Order Code RL30588
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Current Issues
and U.S. Policy
Updated December 3, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Afghanistan: Current Issues
and U.S. Policy
Summary
The United States and its allies are helping Afghanistan emerging from more
than 22 years of warfare, although substantial risk to Afghan stability remains.
Before the U.S. military campaign against the orthodox Islamist Taliban movement
began on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict since the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996
until its collapse in December 2001 at the hands of the U.S. and Afghan opposition
military campaign.
The defeat of the Taliban enabled the United States and its coalition partners to
send forces throughout Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters and
leaders that remain at large, including Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden. Since the
fall of the Taliban, Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were
forbidden under the Taliban, about 2 million Afghan refugees have returned, and
women are returning to schools and their jobs and participating in politics.
As U.S.-led combat against remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban elements winds
down, the United States is shifting its military focus toward stabilizing the interim
government, including training a new Afghan national army, and supporting the
international security force (ISAF) that is helping the new government provide
security. To help foster development, the United Nations and the Bush
Administration have lifted most sanctions imposed on Afghanistan since the Soviet
occupation. The United States gave Afghanistan a total of over $530 million in
humanitarian and reconstruction aid during FY2002.
There are some indications that ethnic tensions that have been so closely
associated with Afghan politics is fading. Although the minority coalition Northern
Alliance emerged from the war as the dominant force in the country, the United
States and United Nations mediators persuaded the Alliance to share power with
Pashtun representatives in a broad-based interim government. On December 5, 2001,
major Afghan factions, meeting under U.N. auspices in Bonn, signed an agreement
to form an interim government that ran Afghanistan until a traditional national
assembly (“loya jirga”) was held June 11-19, 2002. The loya jirga delegates selected
a new government to run Afghanistan for the next 18 months and approved Hamid
Karzai, a Pashtun, to continue as leader for that time, but the assembly adjourned
without establishing a new parliament. Karzai is said to be highly popular
throughout Afghanistan, including among non-Pashtuns.

Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Rise of The Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coalescence of the Northern Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
War-Related Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Political Settlement Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pre-September 11 Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bonn Conference/Interim Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Loya Jirga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
International Security Force/Afghan National Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Regional Context
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
U.S. Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Taliban Harboring of Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Human Rights/Treatment of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Destruction of Buddha Statues/Hindu Badges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Landmine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Assistance and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
U.S. Assistance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Reconstruction Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
FY2003 Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
U.S. and International Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Afghanistan: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy
Background to Recent Developments
Afghanistan became unstable in the 1970s as both its Communist Party and its
Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each
other.1 The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the
rule of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned during 1933 - 1973. Zahir Shah
was the last King in Afghanistan’s monarchy, which was founded in 1747 by Ahmad
Shah Durrani. Prior to the founding of the monarchy, Afghanistan did not exist as
a distinct political entity, but was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal
confederations often linked to neighboring nations. Zahir Shah was the only
surviving son of King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), whose rule followed that
of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), after a brief rule in 1919 by a Tajik
strongman named Bacha-i-Saqqo.
King Amanullah Khan launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly
after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the
Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer
and who presided over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated.
Zahir Shah promulgated a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature,
and he promoted freedoms for women, including freeing them from the veil.
However, possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support
for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his
cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship
characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978
by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and
then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew
Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society.
The communists tried to redistribute land and bring more women into government
positions. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties and their militias
opposed to communist ideology. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic-oriented militias
1 For more information, see CRS Report RL31389, Afghanistan: Challenges and Options
for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State
, by Richard Cronin; and RL31355,
Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress, by
Rhoda Margesson.

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that later became known as “mujahedin”2 (Islamic fighters), and thereby keep
Afghanistan pro-Soviet. Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin
and installed its local ally, Babrak Karmal, as Afghan president.
After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought
them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify all areas of
the country. The Soviets held major cities, but the outlying mountainous regions
remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefitted from U.S.
weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency, working
closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry
included man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which
proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The Islamic guerrillas also hid and
stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves
throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and domestic opinion
shifted against the war. In 1986, perhaps in an effort to signal some flexibility on a
possible political settlement, the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with the more
pliable former director of Afghan intelligence (Khad), Najibullah Ahmedzai (who
went by the name Najibullah or, on some occasions, the abbreviated Najib).
On April 14, 1988, the Soviet Union, led by reformist leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to
withdraw. The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal on February 15, 1989,
leaving in place a weak communist government facing a determined U.S. backed
mujahedin. A warming of superpower relations moved the United States and Soviet
Union to try for a political settlement to the internal conflict. From late 1989, the
United States pressed the Soviet Union to agree to a mutual cutoff of military aid to
the combatants. The failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union reduced Moscow’s
capability for and interest in supporting communist regimes in the Third World,
leading Moscow to agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff
of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989. Press reports
and independent experts believe the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during fiscal years 1986 - 1990.
Even before the 1991 U.S.-Soviet agreement on Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal
had decreased the strategic and political value of Afghanistan and made the
Administration and Congress less forthcoming with funding. For FY1991, Congress
reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the
previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the
fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late
1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill.3
2 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”
3 See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Volume
5, No. 23, June 6, 1994. Page 377.

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With Soviet backing
Population:
25.8 million
withdrawn, on March 18, 1992,
Afghan President Najibullah
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 38%; Tajik
25%;
publicly agreed to step down
Uzbek 6%; Hazara 19%; others
12%
once an interim government
was formed. His announcement
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 84%; Shiite
set off a wave of regime
Muslim 15%; other 1%
defections, primarily by Uzbek
and Tajik ethnic militias that
Per Capita Income:
$280/yr (World Bank figure)
had previously been allied with
External Debt:
$5.5 billion (1996 est.)
the Kabul go v e r n ment,
including that of Uzbek militia
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets
commander Abdul Rashid
Dostam (see below).
Major Imports:
food, petroleum
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2000.
Joining with the defectors,
p r o m i n e n t m u j a h e d i n
commander Ahmad Shah
Masud (of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani)
sent his fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the installation of a mujahedin regime
on April 18, 1992. Masud, nicknamed “Lion of the Panjshir,” had earned a
reputation as a brilliant strategist by successfully preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Two
days earlier, as the mujahedin approached Kabul, Najibullah failed in an attempt to
flee Afghanistan. He, his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the day in September 1996 that the Taliban movement seized control of
the city – Taliban fighters entered the U.N. compound, captured Najibullah and his
brother, and hanged them.
The victory over Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in
Afghanistan but also exposed the serious differences among them. Under an
agreement among all the major mujahedin parties, Burhannudin Rabbani became
President in June 1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in
December 1994. His refusal to step down at the end of that time period–on the
grounds that political authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear
successor–led many of the other parties to accuse him of attempting to monopolize
power. His government faced daily shelling from another mujahedin commander,
Pakistan-backed Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, a radical Islamic fundamentalist who headed
a faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and who was nominally the Prime Minister.
(Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his powerbase around Jalalabad
despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran
before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002.) Four years (1992-1996) of civil war
among the mujahedin followed, destroying much of Kabul and creating popular
support for the Taliban. In addition, the dominant Pashtun ethnic group accused the
Rabbani government of failing to represent all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, and
many Pashtuns allied with the Taliban.

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The Rise of The Taliban
The Taliban movement was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and
students, many of them former mujahedin who had moved into the western areas of
Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They are mostly ultra-
orthodox Sunni Muslims who practice a form of Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that
practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic
Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality
in Afghanistan, accounting for about 38% of Afghanistan’s population of about 26
million. Taliban leaders viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and responsible
for continued civil war in Afghanistan and the deterioration of security in the major
cities. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the Taliban
seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994 and continued
to gather strength. The Taliban’s early successes encouraged further defections
around Afghanistan, and by February 1995 it had reached the gates of Kabul, after
which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the
Taliban captured Herat province, on the border with Iran, and expelled the pro-
Iranian governor of the province, Ismail Khan. In September 1996, a string of
Taliban victories east of Kabul led to the withdrawal of the Rabbani government to
the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul, with most of its heavy weapons intact. The
Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban lost much of its international support as its policies unfolded. It
imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controls, and used harsh
punishments, including executions, on transgressors. The Taliban regime made
extensive use of its Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of
Vice, a force of religious police officers that often used violence and physical
punishments to enforce Islamic laws, customs, and moral regulations. It banned
television, popular music, and dancing, and required male beards. The Taliban
prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in
health care.
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders. During the war against the
Soviet Union, Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Umar fought in the Hizb-e-Islam
(Islamic Party) mujahedin party led by Yunis Khalis. During Taliban rule, Mullah
Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. He lost an eye
during the anti-Soviet war, rarely appeared in public, and did not take an active role
in the day-to-day affairs of governing. However, in times of crisis or to discuss
pressing issues, he summoned Taliban leaders to meet with him in Qandahar.
Considered a hardliner within the Taliban regime, Mullah Umar forged a close
personal bond with bin Laden and was adamantly opposed to handing him over to
another country to face justice. Born near Qandahar, Umar is about 50 years old. His
ten year old son, as well as his stepfather, reportedly died at the hands of U.S.
airstrikes in early October 2001. Umar, having reportedly fled Qandahar city when
the Taliban surrendered the city on December 9, 2001, is still at large and believed
alive, possibly in his native Uruzgan Province.

