Order Code RL31294
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Safeguarding the Nation’s Drinking Water:
EPA and Congressional Actions
Updated December 18, 2002
Mary Tiemann
Specialist in Environmental Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Safeguarding the Nation’s Drinking Water:
EPA and Congressional Actions
Summary
The events of September 11 raised concerns about the security of the nation’s
drinking water supplies and their vulnerability to attack. Issues include the readiness
of water utilities to prevent and respond to attacks on water systems, steps that can
be taken to improve preparedness and response capabilities, and the availability of
resources to help utilities enhance drinking water security.
After a presidential commission on critical infrastructure protection identified
vulnerabilities in the water sector in 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), with other federal agencies, water utilities, and state and local governments,
began taking steps to improve the security of water systems, although these efforts
generally were not targeted to current concerns over terrorism. Pursuant to the 1998
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 on protecting the nation’s critical
infrastructure, EPA had provided some research, information, and technical and
financial assistance to improve preparedness and increase the security of drinking
water systems. However, PDD-63 efforts were focused almost entirely on computer
security issues. Following September 11, EPA significantly increased and expedited
efforts to help utilities safeguard facilities and supplies from terrorist or other threats.
The 107th Congress took significant steps to improve security in the water sector.
In the emergency supplemental appropriations for FY2002 (P.L. 107-117, H.R.3338),
Congress provided EPA with $175.6 million for several counter-terrorism activities,
including enhancing drinking water security. Of this amount, EPA has applied $89
million to reduce the vulnerability of public water systems to terrorist attacks and to
enhance their security and their ability to respond to emergency situations.
Congress also passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188, H.Rept. 107-481), which requires
community water systems serving more than 3,300 individuals to assess their
vulnerability to terrorist attack and to prepare emergency preparedness and response
plans. The legislation authorizes EPA to provide funding for systems to carry out
these activities, and to make emergency assistance grants to states and public water
systems. It also directs EPA to review methods to prevent, detect, and respond to
threats to water safety and infrastructure security and to provide information to
community water systems.
On November 25, 2002, the President signed into law the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, H.R. 5005), which establishes a Department of Homeland
Security. Among other things, the Department is responsible for comprehensively
evaluating the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures. The legislation does not
transfer EPA’s drinking water security responsibilities and activities; however,
cooperation between the EPA and the Department is anticipated. This report will be
updated to reflect developments.


Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
EPA Efforts to Protect Drinking Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Vulnerability Assessment Training and Technical Assistance . . . . . . . 3
Funding for Security Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Congressional Actions to Enhance Drinking Water Security . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
List of Tables
Table 1. Drinking Water Security Bills Enacted in the 107th Congress
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Safeguarding the Nation’s Drinking Water:
EPA and Congressional Actions
Introduction
Ensuring the security of the nations’ drinking water supplies poses a substantial
challenge, partly because the number of water systems is very large and also because
the responsibility for protecting drinking water safety is shared among federal, state
and local governments and utilities. Nationwide, there are approximately 168,000
public water systems, and these systems range greatly in size, serving from as few as
25 persons to more than 1 million persons. Nearly 140,000 of these water systems
serve 500 people or fewer. Another 360 systems serve more than 100,000 people and
provide water to nearly half of the total population served. Because water supplies
directly affect many activities (from drinking water to fighting fires), their disruption
could have significant impacts.
A 1996 executive order on critical infrastructure protection (E. O. 13010),
included water supply systems as one of 8 national infrastructures vital to the security
of the United States. In 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection (established by the executive order) issued a report on the vulnerabilities
of these categories of infrastructures and strategies for protecting them. The
Commission identified three attributes crucial to water supply users: water must be
available on demand, it must be delivered at sufficient pressure, and it must be safe
for use. The Commission concluded that actions affecting any of these factors could
be debilitating for the infrastructure.1
Major threats to water supplies identified in the report include: physical
destruction of facilities or distribution systems, biological or chemical contamination
of supplies, and cyber attacks. The Commission concluded that water supplies had
inadequate protection against the threat of chemical or biological contamination, and
that technology was insufficient to allow detection, identification, measurement, and
treatment of highly toxic, waterborne contaminants. Water utilities were also found
to be vulnerable to cyber attacks as they rely increasingly on computers to control
water flow and pressure.2 The Commission determined that information sharing was
the most immediate need, and that warning and analytical capabilities and research
and development were all insufficient. (For a broader review of water sector security
1The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures.
Report of the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection.
Appendix A, Sector Summary Reports. October 1997. A-45.
2Steps taken by water utilities, typically larger utilities, to avoid Y2K problems have
enhanced computer system security from certain types of attacks. For more information on
this security issue, see CRS Report RL31534, Critical Infrastructure Remote Control
Systems and the Terrorist Threat
.

