links to terrorist groups. Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the
President also condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United
Nations and the world. In reaction to the speech, Senator Edward Kennedy said he
would introduce a resolution seeking “convincing evidence” of an imminent threat
before U.S. troops are committed to a war with Iraq.
In a report to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, 2003, Hans Blix, chief
United Nations weapons inspector, said there were indications Iraq had developed
weapons using deadly VX gas. He added that Iraq had failed to account for large
numbers of chemical bombs and quantities of chemical agent; had not provided
convincing evidence to inspectors for destruction of its anthrax; and was building
rockets with ranges longer than permitted by the United Nations. Blix noted that Iraq
had given inspectors access to suspected weapons sites, but complained of incidents
of harassment. Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, told the Council that inspectors had found no sign of a renewal of Iraq’s
nuclear weapons program, and asked that inspectors be given more time. After the
reports, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters that the opportunity for
Iraq to disarm peacefully is “fast coming to an end.”
In an interview published in the Washington Post on January 27, retired General
Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded U.S. forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf war,
said he would like better information before supporting a new war with Iraq.
Schwarzkopf added that “it is very important for us to wait and see what the
inspectors come up with.” National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote in the
New York Times on January 23 that Iraq was not disclosing and disarming its nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons programs, as required by United Nations
resolutions, and that its December arms declaration to the United Nations “amounts
to a 12,200 page lie.”

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Current Situation
Overview
Raymond W. Copson, 7-7661
(Last updated January 24, 2003)
B a c k g r o u n d . B u s h
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
Administration concerns about Iraq’s
alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil”
nations in his January 2002 State of
the Union address. Vice President
Cheney, in two August 2002
speeches, accused Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons
of mass destruction to dominate the
Middle East and threaten U.S. oil
supplies.1 These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States
might act unilaterally against Iraq.
However, in a September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work
with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2
H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use
of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security
Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with its resolutions. On November 8,
2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving
Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under
previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”
Recent Developments. During January 2003, the U.S. military buildup in
the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts indicated that U.S. forces would be
positioned to launch an attack on Iraq by mid-February or early March. Officials
maintained that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of
summer, but military experts observed that conditions for fighting a war would be far
better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush and top
officials expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with
Security Council disarmament demands, and suggested that key decisions on how the
United States should proceed would be made in the final days of January. The
1 “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103d National Convention,” August 26, 2002; and “Vice
President Honors Veterans of Korean War,” August 29, 2002. Available on the White
House web site at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
2 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].

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President said on January 14, that “time is running out” for Iraq to disarm, adding
that he was “sick and tired” of its “games and deceptions.”3 Secretary of State Colin
Powell added on January 16, that January 27 would be an “important date” for
decision-making on Iraq.4 On that date, chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix was
to report to the Security Council on Iraqi compliance. National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice said on January 19, that January 27 was “not a deadline,” but that
“we are at the verge of an important set of decisions.”5 Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld asserted on January 20, that “in the case of Iraq, we’re nearing the end of
the long road, with every other option exhausted.”6 On January 26, 2003, Secretary
of State Powell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos, Switzerland, that
“multilateralism cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the United States
“continues to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or
in a coalition of the willing.” U.S. officials have at times suggested a link between
Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist group, which is held responsible for the September 11,
2001 attacks on the United States. Secretary Powell reiterated this allegation at
Davos, saying there are “clear ties” between Iraq and terrorist groups, including al
Qaeda.
Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed
confrontation is limited. While the Blix report to the Security Council on January 27
was harsher on Iraq than most observers had expected, several earlier statements by
Blix indicate that he does not regard the January 27 report as final or definitive, that
he believes the inspections are making some progress, and that he wants the
inspections to continue for some time. His position has been supported by French
President Jacques Chirac and other foreign leaders. A Washington Post article
appearing on January 19, reported that under current circumstances, the United States
would have great difficulty in winning Security Council support for a war against
Iraq.7 British Prime Minister Tony Blair continues to give strong support to U.S.
policy, but many other foreign governments and observers are concerned that U.N.
inspectors have yet to find a “smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its
weapons of mass destruction programs, although U.S. officials and others maintain
that this was never the goal of the inspections. In their view, the purpose of
inspections is to verify whether or not Iraq has disarmed in compliance with past
U.N. resolutions. Iraq has not pro-actively cooperated with the inspections process,
they argue, and consequently there has been no such verification.8
Large public demonstrations against a possible war with Iraq occurred in the
United States and in cities overseas on the weekend of January 19-20. A January poll
3 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003. Available at [www.whitehouse.gov].
4 “Interview with Journalists from New Security Council Member Nations,” January 16,
2003. Available at [http://www.state.gov].
5 BBC report, January 19, 2003.
6 “Rumsfeld Says Iraq Diplomacy is Nearing the End of Its Road,” New York Times, January
21, 2003.
7 “A Skeptical U.N.: Support Ebbs for U.S. War Plans,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003.
8 David Kay, “It was Never About a Smoking Gun,” Washington Post, January 19, 2003.

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by the Pew Research Center indicates that 68% of Americans favor military action
to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but only 26% would favor such action if the
United States were to act unilaterally.9
Options for the Future. Whether the Administration will choose to launch
a war against Iraq without broader international support remains to be seen. Some
may urge that policymakers accede to wishes of Security Council members who want
the arms inspection process to be given more time. Others argue that this approach
would reward Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics, and that there would be serious
economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large U.S. military force in the
Middle East indefinitely. It may be that dramatic evidence of Iraqi non-compliance
will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring stronger international backing
for a war. According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite
their denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and
other Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of
guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through
with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.10 However, many
analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move.
Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power,
but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too
sweeping to permit such an event.
Military Situation
Steve Bowman, 7-7613
(Last updated January 23, 2003)
The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the
Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq. The
Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these
deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of
the troop movements underway. The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted, are
not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) is reportedly approaching 80,000, and is reportedly expected to reach over
150,000 some time in February. Another 100,000 personnel may be placed on alert
for later deployment should that be required.11 DOD has announced that, as of
January 22, 2003, there are 78,906 National Guard and Reservists from all services
now called to active duty, an increase of over 20,000 in one week.12 In addition to
9 “Public Wants Proof of Iraqi Weapons Programs; Majority Says Bush Has Yet to Make
the Case.” Available at [http://people-press.org].
10 “Officials Support Exile for Hussein,” Washington Post, January 20, 2003.
11 “Rumsfeld Doubles Carrier Groups in Gulf Region,” Washington Times, January 22,
2003; “Main Developments Concerning Iraq,” Associated Press, January 22, 2003.
12 See the DOD website: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/d20030122ngr.pdf].

