Order Code IB98043
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks,
Terrorism, and U.S. Policy
Updated November 1, 2002
Ted Dagne
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Sudan’s Reaction to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks
Special Envoy Danforth’s Mission
The Danforth Report: Analysis
Current Developments
The Humanitarian Crisis
U.S. Response
Peace Talks
The IGAD Peace Process
Sudan and Terrorism
Sudan and Oil Development
Sudan: Religious Persecution and Slavery
The United States and Sudan
The Bush Administration and Current Policy Debate
The Clinton Administration and Sudan
LEGISLATION
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Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks,
Terrorism, and U.S. Policy
SUMMARY
Sudan, geographically the largest country
edly resisted secularism, walking out on peace
in Africa, has been ravaged by civil war inter-
talks in September 1994 and returning in July
mittently for 4 decades. An estimated 2 mil-
1997 after a series of military defeats. In July
lion people have died over the past decade due
2002, the Sudan government and the Sudan
to war-related causes and famine, and millions
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) signed a
have been displaced from their homes. Ac-
peace framework agreement in Kenya. In early
cording to the United Nations, an estimated 3
September, the government of Sudan walked
million people are in need of emergency food
out of the Machakos talks and returned under
aid.
pressure in early October 2002.
The relief operation is being coordinated
Relations between the United States and
by Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), estab-
Sudan are poor in part because of Khartoum’s
lished in 1989 in response to the 1988 human-
human rights violations, its war policy in the
itarian crisis in which over 200,000 people
south, and its support for international terror-
died of starvation. The OLS, a consortium of
ism, although in recent months relations have
U.N. agencies and three dozen non-govern-
improved somewhat. In November 1997, the
mental organizations (NGOs), operates in both
Clinton Administration imposed comprehen-
government and rebel-controlled territories.
sive sanctions on the NIF government. Presid-
ent Bush renewed the sanctions in late Octo-
The 19-year civil war has been and con-
ber 2002. On September 6, 2001, President
tinues to be a major contributing factor to
Bush appointed former Senator John Danfor-
recurring humanitarian crisis. There have
th as Special Envoy for peace in the Sudan. In
been many failed attempts to end the civil war
January 2002, Envoy Danforth spent several
in southern Sudan, including efforts by Nige-
days in Sudan, his second visit to the region.
ria, Kenya, Ethiopia, former President Jimmy
In April, Danforth submitted his report to
Carter, and the United States. To that end, the
President Bush.
heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya
and Uganda formed a mediation committee
On October 2, 2002, Representative Tom
under the aegis of the Inter-Governmental
Tancredo and 13 other House Members intro-
Authority for Development (IGAD) and held
duced H.R.5531, the Sudan Peace Act. H.R.
the first formal negotiations in March 1994.
5531 is similar to an earlier version passed by
The basis of these talks is the Declaration of
both the House and Senate. On October 7,
Principles (DOP), which includes the right of
2002, the House passed H.R. 5531, 359-8. On
self-determination, separation of religion and
October 9, 2002, the Senate passed the Sudan
the state (secularism), and a referendum to be
Peace Act without amendment by unanimous
held in the south with secession as an option.
consent. On October 21, 2002, President
Although the National Islamic Front (NIF)
Bush signed the bill (P.L. 107-245) at a White
government reluctantly accepted the DOP in
House ceremony.
1994, the government in Khartoum has repeat-
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In mid-October 2002, the government of Sudan returned to the Kenya-sponsored talks,
after more than a month of absence. The government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a cessation of hostilities agreement at the
beginning of the talks in Machakos, Kenya. In the second phase of the negotiations, the
parties are discussing power- and wealth-sharing. In late October 2002, the parties also
signed an agreement to give humanitarian workers unfettered access to all parts of Sudan.
On October 21, 2002, President Bush signed the Sudan Peace Act at a White House
ceremony in which Members of Congress, religious leaders, and Sudan activists
participated. President Bush stated that “The Government of Sudan must choose between
the path to peace and the path to continued war and destruction.” The Act authorizes $300
million for education, health care, and infrastructure support in opposition-controlled areas
of Sudan. The Act also requires the President to impose sanctions if the government of
Sudan fails to negotiate in good faith. The government of Sudan condemned the Sudan
Peace Act, referring to the Act as “the Sudan War Act.”
