Order Code IB94041
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Pakistan-U.S. Relations
Updated December 11, 2002
K. Alan Kronstadt
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Pakistan-India Rivalry
The China Factor
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments
Background
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts
Kashmir Dispute
Congressional Action
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation
Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts
Human Rights Problems
Economic Issues
Overview
Trade Issues
Narcotics
Terrorism


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Pakistan-U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Major areas of U.S. concern in Pakistan
Separatist violence in the Kashmir region
include the proliferation of weapons of mass
continues. India blames Pakistan for the
destruction; counter-terrorism; settlement of
ongoing infiltration of Islamic militants into
the Kashmir dispute; democratization and
Indian Kashmir, a charge that Islamabad
human rights; and economic reform and de-
denies. The United States has received a
velopment. A potential Pakistan-India nuclear
pledge from the Musharraf government that
arms race continues to be the focus of U.S.
all “cross-border terrorism” in the region will
nonproliferation efforts in South Asia and a
be ended.
central issue in U.S. relations with both coun-
tries. This attention intensified following
The United States considers a stable,
nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in
democratic, economically thriving Pakistan as
May 1998. South Asia is viewed by some
key to U.S. interests in South, Central, and
observers as a likely prospect for use of such
West Asia. Although ruled by military re-
weapons, where both countries have deployed
gimes for half of its existence, Pakistan had
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. India and
democratically elected governments from
Pakistan have fought three full-scale wars
1988 to 1999. During that period, Benazir
since 1947.
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served twice as

prime minister. Neither leader served a full
Pakistan-U.S. cooperation began in the
term, being dismissed by the president under
mid-1950s as a security arrangement growing
constitutional provisions that have been used
from U.S. concerns about Soviet expansion-
to dismiss four governments since 1985.
ism and Pakistan’s fear of neighboring India.

Cooperation peaked during the 1979-89 So-
In October 1999, the government of
viet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan-U.S.
Prime Minister Sharif was ousted in a blood-
ties weakened following the October 1990
less coup led by Chief of Army Staff Gen.
cutoff of U.S. aid and arms sales, which were
Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf has since as-
suspended by President Bush under Section
sumed the title of President, a move ostensibly
620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act (the
legitimized by a controversial April 2002
so-called Pressler Amendment). Further U.S.
referendum. The United States has strongly
sanctions were imposed on Pakistan (and
urged the Pakistan military government to
India) as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests.
restore the country to civilian democratic rule.
National elections held in October 2002 re-
The see-saw Pakistan-U.S. relationship
sulted in no clear majority party emerging and
has been on the upswing following Pakistan’s
were marked by significant gains for a coali-
enlistment as a frontline state in the U.S.-led
tion of Islamic parties. Pakistan continues to
anti-terror efforts resulting from the Septem-
face many serious problems, including a
ber 2001 attacks on the United States.
beleaguered economy, corruption, terrorism,
Nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan and
and poor governance. Pakistan will receive
India have been waived; Congress also has
well over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance
given the President authority to waive coup-
and several billion dollars from international
related sanctions on Pakistan. Islamabad
organizations to help strengthen the country as
continues to make important contributions to
a strategically important state.
U.S.-led anti-terror operations in the region.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 21, six weeks after Pakistan held its first national elections since an
October 1999 military coup, veteran politician Mir Zafarullah Jamali was elected Prime
Minister by a fragile coalition of pro-military parties. Jamali is expected to maintain the
fundamental foreign and economic policies of President Musharraf. A coalition of Islamic
parties won a surprisingly large number of votes after running on what largely was an anti-
American platform.

Tensions between Pakistan and India are somewhat subsided since the heightened
acrimony of the past spring. Both countries have announced the redeployment to peacetime
barracks of hundreds of thousands of troops that faced off at the Pakistan-India frontier for
10 months. Reported infiltrations of separatist militants into Indian-held Kashmir continue,
but appear to have stabilized at moderate – if still unacceptable – levels. These movements
may be taking place with the active support of Pakistan’s intelligence service. President
Musharraf continues to deny any Pakistani role in such “cross-border terrorism.”

November press reports indicated that Pakistan provided nuclear weapons-related
technologies to North Korea beginning in the late 1990s and continuing through July 2002.
Islamabad denies that any such transfers have occurred.
The reports have spurred some
Members of Congress to seek a renewal of proliferation-related aid restrictions on Pakistan.

In November, U.S. Treasury Secretary O’Neill visited Islamabad where he praised
Pakistan’s role in the anti-terror campaign, vowed to increase U.S. assistance to the country,
and encouraged continued economic reforms by the Pakistan government. In December,
U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with top Pakistani officials to discuss a
range of bilateral issues. The meetings marked the opening dialogue between the United
States and Pakistan’s new civilian government.

Also in November, Pakistani national Aimal Kansi was executed in Virginia for two
murders committed outside the CIA headquarters in 1993. Thousands of Pakistanis, many
chanting anti-American slogans, attended Kansi’s funeral in a western province where
Islamist politicians are vowing to halt all U.S.-led efforts to track and capture Al Qaeda and
Taliban fugitives.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
The long and checkered Pakistan-U.S. relationship has its roots in the Cold War and
South Asia regional politics of the 1950s. U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism and
Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted the
two countries to negotiate a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954. By the end of
1955, Pakistan had further aligned itself with the West by joining two regional defense pacts,
the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. As a result
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of these alliances and a 1959 U.S.-Pakistan cooperation agreement, Islamabad received more
than $700 million in military grant aid from 1955 to 1965. U.S. economic aid to Pakistan
between 1951 and 1982 totaled more than $5 billion.
Differing expectations of the security relationship have long bedeviled bilateral ties.
