Order Code RS21055
Updated November 4, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
NATO Enlargement
Paul E. Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement, then
sketches recent events culminating in preparations for the NATO summit in Prague on
November 21-22, 2002. The report analyzes the key military and political issues that
affect the current debate over 9 candidate states. It then provides an overview of the
positions of the allies and of Russia on enlargement, citing the important potential
effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes
with a discussion of current legislation on enlargement before Congress. This report will
be updated, as needed.
Background
Congress is in the early stages of considering enlargement of NATO, an issue that
will be addressed at the allied summit in Prague, on November 21-22, 2002. During the
last round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is
necessary to admit new states because enlargement is considered an amendment to the
original North Atlantic Treaty.) Other members of the alliance followed suit, and the
three countries became members in March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had
admitted new states, with membership increasing from the original 12 to 19 today.
At the last NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were open
to further enlargement. NATO created a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining a
structured set of goals for prospective members, such as ending the danger of ethnic
conflict, developing a democratic society with fully transparent political and economic
processes and civilian control of the military, and pledging commitment to defense
budgets to build military forces able to contribute to missions from collective defense to
peacekeeping. NATO pledged to review the enlargement process in 2002.1
1 Washington Summit Communiqué, paragraph 7, NATO. April 24, 1999.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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In June 2001, the North Atlantic Council stated that the 2002 Prague summit would
yield an invitation to at least one candidate state to begin accession negotiations for
membership. On June 15, 2001, President Bush said in Warsaw that “all of Europe’s new
democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the
same chance for security and freedom, and the same chance to join the institutions of
Europe, as Europe’s old democracies.” He did not name countries that the United States
would support. In summer 2001, he also opened the door to possible Russian membership
in the future. Russian President Putin has said that his country is not now interested in
membership, but did not rule out future membership.
The Current Debate
In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as
costs, mission, and qualifications of the candidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly
been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary does not
appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries
have contributed to stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions
to the alliance in such matters as enhancing NATO’s understanding of central and eastern
Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members’ involvement with
these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes
forces to the NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend
its borders. Pentagon officials believe that Poland has made the greatest strides in
restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have
made considerably less progress.2 It should be noted that a period of years is normally
necessary to rebuild a military that has had an authoritarian tradition and convert it to one
having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform its training, and purchase
equipment compatible with a new set of allies.
There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate
states until democratic processes are firmly entrenched. For example, the recent
Hungarian government of Victor Orban was criticized for an ethnic “status law” that some
interpreted as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states having
Hungarian minorities.3 Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely
elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing more than a passing example of
nationalist politics before a close election. Nonetheless, it is possible that the period
between naming candidate states for accession negotiations at Prague in November 2002
and the moment when current NATO member governments decide whether to admit those
candidates (such as the vote in the U.S. Senate), could see debates over whether each
candidate continues to meet criteria for democracy, particularly if there is an election
bringing in a government that member states view as extremist.
Another factor for consideration could prove to be a candidate state’s efforts to
persuade its people that NATO membership is desirable. In Slovenia, for example, the
2 “NATO pushes Czechs on arms,” International Herald Tribune, Feb. 22, 2001, p. 5; and Jeffrey
Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum, June
2000.
3 Jackson Diehl, “New NATO, old values,” Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p. A19.