On October 29, 2002, President Bush renewed Executive Order 13067, economic
sanctions imposed on the government of Sudan in 1997. In his letter to Congress, President
Bush declared that “Because the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan continue
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of
the United States, the national emergency declared on November 3, 1997, and the measures
adopted on that date to deal with that emergency must continue in effect beyond November
3, 2002.” Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department blocked the assets of 12 Sudanese
entities, including the Sudan National Broadcasting Corporation, in late October 2002.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In 1956, Sudan became the first independent (from Britain and Egypt) country in sub-
Saharan Africa. For almost 4 decades, the east African country with a population of 35
million people has been the scene of intermittent conflict. An estimated two million people
have died from war-related causes and famine in southern Sudan, and millions more have
been displaced. The Sudanese conflict, Africa’s longest-running civil war, shows no sign
of ending. The sources of the conflict are deeper and more complicated than the claims of
political leaders and some observers. Religion is a major factor because of the Islamic
fundamentalist agenda of the current government, dominated by the mostly Muslim/Arab
north. Southerners, who are Christian and animist, reject the Islamization of the country and
favor a secular arrangement. Social and economic disparities are also major contributing
factors to the Sudanese conflict.
The abrogation of the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement in 1983, which ended the first
phase of the civil war in the south, by former President Jaffer Nimeri is considered a major
triggering factor in the current civil war. Although the National Islamic Front government,
which ousted the democratically elected civilian government in 1989, has pursued the war
in southern Sudan with vigor, previous governments, both civilian and military, had rejected
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southern demands for autonomy and equality. Northern political leaders for decades treated
southerners as second-class citizens and did not see the south as an integral part of the
country. Southern political leaders argue that under successive civilian and military
governments, political elites in the north have made only superficial attempts to address the
grievances of the south without compromising the north’s dominant economic, political, and
social status. In recent years, most political leaders in the north, now in opposition to the
current government, say that mistakes were made and that they are prepared to correct them.
But the political mood among southerners has sharply shifted in favor of separation from the
north. The current government seems determined to pursue the military option. The war
is costing the government an estimated $1-2 million a day. Economic conditions have
deteriorated significantly, and millions of southern Sudanese are at risk of starvation due to
a serious humanitarian crisis, partly caused by the government’s decision to ban United
Nations relief flights.
Sudan’s Reaction to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks
Sudan’s reactions to the September 11th terrorist attacks and U.S. military actions
against Taliban and Al-Qaeda have been mixed. The leader of Sudan’s National Islamic
Front government, President Omar el-Bashir, who provided a safe haven to Osama bin Laden
between 1991-1996, condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed his government’s
readiness to cooperate in fighting terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell called Sudanese
Foreign Minister Mustapha Ismail several days after the terrorist attacks, the first high-level
contact between U.S. and Sudanese officials. Secretary Powell stated that Sudanese officials
offered to cooperate with the United States and appear eager to join the coalition. According
to press reports, U.S. officials confirmed that the NIF government has given U.S. officials
unrestricted access to files of suspected terrorists and suggested that they might be willing
to hand over some of these individuals to U.S. authorities.
Sudanese officials are sending mixed signals about their level of cooperation with the
United States. According to Secretary of State Powell, the NIF government has been “rather
forthcoming in giving us access to certain individuals within the country and in taking other
actions which demonstrate to us a change in attitude.” The Foreign Minister of Sudan, on
the other hand, downplayed the extent of the cooperation described by U.S. officials. He
stated that “Washington has not so far presented Sudan with any list of wanted people ... and
we have not turned over any suspects.” In late September, State Department spokesman,
Richard Boucher told reporters that Sudanese authorities “recently apprehended extremists
within that country whose activities may have contributed to international terrorism.”