During the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971, the United States suspended military
assistance to both sides, resulting in a cooling of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship. In the
mid-1970s, new strains arose over Pakistan’s apparent efforts to respond to India’s 1974
underground test of a nuclear device by seeking its own nuclear weapons capability. Limited
U.S. military aid was resumed in 1975, but was suspended again by the Carter
Administration in April 1979 in response to Pakistan’s covert construction of a uranium
enrichment facility.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan was again
viewed as a frontline state in the effort to block Soviet expansionism. In September 1981,
the Reagan Administration negotiated a $3.2 billion, 5-year economic and military aid
package with Islamabad. Pakistan became a key transit country for arms supplies to the
Afghan resistance, as well as a camp for some three million Afghan refugees, many of whom
have yet to return home.
Despite the renewal of U.S. aid and close security ties, many in Congress remained
concerned about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Concern was based in part on
evidence of U.S. export control violations that suggested a crash Pakistani program to
acquire a nuclear capability. In 1985, Section 620E(e) (the “Pressler amendment”) was
added to the Foreign Assistance Act, requiring the President to certify to Congress that
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device during the fiscal year for which aid is
to be provided. This amendment represented a compromise between those in Congress who
thought that aid to Pakistan should be cut off because of evidence that it was continuing to
develop its nuclear option and those who favored continued support for Pakistan’s role in
opposing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A $4 billion, 6-year aid package for Pakistan
was signed in 1986.
With Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May 1988, Pakistan’s nuclear
activities again came under closer U.S. scrutiny, and in October 1990 President Bush
suspended aid to Pakistan. Under the provisions of the Pressler amendment, most economic
and all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major military equipment
suspended. Narcotics assistance of $3-5 million annually was exempted from the aid cutoff.
In 1992, Congress partially relaxed the scope of the aid cutoff to allow for P.L.480 food
assistance and continuing support for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
One of the most serious results of the aid cutoff for Pakistan was the nondelivery of
some 71 F-16 fighter aircraft ordered by Pakistan in 1989. In December 1998, the United
States agreed to pay Pakistan $324.6 million from the Judgment Fund of the U.S. Treasury
– a fund used to settle legal disputes that involve the U.S. government – as well as provide
Pakistan with $140 million in goods, including agricultural commodities.
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Pakistan-India Rivalry
Three wars – in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 – and a constant state of military preparedness
on both sides of the border have marked the half-century of bitter rivalry between India and
Pakistan. The acrimonious nature of the partition of British India into two successor states
in 1947 and the continuing dispute over Kashmir have been major sources of tension. Both
Pakistan and India have built large defense establishments at the cost of economic and social
development. The Kashmir problem is rooted in claims by both countries to the former
princely state, divided since 1948 by a military line of control into the Indian state of Jammu
and Kashmir and Pakistan-held Azad (Free) Kashmir. India blames Pakistan for supporting
a separatist rebellion raging in the Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley that has claimed more
than 60,000 lives since 1989. Pakistan admits only to lending moral and political support
to the rebellion, while accusing India of creating dissension in Pakistan’s Sindh province (for
further discussion see below).
The China Factor
India and China fought a brief border war in 1962, and an oftentimes tense border
dispute remains unresolved. A strategic rivalry also exists between these two large nations.
Pakistan and China, on the other hand, have enjoyed a generally close and mutually
beneficial relationship over recent decades. Pakistan served as a link between Beijing and
Washington in 1971, as well as a bridge to the Muslim world for China during the 1980s.
China’s continuing role as a major arms supplier for Pakistan began in the 1960s, and
included helping to build a number of arms factories in Pakistan, as well as supplying
complete weapons systems. In September 1990, China agreed to supply Pakistan with
components for M-11 surface-to-surface missiles, which brought warnings from the United
States. Although it is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
China repeatedly has agreed to abide by the restrictions of the regime. In August 1993, the
United States determined that China had transferred to Pakistan prohibited missile
technology and imposed trade sanctions on one Pakistani and 11 Chinese entities
(government ministries and aerospace companies) for 2 years. The U.S. intelligence
community reportedly has evidence of PRC provision of complete M-11 ballistic missiles
to Pakistan. In February 1996, leaked U.S. intelligence reports alleged that in 1995 China
sold ring magnets to Pakistan that could be used in enriching uranium for nuclear weapons.
Pakistan denied the reports (for more on China-Pakistan technology transfers, see CRS
Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:
Policy Issues
, by Shirley Kan).
Pakistan Political Setting
Recent Developments. On April 30, 2002, Pakistanis went to the polls in a national
referendum to extend President Musharraf’s term by 5 years. The referendum question was,
“For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of
reforms ... would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as president of
Pakistan for five years?” The president won 98% of the vote from an officially reported 50%
voter turnout. A coalition of political parties that are opposed to the military government
claimed that turnout was closer to 5% and denounced the referendum as fraudulent. Post-
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referendum protestations were such that within weeks President Musharraf publically
acknowledged and apologized for irregularities in the voting.
On August 21, 2002, Musharraf’s government announced sweeping changes in the
Pakistani constitution, changes that would provide the office of President and the armed
forces with amounts of power previously unseen in the country’s constitutional history.
These amendments would include provisions for Presidential dissolution of the National
Assembly, and appointment of the Army Chief and provincial governors, among others. The
Supreme Court recently upheld a provision requiring all candidates for National Assembly
seats to be college graduates. This amendment disqualifies more than 98% of all Pakistanis
(and more than half of the politicians who served in the last parliament) from holding
national office, and made it difficult for opposition parties to field many of their preferred
candidates in the 2002 national elections.
On October 10, 2002, the country held its first national elections since 1997, thus
fulfilling in a limited fashion Musharraf’s promise to restore the National Assembly that was
dissolved in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999.
Opposition parties contesting the elections – along with European Union observers – have
complained that the exercise was “flawed” and that the military government’s pre-poll
machinations skewed the results. No party won a majority of parliamentary seats, though a
pro-government alliance won a plurality while a coalition of Islamist parties made a
surprisingly strong showing. Low turnout rates caused many to identify significant levels of
voter apathy with regard to Pakistan’s electoral politics.