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U.S. deployments, Britain is deploying an armor Battle Group with 27,000 personnel
to the Persian Gulf region.
Figure 2. Iraq
The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf
states of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. With
the possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of
cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations
Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of
force against Iraq. Outside of the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom,
Australia, Denmark, and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security
Council does not act further. The White House press office announced in November
2002 that the United States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in
military operations against Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on
responses.13 The United States has also approached NATO Headquarters concerning
the use of certain NATO assets (e.g., AWACS aerial command aircraft). NATO
postponed action on the request, and French and German opposition to military
13 White House press Conference, December 5, 2002.

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action against Iraq at this time makes a NATO commitment appear unlikely in the
near term. Negotiations continue with Turkey over possible U.S. troop deployments
and the use of Turkish airbases. No clear commitment has been obtained, but U.S.
personnel have been allowed to begin surveying some Turkish airfields to determine
their potential usefulness for U.S. operations.
Though Administration spokesmen continue to maintain that no final decision
has been made regarding the use of force, press reports speculate that late February
is currently seen as the most likely time-frame for the onset of military operations.14
This would permit the completion of a large force deployment, with the possibility
of completing operations before the arrival of Iraqi summer weather.
CRS Product
CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: Potential U.S. Military Operations
Diplomatic Situation
Carol Migdalovitz (7-2667)
(Last updated January 23, 2003)
Developments at the United Nations. U.N. Security Council Resolution
1441 of November 8, 2002 gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations” under previous resolutions, and set up an enhanced
inspection regime to bring about the “full and verified completion of the disarmament
process.” Iraq was required to submit, within 30 days, “a declaration of all aspects
of its programs to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, and other delivery systems....” It also was required to provide the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “immediate, unimpeded, unconditional
access” to all sites they wish to inspect. Inspections began on November 27.
On December 7, 2002, Iraq submitted a 12,000-page declaration. On January 9,
2003, Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, appeared at the Council
with Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, and told the Security
Council that the Iraqi declaration, “is rich in volume but poor in new information
about weapons issues ....” Blix added that although Iraq had “failed to answer a great
many questions,” inspectors had not found “any smoking guns.”15 Blix and
ElBaradei went to Baghdad on January 18-20 to consult with Iraqi officials. Blix
later said that Iraq was still not providing proactive cooperation, in that it had not
submitted data on its arms inspections, had put conditions on U.N. U-2 surveillance
flights, and had not yet consented to private interviews with scientists.
On January 20, a Security Council meeting on terrorism was held at the behest
of Council President France to emphasize that the Iraq situation was detracting from
14 “Russia Says War on Iraq Decided; Allies Urge Peace,” Reuters, January 22, 2003
15 “UN Inspection Report May Complicate U.S. Plan in Iraq,” Reuters, January 10, 2003.

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international antiterrorism efforts. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin
declared that “today” nothing justifies military action against Iraq.16 He maintained
that “Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs are being largely blocked, even
frozen,”17 and that war could not solve the problem of proliferation. German Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer, whose country holds a non-permanent seat on the Security
Council, rejected war because it could destabilize the (Middle East) region and fuel
new terrorist attacks. Russian Foreign Minster Igor Ivanov cautioned against
unilateral action that could threaten the unity of the antiterrorism coalition. He noted
that the resolution (1441) is being implemented, and problems with implementation
are solvable. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan asserted that the inspectors’
January 27 report should be a “new beginning” for inspections. Secretary of State
Colin Powell responded by urging the U.N. not to “shrink from its responsibilities.”
Foreign Reactions. The buildup of U.S. forces in the Gulf region appears
to be heightening foreign misgivings about the possibility of war. Many Europeans,
including the European Union (EU) High Representative for Foreign and Security
Policy Javier Solana and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis, current holder of the
rotating EU Presidency, want the inspection process to conclude before the Security
Council decides on military action. On January 23, French President Jacques Chirac
declared that “every decision should be taken at the Security Council.”18 German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder categorically ruled out his government’s voting for a
war resolution. Countering the German and French view, Prime Minister Tony Blair
said that Britain, which favors a new U.N. resolution authorizing use of force, would
support military action if there were “an unreasonable blockage” of such a resolution.
Unease is growing in the Middle East. Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul
has said that his government wants the crisis to end without war, while the leader of
his party, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has urged “the world’s decision makers” to heed
the “rising call for peace.”19 Iranian President Mohammed Khatami has urged Iraq
to give in to international regulation, while Saudi Arabia seeks more dialogue even
if the U.N. decides on war. Crown Prince Abdullah, the Saudi de facto leader,
reportedly will call on an Arab summit in Bahrain in March to reject “external, non-
legitimate aggression” against any Arab state, referring to unilateral U.S. action
against Iraq.20 An Egyptian official had warned earlier that “any strike on Iraq would
mean more terrorism in the region, not to speak of the chaos that will spread in the
region, in addition to the fact that a strike will not have the desired result.” There are
unconfirmed reports that Arab governments are trying to negotiate a deal for Saddam
Hussein to go into exile, but these have been denied.
Peace Initiatives. There are no major peace initiatives at present, but there
is considerable diplomatic activity. After consulting with their governments, Turkish
16 “Powell to UN: Confront Iraq,” Chicago Tribune, January 21, 2003.
17 “France Vows to Block Resolution on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 21, 2003.
18 “France and Germany Condemn U.S. Haste,” Financial Times, January 23, 2003.
19 “Turkey Urges Peace, Prepared to Host Iraq Meeting,” Reuters, January 21, 2003.
20 “Saudi Arabia Makes Rare Proposal for Arab Reforms,” Reuters, January 15, 2003.