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government supports enlargement, but public support for membership has fallen to under
50% as of November 2002.
The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no
apparent consensus. The generally acknowledged serious candidates for invitations to
begin accession negotiations after the 2002 Prague summit are Slovenia, Slovakia, the
three Baltic states, and Bulgaria and Romania.4 Each of these countries is small, with
comparably small militaries potentially capable of specialized functions, such as transport
or medical care, for example, but only minimally capable of building forces able to
contribute to high-intensity conflict. In the view of some observers, to adhere to the letter
of the military qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit communiqué, requiring new
members to contribute to missions from peacekeeping to collective defense, is tantamount
to excluding their entry.
Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect
the current political situation in Europe, where Russia is no longer a military threat but
ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In such circumstances, they
contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border
defense and to peace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell
seemed to suggest such a standard in his confirmation hearing when he stressed a need
for candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen their democratic structures.5
An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all
with an agreement on what types of out-of-area threats, such as terrorism, proliferation,
or a disruption of the flow of oil, should be met with a possible military response. At that
point, enlargement should be considered, with a determination about which candidate
states could contribute to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about enlargement,
note that the United States flew over 60 percent of combat missions in the Kosovo
conflict. They prefer candidate states that could relieve the U.S. burden.
Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense
(high-intensity conflict undertaken in response, for example, to the attacks of September
11, 2001) and collective security (peace operations and humanitarian assistance). In this
view, countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and
preventing “black holes,” such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root.
Countries involved in peace operations, then, are contributing to the prevention of
terrorism, and thereby to collective defense.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting
the enlargement debate. A likely part of the enlargement debate will be how candidate
states might contribute to the conflict against terrorism or act to stem the flow of weapons
of mass destruction. NATO seemed partially to settle one aspect of the debate over its
mission shortly after the attacks when member states invoked Article V, the alliance’s
4 For a review of developments in 9 states seeking admission to NATO, see CRS Report
RL30168, NATO Applicant States: a status report, updated March 11,2002, by Steven Woehrel,
Julie Kim, and Carl Ek.
5 Confirmation hearing of Colin Powell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1st sess., 107th
Congress, Jan. 18, 2001.

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collective defense clause, to come to the aid of the United States in the conflict against
terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any statement that Article V should
be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism. At a NATO ministerial meeting in
Reykjavik in May 2002, the allies agreed that they must be able “to carry out the full
range of... missions, ... to field forces wherever they are needed, sustain operations over
distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”6
However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained
forces for the current tasks in Afghanistan, for example. Few allies besides the United
States have special forces with the potential to contribute meaningfully to the conflict.
At the same time, a number of allies have an intelligence capability, transport, medical
units, and political influence that might assist in the conflict. However, it is possible that
future aspects of the conflict against terrorism will require larger, more conventional
forces, depending upon the location and terrain where terrorists base themselves, or if the
government of a state should fall into the hands of terrorists.
As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine the means by which
candidate states might be able to contribute. These means might include political
influence and support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia or Muslim states,
and not simply or necessarily military potential. It might also include the level of internal
security in the candidate countries and their ability to control their borders, disrupt
terrorist financial networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on their soil. Elements of the
MAP that emphasize an end to corruption may also be increasingly underscored, given
the post-September 11 importance of preventing money-laundering and combating a black
economy.
Views of the Allies
The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998,
several European allies strongly supported enlargement. Today, most member states
couch discussion of enlargement in careful terms. Governments might state their support
in principle for enlargement, or name states that are good candidates but offer no date for
their entry.
Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in
addition, Hungary urges Slovenia’s membership, once NATO criteria for entry are met,
for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any other NATO state. Slovenia’s
entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear
advantage given neutral Austria’s refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO
overflights to Hungary. A weakness of Slovenia’s candidacy, already mentioned, is its
population guarded support for NATO membership. Slovakia is a credible candidate in
some NATO capitals, given the return in September 2002 elections of key elements of its
reform government. Some northern European allies, such as Poland, strongly support
membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic states have met OSCE and
EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries’ work to build stability
in the region and to establish better relations with Russia. U.S. officials state that the
Baltic states have made the most progress in meeting MAP requirements.
6 Communiqué, NATO Ministerial, May 14, 2002.