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Coalescence of the Northern Alliance
The rise of the Taliban movement caused other power centers to make common
cause with ousted President Rabbani and commander Masud. The individual groups
allied with them in a “Northern Alliance.” The Persian-speaking core of the
Northern Alliance was located not only in the Panjshir Valley of the northeast but
also in largely Persian-speaking western Afghanistan near the Iranian border. The
fighters in the west are generally loyal to the charismatic Ismail Khan, who regained
the governorship of his former stronghold in Herat and surrounding provinces after
the Taliban collapse of mid-November 2001.
One non-Tajik component of the Northern Alliance is the Uzbek militia force
(the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Uzbeks constitute about 6% of the population, compared with 25%
that are Tajik.). Dostam’s break with Najibullah in early 1992 helped pave the way
for the overthrow of the communist regime. He subsequently fought against Rabbani
during his presidency in an effort to persuade him to yield power, but then allied with
Rabbani and the Northern Alliance when the Taliban took power in Kabul. Dostam
once commanded about 25,000 troops, significant amounts of armor and combat
aircraft, and even some Scud missiles, but infighting within his faction left him
unable to hold off Taliban forces. The Taliban captured his power base in August
1998, leaving him in control of only small areas of northern Afghanistan near the
border with Uzbekistan. During the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, he, in concert
with a Tajik commander Atta Mohammad and a Shiite Hazara commander
Mohammad Mohaqqiq, recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif from the Taliban. There have
been tensions among the three in governing the city and its environs since, often
resulting in minor clashes. Clashes escalated in July 2002 but were calmed after
mediation by the U.N. personnel in Afghanistan (UNAMA, U.N. Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan).
Shiite Muslim parties, generally less active against the Soviet occupation than
were the Sunni parties, constituted another part of the Northern Alliance. In June
1992, Iranian-backed Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight Hazara tribe
Shiite Muslim groups), agreed to join the Rabbani government in exchange for a
share of power. Hizb-e-Wahdat has traditionally received some material support
from Iran, which practices Shiism and has an affinity for the Hazaras. In September
1998, Taliban forces captured the Hazara stronghold of Bamiyan city, capital of
Bamiyan province, raising fears in Iran and elsewhere that Taliban forces would
massacre the Hazara civilians. This contributed to the movement of Iran and the
Taliban militia to the brink of armed conflict that month. After that time, Hizb-e-
Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city but were unable to hold it. They
recaptured Bamiyan province as the Taliban was collapsing in November 2001.
Another mujahedin party leader, Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a Pashtun-
dominated faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf
lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his
interpretation of Sunni Islam. This interpretation (“Wahhabism”) is also shared by
the Taliban, which partly explains why many of Sayyaf’s fighters originally defected
to the Taliban movement when that movement was taking power. Although he is a
Pashtun, Sayyaf himself remained allied with the Northern Alliance and placed his

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remaining forces at Alliance disposal. Sayyaf is considered personally close to
Rabbani and is reputedly maneuvering in concert with Rabbani for a future leadership
role.
Operation Enduring Freedom. The political rivalries among opposition
groups long hindered their ability to shake the Taliban’s grip on power. In the few
years prior to the beginning of the U.S.-led war, the opposition had steadily lost
ground, even in areas outside Taliban’s Pashtun ethnic base. The losses extended to
the point at which the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all
major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on
September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks that led to the U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan, when Ahmad Shah Masud, the undisputed, charismatic
military leader of Northern Alliance forces, was assassinated at his headquarters by
suicide bombers allegedly linked to Al Qaeda. His successor was his intelligence
chief, Muhammad Fahim, who is a veteran commander but lacked the overarching
authority or charisma of Masud.
The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001
(Operation Enduring Freedom). The campaign consisted of U.S. airstrikes on
Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by U.S. special operations
forces working in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban
forces. Taliban control of the north collapsed first, followed by its control of
southern Afghanistan, which it progressively lost to pro-U.S. Pashtun forces, such as
those of Hamid Karzai, who is now President. Karzai, the 46 year old leader of the
powerful Popolzai tribe of Pashtuns, had entered Afghanistan in October 2001 to
organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, and he was supported in that effort by
U.S. special forces. He has relatives in and close ties to the United States. By the
time the Taliban had been defeated, Northern Alliance forces controlled about 70%
of Afghanistan, including Kabul, which they captured on November 12, 2001.
Groups of Pashtun commanders took control of cities and provinces in the east and
south. One example is Ghul Agha Shirzai, the new governor of Qandahar province
and environs.
Despite the overwhelming defeat of the Taliban, small Taliban and Al Qaeda
groups continue to operate throughout Afghanistan. The United States has about
8,000 troops in and around Afghanistan, and coalition forces are contributing another
8,000, including those in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
discussed further below. The whereabouts of Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden,
identified by the Bush Administration as the main organizer of the September 11
attacks, are still unknown. He reportedly was wounded at or about the time of the
U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern
Afghanistan (December 2001), but an audiotape of his voice released in November
2002 was judged by U.S. experts to be authentic and served as evidence that he
survived the war, overturning the growing U.S. belief that he was killed. The United
States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot
Valley south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many
as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Several smaller military operations by the
United States and its coalition partners have been conducted since, particularly in
eastern Afghanistan. Some pockets are said to straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border, and press reports indicate that Pakistan has been allowing the United States

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to conduct low-level military or military support operations inside Pakistan since
April 2002.
U.S. military commanders in and outside Afghanistan have said since August
2002 that the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is winding down,
and that the U.S. military is increasingly focusing its operations on ensuring political
stability. There is no publicly available timetable for that mission. General Tommy
Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for
prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, said in August 2002 that U.S. forces would likely
need to remain in Afghanistan for years ahead to prevent terrorist groups from
resettling there. In early December 2002, U.S. forces became involved in clashes
between local leaders in the Herat area and called in B-52 airstrikes to quell the
fighting. In late October 2002, CENTCOM ended its practice of providing captured
weapons to local militias with which it is working, saying that the practice conflicts
with the overall U.S. effort to strengthen the central government. Press reports in
early December 2002 said the Defense Department will devote increased attention
to creating secure conditions for aid workers. The plan might entail increasing the
number of U.S. civil affairs officers in Afghanistan from the 60 there currently to
about 250-350.4
Fears of terrorism and instability were increased significantly on September 5,
2002. That day, there was a car bombing in a crowded marketplace in Kabul, and an
assassination attempt against President Karzai. Karzai was unhurt and the assailant,
a member of the security detail, was killed by U.S. special forces who serve as
Karzai’s protection unit. Afghan officials blamed Taliban/Al Qaeda remnants for
both events. Employees of a private U.S. security contractor (Dyncorp) have taken
over the Afghan leadership protection effort as of November 2002.
War-Related Casualties. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on
the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of
Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. On
July 1, 2002, a U.S. airstrike on suspected Taliban leaders in Uruzgan Province, the
home province of Taliban head Mullah Umar, mistakenly killed about 40 civilians.
According to Centcom, as of May 24, 2002, 37 U.S. servicepersons were killed,
including from enemy fire, friendly fire, and non-hostile deaths (accidents). Of
coalition forces, 4 Canadian and 1 Australian military personnel were killed in hostile
circumstances. In addition, according to CENTCOM, there have been ten U.S.
deaths in the Philippines theater of Operation Enduring Freedom (operations against
the Al Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf organization), all of which resulted from a
helicopter crash.
Political Settlement Efforts
The war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban paved the way for a longstanding
U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government to bear fruit, although
substantial instability remains.
4 Rashid, Ahmed. Plans for Afghan Enclaves Indicates Shift in U.S. Policies. Wall Street
Journal
, December 3, 2002.