After more than five weeks of intensive maneuvering and several delays, the new
National Assembly finally met on November 16, 2002, and five days later Musharraf
supporter and former Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali was elected to serve
as Pakistan’s Prime Minster. Musharraf has pledged to turn day-to-day rule of the country
over to the civilian leadership. Most analysts believe that the current pro-Musharraf
coalition, while fragile and potentially unstable, likely will mean continuity in Islamabad’s
economic and foreign policy orientations (see CRS Report RS 21299, Pakistan’s Domestic
Political Developments
, by Alan Kronstadt).
In an unexpected turn of the October elections, the United Action Forum (known as
MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition of six Islamic parties, won 60 seats – nearly
18% of the total – in the national assembly and now controls the provincial assembly in the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and has considerable influence in that of Baluchistan.
These provinces are Pashtun-majority regions that border Afghanistan and where vital U.S.
anti-terror operations are ongoing. This result has led to concerns that a major shift in
Pakistan’s foreign policy may be in the offing, most especially with renewed indications of
the “Talibanization” of western border regions.
There also has been a gradual easing of pressure on Islamic fundamentalist groups in
Pakistan since President Musharraf’s January 2002 speech vowing to halt terrorist activities
on Pakistani soil. The leader of the pro-Taliban Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam was released from
prison, while the head of the banned terrorist organization Jaish-e-Mohammad was released
from prison and placed under house arrest. On Pakistan’s national day in August 2002, the
Jamaat-i-Islami was allowed to hold a public gathering in Rawalpindi, seat of the army’s
General Headquarters. Leaders and activists of the moderate and secular Alliance for the
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Restoration of Democracy were arrested in Lahore when they tried to exercise their right of
association. In November 2002, the founder of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba – a group
designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government – was released from a Pakistani
prison and has vowed to continue the “holy war” in Kashmir.
Changes have also taken place in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. In an effort to assuage
international concerns, President Musharraf has moved away from direct support of the
banned Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba groups. Instead, it is expected that he will
call for the people of Kashmir to determine their own future without the support of the
Pakistan-based Islamic jihadi network. A recent meeting in Azad Kashmir reflects
Pakistan’s changing Kashmir policy: the meeting was attended by the All-Parties Hurriyat
Conference (an umbrella organization of 23 separatist groups), leading Kashmiri
intellectuals, and three Pakistani brigadiers. Participants concluded that the policies of
Kashmir fighters should represent Kashmiri interests rather than those of Pakistan.
Moreover, recent state elections in India’s Jammu and Kashmir resulted in the unseating of
that state’s long-ruling National Conference party, a development viewed by many as
strengthening New Delhi’s argument that the state’s voters were able to express themselves
freely despite separatist attempts to stain the process through threats and violence. Islamabad
denies any legitimacy to the Kashmir elections and continues to insist that the people of the
region be allowed to vote in a plebiscite under U.N. auspices.
Background. Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of its 55 years
in existence, interspersed with periods of generally weak civilian governance. After 1988,
Pakistan had democratically elected governments, and the army appeared to have moved
from its traditional role of power wielder or kingmaker to one of power broker or referee.
During the past decade, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif each served twice as prime
minister. Bhutto was elected prime minister in October 1988, following the death of military
ruler Mohammad Zia-ul Haq in a plane crash. General Zia had led a coup in 1977 deposing
Bhutto’s father, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was later executed. Despite the
restoration of democratic process to Pakistan in 1988, the succeeding years were marred by
political instability, economic problems, and ethnic and sectarian violence. In August 1990,
President Ishaq Khan dismissed Bhutto for alleged corruption and inability to maintain law
and order. The president’s power to dismiss the prime minister derived from Eighth
Amendment provisions of the Pakistan constitution, which dated from the era of Zia’s
presidency.
Elections held in October 1990 brought to power Nawaz Sharif, who himself was ousted
in 1993 under the Eighth Amendment provisions. The 1993 elections returned Bhutto and
the PPP to power. The new Bhutto government faced serious economic problems and,
according to some observers, performance also was hampered by the reemergence of
Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, in a decisionmaking role. In November 1996, President
Farooq Leghari dismissed the Bhutto government for “corruption, nepotism, and violation
of rules in the administration of the affairs of the Government,” and scheduled new elections
for February 1997.
Nawaz Sharif’s PML won a landslide victory in the February 1997 parliamentary
elections, which, despite low voter turnout, were judged by international observers to be
generally free and fair. Sharif moved quickly to consolidate his power by curtailing the
powers of the President and the judiciary. In April 1997, the Parliament passed the
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Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution, deleting the President’s former Eighth
Amendment powers to dismiss the government and to appoint armed forces chiefs and
provincial governors. The new amendment was passed unanimously by both houses of
parliament and signed by President Leghari. As the result of a power struggle, Sharif
replaced the Supreme Court Chief Justice in November; Leghari resigned; and Sharif chose
Mohammad Rafiq Tarar as president. As a result of these developments and the PML
control of the Parliament, Nawaz Sharif emerged as one of Pakistan’s strongest elected
leaders since independence. Critics accused him of further consolidating his power by
intimidating the opposition and the press. In April 1999, a two-judge Bench of the Lahore
High Court convicted former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband of corruption
and sentenced them each to 5 years in prison, fined them $8.6 million, and disqualified them
from holding public office. Bhutto was out of the country at the time. Some analysts believe
that Sharif acted out “political vindictiveness.” In April 2001, the Pakistan Supreme Court
ruled that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s 1999 conviction for corruption was biased
and ordered a retrial.
Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including nuclear
weapons and missile proliferation; South Asian regional stability; democratization and
human rights; economic reform and market opening; and efforts to counter terrorism and
narcotics traffic. These concerns have been affected by several developments in recent years,
including: 1) the cutoff of U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, 1998, and 1999 over nuclear and
democracy issues; 2) India and Pakistan’s worsening relationship over Kashmir since 1989
and their continuing nuclear standoff; 3) Pakistan’s halting attempts to develop a stable
democratic government and strong economy in the post-cold war era; and, most recently, 4)
the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.