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Prime Minister Gul convened a meeting of the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran, Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in Istanbul on January 23, aimed at finding a peaceful
solution to the crisis by persuading Saddam Hussein to cooperate fully with the U.N.
Representatives of these governments may meet again in Damascus, Syria. Foreign
Minister George Papandreou of Greece, the current holder of the rotating European
Union presidency, plans to lead a peace mission to moderate Arab countries in late
January.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31629, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: International Attitudes
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the
Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview, by Marjorie M. Browne
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council
Resolutions – 1992-2002
U.S. Policy
The Administration
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated January 27, 2003)
The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the
Middle East region. The Administration asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 16 U.N.
Security Council resolutions that, among other requirements, mandate that Iraq fully
declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. President
Bush has stated that Iraq must fully and actively cooperate with a new U.N.
disarmament effort, or the United States will lead a coalition to disarm Iraq,
presumably through a major U.S.-led military offensive.
Policy Debate.
Several press accounts indicate that there have been
divisions within the Administration on Iraq policy. Secretary of State Powell has
been said to typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program
of unfettered weapons inspections would succeed in containing the WMD threat from
Iraq.21 He reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the
United Nations to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally. However, press
reports appearing in late January 2003 indicated that Secretary Powell had come to
believe that the weapons inspections are not working and that war may be required,
with or without U.N. authorization. The Secretary was reportedly highly critical of
opposition to a war on the part of the French government. Press reports suggest that
Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, among others, have
consistently been skeptical that inspections can significantly reduce the long-term
21 Lynch, Colum and Karen DeYoung. U.S. Officials Meet to Take Stock of Iraq Policy.
Washington Post, October 16, 2002.

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threat from Iraq and are in favor of military action against Iraq. These and other U.S.
officials reportedly believe that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way
for democracy not only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for
terrorism. Those who favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active
WMD programs and will eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States
unless it is completely disarmed. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that
the Administration is exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an
attack might goad Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.
The Security Council is strongly divided in its evaluation of the new inspections
regime, as it has been for most of the post-Gulf War period. The United States and
Britain believe that Iraq must actively cooperate in its disarmament and that passive
cooperation, such as permitting facility inspections, is insufficient. France, Russia,
and China have tended to minimize individual Iraqi violations as long as Iraq, for the
most part, is admitting the inspectors to all facilities they seek to visit. The outcome
of such Council deliberations could determine whether or not the United Nations
authorizes military action against Iraq to enforce its inspection mandates. France told
the Security Council on January 20, 2003 that, for now, it is opposed to military
action and believes the inspectors should be allowed more opportunity to complete
their work in Iraq. It has threatened to veto a resolution to authorize war at this time.
Regime Change Goal. The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq
under a U.N. umbrella has led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that
the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime. The purpose of downplaying this
goal may be to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note that
regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq. However, in practice,
the United States draws little separation between regime change and disarmament;
the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad would be required
to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD. Press reports in October 2002 said
that the Administration is recruiting an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using
equipment and training funds ($92 million remaining) authorized by the Iraq
Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998). This force could support a U.S.
attack or work on its own to destabilize Saddam Hussein. The Administration is
reportedly working with Iraqi exile groups to determine future policies and priorities
in a post-Saddam Iraq.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action

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Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated January 24, 2003)
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role
in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and
trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions
against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime
from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991,
Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from
Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L.
102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. The statute conferred broad authority on the
President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expressed
Congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the level of consultation and
communication between Congress and the White House since the signing of P.L.
107-243. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle has stated that the Bush
Administration has failed to report to Congress on its diplomatic efforts and military
preparations within 60 days, as he said was required by P.L. 107-243.22 In response,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did not believe that the resolution
required a written report, and that his verbal briefings should suffice. If the Iraq -
U.S. confrontation continues to intensify, calls for greater Administration
consultation with Congress could become more frequent. Secretary of State Powell
and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, came to the Capitol on January 21, 2003, for a
closed briefing with the Senate. According to the press, several Senators asked that
the Administration give weapons inspectors in Iraq more time, and several later
commented that the Administration should do a better job of explaining why Iraq
poses an immediate threat to the United States.23
Members of Congress have participated in several recent delegations to the
Persian Gulf region. In December 2002, two Members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator Joseph Biden, visited
northern Iraq, Turkey, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. The two
22 Janet Hook, “New Anxiety Over Bush’s Foreign Policy Some members of Congress –
including Republicans – criticize the president’s handling of simultaneous crises in Iraq and
North Korea.” The Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2003.
23 “Hill Pressures Bush on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 25, 2003.

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Senators also addressed the 150-member Kurdish Parliament. Congress has called
for Iraq to release information on the whereabouts of an American pilot who was shot
down during the 1991 Gulf War.
Following a war or significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will
likely seek to influence future internal political and economic developments in that
country. Congress may be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance
programs that would facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq. The extent and
cost of U.S. programs would depend on the post-war scenario. The Administration
may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to support coalition
partners in the Middle East, who may suffer economically in the event of regional
instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of assistance specific
to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511) that
authorized aid to the former Soviet Union or the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress will have to weigh aid
to Iraq against other budget priorities.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21324, Congressional Action on Iraq, 1990 - 2002
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy
Issues for Congress
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated January 27, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put
forward for the use of U.S. military forces. Iraq had varying capabilities in all
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War. Iraq had a well-
financed and broad-based nuclear weapons program, most of which, according to
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, was eliminated or
dismantled during inspections conducted between 1991 and 1998. Questions remain
about Iraq’s nuclear weapons design work, the alleged procurement of uranium from
Niger (which Iraq denies) and whether scientists have continued working on nuclear-
weapons-related projects. Bush Administration officials have also pointed to Iraq’s
procurement of high-strength aluminum tubes as evidence of a clandestine program
to produce weapons-grade uranium with centrifuges, but IAEA Director General
Mohamed ElBaradei disputed that conclusion, reporting to the UN Security Council
in January 2003 that Iraq’s reported use of the material for conventional rockets was
deemed credible.
Much less is known about Iraq’s biological weapons program. Iraq apparently
produced anthrax, aflatoxin and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Questions

