Order Code IB92117
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
Updated December 24, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
1997-1998 Crises
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy
Resolution 1441
Nuclear Program
Current Status
Unresolved Questions
Chemical Weapons
Biological Weapons
Current Status
Unresolved Questions
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status
Unresolved Questions
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
War Crimes Trial
International Terrorism/September 11
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property
Reparations Payments
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
Jordan
Turkey
Iran/Persian Gulf States
Syria
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW)
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch
Costs of Containment

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Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
SUMMARY
In recent years, the United States has
U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
been unable to maintain an international
(UNSCOM) made considerable progress in
consensus for strict enforcement of all appli-
dismantling and monitoring Iraq’s but was
cable U.N. Security Council resolutions on
unable to finish verifying Iraq’s claim that it
Iraq, but it has largely succeeded in preventing
has destroyed all its WMD or related equip-
Iraq from reemerging as an immediate strate-
ment. Iraq’s refusal of full cooperation with
gic threat to the region. In the wake of the
UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-British
September 11 attacks, there is heightened U.S.
military action in December 1998. All inspec-
concern about the potential threat posed by
tors withdrew and Iraq has been unmonitored
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs
since, leaving uncertainty as to the degree to
and alleged ties to terrorist groups, and the
which Iraq has rebuilt its WMD programs.
Bush Administration has said it will confront
that potential threat, even if it has to act
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
militarily and without formal U.N. authoriza-
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
tion.
Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has failed to
The Administration is employing a
detail the fate of more than 600 Kuwaitis still
number of tactics to reduce the threat posed by
missing from the war and has not returned all
Iraq, including international sanctions and
Kuwaiti property taken. Iraq initially rejected
diplomacy, reported covert action, and prepa-
a 1991 U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” pro-
rations for possible military action. Changing
gram to address humanitarian needs, but it
Iraq’s regime, which the Administration says
later accepted a revised version of that plan,
remains a U.S. goal, is not openly supported
operational since December 1996.
by many other governments, particularly if it
involves major military action. However,
Iraq is deemed non-compliant in other
many governments support U.S. action
areas, especially human rights issues. A U.S.-
through the United Nations to enforce Secu-
led no-fly zone has provided some protection
rity Council resolutions requiring Iraqi disar-
to Kurdish northern Iraq since April 1991.
mament of its mass destruction weapons
Since August 1992, a no-fly zone has been
(WMD) programs, and the Bush
enforced over southern Iraq, where historically
Administration appears to be tailoring its
repressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated. The
policy to that objective.
zone was expanded in August 1996, but Iraq
nonetheless maintains a substantial ground
Part of the debate over U.S. policy
presence in the south. Iraq has openly chal-
centers on whether Iraq’s WMD programs can
lenged both no-fly zones since December
be ended through a reintroduction of U.N.
1998.
weapons inspectors. During 1991-1998, a
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In a September 12 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implied that U.S.
military action would be taken against Iraq if the United Nations did not disarm Iraq. On
October 11, Congress completed passage of legislation (H.J.Res.114, P.L. 107-243)
authorizing the President to use force against Iraq. On November 8, the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, giving U.N. weapons inspectors new authorities.
New U.N. inspections began November 27. On December 7, Iraq handed over a 12,000 page
required “complete and currently accurate” declaration of all its past WMD programs and
WMD useful capabilities, reportedly stating it currently has no banned WMD programs. On
December 19, Secretary of State Powell said there were material omissions in Iraq’s
declarations that constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations, although other
Security Council members declined to consider the declaration a material breach.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force
to expel Iraq from Kuwait. After the war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was
declared in Security Council Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire
resolution is Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), requiring Iraq – in return for
a graduated easing of sanctions – to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize
Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for
terrorism. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iraq is required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991)
to end repression of its people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance
from the end of the Gulf war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council
maintained the comprehensive international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed
by Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq:
Oil-for-Food Program; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited
WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities
(Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in
November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under
Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), UNSCOM inspected (at point of entry and at end-use
destination) Iraq’s imports of any dual use items.
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991)
requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers.
During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions,
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which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq
governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted
Resolution 1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997)
demanding Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions
against Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997)
again threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the
Americans. Resolution 1137 ( November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi
officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S.
military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71,
because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.)