Government reaction to U.S. military attacks against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in
Afghanistan has been critical. In early October 2001, the government of Sudan issued a
statement criticizing the U.S. military action against Afghanistan, after a cabinet meeting
chaired by President Bashir. The National Assembly of Sudan also criticized the U.S.
military attacks against Afghanistan as “unjustified and lacking legitimacy.” Meanwhile,
anti-American demonstrations in Khartoum have become more frequent in recent weeks. On
October 9, 2001, Islamic clerics led several thousand protestors in an anti-American
demonstration in Khartoum. The demonstration was dispersed by police after protestors
attempted to storm the U.S. embassy in Khartoum.
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Special Envoy Danforth’s Mission
On September 6, 2001, President Bush appointed former Senator John Danforth as
Special Envoy for peace in the Sudan. During a White House ceremony, President Bush
stated that “for nearly two decades, the government of Sudan has waged a brutal and
shameful war against its own people. And this is not right, and this must stop.” President
Bush affirmed his Administration’s commitment to “bringing stability to the Sudan.” In
response, Envoy Danforth stated that “the effectiveness of America’s efforts for peace in
Sudan will depend on our communication and cooperation with other interested countries,
including the European Union and countries neighboring Sudan, especially Egypt and
Kenya.” In late November 2001, Danforth made his first visit to Sudan and other
neighboring countries to assess the Sudan peace process and humanitarian conditions. In
Khartoum, he met with President Bashir of Sudan and senior government officials. In
opposition-controlled southern Sudan, he met with senior officials of the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM). In Nairobi, Kenya, he met with President Moi and in Egypt
Danforth met with President Hosni Mubarak and senior government officials.
Danforth was given the mandate to ascertain if there is a role for the United States to
play in the peace process. As part of his mandate he first sought to test the parties to the
conflict to determine if they were serious about a negotiated settlement. He proposed four
confidence building measures. These included: (1) a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region
to facilitate relief assistance; (2) the creation of “days tranquility” to administer
immunizations and provide humanitarian relief assistance; (3) an end to aerial bombardment
of civilian targets; and (4) the creation of an Eminent Persons Group on slavery in Sudan.
The Danforth Report: Analysis
In April 2002, Danforth submitted his report to President Bush. He made a number of
recommendations and gave his assessment of the situation concerning the peace process.
Danforth concluded that there is a role for the U.S. in the peace process. The Danforth report
recommends that the U.S. support the IGAD peace process and help coordinate it with other
initiatives. Some observers interpreted his recommendation as an endorsement of
constructive and energetic U.S. engagement in the peace process, currently spearheaded by
President Moi of Kenya. Others saw a rejection of a unilateral or U.S.-led peace initiative.
The Danforth recommendation reaffirms continued U.S. support of and preference for the
IGAD peace process, which had been pursued by the Clinton Administration for several
years. The policy to remain engaged in support of the IGAD peace process does not
represent a change in U.S. policy, although the levels of engagement and financial and
political support are expected to be robust.
Another conclusion by Danforth is that the war is not winnable by either side to the
conflict. Thus, a negotiated settlement is the only option. This conclusion echos the long-
standing conventional wisdom that the war is stalemated. Some observers had suggested that
the new oil revenue could tilt the military balance of power in favor of the government.
Indeed, the government of Sudan has been acquiring new weapons, especially helicopter
gunships and fighter planes, from Russia and other countries. Critics maintain that the
government of Sudan is using these newly acquired weapons to terrorize civilian populations,
especially in the oil fields. Sudan observers have witnessed a rise in the deadly use of air
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power against civilians, as witnessed in the bombings in Bieh and Rier in Western Upper
Nile in the past several months. The government, however, has not been able to reverse
gains made by the SPLA in recent years. In fact, the most recent government offensives in
Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Upper Nile have been quashed by SPLA forces. Some
observers contend that while the SPLA and its allies may not be able to march into
Khartoum, it is plausible that the government of Sudan could be defeated in southern Sudan,
since the government’s presence in the south is limited to a handful of garrison towns.
Current Developments
In early September, the government of Sudan walked out of the IGAD-sponsored talks
in Kenya. The government accused the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) of
“offensive military activity” in Eastern Equatoria. The SPLA captured Torit, the capital of
Eastern Equatoria State, in response to a series of government attacks in Western Upper Nile
province and other parts of southern Sudan. The government of Sudan demanded the
withdrawal of SPLA troops from Torit and a cease-fire agreement before Khartoum returns
to the talks in Kenya. Analysts assert that the real reason behind the withdrawal was that the
government of Sudan is opposed to a confederal arrangement and rejects SPLA positions on
security arrangements in the transition period. In early October 2002, the Government of
Sudan returned to the talks under intense international pressure and after it re-captured Torit.