The Bush Administration has identified exiled Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who
had long been harbored by the Taliban government in Afghanistan, as the prime suspect in
the terrorist attacks on the United States. On September 13, 2001, President Musharraf –
under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure – offered President Bush Pakistan’s “unstinted
cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Because of its shared border with Afghanistan
and former close ties with the Taliban, Pakistan is considered key to U.S.-led efforts to
combat terrorism in the region. The Taliban and bin Laden enjoy strong support among a
substantial percentage of the Pakistan population, who share not only conservative Islamic
views but also ethnic and cultural ties with Afghanistan. A major issue facing the
Administration is how to make use of Pakistan’s support – including for military operations
in Afghanistan – without seriously destabilizing an already fragile state that has nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles.
In an effort to shore up the Musharraf government, sanctions relating to Pakistan’s (and
India’s) 1998 nuclear tests and Pakistan’s 1999 military coup were waived in September and
October of last year. In October 2001, a State Department official pledged well over one
billion dollars in U.S. assistance for Pakistan and several billion dollars from international
organizations to help strengthen it as a key member of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.
Direct assistance programs will include aid for health, education, food, democracy
promotion, child labor elimination, counter-narcotics, border security and law enforcement,
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as well as trade preference benefits. The United States also has supported grant, loan, and
debt rescheduling programs for Pakistan by the various international financial institutions,
including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank. In
addition, Pakistan has received promises of substantial aid, debt relief, and trade concessions
from Japan and the European Union in recognition of its support for the international anti-
terrorism coalition. Japan, Pakistan’s largest bilateral aid donor, announced on October 26,
2001, that it was suspending sanctions imposed on Pakistan and India following their 1998
nuclear tests.
On September 12, 2002, President Bush met with President Musharraf in New York
City, after both leaders had addressed the U.N. General Assembly. The U.S. President
reportedly urged his Pakistani counterpart to ensure that his government take all necessary
steps to end the movement of militants into Indian-controlled Kashmir, and also to see that
the country remain on the path to full democracy.
Security
Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation. U.S. policy analysts consider the
apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect
for the future use of nuclear weapons. India conducted its first, and only, previous nuclear
test in May 1974, following which it maintained ambiguity about the status of its nuclear
program. Pakistan probably gained a nuclear weapons capability sometime in the 1980s.
India is believed to have enough fissile material for 75 or more nuclear weapons. Pakistan
may have enough for 25 nuclear weapons. Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering
nuclear bombs. India has short-range missiles (Prithvi) and is reported to have inducted an
intermediate-range ballistic missile (Agni) with enough payload to carry a nuclear warhead.
Pakistan reportedly has acquired technology and short-range missiles (Shaheen) from China
and medium-range missiles (Ghauri) from North Korea, both capable of carrying small
nuclear warheads.
November 2002 press reports suggest that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang’s covert nuclear
weapons program by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and
technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002. If such assistance is
confirmed by President Bush, all non-humanitarian U.S. aid to Pakistan may be suspended,
although the President has the authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would
jeopardize U.S. national security. Islamabad adamantly rejects as “baseless” such reports,
and Secretary of State Powell has been assured that no such transfers are occurring.
Proliferation in South Asia may be part of a chain of rivalries – India seeking to achieve
deterrence against China, and Pakistan seeking to gain an “equalizer” against a larger and
conventionally stronger India. India began its nuclear program in the mid-1960s, after its
1962 defeat in a short border war with China and China’s first nuclear test in 1964. Despite
a 1993 Sino-Indian troop reduction agreement and some easing of tensions, both nations
continue to deploy forces along their border. Pakistan’s nuclear program was prompted by
India’s 1974 nuclear test and by Pakistan’s defeat by India in the 1971 war and consequent
loss of East Pakistan, now independent Bangladesh.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, U.S. and Pakistani
officials have held talks on improving security and installing new safeguards on Pakistan’s
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nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. Fears that Pakistan could become destabilized
by the U.S. anti-terrorism war efforts in Afghanistan have heightened U.S. nuclear
proliferation concerns in South Asia. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a total of
five underground nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on nuclear
testing. Despite U.S. and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan followed, claiming five tests
on May 28, 1998, and an additional test on May 30. The unannounced tests created a global
storm of criticism, as well as a serious setback for two decades of U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation efforts in South Asia (see CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction
Measures for India and Pakistan
, by Sharon Squassoni and CRS Report RL30623, Nuclear
Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress
, by
Alan Kronstadt).
U.S. Nonproliferation Efforts. Neither India nor Pakistan are signatories to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
India has consistently rejected both treaties as discriminatory, calling instead for a global
nuclear disarmament regime. Pakistan traditionally has maintained that it will sign the NPT
and CTBT only when India does so. Aside from security concerns, the governments of both
countries are faced with the prestige factor attached to their nuclear programs and the
domestic unpopularity of giving them up. Following the 1998 tests, the United States set
forth five nonproliferation “benchmarks” for India and Pakistan. They include the following:
halt further nuclear testing and sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; halt
fissile material production and pursue Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refrain
from deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; restrict totally the exportation
of any nuclear materials or technologies; and take steps to reduce bilateral tensions,
especially on the issue of Kashmir.
In May 1998, following the South Asian nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed
economic and military sanctions on India and Pakistan as mandated under Section 102 of the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Humanitarian assistance, food, or other agricultural
commodities are exempted from sanctions under the law. In November 1998, the U.S.