In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume
inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight
“presidential sites” by UNSCOM inspectors and diplomatic observers. Security Council
Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest
consequences” if Iraq reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings)
during March 26-April 3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions
reviews resumed.
Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting previously inspected facilities. The
Senate and House passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998),
declaring Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1194 (September 9, 1998) demanding full unfettered inspections access and
suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered an easing
of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded
an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi
action a “flagrant violation” of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14,
1998, with the United States about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, averting
airstrikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of regime change.
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s cooperation,
UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-related
documents and that it was obstructing inspections. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour
U.S. and British bombing campaign followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19,
1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-capable facilities and military and security targets. After
almost one year of negotiations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December
17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing,
subject to a vote of the Security Council, for the suspension of most sanctions if Iraq “fully
cooperates” with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission). The resolution calls for inspectors to determine within 60 days
of reentering Iraq what WMD elimination tasks remain. Under Resolution 1284, Iraq’s
revenues would be subject to undefined financial controls, exports of dual use items to Iraq
would still require U.N. approval, and arms exports would remain banned. In January 2000,
the Security Council selected as head of UNMOVIC former IAEA director Hans Blix, who
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readied UNMOVIC for activities in Iraq. In the absence of Iraq’s agreement to allow in-
country inspections, UNMOVIC’s staff of 63 – all employees of the United Nations and not
their individual governments – reviewed documents and imagery, interviewed informants,
and reviewed civilian contracts for goods purchased by Iraq to determine whether certain
items (“Goods Review List” items) are not included. Such items are subject to review.
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the
post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq, based partly on fears that Iraq could provide
WMD to terrorist groups, on November 26, 2001, and again in his January 29, 2002 State
of the Union message, President Bush threatened unspecified action against Iraq to prevent
its re-emergence as a threat. In the latter speech he described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil”
along with Iran and North Korea, and he continued to say that U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s
regime. One month prior to the State of the Union speech, the House passed H.J.Res. 75 on
December 20, 2001, by a vote of 392-12. The resolution called Iraq’s refusal to readmit
U.N. inspectors a “material breach” of its international obligations and a mounting threat to
peace and security. The resolution, not taken up in the Senate, did not explicitly authorize
U.S. military action.
The Administration’s renewed call for a change of regime was predicated on the
assertion that Iraq is rebuilding banned WMD capabilities that, based on Saddam Hussein’s
record, Iraq might use against the United States directly or against U.S. allies and friends.
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said in late July 2002 that Iraq is rebuilding biological
capabilities in mobile vehicles and is building some WMD facilities underground. Similar
assertions were made in a British intelligence assessment, released by Prime Minister Blair
on September 24, 2002, and a CIA assessment, released in October 2002. These assessments
say Iraq has reconstituted its WMD programs, particularly its biological program, although
the assessments do not indicate that Iraq has made any major nuclear weapons breakthroughs
since inspections ended in 1998. The British dossier said Iraq had tried to buy fissile
material from “Africa,” that Iraq could deploy chemical weapons against its internal
opponents within 45 minutes of an order to do so, and that it is developing missiles with
ranges of up to 1,000 km. There are allegations of illicit Iraqi imports of conventional
military equipment, including from Belarus, Ukraine, and the former Yugoslavia, possibly
shipped through Syria.
Resolution 1441. After an internal debate, the Administration decided to work
through the United Nations Security Council to force Iraq to eliminate its suspected WMD.
In a September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implicitly
threatened U.S. military action, unilateral if necessary, if the United Nations did not enforce
existing resolutions on Iraq. Iraq, seeing international support for the President’s decision
to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations, pledged on September 16 to admit UNMOVIC
inspectors without conditions, reversing a position taken during several meetings with the
United Nations in 2002: March 7, May 1-3, and July 4-5 (in Vienna). On October 1, 2002,
Iraq and UNMOVIC reached agreement on practical arrangements for new inspections, but
the Bush Administration called the agreement insufficient and insisted on a new Security
Council resolution specifying consequences if Iraq does not fully comply and enhancing
inspection authorities.
