Order Code IB89140
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
Updated December 6, 2002
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Past Settlement Efforts
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique
1984 Proximity Talks
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise
1988-89 Talks
March 1990 - April 1992
“Set of Ideas”
Confidence-Building Measures
Developments, 1997-2001
1997 Talks
1999-2001 Proximity Talks
Developments, 2002
November 11, 2002 Settlement Plan
Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
Policies of Greece and Turkey
European Union Membership
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
U.S. Policy
LEGISLATION
IB89140
12-06-02
Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974.
the focus of intense crisis prevention efforts.
Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population,
On December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not
live in the southern two thirds of the island.
to deploy the missiles on Cyprus.
Turkish Cypriots live in the “Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus” (recognized only by
The prospect of Cyprus’s European
Turkey), with about 30,000 Turkish troops
Union accession triggered heightened interna-
providing security. U.N. peacekeeping forces
tional attention to Cyprus and complicated
maintain a buffer zone between the two.
settlement efforts. The U.N. hosted inconclu-
Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S.
sive talks between Clerides and Denktash in
support, has promoted negotiations aimed at
July and August 1997. Denktash demanded
creating a federal, bicommunal, bizonal repub-
that the TRNC be recognized as a state equal
lic on Cyprus. The two sides would pledge
to the Greek-Cypriot side in a confederation.
not to move toward union with any other
He concluded a declaration of partial integra-
country. This reflects concerns that Greek
tion with Turkey to parallel Cyprus’s integra-
Cypriots would like to unite with Greece and
tion with the EU.
that Turkish Cypriots seek to partition the
island, linking the north to Turkey.
In June 1999, the G-8 group of industrial-
ized countries and Russia suggested that the
The Secretary General’s April 5, 1992
Secretary General invite the parties to negotia-
“Set of Ideas” is a framework for negotiations
tions in fall 1999. Clerides and Denktash
for an overall settlement. The Security
participated in five rounds of U.N.-mediated
Council implied Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
proximity (indirect) talks beginning in Decem-
Denktash’s responsibility for their failure and
ber 1999. On November 8, 2000, the Secretary
called for confidence-building measures
General gave the two leaders his “observa-
(CBMs). Glafcos Clerides was elected
tions” on substance and procedure. In reac-
president of the Republic of Cyprus in
tion, Denktash withdrew from talks. Denktash
February 1993. Subsequent talks focused on
and Clerides met on Cyprus on December 4,
CBMs. Denktash failed to return to talks on
2001, began holding direct talks on January
June 14, 1993. Both sides eventually accepted
16, 2002. On November 11, Secretary Gen-
CBMs in principle, but did not agree on Sec-
eral Annan submitted a new comprehensive
retary General’s proposed method for record-
settlement plan based on Swiss and Belgian
ing clarifications.
models.
A January 4, 1997 confirmation that
Members of Congress have urged the
Greek Cypriots would acquire Russian S-300
Administration to be more active, although
missiles prompted the United States to deplore
they have not proposed an alternative to the
the purchase and Turkey to threaten military
U.N.-sponsored talks. Some Members seek
action to prevent deployment and to bond
increased pressure on Turkey to withdraw its
closer to Turkish Cyprus. The missiles were
troops from Cyprus.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
IB89140
12-06-02
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 11, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive plan
for a Cyprus settlement. (See [http://www.cna.org.cy/data/var/sxedioen.htm] and
Developments, 2002, below.) (Greek) Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides, Turkish Cypriot
leader Rauf Denktash, and the Greek and Turkish governments accepted the plan as the
basis for further negotiations. On December 5, Clerides and Denktash submitted comments
on changes they seek in the plan to Annan. Annan would like the Founding Agreement of
a “common state” signed by December 12; appendices to be concluded by February 28,
2003; and simultaneous referenda held by both sides on March 30. The U.S. Administration
fully supports the U.N. initiative, calling it a “historic opportunity.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been
divided since 1974. The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic origin, and 19% of
Turkish ethnic origin. (Less than 5% of the population is Maronites, Armenians, Roman
Catholic Latins, and others.) At independence, the republic’s constitution defined elaborate
power-sharing arrangements. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president; each elected by his own community. The Treaty of Alliance among the
Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help
defend the island. The two sides aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots
favored union (of the entire island) with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots preferred
partition of the island (taksim) and uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’ success as a new republic lasted from 1960-63. After President Makarios
proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations
between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating
into enclaves in larger towns. In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national
institutions and began to administer their own affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred in
1963-64, and again in 1967. On both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including
that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have
been a buffer between the two communities.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios,
replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis. Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August
25, was in control of more than 36% of the island. The military intervention (often called
an invasion) had many byproducts. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the Cypriot
population and related refugee and property problems. The Athens junta fell, civilian
government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military
command to protest NATO’s failure to prevent Turkey’s action, and Turkey’s civilian
government entered an extended period of instability. U.S. relations with all parties suffered.
