Order Code IB93113
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Saudi Arabia:
Current Issues and U.S. Relations
Updated December 19, 2002
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
Reaction to September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Lawsuits and Investments
The July 2002 Briefing
Other Reports
Security in the Gulf Region
Containment Policies toward Iraq
U.S. Troop Presence
Bombings of U.S. Military Facilities
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Crown Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales
Trade Relationships
Problems in Commercial Transactions
Oil Production
Foreign Investment
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Child Custody Cases
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Political Development
Saudi Leadership
Royal Succession
Economy and Aid
Economic Conditions
Aid Relationships
Defense and Security
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
Arms Sales
Arab Boycott
Trade Practices

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Saudi Arabia:
Current Issues and U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia, a monarchy ruled by the
offered the use of its territory for major air
Saudi dynasty, enjoys special importance in
strikes against Iraq in response to Iraqi ob-
the international community because of its
struction of U.N. weapons inspections in
unique association with the Islamic religion
recent years. Moreover, Saudi officials have
and its oil wealth. Since the establishment of
expressed opposition to expanding the U.S.
the modern Saudi kingdom in 1932, it has
war on terrorism to target Iraq. Bombing
benefitted from a stable political system based
attacks against a U.S. operated training facility
on a smooth process of succession to the
and a U.S. military apartment in 1995 and
throne and an increasingly prosperous econ-
1996, respectively, have raised some concerns
omy dominated by the oil sector. Decrees by
about security of U.S. personnel and further
King Fahd in March 1992 establishing an
security measures have been implemented.
appointive consultative council and provincial
Saudi Arabia convicted and executed four
councils and promulgating a basic law provid-
Saudi nationals for carrying out the 1995
ing for certain citizens’ rights could signal a
bombing. After extended investigations, on
gradual trend toward a more open political
June 21, 2001, a U.S. federal grand jury indic-
system.
ted 14 members of Middle East terrorist orga-
nizations for the 1996 bombing. None is
Since late 1995, King Fahd has suffered
believed to be in U.S. custody. U.S. officials
increasingly from ill health, and Crown Prince
have cited Saudi support in the aftermath of
Abdullah has assumed many routine govern-
the September 11, 2001 attacks, including
mental functions. The upsurge in oil prices
intelligence sharing, law enforcement activi-
that began in 1999 has relieved pressure on
ties, and tracking of terrorist financing. Some
Saudi budgets but created concern in the U.S.
commentators maintain that Saudi domestic
Administration and Congress. In March 2000,
and foreign policies have created a climate
Members of Congress introduced legislation
that may have contributed to terrorist acts by
to reduce or end U.S. assistance or arms sales
Islamic radicals. Saudi officials reject this
to countries engaged in oil price fixing.
viewpoint and maintain that they are working
with the United States to combat terrorism.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have
long-standing economic and defense ties. A
Other principal issues of bilateral interest
series of informal agreements, statements by
include the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli
successive U.S. administrations, and military
conflict, security in the post-war Gulf region,
deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S.
arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, Saudi external
security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Saudi
aid programs, bilateral trade relationships, and
Arabia was a key member of the allied coali-
Saudi policies involving human rights and
tion that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
democracy. In early 2002, Crown Prince
1991, and over 5,000 U.S. troops remain in
Abdullah proposed a peace initiative based on
the country. Saudi Arabia continues to host
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in
U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over
return for normal relations between Arab
southern Iraq; however, Saudi Arabia has not
states and Israel.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 8, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441,
which mandated the resumption of a stringent weapons inspection regime in Iraq. A
statement by the Saudi cabinet on November 18 “welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of U.N.
Security Council Resolution No. 1441 and the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq” and went
on to express the hope “that such a step will put an end to the tense situation in the region,
[and] avert war and use of military force.” Regarding allied use of Saudi bases by U.S.
forces in the event of a war with Iraq, the Saudi Foreign Minister told reporters on
November 19 that “[t]hat’s a sovereign decision ... and I’m not going to speculate on how
we’re going to decide.” According to the press (The Washington Post, November 17, 2002),
U.S. officials believe Saudi officials would rule out a large presence of U.S. ground troops
but would allow U.S. forces to use a command center in Saudi Arabia and permit use of
Saudi air space by U.S. military aircraft.
In late November 2002, news media reported that funds provided by the wife of the
Saudi Ambassador to the United States to a woman in need of medical treatment had ended
up in the hands of intermediaries with ties to two of the September 11, 2001 hijackers.
Senior Saudi officials denied that Saudi Arabia had provided funds to terrorists and said the
Saudi Government was determined to uncover all the facts.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
Oil and national security concerns have combined to produce a close and cooperative
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia for much of the past century. Since
the award of the first Saudi oil concession to a U.S. company in 1933, both states have had
an increasing interest, respectively, in the marketing and acquisition of Saudi petroleum
supplies. As regional threats multiplied in the latter half of the century, mutual concerns over
the stability of Saudi Arabia and other moderate regimes in the Arabian Peninsula
engendered a significant degree of defense cooperation. Saudi Arabia was a key member of
the allied coalition that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 and continues to host more
than 5,000 U.S. military personnel, most of them from U.S. Air Force units that enforce the
no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch). A range of issues, however,
sometimes complicate U.S.-Saudi relations, as discussed below. Also, some commentators
cite additional strains in bilateral relations since the September 11, 2001 attacks, but U.S. and
Saudi officials continue to characterize ties between the two countries as excellent.