In debate on a new resolution, France and Russia opposed authorizing force without
a second vote of the Council. As U.N. negotiations continued, on October 11 Congress
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completed work on a resolution (H.J.Res. 114, P.L. 107-243) authorizing the use of U.S.
armed forces against Iraq. After several weeks of negotiations, on November 8, 2002 the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, with the following key provisions:
(1) declaring Iraq in material breach of pre-existing resolutions;
(2) giving Iraq 7 days to accept the resolution and 30 days (until December 8) to provide a
full declaration of all WMD programs;
(3) requiring new inspections to begin within 45 days (December 23) and an interim progress
report within 60 days thereafter (no later than February 21, 2003);
(4) declaring all sites, including presidential sites, subject to unfettered inspections;
(5) giving UNMOVIC the right to interview Iraqis in private, including taking them outside
Iraq, and to freeze activity at a suspect site;
(6) forbidding Iraq from taking hostile acts against any country upholding U.N. resolutions,
a provision that would appear to cover Iraq’s defiance of the “no fly zones;” and
(7) giving UNMOVIC the authority to report Iraqi non-compliance and the Security Council
as a whole the opportunity to meet to consider how to respond to Iraqi non-compliance.
Iraq accepted the resolution on November 13 in a defiant letter. Blix and an advance
team of inspectors landed in Iraq on November 18 to re-establish UNMOVIC facilities, and
inspections began on November 27. Press reports say the inspectors have received full
access thus far in their visits to about 150 sites, as of late December. On December 7, one
day before the deadline of Resolution 1441, Iraq submitted its declaration of its past WMD
programs and WMD-useful capabilities. After comparing the Iraqi declaration to U.S.
intelligence assessments, Secretary of State Powell said on December 19 that there were
material omissions that constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations, particularly
Iraq’s failure to address the outstanding questions from the 1991-1998 inspections, involving
fate of WMD and WMD components and precursors. Blix also criticized the declaration
as failing to clear up outstanding questions, although neither he nor any other country called
the declaration a material breach of Resolution 1441. Iraq is to turn over a list of Iraqi
scientists to be interviewed, possibly outside Iraq, by December 31; the United States is
pushing for interviews to be held outside Iraq, and for accelerated inspections.
President Bush has said the United States will have “zero tolerance” for Iraqi non-
compliance, making U.S. military action against Iraq a possibility. Along with its criticism
of Iraq’s declaration, President Bush approved deployment of an additional 50,000 U.S.
forces to the Persian Gulf, which would, when completed, bring the total personnel to more
than 100,000. Press reports have discussed various reported war plans, some outlining a
large ground offensive, while others report plans for a targeted attack on Baghdad intended
to quickly remove Iraq’s leadership. To varying degrees, European and Arab governments,
as well as Turkey, have indicated opposition to unilateral U.S. military action, although they
indicate they might be supportive if the United Nations authorized force.
The following summarizes outstanding issues on Iraq’s WMD.
Nuclear Program
Current Status. The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about
7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program. Administration
officials have pointed particularly to reputed attempts to purchase materials abroad, including
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uranium from Niger and aluminum tubes that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.
The CIA assessment, mentioned above, says that Iraq would likely not be able to produce a
nuclear weapon until the latter half of the decade, unless it acquires fissile material from
abroad. On September 6, 2002, the New York Times reported that IAEA/UNMOVIC
inspectors have noted from commercial satellite photos construction and other alterations at
some Iraqi nuclear-related sites that could suggest banned nuclear activity by Iraq. New
inspections have focused heavily on Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, including several visits to the
reactor site at Tuwaitha.
Unresolved Questions. During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it
had no nuclear weapons facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA uncovered
and dismantled a previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities,
including three clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and
chemical isotope separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program.
Inspectors found and dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons development
program, and they found evidence of development of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”),
which scatters nuclear material without an explosion. No radiological weapon was ever
completed, but Iraq might have tested such a device. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all
discovered nuclear reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein
Kamil (Saddam’s son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq
revealed it had launched a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as
quickly as possible by diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA
report of December 1, 1995 said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq
might have produced a nuclear weapon by December 1992.