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CRS-12
remain about the production and destruction of anthrax, although new information
on biotechnology developments since 1998 was included in Iraq’s December 7, 2002
weapons declaration to the United Nations Security Council. Iraq’s capabilities in
chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, in contrast, are well-known. Iraq produced
blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and non-persistent nerve agents
(VX and Sarin). While inspectors destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of
chemical agents and 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals in inspections from
1991 to 1998, significant questions remain. For example, the fate of about 31,600
chemical munitions, 500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors
are still unknown, as are Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent. In 1995, Iraq
admitted it had produced 4 tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it
had imported enough precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons. There is also
evidence that VX agent was weaponized, although Iraq has not declared this. In
October 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency assessed that Iraq had renewed
chemical weapons production and probably had stockpiled a few hundred tons of
agent. In addition, the discovery in late January 2003 of 16 empty chemical
munitions shells not previously declared points to further discrepancies in Iraq’s
December 7, 2002 declaration of all its capabilities.
Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production capabilities prior to the
Gulf War, but much of this was destroyed during that war and in inspections from
1991 to 1998. About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles remained after the war and
inspectors accounted for all but two. Iraq is permitted to produce missiles with
ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in producing Ababil and
Samoud missiles of permitted ranges. In its December 7 declaration, Iraq admitted
that some flight tests of those missiles did exceed the 150km-range by 50km. U.S.
analysts believe that Iraq may be concealing 12 Scud missiles and is manufacturing
propellant for longer-range missiles. Key unresolved issues include documentation
of missile programs, the fate of 300 tons of special missile propellant, and indigenous
missile production.
The U.N. Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA
have conducted over 400 inspections from mid-November 2002 to mid-January
2003. Both UNMOVIC and the IAEA have repeatedly stressed that Iraq must not
only permit inspections to take place, which they have done thus far, but must also
actively cooperate with the investigation and voluntarily provide accurate
information. Since November 2002, few new details have been uncovered, apart
from the discovery in mid-January of empty chemical weapons shells not previously
declared and of 3000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a
private home.
In his report to the U.N. Security Council on January 27, 2003, Chairman Blix
noted that Iraq has cooperated “rather well,” but suggested ways in which Iraq could
help produce evidence and transparency that could lead to confidence in
disarmament. These include greater Iraqi cooperation in finding items and activities
(e.g., 122mm chemical warheads), in finding documents, particularly those in private
homes, in providing names of personnel and in ensuring that interviews are credible.
Director General ElBaradei’s report noted that inspections since November 2002
have identified no prohibited nuclear activities but urged states to continue to provide
intelligence information. ElBaradei specifically suggested that the inspection process

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“should be allowed to run its natural course” and that credible assurances could be
provided within the next few months. The Bush Administration has interpreted the
January 27 report as a definitive statement of UNMOVIC and the IAEA’s findings
to date, and the White House spokesman has said that the “report...clearly shows Iraq
is not complying.”
A potential key to inspections progress is credible interviewing of scientists.
The Bush administration has maintained for several months that interviews with
scientists should be conducted outside of Iraq. Blix has resisted this approach,
stating that he does not run a “defector agency,” but on the other hand, UNMOVIC
has been unable to interview scientists in private in Iraq. Until recently, Iraq held
that individual scientists could choose whether or not to comply with interviews. In
talks with UNMOVIC and IAEA in Baghdad on January 19 and 20, 2003, however,
Iraq said it would encourage its scientists to comply with interview requests.
Nonetheless, many analysts have pointed out that whatever the Iraqi government may
say, there is a potential threat to scientists’ families remaining in Iraq, and that this
may make any scientists who go outside the country unwilling to fully disclose what
they know. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said on January 23, 2003,
that Saddam Hussein had ordered that scientists and their families be killed if they
cooperated with U.N. weapons inspectors. Iraq’s refusal to permit U-2 surveillance
flights is another issue of concern to inspectors.
Many analysts regard getting more information on Iraq’s WMD programs as
essential, whether or not military force is used. In the case of war, such information
will be primarily useful in targeting weapons infrastructure and possibly the weapons
themselves. A key question for the moment is whether the information the United
States may possess on these programs should be utilized in support of the inspections
process, or held back to support war-time targeting. Although some intelligence
information has been shared, according to Secretary of State Powell, the United
States will present new evidence soon to prove its case. Some reports suggest that the
Administration has been reluctant to release more information for fear of
jeopardizing intelligence sources while others suggest that the Administration is
reserving this information for the potentially difficult diplomatic negotiations within
the U.N. Security Council on the use of force.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy
CRS Report RL31671, Iraq: UN Inspections for Weapons of Mass Destruction
CRS Report RS21376, Iraq: WMD-Capable Ballistic Missiles and Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

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Post-War Iraq
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated January 21, 2003)
Background. The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation of and instability
in a post-Saddam Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current
debate over Iraq policy. One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush
Administration for ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-
Saddam Iraq could dissolve into chaos. It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims,
the majority but under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into
warring ethnic and tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran,
Turkey, and Syria. Because of the complexities of planning for a post-war Iraq, and
the potential for major inter-ethnic and factional feuding if Saddam falls, some
observers believe that the Bush Administration would prefer that Saddam Hussein
be replaced by a military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to
democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. Administration
statements, however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq.
Some regional governments that fear destabilizing effects on their own regimes from
a war, including Saudi Arabia, are said to be trying to persuade Saddam to go into
exile in order to prevent war.
Current Planning Efforts. The Administration is planning for a post-
Saddam regime. The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts
the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a
stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N.
resolutions. Some press reports say that the Administration is planning for an
approximately 18 month occupation of Iraq led primarily by U.S. military officials,
working in concert with Iraqis to build a democratic post-war Iraq.24 Other reports
indicate that some military planners would prefer that the United Nations and U.S.
allies play a major role in governing post-war Iraq on an interim basis. In September
2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that U.S. occupation force levels
would range between 75,000 and 200,000 personnel, at a cost of $1 billion to $4
billion per month. (See below, Cost Issues)
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States. The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power
after Saddam is overthrown.
24 “U.S. Is Completing Plan to Promote a Democratic Iraq,” New York Times, January 6,
2002.

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As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.25 The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure. Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (1) education; (2) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (3) foreign and national security policy; (4) defense institutions
and policy; (5) free media; (6) civil society capacity-building; (7) anti-corruption
measures; and (8) oil and energy.
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects. It is widely assumed that Iraq’s
vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, would be used to
fund reconstruction. However, many observers believe that an Iraqi regime on the
verge of defeat could destroy its own oil fields. Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire
before withdrawing from there in 1991. The Administration reportedly is planning
to secure Iraq’s oil fields early in any offensive against Iraq to prevent this from
happening. A related issue is long term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and
which foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore
Iraq’s vast reserves. Russia, China, and others are said to fear that the United States
will seek to develop Iraq’s oil industry with minimal participation of firms of other
countries. Some press reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such
control,26 although some observers speculate that the Administration is seeking to
create such an impression in order to persuade Russia that it has an interest in
participating in a coalition against Iraq.