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Pre-September 11 Efforts. For the 8 years prior to the war, the United
States worked primarily through the United Nations to end the Afghan civil conflict,
because the international body is viewed as a credible mediator by all sides. It was
the forum used for ending the Soviet occupation. However, some observers
criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged in Afghan mediation to bring
about a settlement. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, a succession of U.N.
mediators – former Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri (March 1994-July
1996); German diplomat Norbert Holl (July 1996-December 1997); and Algeria’s
former Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (August 1997-October 1999) – sought to
arrange a ceasefire, and ultimately a peaceful transition to a broad-based
government. The proposed process for arranging a transition incorporated many
ideas advanced by former King Zahir Shah and outside experts, in which a permanent
government was to be chosen through a traditional Afghan selection process, the
hallmark of which was to be the holding of a loya jirga, a grand assembly of notable
Afghans.
These U.N. efforts, at times, appeared to make significant progress, but
ceasefires and other agreements between the warring factions always broke down.
Brahimi suspended his activities in frustration in October 1999, and another U.N.
mediator, Spanish diplomat Fransesc Vendrell, was appointed.
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups. In parallel with
direct U.N. mediation efforts, the “Six Plus Two” contact group consisted of the
United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Reflecting the common
concerns about Afghan-inspired regional instability, the “Six Plus Two “ contact
group met since early 1997 to discuss ways of bringing peace to Afghanistan. The
Six Plus Two process was created after several informal meetings of some of the key
outside parties in which the United States and others agreed not to provide weapons
to the warring factions. (In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban
on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy already that had been
already in place less formally.5) The process was conducted in coordination with
U.N. peace efforts in Afghanistan.
In 2000, possibly because of the lack of progress in the Six Plus Two process,
another contact group began meeting in Geneva, and with more frequency than the
Six Plus Two. The Geneva grouping includes Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United
States. Another Afghan-related grouping multilateral mediating grouping consisted
of some Islamic countries operating under the ad-hoc “Committee on Afghanistan”
under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The countries
in that ad-hoc committee include Pakistan, Iran, Guinea, and Tunisia. As of late
2002, these groups technically still exist, although they no longer constitute major
centers of international decision-making on Afghanistan.
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes. During the period of
Taliban rule, the United States also supported initiatives coming from Afghans
inside Afghanistan and in exile. During 1997, Afghans not linked to any of the
5 Federal Register, Volume 61, No. 125, June 27, 1996. Page 33313.

CRS-9
warring factions began a new peace initiative called the Intra Afghan Dialogue. This
grouping, consisting of former mujahedin commanders and clan leaders, held
meetings during 1997 and 1998 in Bonn, Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Ankara. Another
group, based on the participation of former King Zahir Shah, was centered in Rome
(“Rome Grouping”), where the former King lived. A third grouping, calling itself
the “Cyprus Process,” consisted of former Afghan officials and other Afghan exiles
generally sympathetic to Iran, including a relative of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts. The September 11 attacks and the start
of U.S. military action against the Taliban injected new urgency into the search for
a government that might replace the Taliban. In late September 2001, Brahimi was
brought back as the U.N. representative to help arrange an alternative government,
an effort that, it was hoped, would encourage defections within Taliban ranks and
hasten its demise. On November 14, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in establishing a transitional
administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote
stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Many of the hopes for a post-Taliban government at first appeared to center on
the former King. A 2-day (October 25-26, 2001) meeting of more than 700 Afghan
tribal elders in Peshawar, Pakistan (“Peshawar Grouping”) issued a concluding
statement calling for the return of the former King. However, even though the
gathering was supportive of the former King, neither the King’s representatives nor
those of the Northern Alliance actually attended the gathering because of their
suspicions that the meeting was orchestrated by Pakistan for its own ends.
Bonn Conference/Interim Government. As part of the effort to craft a
new government, a U.S. envoy to the Northern Alliance, Ambassador James
Dobbins, was appointed in early November 2001 and, until April 2002, coordinated
U.S. reconstruction assistance efforts. (Later, another envoy was appointed, NSC
Senior Director for the Near East Zalmay Khalilzad, see below.) In late November,
after Kabul had already fallen (November 12), delegates of the major Afghan factions
– most prominently the Northern Alliance and representatives of the former King –
gathered in Bonn, Germany, at the invitation of the United Nations. The Taliban was
not invited. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed an agreement to form a 30-
member interim administration, to govern until the holding in June 2002 of a loya
jirga
, to be opened by the former King. The loya jirga was to choose a new
government to run Afghanistan for the next eighteen months until a new constitution
is drafted and national elections held. It also would establish a 111-member
parliament. According to the Bonn agreement, the new government is to operate
under the constitution of 1964 until a new constitution is adopted. The last loya jirga
that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution.
Communist leader Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 largely to approve his
policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.
The Bonn agreement also provided for an international peace keeping force to
maintain security, at least in Kabul. The Bonn conference’s conclusions were
endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the
international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution
1386, adopted December 20, 2001. (For text of the Bonn agreement, see
[http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm].)

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At the Bonn meeting, Hamid Karzai was selected chairman of the interim
administration, which governed from December 22, 2001, until the end of the loya
jirga
. However, Karzai presided over a cabinet in which a slight majority (17 out of
30) of the positions were held by the Northern Alliance, with this block holding the
key posts of Defense (Mohammad Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah),
and Interior (Yunus Qanuni). The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the exception of Dr.
Abdullah, who is half Tajik and half Pashtun. This trio, all of whom are in their mid-
40s and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud, is considered generally well
disposed toward the United States, although they also have ties to Iran and Russia,
and all three are suspicious of Pakistan.
The Loya Jirga. In late January 2002, the 21 members of the commission,
including two women, were chosen to prepare for the loya jirga. In preparation for
the assembly, the former King returned to Afghanistan on April 18, 2002, and he
conducted meetings with Afghan notables and local leaders. By the beginning of
June, 381 districts of Afghanistan had chosen the 1,550 delegates to the loya jirga.
About two hundred of the delegates were women.
On the first day of the loya jirga (June 11, 2002), the former King and
Burhannudin Rabbani withdrew from leadership consideration and endorsed interim
government chairman Hamid Karzai to continue as Afghanistan’s leader. Their
withdrawals, reportedly urged or supported by the United States, paved the way for
Karzai’s selection as leader by the loya jirga delegates over two other candidates, one
of whom was a woman. On June 13, 2002, by an overwhelming margin, the loya
jirga
selected Karzai to lead Afghanistan until the elections at the end of 2003. On
its last day, June 19, 2002, the assembly approved Karzai’s new cabinet, which
included three vice presidents and several “presidential advisors” in an effort to
balance the ethnic and factional composition of the government. However, the loya
jirga
adjourned without establishing the new parliament; a group of experts has
remained in Kabul to continue working on the parliament, with no decision to date.
In the cabinet endorsed by the loya jirga, Karzai moved Yunus Qanooni to head
the Ministry of Education and serve as an adviser on security. He was replaced as
Interior Minister by Taj Mohammad Wardak, a Pashtun. Abdullah and Fahim
retained their positions, with Fahim acquiring the additional title of vice president.
Other notable changes to the government made by the loya jirga include the
following:
! Ashraf Ghani replaced Hedayat Amin Arsala as Finance Minister
(see below). Ghani is a Pashtun with ties to international financial
institutions.
! The new Minister of Women’s Affairs is Habiba Sorabi, replacing
Sima Samar.
! Hajji Abdul Qadir, a Pashtun, who is also governor of Nangahar
Province, switched portfolios to head the Ministry of Public Works.
He had headed the Ministry of Urban Affairs in the interim
goverment. He was also appointed a vice president. However,

CRS-11
Abdul Qadir was assassinated by unknown gunmen on July 6.
Hedayat Amin Arsala was appointed a Vice President to replace
Qadir. Arsala, a former World Bank official, is a supporter of the
former King and a relative of Pir Ahmad Gaylani, leader of a pro-
King mujahedin faction during the anti-Soviet war.
! The third vice president appointed was Karim Khalili, the leader of
a faction of the Hazara Shiite party Hizb-e-Wahdat.
! Herat leader Ismail Khan was given no formal post; he preferred to
remain in his locality rather than take a position in the central
government in Kabul. His son, Mir Wais Saddiq was retained in the
new cabinet, heading the Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism.
(He headed the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in the interim
government.)
! Dostam was given no formal post, although he served as deputy
Defense Minister in the interim administration. Dostam said in early
August 2002 that he prefers to remain in his northern stronghold
rather than accept a post that would bring him to Kabul.
! A national security council was formed as an advisory body to
Karzai. The intention in establishing this council is to increase
Kabul’s decisionmaking power and extend central government
influence. The national security adviser is Zalmai Rasool.
Since the loya jirga, there have been reports of strain between Karzai and
Fahim, who continues to dominate most of the armed force in Afghanistan. U.S.
envoy Khalilzad visited Kabul in August 2002 to try to ease these tensions, with
some signs of success, at least for the current time. Some of the reports of strains
surfaced after Karzai replaced his Afghan bodyguard force with U.S. special forces,
shortly after the assassination of Abd al Qadir. The bodyguard switch suggested to
some Afghans that Karzai did not trust Fahim’s forces to protect him or the interests
of Afghanistan as a whole.
International Security Force/Afghan National Army. The International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) created by the Bonn agreement has reached its
agreed strength of over 4,900. It is headed until December 20, 2002 by Turkey,
which replaced Britain as the lead force following the loya jirga. After that time,
Germany and the Netherlands will begin assuming command for the December 20,
2002- December 20, 2003 period. The force is operating in conjunction with Afghan
security forces in Kabul and is coordinating, to an extent, with the approximately
8,000 U.S. military forces in and immediately around Afghanistan. In an effort to
assuage Turkish concerns about the costs of heading the force, the United States
offered Turkey $228 million in new U.S. aid to compensate for those costs.
As of August 2002, ISAF has forces from the following 18 countries: Austria
(71 troops), Belgium (19), Bulgaria (32), Czech Republic (132), Denmark (36),
Finland (31), France (520), Germany (1121), Greece (163), Ireland (7), Italy (403),
the Netherlands (232), New Zealand (8), Norway (17), Romania (155), Spain (349),