In 1997, the IAEA said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been ended and that it had a
relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15, 1998 Security Council
statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file if Iraq cleared up
outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of some nuclear
equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still remained, and
the United States did not agree to close the file. In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear
centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991. In January 2002, as it has in each of the
past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained sealed, acting
under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions,
480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces
of production equipment items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14,
1994. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and
4,000 tons of chemical precursors, remains unknown. Iraq refused to yield an Air Force
document, found in July 1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq
allowed UNSCOM to take notes from it. Iraq did include the document in its December 7
declaration. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells taken from Iraq in 1996
contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly produced.
The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which
Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile was ever
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located. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to
admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported
enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late June 1998,
UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab,
contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing
the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX. About
170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997. The October 2002 CIA assessment
says Iraq has renewed chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred
tons of agent.
Biological Weapons
Current Status. Biological weapons is the area with more outstanding and
unresolved issues than any other weapons area; Iraq’s previous biological declarations were
considered neither credible nor verifiable, and very little new was apparently included in
Iraq’s December 7 declaration. Press reports in 2002 say Iraq has been developing
unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver biological or chemical weapons. The
October 2002 CIA assessment said that Iraq had reactivated its biological program and that
most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf
war. No evidence linking the October 2001 anthrax-related terrorism in the United States
to Iraq has been announced. The White House said in late December 2001 that the anthrax
used in the attacks appeared to be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military laboratory.
Unresolved Questions.
Iraq did not initially (1991) declare any biological
materials, weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever
uncovered. UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and
development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first
inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research
program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive
biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters
of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. In August 1995, Iraq
confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs, of which 25 were missile warheads,
loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in the Gulf war, but Iraq claims to have
destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict. UNSCOM monitored 86 biological sites during
1994 -1998. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled the Al Hakam facility on June 20, 1996.
According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing
biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for. UNSCOM
lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological
dissemination, as well as the fate of the biological munitions.
Ballistic Missiles
Current Status. Iraq is making progress in developing permitted-range missiles – the
Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002 CIA report to Congress and,
prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63 missile sites and 159 items of
equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles. In early May 2002, the United States
presented to the U.N. Security Council evidence that Iraq is developing missiles of ranges
beyond the permitted 150 km.
Iraq’s December 7 declaration said some flight tests of
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these missiles did exceed the allowed range by about 50 km. U.S. analysts believe Iraq might
be concealing as many as 12 Scud-like missiles and that it is manufacturing propellants for
missiles of ranges longer than those allowed.
Unresolved Questions. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires the
destruction of all Iraqi ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. UNSCOM
accounted for 817 of 819 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war,
as well as all 14 declared mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads. UNSCOM’s October
1998 report said it had been able to account for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological
(CBW) warheads Iraq said it unilaterally destroyed in 1991. (The warheads were unearthed
in mid-1998.) An additional 30 chemical warheads were destroyed under UNSCOM
supervision. UNSCOM also accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads and said
it made progress establishing a material balance for Scud engine components. Unresolved
issues include accounting for missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile
propellant, and indigenous missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7
missiles).
There is evidence of past Iraqi cheating on missile issues. In December 1995, after
Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance components allegedly bound for
Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile components since 1991, a violation of
sanctions. (That month, UNSCOM retrieved prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes,
suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s Tigris River, apparently procured from
Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.) UNSCOM also had evidence that Iraq was
conducting secret flight tests and research on missiles of prohibited ranges.
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq
as a gross violator of human rights. In 1994, the Clinton Administration said it was
considering presenting a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948
Genocide Convention. U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report
said that Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in
southern Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live. In February 2002, Iraq
allowed the U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis of Cyprus, to visit
Iraq, the first such visit since 1992. On October 20, 2002, Saddam Hussein granted an
amnesty and released virtually all prisoners in Iraq, calling the move gratitude for his
purported “100%” victory in a referendum on his leadership on October 15, 2002.
War Crimes Trial. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related atrocities to the
United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L. 102-138,
October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President should propose
to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation
was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House November 13, 1997);
S.Con.Res. 78, (passed the Senate March 13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation
Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998).