War Crimes Trials. An issue related to regime change but somewhat separate
is whether Saddam Hussein and his associates should be prosecuted for war crimes
and, if so, whether that should be pursued while Saddam is still in power. The
Administration reportedly has reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military
action that overthrows Saddam, that he and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq.27
The Administration is gathering data for a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his
associates, but at the same time, some officials have indicated that Saddam and might
be allowed a safe haven if he leaves Iraq voluntarily before a war.28
25 “State Department Hosts Working Group Meeting for Future of Iraq Project,”
Washington File, December 11, 2002.
26 “After Saddam, an Uncertain Future,” Insight Magazine, February 3, 2003
27 “U.S. Seeks War Crimes Trial Data.,” Washington Post, October 30, 2002.
28 “Exile for Hussein May be an Option, U.S. Officials Hint,” New York Times, January 20,
2002.

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CRS-16
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions,
and Illicit Trade
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some
Economic Consequences
Burden Sharing
Carl Ek (7-7286)
(Last updated January 27, 2003)
In November 2002, it was reported that the U.S. government had contacted the
governments of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq.
According to press reports, several governments have offered help of one kind or
another; other countries, according to Bush Administration officials, also intend to
support the war effort but, for domestic political reasons, would prefer not to
publicize their contributions. Nevertheless, at present it appears unlikely that a
coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will arise.
Political and Military Factors. Some observers believe that the Bush
Administration’s effort to build a coalition against Iraq is being conducted as much
for diplomatic as for military reasons. On the international political front, analysts
contend that the United States will seek to enlist allies in order to demonstrate that
it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm Iraq has been
endorsed by a broad global coalition. In most cases, foreign decisions to participate
or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and
the further actions of the U.N. Security Council. Although the political leaders of
some Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration’s aims,
they must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their populations.
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the United States initially
relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only small contingents of
special forces from a handful of other countries. Allied combat and peacekeeping
forces entered the fray in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been defeated.
Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because the unique
nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating and then
calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the utmost speed
in command and communications. An opposing view is that the United States lost
an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for an allied coalition
in the conflict against terrorism. During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999,
some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for allied consensus
hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing target approval
process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces conduct
operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military capabilities
(e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and night vision

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equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to achieve a swift
victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions. Britain, the only other country that has
had warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to make contributions
of ground, air, and naval forces. Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it
is believed that other countries, such as Poland and Canada, may support coalition
forces once a conflict begins. Washington and Prague have discussed the possibility
of reinforcing Czech anti-chemical weapons specialists in Kuwait, where they have
been stationed since March 2002. Japan, constitutionally barred from dispatching
ground troops, recently reinforced its fleet of naval vessels patrolling the Indian
Ocean. Sweden has indicated that it might contribute field hospitals. Although the
German government has said that it would not contribute troops to combat,
Chancellor Schroeder has stated that German AWACS crews might help patrol the
Turkish-Iraqi border in the event of a war.
There are other forms of support that might prove valuable. For example,
countries could grant fly-over rights, or back-fill for U.S. troops that might redeploy
to Iraq from Central Asia or the Balkans. In addition, gaining permission to launch
air strikes from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling,
allow aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enable planes to respond more quickly to ground
force calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Romania and Bulgaria have
offered the use of their airbases and seaports. On January 15, the United States
formally requested several measures of assistance from the NATO allies, such as
AWACS, refueling, and overflight privileges; the request was deferred. The Bush
Administration has reportedly sought permission from the Turkish government to
use Turkish bases and ports, and to move up to 75,000-80,000 U.S. troops through
southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq; the response is still
pending and is a key issue for U.S. planners. Reports appearing on January 17, 2003,
indicated that Turkey might permit only a much smaller U.S. contingent due to
domestic opposition to a war with Iraq. At the Bush Administration’s request, the
Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training of up to
3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant
interpreters and administrators.
Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public
statements, more than 50,000 U.S. troops currently are stationed in the region, and
Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers. Whether the
United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in carrying out an
attack on Iraq remains unclear. U.S. troops based in Kuwait would likely play a key
role in any ground attack against Iraq.
Post-conflict Assistance. After the 1991 Gulf war, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq. However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces.

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CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003
Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated January 23, 2003)
A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and outcome
– could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic
pressures, stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and
festering regional disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of
the Middle East. Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along
ethnic or sectarian lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional
boundaries as occurred after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is
highly unlikely; however, political realignments could take place, along with new
alliances and rivalries that might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide
to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance,
political support, or both. Turkey, for example, is aware that use of bases on its
territory would be critical in providing U.S. forces with essential staging areas.
Turkish officials say their country has lost billions of dollars in trade over more than
a decade of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and are already pressing for compensation.
Similarly, Saudi Arabia, should it assent to U.S. use of its bases or facilities, would
be likely to push for political concessions, including a stronger U.S. effort to resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See below.)
The ability of the U.S. Government to obtain the support or acquiescence of
Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will
be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest
to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted Arab-
Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region. Two
other issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.
Democracy and Governance. Some commentators believe that a war with
Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic
revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has
repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the
Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have
authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort
to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political

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empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million the first year) reflects only a token effort to
support democratization and development. (Arab reactions to the Powell initiative
tended to be cool, some arguing that the United States should deal with Arab-Israeli
issues first.) Still others fear that more open political systems could lead to a
takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups, who often constitute the most viable
opposition in Middle East countries, or by other groups whose goals might be
inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior experience with democracy may
inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. The timing of further initiatives to move
forward with Arab-Israeli peacemaking has been among the issues covered in recent
debates over a possible war with Iraq. Administration officials and other
commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more
favorable climate in which Arab-Israeli issues can be addressed. Proponents of this
view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which brought Arabs and
Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in 1991, after first
disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Many believe that the then Bush
Administration secured wide Arab participation in the coalition to expel Iraq from
Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to address the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Officials of the present Bush Administration continue to speak of their vision of
pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after eliminating current threats from Iraq.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to the United States than a
largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led
coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab
and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli
issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate
in Arab-Israeli negotiation, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of
inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in
anti-U.S. terrorism.29 Regardless of priority, however, it is likely that a war with Iraq
29 A former high U.S. official described the “Arab street” as “explosive”; however, many
(continued...)

