Order Code IB92101
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
POWs and MIAs:
Status and Accounting Issues
Updated November 19, 2002
Robert L. Goldich
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Areas of Congressional Interest
Definition of Terms
U.S. POWs and MIAs in 20th Century Wars: Statistics
Vietnam War POWs and MIAs
Vietnam POW/MIAs: U.S. Government Policy and Organization
U.S.-Vietnamese Interaction on POW/MIA Issues: Recent Developments and
Issues
U.S. Policy and the Remains Issue
Congress and the POW/MIA Issue, 1993-2002 (FY1994-FY2003)
POW/MIA Issues: Current Relevance
Vietnam POW/MIAs: Were Americans Left Behind? Are Any Still Alive?
The “Coverup” Issue
Have Americans Remained in Indochina Voluntarily?
Are the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Cambodians Still Holding the Remains of Dead
Americans?
Korean War POWs/MIAs
POWs and MIAs from Cold War and Other Incidents
A Persian Gulf War POW/MIA Case
World War II POWs and MIAs: Soviet Imprisonment of U.S. POWs Liberated from the
Germans
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
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POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting Issues
SUMMARY
There has been great controversy about
returned in 1979). The U.S. government says
U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) and those
the possibility of Americans still being held in
missing in action (MIAs) during the Cold
Indochina cannot be ruled out. Some say
War. While few people familiar with the
Americans may have been kept by the Viet-
issue feel that any Americans are still being
namese after the war but killed later.
held against their will in the few remaining
Increased U.S. access to Vietnam has not yet
Communist countries, more feel that some
led to a large reduction en masse in the num-
may have been so held in the past in the So-
ber of Americans still listed as unaccounted
viet Union, China, North Korea, or North
for, although this may be due to some U.S.
Vietnam. Similarly, few believe there was a
policies as well as Vietnamese non-coopera-
“conspiracy” to cover up live POWs, but few
tion.
would disagree with the statement that there
was, at least during the 1970s and 1980s, U.S.
There is considerable evidence that
government neglect and mismanagement of
prisoners from the Korean War and “Cold
the issue.
War shootdowns” of U.S. military aircraft
may have been taken to the USSR and not
Normalization of relations with Vietnam
returned; the same might be true for a very
exacerbated this longstanding debate. Propo-
few Americans liberated from German POW
nents of normalization contended that Viet-
camps by the Soviets at the end of World War
namese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue
II. The evidence about POWs from Vietnam
has greatly increased and will be enhanced by
being taken to the Soviet Union is more ques-
normalization. Opponents argued that cooper-
tionable. There is similar evidence about
ation has in fact been much less than support-
possible Iraqi capture of Navy pilot Scott
ers say, and that the Vietnamese can only be
Speicher, shot down on the first night of the
induced to cooperate by firmness rather than
Persian Gulf War (January 17, 1991), and
conciliation. Those who believe Americans
until recently listed as “killed in action” rather
are now held, or were after the war ended, feel
than “missing in action” based on data devel-
that even if no specific report of live Ameri-
oped in recent investigations. The recent
cans has thus far met rigorous proofs, the
consensus in the intelligence community is
mass of information about live Americans is
that Speicher probably survived being shot
compelling. Those who doubt live Americans
down and, if so, was almost certainly captured
are still held, or were after the war ended,
by the Iraqis. The conference version of the
argue that despite vast efforts, not one report
FY2003 defense authorization bill requires the
of a live American military prisoner remaining
Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with
in Indochina after the end of the war has been
periodic reports on the Speicher case.
validated (with one exception, a defector, who
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 12 and 13, 2002, the House and Senate respectively approved the
conference version of the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (H.Rept. 107-772),
containing provisions that (1) placed a floor beneath which Defense POW/Missing Persons
Office (DPMO) personnel and funding will not be allowed to fall during FY2003; and (2)
required DOD to submit periodic reports on the status of Persian Gulf War POW/MIA
Captain Michael Scott Speicher, U.S. Navy.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Areas of Congressional Interest
This issue brief summarizes numbers of U.S. POWs and MIAs lost during the Vietnam
War (1961-1975) and the Korean War (1950-1953), compares these losses to other 20th
century American wars, and describes the POW/MIA investigation and policy process. It
discusses whether some POWs from these wars were not returned to U.S. control when the
wars ended, and whether some may still be alive. Further, it discusses whether Americans
were captured by Communist countries during Cold War incidents, or after being liberated
from German POW camps at the end of World War II, and whether any such Americans are
still alive; it also treats a similar case involving a Persian Gulf War aviator. Finally, the issue
brief describes legislation and congressional oversight concerning the POW/MIA issue. For
information on other aspects of U.S.-Vietnam relations, and on the current controversy over
the attempt by some American former POWs held by the Japanese during World War II to
obtain compensation from Japanese corporations, see the For Additional Reading section
at the end of this issue brief.
Definition of Terms
The following terms are frequently encountered in analyses of the POW/MIA issue:
POW (Prisoner Of War): Persons known to be, or to have been, held by the enemy as a
live prisoner or last seen under enemy control.