CRS-12
Sweden (38), Turkey (1322), and the United Kingdom (426). Germany will roughly
double its troop commitment when it assumes command of ISAF.
Because of several threats to Afghanistan’s internal security since the interim
government was constituted, Afghan officials want the force to be expanded and
deploy to other major cities. The Bush Administration favors its own alternative
plan to help build an Afghan national army rather than expand ISAF, but the
Administration has recently expressed support for an expansion if enough troops are
contributed to it. Training by U.S. special forces has begun, and the first 2,500 have
completed training by the end of 2002 and, in early December 2002, began training
as a battalion, according to the Defense Department. On May 3, President Bush
pledged to Karzai an additional $2 million in U.S. aid to help equip the new army.
The Department of Defense envisions training up to 14,400 Afghan troops by the end
of 2003 at a cost, including establishing a general staff and a headquarters staff, of
about $135 million.6 Afghan officials say the desired size of the army is 70,000, a
level that will likely not be reached for several more years, at the current rate of U.S.-
led training. The United States plans to provide some additional U.S. arms and/or
defense services to the national army, according to statements by U.S. officials. In
November 2002, at U.S. urging, Albania sent surplus light weaponry to the fledgling
Afghan national army.
Some analysts have expressed concern that the national army will likely not be
ready in a timely enough manner to deal with the security threats now facing the
country, although the Administration and others indicate that U.S. forces will be
engaged in Afghanistan for a long enough period to ensure security until the Afghan
army can assume its full mission. The desire to expand ISAF’s mandate gained
further strength among Afghan officials following the July 1 assassination of Vice
President Abdul Qadir. Others are concerned about reports that Vice
President/Defense Minister General Fahim is weighting the recruitment of the
national army to favor his Tajik ethnic base, and that Pashtuns, in reaction, are
refusing recruitment or leaving the national army program.
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity. Since the constitution of the
interim government, several countries have reopened embassies in Kabul, including
the United States. In conjunction with the formation of the interim administration,
NSC official Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed a special envoy to Afghanistan in
December 2001 and has made several extended visits there. In late March 2002, a
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn, was sworn in Kabul. The new
Afghan government has reopened the Afghan embassy in Washington and a new
ambassador, U.S.-educated and U.S.-based energy entrepreneur Ishaq Shahryar, has
taken office. He previously was an adviser to former King Zahir Shah.
The priorities of the new government thus far have been expanding
governmental capabilities, guiding reconstruction efforts, and attempting to bring
security to all parts of Afghanistan. One of Karzai’s principal challenges is to
extend the writ of the central government while providing local leaders the degree of
6 Briefing Slides Prepared by the National Defense University, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, for J-5 of the Department of Defense Joint Staff. June 2002.

CRS-13
autonomy that Afghanistan’s regions traditionally have sought. Achieving a balance
between central and local authority has generally been the key to stability in
Afghanistan’s past. Some local militias have been disarmed, but many independent
militias remain throughout the country. In August 2002, Karzai threatened to send
Afghan central government forces to combat a rebellious local leader in Paktia
province, Padsha Khan Zadran, but no fighting ensued. In early November 2002,
Karzai fired 15 provincial officials, partly in an attempt to establish the primacy of
the central government. That same month, police in Kabul suppressed student riots
at Kabul University; they were protesting poor dormitory facilities.
Karzai has sought and received some international funds to pay government
workers who had not been paid in many months. At a meeting on October 13, 2002,
international donors applauded Afghanistan’s budgetary and reconstruction plans.
The national airline, Ariana, also has resumed some operations, although its fleet is
very small. On March 23, 2002, schools reopened following the Persian/Afghan new
year (Nowruz). Girls returned to the schools for the first time since the Taliban
came to power, and a total of 3 million children have returned to school since the fall
of the Taliban.
Regional Context 7
Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming
alarmed about threats to their own security interests emanating from Afghanistan.
All of these governments endorsed the Bonn agreement, but some experts believe
that the neighboring governments will likely attempt, over the long term, to
manipulate Afghanistan’s factions and its political structure to their advantage.
Pakistan8
Pakistan reversed its position on the Taliban in the aftermath of the September
11 attacks. Pakistan initially saw the Taliban movement as an instrument with which
to fulfill its goals. Those goals traditionally have been to seek an Afghan central
government strong enough to prevent calls for unity between ethnic Pashtuns in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to
provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. In the wake of the Soviet
pullout in 1989, Pakistan was troubled by continued political infighting in
Afghanistan that was enabling drug trafficking to flourish and to which Afghan
refugees did not want to return. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as essential to opening up
trade relations and energy routes with the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union.
7 For further information, see CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic
Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia
. December 7, 1999, by Kenneth
Katzman.
8 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign
Affairs,
November - December 1999.

CRS-14
Pakistan was the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one
of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others)
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Prior to the September 11
attacks, the government of General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October
1999 coup, resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership
to achieve bin Laden’s extradition. Pakistan’s links to the Taliban, and the Taliban’s
hosting of Al Qaeda terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, were a major focus of a visit
to Pakistan by Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering in May 2000, but Pakistan
made no commitments to help the United States on that issue. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly an effort by the United States and
Russia to compel Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban. Pakistan
did not completely cease military assistance, but it abided by some provisions of the
resolution, for example by ordering the Taliban to cut the staff at its embassy in
Pakistan.9 Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Pakistan
had said it would cooperate with a follow-on U.N. Security Council Resolution (1363
of July 30, 2001) that provided for U.N. border monitors to ensure that no
neighboring state was providing military equipment or advice to the Taliban.
Pakistan’s modest pre-September 11 steps toward cooperation with the United
States reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing
existing Islamic movements inside Pakistan and becoming an increasing
embarrassment to Pakistan itself. Pakistan also feared that its position on the Taliban
was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with Pakistan’s arch-rival,
India. These considerations, coupled with U.S. pressure as well as offers of
economic benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the
September 11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to
Pakistani airspace, ports, airfields. Pakistan also arrested hundreds of Al Qaeda
fighters fleeing Afghanistan and turned them over to the United States and deployed
substantial forces to the Afghan border to capture Al Qaeda fighters attempting to
flee into Pakistan. Pakistani authorities helped the United States track and capture
top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah in early April 2002, and alleged September 11
plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (captured September 11, 2002). Pakistani forces
reportedly are helping the United States track and fight Al Qaeda forces along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a
strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary
that a post-Taliban government dominated by the Northern Alliance, which is
backed by India, would amount to Indian encirclement of Pakistan. To counter that
perceived threat, Pakistan was instrumental in preventing Northern Alliance leader
Rabbani from heading the post-Taliban government. Karzai visited Pakistan in late
January 2002, and the two countries pledged to look to the future rather than to the
recent history of strains. Some Afghan officials are concerned about the implications
for the new Afghan government of the election gains of some pro-Taliban parties in
Pakistan’s October 2002 parliamentary elections; those parties did well in districts
that border Afghanistan.
9 Constable, Pamela. New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties. Washington Post,
January 19, 2001.