CRS-1
IB89140
12-06-02
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities
separate in two sovereign states or two states in a loose confederation. In February 1975,
they declared their government the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983,
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
(TRNC) — a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of independence. Turkish
Cypriots have a constitution and a 50-seat parliament. Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots. He
ruled out a merger with Turkey, and pledged cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’ interests and
reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and ways to
implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities. Greek Cypriots emphasized the three freedoms –
movement, property, and settlement – envisioning a society with free movement of people.
Turkish Cypriots prefer two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact. They also
differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots want their internationally
recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then
join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would join, for the first time,
in a new federation. These views could affect resolution of property, citizenship of Turkish
settlers, and other legal issues. Since 1974, there have been several formal sets of U.N.-
sponsored direct negotiations as well as indirect talks:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting. Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each administration’s control over territory
will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights;
3)freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and
functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique. Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha; to
abstain from actions which might jeopardize the talks, accept the principle of
demilitarization, and eschew union in whole or part with any other country.
1984 Proximity Talks. After the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC,” both sides
proposed confidence-building measures and resolution through a comprehensive framework.
Proximity or indirect talks were conducted through U.N. representatives on constitutional
arrangements, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of international treaties and
guarantees dating from 1959-1960.
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise. In January 1985, Denktash and
Kyprianou met in New York. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a draft U.N. document; Greek
Cypriots considered it a basis for negotiations, but did not want to sign. The U.N. modified
the document in light of objections. Greek Cypriots accepted an April 1985 version; Turkish
Cypriots did not. Greek Cypriots opposed a March 1986 revision and called for an
international conference or a new summit to revitalize the process.
CRS-2
IB89140
12-06-02
1988-89 Talks. After futile informal direct talks, Cypriot President Vassiliou and
Denktash submitted papers that hardened positions. In April 1989, Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar discouraged the parties from writing positions and proposed separate meetings to
draft an agreement outline on a noncommittal basis. Denktash criticized the new approach
as substituting proximity talks for direct talks, but the U.N. believed the parties had agreed
to “separate and periodic joint meetings.” In June, Perez de Cuellar circulated draft ideas for
an outline of an agreement. Turkish Cypriots argued that the U.N. had gone beyond its good
offices role and stated that only a document drafted by the parties would be acceptable.
March 1990 - April 1992. Security Council Res. 649, May 13, 1990, reaffirmed the
Secretary General’s right to make suggestions. It referred to the federal solution as
bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial aspects — the
first U.N. reference to bizonality, a key concept for the Turkish Cypriots. In June 1991,
Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting. On August 2, President Bush
announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus. The
Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range of agreement first. The Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers were unable to find common ground. On October 8, the Secretary
General reported that a conference was not possible and blamed Denktash’s assertion that
each side possessed sovereignty, differing from U.N. resolutions attributing that
characteristic solely to the Republic.
“Set of Ideas.” Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s April 1992 report suggested a
bizonal federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international
personality and sovereignty. A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house. 7:3
ratio would prevail in the federal executive. Each state would be guaranteed a majority of
the population and of land in its area. Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty
of Alliance would withdraw. In June, Boutros-Ghali presented a “non-map.” A new U.N.
draft provided for a separate referendum by each community within 30 days of an agreement,
an 18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees consistent with
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek Cypriot
embargo, free movement, a time-table for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their
property, three constitutions (one for each community and one for the central government),
a 7:3 ratio in the executive, vice-presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an
island-wide referendum on EC membership, and the return of Varosha and about 30 villages
to Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation. Greek
Cypriots would get Morphou, home of about 11,000 Turkish Cypriots. Denktash said that
they and Turkish Cypriots to be displaced from other areas total 40,000 or about one-quarter
of the Turkish Cypriot population. Vassiliou estimated that 82,000 Greek Cypriots would
be able to return home and that Denktash’s 40,000 figure was inflated.
On August 21, Boutros-Ghali reported that his map provided for two federated states,
the return of many Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot retention of the coastline and
traditional villages. He said that Denktash’s territorial proposals were not close to the
“non-map” and that arrangements would be made for displaced Turkish Cypriots. Vassiliou
was depicted as ready to negotiate an agreement based on the map. Denktash accepted the
right of return and right to property, provided practical difficulties were taken into account.
Boutros-Ghali concluded that an agreement was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw
territorial adjustment in line with his map. Denktash said the report was unacceptable.
CRS-3
IB89140
12-06-02
Security Council Res. 774, August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map. The
Secretary General’s November 19 report implied Denktash’s responsibility for the lack of
progress. A February 14, 1993, election in Cyprus produced a new president, Glafcos
Clerides, and a delay. Clerides accepted the set of ideas only “in principle.”
Confidence-Building Measures. On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a reduction of Turkish troops in
exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control of
Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on
foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.-supervised
island-wide census; cooperation in U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha and
reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under U.N. control but unused since 1974.
Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash wanted to retain about
20% and/or have a U.N. security circle around it and an end to the Greek Cypriot embargo
of northern Cyprus. Greek Cypriots sought to avoid recognizing the TRNC. Denktash
claimed that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots, and would
not return to New York. However, U.N. experts later determined that both sides would
benefit from the CBMs, with relatively greater benefits for Turkish Cypriots because of their
smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them.
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle. He later contended that
a March 21 U.N. draft unbalanced equities in the CBMs. Clerides said that he would accept
the March 21 text if Denktash would. The Secretary General’s May 30 report, made known
on June 1, insisted that the March draft had not destroyed balance. Boutros-Ghali blamed
the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of political will for the lack of agreement. On May 31, Denktash
had said that he would accept the CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated.
Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document. Boutros-Ghali’s June 28 letter
to the Security Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement
CBMs based on the March paper and clarifications, and said that he intended to address an
identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and request the Security
Council to endorse the March 21 paper. Neither side accepted this procedure.
Developments, 1997-2001
On January 4, 1997, Cyprus signed a contract to purchase Russian S-300 (SA-10)
anti-aircraft missiles with a 90-mile range, i.e., able to reach southern Turkey, at a cost of
about $400 million, to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by Greece.
The U.S. State Department said that the decision “introduces a new and destabilizing
element” that “threatens to take the arms buildup on Cyprus to a new and disturbing
qualitative level....” Turkish officials said that they would not allow the weapons to be
deployed. The State Department declared that any threat to use force was unacceptable. On
January 20, Turkish President Demirel and Denktash signed a joint defense declaration,
stating that any attack on the TRNC would be considered an attack on Turkey.
CRS-4
IB89140
12-06-02
1997 Talks. In 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for indirect talks
followed by open-ended, face-to-face talks between Clerides and Denktash. His Special
Representative on Cyprus began proximity or indirect talks. As goodwill gestures, Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots exchanged visits to holy sites and held bicommunal events and
business and professional meetings. Greek planes did not overfly Cyprus during joint
Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises in May 1997 and for the next five months. Turkish
planes did not overfly Cyprus for as long as Greek aircraft did not do so.
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and
in Switzerland, August 11-15. Before the talks, Denktash said that he would not sign any
documents until the European Union (EU) suspended its accession negotiations with the
(Greek) Cypriot government as the sole representative of Cyprus. (See European Union
Membership, below.) Denktash said that a settlement was not possible without political
equality and sovereignty, the accession process stopped, and the delivery of missiles
withdrawn. He refused to sign a joint declaration at the end of the talks. The U.N. Security
Council President said that the Turkish Cypriots’ preconditions had impeded progress.
Greece terminated its moratorium on military flights over Cyprus before joint exercises
with Cypriot forces on October 10, 1997. Turkey ended its parallel moratorium on October
14. During the exercises, Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus,
but neither side fired. Greece charged that Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister’s
plane. In October, Turkey conducted exercises in northern Cyprus, including the mock
destruction of missile launchers.
After the December 12, 1997 EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus,
Denktash informed the U.N. that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and that he would only
participate in talks between states having equal status. On December 27, the TRNC
suspended all bicommunal activities except religious pilgrimages.
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on
January 24, 1998. The S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. The Cypriot
government said that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or substantial progress
toward a settlement, then it would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel issued a communique
calling for negotiations only between sovereign, equal states. They said that the special
relationship between Turkey and the TRNC would be enhanced in every field.
On June 16, Greece sent four F-16 fighter planes and one C-130 cargo plane to the
Paphos air base. Turkey responded on June 18 by sending six F-16’s to northern Cyprus.
Cypriot troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July with a test-firing. The Cypriot
press claimed that Secretary of State Albright had asked President Clerides to reconsider the
S-300 purchase, to store the missiles outside of Cyprus, or to replace the order with one for
shorter range SA-15s.
On August 31, Denktash proposed the creation of a Cyprus Confederation . The Greek
Cypriot government declared the proposal to be “unacceptable.” The U.S. Administration,
the U.N., and others reiterated that the basis for a settlement is a bizonal, bicommunal
federation.
CRS-5
IB89140
12-06-02
On December 29, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. The EU,
United States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided a face-saving context for his decision. A
December 14 letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council
reported that his Special Representative was continuing shuttle talks and that he perceived
a “flexible approach by both sides.” On December 22, the Security Council approved
S/Res/1217, to renew the UNFICYP mandate, and S/Res/1218, requesting the Secretary
General to work on measures to build trust and cooperation.
On June 20, 1999, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and
Russia urged the Secretary General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiations, without
preconditions. On June 22, the Secretary General declared his readiness to do so. On June
29, the Security Council passed S/Res/1250, calling upon the two leaders to support a
comprehensive negotiation with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to negotiate in
good faith until a settlement is reached, with full consideration of all U.N. resolutions and
treaties. S/Res/1251 said that the goal is a Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises
two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot annual military exercise from October 2-7,1999, no Greek
planes landed at the Paphos air base; there were no incidents involving Greek and Turkish
planes; and Turkey’s objections to the exercise were milder than in previous years.