Department of Commerce published a list of more than 300 Indian and Pakistani government
agencies and companies suspected of working on nuclear, missile, and other weapons
programs. Any U.S. exports to these entities required a Commerce Department license, and
most license requests reportedly were denied. On the one hand, Pakistan was less affected
than India by the sanctions, since most U.S. assistance to Pakistan had been cut off since
1990. On the other hand, Pakistan’s much smaller – and currently weaker – economy was
more vulnerable to the effects of the sanctions (see CRS Report RS20995, India and
Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions
, by Dianne Rennack).
Kashmir Dispute. The prospects for India-Pakistan detente suffered a severe setback
in May-July 1999, when the two countries teetered on the brink of their fourth war, once
again in Kashmir. In the worst fighting since 1971, Indian soldiers sought to dislodge some
700 Pakistan-supported infiltrators who were occupying fortified positions along mountain
ridges overlooking a supply route on the Indian side of the line of control (LOC) near Kargil.
Following a meeting between then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President
Clinton in Washington on July 4, 1999 the infiltrators withdrew across the LOC.

Tensions between India and Pakistan remained extremely high in the wake of the Kargil
conflict, which cost more than 1,100 lives. Throughout 2000-2002, intermittent cross-border
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firing and shelling has caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. India accuses
Pakistan of sending a flood of militants into Kashmir. Pakistan accuses India of human
rights violations in Kashmir. The United States strongly urged India and Pakistan to create
the proper climate for peace, respect the LOC, reject violence, and return to the Lahore peace
process. A six-month-long unilateral cease-fire and halt to offensive military operations in
Kashmir was undertaken by India in 2000-2001 and the Pakistani government responded by
announcing that its forces deployed along the LOC in Kashmir would observe maximum
restraint and that some of its troops would be pulled back. Kashmir’s main militant groups,
however, rejected the cease-fire as a fraud and continued to carry out attacks on military
personnel and government installations. As security forces conducted counter-operations,
deaths of Kashmiri civilians, militants, and Indian security forces continued to rise.
In May 2001, the Indian government announced that it was ending its unilateral cease-
fire in Kashmir but that Prime Minister Vajpayee would invite President Musharraf to India
for talks. The July summit talks in Agra between Musharraf and Vajpayee failed to produce
a joint communique, reportedly as a result of pressure from hardliners on both sides. Major
stumbling blocks were India’s refusal to acknowledge the “centrality of Kashmir” to future
talks and Pakistan’s objection to references to “cross-border terrorism.” According to Indian
government reports, more than 2,000 people have died since January 2001 as a result of the
fighting in Jammu and Kashmir state, including 618 civilians, 1,133 militants, and 228
security forces. According to Amnesty International, more than 1,100 people have
disappeared in Kashmir since the revolt began in 1989.
In October 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Pakistan and India in an
effort partly aimed at easing the escalating tensions over Kashmir. Yet a terrorist attack on
the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly during the same month was followed by a December
2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Both incidents were blamed on
Pakistan-based militant groups. The Indian government responded by mobilizing hundreds
of thousands of troops to forward stations along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatening
war unless Islamabad put an end to all cross-border infiltrations of Islamic militants. Under
significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India’s use of possibly massive
force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence of terrorist entities on
Pakistani soil and upwards of 2,000 radicals were jailed (many of these have since been
released).
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into Indian-held Kashmir continued, and a
May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women
and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and
caused Islamabad to recall army troops from both patrol operations along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border as well as from international peacekeeping operations. Pakistan also
tested three ballistic missiles in late-May 2002 – the intermediate range Ghauri and the short-
range Ghaznavi and Abdali – sending an implicit message to India that it would employ
nuclear weapons in a conflict.
A flurry of intensive diplomatic missions to South Asia appears to have reduced
tensions during the summer of 2002 and prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top U.S.
diplomats were involved in this effort. As of December 2002, both Pakistan and India are
in the process of redeploying their troops to peacetime barracks. The latter months of 2002
have seen an apparent reduction of militant infiltration across the line of control, though such
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movements are ongoing and may be taking place with the active support of Pakistani security
services. The U.S. government continues to strenuously urge the two countries to renew a
bilateral dialogue that has been moribund since the summer of 2001. New Delhi refuses to
engage such dialogue until it is satisfied that Pakistan has ended all militant infiltration into
its Jammu and Kashmir state (for further reading, see CRS Report RS20277, Recent
Developments in Kashmir and U.S. Concerns
, by Amit Gupta and Kaia Leather, and
RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for
Resolution of the Conflict
, by Kaia Leather).
Congressional Action. Through a series of legislative measures, Congress has
incrementally lifted sanctions on Pakistan and India resulting from their 1998 nuclear tests.
In October 1999, Congress passed H.R. 2561, the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act, 2000, and it was signed by the President as P.L. 106-79 on October 29 of that year.
Title IX of the act gives the President authority to waive sanctions applied against Pakistan
and India in response to the nuclear tests. In a presidential determination on Pakistan and
India issued on October 27, 1999, the President waived economic sanctions on India.
Pakistan, however, remained under sanctions triggered under Section 508 of the annual
foreign assistance appropriations act as a result of the October 1999 coup. The Foreign
Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations Agencies Act, 2001 provided an
exception under which Pakistan could be provided U.S. foreign assistance funding for basic
education programs (P.L. 106-429; Section 597). The U.S. Agency for International
Development request for FY2003 includes $7 million for programs to strengthen civil society
and reform public education in Pakistan.
After the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, and in recognition
of Pakistan’s cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition being assembled, policymakers
searched for new means of providing assistance to Pakistan. President Bush’s issuance of
a final determination on September 22, 2001, removed remaining sanctions on Pakistan and
India resulting from their 1998 nuclear test, finding that denying export licences and
assistance was not in the national security interests of the United States. Also, on October
27, President Bush signed into law S. 1465 (P.L. 107-57), which gives the President 2-year
waiver authority to lift sanctions on foreign assistance imposed on Pakistan following the
1999 military coup if he determines that such a waiver would facilitate the transition to
democratic rule in Pakistan and is important to U.S. efforts to combat international terrorism.