CRS-15
As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from
Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan.
Iran
Iran’s key national interests in Afghanistan are to exert influence over western
Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to
protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran strongly supported the Northern Alliance
and its Tajik (Persian-speaking) leaders who have traditionally been strong in western
Afghanistan as well as northern Afghanistan. Since Taliban forces ousted Ismail
Khan from Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995, Iran
has seen the Taliban movement as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan. After that
time, Iran provided fuel, funds, and ammunition to the Northern Alliance10 and
hosted fighters loyal to Khan, who was captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped
and fled to Iran in March 2000. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly
came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed
in the course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at
the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash,
possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities.
The United States and Iran have long had common positions on Afghanistan,
despite deep U.S.-Iran differences on other issues. U.S. officials have long
acknowledged working with Tehran, under the auspices of the Six Plus Two contact
group and Geneva group. U.S. and Iranian common interests on Afghanistan might
explain why Iran generally expressed support for the U.S. effort to forge a global
coalition against terrorism, although it publicly opposed U.S. military action against
Afghanistan. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in
Afghanistan, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to
transit Iran. On the other hand, some Iranian leaders have been harshly critical of
U.S. military action against the Taliban; in late September Supreme Leader Ali
Khamene’i compared that action to the September 11 terrorist attacks themselves.
Amid reports Iran seeks to exert influence over the new government by arming
pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned Iran
against meddling in Afghanistan. The President listed Iran as part of an “axis of
evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, partly because of Iran’s
actions in Afghanistan. Since then, the Bush Administration has continued to accuse
Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government and of failing to attempt
to locate or arrest Al Qaeda fighters who have fled to Iran from Afghanistan. Partly
in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran reportedly expelled a major
critic of the interim administration, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, from Iran. Hikmatyar
subsequently returned to Afghanistan but escaped an early May 2002 U.S. strike by
a CIA-controlled Predator-launched missile. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran
is an important neighbor of Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002,
pledging to build ties with the Islamic republic. Saudi Arabia said in early August
10 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran In Talks On Ending War In Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997. A14.

CRS-16
2002 that Iran had turned over to Saudi Arabia several Al Qaeda fighters located and
arrested in Iran.
As of October 2002, about 275,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran
since the Taliban fell. About 1.2 million remain, many of which are integrated into
Iranian society.
Russia
A number of considerations might explain why Russia supported the U.S. effort
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including the use of bases in Central Asia to
conduct the war. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the
further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central Asian states
or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. Russia’s fear became acute
following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s Dagestan region by Islamic
guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya. Some reports link at least one faction of the
guerrillas to Al Qaeda.11 This faction is led by a Chechen of Arab origin who is
referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab). In January 2000, the
Taliban became the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s
independence, and some Chechen fighters integrated into Taliban/Al Qaeda forces
were captured or killed during Operation Enduring Freedom.
The U.S. and Russian positions on Afghanistan became coincident well before
the September 11 attacks.12 Even before the U.S.-led war, Russia was supporting the
Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance.13 U.S.-
Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 and
1233 (see section on “Harboring of Al Qaeda, below).
On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent
attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda. President Bush has been critical of Russian tactics in
Chechnya, although the criticism has been more muted since the September 11
attacks. Some outside experts believe that Russia exaggerated the threat emanating
from Afghanistan in an effort to persuade the Central Asian states to rebuild closer
defense ties to Moscow and to justify its actions in Chechnya.
11 Whittell, Giles. “Bin Laden Link To Dagestan Rebel Fightback.” London Times,
September 6, 1999.
12 Constable, Pamela. “Russia, U.S. Converge on Warnings to Taliban.” Washington Post,
June 4, 2000.
13 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.

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Central Asian States14
During Taliban rule, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan grew
increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements were receiving
safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of these states banded together with
Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime.
The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, two of them –
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – had seen themselves as particularly vulnerable to
militants harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul Rashid Dostam,
the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his influence in 1998,
although he has now regained power in the north. Prior to the U.S. war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda, Uzbek officials had said that more active support from
Uzbekistan would not necessarily have enabled Dostam to overturn Taliban control
of the north.15
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in
Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.16 One
of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Uzbekistan was
highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks and
placed military facilities at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the Taliban
and Al Qaeda. About 1,000 U.S. troops from the 10th Mountain Division, as well as
U.S. aircraft, have been based at the Khanabad air base there. Following the fall of
the Taliban, in December 2001 Uzbekistan reopened the Soviet-built “Friendship
Bridge” over the Amu Darya river in order to facilitate the flow of aid into
Uzbekistan. Uzbek officials in Tashkent told CRS in May 2002 that the defeat of the
Taliban has made them less anxious about the domestic threat from the IMU, and
press reports say the IMU has been severely weakened by its war defeats and
Namangani’s death.
Tajikistan feared that its buffer with Afghanistan would disappear if the Taliban
defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base borders Tajikistan. Some of
the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including Namangani, fought alongside the
Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the 1994-1997 civil war
in that country. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, whose 25,000 troops guards
the border with Afghanistan, initially sent mixed signals on the question of whether
it would give the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan. However,
on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of
14 For further information, see CRS Report RL30294. Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests
. December 7, 1999.
15 CRS conversations with Uzbek government officials in Tashkent. April 1999.
16 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.

CRS-18
three air bases in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S.
use, which it did formally offer in early November 2001.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU
guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.17
Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the year prior to the
September 11 attacks, but it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the
Taliban. In early December 2001, Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. warplanes, and
U.S. and French aircraft, including U.S. Marine F-18 strike aircraft, have been using
part of the international airport at Manas (Peter J. Ganci base) as a base for combat
flights in Afghanistan.18 Kyrgyzstan said in March 2002 that there is no time limit
on the U.S. use of military facilities there; French aircraft withdrew in September
2002 as the war wound down. Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the United
States in July 2002 to allow coalition aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airports in case of
an emergency or short term need related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan was not
alarmed at Taliban gains and chose to seek close relations with the Taliban
leadership. An alternate interpretation is that Turkmenistan viewed engagement with
the Taliban as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic
activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leadership also saw Taliban control as
bringing the peace and stability that would permit construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. That pipeline would help
Turkmenistan bring its large gas reserves to world markets. However, the September
11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the
country politically supported the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. There are no indications
the United States requested basing rights in Turkmenistan.
China
China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan
corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for
Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war. China expressed its concern through active membership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted above. In December 2000, sensing
China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met
with Mullah Umar at the Taliban’s invitation.
Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin
Laden, China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the
Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic
considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup on its doorstep. China is an ally
with Pakistan, in part to balance out India, which China sees as a rival. Pakistan’s
cooperation with the United States appears to have allayed China’s opposition to U.S.
17 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92.
18 Some information based on CRS visit to the Manas facility in Kyrgyzstan, May 2002.

CRS-19
military action, and President Bush has praised China’s cooperation with the anti-
terrorism effort in his meetings with senior leaders of China.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, and particularly to hardline Sunni Muslim
fundamentalist resistance leaders. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict
Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to
formally recognize the Taliban government. (The others are Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates.) The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to
Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution.
However, Iranian-Saudi relations improved dramatically beginning in 1997, and
balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor motivating Saudi policy toward
Afghanistan.
Instead, drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet
war, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-
Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s
presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself
and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press
reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not
agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin
Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from
Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could
become a rallying point for opposition to the regime. In March 2000 and again in
May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored
indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between the warring factions, but the talks were
not productive.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia has generally cooperated with the U.S.
war effort. Along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the
Taliban in late September 2001. It quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi
base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S.
aircraft to launch strikes on Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has
generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so
is not publicly requested or highly publicized.
U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan have long been multifaceted, although in
the 3 years prior to the September 11 attacks, U.S. goals had largely narrowed to
ending the presence of the Al Qaeda leadership and infrastructure there. Since the
Soviet withdrawal, returning peace and stability to Afghanistan has also been a U.S.
goal, pursued with varying degrees of intensity. Other longstanding U.S. goals have
included an end to discrimination against women and girls, the eradication of
narcotics production, and alleviating severe humanitarian difficulties.

CRS-20
The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement as
it was gathering strength, but U.S. relations with the Taliban deteriorated sharply
during the 5 years that the Taliban were in power in Kabul, to the point where the
United States and the Taliban were largely adversaries well before the September 11
attacks. Despite the deterioration, Clinton Administration officials including
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth met periodically
with Taliban officials. At the same time, the United States withheld recognition of
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and formally recognized no
faction as the government. Based on the lack of broad international recognition of
Taliban, the United Nations seated representatives of the former Rabbani
government, not the Taliban. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in
January 1989, just after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, and the State
Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C. closed in August 1997
because of a power struggle within the embassy between Rabbani and Taliban
supporters.
Although press reports in May 2002 said the Bush Administration was
considering a plan to give military aid to the Northern Alliance prior to the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration continued the previous
Administration’s policy of maintaining a dialogue with the Taliban. In compliance
with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department
ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban
complied with the directive, but its representative, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, continued
to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a
Taliban envoy, Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Three State
Department officers visited Afghanistan in April 2001, the first U.S. visit since the
August 1998 bombings of the Al Qaeda camps, although the purpose of the visit was
described as assessing the humanitarian needs and not furthering U.S.-Taliban
relations.
As did the executive branch, Congress became highly critical of the Taliban well
before the September 11 attacks. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that
resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed that chamber by
unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 218,
passed the House on April 28, 1998. In the 107th Congress, H.Con.Res. 26 was
introduced on February 8, 2001, expressing the sense of Congress that the United
States should seek to prevent the Taliban from obtaining Afghanistan’s U.N. seat and
should not recognize any government in Afghanistan that does not restore women’s
rights.
After September 11, legislative proposals became significantly more adversarial
toward the Taliban. One bill, H.R. 3088, stated that it should be the policy of the
United States to remove the Taliban from power and authorized a drawdown of up
to $300 million worth of U.S. military supplies and services for the anti-Taliban
opposition. The bill, as well as another bill (H.R. 2998, introduced October 2, 2001),
would establish a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service under RFE/RL. On
February 12, 2002, the House passed the Senate version of H.R. 2998 providing $17
million funding for the radio broadcasts for FY2002. President Bush signed the bill
into law on March 11, 2002 (P.L. 107-148).

