Order Code RS20333
Updated November 1, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
China and “Falun Gong”
Thomas Lum
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The “Falun Gong” movement led to the largest and most protracted public
demonstrations in China since the democracy movement of 1989. On April 25, 1999,
an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 adherents assembled in front of Zhongnanhai, the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership compound, and participated in a silent
protest against state repression of their activities. Three months later, the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) government, fearful of the spread of social unrest, outlawed
the movement. Despite a massive government campaign against them and harsh
punishments meted out to many followers, Falun Gong adherents continued to stage
demonstrations for over two years. In 2002, Falun Gong practitioners interrupted
television programming in several cities and broadcast their own videos. On July 24,
2002, the House of Representatives unanimously agreed to H.Con.Res. 188, which calls
upon the PRC government to cease persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, and
referred the resolution to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Background and Major Events
What Is “Falun Gong”? “Falun Gong,”also known as “Falun Dafa,”1 combines
an exercise regimen with meditation and moral tenets. The practice and beliefs are
derived from qigong, a set of movements through which one channels vital energies, and
Buddhist and Daoist principles. Practitioners claim that they experience physical well-
being, emotional tranquility, and a higher understanding of life’s purpose and one’s place
in society. They state that by controlling the wheel of dharma, which revolves in the
body, one can cure such ailments as high blood pressure, back aches, and even cancer.
Falun Gong upholds three main virtues — compassion, forbearance, and truthfulness —
and warns against manifestations of contemporary “moral degeneration” such as rock
music, drugs, and “sexual liberation.” Adherents believe that through practicing Falun
1 The literal meanings of “Falun Gong” and “Falun Dafa,” respectively, are “law wheel exercise”
and “great way of the wheel of dharma.” See Danny Schechter, Falun Gong’s Challenge to
China
(New York: Akashic Books, 2000).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Gong, individuals can reach higher levels of “cultivation,” problems of society can be
solved, and the end of the world can be averted.2
Some observers argue that Falun Gong resembles a cult; they refer to the
unquestioning support of its founder, Li Hongzhi, the interest in end-of-the-world
prophesies, and the rejection of Western science. The PRC government charges that
Falun Dafa has contributed to the deaths of nearly 2,000 persons by discouraging medical
treatment and causing or exacerbating mental disorders. Followers counter that the
practice is voluntary, compatible with mainstream science and culture, and helps develop
healthy, moral, and productive citizens. They also emphasize that Falun Gong is not a
religion – there is no worship of a deity, all-inclusive system of beliefs, church or temple,
or formal hierarchy.

Falun Gong’s Spiritual Leader. Li Hongzhi (“Master Li”), a former Grain
Bureau clerk, developed Falun Gong in the late 1980s, when qigong began to gain
popularity in China. In 1992, Li explained his ideas in a book, Zhuan Falun. In 1993,
Falun Gong was incorporated into an official organization, the Chinese Qigong
Association. However, the Falun Gong chapter was expelled in 1996 because of
unorthodox practices. Li reportedly left China soon after. During the mid-1990s, Falun
Gong acquired a large and diverse following of varying levels of involvement, with
estimates ranging from 3 to 70 million persons, including several thousand practitioners
in the United States.3 In China, the practice attracted many retired persons as well as
factory workers, peasants, state enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and
students. In addition, the spiritual discipline was embraced by many retired and active
Party and government cadres and military officials and personnel. Then Vice-President
Hu Jintao stated that of 2.1 million known members of the Falun Gong group, one-third
belonged to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).4 Since 1998, Li and his family have
lived in the New York City area. He has appeared at Falun Gong gatherings in the United
States and Canada four times since May 1999 and has not granted an interview since the
crackdown in China began.
The Demonstrations and PRC Government Responses. On April 25,
1999, 10,000 to 30,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered in Beijing. Provincial
representatives arrived in the capital before dawn and joined local followers in front of
Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound. Clutching Master Li’s writings, the
demonstrators sat silently or meditated. Concerned that the government was starting a
campaign to discredit them, some adherents presented an open letter to the Party
leadership demanding official recognition and their constitutional rights to free speech,
press, and assembly.