The law not only gives the president authority to waive sanctions related to democracy but
to waive sanctions imposed on Pakistan for its debt servicing arrearage to the United States
under the terms of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act. At the end of 2000,
Pakistan’s international debt was estimated at $38 billion. P.L. 107-57 allowed for an
agreement of Pakistan to reschedule $379 million of its debt to the United States thereby
enabling it to cancel its arrearage. After President Musharraf’s visit to Washington, D.C. in
February 2002, President Bush wrote a letter to Congress stating that he had ordered $220
million in emergency funds that had been given to the Defense Department for warfighting
and to the State Department for security upgrades, be reallocated to Pakistan “for costs
incurred in aiding U.S. military forces in Operation Enduring Freedom.”
For FY2003, the Bush Administration has proposed increased funding for Pakistan that
includes $50 million for development assistance (up from an estimated $15 million in 2001),
$200 million in the Economic Support Fund (up from $9.5 million in 2001), $1 million for
International Military Education and Training (same as 2001), $50 million for Foreign
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Military Financing (up from zero in 2001), and $4 million for International Narcotics Control
(up from $2.5 million in 2001) (for details, see CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan:
Current U.S. Economic Sanctions
, by Dianne Rennack).
Some Members of Congress seek to reimpose restrictions on aid to Pakistan in light of
what are perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices by the Musharraf government.
On July 17, 2002, Rep. Frank Pallone introduced H.R. 5150 to repeal the U.S. President’s
authority to waive economic sanctions and end assistance to Pakistan as a country whose
elected head of government was deposed by military coup. Other Members seek to modify
the President’s waiver authority. On July 26, 2002, Rep. Gary Ackerman introduced H.R.
5267 that would require Presidential certification of Pakistan’s successful efforts to halt
cross-border terrorism into India, that the country’s national elections are conducted freely
and fairly, and that waivers on aid restrictions would facilitate both U.S. anti-terror efforts
and the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan.
Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation. The close U.S.- Pakistan military ties of the
Cold War era – which had come to near halt after the 1990 aid cutoff – appear to be in the
process of being restored as a result of Pakistan’s role in the U.S. anti-terrorism operations
in Afghanistan. Pakistan also has been a leading country in supporting U.N. peacekeeping
efforts with troops and observers. Some 5,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as part of the U.S.-led Persian Gulf War efforts in
1990. Pakistani troops played an important role in the U.S.-led humanitarian operations in
Somalia from 1992 to 1994. In August 2002, over 4,700 Pakistani troops and observers
participating in U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Congo, and
other countries, making Pakistan the leading contributor of such forces by any member
nation save Bangladesh.
In the wake of the September 2001 attacks against the United States and President
Musharraf’s participation in the anti-terror coalition, U.S. law enforcement agents have
assisted in tracking and capturing Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives that have sought refuge in
Pakistani cities. U.S. special operations soldiers are reportedly working with Pakistani
security forces in their efforts to track and capture those fugitive militants who remain in the
mountainous region of western Pakistan near the Afghan border.
In July 2002, Congress was notified of two Foreign Military Sales arrangements with
Pakistan reportedly worth $230 million. Under the deals, Pakistan is to receive seven used
C-130E transport aircraft (one being for spare parts) and six Aerostats (sophisticated,
balloon-mounted surveillance radars). These mark the first notable arms sales to Pakistan
in more than a decade and are intended to bolster Islamabad’s efforts to move troops quickly
and detect infiltration (thus aiding in anti-terror operations). Islamabad continues to seek
U.S. weapons and technology, especially in an effort to bolster its air forces. Several
Members of Congress are reported to be supportive of these efforts. A revived high-level
U.S.-Pakistan defense consultative group – moribund for the past 5 years – met in late-
September 2002 and included high-level discussions of military cooperation, security
assistance, and anti-terrorism (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism
Cooperation
, by Alan Kronstadt).
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Democratization and Human Rights
Democratization Efforts. The United States considers the October 1999 Pakistan
military coup to be a serious setback to the country’s efforts to return to the democratic
election process beginning in 1988. National elections, judged by domestic and international
observers to be generally free and fair, were held in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. Pakistan
democracy between 1988 and 1999 was, however, marred by wide-scale corruption, volatile
mass-based politics, and a continuing absence of symmetry between the development of the
military and civilian bureaucracies and political institutions. The politics of confrontation
between parties and leaders flourished at the expense of effective government; frequent
walkouts and boycotts of the national and provincial assemblies often led to paralysis and
instability. The major political parties lacked grassroots organization and failed to be
responsive to the electorate.
There had been hopes that national elections in October 2002 would reverse the trend
and set Pakistan back on the path toward democratic governance. Such hopes have been
eroded by the passage of a number of highly restrictive election laws – including those that
apparently will prevent the country’s two leading civilian politicians from participating – as
well as President Musharraf’s unilateral imposition of major constitutional amendments in
August 2002. The United States has expressed concern that these developments may make
the realization of true democracy in Pakistan more elusive (see CRS Report RS21299,
Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments, by Alan Kronstadt).
Human Rights Problems. The U.S. State Department, in its Pakistan Country
Report on Human Rights Practices for 2001 (issued March 4, 2002), noted that, although
Pakistan’s human rights record remained poor under the military government, there were
improvements in some areas, including freedom of the press. The government bureaucracy
continued to function but was “monitored” by the military. The State Department report
cites continuing problems of police abuse, religious discrimination, and child labor. Security
forces were cited for committing extrajudicial killings and for using arbitrary arrest and
detention, torturing and abusing prisoners and detainees, and raping women. Political and
religious groups also engaged in killings and persecution of their rivals and ethnic and
religious minorities. Politically motivated violence and a deteriorating law and order
situation reportedly continued to be a serious problem.