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CRS-20
will be followed by further pressures on the U.S. Administration to intensify its
efforts to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region. Changed conditions in the
Persian Gulf region in the aftermath of a war with Iraq could breathe new life into
long moribund proposals for a Gulf regional security organization, perhaps with the
participation of other U.S. regional allies in the region such as Egypt and Jordan.
Over time, such an organization, if effective, might help alleviate burdens that
currently devolve upon the United States in countering threats to regional stability
and might also play a useful role in the war against terrorism. On the other hand, the
departure of Saddam Hussein from the scene could remove a leading incentive for
Gulf states to expand their involvement in regional security arrangements.
Furthermore, a U.S.-led war that did not enjoy widespread acceptance among the
Middle East populace might make local governments reluctant to participate in a
regional organization if it were perceived as a U.S. creation. It is possible, too, that
Gulf states would prefer to continue relying on their bilateral ties with the United
States for security guarantees rather than moving toward a multilateral approach.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21325, Iraq: Divergent Views on Military Action
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy
CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and
U.S. Policy
Humanitarian Issues
Rhoda Margesson, 7-0425
(Last updated January 23, 2003)
Background. Since the end of the 1991 war with Iraq, surveys and studies
show a continuing decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian
population, estimated at 27 million,30 especially among children and the elderly. But
it is difficult to determine how much of the suffering is due to the sanctions imposed
on Iraq and how much is due to other factors. Imposition of U.N. sanctions followed
a nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran, during which spending on the social
welfare system declined. Decades of conflict and the bombing during the Gulf war
damaged or destroyed much of the public infrastructure such as water and sewage
plants and many public buildings. Some argue that supplies of water, food, medicine,
29 (...continued)
observers point out that Middle East governments had little trouble containing incipient anti-
U.S. demonstrations during the Gulf war in 1990-1991.
30 Total population numbers for Iraq vary by source from 24 to 27 million people. “UNICEF
Humanitarian Action: Iraq Donor Update January 14, 2003.” See [http://www.reliefweb.int].

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CRS-21
and electricity are a matter of urgent concern.31 However, much of the information
available on the conditions within Iraq is also considered unreliable. Some groups
question the accuracy of statistics publicized by the government, but have no
independent sources of information. All estimates of the number of deaths due to
lack of food or medical care vary widely based on the source.
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies provide aid to Iraq through the Oil-for-
Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and
medicines for the civilian population.32 Both bilateral and multilateral aid have
continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to
assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP. During the 1990s,
the OFFP alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian
situation (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains
serious and has continued to deteriorate over time. Some improvements have been
seen in nutrition, health services, water supply and sanitation, but there is now greater
dependence on government services. Health and nutrition problems have been tied
to the consequences of war, sanctions, shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate
policies of the Iraqi regime.
War-Related Concerns. The implications of war in Iraq include a potential
humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq
itself. Four issues are of critical interest to Congress in that context. First, how the
war will be fought and for how long; will it be a protracted, urban war with heavy
civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi people? Second,
what type of humanitarian assistance will be provided to displaced populations (aid
priorities, use of oil revenues) and the role of other donors? Third, how will
assistance programs be implemented–through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration,
or U.N./donor assistance? And finally, what will be the impact of refugee flows on
stability in the region and the role of neighboring countries in contributing to post-
war efforts?
A U.N. Task Force assembled to coordinate the U.N. response to a possible
conflict predicts a conflict in Iraq could cause 500,000 casualties, create 900,000
refugees, and displace 2 million people, leaving about 10 million Iraqi civilians
(nearly 40% of the Iraqi population) in need of emergency assistance.33 However,
31 “Agencies Fear Consequences But Plan for War in Iraq; Iraq Stocks up Food Ahead of
Possible US War.” Turkish Daily News, December 27, 2002.
32 For more information about the Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP) see CRS Report RL30472,
Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanctions, and Illicit Trade by Kenneth
Katzman.
33 “War in Iraq Will Have Major Impact on Global Economy, U.N. Says,” Deutsche Presse
Agentur, January 10, 2003. The U.N. report “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios” that contained
this information was originally kept strictly confidential, but a Mennonite organization
obtained a copy and posted it [http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/pr/pr030107undoc.html].
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Jordan had 1.64 million refugees at the end
of 2001; 350,000 Iraqis have settled there since the 1991 war. “Aid Groups Get Ready for
War–Nearby Nations Expect Flood of Iraqi Refugees,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
(continued...)

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some analysts believe that if the war is a brief one, casualties will be considerably
fewer. The United Nations reportedly estimates that 4.5 million to 9.5 million Iraqis
would need food soon after the onset of hostilities.34
Refugees. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have publicly stated that
they will prevent refugees from entering their countries.35 Iranian leaders have stated
that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but refugees would be
provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran in Afghanistan.36
However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in case. Turkey has
said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and is planning to
build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five more camps
within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of 24,000 tents. The
Red Crescent team is making preparations to accommodate up to 100,000 people and
treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting.37 Kuwait’s government has said it
will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that displaced people could be
cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two countries. The
government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees. According to relief
agency officials, Jordanian authorities appear determined not to allow Iraqi refugees
into Jordan. Saudi Arabia has not publicly discussed the need for preparation for
refugees, but there have been reports that the government is making some plans.38
Aid Agency Planning. The United Nations has an extensive infrastructure
in Iraq to oversee the OFFP.39 Few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have
offices in Baghdad and only a handful have a presence in Iraq. The Iraqi regime
restricts NGOs–for example, those that work in the North cannot have offices in the
South. In addition, U.S.-based organizations are required by the U.S. Government
to have a license to operate in Iraq.40 Among NGOs, there is a concern that U.S. and
33 (...continued)
December 23, 2002.
34 “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’ War; As U.S. Military Prepares
for Fighting, Relief Groups Mobilize to Save Lives,” Washington Post, January 5, 2003.
35 “Aid Groups Cagey on Contingency Plans for Iraq War,” Reuters, January 15, 2003.
36 Iranian police chief Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf recently said, “No Refugees will be
Allowed into our Territory if America Attacks Iraq.” “Tehran Sends Mixed Signals on Iraqi
Refugees,” RFL/RL, January 16, 2003; “Iran Prepares for Possible Iraqi Refugee Influx,”
Reuters, January 16, 2003.
37 “Turkey to set up 24,000 tents at Iraq border for possible refugee influx,” Agence France-
Presse, January 15, 2003; “Supplies Amassed Along Front Line of Iraq’s ‘Other’ War.”
38 Ibid.
39 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has four offices inside
Iraq, and works primarily with 100,000 Palestinians, 23,000 Iranians and 13,000 Turks–all
of whom are refugees. “U.N. Seeks $37.4 million Humanitarian Supplies in Case of Iraq
War.” Dow Jones International News, December 23, 2002.
40 “U.S. Plans Humanitarian Assistance for Iraqi People in Case of War,” January 16, 2003,
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq]. “Uncertainty Dogs Relief Groups’ Plans to Care
(continued...)