MIA (Missing In Action): Persons removed from control of U.S. forces due to enemy
action, but not known to either be a prisoner of war or dead.
KIA-BNR (Killed In Action-Body Not Recovered): Persons known to have been killed
in action, but body or remains not recovered by U.S. forces — i.e., an aircraft exploding in
midair or crashing; or a body lost at sea.
PFOD (Presumptive Finding Of Death): An administrative finding by the appropriate
military service Secretary, after statutory review procedures, that there is no current evidence
to indicate that a person previously listed as MIA or POW could still be alive.
Unaccounted For: An all-inclusive term — not a legal status — used to indicate
Americans initially listed as POW, MIA, KIA-BNR, or PFOD, but about whom no further
information is yet known.
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Names are shifted, usually from the most uncertain status, MIA, to more certain
categories, during and after hostilities, based on new information, or, in the case of a PFOD,
lack of new information over time that indicates an individual is still living.
U.S. POWs and MIAs in 20th Century Wars: Statistics
Statistics on U.S. POWs and MIAs in Vietnam and past wars are often mutually
irreconcilable. The procedures and terminology used for classifying what we would now
refer to as POW, MIA, KIA-BNR, and PFOD were different — or did not exist — for
previous wars. However, data in the following tables provide a basis for some
generalizations.
Table 1. U.S. POWs in 20th Century Wars

WWI
WWII
Koreac
Vietnam
Captured
4,120
130,201
7,140
766
Still Classified POW
0
0
0
7a
Died While POW
147
14,072
2,701
106
Refused Repatriation to U.S.
0
0
21
0
Returned to U.S. Control
3,973
116,129
4,418
653b
Source: U.S. Veterans Administration Study, 1980.
a. As of 1980; at this writing, no Americans are still listed as POWs. See Table 3, note b.
b. Includes escapees, those returned by the enemy before and after the end of hostilities.
c. Exact totals and subcategories of Korean War POW/MIA are a morass of conflicting data. These figures
approximate those found in other sources and are used here for consistency with the other wars mentioned in
the 1980 VA study from which these statistics are taken.
Table 2. Americans Unaccounted For in Previous 20th Century Wars
World War I (1917-18) a
Unidentified remains
1,648
World War II (1941-45) b
Remains not recovered
78,794 c
Korean War (1950-53) d
PFOD
4,735
KIA-BNR
1,107
MIA
24 e
Total Korean War MIA
5,866
Total Korean War Unaccounted For
f
a. Bruce Callender, “The History of Arlington’s Silent Soldiers.” Air Force Times, June 19, 1984: 23.
b. Source: U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. Americans Missing
in Southeast Asia, Final Report, December 13, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976 (94th
Congress, 2nd session. H.Rept. 94-1764): 73-74.
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c. An estimated 9,000-17,000 were subject to the equivalent of a PFOD. See ibid: 74.
d. Ibid: 75.
e. Still carried as MIA as of Sept. 30, 1954; known to be in Chinese prisons; all later either released alive or
subject to a PFOD.
f. Current DOD statistic — breakdown not available and does not correlate with any other statistics in Tables
1 and 2. As stated above (note c, Table 1), Korean War POW/MIA statistics are a mass of
inconsistencies. A Rand Corp. study prepared for DOD itemizes Korean War unaccounted-for Americans
somewhat differently, but along lines that are broadly similar to those stated here: 8,140 KIA-BNR, of
which the deaths of 5,945 were witnessed or otherwise well-documented, leaving 2,195 whose death
cannot be explicitly established, although many were undoubtedly killed. Cole, Paul M. POW/MIA
Issues: Volume 1, The Korean War.
Report no. MR-351/1-USDP. Santa Monica, CA, National Defense
Research Institute, The Rand Corporation, 1994: xv-xvi.
Vietnam War POWs and MIAs
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong authorities returned 591 POWs to U.S. control within
the specified 2-month period after the signing of the Vietnam War peace treaty on January
27, 1973. 67 U.S. civilians, not part of the official list of Americans unaccounted for, were
trapped or stayed voluntarily after South Vietnam fell in April 1975. All were released by
late 1976. Since 1976, some Americans have been imprisoned in Vietnam (almost all for
civilian offenses) and eventually released. Most Americans now in Vietnamese prisons for
criminal offenses (some of which would be characterized as “political” crimes by the
Vietnamese authorities) are naturalized Americans of Vietnamese birth or ancestry. Since
1973, only one U.S. military member has returned alive from Vietnam. Marine Corps PFC
Robert Garwood was listed as a POW by U.S. authorities — but never by the Vietnamese
— in 1965 and returned voluntarily to the U.S. in 1979. He was convicted of collaboration
with the enemy, but his light sentence included no prison term.