2 See [http://www.falundafa.org]and [http://www.faluninfo.net].
3 A later estimate put the number of adherents in China at “several million” members. See Craig
S. Smith, “Sect Clings to the Web in the Face of Beijing’s Ban,” New York Times, July 5, 2001.
4 The practice reportedly enjoyed a strong following among soldiers and officers in some
northeastern cities while the PRC Navy published copies of Zhuan Falun. According to one
source, there were 4,000-5,000 Falun Gong “sympathizers” in the PLA air force. See David
Murphy, “Losing Battle,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 15, 2001. See also John
Pomfret,”China Takes Measured Steps Against Sect,” Washington Post, August 6, 1999.

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Between May and June 1999, Chinese Communist Party leaders were reportedly split
on whether to ban Falun Gong and conveyed contradictory messages.5 Premier Zhu
Rongji met with a delegation of practitioners to consider its request for official approval,
and told them that they would not be punished. By contrast, President Jiang Zemin was
said to be shocked by the affront to Party authority and ordered the crackdown. Jiang was
also angered by the apparent ease with which U.S. officials had granted Li Hongzhi a visa
and feared U.S. involvement in the movement. The government produced circulars
forbidding Party members from practicing Falun Gong. State television and newspapers
portrayed the following as a dangerous religious cult. Security forces collected the names
of instructors, infiltrated exercise classes, and closed book stalls selling Falun Dafa
literature. Tensions escalated as followers engaged in 18 major demonstrations, including
occupying a government building in the city of Nanchang and demonstrating in front of
China Central Television Station in Beijing.
The crackdown began on July 21, 1999, when Falun Gong was officially outlawed
and an arrest warrant was issued for Li Hongzhi.6 In Beijing alone, public security
officers closed 67 teaching stations and 1,627 practice sites.7 CCP leaders ordered 1,200
Party and government officials who had practiced Falun Gong to sever their own ties to
the movement. The state detained and questioned over 30,000 participants nation-wide,
releasing most of them after they promised to quit or identified group organizers. The
state also attempted to block Falun Gong Internet sites and close the e-mail accounts of
Falun Gong practitioners.
PRC prosecutors have charged Falun Gong leaders with various crimes, including
“leaking state secrets to foreigners,” “organizing superstitious sects,” disrupting public
order, obstructing justice, engaging in unlawful assembly and publication, tax evasion,
and manslaughter. An estimated 150 to 450 group leaders and other members have been
tried and sentenced to prison terms of up to 18 years. In December 2000, Teng Chunyan,
a Falun Gong practitioner and U.S. resident, was tried in a Beijing court and sentenced
to 3 years in prison on charges of espionage.8 An estimated 10,000 unrepentant followers
have endured long periods of detention or “labor re-education.”9 Human rights
5 Chan, Vivien Pik-Kwan, “Sect Ban Rumour Not True — Beijing,” South China Morning Post,
June 15, 1999; John Pomfret, “Jiang Caught in Middle on Standoff,” Washington Post, April 8,
2001.
6 However, in November 1999, Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Bureau of Religious Affairs,
stated that police would not interfere with people who practiced alone in their own homes. Matt
Forney, “Beijing Says Changes in Economy Helped Spur Falun Dafa’s Growth,” Wall Street
Journal
, November 5, 1999.
7 Before the crackdown, there were approximately 39 “teaching centers,” 1,900 “instruction
centers” and 28,000 practice sites nationwide. See John Pomfret and Michael Laris, “China
Expands Sect Crackdown,” Washington Post, July 25, 1999; and John Wong and William T. Liu,
The Mystery of Falun Gong (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. and Singapore
University Press, 1999).
8 Ms. Teng had allegedly brought foreign journalists to a Chinese psychiatric hospital where
Falun Gong adherents were being kept. See also H.Res. 160 (passed on June 25, 2001), which
calls upon the PRC to release detained U.S. citizens and U.S. residents of Chinese ancestry.