CRS-2
issues (including wastewater facilities and dams), see CRS Report RS21026,
Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector.)
In response to these findings and other developments, President Clinton issued
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 on critical infrastructure protection in
1998.3 Under this directive, a public/private partnership was established to put in
place prevention, response, and recovery measures to ensure the security of the
nation’s critical infrastructures against criminal or terrorist attacks. PDD-63
designated EPA as the lead federal agency for the water supply sector, and EPA
appointed the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies (AMWA) to coordinate
the water sector. Before September 11, however, the focus of the PDD-63 efforts for
all critical infrastructure sectors was on cyber security. Subsequently, efforts to
protect the nation’s critical infrastructures have been broadened and accelerated.4
EPA Efforts to Protect Drinking Water
EPA believes that the threat of public harm from an attack on the nation’s water
supplies is small. Nonetheless, the Agency has set a goal to ensure that water utilities
in all communities (1) have access to scientific information and expertise, (2) assess
their vulnerability to a terrorist attack, (3) improve security, and (4) know the
immediate steps to take should an attack occur.5
For several years, but most substantially since September 11, EPA has been
working with state, local, and tribal governments, the drinking water industry,
training organizations, and other federal agencies to improve preparedness and
increase the security of water supplies. Security-related activities fall into 5 general
categories including: developing vulnerability assessment tools, identifying actions
to minimize vulnerabilities, revising and enhancing existing emergency operations
plans, establishing an information center on drinking water alerts or incidents, and
supporting research on biological and chemical contaminants considered to be
potential weapons of mass destruction. Several key government and private sector
efforts are described below.
Information Sharing. One goal of PDD-63 in 1998 was to establish, within
5 years, an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) for each critical
infrastructure sector. With assistance from EPA and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies has led the
effort to develop and implement a secure ISAC for water utilities. The Water ISAC
provides a Web-based communication system that can be used to (1) disseminate
early warnings and alerts regarding threats against the physical and cyber systems of
drinking water and wastewater facilities; (2) allow water utilities to share with each
other information on security incidents; and (3) provide an opportunity for utilities
3See [http://www.ciao.gov/resource/directive.html].
4For more information on PPD-63 and more recent developments, see CRS Report RL30153,
Critical infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation.
5U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Actions to Safeguard the Nation’s Drinking
Water Supplies.
October 2001. See [http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/index.html].

CRS-3
to have security incidents analyzed by counter-terrorism experts. It was officially
launched in December 2002.6
Among other initiatives to provide information to utilities, notices were
distributed to utilities and local law enforcement officials on measures they could
take immediately to improve security. Also, EPA sent several notices to utilities
outlining available resources and providing advice on monitoring and treatment.
Also, names of individuals who are on the FBI’s watch lists were sent to utilities.
Vulnerability Assessment Training and Technical Assistance.
Among water utilities, concerns over the security of facilities and supplies had been
increasing in recent years. In response to these concerns, the American Water Works
Association Research Foundation (AWWARF) initiated a project in June 2000 with
the Department of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories to develop a vulnerability
assessment methodology for utilities to use to assess vulnerabilities and develop plans
to minimize identified risks. The original deadline for completing the vulnerability
assessment methodology was Spring 2002; however, after the attacks of September
11, the project was expedited and completed in November 2001.
With EPA support, the American Water Works Association (AWWA) has
offered workshops and training for water utilities on a wide range of security topics,
including risk and vulnerability assessment, emergency response planning, and risk
communication. This training has included workshops based on the vulnerability
assessment methodology developed by Sandia National Laboratories which has
enabled a number of large water utilities to acquire tools to evaluate their security and
improve the preparedness of their water systems against intentional acts or emergency
events.7
Additionally, EPA has used funds provided in the FY2002 emergency
supplemental appropriations (P.L. 107-117) to provide vulnerability assessment
training to many other utilities during 2002. This training initially has been directed
to the community water systems that serve 100,000 or more people. EPA’s goal was,
that by the end of FY2002, most of these large systems would have completed their
assessments and have begun taking remedial action and enhancing their emergency
response plans. Under the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188), enacted in
June 2002, these largest systems now are required to complete vulnerability
assessments by March 31, 2003. (See further discussion in funding and congressional
sections below.)
EPA also has worked with states, tribes, and utility organizations to provide
technical assistance to utilities on security matters. In April 2002, EPA issued model
emergency response guidelines to provide uniform response, recovery and
remediation guidance for water utility actions in response to man-made or
technological emergencies. In addition to describing minimum actions that EPA
recommends be carried out by water utilities for various described events, the
6For further information on the Water ISAC, see [http://www.waterisac.org].
7For more information, see the American Water Works Association Research Foundation
Web site at [http://www.awwarf.com/press/security.pdf].