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A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993, after
Clinton took office. Since April 1997, the Administration has supported INDICT, a private
organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the arrest of 12 alleged Iraqi
war criminals, including Saddam and his two sons. Although apparently lacking
international support, in August 2000 then U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes David
Scheffer said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These include the use of chemical weapons
against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds) and the forced
relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which an estimated 50,000
to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against Iran; post-war crimes against
humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes against Kuwait (including oil field
fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations. In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State
Department contributed $4 million to a U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission, “ to be spent
if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war crimes is formed. (For more information on the issue and on
U.S. funding for Iraqi war crimes issues, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to
Change the Regime.)
International Terrorism/September 11
Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq made
a declaration to that effect to the U.N. Security Council. FBI Director Robert Mueller said
in early May 2002 that, after an exhaustive FBI and CIA investigation, no direct link has
been found between Iraq and any of the September 11 hijackers, although some still assert
that hijacker Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. Senior
U.S. officials said in late September 2002 that there is intelligence that some high-ranking
Al Qaeda members have had contacts with Baghdad and that Iraq had helped Al Qaeda train
with chemical weapons at some point in the past. Others believe that Baghdad has little
contact with Al Qaeda because it differs with Iraq’s secular ideology and would hurt Iraq’s
efforts to improve relations with Egypt and other moderate Arab states that are threatened
by Al Qaeda. The CIA told Congress on October 7, 2002 that Iraq would likely not conduct
a terrorist attack using WMD against the United States unless there were a U.S.-Iraq war.
Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and according to the State
Department’s reports on international terrorism (most recently the report for 2001, issued
May 21, 2002), continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation
Front of Abu Abbas. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died (committed suicide or was killed) as
Iraqi police went to arrest him for alleged contacts with foreign governments opposed to
Baghdad. Iraq says it is paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers $25,000, and
some press reports say Iraq is cultivating Palestinians that might unleash anti-U.S. or anti-
Israel terrorism in the event of a U.S.-led war against Iraq. (See CRS Report RL31119,
Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002.)
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Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below but, unlike Resolution
687, does not link the easing of any sanctions to Iraqi compliance on Kuwait-related issues.
Resolution 1441 does not impose any new Kuwait-related requirements on Iraq.
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty. Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its
annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N. Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait
border, and established a demilitarized zone 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into
Kuwait. Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992) endorsed border decisions taken by the
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (established May 2, 1991) that, in
November 1992, finished demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October
1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The border took effect January 15, 1993. The
new line deprived Iraq of part of Umm Qasr port and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which
straddles the border. On March 18, 1993, the Commission determined the sea border,
allowing both countries access to the Gulf. Resolution 833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that
Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation. On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally
recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Hussein. At the Arab summit in Beirut
(March 27-29, 2002), Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to Kuwait’s territorial integrity and
pledged to cooperate to determine the fate of missing Kuwaitis (see below), earning a Arab
statement of opposition to a U.S. attack on Iraq and a step toward reconciliation with Kuwait.
On December 7, 2002, Saddam Hussein issued an “apology” to Kuwait for the invasion, but
Kuwait rejected it as insincere.
The 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by
Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), continues to monitor border violations. The United
States contributes 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which is considered a
U.N. peacekeeping operation. Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after Iraqi
incursions into the demilitarized zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member
Bengali troop contingent supplements the observer group. Kuwait furnishes two-thirds of
UNIKOM’s $51 million annual budget. The United States contributes about $4.5 million
per year to UNIKOM.
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687
require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian
Gulf crisis. Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608 are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May
2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi nationals. Iraq has admitted to having
arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not provide enough information to resolve their
fate. Only three cases have been resolved since 1995. Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait
were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and
Saudi representatives, but Iraq has boycotted the meetings since Operation Desert Fox. In
February 2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post
(created by Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons
and unreturned property. Iraq has not yet allowed him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and
August 2000, as well as in March, April, and June 2001, the Security Council has issued
statements of concern about the lack of progress. However, on December 12, 2002, Iraq
publicly invited Vorontsov to visit. In April 2002, Iraq offered to receive a U.S. team to
discuss the case of missing Gulf war Navy pilot Michael Speicher, but Defense Department
officials declined on doubts of the benefits of a visit. Iraq says that non-Iraqis were included
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in its blanket prisoner amnesty of October 20, 2002, and that Kuwait can send representatives
to search its prisons, which Iraq claims are virtually empty now.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property
seized from Kuwait. In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti
civilian and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles,
and a June 2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did
note that Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.” However, since 1994, U.S.
officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was
never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers
during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border. The United Nations and
Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as
well as military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting
vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank
missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq claims the materiel was
left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. U.N. Secretary General Annan said
at the conclusion of the July 4-5, 2002 inspections talks that agreement had been reached on
a “mechanism” for Iraq to return Kuwait’s state archives (six truckloads of documents) to
Kuwait. Iraq began the return of tons of documents on October 20, 2002, although Kuwait
says preliminary assessments suggest some key archives were not returned.
Reparations Payments
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced
from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. As of June 21, 2002 –
following an award of $4.5 billion to Kuwait’s government and state-owned oil industry –
the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has approved claims worth about $43.6 billion, of
a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted. Following an April 2002 payout of
about $1 billion, which included $800 million in payments to Kuwait, the UNCC has paid
out about $14.8 billion. Awards to U.S. claimants thus far total over $666 million. In
September 2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion
for oil revenues lost because of the Iraqi occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning
oil wells), although current payment schedules will provide only a small fraction of that
award (about $50 million) until 2003. In June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in
payments to all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors (except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war
environmental damage. Of this amount, $5 million was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses
to counter the expected environmental reparations claims. Kuwait was awarded $700 million
in October 2002 to cover the cost of removing Iraqi mines laid in the Gulf war.
Several legislative proposals (“Iraq Claims Act”) to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about
$2.2 billion) in the United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not
enacted, because of differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority. In
the 107th Congress, H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S.
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some might argue that this group of claimants is
covered under the U.N. process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United
States should be used for those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion.
(See CRS Report 98-240, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
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U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people have grown, the United
States has had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions. The oil-
for-food program, established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) and in operation since
December 1996, has been progressively modified to improve Iraq’s living standards, and the
United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Of the Security
Council permanent members, the United States has set the highest standards for full Iraqi
compliance that would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The United States rules out direct
dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of compliance does not justify talks. (See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative. During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East,
Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to
Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq. The
Administration portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing
differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion. France, Russia, and
China have generally sought to ease sanctions in order to give Iraq incentives to cooperate
with the international community. After a year of debate within the Council on the U.S. plan,
on May 14, 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1409, providing for goods to be
exported to Iraq without Sanctions Committee scrutiny. This largely removes the
opportunity for Sanctions Committee members to place contracts for Iraq on “hold.”
Military items remain banned outright and GRL items are subject to export after review by
UNMOVIC. The new export procedures were placed into effect in late July 2002. In late
November 2002, the United States insisted on additions to the GRL to prevent imports that
Iraq could use to counter a U.S. offensive; the U.S. objections led to a brief six-day rollover
of the oil-for-food program (Resolution 1442 of November 25). Amid criticism within the
Security Council, the United States dropped its GRL modification insistence and agreed to
a regular six-month rollover of the program (Resolution 1447, December 4), which contained
a pledge to consider a GRL modification within 30 days. On December 10, the United States
circulated a list of 36 items it wants added to the GRL.
Formally, comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since
Iraq’s 1990 invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of
August 6, 1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513). Since
then, U.S. trade regulations have been amended to align them with the oil-for-food program.
(A summary of the regulations governing transactions with Iraq is provided in CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.) U.S. imports of Iraqi oil have increased since 1999
and reached a high of about 970,000 barrels per day in May 2001 — nearly half of Iraq’s oil
exports. That figure has fallen to about 500,000 barrels per day since August 2002 as Iraq’s
export volumes have declined to about 1.2 - 1.5 million barrels per day. In the 107th
Congress, S. 1170, introduced July 12, 2001, would bar U.S. imports of Iraqi oil. The
measure was adopted by the Senate on April 18, 2002, as an amendment to an energy bill
(H.R. 4), but it is opposed by the Bush Administration on the grounds that the imports are
part of a U.N.-supervised program.