1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Secretary General Annan and his Special Advisor on
Cyprus, Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, began proximity or separate, indirect talks with
Clerides and Denktash in New York from December 3 to 14. In U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1283 (December 15, 1999), the Council reaffirmed “all its relevant resolutions
on Cyprus,” without specifying that a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single
sovereignty on the island is its goal. On December 15, the Secretary General submitted an
addendum, noting that the governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Britain concurred with
UNFICYP’s extension. He also stated, “The Government of Turkey has indicated that it
concurs with ... the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can operate
on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties and that the
Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work with them to develop
modalities of UNFICYP’s operation in northern Cyprus.” The Turkish Cypriots interpreted
the wording as a move toward recognition of their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset
with this Turkish Cypriot view. A second round of proximity talks was held in Geneva,
January 31-February 8, 2000. Bicommunal contacts among political parties, journalists,
businessmen, and environmentalists resumed.
The Cypriot and Greek governments succeeded in preventing an addendum similar to
that of December 1999 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1303, June 15, 2000. Denktash
linked his attendance at talks to measures that, he asserted, would prove that UNFICYP
needs Turkish Cypriot cooperation to fulfill its mission. He constrained UNFICYP activities
in the north and, on June 30, Turkish forces set up a three-man checkpoint outside Strovilia,
a small Greek Cypriot village in the no-man’s land separating the Turkish-Cypriot-
administered area and a British base, which is an UNFICYP crossing point between north
and south, thereby blocking UNFICYP access.
A third round of talks was held from July 24 to August 4. At the outset of the fourth
round of talks, September 12 to 26, Secretary General Annan said that he had concluded that
CRS-6
IB89140
12-06-02
the equal status of the parties “must and should be recognized” explicitly in a comprehensive
settlement, noting that in the negotiations each represents its side and no one else, as the
political equal of the other. Clerides boycotted the talks for two days in protest until assured
that they would take into account U.N. resolutions that call for a federal solution. Denktash
was pleased with Annan’s remarks.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises from October 19 to 23, Greek and
Turkish planes engaged in mock dogfights. Greek planes landed at Paphos air base for the
first time since it became operational in January 1998, and Greek Cypriot National Guard
TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missiles deployed at Paphos locked onto Turkish F-16 fighter planes.
Turkish planes landed on the island during Turkish-Turkish Cypriot exercises in November.
A fifth round of proximity talks was held from November 1 to 10. On November 8, the
Secretary General gave the two leaders his “assessment.” Media leaks and statements by the
parties suggest that he called for one sovereign, indissoluble, common state with a single
international legal personality; common state law would overrule regional law; political
equality would be defined as effective “participation” in government, not numerically;
component states would be to a great extent self-governed; the return of an “appreciable
amount of territory” to Greek Cypriots, with as little dislocation of Turkish Cypriots as
possible and return of as many Greek Cypriots as possible; and a security regime including
an international military force, police, and a political mechanism. Clerides welcomed the
Secretary General’s views. Denktash rejected them and, at a November 24 “summit” with
Turkey’s President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and other high
officials, announced his withdrawal from the talks because no progress could be made until
two separate states are recognized. Turkey supported his decision. (Denktash later said that
he was not asking the Greek Cypriots to recognize his state politically but rather to
acknowledge that his state exists.) Denktash refused to participate in a sixth round of
proximity talks in January 2001, labeling the Secretary General’s November 2000 assessment
an unacceptable precondition.
Alvaro de Soto visited Cyprus from August 29-September 5. On September 5, he said
that Annan had invited the two leaders to hold separate meetings with him on September 12
in New York. De Soto hoped that the meetings would be followed by separate working
meetings with him. Clerides accepted. Denktash did not because “The necessary foundation
has not been established.” Denktash proposed a secret face-to-face meeting with Clerides,
but de Soto did not think it was a good idea.
On December 4, Clerides and Denktash met for the first time since August 1997. De
Soto also was present. The two leaders agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions,
all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement is achieved.
Clerides became the first Cypriot president to travel to the north since 1974 on December 5,
when he attended a dinner at Denktash’s his residence . Denktash reciprocated by visiting
Clerides’ private home for dinner on December 29.
CRS-7
IB89140
12-06-02
Developments, 2002
On January 16, 2002, Clerides and Denktash met in de Soto’s presence and agreed to
hold intensive peace talks beginning January 21 at the Nicosia airport, a U.N. base. Ground
rules provide that there will be no final agreement until all issues are agreed upon.
On April 29, Denktash presented a “non-paper” of his views on a solution, proposing
a Partnership State to be founded by the two now-existing states on Cyprus. Each partner
would retain authority over its domestic affairs. Together, they would set up a 12-member
Council consisting of two presidents and five representatives from each side. Each president
would chair the Council for 2 years. Council members would hold portfolios for foreign
affairs, economy, and EU relations. A joint parliament would have an equal number of
members from each side. Denktash insisted that the Turkish security guarantee continue.