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guidance document also identifies federal responsibilities and capabilities that can
support local response efforts.8 In July 2002, EPA issued a water security strategy for
systems serving fewer than 100,000 persons.9 In June, the Association of State
Drinking Water Administrators and the National Rural Water Association, in
collaboration with EPA, published a security vulnerability self-assessment guide for
small drinking water systems (serving fewer than 3,300 people). A similar guide was
issued in November 2002 for systems serving population between 3,300 and 10,000.
Funding for Security Improvements. In the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-117), EPA received roughly $90 million
that could be used for drinking water vulnerability assessments. Congress provided
another $5 million for state grants for counter-terrorism coordinators to work with
EPA and water utilities in assessing drinking water safety.
During FY2002, EPA allocated roughly $89 million of the amount provided in
the emergency supplemental appropriation to support security enhancements at the
nation’s drinking water systems. Of this amount, EPA planned to use approximately
$80 million to (1) provide grants to the largest drinking water systems to conduct
vulnerability assessments and enhance emergency response plans; (2) provide
technical assistance on vulnerability assessments and emergency response plans to
small and medium drinking water systems; and (3) refine security-related detection,
monitoring, and treatment tools. EPA targeted another $4 million to: accelerate the
development and testing of counter-terrorism tools; support training for the
development of vulnerability assessments; provide technical assistance; and conduct,
test, and implement research on redesign and detection for collection and treatment
systems. EPA also used funds to develop tools and provide training for medium and
small drinking water systems to assess vulnerabilities and develop emergency
response plans. Additionally, EPA planned to provide $5 million to the states to
support homeland security coordination work involving EPA and drinking water
utilities. 10
Since June 2002, EPA has awarded more than $51 million in water security
grants to 449 large community water systems (i.e., systems serving more than
100,000 individuals). EPA has made grants for vulnerability assessments and other
security planning to publicly and privately owned community water systems for as
much as $115,000 per grant. According to EPA,
grant monies may be used to develop a vulnerability assessment, emergency
response/operating plan, security enhancement plans and designs, or a
8U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Guidance for Water Utility Response, Recovery &
Remediation Actions for Man-Made and/or Technological Emergencies
. EPA 810-R-02-
001. April 2002. Available at [http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security].
9U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Water Security Strategy for Systems Serving
Populations Less Than 100,000/15 MGD or Less
(for drinking water utilities and for
wastewater utilities treating 1,500 million gallons per day (MGD) or less). Available at
[http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/index.html].
10Environmental Protection Agency. FY2003 Annual Performance Plan and Congressional
Justification.
Special Analyses: Homeland Security, p. SA-15, SA-16.

CRS-5
combination of the efforts. Utilities may use grant funds for in-house or
contractor support, assuming demonstration of qualifications. ... Funds awarded
under this program may not be used for physical improvements.11
Although these grants have been made only to large systems, EPA has worked
with states and utilities to determine the best ways to meet the security needs of small
and medium-sized drinking water systems. EPA has provided roughly $21 million of
FY2002 supplemental funds for technical assistance and training for drinking water
systems serving fewer than 100,000 people.
In addition to the above resources, EPA has identified numerous security
measures that are eligible for funding through the Drinking Water State Revolving
Fund (DWSRF) program.12 Examples of eligible measures include vulnerability
assessments, contingency plans, and various facility improvements. Congress
approved $850 million for this program for FY2002. However, it is uncertain how
readily funds might become available for security measures, as the key purpose of the
DWSRF is to facilitate compliance with federal drinking water regulations, and
because it can take years for a public water system to receive funding through this
infrastructure program.13 14
For FY2003, EPA requested $16.9 million to conduct additional drinking water
vulnerability assessments for small and medium-sized systems, and $5 million in
grants to states to support homeland security coordination.
Research. The FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriation provided
funds for research and development activities related to homeland security. EPA has
used some of these resources to evaluate the performance of drinking water treatment
systems for their ability to remove and inactivate biological and chemical warfare
agents. Additionally, EPA has supported research projects on other security-related
11For a list of communities that have received grants, see Large Drinking Water Utilities
Awarded Security Grants
at [http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/large_grants/list.html].
12For more information, see EPA fact sheet, Use of the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund
(DWSRF) to Implement Security Measures at Public Water Systems
. EPA 816-F-02-040.
November 2001. Available at [http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwsrf/security-fs.pdf].
13For information on the DWSRF program, see CRS Report 97-677, Safe Drinking Water
Act: State Revolving Fund Program.