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Reaction to September 11 Terrorist Attacks
The September 11, 2001
attacks kindled criticisms within the
Saudi Arabia in Brief
United States of alleged Saudi
involvement in terrorism or of Saudi
Population (July 2001): 23,513,33-*
(includes 5,360,526 foreign residents)
laxity in acting against terrorist
Growth rate: 3.27%
groups. Commentators have pointed
Area: 1,945,000 sq. km. (750,965 sq.mi.)
to the high percentage of Saudi
(almost 3 times that of Texas)
nationals among the hijackers (15
Ethnic Groups: (native Saudis only)
out of 19). Others maintain that
Arab 90% Afro-Asian 10%
Saudi domestic and foreign policies
Religion: (native Saudis only)
have created a climate that may have
Muslim 100% (Sunni 85-95%; Shi’ite 5-15%)
contributed to terrorist acts by
Literacy (2002):
Islamic radicals. Critics of Saudi
78% (male 84.2%, female 69.5%)
policies have cited in particular a
GDP: $168.8 billion (2000);
multiplicity of reports that the Saudi
$170.5 billion (2001)
Government has permitted or
External Public Debt: $28.9 billion (2000)
Inflation (2001): 1.7%
encouraged fund raising in Saudi
Arabia by charitable Islamic groups
*Some estimates are 15-30% lower
and foundations linked to Osama bin
Laden’s Al Qaeda organization,
Sources: IMF; U.S. Dept. of Commerce; CIA World Fact
which that U.S. Government has
Book
identified as clearly responsible for
the hijackings. An independent task
force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, in a report published in October 2002,
asserted that individuals and charities in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source
of funds for Al Qaeda for some years, and that “Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to the
problem.”
Saudi officials reject these criticisms and maintain that they are working closely with
the United States to combat terrorism. In October 2001, the Saudi Government announced
that it would implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which called among other
things for freezing terrorist related funds. In December 2001, the Saudi Embassy in
Washington listed various measures the Saudi Government had adopted to combat terrorist
financing, including a requirement for all Saudi banks to have anti-money laundering units
and the establishment of a program to monitor charitable organizations and bank accounts
associated with prominent businessmen. After publication of the Council on Foreign
Relations study in October 2002, the Saudi Embassy disputed the findings of the study, and
listed several more steps by the Saudi Government to combat terrorist financing: freezing
dozens of bank accounts with suspected links to terrorists; implementing U.N. Security
Council resolutions related to terrorist financing; working with the United States and other
countries to block over $70 million in terrorist assets; auditing all charitable groups; adopting
new guidelines to prevent terrorist use of legitimate charitable groups; requiring charities
dealing outside Saudi Arabia to report their activities to the Saudi Foreign Ministry. Saudi
officials also stated in August 2002 that they were interrogating 16 Al Qaeda members who
had been extradited from Iran to Saudi Arabia. In the same vein, a Saudi report averred that
the government has questioned 2,800 terrorist suspects and 200 are currently in detention.
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U.S. Government statements have generally complimented Saudi cooperation with the
U.S. campaign against terrorism, while sometimes suggesting that the Saudi Government
could do more . The State Department in its most recent Patterns of Global Terrorism report
noted that Saudi authorities were putting pressure on private agencies in the Kingdom to
follow existing laws governing charitable contributions–these laws had not been scrupulous
enforced in the past. On a trip to Saudi Arabia in March 2002, then Secretary of the Treasury
Paul O’Neill complimented Saudi efforts to uncover money laundering activities. More
recently, on November 25, 2002, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told
reporters that the Administration has “made it clear again and again we believe the Saudi
response on matters involving the war on terrorism has been very strong.” He specifically
cited cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military aspects of the war on terrorism,
and measures to block terrorist financing. In this connection, according to the U.S. Treasury
Department, the United States and Saudi Arabia have worked together in jointly designating
several entities as supporters of terrorism. White House spokesman Ari Fleischer was quoted
in a New York Times article on November 26 as commenting that “Saudi Arabia is a good
partner in the war on terrorism, but good partners can do more.”
Lawsuits and Investments. According to press reports in mid-August 2002,
families of more than 600 victims of the September 11 attacks have filed a suit in the U.S.
District Court of Alexandria, Virginia against three members of the Saudi royal family, seven
banks, and eight charitable organizations. The lawsuit, which also names Osama bin Laden,
members of his family, and the government of the Sudan, seeks approximately $1 trillion
in damages from these individuals or organizations for allegedly helping finance the Al
Qaeda network. According to excerpts reported in the press, the lawsuit states that “the
financial resources and support network of these defendants – charities, banks and individual
financiers – are what allowed the attacks of September 11, 2001 to occur.” Saudi media and
business spokesmen have described the suit as an attempt to extort Saudi money deposited
in the United States and exert political pressures on Saudi Arabia; some have called for
withdrawing Saudi investments in the United States, estimated by one media source at $750
billion and another at between $400 and $600 billion. A London Financial Times article on
August 21, 2002, quoted estimates that Saudi investors have withdrawn between $100 billion
and $200 billion from the United States in recent months, but other sources quoted in the
article expressed skepticism that a mass exodus of Saudi money is under way. According
to an August 21 BBC newscast, a Saudi lawyer is planning to file a counter-suit against the
U.S. Government for detention of Saudi students in the United States after the September 11
attacks and publication of pictures in U.S. newspapers of Saudi citizens with alleged ties to
Al Qaeda.
The July 2002 Briefing. On August 6, 2002, an article in The Washington Post
described a briefing given by an analyst from the Rand Corporation on June 10, 2002, to the
Defense Policy Board, a high-level advisory group that advises the U.S. Defense Department
on defense policy. According to the article and to other media, the briefer asserted among
other things that “Saudi Arabia supports our enemies and attacks our allies” and that “the
Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers.” Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters on August 6 that the briefing represented the
analyst’s own opinion and went on to say: “It did not represent the views of the government,
it didn’t represent the views of the Defense Policy Board.” State Department spokesman Phil
Reeker told reporters that these views “do not reflect the views of the President of the United
States or of the U.S. Government.” He added that Secretary of State Powell made that clear
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in a telephone call to Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal. Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah’s foreign policy adviser described views expressed in the briefing as “pure fiction.”
According to media reports, however, these views have gained some currency among various
commentators with ties to Administration policy makers.