On July 20, 2002, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLA), after five weeks of talks in Machakos, Kenya, signed a framework agreement to end
the war in southern Sudan. The Machakos Protocol calls for a 6-year transition period and
a referendum on the political future of southern Sudan at the end of the transition period.
The Agreement establishes an independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission to
monitor and evaluate the implementation of a final peace agreement. The Machakos
Protocol also exempts southern Sudan from Sharia laws. The United States, the United
Kingdom, and Norway participated as observers in the Machakos IGAD negotiations.
In early June 2002, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) captured Kapoeta, a
garrison town near the Kenyan border. The government of Sudan acknowledged the loss of
Kapoeta to the SPLA. Kapoeta is the capital of the Eastern Equatoria province and had been
under the government control since 1993, when government forces captured the town from
the SPLA. The government of Sudan has accused the SPLA of violating a humanitarian
ceasefire and has threatened to walk out of the IGAD peace talks. In May 2002, government
forces captured a small garrison town, Gessan, in Blue Nile province from SPLA forces.
In April, the government of Sudan intensified its military attacks in Western Upper Nile
province, near the oil regions, killing scores of civilians and displacing thousands in the
process. United Nations and relief officials have warned that humanitarian conditions are
deteriorating. The government of Sudan has banned relief flights in Upper Nile and Bahr el-
Ghazal, despite repeated calls by relief officials to allow flights to resume. According to
United Nations officials, the government of Sudan has denied access to “more than 40
locations” in southern Sudan since late March 2002.
In late April 2002, Sudanese Defense Minister, Major General Bakri Hassan Saleh,
visited Russia and met with senior Russian officials to discuss a military cooperation
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agreement with Russian defense officials. The Sudanese government has intensified its
purchase of Russian made weapons system over the past several years. In January 2002,
Sudan reportedly purchased a dozen advanced Mig-29 fighter jets from Russia. The
Sudanese armed forces still hold large quantities of Russian made weapons, including T-62
and T-72 tanks, BMP-1 combat infantry vehicles, and Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopter gun ships.
In March 2002, Sudan and Uganda reached agreement, which allowed Ugandan forces
to go after Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels inside Sudan where LRA is most active.
In April 2002, Khartoum and Kampala agreed to restore full diplomatic relations. Ugandan
forces are expected to pull out of southern Sudan by mid-May 2002, although some
observers have suggested that Ugandan forces could extend their presence beyond the May
deadline.
In early March 2002, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM),
Dr. John Garang, came to the United States for talks with Bush Administration officials. On
March 15, 2002, Garang met with Secretary of State Colin Powell and with senior officials
at the White House. Garang also met with members of Congress, USAID Administrator
Andrew Natsios, and other senior Administration officials.
On March 19, 2002, the Washington Post reported that a top Al-Qaeda member was
captured in Sudan and sent to Egypt. According to the Post article, Abu Anas Liby, wanted
for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, is one of the 22 most wanted
terrorists by the Bush Administration. A senior Sudanese official said the story about Liby
was inaccurate. Sudanese officials, while offering to cooperate with the United States on
counter terrorism, have consistently denied the presence of terrorist groups or individuals in
Sudan.
In late February 2002, Sudanese army helicopters fired several rockets into a crowd of
civilians waiting for food distribution by United Nations officials. An estimated 17 people
were killed in the attack, and several hundred were wounded. The government of Sudan
initially denied that it had targeted civilians but apologized later after strong international
condemnations. The United States suspended peace talks with the government, pending full
explanation. Talks resumed after the government of Sudan signed an agreement to protect
civilians from such attacks.
In January 2002, Special Envoy Danforth met with senior government officials in
Khartoum and with Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) officials in rebel-
controlled Rumbek in southern Sudan to discuss his proposed initiatives. Envoy Danforth’s
mission succeeded in securing a ceasefire agreement in the Nuba and received the support
of the parties on his other two proposals. The parties agreed to the creation of a commission
to investigate allegations of slavery and endorsed a proposal to create “zones of tranquility”
for humanitarian purposes.