The situation would be reviewed in 5 years, when new authorities could be given to the
partnership. Clerides’ spokesman charged that Denktash’s positions completely contravened
U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Secretary General Annan visited Cyprus, May 14-16, and asked Clerides and Denktash
to focus on the core issues of governments (meaning structures and powers), security,
territory, and property. Annan looked to Greece and Turkey for support.
According to disclosures by both sides, security issues were discussed in May and June.
According to Denktash, the Greek Cypriots want the U.N. to be a guarantor, while he wants
it to observe. Turkish Cypriot reports said that the Greek Cypriots conveyed views on
territory, proposing to reduce the Turkish Cypriot area to 24%. Denktash responded that “the
territorial issue cannot be discussed with percentages” because it is related to sovereignty,
his overriding demand. Denktash proposed that ideas from the Belgian constitution be
discussed; Clerides offered to discuss it in its entirety.
On August 27, Denktash warned that if that there is no settlement by the end of the year,
then he would “consider giving to Turkey ... our foreign affairs and defense ministries and
monetary matters under a protocol until Turkey enters the EU.” He added that no decision
had been made. He later described possible Turkish-Turkish Cypriot cooperation as similar
to that which the Greek Cypriots would have with the EU.
On September 6, Secretary General Annan met with the two leaders in Paris and asked
them to work on certain issues. He noted that “though serious differences remain, the
elements of a comprehensive settlement that would meet the basic needs of both sides do,
in fact, exist.” He believed “that the gaps dividing the parties can be bridged.” Clerides
observed, however, “there appears to be no way of approach” on the issues of sovereignty
and whether there will be a new state or a continuation of the Republic of Cyprus. On
September 16, Denktash submitted a document, purportedly revising his ideas of April 29,
strengthening central government authority to address some of Clerides’ objections but
retaining the concept of a new partnership state. He reportedly proposed Belgium as a model
for foreign affairs and Switzerland as a model for domestic affairs.
On September 30, the Secretary General said that settlement talks would continue after
an expected December 12 EU decision to accept Cyprus as a member. He acknowledged that
“it will make things perhaps a bit more difficult.” Annan met with Clerides and Denktash
CRS-8
IB89140
12-06-02
in New York on October 3-4. The two leaders agreed to establish two bilateral technical
committees. Clerides said that “huge differences” about sovereignty prevented discussion of
other issues. The Secretary General noted, “A comprehensive settlement has to be a
complex, integrated, legally binding and self-executing agreement, where the rights and
obligations of all concerned are clear, unambiguous and not subject to further negotiations.”
Denktash underwent open-heart surgery on October 7. On October 26, Greece and Turkey
agreed to postpone their respective military exercises scheduled for November on Cyprus.
November 11, 2002 Settlement Plan. (Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, presented by the Secretary General.) It calls for a “new
state of affairs” in Cyprus, in which the “common state” government’s relations with its two
politically equal component states is modeled on the Swiss federal example. It will have a
single international legal personality. Component states will participate in the formulation
and implementation of policy in foreign and European Union relations modeled on the
Belgian example. Parliament will have two 48-seat houses. Each state will have equal
representation in the Senate. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies will be allocated in proportion
to population, provided that no state will have less than 25% of the seats. A Presidential
Council will have 6 members. The offices of President and Vice President shall rotate every
10 months among members of the Council. No more than two consecutive presidents may
come from the same component state. Greek and Turkish troops may not exceed a four-digit
figure (9,999). A U.N. peacekeeping operation will remain as long as the common state with
the concurrence of the component states decides. Cyprus shall be demilitarized. A Supreme
Court will have nine judges: three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three non-
Cypriot. During a three-year transition, the leaders of the two sides will be co-presidents for
3 years. The 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance will remain in force.
There will be a single Cypriot citizenship and citizenship of a component state; residence in
a component state may be limited by citizenship, but such limits will have restrictions.
Provisions for return or compensation of property. A map of territorial adjustments, reducing
the Turkish Cypriots’ holding to 28.5% of the territory, is included.
Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
(Greek Cypriot positions are on the left; Turkish Cypriot positions are on the right.)
Sovereignty and Powers
Greek Cypriots say that bicommunal, bizonal
The Turkish Cypriots say that each
federation of two states with one sovereignty
community should form a sovereign state as
should be established. A new federal
equals and join in a “partnership state,”which
constitution should come first, specifying the
would have a single international legal
powers of the central government and those
personality.
of the self administered states.
Presidency
The President will be elected by a common
A rotating presidency will prevent one
vote from Greek Cypriots and Turkish
community retaining control of the office.
Cypriots, but must have votes from the other
Each community separately must elect its
community.
own representative to fill the office of
president or vice president.
CRS-9
IB89140
12-06-02
Territory
The Greek Cypriots accepted the map in the
The Turkish Cypriots rejected the map
U.N. set of ideas, subject to marginal
included in the U.N. set of ideas. Denktash
changes. Turkish Cypriot territory on the
will not discuss territory before Turkish
island must fall under 29+% (optimally to
Cypriot sovereignty is accepted, adding that
24%) to allow the maximum number of
Turkish Cypriots have a “right” to more than
Greek Cypriot refugees to remain under
33% of the island.