In recent years, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Amnesty International
have issued reports critical of Pakistan’s lack of political freedoms and of the country’s
alleged abuses of the rights of women and minorities. According to the reports, rape is a
serious problem, particularly the rape of minors and gang rape. The State Department human
rights report also noted a high rate of abuse of female prisoners – including rape and torture
– by male police officers. Women also suffer discrimination in education, employment, and
legal rights. Discrimination against women is widespread, and traditional constraints –
cultural, legal, and spousal – have kept women in a subordinate position in society. The
adult literacy rate for men in Pakistan is about 50% and for women about 24%. Religious
minorities – mainly Christians, Hindus, and Ahmadi Muslims – reportedly are subjected to
discriminatory laws and social intolerance. A 1974 amendment to the Pakistan constitution
declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority because they do not accept Muhammad as
the last prophet. In 1984, the Zia government made it illegal for an Ahmadi to call himself
a Muslim or use Muslim terminology. Blasphemy laws, instituted under the Zia regime and
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strengthened in 1991, carry a mandatory death penalty for blaspheming the Prophet or his
family. Blasphemy charges reportedly are usually brought as a result of personal or religious
vendettas.
Economic Issues
Overview. The long-term economic outlook for Pakistan continues to be rather bleak,
given a low national savings rate, and high population and labor force growth rates in a
country that remains highly dependent on foreign lending and the importation of basic
commodities. In the middle-term, political stability in the wake of October 2002 elections
could brighten the outlook by providing President Musharraf with a political base for the
further pursuit of economic reform. In the short-term, substantial fiscal deficits and the still
urgent dependency on external aid donations counterbalance a major overhaul of the tax
collection system and what have been modest gains in the Karachi Stock Exchange.
Pakistan’s current military government inherited an economy in serious recession and
GDP growth rates have been sluggish for several years. The country’s real GDP for FY2002
(ending June 2002) was estimated at $272 billion, up some 3.6% from the previous year.
FY2001 saw the economy grow by only 2.6%, a significant decline from FY2000.
Islamabad’s goal of 5% growth for FY2003 is unlikely to be met, though most predictions
put the rate at something more than 4%.
The Pakistani government has stabilized the country’s external debt at $36.5 billion and
the country’s total liquid reserves grew to $6.43 billion by November 2002 – an increase of
more than $4 billion since October 1999. In December 2001, the Paris Club of creditor
nations agreed to reschedule $12.5 billion in repayments on Pakistan’s external debt – one-
third of the country’s total burden. Pakistan’s economic reforms and a more prudent fiscal
policy have reduced the fiscal deficit from 7% of GDP to about 5.2% of GDP. Foreign
remittances for 2001 exceeded $1.6 billion – $772 million more than in 2000. Inflation, at
3%, is at the lowest in three decades. Interest on public debt together with defense spending,
however, consume 70% of total revenues, thus squeezing out development expenditure,
including social spending.
A decade of political instability has left a legacy of crippling foreign debt, declining
production and growth rates, halting economic reform policies, and pervasive corruption.
Foreign debt totals more than $36 billion, though that amount is declining and foreign
reserves are up significantly in recent years. Output from both the industrial and service
sectors grew in 2001, but the agricultural sector’s output has continued to decline enough to
significantly slow growth overall. Agricultural labor accounts for nearly half of the country’s
work force.
Over the long term, many analysts believe that Pakistan’s resources and comparatively
well-developed entrepreneurial skills may hold promise for more rapid economic growth and
development. This is particularly true for Pakistan’s textile industry, which accounts for
60% of Pakistan’s exports. Analysts point to the pressing need to broaden the country’s tax
base in order to provide increased revenue for investment in improved infrastructure, health,
and education, all prerequisites for economic development. Less than 1% of Pakistanis
currently pay income taxes. Agricultural income has not been taxed in the past, largely
because of the domination of parliament and the provincial assemblies by wealthy landlords.
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Successive Bhutto and Sharif governments made agreements with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), promising austerity, deficit reduction, and improved tax collection
in return for loans and credits. The promised reforms, however, fell victim to political
instability and a host of other problems, including floods, drought, crop viruses, strikes, a
bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, widespread tax evasion, weak infrastructure, and a
swollen defense budget. The Musharraf government has had some modest successes in
effecting economic reform, and participation in the post-September 2001 anti-terror coalition
appears to have eased somewhat Islamabad’s severe national debt situation, with many
countries, including the United States, boosting bilateral assistance efforts.
A June 2002 IMF report stated that Pakistan is making progress toward stated
macroeconomic objectives. It notes particular successes in the areas of tax administration,
fiscal transparency, and privatization. An October 2002 World Bank report commended
Pakistan for bringing about macroeconomic stability and implementing wide-ranging
structural reforms to spur economic growth, while also noting that the country’s poverty
levels are both high and static. A November 2002 IMF report identifies a “worrisome trend
of declining growth” linked in part to “a turbulent domestic and regional political
environment.” During a November 2002 visit to the region, a top U.S. State Department
official expressed appreciation of Islamabad recent economic reform efforts and pledged
continued U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on the economic front.
In the view of the International Financial Institutions – the World Bank, the IMF, and
the Asian Development Bank – the major risk to economic reforms and to future investment
is the possibility that there might be a break in the continuity of policy after the October 2002
national elections. As of December 2002, this does not appear to be the case. The
November 2002 seating of a pro-Musharraf ruling coalition in the Parliament has added to
analysts confidence that reforms will remain on track. The Bush Administration has
promised Islamabad a $1 billion debt write-off, though the Congress has yet to pass the
required legislation for such an award.
Trade Issues. During January-June 2002, total U.S. imports from Pakistan were
worth just over $1 billion, nearly identical to the previous year’s amount. More than half of
this value came from the purchase of textiles and clothing. U.S. exports to Pakistan during
this period were worth only $316 million, but this represents a major increase of 50% over
the first half of 2001. Pakistan ranked as the 65th largest U.S. trade partner in 2001, with the
United States consuming $2.2 billion worth of Pakistani goods and exporting $556 million
worth in return, for a negative trade balance of approximately $1.7 billion.