Other Reports. In November 2002, news media reported that Princess Haifa, the wife
of Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar bin Sultan, had provided
funds–approximately $100,000 according to one article–over a four-year period to a
Jordanian woman (married to a Saudi citizen) who was in need of medical treatment. The
recipient, in turn, reportedly passed some of these funds to Saudi intermediaries with ties to
two of the September 11 hijackers. On November 23 and 24, a senior policy advisor to Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah (the country’s de facto ruler) said there is no evidence that Saudi
Arabia provided money to the hijackers and that his government is determined to uncover
all the facts; a Saudi Embassy officials said the Saudi investigation will probably be widened
to scrutinize all gifts provided by the Embassy. Ambassador Bander told the New York
Times on November 26 that Saudi Arabia is a partner with the United States in its anti-
terrorism campaign, while his wife expressed outrage that donations to the needy were being
linked to terrorism.
Security in the Gulf Region
Containment Policies toward Iraq. As noted above, Saudi Arabia hosts U.S. Air
Force units that conduct overflights to enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq. Although
they do not usually object to small scale U.S. responses to Iraqi aircraft or air defense units
challenging allied aircraft conducting these overflights, Saudi authorities are opposed to
large-scale allied military action against Iraqi targets. On several occasions, Saudi Minister
of Defense Prince Sultan has said his country would not permit allied aircraft to launch
preemptive or major retaliatory campaigns against Iraq from bases in Saudi Arabia. In the
aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Saudi authorities have expressed concern
over any expansion of the U.S. campaign against terrorism to Iraq or Iran. In comments
published on August 7, 2002, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faysal reiterated this
position, and said the Saudi government does not want allied forces “to use Saudi grounds”
for any attack on Iraq. In mid-September, however, there were signs that Saudi officials may
be softening their opposition to U.S. or allied attacks on Iraq originating from Saudi territory.
When asked during a CNN interview on September 16 about the availability of Saudi bases
to U.S. forces, the Saudi Foreign Minister reiterated that he was opposed in principle to an
attack on Iraq. He added, however, that if the U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution
authorizing military force, then “everybody is obliged to follow through.” Later, on
November 4, he told CNN that Saudi Arabia will abide by the decision of the U.N. Security
Council, but “as to entering the conflict or using facilities ... that is something else.”
On November 8, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441,
which mandated the resumption of a stringent weapons inspection regime in Iraq. A
statement by the Saudi cabinet on November 18 “welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of U.N.
Security Council Resolution No. 1441 and the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq” and went
on to express the hope “that such a step will put an end to the tense situation in the region,
[and] avert war and use of military force.” Regarding allied use of Saudi bases, the Saudi
Foreign Minister told reporters on November 19 that “[t]hat’s a sovereign decision ... and I’m
not going to speculate on how we’re going to decide.” According to the press (The
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Washington Post, November 17, 2002), U.S. officials believe Saudi officials would rule out
a large presence of U.S. ground troops but would allow U.S. forces to use a command center
in Saudi Arabia and permit use of Saudi air space by U.S. military aircraft.
U.S. Troop Presence. Some commentators suggest that the U.S. troop presence,
which is unpopular among some Islamic fundamentalists both in the kingdom and elsewhere
in the region, could undermine the stability of the Saudi regime. Others believe the U.S.
presence is crucial to U.S. efforts to maintain security in the Gulf region. Both for reasons
of security and host country sensitivities, U.S. military personnel are housed in remote
compounds away from major population centers or Islamic holy places. Saudi Defense
Minister Prince Sultan stated on April 10, 2000, that U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia “are within
the frame of United Nations assignments and directions to continue the surveillance of
southern Iraq, and also the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as the other GCC
[Gulf Cooperation Council] countries.”
A Washington Post article on January 18, 2002, described Saudi leaders as increasingly
uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in their country and indicated that senior
Saudis would like to devise “other forms of less conspicuous military cooperation” once the
Afghan campaign is over. Earlier, on January 15, a Member of the U.S. Senate had
reportedly expressed “unease about our presence in Saudi Arabia.” Officials of the Bush
Administration and Saudi officials have denied that there has been any change in long-
standing U.S.-Saudi defense relationships. In an interview carried by media on February 26,
when asked if “the U.S. military has worn out its welcome in Saudi Arabia”, Prince Abdullah
replied that “[w]e don’t think about raising this issue at all. If and when the time comes, it
will be discussed by both governments.” According to a senior Administration official, the
subject of bases did not arise during the visit of Crown Prince Abdullah to President Bush
on April 25, 2002.
A subsequent Washington Post article, on April 6, 2002, reported that the U.S. Defense
Department has prepared plans to move a sophisticated military command center known as
the “Coalition Air Operations Center” (CAOC) from Saudi Arabia to the neighboring state
of Qatar, in an effort to reduce U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia in supporting military
operations in the region. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not confirm this report,
telling reporters that “we’re constantly moving people from one place to another place.”
Earlier, on March 26, the unified theater commander General Tommy Franks told reporters
that “I have no plans to move the CAOC from its current location.” But he added that this
would not preclude plans “to replicate it some place.”
Bombings of U.S. Military Facilities. Two attacks on U.S. military facilities in
Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s created concern in the United States over the security of U.S.
military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia and other U.S. service members stationed
elsewhere in the Gulf. The first, which occurred on November 13, 1995, at the headquarters
of a U.S. training program for the Saudi National Guard in the capital of Riyadh, killed seven
persons (including five U.S. citizens). Several months later, Saudi authorities charged four
Saudis with the crime. The four, who confessed to being influenced by Islamic
fundamentalist exiles, were convicted and executed.
The second and more lethal explosion, which occurred at Khobar Towers (a housing
facility for U.S. Air Force personnel near Dhahran Air Base) in June 1996, killed 19 U.S. Air
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Force personnel, wounded many others, and prompted the relocation of most U.S. military
personnel to more remote sites in Saudi Arabia to improve security. Press reports allegedly
based on Saudi investigations and reported statements by other suspects have suggested
involvement by Iran, but Saudi officials have called these reports inaccurate. Earlier reports
had suggested involvement by exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden, who has praised the
bombings in Saudi Arabia but has not claimed responsibility for them. On May 22, 1998,
Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Nayif told reporters from Kuwait that the Riyadh and
Khobar bombings “were carried out by Saudis with the support of others” (whom he did not
identify). The Minister further stated in November that bin Ladin was not responsible for
either the Riyadh or the Khobar bombings but acknowledged that individuals influenced by
bin Ladin might have conducted the attacks.