CRS-21
The following sections discuss major issues in U.S. relations with Afghanistan.
Taliban Harboring of Al Qaeda
By all U.S. accounts, the new Afghan government has been highly cooperative
with U.S. military efforts to hunt down remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban elements in
Afghanistan. Several regional leaders are also working with U.S. forces against
remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban. In late September 2002, the top U.S. commander
in Afghanistan said that as many as 1,000 Al Qaeda might still be active inside
Afghanistan, suggesting there is still substantial work left to do to eliminate the Al
Qaeda presence. This section provides background on the issue that caused the most
strain in U.S. relations with the Taliban – the Taliban’s harboring of Al Qaeda.
Even before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s refusal to yield Al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the United States (or a U.S. ally) for trial – and its
protection of radical Islamic movements more broadly – had become the overriding
bilateral agenda item in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.19 Particularly after the
August 7, 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
the United States had been placing progressively more pressure on the Taliban to
extradite bin Laden, adding sanctions, some military action, reported covert
intelligence operations, and the threat of further punishments to ongoing diplomatic
efforts.
! During his April 1998 visit, Ambassador Richardson asked the
Taliban to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, but he was
rebuffed.
! On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at
alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation
for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
! On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on
U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and
blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions. The Taliban
was not designated as a terrorist group, nor was Afghanistan named
a state sponsor of terrorism. On August 10, 1999, the Clinton
Administration determined that Ariana Airlines represents Taliban-
controlled property, thereby preventing Americans from using the
airline and triggering the blocking of about $500,000 in Ariana
assets identified in the United States. (President George W. Bush
revoked Executive Order 13129 on the grounds that the Taliban
government had been dismantled.)
19 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001.
See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central
and South Asia and Southern Russia
.

CRS-22
! On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States
achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, the
first U.N. resolution sanctioning the Taliban regime. The resolution
banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines and directed
U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. The resolution was in
response to the Taliban’s refusal to hand bin Laden over to justice,
and it threatened further sanctions if it did not do so.
On December 19, 2000, again by combining diplomatic forces with Russia, the
United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, a follow-
on to Resolution 1267, imposing even stricter sanctions against the Taliban. The
major additional provisions of the Resolution included: (1) a worldwide prohibition
against the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban, and a requirement
(directed against Pakistan) that all countries withdraw any military advisers that are
helping the Taliban; (2) a call for all countries that recognize the Taliban to reduce
the size of Taliban representative missions in their countries, and for all other
countries to close completely all Taliban offices and Ariana Afghan airline offices
and ban all non-humanitarian assistance flights into or out of Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan; (3) a requirement that all countries freeze any bin Laden/Al Qaeda
assets that can be identified; (4) a prohibition on any supply to areas under Taliban
control of the chemical acetic anhydride, which is used to produce heroin; and (5) a
ban on foreign travel by all Taliban officials at or above the rank of Deputy Minister,
except for the purposes of participation in peace negotiations, compliance with the
resolution or 1267, or humanitarian reasons, including religious obligations. On July
30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted an implementing Resolution 1363. The
resolution provided for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan, to ensure that no
weapons or military advice was being provided by the Taliban.
In the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions were
narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.
Human Rights/Treatment of Women
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the
Taliban, although the interim administration is relatively young, and many want to
evaluate its human rights practices over a longer period of time. The groups that
have assumed power from the Taliban are widely considered far less repressive of
women than was the Taliban, although some of the factions now part of the ruling
coalition, including the Northern Alliance, have been accused of significant human
rights abuses in the past. Since the interim administration took office, there have
been some reports of reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity in certain parts of
Afghanistan, particularly against Pashtuns living in largely Tajik and Uzbek northern
Afghanistan. Some Afghans say that the Taliban brought order and peace to the areas
it captured by disarming independent militiamen and that, to some extent,
lawlessness has returned in certain parts of Afghanistan. U.S. officials believe that
law and order will improve as the central government extends its writ throughout the
country and as economic reconstruction expands. Some observers say that the new

CRS-23
government is reimposing some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule,
including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.20
Under the new government, women in Kabul are said to be reverting to the less
restrictive behavior practiced before the Taliban fled. The burqa is no longer
obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition or because of fear
or uncertainty of the new government’s attitudes on the issue. Two women hold
positions in the new government, and many women are returning to the jobs they
held before the Taliban came to power. As noted above, girls returned to school
March 23, 2002, for the first time since the Taliban took over, and many female
teachers have resumed their teaching jobs.
Before the war, there was significant U.S. and U.N. pressure on the Taliban
regime to moderate its treatment of women. Several U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998), and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged
the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to
Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as
despicable and intolerable. U.S. women’s rights groups like Feminist Majority and
the National Organization for Women (NOW) mobilized to stop the Clinton
Administration from recognizing the Taliban government unless it altered its
treatment of women. On May 5, 1999, the Senate passed S.Res. 68, a resolution
calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that refuses to end
discrimination against women. On November 27, 2001, the House unanimously
adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier
passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of
supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38) to fund educational and health
programs for Afghan women and children. After the new government took office,
the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s
Council to coordinate the allocation of resources so as to improve the future of
Afghan women. It is chaired on the U.S. side by Undersecretary of State for Global
Affairs Paula Dobriansky, and on the Afghan side by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and of Women’s Affairs.
Destruction of Buddha Statues/Hindu Badges. The Taliban’s critics
pointed to its March 2001 destruction of two large Buddha statues, dating to the 7th
century, as evidence of the Taliban’s excesses. The Taliban claimed it ordered the
destruction of the statues, which it considered un-Islamic, after representatives of the
United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) offered to
fund preservation of the statues. Others believe the move was a reaction to new U.N.
sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below). The destruction provoked
widespread condemnation, even among other Islamic states, including Pakistan.
Some international groups are looking at the possibility of rebuilding the statues,
although at least one group has said doing so will be extremely difficult technically.
In May 2001, the Taliban said it was considering requiring non-Muslims to
wear identity labels on their clothing to distinguish them from Muslims. The Taliban
explained the move as an effort to prevent non-Muslims from being harassed by
20 Shea, Nina. Sharia in Kabul? The National Review, October 28, 2002.

CRS-24
Taliban security forces for not attending Muslim prayer, which is compulsory for
Muslims. The announcement received worldwide condemnation and was not
implemented before the Taliban was ousted. There are believed to be only two Jews
left in Afghanistan, so the move was not viewed as being directed against Jews, even
though the policy evoked memories of the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany.
Counternarcotics
The December 5, 2001 Bonn agreement mentions the need for a post-Taliban
Afghanistan government to prevent Afghanistan’s re-emergence as a haven for drug
cultivation, and the Bush Administration is focusing some U.S. resources on
counter-narcotics. The new government has banned poppy cultivation, although it
has had difficulty enforcing the ban due to resource limitations and opposition from
Afghan farmers who see few alternatives. The U.N. Drug Control Program estimated
in August 2002 that 3,000 tons of opium crop would be produced in Afghanistan in
2002, restoring Afghanistan to its previous place as the world’s top opium producer.21
On the other hand, the U.S. military is opposed to its conducting poppy crop
eradication in Afghanistan.22 In mid-October 2002, the Afghan government burned
5,500 pounds of hashish and opium to demonstrate its determination to the counter-
narcotics effort.
Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban
apparently satisfied much of the international community. The Taliban, for the most
part, enforced its July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation; in February 2001, U.N.
International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) officials said that surveys showed a
dramatic drop in poppy cultivation in the areas surveyed.23 The Northern Alliance
did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. In April 2001, the United States
began funding a UNDCP crop substitution program, contributing $1.5 million to that
program in FY2001. Despite the Taliban’s performance on drug issues, and despite
the ascension of a pro-U.S. government, in March 2002, the Bush Administration
determined that Afghanistan had “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts”
during the past 12 months to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and
take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. (This is equivalent to
the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987,
as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has
failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.) Despite that
determination, President Bush waived drug-related sanctions on the new government
on the grounds that providing assistance is in the vital national interest of the United
States (see section on sanctions, below).
21 Armitage, Tom. U.N. Sees Afghan Opium Cultivation Soaring in 2002. Reuters, February
28, 2002.
22 Gertz, Bill. Military Opposes Spraying Poppies. Washington Times, March 25, 2002.
23 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times
, February 7, 2001.