According to the report of the U.S. Trade Representative for 2002, Pakistan has made
progress in reducing import tariff schedules, though a number of trade barriers remain. Some
items are either restricted or banned from importation for reasons related to religion, national
security, luxury consumption, or protection of local industries. The U.S. pharmaceutical
industry believes that Pakistan maintains discriminatory practices that impede U.S.
manufacturer profitability. Other American companies have repeatedly complained about
violations of their intellectual property rights in the areas of patents and copyrights. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated trade losses of $143.3 million in 2001,
and widespread piracy, especially of copyrighted materials, has kept Pakistan on the “Special
301” watch list for 13 consecutive years.
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Narcotics
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in
Afghanistan and western Pakistan, then distributed throughout the world by Pakistan-based
traffickers. The region has supplied a reported 20%-40% of heroin consumed in the United
States and 70% of that consumed in Europe, and is second only to Southeast Asia’s Golden
Triangle as a source of the world’s heroin. Although much of the heroin is smuggled by land
and sea routes to Europe and the United States, a substantial portion is consumed by
Pakistan’s rapidly growing domestic market. The Pakistan government estimates the 4
million drug addicts in the country include 1.5 million addicted to heroin. According to
some experts, Pakistan’s drug economy amounts to as much as $20 billion. Drug money
reportedly is used to buy influence throughout Pakistan’s economic and political systems.
The U.S. Department of State calls “excellent” Pakistan’s cooperation on drug control
with the United States. In March 2002, Pakistan was among the countries certified by
President Bush as having cooperated fully with the United States in counter-narcotics efforts,
or to have taken adequate steps on their own. The Islamabad government has made
impressive strides in eradicating opium poppy cultivation. Estimated production in 2001 was
only 5 metric tons, down 59% from 2000 and less than one-thirtieth of the estimated 155 tons
produced in 1995.
Pakistan’s counter-narcotics efforts continue to be hampered by a number of factors,
including lack of total government commitment; scarcity of funds; poor infrastructure in
drug-producing regions; government wariness of provoking unrest in tribal areas; and
corruption among police, government officials, and local politicians. U.S. counter-narcotics
aid to Pakistan, administered by the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs, totaled $3.5 million in FY2001 and is estimated to be $2.5
million for FY2002 (this does not include the $73 million emergency supplemental
appropriation for border security projects that will continue in FY2003). The request for
FY2003 stands at $4 million. The major counter-narcotics efforts engaged in by the Pakistan
government, many of which receive U.S. or U.N. support, include improved law
enforcement; reduction of demand; opium crop destruction and crop substitution; and
outreach programs that include supplying roads, irrigation, drinking water, and schools to
remote tribal areas.
Terrorism
After the September 2001 attacks on the United States, Pakistan pledged and has
provided support for the anti-terror coalition effort. According to the U.S. State Department
and Department of Defense, Pakistan has afforded the United States unprecedented levels
of cooperation by allowing the U.S. military to use bases within the country, helping to
identify and detain extremists, and tightening the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In a landmark, nationally-televised speech in January 2002, Musharraf vowed to end
Pakistan’s use as a base for terrorism of any kind, criticized religious extremism and
intolerance in the country, set new rules to govern religious schools that have been viewed
as hothouses for Islamic militancy, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-
e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India.
The Islamabad government also instituted sweeping police reforms, upgraded its immigration
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control system, and began work on new anti-terrorist finance laws. In the wake of the
speech, thousands of extremists were arrested and detained, though many if not most of these
have since been released.
In February 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnaped in Karachi
and was later found murdered. In May, a bomb blast in Karachi killed 14 people, including
11 French military technicians. One month later, a car bomb detonated outside the U.S.
consulate in Karachi, killing 12 Pakistani nationals. These attacks are widely viewed as
expressions of militants’ anger with the Musharraf regime for its cooperation with U.S. anti-
terror operations, and have raised fears that terrorist groups would further complicate the law
and order situation within the country. Both incidents were linked to Al Qaeda, as well as
to indigenous militant groups. In September 2002, Pakistani authorities announced a series
of high-profile arrests of those deemed responsible for the car bombings, and they claim to
have “broken the back” of the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan. Yet press reports indicate that
Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives still are numerous in Pakistan and may be attempting to re-
establish their organizations in Pakistani cities such as Karachi. Alleged Al Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden may himself be in Pakistan.
For the first time since independence, Pakistani army troops have been operating in
tribal areas of the country’s mountainous western border regions. These units have made
raids on suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban hideouts in an area that is ethnically Pashtun and
where the people can be sympathetic toward militants and hostile toward Westerners and
anyone seen to be cooperating with them. Small teams of U.S. special operations soldiers
are reported to be assisting the Pakistani regulars on these missions. An undisclosed number
of U.S. law enforcement agents are assisting Pakistani security forces in the country’s urban
areas (see CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Alan
Kronstadt).
Islamabad has been under continuous pressure from the United States and numerous
other governments to terminate the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistani Kashmir into
Indian Kashmir. Such pressure elicited an explicit promise from President Musharraf to U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that all such movements would cease. After
confirmations from both U.S. and Indian government officials that infiltration was down
significantly in June and July of 2002, reports are indicating that the number of militants
crossing into Indian-controlled Kashmir is again on the rise, and in December 2002 the U.S.
envoy to New Delhi indicated that the problem in Kashmir is “cross-border terrorism” that
is “almost entirely externally driven.” President Musharraf adamantly insists that his
government is doing everything possible to stop such movements. Critics contend, however,
that Islamabad has renewed implicit, if not active, support for the insurgents in Kashmir as
a means of both maintaining strategically the domestic support of Islamists who view the
Kashmir issue as fundamental to the Pakistani national idea, as well as to disrupt tactically
the state government in Kashmir and so seek to erode New Delhi’s legitimacy.
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