Greek Cypriot administration.
Security/Turkish Troops/Guarantees
The island should be demilitarized. A
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whereby
permanent U.N. force should oversee
Turkey rightfully protects the Turkish
implementation of a settlement accord. No
Cypriot community, must not be diluted.
Turkish guarantee.
Turkish troop presence may be reduced if
Turkey retains its Treaty rights. Agrees that
island should be demilitarized. A U.N. force
may stay after a settlement, but without
permanent status which would contradict
sovereignty.
Displaced Persons and Property Rights
A majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees
The population exchange cannot be reversed.
must return to their homes under local Greek
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled should be
Cypriot administration; remaining refugees
compensated at the current value for the
must have the right to return. Turkish
property they occupy at the time of
Cypriots cannot be compensated for property
resettlement. Greek Cypriots unable to
they did not own in 1974. Turkish Cypriots
return to property they owned in 1974 will be
may opt to return to properties they owned in
compensated from the sale of Turkish
the south in 1974 or to be compensated for
Cypriot property in the south. The Turkish
them at 1974 values plus inflation. All
Cypriot property in the south roughly equals
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled will be
the Greek Cypriot property in the north.
c o m p e n s a t e d . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t
Deeds to Greek Cypriot properties in the
misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties
north allocated to Turkish Cypriots in the
is null and void. More recently, the
north since 1974 are legally valid. A Joint
European Union requires free movement of
Property Claims Commission should be
people and purchase of property; therefore,
formed to inventory property on both sides of
exchange of property and compensation will
the island, determine value, and seek
be on a voluntary basis.
resources to pay compensation.
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
The Cyprus talks have been vulnerable to changes in the atmosphere between the two
communities and within each community and to factors not part of the talks.
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
In the south, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Clerides was elected President of the
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993 and reelected in February 1997. The next presidential
CRS-10
IB89140
12-06-02
election will be held in February 2003. Tassos Papadopoulos is the candidate of his right-
wing Democratic Party (DIKO) and the Reformist Party of Working People (AKEL), a
communist party that supports accession to the EU and has engaged leftist parties of the
north. Papadopoulos, a nationalist, is controversial because of his law firm’s representation
of Serbian companies accused of violating U.N. sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. During
the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Papadopoulos had been on the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets
Control list of “blocked person” and the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia still maintains no contacts
with him. Yiannakis Omirou is the candidate of his Social Democratic Movement (KISOS)
and may have the conditional support of DISY.
May 28, 2001 parliamentary elections produced a narrow victory for AKEL, which
received 34.71% of the vote and 20 seats in the 50-seat parliament. DISY dropped to second
place with 34% of the vote and 19 seats. DIKO won 14.84% of the vote and 9 seats; KISOS,
with 6.51% of the vote, holds 4 seats. Four other parties also won seats. Dimitris
Christofias, AKEL’s leader, was elected speaker of parliament. There is no vice president.
The speaker is the second highest official in government and acts for the president when he
is absent or incapacitated.
In the north, Denktash was elected the first “President” of the TRNC in 1983, and
reelected subsequently. On April 15, 2000, Denktash won 43% of the vote to 30% for Dervis
Eroglu in the first round of the election for “President.” Eroglu withdrew on April 19, before
a second round, and Denktash was declared “President” again. In December 6, 1998,
elections for the 50-seat parliament, the National Unity Party (UBP) had won 24 seats; the
Democratic Party (DP) 13; Communal Liberation Party (TKP) 7; and CTP, 6. Dervis Eroglu
then became Prime Minister and formed a coalition with the TKP. However, Eroglu and his
TKP Deputy Prime Minister, Mustafa Akinci, increasingly disagreed. Akinci criticized
Denktash’s withdrawal from the U.N. talks and non-participation in EU membership
negotiations, and Turkey’s influence over TRNC affairs. On May 19, 2001, the National
Popular Movement (UHH) announced its formation, vowing to strengthen ties with Turkey
and to struggle against “foreign forces and local collaborators.” A Denktash adviser is a UHH
founder, and Denktash supports it. On May 24, the UBP withdrew from the coalition with
the TKP. On the same day, the headquarters of a newspaper critical of Denktash was
bombed. On June 5, Eroglu formed a new government with the DP.
In June 30, 2002, local elections, UBP won 16 out of 28 mayoral posts, but the pro-
settlement, pro-EU Republican Turkish Party (CTP), led by Mehmet Ali Talat, won the key
cities of Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta and polled second overall.
Policies of Greece and Turkey
The “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey, have widely different approaches to the Cyprus
problem. They defend and protect their ethnic kin, and their bilateral relations, strained over
Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.