9 “Labor re-education” is a form of “administrative punishment” for non-criminal acts (such as
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organizations claim that 500 adherents have died in custody, mostly from torture. Many
other followers have been suspended or expelled from school or demoted or dismissed
from their jobs.
It took the PRC government over two years to subdue the Falun Gong organization,
although many followers are believed to be still practicing in their homes or meeting
secretly. Between July 1999 and October 2000, Falun Gong adherents continued to travel
to Beijing and staged several large demonstrations (several hundred to over a thousand
persons) – many were sent home repeatedly or evaded the police. At first, the
enforcement of government decrees, such as those requiring universities, employers, and
neighborhood committees to extract signed repudiations of Falun Gong, was often lax.
Many local public security bureaus lacked the capacity or will to detain, let alone reform,
adherents.10
In January and February 2001, as large demonstrations abated, six persons widely
believed to be Falun Gong practitioners immolated themselves at Tiananmen Square.
Subsequently, the central government began to intensify its crackdown, pressuring local
officials, universities, state-owned enterprises, and neighborhood organizations to
carefully monitor all Falun Gong activities, even those done privately. Sporadic, small
demonstrations continued through July 2001, but they involved only a few dozen or
several protesters each. According to some sources, in August 2001, the central
government sanctioned violence by local authorities against demonstrators and detainees
and directed a policy of “using all means” to suppress the movement completely.11
Meanwhile, the CCP exploited the self-immolations in an extensive propaganda campaign
to discredit Falun Gong.
Falun Gong Organization
Adherents of Falun Gong often characterize their objectives as personal and limited
in scope, claiming that they have no political agenda beyond protecting their
constitutional rights and receive little guidance from Master Li.12 However, according to
some analysts, the movement was well organized before the crackdown. After the
government banned Falun Gong, a more fluid, underground network, aided by the
Internet, pagers, and pay phones, carried on for over two years.13 Some reports suggest
9 (...continued)
“disrupting public order”) that lasts between one and three years and does not require a trial.
Falun Gong activists claim that the actual figure of those under detention is much higher. Craig
S. Smith, “Sect Clings to the Web in the Face of Beijing’s Ban,” New York Times, July 5, 2001;
Mary Beth Sheridan, “Falun Gong Protests on the Mall,” Washington Post, July 20, 2001.
10 See John Pomfret, “China’s Steadfast Sect,” Washington Post, August 23, 2000.
11 Charles Hutzler, “Falun Gong Feels Effect of China’s Tighter Grip,” Asian Wall Street Journal,
April 26, 2001; John Pomfret and Philip Pan, “Torture is Breaking Falun Gong,” Washington
Post
, August 5, 2001.
12 Li was reportedly en route from Hong Kong to Australia when the April 1999 demonstrations
broke out and denies that he instigated them.
13 Ian Johnson, “Brother Li Love: In China, the Survival of Falun Dafa Rests on Beepers and
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that Li Hongzhi has directed the movement from behind the scenes or that some of his
public statements have had profound moral influence upon many of his followers. As the
crackdown entered its third year, some of Li’s exhortations became more exacting, urging
followers not to “hide themselves” or retreat but rather to “step forward” – even to endure
torture in prison – as a means toward higher levels of existence or “consummation.”14
New Tactics
Since January 2002, Falun Gong members have interrupted television programming
in several large Chinese cities, mostly in the northeast, as well as in remote areas. These
efforts include momentarily replacing regular cable broadcasts with their own Falun Gong
programs in Chongqing in January and June 2002, in Changchun in March and June 2002,
in Anshan and Harbin in June 2002, and in Baoding in August 2002. In addition, in June
and September 2002, satellite signals beaming World Cup finals and other regular
programs were jammed and replaced by Falun Gong images.15 In September 2002, a
Chinese court sentenced 15 practitioners who had allegedly carried out television
disruptions to prison terms of 4 to 20 years. The PRC government recently announced
plans to launch a television satellite that can block attempts to “hijack” its signals.