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CRS-23
other military leaders have underestimated the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq.41
NGOs have also complained that the U.S. government has delayed approval of
licenses required for U.S. agencies in Iraq, Iran, and Syria because of U.S.
sanctions.42 As a result, according to Interaction (an alliance of U.S.-based
international development and humanitarian non-governmental organizations), very
few U.S. or international organizations are operating in and around Iraq, which
means that they have no network in place and little experience in the area.43
Furthermore, according to NGOs, Pentagon officials have suggested that aid
organizations should not expect to operate in much of Iraq for several months after
a start of hostilities.
Some international organizations, such as the International Committee for the
Red Cross, have stockpiled supplies in and around Iraq, but there is a reluctance to
do this because these organizations do not want to send a message that they believe
a conflict is inevitable.44 U.N. humanitarian agencies met with key donors in Geneva
on December 13, 2002, to develop possible humanitarian scenarios and contingency
plans. The United Nations has appealed for $37.4 million to provide humanitarian
assistance and food, increase staffing for relief operations, and develop joint services
for the aid community in Iraq.45 UNHCR has been putting together a contingency
plan to address the potential for large-scale population movements. The United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping is reportedly planning to establish an office that
could help with the coordination and distribution of humanitarian aid.46
Potential Internal Humanitarian Consequences of War. The United
Nations has explored the ways in which the current poor humanitarian situation
inside Iraq could worsen during a conflict.47 With more than two thirds of the
country receiving food assistance and many suffering from malnutrition and other
health problems, this situation could get worse if parts of Iraq became isolated and
humanitarian agencies could not gain access to these areas. Food security is a critical
concern in Iraq. Reportedly, families cannot make their rations last the full month
or they need to sell part of it for other necessities–leaving them without any food
stored in reserve and more vulnerable, particularly if food distribution were to be
40 (...continued)
for Iraq Refugees,” Financial Times, January 6, 2003.
41 AlertNet, “Agencies Should Resist Being Taken for Granted,” January 17, 2003,
http://www.reliefweb.org.
42 “Aid Agencies accuse US of Hindering War Relief Preparations in Iraq,” Agence France-
Presse, January 17, 2003.
43 Interaction, U.S. Relief and Development Organizations Concerned Over Potential
H u m a n i t a r i a n C o n s e q u e n c e s o f W a r i n I r a q , N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 2 ,
[http://www.interaction.org/media/Hot_Iraq.html].
44 “This Time Around, War Would Hit Iraq Harder,” The Washington Post, Oct. 29, 2002.
45 “U.N. Appeals for $37.4 million in Iraq Aid.” AP On Line, December 23, 2002.
46 “Iraq War Could Put 10 Million in Need of Aid,” The Washington Post, January 7, 2003.
47 “Strictly Confidential U.N. document “Likely Humanitarian Scenarios,” December 10,
2002, [http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/pr/pr030107undoc.html.]

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CRS-24
interrupted.48 Military destruction of roads or railways could also destroy the food
distribution systems within Iraq and those from the international community. If
power stations were hit, the already damaged water and sanitation systems could be
further damaged, which could lead to epidemics, such as cholera and hepatitis.
According to the United Nations, particularly with an increase in displaced
populations “the outbreak of diseases in epidemic if not pandemic proportions is very
likely.”49 Water and sanitation are of greatest concern. Shortages in medical
supplies, drugs and vaccines have also been reported, and current stocks are predicted
to last only 4 months at current consumption rates.
In the confusion of war or in the context of a power vacuum, some observers
have suggested that Iraqis may initiate revenge killings and seek to resolve grievances
through violence or some form of revolt. In 1991, some Shiites executed Baath party
officials. Such an environment with a breakdown of the social order could have
serious humanitarian impacts, such as large-scale deaths and serious human rights
abuses, particularly towards women.50
Depending on the type of warfare, many Iraqis could suffer the unintended
consequences of military action, or the effects of chemical and biological weapons
if used by their government. If units of the Iraqi army took a scorched earth policy,
as they did with the Kuwaiti oil wells in the Gulf War, there could be serious
environmental and health consequences.
International and Domestic Legal Issues
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, January 24, 2003)
The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises
a number of domestic and international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article
I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under
international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; (3) the effect of United Nations
Security Council resolutions on the matter; and (4) the implications of such a use of
force for the numerous statutes providing special emergency powers to the President.
The following subsections give brief overviews of these issues and provide links to
reports that discuss these matters in greater detail.
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. The potential use
of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions
under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has
48 “UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Iraq Donor Update,” January 14, 2003.
49 “Strictly Confidential U.N. Document.”
50 “Statement on War with Iraq,” Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children,
International Rescue Committee, [http://www.womenscommission.org].

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employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of
the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....” Because of these separate powers, and
because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue
of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often
arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without
congressional authorization. While all commentators agree that the President has the
constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without
congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent
to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated
against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional.
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.” Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force.
In the present circumstance these legal requirements have been met and any
controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force avoided. As noted earlier
in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the
President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” As predicates for the use of
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism. P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is
“intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” It also requires the President to make periodic
reports to Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.” Finally, the statute
expresses congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt
and decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions; but it does not condition the use of force on
prior Security Council authorization.

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CRS Products
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Statutory Authority
for the Use of Force Against Iraq,” available online from the CRS site at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter226.html]
CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Terrorism, “War Powers: Domestic Legal
Considerations” [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter126.html]
CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of
Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications
International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question
that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the U.S. would be
deemed legitimate under international law. International law traditionally has
recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues to
be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. That right has also traditionally
included the right to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate,
preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be
imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces. But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. As
a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq
by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the
outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to
provide justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to
be a lawful preemptive use of force.
CRS Products
CRS Report RS21314, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force
Against Iraq
CRS Report RS21311, U.S. Use of Preemptive Military Force
Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter was

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intended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....” It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans. In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the right of States to use
force in self-defense.
Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N.
authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable. It is at least arguable that the
authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect. In the wake of a number
of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678,
adopted November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary means
to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” In Resolution
687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including
unconditional Iraqi disarmament, and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop
or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related
to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire.
Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including
Resolution 678. It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the
conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the
authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.
Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security
Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit
authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990. On November 8, 2002, in
the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month
earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi
compliance with that resolution. Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations. The resolution obligates the Council to
“convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise
fail to meet its disarmament obligations.