In September 1999, media cited purported U.S. intelligence information that three Saudi
men linked to the bombing had taken refuge in Iran. On October 2, 1999, Iran’s foreign
minister rebuffed an alleged request from President Clinton to Iranian President Khatemi for
Iranian assistance in resolving the case. Asked on March 12, 2000, if any suspects in the
Khobar case were currently in Iran, Prince Nayif told reporters that “we cannot hold anyone
responsible until the facts become clear to us.” Later, on October 30, 2000, he commented
that “[t]he main suspects are not in Saudi Arabia” and added that “[w]e are making efforts
for their return to the kingdom.” There have been numerous reports, denied by both the U.S.
and Saudi governments, that both governments fear that a finding of Iranian involvement
could complicate relations with Iran or force U.S. retaliation against Iran.
On June 21, 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that a federal grand
jury had indicted 14 individuals in connection with the Khobar Towers bombing. According
to the Justice Department, 13 of those indicted belong to the pro-Iranian Saudi Hizballah
organization and the 14th is linked to the Lebanese Hizballah organization. (Saudi Hizballah
appears to be a chapter of the parent Hizballah organization in Lebanon.) According to the
press, none of the persons indicted is in U.S. custody at this time; 11 of them are in Saudi
jails. Although no Iranian is named or charged in the indictment, Ashcroft said “[t]he
indictment explains that elements of the Iranian government inspired, supported and
supervised members of Saudi Hizbollah [variant spelling]. In particular, the indictment
alleges that the charged defendants reported their surveillance activities to Iranian officials
and were supported and directed in those activities by Iranian officials.” Ashcroft said the
investigation is continuing and additional charges will be brought, as appropriate.
During the investigation, U.S. law enforcement officials criticized Saudi counterparts
for not providing U.S. investigators with access to suspects in the Khobar bombing.
According to a May 14, 2001 article in The New Yorker and other media reports, starting in
late 1998, Saudi officials began allowing FBI agents to watch behind a one-way mirror as
Saudi interrogators posed questions provided by the FBI to suspects and witnesses. In a
phone call on June 21, 2001–the day the indictments were announced–President Bush
thanked Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah for Saudi cooperation in the investigation. The FBI
Director also expressed his appreciation, along with his hopes that the suspects would be
brought to justice in the United States. In an interview published on June 23, however, Saudi
Interior Minister Prince Nayif appeared to rule out extradition of the suspects to the United
States, stating that “[t]he trials must take place before Saudi judicial authorities....” He added
that “[n]o other entity has the right to try or investigate any crimes occurring on Saudi lands.”
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On June 1, 2002, Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior Prince Ahmad said an
unspecified number of people previously arrested by Saudi Arabia in connection with the
Khobar bombing had been sentenced by an Islamic court. In a follow-up announcement on
June 13, the Prince said those convicted “do not include any non-Saudi nationals” and added
that the verdicts would be reviewed by higher courts and announced “at the appropriate
time.”
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Saudi Arabia supports Palestinian aspirations and strongly endorses Muslim claims in
the old city of Jerusalem. It has supported Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, and joined
with neighboring Gulf states in 1994 in terminating enforcement of the so-called secondary
and tertiary (indirect) boycotts of Israel while retaining the primary (direct) boycott. Saudi
leaders have been increasingly critical of Israel since the Palestinian uprising began in
September 2000. According to a New York Times article of May 17, 2001, Crown Prince
Abdullah declined an invitation to visit the United States in June 2001, to indicate
displeasure over what Saudis regard as insufficient U.S. efforts to restrain Israeli military
actions against Palestinians. However, the Crown Prince did accept a subsequent invitation
to visit President Bush in Texas in April 2002 (see below).
Saudi Arabia, like other Arab states, recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and provides some financial
support to Palestinian institutions. At an Arab League meeting on October 22, 2000, Crown
Prince Abdullah took the lead in creating a $1 billion fund: $800 million to help preserve
the “Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem” and $200 million to help families of
Palestinians killed in the current unrest. Saudi Arabia reportedly pledged a total of $250
million to these two funds, and provided an additional $30 million to the Palestinian
Authority (PA) on November 5 as a separate donation. At an informal international donors’
conference at Stockholm on April 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia pledged $225 million in direct
monetary support to the PA over a 6-month period to cover emergency expenses. PLO/PA
Chairman Yasir Arafat received a $45 million grant during a visit to Saudi Arabia on July
23, 2001, but it is not clear whether this represented part of the $225 million grant pledged
by Saudi Arabia in April.
There have been unsubstantiated reports of Saudi assistance to the PLO’s rival
organization, the fundamentalist Hamas, particularly after the Saudi-PLO rift that occurred
after the PLO supported Iraq in 1990. In its report entitled Patters of Global Terrorism, 2001,
the State Department noted that Hamas receives funding from “private benefactors in Saudi
Arabia” and some other countries but does not estimate amounts involved. Saudi Arabia has
provided aid (variously estimated at $33 million and $59 million) to families of Palestinians
killed or injured in the 17-month-old Palestinian uprising; in addition, Saudis raised
additional funds (over $100 million according to one report) for this purpose at a telethon
sponsored by King Fahd on April 11, 2002. Saudi officials told U.S. counterparts in late
April that proceeds of the telethon are funneled through non-governmental organizations to
provide some humanitarian support to needy Palestinian families; the Saudis drew a
distinction between their fund raising activities and those of Iraq, which pays families who
will sacrifice their children as suicide bombers. In early May, Israel officials, citing captured
Palestinian documents, said the Saudi Government has given money to 13 charities, seven
of which provide support to Hamas. The Saudi Ambassador denied this report.