After the return of the 591 POWs, 2,583 Americans were unaccounted for (not counting
civilians trapped in Vietnam after the South fell, or who later visited Vietnam). Identified
remains of 681 Americans have been returned from Vietnam (485), Laos (169), Cambodia
(25), and China (2) since the war ended on January 27, 1973. Of the 1,904 still listed as
unaccounted for, DOD is still actively seeking to recover the remains of 1,243. DOD
believes that, based on currently available information and its analysis, it will be unable to
ever recover the remains of the other 661. Examples of the latter would include the 459 men
lost over water, as stated in the note to Table 3, which summarizes data on Americans
currently unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. Another example would be those crewmen of
aircraft that, at the time, were observed by both Vietnamese and Americans to have exploded
without any sign of the crew ejecting; and similar situations.
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Table 3. Americans Unaccounted for in Southeast Asia
(as of October 10, 2002)
Country of Loss
Cambodi
Service
N. Viet.
S. Viet.
Laos
a
China
Total
Army
9
462
99
26
0
596
Navy
270
90
28
1
8
397
Marine Corps
22
195
16
8
0
241
Air Force
208
169
238
18
0
633
Coast Guard
0
1
0
0
0
1
Civilians
1
20
10
5
0
36
Total
510
937
391
58
8
1,904
Source: Department of Defense. All U.S. servicemembers are currently listed by DOD as KIA-BNR or, if
formerly listed as a POW or MIA, a PFOD has been made. Until 1994, one POW, a pilot whose capture and
POW status were verified, remained listed as a POW for symbolic reasons. His status was changed to KIA-
BNR at the request of his family. The total of 1,904 personnel includes 459 lost at sea or over water.
Vietnam POW/MIAs: U.S. Government Policy and Organization. Since 1982,
the official U.S. position regarding live Americans in Indochina has been as follows:
“Although we have thus far been unable to prove that Americans are still being held against
their will, the information available to us precludes ruling out that possibility. Actions to
investigate live-sighting reports receive and will continue to receive necessary priority and
resources based on the assumption that at least some Americans are still held captive.
Should any report prove true, we will take appropriate action to ensure the return of those
involved.”
The Director of the DOD Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), who also
serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs
(DASD POW/MIA), provides overall direction and control of DOD POW/MIA matters,
both for previous conflicts and the formulation of policies and procedures for future
circumstances in which U.S. military personnel could become POWs or MIA. Indochina
activities are supervised by DOD’s Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA),
headquartered in Hawaii, which maintains POW/MIA files, conducts research and interviews
in Indochina and elsewhere in Asia with refugees and others, and staffs U.S. POW/MIA
operations in Indochina. The U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CIL-
HI) identifies returned remains from around the world. The Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) also has its own POW/MIA-related intelligence organization, established totally
separate from the DPMO at congressional direction.
POW/MIA information comes from refugees and other human contacts and assets,
physical evidence (such as “dog tags” worn by U.S. military personnel, photographs, and
aircraft debris), communications intelligence and aerial reconnaissance, and open sources.
Between the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 and October 10, 2002, according to DOD,
22,009 reports of all kinds regarding the POW/MIA issue have been acquired by the U.S.
government about alleged live Americans in Indochina, including 1,918 alleged first-hand
sightings. Of the 1,918, fully 1,897 (98.91%) have, according to DPMO, been resolved.
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More specifically, 68.87% (1,321) correlate with persons since accounted for (i.e., returned
live or known dead); another 27.69% (531) have been determined to be fabrications; and
2.35% (45) correlate to wartime sightings of Americans. The remaining 21,or 1.09%,
involve sightings of Americans in either a captive (20) or non-captive (1) environment,
“represent the focus of DPMO analytical and collection efforts,” and are still under
investigation. Of the 21, 15 were reported to have occurred prior to 1976; another two
between 1976 and 1980; one between 1986 and 1990; one between 1991 and 1995, and the
date of reporting is not listed for one more. The remaining sighting is supposed to have
taken place sometime in 1999–a surprising development, which has only recently been
reported to DPMO and associated DOD POW/MIA agencies (it was not mentioned in the
periodically released DPMO statistical summaries of Vietnam War POW/MIAs until
November 2001).
U.S.-Vietnamese Interaction on POW/MIA Issues: Recent Developments
and Issues. Since 1991, the U.S. has gained substantial access to aircraft crash sites,
Vietnamese records, and Vietnamese civilians, and has established a substantial permanent
presence of military and civilian personnel. Most recently, the Vietnamese have agreed to
expand access to their government archives with materials related to the issue, and to
interview senior Vietnamese military leaders from the war for possible relevant data. This
increased access over the past decade, however, has not yet led to large numbers of
Americans being removed en masse from the rolls of over 1,900 people who are unaccounted
for (between September 3, 1991 and October 10, 2002, the total number dropped by
369–from 2,273 to 1,904–or about 33 per year). Much of the material has turned out to be
redundant, already in U.S. hands, or pertaining to resolved cases; and there continues to be
evidence that the Vietnamese retain some unreleased data. Normalization has exacerbated
the debate over Vietnamese cooperation on the issue. Proponents of normalization contend
that Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue has been greatly enhanced by
normalization; opponents argue that cooperation has in fact been much less than supporters
say, and that the Vietnamese can only be induced to cooperate by firmness rather than
conciliation. Relevant documents, studies, and analyses are available at the DPMO Web site
at [http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo].