On November 16, 1993, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Clerides
agreed to a joint defense doctrine whereby their governments would decide on the Cyprus
issue jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its defense plan, and any Turkish advance
would lead to war between Greece and Turkey. Clerides announced in April 1994 that
Greece would provide air cover for Cyprus, while Cypriot bases would prepare to refuel
CRS-11
IB89140
12-06-02
Greek Air Force planes, a naval base would be set up, and elite troops would bolster land
forces. In January 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded Papandreou and retained the doctrine.
Turkish governments argue that the Cyprus problem is not acute because Turkish
Cypriot security has been ensured since 1974, and that dialogue is the appropriate channel
for resolution. Turks support their armed forces on the island and agree that they should not
withdraw until Turkish Cypriots’ rights are guaranteed effectively. Turkey provides aid to
the TRNC. In January 2001, a 3-year, $350 million aid package was announced to help the
TRNC overcome a major financial crisis. It also brought increased Turkish supervision of
the Turkish Cypriot economy. On September 30, 2002, Turkey granted Turkish Cypriots
the right to obtain 5-year residence permits in Turkey – to live, work, and acquire property
like Turkish citizens.
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on “lesser” issues, excluding Cyprus
and the Aegean, that eventually led to many bilateral accords. The rapprochement
accelerated after earthquakes in both countries produced mutual sympathy and good will.
Greece’s decision to allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December
confirmed a change in relations. In January 2000, George Papandreou made the first official
visit by a Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey in 37 years. Then Turkish Foreign Minister
Ismail Cem visited Greece in February. On November 2, 2000, Papandreou asserted that the
most basic precondition for a full rapprochement is the solution of the Cyprus problem based
on U.N. Security Council resolutions. On March 12, 2002, Athens and Ankara began
exploratory talks on significant issues concerning the Aegean Sea. Greece continues to
champion Turkey’s cause in the EU.
European Union Membership
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into
force in 1988. On July 4, 1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership, stating that it would
welcome Turkish Cypriot participation in technical negotiations. Turkish Cypriots objected
because EC acceptance of the application recognized the Republic’s government and not
their own. Greece’s EC membership and Turkey’s lack thereof led Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to view increased EC involvement in Cyprus as favoring Greek Cypriots.
The EU was to fix a date for Cyprus membership accession negotiations in January
1995. The EU preferred a prior intercommunal solution, but was willing to begin
negotiations without one. In December 1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs
union and some Europeans demanded that the veto be lifted before Cyprus’s application was
raised. On March 6, 1995, the EU separately ratified the customs union accord and
scheduled accession talks with Cyprus. At Greece’s insistence, the Republic is the EU’s
interlocutor. Turkey said that if Greek Cypriots were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus
government, then Turkey would integrate with the “TRNC” to the same degree. Denktash
asserted that if Cyprus becomes an EU member while Turkey is not a member, then it would
weaken Turkey’s guarantees and mean surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.
On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with
Cyprus would open in 1998. On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit and
Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of
partial integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel that of Cyprus and the EU.
CRS-12
IB89140
12-06-02
Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they “legitimize” an accession process
initiated “illegally” by the Greek Cypriots.
Clerides said that Turkish Cypriots could participate as full members of the negotiating
team for accession if they accept the idea of EU membership and if their participation did not
suggest recognition of the TRNC. On September 25, 1997, then Greek Deputy Foreign
Minister Papandreou said that Greece would block the EU’s expansion eastward if Cyprus
were not accepted because it is divided. France withdrew its objection to accession talks
with a divided Cyprus when Greece withdrew its objection to talks with East European
candidates. On June 12, 1998, at an EU summit, however, France reiterated its opposition.
On November 9, the French, German, Dutch, and Italian foreign ministers warned of
“particular difficulties” linked to accession talks with a divided island. Greece again warned
that it would block EU expansion if Cyprus were excluded on these grounds. On November
10, the EU began substantive accession negotiations with Cyprus.
On May 14, 1999, then Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared, “It is
clear that Cyprus can become a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not
solved.... “ On July 10, he said that Greece would not object to Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy if assured that Cyprus’s accession would go ahead even without a resolution.
Greece later said that it would not veto Turkey’s candidacy if Turkey met conditions relating
to acceptance of borders in the Aegean and Cyprus’ EU accession. Turkey rejects linkage
between the Cyprus issue and its candidacy.
The EU Helsinki summit’s conclusions on December 10, 1999, “underline(d) that a
political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no
settlement has been achieved by the completion of accession negotiations, the ... decision on
accession will be made without the above (i.e., a settlement) being a precondition. In this
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” Greece had insisted that Cyprus be
allowed to join the EU without preconditions and expressed satisfaction. Turkey focused on
the reference to “all relevant factors,” suggesting that the EU could consider a settlement or
lack thereof at that time as a factor in its decision-making. Greeks argue that the phrase
refers to overall EU membership criteria. The summit also affirmed Turkey’s EU candidacy.
In February 2001, Clerides suggested that Denktash’s intransigence may make Cyprus’s
entry into the EU easier because it will enable Cyprus to show it is not to blame for the lack
of a settlement. On April 5, Foreign Minister Kasoulides said that if Denktash accepts that
Cyprus’s accession is inevitable, then he may change his approach to a settlement because
it would be better for Turkey if a settlement were achieved before accession. If Cyprus enters
the EU before a settlement, then Greek Cypriots will vote on Turkey’s own accession.