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Crown Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative. On February 17, 2002, New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman reported an off-the-record conversation with Crown
Prince Abdullah. According to Friedman, the Crown Prince said he had prepared a draft
speech calling for full Israeli withdrawal from Israeli occupied territories in return for full
normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel. The Crown Prince added that he
had planned to give the speech before an Arab summit conference at the end of March but
had delayed doing so after what he regarded as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s
resorting to increased oppression in the Palestinian territories. However, Prince Abdullah’s
office did authorize Friedman to put the prince’s comments on the record. Abdullah did not
provide details of his proposal, and some commentators believe the prince’s comments
represent nothing new over and above long-standing Arab land-for-peace proposals. Other
commentators believe that such comments from an Arab leader of Abdullah’s stature carry
special weight and could portend a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal was the centerpiece of the Arab League summit
conference held on March 27-28, 2002, and an expanded version of his proposal was
included in a resolution adopted at the conference. The proposal, as agreed upon by the
attendees, called among other things for Israeli withdrawal from territories it had occupied
since 1967, a “just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees,” and establishment of
normal relations between Arab states and Israel. The Saudi-initiated peace proposal was
also a major topic of discussion during Crown Prince Abdullah’s visit to President Bush at
the latter’s ranch in Texas on April 25. A senior Administration official told reporters that
“[t]he President congratulated him [Abdullah} again on his statesmanship in putting the
[initiative] forward.” According to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, there are areas
of disagreement between U.S. and Saudi peace plans but significant areas of overlap as well.
Saudi officials found “positive factors” in President Bush’s speech of June 24 but
expressed concern over his statements conditioning a Palestinian state on the installation of
a new Palestinian leadership. A statement by the Saudi cabinet on July 1 alluded to “the
positive elements of the Bush initiative,” but on the same day Crown Prince Abdullah was
quoted as telling the visiting Spanish Defense Minister that the Palestinian people “alone
have the right to choose their leadership.”
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales. The United States is currently Saudi Arabia’s leading arms
supplier. Total value of arms agreements with Saudi Arabia from 1950 through March 31,
1997, was $93.8 billion, while arms agreements with Saudi Arabia from 1991 through 1998
amounted to $22.8 billion. The upsurge in Saudi arms purchases from the United States after
1990 was due in large measure to the Persian Gulf crisis and its aftermath. The largest recent
sale was a $9 billion contract for 72 F-15S advanced fighter aircraft, signed in May 1993.
As Table 1 shows, approximately 21% of the value of U.S.-Saudi arms contracts from 1950
to 1997 were for lethal equipment (i.e., weapons, ammunition, and combat vehicles, aircraft,
and ships); the largest portion (32%) went for support services (repair, rehabilitation, supply
operations, and training). Another major component of the Saudi program has been
construction of military bases and facilities, accounting for 19%, although most military
infrastructure projects were completed by 1990.
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A downward trend has marked Saudi arms procurement since the mid-1990s as Saudi
Arabia completed many of its post-Gulf War purchases and the country faced straitened
finances. Since the late 1990s there have been occasional reports of Saudi interest in
renovating further their model combat aircraft fleet, but no significant deals have emerged.
On May 7, 2001, the Saudi Assistant Minister of Defense described his country’s priority as
sustaining existing weapon systems rather than large-scale procurement of new weaponry,
despite mounting oil revenues. He ruled out additional F-15 fighters aircraft to replace aging
F-5s this year as well as tank modernization. Reports in April 2001, however, indicated
continued Saudi interest in more and newer F-15s or possibly F-16 or F-22 fighter aircraft
(both made by Lockheed Martin Corporation in Bethesda, Maryland.)
On September 8, 2000, the U.S. Defense Department announced that Saudi Arabia has
asked to buy three arms packages from the United States: (1) $416 million in light armored
vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and advanced communications equipment for the paramilitary
Saudi National Guard; (2) $690 million in contractor training and maintenance support for
Saudi Arabia’s fleet of F-15 fighter aircraft; and (3) $1.6 billion in flight simulators, repair
parts, and other technical services for the F-15 aircraft. The prime contractors for the first
package would be the Diesel Division of General Motors of London, Ontario, and Raytheon
Corporation of Tuscon, Arizona. The prime contractor for the second package would be al-
Salam Aircraft Company of Saudi Arabia, which is 50% owned by Boeing Co. The prime
contractor for the third package has not yet been determined.
Table 1. U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia, 1950-1997
Orders
Deliveries
Category
$ in
% of Total
% of Total
$ in Billions
Billions
Orders
Deliveries
Weapons & Ammunition
19.893
21.2
9.092
15.6
Support Equipment
16.614
17.7
9.815
16.8
Spare Parts & Modifications
9.778
10.4
5.259
9.0
Supply, Repair, Training
29.615
31.6
17.804
30.6
Construction
17.924
19.1
16.197
27.8
TOTALS
93.824
–
58.167
–
Note: All figures are current through March 31, 1997.
Successive U.S. Administrations have entered into military sales agreements with Saudi
Arabia because of its prestige in the Arab world, its importance as a major source of oil, and
its vulnerability to threats from neighboring states supported in the past by the Soviet Union.
Heightened threats from Iran in the late 1980s and subsequently from Iraq provided rationale
for an expansion of the arms supply relationship, and some observers believe further sales
are needed to redress a continuing gap between Saudi weapons inventories and those of
potential adversaries. Also, the Saudi arms market has helped maintain the U.S. industrial
base and create jobs.
Some critics doubt that Saudi forces can absorb large quantities of advanced military
hardware and voice concerns that such equipment could fall into the wrong hands in the
event of external invasion or a radical change in the Saudi regime. Many are concerned that
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arms being sold to Saudi Arabia might be used one day against Israel. Others doubt that
Israel is seriously threatened by Saudi Arabia, but oppose sales to Arab countries technically
at war with Israel and fear that enhancement of Saudi air and missile capabilities could
increase the costs to Israel of a future conflict. Another concern is that continuing arms sales
to Saudi Arabia undermine efforts to restrain the flow of advanced weaponry to an already
heavily armed Middle East.