Prior to the oil-for-food program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of
U.N. resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct
contributions — to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992).
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Total U.S. transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other
countries, reached $200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778. These
transfers were being repaid to the United States from proceeds of the oil-for-food program.
Resolutions 1284 and 1302 (June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000;
about $173 million was due back to the United States. Repayments resumed in 2001.
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the
United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments to enforce the sanctions
regime. Improving sanctions enforcement by Iraq’s neighbors was dropped from the U.S.
targeted-sanctions proposals adopted in Resolution 1409 because of regional resistance. See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
Jordan. Since 1992, despite Jordan’s economic linkages with Iraq and its vocal stand
against a U.S. attack on Iraq, the United States has considered Jordan’s compliance with the
U.N. sanctions regime on Iraq satisfactory. Every year since FY1994, foreign aid
appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306, P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118,
P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, P.L. 106-429, and P.L. 107-115), have denied U.S. aid to any
country that does not comply with the sanctions against Iraq, though these laws do not
mention Jordan specifically. The Administration has routinely waived sanctions in order to
provide aid to Jordan, which is a key U.S. ally in the Middle East peace process.
Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the Sanctions Committee “takes note of” Jordan’s
purchases of discounted Iraqi oil and oil products, which is exchanged for Jordanian goods
(approved under the oil-for-food program) and write-downs in Iraqi debt to Jordan. This
relationship was renewed in November 2001 at a level of about $500 million for the year,
which translates into about 100,000 barrels per day of Iraqi oil exports to Jordan. (See CRS
Issue Brief IB93085, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues).
Turkey. Turkey, concerned about the unanticipated consequences of a a U.S. attack
on Iraq, estimates that it has lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions. The Turkish
government regulates and taxes the illicit importation of about $400 million per year in Iraqi
energy products by Turkish truck drivers. U.S. sanctions against Turkey for this trade have
been waived each year. Turkey returned its Ambassador to Iraq in January 2001.
Iran/Persian Gulf States. In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships lead a
Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian Gulf
to prevent the smuggling of oil and other high-value exports. From its high of about $600
million in 2000, smuggling through this route has fallen substantially since early 2001,
indicating that Iraq may be increasingly using the pipeline to Syria (see below). In June
2002, U.S. military officials attributed the drop-off in part to more robust enforcement
techniques by the MIF, but which might also reflect Iran’s cooperation with sanctions
enforcement. Iran’s cooperation with the sanctions comes despite the substantial
improvement in Iranian-Iraqi relations since 1995, and Iran publicly opposes a unilateral U.S.
attack on Iraq. The two exchanged 6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and
smaller batches of prisoners and remains since. In early October 2000, the two agreed to
abide by the 1975 Algiers Accords that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister
visited later in the month, a sign of accelerating rapprochement. Iraq’s Foreign Minister
visited Iran in January 2002, and Iran released over 600 Iraqi prisoners still held.
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Nonetheless, press reports in November 2002 say Iran will likely tacitly cooperate with a
U.S. military offensive against Iraq, in part to gain greater participation in a post-Saddam
regime for Iranian-backed Shiite Islamist groups.
The Gulf states, despite the threat they have faced from Iraq, publicly oppose a
unilateral U.S. attack, although it is widely believed they could change their positions if the
United States moved forward. (For further information on Gulf state attitudes toward Iraq,
see CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.)
Syria. Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by reopening their border in
1997; this trend has accelerated since the July 2000 accession of Bashar Assad to the
presidency of Syria. Since late 1998, the two countries have benefitted from the reopening
of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and Iraq has been sending about 180,000 -
250,000 barrels per day of oil through the line, under a “swap” arrangement in which Syria
uses the oil domestically and exports an equivalent extra amount of its own oil. In May
2001, Iraq and Syria reopened diplomatic missions in each others’ capitals. Nonetheless,
Syria voted in favor of Resolution 1441.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The current debate on Iraq policy includes the question of the role, if any, for the Iraqi
opposition in a U.S. military action against Iraq and in a post-Saddam Iraq. A Washington
Post report of June 16, 2002 said that in early 2002, President Bush, either as a prelude to
or alternative to a ground offensive, authorized stepped up covert action by the CIA and U.S.
special forces to destabilize Saddam. During August 9 and 10, 2002, senior members of six
major Iraqi opposition groups visited Washington for meetings with senior U.S. officials.