CRS-25
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers
Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan
Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles
to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the
U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates among experts
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 1,000
provided during the war against the Soviet Union.24 In the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States had tried to retrieve the at-large
Stingers.25 The United States feared that the missiles could fall into the hands of
terrorist groups for possible use against civilian airliners. Iran bought 16 of the
missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were
transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to press reports in January 2002. India
claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by
sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.26 It was not the Stinger but Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man portable
launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in
Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on
November 30, 2002. Both firings missed their targets.
The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade
from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan. In 1992, the United States reportedly spent
about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin
commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including
Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994
in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post
reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers. Many
observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 Stingers.
According to Defense Intelligence Agency testimony in 1996,27 an unspecified
number of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (Stingers) remain in Afghanistan.28
The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with the U.S. war effort. U.S. pilots
reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war, but they
recorded no hits. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely
controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and would presumably pose
less of a threat. In early February 2002, the interim government collected and
24 Saleem, Farrukh. Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan, Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
25 Gertz, Bill. Stinger Bite Feared in CIA. Washington Times, October 9, 2000.
26 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles – Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.
27 John Moore, before the House International Relations Committee. May 9, 1996.
28 Common estimates in a variety of press reports suggest that 200-300 Stingers may remain
at large in Afghanistan.

CRS-26
returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers and said it would continue to try
to find and return additional Stingers.29
Landmine Eradication
Landmines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal
dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines
remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside
organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been
killed or wounded by landmines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and
commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid
table for FY1999-FY2002, the United States Humanitarian Demining Program was
providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan demining activities, and the
amount escalated to $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds go to
the HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for
Afghanistan.
Assistance and Reconstruction
Since the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan has faced major humanitarian
difficulties, some of which deteriorated further under Taliban rule. In addition to 3.6
million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war,30 another 500,000 Afghans
were displaced internally even before U.S. military action began, according to
Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001 report on Afghanistan. Many of the
displaced persons had fled the effects of a major drought that affected the 85% of the
population that directly depends on agriculture. Some Afghan refugees are now
members of a third generation to live outside Afghanistan, although about 2 million
Afghan refugees have returned since January 2002. The conflicts in Afghanistan,
including the war against the Soviet Union, have reportedly left about 2 million dead,
700,000 widows and orphans and about one million Afghan children who were born
and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan.
As part of its military operations, the United States air-dropped food rations to
help alleviate suffering. Following the Taliban collapse, aid routes via Uzbekistan
and Pakistan reopened, largely eliminating the need for the airdrops. A variety of
U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) serve as the vehicles for
international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan repatriation.
U.S. Assistance Issues. To address humanitarian concerns, the United
States had become the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people,
even before the crisis triggered by the September 11 attacks. In 1985, the United
29 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
30 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia;
17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.

CRS-27
States began a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was
distributed in Afghanistan, via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing
budgetary constraints and the difficulty of administering a cross-border program,
there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan after the end of FY1994, and U.S. aid
has been provided through various channels, mostly U.N. agencies and NGO’s.
Primarily because of a drought and the widely publicized suffering of the
Afghan people, U.S. aid to the Afghan people in FY2001 greatly exceeded that
provided in FY2000 or FY1999, but no U.S. assistance went directly to the Taliban
government. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program. According to
the USAID fact sheet issued September 27, 2001, the United States provided about
$183 million in assistance to the Afghan people in FY2001. For a history of U.S. aid
to Afghanistan (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.
On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate that the United States has an
interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just the defeat of the Taliban,
President Bush announced that humanitarian aid to the Afghan people would total
about $320 million for FY2002. The amounts provided for FY2002 are listed in the
table; the figures include both humanitarian and reconstruction aid, totaling over
$530 million for FY2002. The conference report on the FY2002 foreign aid
appropriation (H.Rept. 107-354, P.L. 107-115) contained a sense of Congress
provision that the United States should contribute substantial humanitarian assistance
to Afghanistan, although no dollar figures were mentioned. The conference report
on a FY2002 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4775, P.L. 107-480) recommends
$134 million in additional aid to Afghanistan. These funds will likely be used for
U.S. aid to Afghanistan, humanitarian and reconstruction, during FY2003. (For more
information on aid to Afghanistan provided by the FY2002 supplemental
appropriation, including aid to help Afghan civilian victims of U.S. airstrikes, see
CRS Report RL31406, Supplemental Appropriation for FY2002: Combatting
Terrorism and Other Issues
, by Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels.)
Reconstruction Aid. The United States also pledged
substantial
reconstruction assistance for post-Taliban Afghanistan. Common estimates of
reconstruction needs run up to about $10 billion. In conjunction with a donors’
conference in Tokyo during January 20-21, 2002, the United States pledged $296
million in reconstruction aid for Afghanistan for FY2002. That amount is drawn
from regular FY2002 appropriations and the emergency September 11-related
supplemental appropriation enacted in September 2001.
U.S. reconstruction funds have been used primarily for various “quick impact”
programs. These programs include $6.5 million for 9.7 million school textbooks; $7
million for agricultural rehabilitation, programs for women (about $15 million in
FY2002), and support to the interim administration; $5 million for health services
infrastructure; $1 million for the rehabilitation of landmine victims and other
disabled persons (Leahy War Victims Fund); and funding to rebuild the Ministry of
Women’s Affairs building ($64,000) and to distribute radios to localities to
disseminate information on humanitarian aid. The United States is forwarding
donations from American citizens for the rebuilding of Kabul University.

CRS-28
FY2003 Plans.
The Administration says it plans to spend about $300
million for Afghan programs in FY2003, which the Administration says is a
sufficient contribution to help accomplish international objectives. Larger amounts
than this, according to the Administration, cannot be easily absorbed by existing
infrastructure and could lead to waste or abuse. As part of the FY2003 plan, on
September 12, 2002, the Administration pledged Afghanistan $80 million for road
reconstruction, as part of an international pledge of $180 million.
An authorization bill, H.R. 3994, which was passed by the House on May 21,
2002, authorizes $1.05 billion in U.S. reconstruction assistance during FY2002-
FY2005 ($200 million in FY2002; $300 million in each of FY2003 and FY2004, and
$250 million in FY2005). The bill also authorizes $15 million per year for FY2002-
2005 for counternarcotics, and $10 million per year for FY2002-FY2005 for the loya
jirga
and local political development. A similar bill in the Senate would authorize
$2.5 billion in reconstruction aid during FY2002-FY2005, of which $500 million
would be for an enterprise fund, plus an additional $1 billion to expand ISAF if such
an expansion takes place. Both bills authorize $300 million in defense, crime
control, and counter-narcotics articles and services. S. 2712 was passed by the
Senate on November 14 and by the House on November 15. It was presented for
presidential action on November 22.
In appropriations activity, the Senate version of the FY2003 foreign aid
appropriations (S. 2779, S.Rept. 107-219) recommends $157 million for
Afghanistan. The House version, H.R. 5410, would provide $405 million for
FY2003, including $110 in bilateral assistance and the rest through international
programs. No FY2003 foreign aid appropriations was completed before the 107th
Congress adjourned.
In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control,
OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government owned
banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in
1999 (see below). These funds are being used by the new government for currency
stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim government. Most of the funds
consist of gold that will be held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back
up Afghanistan’s currency. In January 2002, the United States agreed to provide $50
million in credit for U.S. investment in Afghanistan, provided by the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The United States also has successfully
pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million
in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban. In
April 2002, OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. In May
2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty years.
At the donors’ conference, the following international reconstruction pledges
were announced: European Union - $495 million in 2002; Japan - $500 million over
the next 30 months; Germany - $362 million over the next 4 years; Saudi Arabia -
$220 million over the next 3 years; Iran - $560 million over the next 5 years;
Pakistan - $100 million over the next 5 years; India - a $100 million line of credit;
South Korea - $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom - $86 million in
2002. Total pledges in Tokyo for reconstruction amounted to $1.8 billion to be spent
in 2002 and $4.5 billion over the next 5 years. Of the amounts pledged for 2002,

CRS-29
about $1.3 billion has been spent, received, or about to be received, as of October
2002.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development
In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian
problems, the United States has, when feasible, tried to promote major development
projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over
the long term. During 1996-98, the Administration supported proposed natural gas
and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions
to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal
Corporation31 was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of
Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with
possible extensions into India.
The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for
the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the August
20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended all its
Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for
Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved
U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998.
Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacked the financing
and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas
of Argentina reportedly continued to try to win approval for its proposal to undertake
the project.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit
meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of
the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a
series of preliminary agreements. However, financing for the project is unclear.
31 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 1997. Page 3.