Trade Relationships
Saudi Arabia was the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2000. For that
year, Saudi exports to the United States were estimated at $14.3 billion and imports from the
United States at $5.9 billion. Comparable figures for Israel, the second largest U.S. trading
partner in the Middle East, were $12.9 billion in exports and $6.2 billion in imports. To a
considerable extent, this high volume of trade is a result of U.S. oil imports from Saudi
Arabia and U.S. arms exports to that country. The Saudis buy significant amounts of U.S.
commercial equipment as well. Also, a Washington Post article of February 11, 2002,
estimates that Saudi nationals have invested between $500 and $700 billion in the U.S.
economy.
Saudi Arabia has applied to join the 128-member World Trade Organization (WTO) as
a developing country, an arrangement that would give it a special transition period to bring
its commercial procedures in line with WTO rules. The U.S. State Department notes that
accession will require the Saudi government to initiate substantial reforms, including tariff
reduction, opening up financial services (insurance and banking), allowing competition in
telecommunications and other services, and better protection of intellectual property rights.
In recognition of its progress in protection of intellectual property rights, Saudi Arabia was
removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Priority Watch List in 1996, but remains on
the basic Watch List pending further progress. The U.S. Trade Representative reportedly has
also cited Saudi observance of the secondary boycott against Israel as an obstacle to
admission to the WTO. In March 2001, WTO officials reportedly expressed disappointment
over a recent list issued by the Saudi government of activities off limits to foreign investment
(see below) and predicted that these restrictions could delay Saudi accession to the WTO.
During Crown Prince Abdullah’s April 2002 visit, however, President Bush expressed
support for Saudi accession and said the United States is making technical assistance
available to Saudi Arabia to support the Saudi application.
Problems in Commercial Transactions. Complaints have arisen within the U.S.
business community over commercial disputes that have resulted in hardships for U.S.
companies doing business in Saudi Arabia and for their employees. These disputes center
on allegations by U.S. firms that Saudi clients have not paid for services rendered or have
sought to expand terms of a contract without further reimbursement, and in some cases have
taken reprisals against U.S. employees of the firms involved. (For further information, see
CRS Report 95-666, Saudi Arabia: Commercial Disputes With U.S. Firms.).
Oil Production. With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7
billion barrels in January 2001), Saudi Arabia produced an average of 9.145 million barrels
per day (bpd) of crude oil during 2000. Approximately 14% of U.S. oil imports and 8.46%
of total U.S. oil consumption came from Saudi Arabia during 2001. Formerly the largest
foreign supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been exceeded in this role by
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Venezuela and/or Canada during recent years (see Table 2). In recent years, Saudi Arabia
has alternately supported cuts and increases in production as oil prices on the international
market have fluctuated. Under a “gentlemen’s agreement” reached in June 2000, members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established a mechanism to
adjust the supply of oil by 500,000 bpd if the 20-day average price of oil moved outside a
$22 to $28 price band. Members disagree, however, as to whether this mechanism is
automatic or requires separate action by OPEC to implement, and Saudi Arabia has spoken
of a target price of $25 rather than a price band. Congress has enacted legislation to
discourage price fixing by oil producing countries (see below). With regard to Iraq’s call in
April 2002 for a halt in oil production to protest Israeli actions toward Palestinians, a senior
Administration official told reporters after the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah that
Saudi officials assured their U.S. hosts that oil would not be used as a weapon. In May, the
Saudi Oil Minister added that “Saudi Arabia is keen to maintain stability in the international
oil market ...”
Table 2. Oil Consumption and Imports
(in millions of barrels per day)
Category
1998
1999
2000
2001
Total U.S. Consumption
18.917
19.519
19.701
19.649
Total U.S. Imports
10.708
10.852
11.459
11.871
Imports from Saudi Arabia
1.491
1.478
1.572
1.662
Imports from Venezuela
1.719
1.493
1.546
1.553
Imports from Canada
1.598
1.539
1.807
1.828
Source: DOE.
Foreign Investment. Saudi leaders have shown increasing interest in attracting
foreign investment in their energy sector, although projects in upstream oil apparently remain
off limits. On April 10, 2000, King Fahd approved a new foreign investment law which
allows international investors to have full ownership of projects and related property in Saudi
Arabia, reduces taxes from 45% to 30% on corporate profits, and restructures (but apparently
does not abolish) requirements for foreign businessmen to have a Saudi sponsor. On
February 11, 2001, the Saudi Supreme Economic Council issued a so-called “negative list”
of those investment activities that remain off limits to foreign investment. In general, the list
covers oil exploration and production, some manufacturing activities, radio and
telecommunications, transport, electricity transmission and distribution, and a range of
services including tourism, publishing, real estate brokerage, and insurance. According to
news reports in March 2001, international trade officials expressed disappointment over the
length and scope of the list. The list will be reviewed annually, however, and some observers
have speculated that it will be shortened as the country adjusts to an expansion in foreign
investment. In a later development, according to a news report in April 2002, Saudi officials
are considering a draft law that would tax the earnings of expatriate employees in Saudi
Arabia for the first time since the 1970s, in addition to the annual corporate taxes already
levied on foreign firms operating in Saudi Arabia.
On June 3, 2001, Saudi Arabia signed preliminary agreements worth approximately $25
billion with eight international oil companies to develop three natural gas fields, together
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with related power plants, transmission pipelines, and water desalinization projects. Five of
these companies are U.S.-based, including Exxon Mobil Corporation, Conoco, Phillips
Petroleum Company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Marathon. Exxon Mobil is the
lead manager for two of the three gas field projects. Conclusion of final agreements,
originally set for mid-December 2001, has been delayed, as Saudi and company negotiators
continue trying to resolve several issues including taxes, rate of return on investments, and
size of the gas reserves being offered. According to a British Broadcasting Company (BBC)
report of September 30, 2002, the Saudi negotiating team has given the oil company
consortiums until November 1 to accept its final offers, which include additional areas for
gas excavations and a higher rate of return on investment (15.5%), which is in the 15%-to-
18% range reportedly sought by the oil companies. On November 20, 2002, however, the
London Financial Times reported that the deal has encountered resistance in several Saudi
Government departments.