These groups sponsored a major meeting in London ( December 13 - 17, 2002) that
established a 65-member “follow-up committee,” in which Iranian-backed Shiite Islamists
are heavily represented. There is substantial debate among opposition groups and within the
Bush Administration about whether it would be productive to declare a provisional
government in advance of Saddam’s overthrow.
Despite strains within the opposition, on December 9, 2002, President Bush announced
he had authorized the draw down of $92 million (the remainder of the $97 million total
authorized) of defense articles and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA,
P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) for the opposition. He also named six new groups as
eligible to receive such aid. The drawdown would reportedly include articles and services
that would help about 5,000 oppositionists support any U.S. military action against Iraq, and
would constitute lethal military aid, even though the proposed drawdown does not apparently
include actual weaponry. Some Iraqis might receive combat training. More extensive
coverage is included in CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
The current U.S. military posture in the Persian Gulf is focused on containing Iraq.
Currently, the United States and Britain enforce two “no fly zones” to provide a measure of
protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other objects of regime repression and to contain
Iraq militarily. To enforce the no-fly zones, the two allies invoke U.N. Resolution 678
(November 29, 1990, authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait), 687 (the main
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ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights), and the Safwan Accords (the March 3, 1991
cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference
with allied air operations). Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and are interpreted as allowing military action
to enforce these resolutions. Resolution 688 (human rights) was not written under Chapter
VII, nor does that or any other resolution establish no fly zones.
To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from
Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-
compliance. Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992,
signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve
the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. (For information on the U.S. military
posture in the Gulf, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002.)
In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other infractions, the Administration also has
cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of January 12, 1991), authorizing military
action to expel Iraq from Kuwait. The Administration asserts that hostile acts by Iraq against
coalition aircraft enforcing the zones (two such episodes since its adoption, as of November
19, 2002) is a violation of the provision of Resolution 1441 requiring Iraq not to undertake
hostile acts against countries upholding U.N. resolutions on Iraq, although the United
Nations and most other countries appear to differ with this U.S. interpretation.
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW). The northern no fly zone was set up
in April 1991, to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The zone extends north of the 36th
parallel. After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects
of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation. On June 18, 2002, Turkey
renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and
about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces). However, Turkey fears that ONW protects the
anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq,
and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997.
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Mas’ud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government. With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force). The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for peacekeeping (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DoD drawdowns for vehicles
and communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).
Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United States, Britain,
Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. A tenuous cease-fire has held since
November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an agreement in Washington in
September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues
and control over the Kurdish regional government). Reconciliation efforts showed
substantial progress in 2002; on October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly
reconvened the Kurdish regional parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In
June 2002, the United States gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to help continue
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the reconciliation process, amid press reports of U.S. proposals for U.S. special forces teams
to begin working with the Kurds as part of an overthrow effort against Saddam (New York
Times, July 5, 2002). Both parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National
Congress, and both also maintain a dialogue with Baghdad.
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch. Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed. The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S.
containment strategy. The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded
the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely
after Desert Fox. In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994,
Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to
threaten its neighbors. The United States and Britain interpret this as authorizing military
action if Iraq enhances (numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
Such enhancements include Iraq’s movement of air defense equipment into the zones.
During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied
aircraft enforcing both zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the
activated missile batteries. On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck
elements of that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing
ability to target U.S. aircraft. U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone. As of late December
2002, during 2002 Iraqi air defenses and related infrastructure have been bombed about 60
times in response to about 200 provocations, and U.S. strikes on Iraqi facilities have become
somewhat more intense in late 2002 in conjunction with U.S. preparations for possible
military action against Iraq. On December 23, Iraq shot down a U.S. “Predator” drone.
Costs of Containment. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm,
all of which has been paid. From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2001, the
Defense Department has incurred about $9 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide
humanitarian aid to the Kurds. About $1.2 billion was spent in FY2002. The Department
of Defense, under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a),
assisted UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since the December 15,
1998 UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical support, at a cost
of about $15 million per year. (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement.)
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