Others suggest that the DPMO and the Administration are equating activity with results
and resource inputs with true outputs in terms of the fate of unaccounted-for Americans. They
claim that the true monetary costs of all U.S. military and diplomatic activities associated with
DPMO operations relevant to post-1945 POW/MIAs is much higher than the stated DPMO
outlays of approximately $15 million yearly, perhaps in the $50-100 million range. They
allege that Vietnam and North Korea charge extraordinarily high fees for providing support
to DPMO/JTF-FA operations – logistical support, aviation costs, food and lodging, and the
like – and that the services received are by no means as lavish as the bills presented indicate.
U.S. Policy and the Remains Issue. As noted above, DPMO believes that of the
1,904 Americans listed as unaccounted for as of October 10, 2002, 661 are definitely dead,
and that further investigation could result in no more evidence or remains being found. Such
cases include those resulted from aircraft explosions, drowning, or simple disappearance.
Some believe that the Vietnamese have documentary evidence about the fate of at least some
of them. It appears that concerns over public reaction, more than disagreements on the part
of American analysts that the individuals concerned really are dead, are holding up the
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decision to close these cases. The question may be as follows: if evidence other than remains
is not conclusive, what use is it, if no remains are available?
Congress and the POW/MIA Issue, 1993-2002 (FY1994-FY2003).
2002 (FY2003) Congressional Action. Senate Action. On June 27, 2002, the
Senate passed its version of the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (S. 2514,
reported May 15, 2002; S.Rept. 107-151). Section 1035 of the Senate bill requires the
Secretary of Defense to submit a comprehensive report on the Speicher case (see below, “A
Persian Gulf War POW/MIA Case,” and also under Legislation) to Congress within 60 days
after the bill became law.
House Action. On May 9, 2002, the House passed its version of the FY2003 National
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546, reported May 3, 2002, H.Rept. 107-436). Section 551
of the House bill prohibits DOD from making any planned reductions in the personnel levels
or budget of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), and in fact
requires the Secretary of Defense to increase the size of the DPMO.
Section 551 appears to have resulted from planned reductions of at least 15% in the size
of the DPMO staff that had been scheduled as part of a general DOD effort to reduce
headquarters staffs. The House committee, however, stated that “it believes the DPMO plays
a crucial role in the fulfillment of the national commitment to provide a full accounting for
the prisoners of war and missing in action of the nation’s wars.” This would apply to current
operations in the War against Terrorism as well as past conflicts. It suggests that, even if the
level of national concern about the POW/MIA issue has subsided compared to the 1970s and
1980s, it has by no means vanished.
1993-2001 (FY1994-FY2002) Congressional Action. From 1993 through 1997
(FY1994-FY1998 legislation), the annual defense authorization bill included POW/MIA-
related sections with considerable policy significance and, frequently, political controversy.
However, during 1998-2001 (FY1999-FY2002 legislation), Congress arguably “took a
breather” on POW/MIA matters. None of the National Defense Authorization or Intelligence
Authorization Acts of the latter period contained significant POW/MIA-related provisions or
report language with broad policy implications.
POW/MIA Issues: Current Relevance. The POW/MIA issue is not merely a
“historical” one. The congressional concerns over Americans unaccounted for from the
Vietnam War have been an integral component of the discussion about how to account for
Americans missing in the inevitable future conflicts. That these are not purely theoretical
issues is shown by the 49 Americans initially listed as missing in action during the Persian
Gulf War (23 were captured by the Iraqis and released after the war ended, the remains of 13
were recovered, and another 13 were eventually determined to be KIA-BNR); the American
soldier held captive in Somalia for almost two weeks in 1993; the three American soldiers
held by the Serbs for a month in late spring 1999 during the NATO air war against Serbia; and
the successful recovery of an Air Force pilot in 1995, and two others shot down in mid-1999,
all over Serbia or Kosovo as well. Furthermore, it seems possible that military operations in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001 will result in American prisoners being taken by enemy
forces or in American personnel being designated as MIA; the DPMO and other U.S.
government organizations concerned with missing personnel began planning for these
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eventualities almost immediately after the beginning of hostilities. (For instance, on March
2, 2002, a U.S. Navy SEAL fell from a helicopter during combat in Afghanistan and was
captured by enemy forces; his body was recovered the next day, but he was seen to have
survived the fall – it was from very low altitude – and apparently was tortured and then killed.
Had his captors been less brutal, he could have been the first American POW.)
Vietnam POW/MIAs: Were Americans Left Behind? Are Any Still Alive?
Those who believe Americans are still held, or were held after the war ended, feel that even
if no specific report has thus far been proved, the numbers unaccounted for, and the
cumulative mass of information about live Americans is compelling. Those who doubt
Americans are still held, or were when the war ended, argue that despite numerous reports,
exhaustive interrogations, and formidable technical means used by U.S. intelligence agencies,
no report of an unaccounted-for live American (with the exception of Garwood) has been
validated as to who, when, and where the individual is or was. They believe that much of the
“evidence” cited relates to already accounted-for Americans, wishful thinking, or fabrication.