Tung Chee-hwa, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(SAR), has parroted Beijing’s line in his criticism of Falun Gong. However, practicing
Falun Gong is legal in Hong Kong. Followers held a demonstration on October 1, 2002,
China’s National Day, publicizing human rights abuses in mainland China and protesting
the SAR government’s plan to introduce anti-subversion legislation for Hong Kong. In
August 2002, 16 Falun Gong practitioners (11 Hong Kong SAR residents and 5 foreign
nationals) were convicted in a Hong Kong court and fined up to HK $3,800 (US $485)
for obstructing the police and pedestrians in a March 2002 demonstration.
On behalf of plaintiffs in China, Falun Gong adherents in the United States have
filed numerous civil complaints in U.S. federal courts against PRC officials for violations
of the Torture Victim Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act, and other “crimes
against humanity.”16 Falun Gong followers in the United States have also filed several
lawsuits in U.S. District Courts claiming that PRC embassies and consulates have been
responsible for harassment, eavesdropping, and destruction of their property.17
13 (...continued)
Faith,” Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2000.
14 “Master Li Hongzhi’s Lecture at the Great Lakes Conference in North America,” December
9, 2000. See also John Pomfret, “A Foe Rattles Beijing from Abroad,” Washington Post, March
9, 2001and Ian Johnson, “As Crackdown Grows, Falun Gong’s Faithful Face a New Pressure,”
Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2001.
15 The satellite interference may have originated overseas. The Taiwanese government denied
any involvement.
16 Under U.S. law, foreigners accused of crimes against humanity or violations of international
law can be sued in federal court by U.S. citizens or aliens in the United States. The accused
individual must be served a civil complaint in the United States.
17 The PRC government denies these accusations. See Neely Tucker, “Falun Gong Followers in
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Implications for Chinese Politics
Social Stability. The Chinese government has reportedly referred to Falun Gong
as “the most serious threat to stability in 50 years of [Chinese] communist history.” The
movement’s size, organizational effectiveness, level of commitment, and attraction to
segments of the PRC government and military have posed uniquely difficult political
challenges to the CCP, both real and imagined. Although the following had grown
increasingly diverse by the late 1990s, the most fervent adherents of Falun Gong have
been found in regions of the country, such as the northeast, where adaptation to central
government economic policies has been the most painful.18 In these areas in particular,
Falun Gong has tapped into and exacerbated existing social and political tensions.
Public Opinion. For the vast majority of non-practitioners, however, Falun Gong
has not aroused a significant degree of political passion. On the one hand, the crackdown
and suppression of Falun Gong has deepened anti-government sentiment among not only
adherents but also non-practitioners, including many intellectuals. On the other hand,
many Chinese have remained indifferent or even critical toward Falun Gong adherents.
Some Chinese have blamed Li Hongzhi, arguing that he exploited vulnerable people and
caused their suffering by encouraging them to forgo medical treatment or to continue to
oppose the government. The January-February 2001 self-immolations further alienated
many Chinese. In 2002, some Beijing residents reportedly expressed being offended by
the sight of foreigners protesting against their government on Chinese soil.19
U.S. Government Responses
On July 24, 2002, the House of Representatives unanimously passed H.Con.Res.
188, which calls upon the PRC to cease persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, and
referred it to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom produces an annual report, in compliance with the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292), that describes religious
activities in countries where they have been restricted. On the basis of the Commission’s
findings, the U.S. Department of State has designated China as a “country of particular
concern” for “particularly severe violations of religious freedom” for three consecutive
years (1999-2001), and is expected to do so again in 2002.20
17 (...continued)
the U.S. Sue China,” Washington Post, April 4, 2002.
18 Nearly two-thirds or 64% of Falun Gong adherents reported to have died in prison came from
China’s “rust belt” – the northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, Heibei, and
Shandong.
19 Erik Eckholm, “China Expels 53 Foreign Falun Gong Followers,” The New York Times,
February 16, 2002.
20 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “ International
Religious Freedom Report 2002 – China.”