In early January 2002, the leader of the Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF), Riek
Machar, and the leader of the SPLA/M, John Garang, signed a declaration of unity in
Nairobi, Kenya. In 1991, Riek Machar split from the SPLA and formed his own faction, and
in 1997 he joined the Sudan government as Assistant Vice President, after signing a peace
agreement with President Omar Bashir. In late 2000, Machar left the government and began
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to negotiate with the SPLA. Many observers consider the agreement key to reconciliation
efforts between the two main ethnic groups in southern Sudan, the Nuer and Dinka.
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against
Sudan, which were imposed in 1996. The sanctions reduced the number of Sudanese
diplomats and restricted the entry and transit of Sudanese officials. The sanctions were
imposed to force Sudan to handover three suspects in the assassination attempt of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 in Ethiopia. The vote was 14-0 with the United States
abstaining. The Clinton Administration rejected the lifting of these sanctions in late 2000,
arguing that the Sudanese government had not fully cooperated in the fight against terrorism.
In reaction to the lifting of the sanctions, the Foreign Minister of Sudan, Dr. Mustafa Ismail,
stated that “its timing was a proof that Sudan’s land is free of any terrorist elements.”
In July, a high-level American delegations, headed by U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator Andrew Natsios, visited Khartoum as well as the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)-controlled areas in southern Sudan. The delegation
pledged additional humanitarian assistance to north and south Sudan. In early June 2001, the
heads of state from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea met in Kenya to reactivate the
stalled IGAD peace process. Both the leader of the SPLA, John Garang, and President Omar
Bashir of Sudan attended the talks. The talks failed to produce an agreement. A press
release after the talks stated that there were serious disagreements between the parties on a
wide range of issues.
On June 2, 2001, shortly after the IGAD talks ended, Garang announced the capture of
Raga, an important town in western Bahr el-Ghazal, by SPLA forces. In recent weeks, SPLA
forces have captured several garrison towns in a series of battles in Bahr el-Ghazal and Blue
Nile province. On June 6, 2001, President Bashir ordered the mobilization of forces and
vowed to defeat SPLA forces.
On February 21, 2001, the former Speaker of Parliament and the one-time leader of the
People’s National Front (PNC), Turabi, was arrested with many PNC leaders accused of
collaborating with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The Minister of
Information described the PNC and SPLM agreement to work together for peace as a
“declaration of a political alliance to fight the government, an alliance which does not use
legalized methods and an alliance with a military movement that continues to fight the state
and the Sudanese people and whose agenda and principles are known.”
The Humanitarian Crisis
The current humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan is considered one of the worst in
decades. According to the World Food Program (WFP), southern Sudanese “are facing
serious food and water shortages due to the combined disruptions of civil war and drought.”
(World Food Program website, [http://www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=2].) According to
WFP, more than 2.9 million people in the south of the country are “severely affected” by the
civil war, and an estimated 800,000 people are affected by drought in the north. Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which is the U.N.-coordinated relief effort, was established in 1989
in response to the death of 250,000 people due to starvation in southern Sudan. The OLS is
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a consortium of UN agencies and more than 40 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
provides emergency relief for civilians living in drought and war-affected areas.
The 18-year civil war, drought, and raids by government-backed militias and rebel
groups have disrupted the distribution of food aid and obstructed assessments of need in
severely affected areas. The crisis has escalated dramatically in recent years. The scorched-
earth techniques used by pro-government militias have decimated fields and homes and
forced tens of thousands of people to flee the war-torn areas. According to reports from the
scene, the government of Sudan (GOS) routinely and deliberately denies access to areas of
southern Sudan to the OLS, according to U.N. relief officials. The government of Sudan has
denied access to WFP relief flights to 43 locations in southern Sudan, according to WFP.
Many relief centers and hunger-stricken areas are inaccessible by ground transportation
because roads were destroyed, did not exist or are impassible due to rain and mud.