For many years, a huge gulf separated those who argued about whether live Americans
were kept behind in Vietnam after the end of the war in 1973. Those who argued live
Americans were, or had been, kept in Indochina after the war concentrated on factors
including, but not limited to, the following: (1) the excellent physical condition of the mostly
officer aircrew taken prisoner; (2) the habit of Communist governments holding prisoners for
many years, up to several decades; (3) the apparent unwillingness of the Vietnamese to release
records they almost certainly have; and (4) the fact that many Americans were shot down over
Laos but few came home. Those who argued it was unlikely that live Americans were still
in Indochina noted the following factors: (1) the very high cumulative death rates due to the
ordeals of shootdown, poor medical care from the enemy, and systematic Vietnamese
Communist abuse and torture; (2) the apparent lack of use of Americans who could have been
held as “negotiating chips”; and (3) the lack of any live Americans held after the end of the
war being uncovered after roughly 15 years of Vietnam becoming a much more open society.
Most U.S. government analysts, many of whom have worked on the issue for several
decades and have access to the huge amounts of information that the intelligence community
and other agencies have amassed on POW/MIA matters, have come to believe that it is
extremely unlikely that the North Vietnamese kept U.S. prisoners after the end of the war, or
transferred any to the USSR. They fully appreciate the repressive nature of totalitarian
Communist regimes — that the Vietnamese Communists could have opted to keep some
Americans. They just feel that their examination of the evidence indicates that they did not.
Many analysts have posited that a lack of will to continue investigating the issue in the
aftermath of the Vietnam War, on the part of both DOD and political leadership in successive
Administrations in the 1970s, contributed to what observers have called “a mindset to
debunk” reports of live Americans as well as a desire on the part of successive
Administrations to wash their hands of the issue. This attitude may have contributed to the
less vigorous effort on the issue that characterized not only the Nixon and Ford
Administrations but that of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) as well. The Carter
Administration’s unwillingness to elevate the issue to a higher profile, some have argued, also
resulted from President Carter and members of his Administration having been opposed to
the Vietnam War in the first place and being desirous of expediting the normalization of
relations with Vietnam until that country invaded Cambodia in late 1978. These problems
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have been held responsible by many for the lack of attention, and the loss of fresher
information, regarding POW/MIAs in the 1970s.
Significantly, the progressively increasing penetration of Vietnam by a large American
official presence (JTF-FA and full diplomatic representation), as well as commercial interests,
American tourists, and many Europeans, has failed to disclose any indications that American
POWs were kept behind in the early 1970s, let alone are still being held. It would seem
unlikely that a secret of such magnitude could have continued to be concealed throughout the
1990s and into this decade, as thousands of Americans have visited Vietnam and some have
taken up extended residence there.
The “Coverup” Issue. Some say the U.S. government has engaged in a “coverup”
of evidence about live Americans still being held in Indochina; they attach greater credence
to some sources than does the government, and suggest that the criteria set by the government
for validating reports of live Americans are unreasonably, and perhaps deliberately, high. The
government responds by stating that such assertions are based on data that is inaccurate or
fraudulent. It also asserts that numerous investigations have cleared DIA of coverup charges
and that the ability to maintain a coverup strains credulity in an era of press leaks and
openness. Since 1982, it has been U.S. policy to provide intelligence to families of
unaccounted-for Americans that pertains or may pertain to their missing men.
Have Americans Remained in Indochina Voluntarily? Some Americans stayed
in Indochina voluntarily, Garwood being the best known. Another, Army PFC McKinley
Nolan, defected to the Viet Cong in 1967 and was killed by the Khmer Rouge (Cambodian
Communists) in 1975 or 1976. Ideology, collaboration with the enemy and a fear of
punishment upon return to the U.S., personal problems, a home, a local wife and children,
“brainwashing” by captors — or a combination of these factors — all could have played a role
in other Americans remaining in Indochina voluntarily. The Vietnamese have always left
room for such by denying Americans are living in areas “under their control.” In addition, the
U.S. government policy cited above on live Americans is careful to refer to “Americans ... still
being held against their will.”
Are the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Cambodians Still Holding the Remains
of Dead Americans? Few question the proposition that for many years the Vietnamese
had a stockpile from which they released remains as they saw fit. The DPMO believes that
this stockpile may have been exhausted by August 1990; after that month, none of the
returned remains identified as Americans had the chemical characteristics which would
indicate prolonged storage. Whether the Vietnamese hold other remains that, for whatever
reason, they have not returned is not known. In general, while the intelligence community is
convinced that a stockpile did exist, there is no consensus on more specific characteristics of
this stockpile. Vietnamese officials say they have provided detailed records to the U.S. that
we have not released. Others suggest the Vietnamese have not released remains that would
indicate mistreatment of POWs and/or that some were alive when the war ended but died in
Vietnamese custody thereafter (although such mistreatment is well known).
The large number of Americans lost in or over Laos, the number of known discrepancy
cases, and the few Americans returned who had been captured in Laos suggest that the
Laotians know more about the fate of unaccounted-for Americans than they have yet stated.