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Of particular concern to Westerners are pervasive restrictions on women’s activities and
an injunction against the practice of other religions throughout the Kingdom. This injunction
has been applied not only against non-Islamic faiths but also at times against the Shi’ite
Muslim community in Saudi Arabia, estimated at 500,000 or more persons mainly in the
Eastern Province. Since 1990, the Saudi government has moved quietly to ease some
restrictions on Shi’ites. Also, according to the State Department, high-level Saudi officials
have said that Saudi policy allows for private non-Muslim worship, for example, in private
homes or secluded compounds. On April 6, 2000, responding to criticisms by the London-
based Amnesty International, a Saudi Under Secretary in the Foreign Ministry maintained
that “non-Muslims enjoy full freedom to engage in their religious observances in private.”
Earlier, in April 1999, Crown Prince Abdullah told a local audience: “Taking into account
the teachings of Islam, we will do our best to enable Saudi women to continue to contribute.”
Political reforms promulgated by King Fahd appear to represent a limited move toward
democracy and protection of individual freedoms. The “main law” announced by the King
on March 1, 1992, bans arbitrary arrest, harassment, or entry of individual homes without
legal authority and specifies privacy in telephone calls and mail. On August 20, 1993, the
King appointed a 60-member consultative council (increased to 90 in 1997 and to 120 in
2001), with limited powers to question cabinet members and propose laws. On the other
hand, King Fahd has said that free elections are not suitable for his country; he stated on
March 30, 1992 that elections “do not fall within the sphere of the Muslim religion, which
believes in the al-shura (consultative) system and openness between ruler and his subjects
and which makes whoever is in charge fully answerable to his people.”
Child Custody Cases. Child custody cases in which a Saudi husband has refused
to permit his children by an American wife to travel to the United States have been a source
of U.S.-Saudi friction. Under Saudi laws the father is almost always given custody of
children in divorce cases; moreover, in some instances where a wife secured child custody
in the United States, an estranged Saudi husband has abducted the children from the United
States and taken them to Saudi Arabia, where his claim is usually upheld. Members of
Congress have criticized the U.S. State Department for not exerting more pressure on Saudi
Arabia to resolve these cases. State Department officials say they have tried to do so, and
point out that there are approximately 1,100 such cases world wide, of which 92 involve U.S.
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citizens in Saudi Arabia. According to September 2002 press reports, Saudi and U.S.
officials have agreed to work on establishing a mechanism to help resolve these issues.
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Political Development
Saudi Leadership. As the birthplace of the Islamic religion in 622 A.D. and as the
home of Islam’s two holiest shrines, the Arabian Peninsula has always occupied a position
of special prestige within the Middle East. With the establishment of Arab empires based
in Damascus and Baghdad, the peninsula gradually lost its political importance and sank into
disunity. In the 16th century, much of the Arabian Peninsula came under the nominal rule
of the Ottoman Empire; however, tribal leaders effectively controlled most of the region.
During this period, an alliance developed between an influential eastern tribe, the House of
Saud, and the leaders of a puritanical and reformist Islamic group known as the Wahhabi
movement. During the first quarter of the 20th century, a chieftain of the Saud family, Abd
al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (later known as Ibn Saud) overcame numerous rivals with the
support of his Wahhabi allies and succeeded in unifying most of the Arabian Peninsula under
his rule. Four sons have succeeded him.
Royal Succession. King Fahd, the current ruler and a dynamic leader for many
years, is approximately 80 years old and suffers from medical problems including diabetes
and arthritis. In early 1996, King Fahd temporarily turned over affairs of state to his half-
brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, for a six-week period while the King recuperated from a
stroke. More recently, amid conflicting reports about the King’s condition, Crown Prince
Abdullah has increasingly carried out many governmental functions since 1996, together
with other senior princes of the royal family. Another key figure is Defense Minister Prince
Sultan, a full brother of King Fahd, who is generally considered next in line of succession
after Prince Abdullah. (King Fahd, Prince Abdullah, and Prince Sultan also hold the
positions of Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Second Deputy Prime
Minister, respectively.) Press reports in August and September 2002 indicate that King
Fahd’s health has been deteriorating.
Most commentators believe the royal family would back Crown Prince Abdullah in a
smooth transfer of power if King Fahd should pass from the scene. Various sources describe
Prince Abdullah as more traditional and less western in outlook than King Fahd and more
oriented toward the Arab world. On balance, the Crown Prince seems likely to maintain
Saudi Arabia’s long-standing strategic and economic ties with the United States. U.S.
officials commented that President Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah established a very good
personal rapport during the latter’s visit in April 2002. Some speculate, however, that
succession could become more intricate after Abdullah (who is only two years younger than
Fahd but believed to be in better health) and fear that future intra-family rivalries could
weaken the Saud dynasty over the long term. Possible future candidates include some 25
brothers and half-brothers of King Fahd and a number of sons and nephews.
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Economy and Aid
Economic Conditions. Oil is the dominant factor in the Saudi economy, accounting
for 35-40% of GDP, 75% of budget receipts, and 90-95% of export earnings as of April
2000; even more of the GDP is derived indirectly from the oil industry. Despite immense
oil revenue, a combination of fluctuating oil prices, domestic welfare spending, and military
spending have caused periodic budget deficits (see Table 3). For example, the 1990-1991
Gulf war cost Saudi Arabia approximately $55 billion (including $16.9 billion contributed
to the United States to help defray expenses). Although the government was able to retire
its external debt in May 1995, it had to borrow $4.3 billion again from external sources in
December 1997 to finance purchase of aircraft and had to resort to subsequent borrowing to
cover other expenses. Since 1994 the government has instituted various austerity measures
to deal with shrinking revenue.
Table 3. Saudi Budget Figures
(In billions of U.S. dollars, at exchange rate of $1.00=S.R. 3.75)
1999
2000
2001
2002
Category
Budget
Actual
Budget
Actual
Budget Est.
Budget
Expenditure
44.0
48.3
49.3
54.1
57.3
68.0
53.9
Revenue
32.3
39.2
41.9
66.1
57.3
61.3
41.9
Balance
-11.7
-9.1
-7.5
12.0
0
-6.7
-12.0
Source: Saudi Ministry of Finance; Saudi government announcements; press estimates.