Moreover, deliberate aerial bombardment of civilian centers has led to serious humanitarian
crisis. In February 2002, government helicopter gunships bombed Bieh in Western Upper
Nile, while civilians were lined up at a food distribution center. Seventeen people were
killed and many more injured.
U.S. Response. The United States contributed more than $231.1 million in
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year (FY)1999, $93.7 million in FY2000, and $154.7
million in 2001. As of May 2002, the United States has provided an estimated $83.9 million
in humanitarian assistance in the current fiscal year. Moreover, the United States is
providing development aid in opposition-controlled areas to build the capacity of civil
administration, conflict resolution, and assist indigenous non-governmental organizations.
The Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) was increased from $2 million
in FY1999 to $4.25 in FY2000, and the STAR budget for FY2001 was $4 million. In 2002,
the Bush Administration announced two major development programs for southern Sudan
and significantly increased the development budget. According to USAID, the Southern
Sudan Agricultural Revitalization Project provides $22.5 million for a five year program to
improve agricultural production. The Sudan Basic Education Program is a five-year $20
million program designed to improve access to quality education.
Peace Talks
Peace efforts to end the civil war in Sudan have not succeeded in part because of
irreconcilable differences on fundamental issues between the “Arabized” north and southern
rebels. The strong belief by the NIF regime that it could resolve the conflict through military
means has been and continues to be a major impediment to peaceful efforts. Another major
obstacle is NIF’s inflexible position on the role of religion in politics and government. The
government seems to show interest in talks when it is weakened militarily or to buy time to
prepare for another military offensive.
The IGAD Peace Process
Alarmed by the deepening crisis and multiple failed attempts by outside mediators,
members of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), a regional
organization that promotes cooperation and development, formed a mediation committee
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consisting of two organs: a summit committee of heads of state from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya
and Uganda, and a standing committee composed of their mediators. Preliminary talks were
held in November 1993 and January 1994, and formal negotiations began in March and May
of the same year. Presented at the May meeting, the Declaration of Principles (DOP)
included the following provisions: the right of self-determination with national unity as a
high priority, separation of religion and state (secularism), a system of governance based on
multiparty democracy, decentralization through a loose federation or a confederacy, respect
for human rights and a referendum to be held in the south with secession as an option. The
NIF government initially resisted the DOP, particularly self-determination and secularism.
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) accepted the DOP and the government
was later persuaded by the mediators to accept the DOP.
The IGAD peace process began with the view that the Sudan conflict was having
serious repercussions not only in the country but also in the region, and sought to deal with
the root causes of the conflict. Conditions were ripe for talks since both sides were
exhausted from years of fighting and some members of the IGAD committee were seen by
Khartoum as allies. In 1994, however, relations between IGAD member Eritrea and Sudan
began to deteriorate largely due to Sudan’s support for an Eritrean opposition group, the
Eritrea Islamic Jihad. Meanwhile, serious opposition to the DOP began to emerge from the
NIF government. The most contentious issues were secularism and self-determination,
which the Khartoum government refused to concede. In July 1994, the polarization of the
two sides intensified after the Khartoum government appointed a hard-line NIF member to
its delegation. The Khartoum delegation professed the government’s commitment to Islamic
law as part of a religious and moral obligation to promote Islam in Sudan and throughout the
continent, and refused self-determination as a ploy to split the country. In September,
President Moi of Kenya convened a meeting of the committee’s heads of state, Sudan’s
President al-Bashir and the leader of SPLA. The Khartoum government walked out of these
peace talks, rejecting the DOP. Loss of military ground and intense international pressure
forced the government to the negotiating table in Nairobi in 1997 and formally accepted the
DOP. The return to the IGAD process was, in part, in recognition of its failed effort to attract
other mediators, who might have been more supportive of NIF positions.
Further meetings in 1997-1998 sought to narrow divisions between the two sides with
the government of Sudan formally agreeing to self-determination for the south. The
government of Sudan also appeared willing to compromise on some other issues. In May
1998, the parties, despite some progress earlier, disagreed on which territories were
considered part of the south. The Khartoum delegation defined the south as the three
provinces of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, established at independence in
January 1956. The SPLM/A argued that Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile and
other areas on the margins of the three core provinces were also part of the south. There
were also serious disagreements on the duration of the interim period before a referendum
on self determination, and issues relating to interim arrangements were shelved by the
mediators in part to avoid failure. The question of religion and state remained unresolved.