On the other hand, most Lao governments, Communist or not, have exercised little control
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over large parts of their country, due to Vietnamese occupation and their own lack of
resources. This suggests the Laotians may not have the ability to provide many answers about
missing Americans, and such answers may be better found from the Vietnamese. Laos is,
however, one area where searches of aircraft crash sites have resulted in the recent
identification of some unaccounted-for Americans.
Until 1990, U.S. efforts to obtain Cambodian cooperation met with no response.
However, during 1990-1992, U.S. personnel received 11 sets of remains at Phnom Penh, the
Cambodian capital; three have been identified as American. In addition, just recently the
remains of several Americans who were unaccounted for after the operations connected with
the recovery of the ship Mayaguez in Cambodian waters in May 1975, shortly after the fall
of South Vietnam, have been identified.
Korean War POWs/MIAs
Since the Korean War ended in 1953, there have been rumors Americans captured by the
North Koreans or Chinese were, or still are, held against their will in North Korea, China, or
the former USSR. There is little doubt that the Communist powers involved in the war have
withheld much information on POW/MIA from the United States.
DPMO states that although there is no first-hand, direct evidence of Korean War POWs
being transferred to the Soviet Union, the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence is so
compelling that they believe that at least small numbers of Americans were in fact so
transferred. There are indications that some sightings of Caucasians by foreign nationals in
North Korea may be of American soldiers who defected to North Korea in the post-Korean
War era. At least four such Americans who defected in the 1960s are known to be alive.
Assertions of very large numbers of Americans (several hundred or more) being transferred,
and/or their use as “guinea pigs” for Soviet and Soviet-bloc chemical and biological warfare
experiments, has not yet been validated to any appreciable degree.
Some U.S. POWs were not released by China until 1955, 2 years after the war ended.
Two civilian CIA aircrew members shot down over North Korea during the war, in 1952,
were imprisoned for 20 years and not released until 1972. Declassified U.S. documents
indicate that the U.S. government maintained an intensive interest in live POWs from the
Korean War throughout the 1950s. The documents are more explicit than anything yet
released regarding the Vietnam War. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Soviets, Chinese,
and North Koreans maintained labor camps containing millions of political prisoners. The
end of the Korean War in 1953 was followed by intensely bitter relations between the U.S.,
the North Koreans, and the Chinese. This suggests that the two Communist enemies of the
United States during the Korean War, as well as a Stalinist Soviet Union, were inclined to
hold live Americans — perhaps more so than Vietnam in the 1970s.
During the mid-1950s, the U.S. demanded the North Koreans and Chinese account for
missing Americans. After 1955, due to the lack of response by the Communists (except for
the return of 1,868 remains in 1954), the issue abated, although the United States periodically
raised the issue. In 1957, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearings on the Korean MIA
issue aired frustrations similar to those raised since 1973 on Indochina MIAs. Although the
issue of Korean MIAs began to get more attention in the early 1980s, concrete results of
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contact with the North Koreans were minimal until 1996. Between mid-1996 and mid-1997,
negotiations took place in which United States and North Korea agreed on parameters for
conducting field investigations and archival research for U.S. MIAs. Since 1996, U.S.
personnel have completed 24 visits to North Korea which have resulted in some additional
information and the return of 167 remains, of which 13 have been identified positively as
Americans. The most recent actual transfer of remains took place on October 29, 2002, when
11 remains that are possibly of Americans killed in ground combat in North Korea were
repatriated to U.S. custody. Talks with North Korea completed on June 10, 2002, provided
for three further operations in 2002, involving 28-person U.S. teams and lasting about a
month each. The first began July 20; the last began September 28 and ended October 29.
POWs and MIAs from Cold War and Other Incidents
During the Cold War (1946-1991), some U.S. military aircraft were shot down by the
USSR, Eastern European countries, China, and North Korea. Some of these aircraft were
performing intelligence missions near or actually inside Soviet airspace; others were definitely
in international airspace and/or were not involved in intelligence operations. While virtually
all such aircraft losses were acknowledged at the time, often with considerable publicity, their
intelligence functions were not.
Between 1946 and 1977, according to a DOD list released in 1992, there were at least
38 such incidents and one involving a ship (the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, by the North
Koreans in early 1968). Of the 364 crewmembers, 187 were eventually returned to U.S.
custody, the remains of 34 were recovered, 11 were known to be dead from eyewitness reports
but remains were not recovered, and 132 were “not recovered, fate unknown.” In 1956, the
U.S. asked the USSR about the crews of two aircraft shot down by Soviet forces in 1950 and
1952, citing intelligence reports (apparently obtained from German and Japanese POWs from
World War II, several hundred thousands of whom were not released by the Soviets until
1954-1955) that some crewmembers of these aircraft had been seen and spoken to in Soviet
concentration camps. In a 1992 letter to the U.S. Senate, Russian then-President Boris Yeltsin
acknowledged the shooting down of some U.S. aircraft by the Soviets and the recovery of
some surviving crewmen.