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CRS Products
CRS Report RS21323, The United Nations Security Council – Its Role in the
Iraq Crisis: A Brief Overview
CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council
Resolutions Texts – 1992-2002
CRS Report 91-395, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council Texts and Votes –
1991
CRS Report 90-513, Iraq-Kuwait: U.N. Security Council Resolutions Texts and
Votes – 1990
Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated January 23, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department appears to be financing the mobilization of
forces and the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using either
supplemental appropriations that Congress provided last year for global counter-
terrorism operations or regular FY2003 funding. The Administration is expected to
request supplemental appropriations to cover additional expenses either in February,
when the FY2004 budget is submitted, or shortly thereafter. In the mean time, the
FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill, H.J. Res. 2, may include some interim
measures to give the Defense Department flexibility in paying for the buildup of
forces in the Persian Gulf. The House-passed version of H.J. Res. 2 includes a
provision providing DOD with $2.5 billion in additional general transfer authority
– the regular FY2003 defense appropriations bill provided $2 billion, equal to
amounts usually provided in recent years.
The Defense Department has not provided any estimates of the potential costs
of a war with Iraq. The Office of Management and Budget has prepared an internal
estimate, which reportedly projects costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the
estimate publicly, and it has not explained the assumptions underlying its projections.
Two congressional estimates of costs are available, however.
! On September 30, 2002, the Congressional Budget Office prepared
estimates of the costs of two illustrative campaigns – a heavy ground
option involving 370,000 troops deployed to the region and a heavy
air option involving 270,000 troops. It projected that costs of these
options could range from $9 to $13 billion to deploy forces to the
Persian Gulf, from $6 to $9 billion a month to fight a war, from $5
to $7 billion to return forces to their home bases, and from $1 to $4
billion a month for a continuing occupation.51
51 The CBO report is at [ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].

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! A week earlier, the Democratic staff of the House Budget
Committee prepared an estimate based on costs of the Persian Gulf
War of 1991. Its estimates ranged from $31 billion for a conflict
lasting 30 days with 125,000 troops to $60 billion for a conflict
lasting 60 days with 250,000 troops. The estimate also calculated
that interest costs of increasing the deficit to finance the war would
total an additional $17 to $33 billion over 10 years. The study did
not address occupation or reconstruction costs.52
CBO and the House Budget Committee Democratic staff estimated only the
direct budgetary effects of a war. Neither considered the possible economic
consequences, which could, in turn, affect federal revenues and outlays indirectly.
In November 2002, William Nordhaus of Yale University prepared a study that
estimated the total economic costs. Using the CBO and House Budget Committee
staff estimates as a starting point, he calculated that total costs could range from a
cumulative total of $120 billion on optimistic assumptions to $1.6 trillion on
unfavorable assumptions.53
Economic Effects of a War with Iraq
Marc Labonte, 7-0640
(Last updated January 24, 2003)
U.S. military operations in Iraq would potentially have two distinct effects on
the economy. First, an increase in military expenditures, if deficit financed, could
increase aggregate demand in the short run. Second, if military operations led to a
sudden and persistent spike in the price of oil, economic growth could fall and
inflation could rise in the short run. Specific economic estimates are hindered by
uncertainty surrounding the scale and scope of operations, the effects of operations
on oil prices, and the response of (and effect on) neighboring oil-producing countries.

Economic Effects of Military Expenditures. In the past, military conflicts
have been financed through higher taxes, lower government spending in non-military
areas, government borrowing from the public, or money creation. Higher taxes or
lower government spending may play a small role in financing any U.S. operation in
Iraq; money creation would almost certainly not play a role. Government borrowing
from the public, through the issuance of U.S. Treasury securities to finance a larger
budget deficit, appears likely to be the primary form of financing any military
operations in Iraq. If this were the case, the military outlays would boost aggregate
demand in the short run. Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be directed
to foreigners instead of domestic producers since the operations would occur abroad.
Some of the boost in aggregate demand would be “crowded out” by higher interest
rates, which reduce investment spending and other interest-sensitive spending, and
52 See [http://www.house.gov/budget_democrats/analyses/spending/iraqi_cost_report.pdf].
53 See [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf] .

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dollar appreciation, which reduces exports and the production of import-competing
goods. If economic activity were still sluggish when an invasion took place, less of
the boost in aggregate demand would be crowded out. In any case, even the highest
cost estimates of the operations suggest that the outlays would be too small relative
to GDP to have significant economic effects. Wars may shift resources from non-
military spending to military spending, but since military spending is included in
GDP, this would not by itself lead to a recession.
Economic Effects of Higher Oil Prices. Perhaps the greatest unknown
economic factor in a military conflict with Iraq is the effect it would have on oil
prices. Economic theory suggests that oil shocks lead to higher inflation, a
contraction in output, and higher unemployment. Effective policy responses are
difficult because expansionary policy would exacerbate the inflationary pressures
while contractionary policy would exacerbate the contraction in output. Military
operations against Iraq would be likely to reduce Iraqi oil output temporarily.
Whether this led to a sustained spike in oil prices would depend on whether other oil
producers increase their production to fill the gap or whether the military operations
could accomplish their objectives quickly with little collateral damage to Iraqi oil
facilities, topics beyond the scope of this report. Evidence suggests that an increase
in the price of oil would have little effect on the economy if it is transient.
The Role of Confidence in the Economy. M a n y o f t h e n e g a t i v e
economic forecasts by private analysts concerning a potential conflict are being
driven in large part by their assumptions that the conflict would reduce consumer and
business confidence and stock market values. These effects are highly speculative,
as they have not been important factors in many past American wars.
Economic Effects of the First Gulf War. Most economists do not attribute
the 1990-1991 recession to the Gulf War. Rather, they attribute it to contractionary
monetary policy, the spike in oil prices that accompanied the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, and problems in the U.S. banking sector. The Gulf War did not begin until
the recession was almost over. As a percentage of GDP, military outlays actually fell
during the Gulf War, unlike the typical war-time military buildup that expands
aggregate demand.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some
Economic Consequences, by Marc Labonte.
CRS Report RL31176, Financing Issues and Economic Effects of Past
American Wars
CRS Report RL31676, Middle East Oil Disruption, Potential Severity and
Policy Options

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Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Chronology
For a chronology of Iraq related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
Iraq Facts
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources. The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This website includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation.
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html#ppos].

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The following site focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted Resolution 1441, holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations. For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.

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