CRS-30
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan
Ideology/
Party/Commander
Leader
Areas of Control
Ethnicity
Taliban
Mullah
ultra-orthodox
Small groups hiding
(Islamic cleric)
Islamic,
throughout
Muhammad
Pashtun
Afghanistan. No
Umar
presence in
government.
Northern
Burhannudin
conservative
Most of northern and
Alliance/Islamic Society
Rabbani
Islamic, mostly
western Afghanistan,
(dominant party in the
(political leader), Tajik
including Kabul.
Northern Alliance)
Muhammad
Fahim is Vice
Fahim (military
President and
leader)
Defense Minister.
Dr. Abdullah is
Foreign Minister.
Rabbani holds no
official position.
Forces of Ismail Khan
Ismail Khan
Tajik
Herat Province and
(part of Northern
environs; Khan’s son
Alliance)
in cabinet.
Eastern Shura (loosely
No clear leader,
moderate
Jalalabad and
allied with Northern
following death
Islamic,
environs; Qadir was
Alliance)
of Abdul Qadir;
Pashtun
vice president.
Qadir’s son
appointed
Jalalabad
governor after
Qadir’s death
National Islamic
Abdul Rashid
secular, Uzbek
Mazar Sharif and
Movement of Afghanistan Dostam
environs; Dostam
(part of Northern
was deputy defense
Alliance)
minister in interim
government.
Hizb-e-Wahdat
Karim Khalili
Shiite, Hazara
Bamiyan province.
(part of Northern
tribes
Khalili is a vice
Alliance)
president.
Pashtun Commanders
Ghul Agha
mostly
Southern
Shirzai, and
orthodox
Afghanistan,
other tribal
Islamic,
including Qandahar.
leaders
Pashtun

CRS-31
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY2002
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
(final)
U.S. Department of
$42.0 worth
$68.875 for
$131.0
$198.12 for
Agriculture (DOA)
of wheat
165,000
(300,000
food
and USAID Food
(100,000
metric tons.
metric tons
commodities
For Peace, via
metric tons
(60,000 tons
under
World Food
under
for May 2000
P.L.480,
Program(WFP)
“416(b)”
drought
Title II, and
program.
relief.)
416(b)
State/Bureau of
$16.95 for
$14.03 for
$22.03 for
$136.54 to
Population,
Afghan
the same
similar
U.N.
Refugees and
refugees in
purposes
purposes
agencies
Migration (PRM)
Pakistan and
via UNHCR and
Iran, and to
ICRC
assist their
repatriation
State Department/
$7.0 to
$6.68 for
$18.934 for
$113.36 to
Office of Foreign
various
drought relief
similar
various U.N.
Disaster Assistance
NGO’s to aid
and health,
programs
agencies and
(OFDA)
Afghans
water, and
NGO’s
inside
sanitation
Afghanistan
programs
State
$2.615
$3.0
$2.8
$7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust/other
(Humanitarian
demining
Demining Program)
Aid to Afghan
$5.44 (2.789
$6.169, of
$5.31 for
Refugees in
for health,
which $3.82
similar
Pakistan (through
training -
went to
purposes
various NGO’s)
Afghan
similar
females in
purposes
Pakistan
U.N. Drug Control
$1.50
Program
USAID/
$0.45
$24.35 for
Office of Transition
(Afghan
broadcasting/
Initiatives
women in
media
Pakistan)
Dept. of Defense
$50.9 ( 2.4
million
rations)
Totals
$76.6 $113.2
$182.6
$530.28

CRS-32
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
P.L. 480
Supp.
Military
(Incl. regional
Total
Year
Assist.
(Title I and II)
(ESF)
refugee aid)
1978
4.989

5.742
0.269
0.789
11.789
1979
3.074

7.195

0.347
10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion - December 1979)


1981






1982






1983






1984






1985
3.369




3.369
1986


8.9


8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6


32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9


74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6


77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1


88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1


80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4


81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0

30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0

27.9
42.3
1995
1.8

12.4

31.6
45.8
1996


16.1

26.4
42.5
1997


18.0

31.9*
49.9
1998


3.6

49.14**
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
* Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and
$1.54 for counternarcotics.

CRS-33
U.S. and International Sanctions
Shoring up a post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with financial and other
assistance has required waivers of restrictions or the permanent modification of U.S.
and U.N. sanctions previously imposed on Afghanistan. Most of the sanctions
discussed below have now been lifted.
! On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated
beneficiary countries under the U.S. GSP, denying Afghanistan’s
exports duty free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R.
20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2464]. On
October 18, 2002, the Administration announced it was beginning
a review to determine whether Afghanistan should be eligible for
GSP.

! On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union
for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls
on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas
exploration and production equipment, and phosphates. This was
implemented at 15 CFR Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the
authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of
1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On April 24,
1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S.
exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.
! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that
Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This
opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the
U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to
Afghanistan.
! On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued
Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a
Marxist-Leninist country. The designation as such a country had
prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. 635).
However, President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not
implemented before he left office.
! President George H.W. Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (93-
3) also found that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of
the Foreign Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United
States because of the change of regime in Afghanistan. The
presidential determination, had it been implemented in regulations,
would have waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan
provided for in the Act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2374];
as added by Section 505 of the International Development

CRS-34
Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-53]. These provisions prohibit
foreign assistance to Afghanistan until it apologizes for the death of
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped
in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout
where he was held, unless the President determines that such
assistance is in the national interest because of changed
circumstances in Afghanistan. The restrictions on U.S. aid to the
government of Afghanistan have been lifted in light of the change of
government there.

! Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986
[P.L. 99-190] authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. Under that
law, on February 18, 1986, the height of the Soviet occupation,
President Reagan had issued Presidential Proclamation 5437,
suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). On
May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the
products of Afghanistan.

! On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds,
waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and
restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
[P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994. Mandatory
sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial
of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for
multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S.
sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP); additional duties on country exports
to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the
United States. On February 25, 2002, President Bush waived
restrictions on FY2002 aid to Afghanistan under this Act.

! On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. This amended the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the
authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section
126.1 of 22 CFR Part 126. On July 2, 2002, the State Department
amended U.S. regulations (22 CFR Part 126) to allow arms sales to
the new Afghan government.

! In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997,
the State Department designated Afghanistan under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts. The designation, made primarily because of Taliban’s
harboring of bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S.
exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was

CRS-35
repeated every year since 1997. Afghanistan was deleted from the
list of non-cooperative states when the list was reissued on May 15,
2002, thereby eliminating this sanction on Afghanistan.

! On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued
Executive order 13129 that imposed sanctions. The sanctions
include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United
States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined
that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity. That
determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline.
On January 29, 2002, the State Department issued a determination
that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan, thus
essentially ending this trade ban. On July 2, 2002, President Bush
formally revoked this Executive order.

! On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1267; on December 19, 2000, it adopted U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1333, imposed a number of new sanctions against the
Taliban. For the provisions of these sanctions, see the section on the
harboring of bin Laden. As noted, these sanctions were narrowed to
penalize only Al Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.


CRS-36
Map of Afghanistan
C h i n a
U z b e k i s t a n
T a j i k i s t a n
T u r k m e n i s t a n
Langar
Faizabad
Andkhvoy
Aqcheh
Mazar
Bahárak
Balkh Sharif
Taloqan
Kholm
Konduz
Sheberghan
Skazar
Samangan
Warsaj
Meymaneh
Baghlan
Tokzar
Bala
Belcheragh
Morghab
Qeysar
Dowshi
Kushka
Towraghondi
Sayghan
Charikar
Asadabad
Koshkekohneh
Raqi
Qal'eh-ye Now
Bamian
Mehtarlam
Karokh
Chaghcharan
I n d i a
Dowlat Yar
Kowt-e
Jalalabad
Rowzanak
Panjab
Khyber
Herat
Ashrow
Kabul
Pass
Shahrak
Garghareh
Baraki
Teywarah
Gardeyz
Shindand
Ghazni
Mushaki
Zareh
Anar
Badam
Darreh
Mazar
Tarin
Shab Juy
Sharan
Kowt
Farah
Delaram Shorawak
Qalat
Lash-e-Joveyn
Jaldak
Lashkar
Sinjiri
Darwazgai
Gah
Qandahar
Khash
Zaranj
Hauz Qala
Qal'eh-ye Fath
Khannan
Deshu
Pulalak
P a k i s t a n
I r a n
Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.