The first tangible evidence of such incidents from Soviet soil came in 1994, when U.S.
and Russian investigators found the remains of a U.S. Air Force officer who had been a
crewmember of a U.S. plane shot down by the Soviets while performing an intelligence
mission near Soviet territory in 1952. The 1993 report of the Senate Select Committee on
POW/MIAAffairs, a 1994 Rand Corporation study, and DPMO analysis all suggest strongly
that some Cold War shootdown crewmen survived and were taken prisoner by the Soviets.
In September 1998, the final remains from a U.S. plane shot down by the Soviets over Soviet
Armenia in 1958 were buried in Arlington National Cemetery; some remains had been
returned in 1958, and others had been gathered during U.S. POW/MIA recovery operations
in Armenia in 1993.
A second type of “Cold War incident” involves kidnapping of U.S. personnel in or near
Soviet-occupied territory in Europe after the end of World War II, by Soviet intelligence
agents. Some were allegedly identified as Americans in the late 1940s and early 1950s by
German POWs who were kept by the Soviets until 1954-1955. Most, however, were
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defectors, or had wandered into Soviet-occupied areas for nonpolitical reasons (romantic
entanglements, drunkenness, and the like). The full story of such kidnappings may well not
have been told and may never be. DPMO staff is aware of some such kidnappings, but has
not yet acquired any evidence about the permanent abduction of any Americans who were
never returned.
A Persian Gulf War POW/MIA Case. On January 10, 2001, the Navy changed the
status of Lt. Cdr. Michael Scott Speicher, shot down over Iraq during the Persian Gulf War,
from killed in action to MIA. This was a major development in a complicated and lengthy
case involving Lt. Cdr. Speicher’s exact fate. Several members of Congress have expressed
interest in the circumstances surrounding the loss of Lt. Cdr. Speicher, who was the first U.S.
pilot shot down during the Persian Gulf War, on the night of January 17, 1991. These
concerns have led to continuing active oversight of the issue by the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence. Lt. Cdr. Speicher’s body was never recovered. There is no doubt his aircraft
was shot down and crashed in Iraq about 150 miles southwest of Baghdad. The issue is the
lack of remains, resultant questions about whether he was in fact killed upon impact, and
some evidence, from a variety of sources, that he was taken prisoner by the Iraqis when in
relatively good physical condition.
Several members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested in mid-1999
that the Director of Central Intelligence and the President ensure that a more thorough
investigation of the matter be made. This report received wide publicity in the press and
media during the second week of March 2002, although its contents and basic findings had
been known, on an unclassified basis, since its completion in March 2001. This report stated,
We assess that Iraq can account for LCDR Speicher but that Baghdad is concealing
information about his fate. LCDR Speicher probably survived the loss of his aircraft, and if
he survived, he almost certainly was captured by the Iraqis”
(CRS italics). The report did not
explicitly address the likelihood of his still being alive and imprisoned by Iraq at the time the
report was completed. It merely suggested the strong possibility that he could have survived
the crash of his aircraft and been captured alive at that time. It also stated that technical
analysis of many of the objects found at the crash site, as well as the site itself, indicates that
the Iraqis had been at the site, recovered a great many things, and then returned to “plant”
some of them – including the flight suit – in an attempt to mislead U.S. investigations.
Since early 2002, coverage of the Speicher case in the media has been steadily
increasing, which has raised its profile among the American public and Congress. Indicative
of this is that the conference version of the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R.
4546; H.Rept. 107-772, November 12, 2002) would require the Secretary of Defense to begin
submitting periodic reports on the Speicher case to Congress within 90 days after the bill
becomes law.
Aspects of the Speicher case may be relevant to the current war against terrorism. The
controversies and concerns voiced about Speicher’s fate, and the U.S. government’s
management of his case, may well inform discussion and policies related to any U.S. military
personnel captured by enemy forces in Afghanistan or elsewhere. In particular, the “mindset
to debunk,” first raised regarding Americans unaccounted for from the Vietnam War but
arguably present in some echelons of the U.S. government regarding Speicher, may be a
cautionary tale for those making policy on Americans taken prisoner or missing in ongoing
hostilities. (See also see the section above entitled POW/MIA Issues: Current Relevance.)
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World War II POWs and MIAs: Soviet Imprisonment of
U.S. POWs Liberated from the Germans
There are allegations that the USSR failed to repatriate up to 25,000 American POWs
liberated from the Germans after World War II ended in Europe on May 8, 1945. This
appears to have no foundation in fact and results in large part from an apparent lack of rigor
and care in analyzing the issue. Archival research in the United States and Russia, combined
with interviews in Russia, appears to establish conclusively that virtually all such prisoners
were returned. In addition, the large flow of information on Soviet concentration camps of
the Stalin era, beginning in the early 1960s, both in writing and from emigre accounts, has
provided no indication of mass imprisonment of Americans.