Kasoulides argued that EU membership addresses concerns at the heart of a settlement,
especially security because, if Cyprus is in the EU, then there is less potential for instability
on the island and between Greece and Turkey.
In November, the European Commission said that it would support any constitutional
arrangements the two sides reached in a settlement, provided that Cyprus was “able to speak
with one voice in the EU decision-making process.” On June 22, Spain, as holder of the
rotating EU Presidency, called upon the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities to achieve a settlement before the conclusion of accession negotiations between
CRS-13
IB89140
12-06-02
the EU and Cyprus. The EU then would accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty
of Accession.
On August 23, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou said, “it is possible for Turkey to
secure a date for commencing accession negotiations at Copenhagen in December, but it
cannot avoid its obligations on the Cyprus issue to continue the talks until the problem’s final
solution.” His statement provides a way to prevent the lack of a Cyprus settlement from
impeding Turkey’s EU prospects. It also links Turkey’s eventual EU accession to a Cyprus
settlement, allowing talks to continue for some time.
An October 9 EU progress report recommended concluding accession negotiations by
the end of 2002 and signing an accession treaty in spring 2003 and expressed hope that a
reunited Cyprus would accede. The EU tentatively set May 1, 2004, as the accession date.
On November 25, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Yasar Yakis, said that if the EU
gives Turkey a date for beginning its negotiations for accession to the EU, then Turkey “will
try more about Cyprus question....”
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP (U.N.
Forces in Cyprus) is now 1,227, with 15 countries participating. On April 2, 1993, the
Secretary General urged a change in financing from having costs borne by UNFICYP
participating countries, contributions, and assessments to assessments. On May 27, the
Council agreed that costs not covered by contributions would be treated as U.N. expenses.
UNFICYP cost about $42.4 million for the period from July 2001 through June 2002. The
government of Cyprus contributes one-third of the cost and the government of Greece
contributes $6.5 million annually; the rest comes out of assessments.
U.S. Policy
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement.
The 1974-1978 period was marked by sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter
Administrations and Congress over Turkey’s role on Cyprus. A congressionally mandated
arms embargo was in place against Turkey until September 1978. In general, Congress still
favors measures to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and encourage concessions by
Denktash, while successive administrations have argued that pressures are counterproductive
and have preferred diplomacy. Although Members do not propose an alternative to the U.N.
talks, they advocate an active U.S. role. In response, President Reagan created the State
Department post of Special Cyprus Coordinator, and President Clinton named a Presidential
Envoy for Cyprus. The Bush Administration decided not to fill the position of Presidential
Envoy. On February 14, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote to the Cypriot
Foreign Minister, affirming that the Administration “fully supports the ongoing U.N. efforts
to achieve a comprehensive settlement” and declared “the U.S. will also remain engaged in
efforts to facilitate a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue.” The United States
CRS-14
IB89140
12-06-02
supports the accession of Cyprus to the EU. It also strongly supports the U.N.’s November
2002 settlement plan.
Since 1978, Congress has appropriated $14 million or $15 million for scholarships,
bicommunal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to
reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on
Cyprus. Fifteen million dollars were appropriated for FY2002.
LEGISLATION
H.Con.Res. 164 (Bilirakis)
Expresses the sense of Congress that security, reconciliation, and prosperity for all
Cypriots can best be achieved within the context of membership in the EU. Introduced and
referred to the Committee on International Relations, June 19, 2001. Forwarded by the
Subcommittee (amended) to the full Committee, July 24, 2002.
H.R. 2707 (Payne)
Restricts U.S. aid to Turkey until Turkey uses its influence with the Turkish Cypriot
leadership to achieve a settlement on Cyprus based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Introduced and referred to the Committee on International Relations, August 1, 2001.
H.Con.Res. 269 (Ros-Lehtinen)
Same as S.Con.Res. 28, below. Introduced and referred to the Committee on
International Relations, November 13, 2001.
S.Con.Res. 28 (Snowe)
Urges the President to undertake efforts to end restrictions on the freedoms and human
rights of the enclaved peoples (426 Greek Cypriots and 160 Maronites) in the occupied area
of Cyprus. Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 26, 2001.
Reported favorably without amendment, with an amended preamble, and without a written
report, and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, July 12.
S.Con.Res. 122 (Snowe)
As introduced, same as H.Con.Res. 164, above. Welcomes direct negotiations between
the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; supports membership of Cyprus in the EU and UN
efforts to facilitate a settlement. Introduced and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations,
June 19, 2002. Reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and with an
amended preamble, and placed on the Senate calendar, August 1. Agreed to in the Senate
with an amendment and an amended preamble, November 18. Sent to and received in the
House, and referred to the Committee on International Relations, November 19.
CRS-15
IB89140
12-06-02
CRS-16