14Another potential source of funding for community water systems to enhance security may
be through the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Utility Service (RUS), Water and
Environmental Programs. These programs provide grants, loans, and loan guarantees for
water and waste disposal projects (i.e., drinking water, sanitary sewer, solid waste, and
storm drainage facilities) for communities of 10,000 or fewer individuals. According to RUS
officials, funds provided for community water system projects could be used to improve the
security of those systems. For FY2002, the RUS has available for the Water and
Environmental Programs approximately $586 million for grants, $836 million in direct loan
authority, and $75 million in guaranteed loan authority. In addition to these funds, Congress
provided in the 2002 Farm Bill (P.L. 107-171) $360 million to fund water and waste
disposal applications that were pending on the date of Farm Bill’s enactment, May 13, 2002.
The entire amount is mandatory funding that does not require an appropriation, and it is to
remain available until expended.

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matters. Projects have included research on “river spill” and “pipeline” models to
determine the fate and transport of contaminants within rivers and streams and within
water treatment plants and distribution systems, and research to develop biodetectors
for detecting and quantifying biological contaminants in drinking water supplies.15
Relatedly, EPA has been working with the Department of Defense (DOD), the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the FBI, and the Food and Drug
Administration to develop information for the Homeland Security Office on
biological, chemical, and radiological contaminants, and how to respond to their
presence in drinking water. This effort is intended to expand the state of knowledge
on: technologies to detect contaminants, monitoring protocols and techniques, and
treatment effectiveness.
In support of the President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, EPA
issued the Agency’s Strategic Plan for Homeland Security in September 2002.
Regarding drinking water research, the plan generally incorporates the research
requirements of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (outlined below). Specifically, the
plan states that EPA will work with the Department of Homeland Security, other
federal agencies, universities, and the private sector to (1) review methods to prevent,
detect and respond to chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants that could
be intentionally introduced in drinking water systems; (2) review methods and means
by which terrorists could disrupt the supply of safe drinking water; and (3) review
methods and means by which alternative supplies of drinking water could be
provided in the event of a disruption. (The full text of this Agency-wide strategic
plan is available at [http://www.epa.gov/epahome/headline_100202.htm].
Congressional Actions to Enhance Drinking Water Security
The 107th Congress held multiple hearings to examine security issues facing the
water infrastructure sector and acted on several bills to improve drinking water
security. The bills ranged from requiring utilities to assess and reduce vulnerabilities,
to providing assistance to utilities for security enhancements, to establishing research
programs to improve utilities’ ability to prevent, mitigate, and respond to attacks.
Selected bills are discussed below. (Table 1 on page 10 outlines drinking water
security provisions in bills enacted in the 107th Congress.)
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-117,
H.R. 3338), enacted January 10, 2002, provided EPA with $175.6 million for
emergency expenses to respond to the September 11 attacks and to support counter-
terrorism activities. The accompanying conference report, H.Rept. 107-350, specified
that roughly $90 million was intended to be used to improve security at EPA
laboratories, to perform drinking water vulnerability assessments, and for anthrax
decontamination activities. Another $5 million was for state grants for counter-
15Statement of Marianne Horinko, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before the Subcommittee on
Water Resources and Environment of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
October 10, 2001.