A Rand Corporation study does, however, state that 191 Americans are known not to
have been repatriated by the Soviets. In addition, in 1992 Russian President Yeltsin stated
that about 450 Americans were not returned, sometimes on the basis of ethnic origin. It is
clear that some U.S. citizens of German birth who served in the German armed forces or
lived in Germany were taken prisoner by the Red Army as it advanced into Central Europe;
in addition, the Soviet secret police singled out Americans with German, Russian, or Jewish
names for special attention. Both figures are consonant with other knowledge of the arbitrary
and brutal nature of the Stalinist USSR. Accounts of U.S. dealings with the USSR during and
immediately after World War II on the POW issue are replete with accounts of Soviet
obfuscation, truculence, and reluctant cooperation. The Joint U.S.-Russian Commission on
POWs/MIAs set up by both countries to investigate these matters and Soviet involvement
with U.S. POWs in other post-World War II conflicts has been operating since mid-1992 with
mixed results. A good deal of information has been obtained. However, there has been
considerable obstruction of the Commission’s work by officials stillsympathetic to
Communist ideology and the former Soviet regime. See also the DPMO Web site
[http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/special/gulag_study.htm].
LEGISLATION
P. L. 107-258, S. 1339
Persian Gulf POW/MIA Accountability Act of 2001. Directs the Attorney General to
grant refugee status to any alien or close relative thereof who is a citizen of Iraq or other
Middle Eastern country who personally delivers into U.S. custody “a living American Persian
Gulf War POW/MIA.” Provides some exceptions to prevent the Act from being used by
dangerous or undesirable individuals. S. 1339 reported favorably with an amendment by
Senate Judiciary Committee, June 27, 2002; no written report. Passed Senate with an
amendment by unanimous consent, July 29, 2002. Reported favorably by House Judiciary
Committee without amendment October 15, 2002 (H.Rept. 107-749, Part 1). Passed House
by voice vote October 15, 2002. Signed into law October 29, 2002.
H.R. 4546 (Stump)/S. 2514 (Levin)
Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003. House Action. Report
language (Sec. 551–Staffing and Funding of the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel
Office, Subtitle F, Title V-Military Personnel Policy) requires the Secretary of Defense to
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increase military and civilian staffing levels and DPMO funding in FY2004 and subsequent
years “to enable the DPMO to adequately perform its full range of missions.” Prohibits any
reduction in staffing or funding below FY2003 budget request level of 46 military and 69
civilian personnel and $16.0 million. Criticizes the Secretary for not increasing DPMO
resources in accordance with committee report on FY2002 National Defense Authorization
Act. States that a planned reduction in DPMO personnel levels of 15% “would be imprudent.”
H.R. 4546 reported favorably by House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 107-436) on
May 3, 2002. Passed House May 9, 2002, 359-58, Recorded Vote No. 158. Senate Action.
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003. Reported favorably by Senate Armed
Services Committee (S.Rept. 107-151) on May 15, 2002. Amendment by Senators Ben
Nelson and Roberts (S.Admt. 4101) adopted by voice vote, June 26, 2002 (Congressional
Record
, June 26, 2002: S6079-85). Sec. 1035: Requires reports on efforts to resolve
whereabouts and status of Captain Michael Scott Speicher, USN. Requires the Secretary of
Defense to report to Congress, no later than 60 days after enactment and every 90 days
thereafter, on efforts of the U.S. government to determine whereabouts and status of Capt
Speicher. Such reports to include information on (1) any contacts with Iraq related to
Speicher; (2) any requests made to any other country regarding Speicher; (3) each current lead
and assessments of such leads regarding Speicher’s status; and (4) any work with
nongovernmental/international organizations regarding Speicher’s status and/or recovery.
Passed Senate June 27, 2002, 97-3, Rollcall Vote No. 165. Conference Action. Conference
version reported November 12, 2002, H.Rept. 107-772. Sec. 551: Adopted House version
regarding DPMO staffing and funding levels with minor technical changes only. Sec. 583:
Adopted Senate version regarding status of Captain Speicher, amending it to (1) change the
dates specified to 90 days and 120 after enactment, (2) provide that the reports would cease
upon a final determination as to Captain Speicher’s status, and (3) minor clarifying
amendments. House approved conference report November 12, 2002, and Senate approved
November 13, clearing measure for the President.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Cole, Paul M. POW/MIA Issues. Volume 1, The Korean War; Volume 2, World War II and
the Early Cold War; Volume 3, Appendixes. Reports no. MR-351/1, 2, and 3-USDP.
Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1994. 284, 182, and 302 p.
Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office. Extensive statistical breakdowns, lists of
individuals, and studies and analyses on POW/MIA matters from World War II to the
present. [http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo]
Keating, Susan Katz. Prisoners of Hope. New York, Random House, 1994. 276 p.
Nenninger, Timothy K. “United States Prisoners of War and the Red Army, 1944-45: Myths
and Realities.” The Journal of Military History, July 2002: 761-82.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. POW/MIA’s. Report.
January 13, 1993. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993 (103rd Congress, 1st
session. S.Rept. 103-1). 1223 p.
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Yarsinske, Amy Waters. No One Left Behind: The Lt. Comdr. Michael Scott Speicher Story.
New York, Dutton/Penguin Putnam, Inc., July 2002. 292 p.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL30606. U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American Citizens Captured and
Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan.
CRS Issue Brief IB98033. The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process.
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