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Italy, Greece, and Turkey are mounting a quiet campaign for invitations to Bulgaria
and Romania. They contend that these two candidates can contribute to stability in the
Balkans, where Europe’s greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that both Romania
and Bulgaria continue to suffer from corruption in their governing structures, and that
Bulgaria must make stronger efforts to modernize its military. Bulgaria has also had a
succession of governments that have followed an uncertain course towards political and
economic reform.
The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Germany and several
allies, such as France, had held the view until recently that NATO enlargement and the
U.S. missile defense program had antagonized Moscow, and that a new round of
enlargement would only contribute more tension to the Russia-NATO equation. Putin’s
softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since the September 11 terrorist attacks appears
to have moved Paris and Berlin closer to more assertive support for inviting candidate
states at the Prague summit.
In the broadest sense, the debate may eventually widen to address strategic issues.
One element of this question, the military contribution that a prospective member can
make, has been mentioned. Another element is whether states now having their security
threatened should be considered. The argument was raised during the 1998 debate over
enlargement: “NATO is bringing in states that are not threatened, and leaving to fend for
themselves countries that are in the greatest need of security.” Today, for example,
Macedonia is under pressure from a restive ethnic Albanian minority within its borders
and from rebel Albanian forces who until recently had fought for control of part of the
Macedonian state. In the 1998 debate, the argument that states should join NATO that are
in the greatest need of security failed, largely because their instability might have saddled
the alliance with unwanted internal problems. The Senate and allied governments decided
to choose countries that had demonstrated stability, had promised to make a military
contribution to the alliance, and were not under threat from ethnic strife.
As already noted, Russian President Putin has softened his public opposition to
enlargement since the terrorist attacks on the United States. It is possible that he now
views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow’s ongoing conflict in
Chechnya, as more important than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement.
The Duma and much of Russia’s military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly
opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a military alliance
closer to their territory. U.S. and officials from other allied states often counter such an
argument by underscoring that enlargement’s purpose in large part is to ensure stability
in Europe, and that the addition of new member states provides stability, and therefore
security, to Russia’s west.
Congressional Views
The issue of NATO enlargement has not yet fully engaged the 107th Congress. Some
individual Members, however, have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has
recently been introduced. Rep. Shimkus and others introduced H.Con.Res. 116, which
calls for NATO invitations to the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit, as
long as they satisfy the alliance’s qualifications. It passed by voice vote on October 7,
2002.

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On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate supporting further enlargement. Representative Bereuter
introduced H.R. 3167, the Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert, Reps.
Bonior, Goss, Hyde, and Lantos, among others, cosponsored the bill. Senator Helms
introduced an identical bill, S. 1572, simultaneously in the Senate; cosponsors included
Senators Durbin, Lieberman, Lott, Lugar, and McCain. The bill recalled and approved
legislation of the four previous Congresses that urged enlargement and provided funding
for particular candidates. While the bill did not champion any particular candidate for
entry at the Prague summit, it encouraged the continued efforts of the current 9 formal
candidates, as well as Moldova and Ukraine. It designated Slovakia as eligible to receive
U.S. assistance under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of
P.L. 103-447). This section gives the President authority to establish a program of
assistance with a government if he finds that it meets the requirements of NATO
membership. The bill also authorized a total of $55.5 million made available for FY2002
under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and
Romania. The bill became law on June 10, 2002 (P.L. 107-187).
Representative Gallegly has introduced H.Res. 468, which describes NATO as key
to U.S. interests in Europe, supports enlargement at Prague, and encourages a continued
path of improving relations with Russia. It passed the house 358-9 on October 7, 2002.
On August 30, 2002, the Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee submitted a report on enlargement to Senators Helms and Biden. The staff
found that “most of the candidates... have serious problems with pervasive corruption....”
The report evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the principal candidate states. A key
finding of the report was:
“As a general matter... those countries with strong assets to contribute militarily –
both in the form of troops, weapons, or strategic location (specifically Romania and
Bulgaria) – have more serious work remaining to develop and modernize their
democratic institutions. While those with strong democratic institutions, market
economies, and the rule of law do not add significantly to the overall military posture
of the Alliance.”7
7 Republican Staff Report on Enlargement, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 30,
2002.

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