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terrorism coordinators to work with EPA and water utilities in assessing drinking
water safety.
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act. On June 12, the President signed into law
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-188, H.Rept. 107-481). The House-passed version of the bill contained
drinking water security provisions, and the final act expanded on these provisions,
including elements of Senate bills on water security research and preparedness.
Title IV of the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act amended the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) to require each community water system serving more than 3,300
individuals to conduct an assessment of the system’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks
or other intentional acts to disrupt the provision of a safe and reliable drinking water
supply. The law establishes deadlines, based on system size, for community water
systems to certify to EPA that they have conducted a vulnerability assessment and to
submit to EPA a copy of the assessment. Certifications and submissions must be
made before:
! March 31, 2003 by systems serving 100,000 or more persons;
! December 31, 2003 by systems serving 50,000 or more but fewer than 100,000
persons; and
! June 30, 2004 by systems serving more than 3,300 but fewer than 50,000
persons.
The Act exempts the contents of the vulnerability assessments from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act (except for information contained in the
certification identifying the system and the date of the certification). The law
required EPA to develop protocols to protect the assessments from unauthorized
disclosure, and provides for civil and criminal penalties for inappropriate disclosure
of information by government officials.
Additionally, the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act requires each community water
system serving more than 3,300 individuals to prepare or revise an emergency
response plan incorporating the results of the vulnerability assessment. EPA is
required to provide guidance to smaller systems on how to conduct vulnerability
assessments, prepare emergency response plans, and address threats.16

The Act authorized $160 million for FY2002 to provide financial assistance to
community water systems to conduct vulnerability assessments, to prepare response
plans, and for expenses and contracts to address basic security enhancements and
significant threats. (Security enhancements may include purchase and installation of
intruder detection equipment and lighting, enhancing security of automated systems,
personnel training and security screening of employees or contractors, etc. Funding
may not be used for personnel costs, plant operations, monitoring or maintenance.)
16In July, 2002, EPA published Water Security Strategy for Systems Serving Populations
Less than 100,000/15MGD or Less
. Available at Internet Web site
[http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/med-small-strategy.pdf].

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Also for FY2002, the Act authorized $35 million for EPA to make grants to
states and water systems to assist in responding to emergency situations, and $15
million for EPA to review methods by which terrorists or others could disrupt the
provision of safe water supplies, and methods for preventing, detecting, and
responding to such disruptions.17
Related legislation. The House and Senate acted on several other bills
focused specifically on water security. Senate-passed S. 1608 (S.Rept. 107-119)
would have directed EPA to provide funds to states to use in awarding grants to
drinking water and wastewater facilities to meet immediate security needs (several
of the specified activities were incorporated into the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act).
Two other bills addressed concerns over gaps in water security research: House-
passed H.R. 3178; and S. 1593, reported by the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee (S.Rept. 107-118). These similar bills proposed to establish grant
programs to support research and development projects for the security of drinking
water and wastewater infrastructure.18 Elements of these bills also were incorporated
into P.L. 107-188.
Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Homeland Security
proposal announced by the Bush Administration on June 6, 200219 envisioned a
Department that, among other things, would be responsible for “comprehensively
evaluating the vulnerabilities of America’s critical infrastructure,” including water
systems. Under “Critical Infrastructure Protection,” the proposal discussed a national
effort to secure America’s critical infrastructure sectors by building and maintaining
a “comprehensive assessment” of these sectors. As proposed, the Department would
analyze threats, direct or coordinate action to protect vulnerable systems, and would
“establish policy for standardized, tiered protective measures tailored to the target and
rapidly adjusted to the threat.”
After months of congressional deliberations and various modifications to the
original proposal, President Bush signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296, H.R. 5005) on November 25, 2002.(For further discussion, see CRS
Report RL31493, Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management.)
The Homeland Security Act does not transfer EPA water security functions to
the new Department of Homeland Security, and water infrastructure is not
specifically mentioned. Section 2 of the Act states that the term “critical
infrastructure” has the meaning given the term in section 1016(e) of the Patriot Act
(P.L. 107-56). This provision defines critical infrastructure to mean,
17For a detailed discussion of the entire Act and a chronology of bioterrorism hearings, see
CRS Report RL31263, Bioterrorism: Legislation to Improve Public Health Preparedness
and Response Capacity.

18For a broad discussion of security-related water research issues and needs, see: H.R. 3178
and the Development of Anti-Terrorism Tools for Water Infrastructure
. Hearing before the
Committee on Science, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 1st session. Serial No.
107-29. 2001. Available at [http://www.house.gov/science].
19[http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect1.html].