Aid Relationships. As Saudi oil income expanded, U.S. economic aid ended in
1959. Small amounts of aid continued through 1975, limited to a small international military
education and training (IMET) program after 1968. Total U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia from
1946 through its termination in 1975 amounted to $328.4 million, of which $295.8 million
was military and $32.6 million was economic assistance. Approximately 20% of total aid
was in the form of grants and 80% in loans, all of which have been repaid. A small IMET
program of $25,000 per year to help defray some expenses of sending Saudi officers to U.S.
military service schools was resumed in FY2002, and the same amount was requested by the
Administration for Saudi Arabia in FY2003. Saudi officials also cite their country’s role as
a donor of aid to less affluent countries; according to a Saudi diplomat, the Saudi government
extended $820.3 million worth of aid to developing countries in 2001.
Defense and Security
The United States and Saudi Arabia are not linked by a formal defense treaty; however,
a series of informal agreements, statements by successive U.S. Administrations, and military
deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. (For
statements by previous administrations, see CRS Report 94-78, Saudi Arabia: U.S. Defense
and Security Commitments, February 3, 1994.) Saudi forces acquired experience during the
Gulf war and are undergoing further upgrading through a large-scale program of arms
procurement (see below), both Saudi Arabia and its five smaller Gulf neighbors remain
vulnerable to future external aggression. On one hand, both the Iranian and Iraqi armed
forces suffered major personnel and equipment losses during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war
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and Operation Desert Storm, respectively, and neither is in a position to offer an immediate
threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the other hand, as shown in Table 4, the
combined forces of Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies are outnumbered in important categories
by those of Iraq and Iran, even after the losses sustained by both countries in recent wars.
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
In early 2000, the precipitate rise in international oil prices prompted several legislative
initiatives designed to restrain oil price increases, as mentioned above. On March 22, 2000,
by a vote of 382 to 38 (with one present and 30 abstentions, Roll Call 65), the House passed
H.R. 3822, which requires the President, inter alia, to determine which oil producing nations
are engaged in oil price fixing to the detriment of the U.S. economy, submit reports to
Congress, and “take the necessary steps to begin negotiations to achieve multilateral action
to reduce, suspend, or terminate bilateral assistance and arms exports to major net oil
exporters engaged in oil price fixing as part of a concerted diplomatic campaign with other
major net oil importers...” In the 107th Congress, H.R. 334, the Persian Gulf Security Cost
Sharing Act, introduced on January 31, 2001, would direct the President to seek further
contributions from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states to defray the costs of U.S.
military deployments in the region.
Arms Sales
Congress has been particularly sensitive to the argument that enhancing Saudi arms
inventories could result in an incremental increase in overall threats to Israel, although some
Members have supported such sales on the grounds that they help buttress Saudi defense
capabilities in the Gulf and enhance the U.S. job market. Since the mid-1970s, several major
arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been challenged in Congress: F-15 fighter aircraft in 1978;
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, advanced tanker aircraft, and
advanced Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in 1981; and a large package of air-to-air,
surface-to-air, and air-to-sea missiles in 1986. All of these sales ultimately were allowed to
proceed, and several larger sales followed before and during the Persian Gulf crisis, without
significant congressional opposition. The Bush Administration’s proposal in September
1992 to sell 72 improved F-15XP fighters to Saudi Arabia met some opposition, but
resolutions to block or postpone the sale never came to a vote.
Arab Boycott
Members of Congress frequently have decried Saudi participation in the Arab boycott
because of its impact on Israel and on U.S. businesses. Some have called for linkage
between U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Saudi renunciation of the boycott. Part C of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994),
known as the Anti-Economic Discrimination Act, under a provision that took effect on April
30, 1995, bars the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles or services to any country that sends
letters to U.S. firms requesting compliance with, or soliciting information regarding
compliance with, the Arab League primary or secondary boycott of Israel. This provision
permits a presidential waiver on national security grounds; then President Clinton exercised
waiver authority for Saudi Arabia and several other Arab states in Presidential Determination
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(PD) 95-20, May 1, 1995, and again in PD 96-23, April 30, 1996. On April 24, 1997, the
President delegated waiver authority under this act to the Secretary of State.
Trade Practices
In the 105th Congress, Section 2801 in Division G of the Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-277, October 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-
845) required reports every 120 days by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, on actions taken by the three departments to resolve
commercial disputes between U.S. firms and Saudi Arabia as listed in a June 1993 letter
from the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce. In the 106th Congress, this requirement was
retained in Section 209 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000-2001 (H.R.
3427, passed by reference in H.R. 3194, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000,
P.L. 106-113, November 29, 1999. Currently, this provision appears in Section 216(a) of
H.R. 1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization bill for FY2002-2003, which was signed by
President Bush as P.L. 107-228 on September 30, 2002.
Table 4. Selected Middle East Armed Forces
Main Battle
Combat
Surf. Surf.
Chem
Nucl.
Country
Force Size
Tanks
Aircraft
Mslsa
Warf. Cap
Cap.b
Iran
520,000
1,565
306
S
X
D
Iraqc
389,000
2,600
316
S
X
D
Saudi Arabiad
199,500
910
294
I
–
–
Yemene
66,500
760
76
S
–
–
Oman
41,700
117
40
–
–
–
U. A. E.
41,500
381
101
–
–
–
Kuwait
15,500
293
81
–
–
–
Qatar
12,400
35
18
–
–
–
Bahrain
10,700
140
34
–
–
–
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2001-2002.
a S = short-range (70-1,000 km); M = medium-range (1,001-3,000 km); I = intermediate-range (3,001-5,000
km).
b D = reportedly under development (now or in the past).
c Figures represent estimates of Iraqi forces and equipment after Operation Desert Storm. Some older tanks are
believed unserviceable. The aircraft total does not include combat aircraft impounded in Iran.
d Force total includes active members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (estimated at 57,000). Tank total
does not include an estimated 145 French-manufactured AMX-30 tanks in storage.
e Force total includes conscripts. Tank total does not include 30 obsolescent Soviet-manufactured T-34 tanks.
Aircraft total does not include 40 in storage.
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