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systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination of those matters.
The Act establishes a Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection to be headed by an undersecretary, and to include an Assistant Secretary
for Information Analysis and an Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection. The
responsibilities of the undersecretary include:
! receiving, analyzing, and integrating law enforcement, intelligence and other
information to identify and assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to
the United States;
! assessing vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructure;
integrating information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments to identify
priorities for protective and support measures;
! ensuring timely access by the Department to all necessary information; and
! developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and
critical infrastructure of the United States.
Drinking water utilities are already assessing vulnerabilities and sharing
information through their own initiative and under the Bioterrorism Act; thus, it
remains to be seen how drinking water infrastructure will be categorized for purposes
of implementing the Homeland Security Act. It appears likely that, at a minimum,
EPA will be sharing information and coordinating with the new Department. The
Agency’s specific responsibilities and relationship with the Department are likely to
evolve over time. In the meantime, the Bioterrorism Act has given EPA new
authority to pursue its efforts to assist states, communities, and private suppliers in
enhancing the security of drinking water supplies and systems.

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Table 1. Drinking Water Security Bills Enacted in the 107th Congress
Bill Key
Provisions
Funding
P.L. 107-117
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002. Division B authorizes appropriations to
$175.6 million for FY2002
(H.R. 3338),
EPA for emergency expenses to respond to 9/11 attacks and to support counter-terrorism activities,
including:
Division B
including:
Science and Technology Account: to assess and improve building security at EPA laboratory sites, to
$90.3 million
perform drinking water vulnerability assessments, and for anthrax decontamination.
State and Tribal Assistance Grants: for counter-terrorism coordinators to work with EPA and water
$5 million
utilities in assessing drinking water safety.
Environmental Programs and Management Account: for planning manuals for wastewater treatment
$39 million
plants, anthrax decontamination, personnel, etc.
Hazardous Substance Superfund Account: for a West Coast “Immediate Response Team, anthrax
$41.3 million
cleanup and reimbursement, personnel, etc.
P.L. 107-188
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.
$160 million for FY2002, and such
(H.R. 3448)
Title IV of this comprehensive bioterrorism legislation amends the Safe Drinking Water Act to
sums as may be necessary for
Title IV
require community water systems serving more than 3,300 individuals to conduct vulnerability
FY2003-FY2005 for these activities
assessments and to prepare emergency response plans. Utilities must submit assessments to EPA;
the information they contain is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Authorizes EPA, in
coordination with state and local governments, to provide financial assistance to these systems for
conducting assessments and preparing response plans, and for expenses to address basic security
enhancements and significant threats. EPA must provide guidance for smaller systems on how to
conduct vulnerability assessments, prepare response plans, and address threats to water supplies.
$5 million of the funds made available may be used to make grants to systems to assist in responding
to any vulnerability that EPA determines presents an urgent security need;
Another $5 million may be used for security activities for systems serving fewer than 3,300 persons.

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Bill Key
Provisions
Funding
P.L. 107-188
Authorizes EPA to provide technical assistance and to make grants to states and public water
$35 million for FY2002 and such
Title IV
systems to assist in responding to and alleviating emergency situations.
sums as necessary thereafter
Directs EPA, with the Centers for Disease Control, to review (directly or through contracts or
$15 million for FY2002 and such
cooperative agreements) methods and means to prevent, detect and respond to the intentional
sums as necessary for FY2003-
introduction of chemical, biological or radiological contaminants into community water systems and
FY2005
source waters. The review must include methods to detect contaminants, to provide sufficient notice
of contamination, to prevent the flow of contaminated drinking water, to negate or mitigate adverse
effects on public health, to develop educational and awareness programs for community water
systems, and to conduct biomedical research. Requires EPA to share the information developed, as
appropriate, through the Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). EPA also must, in
coordination with other federal departments and agencies, review methods by which terrorists or
others could disrupt the supply of safe drinking water or render a public water supply unsafe,
including methods and means by which water systems could be destroyed, impaired, or made subject
to cross-contamination, or by which information systems, including process controls and computer
systems could be disrupted. EPA must also review methods to reasonably protect systems from
attacks, and to provide alternative drinking water supplies.
Specifies that EPA’s emergency powers under SDWA include authority to act when there is a
threatened or potential terrorist attack or other intentional act to disrupt a water supply.
Increases criminal and civil penalties for tampering, or threatening to tamper, with public water
supplies.