The United States and the European Union praised Khartoum’s acceptance of self-
determination as a major step forward. However, some observers saw the agreement on self-
determination as a small step in the right direction after years of stalled efforts. The most
contentious and difficult issues are yet to be tackled by IGAD mediators, including the
separation of religion from politics and interim arrangements prior to the referendum. Some
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observers believe that it is too soon to judge whether the concession on self-determination
represents a change in Khartoum’s position or a tactical move to buy more time. A follow-
up meeting between the parties took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in early August 1998.
The talks collapsed due to differences on the role of religion in politics. The parties also
disagreed again on the territorial definition of southern Sudan for the purpose of referendum.
In February 2000, the parties met in Nairobi but failed to make progress. In early June 2001,
President Moi reconvened the stalled IGAD peace talks in Nairobi. No progress was made,
according to a press release issued at the conclusion of the talks. In January 2002, IGAD
mandated President Moi to merge the IGAD peace process with the Egypt-Libya Initiative
(ELI), a peace initiative launched by the governments of Egypt and Libya in 2000. A peace
summit is expected to take place in mid-June 2002.
Sudan and Terrorism
Sudan is considered a rogue state by the United States because of its support of
international terrorism, although in recent years it has taken some measures to improve its
record. The State Department’s 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report said that Sudan
“has stepped up its counter terrorism cooperation with various U.S. agencies, and Sudanese
authorities have investigated and apprehended extremists suspected of involvement in
terrorist activities.” According to the same report, “Sudan, however, remained a designated
state sponsor of terrorism. A number of international terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda,
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Egyptian al-Gama’ al-Islmaiyya, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
and HAMAS continued to use Sudan as safe haven, primarily for conducting logistics and
other support activities.” Counter-terrorism cooperation began in mid-2000, but the
government of Sudan did not offer significant assistance until after the September 11 terrorist
attacks. In November 2001, President Bush renewed U.S. bilateral sanctions on Sudan and
the State Department kept Sudan on the terrorism list.
The United States placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in August
1993 after an exhaustive interagency review and congressional pressure. Sudan has been a
safe haven for major terrorist figures. A particularly noteworthy example is Osama bin
Laden. He used Sudan as a base of operations until mid-1996 when he returned to
Afghanistan, where he had previously been a major financier of Arab volunteers in the war
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The GOS claims that it expelled bin Laden
from Sudan due to pressures from the Middle East and the United States. In August 1996,
the State Department said that bin Laden was “one of the most significant financial sponsors
of Islamic extremist activities in the world today.”
Sudan and Oil Development
The government of Sudan earns an estimated $500 million annually from oil since it
began to export in August 1999. Chevron began oil exploration in the mid-1970s and made
its first discovery in1979. Large reserves in the Upper Nile region of southern Sudan were
discovered in the 1980s. Chevron interrupted its work several times in the mid- and late
1980s after attacks by the SPLA. In 1990, Chevron halted operations and sold its
concessions to Arakis, a Canadian oil company. Arakis was not able to raise the necessary
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capital for its projects in Sudan, and due to company financial troubles, it was taken over by
another Canadian oil company, Talisman Energy. In March 1997, Talisman Energy,
Petronas Carigali of Malaysia, PetroChina, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum
Company (CNPC), and Sudapet, Sudan’s national petroleum company, signed an agreement
and created a consortium, the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) for oil
production and construction of a 1,000-mile pipeline. PetroChina holds a 40% share,
Petronas 30%, Talisman Energy 25%, and Sudapet 5% in GNPOC.
The government of Sudan and the oil companies involved in oil development have
come under severe criticism from human rights groups and NGOs. Human rights groups
accuse the government of Sudan of a scorched-earth policy. In a March 2001 report,
Christian Aid, a British-based NGO, declared that “in the oil fields of Sudan, civilians are
being killed and raped, their villages burnt to the ground.” (Christian Aid. “The Scorched
Earth: Oil and War in Sudan, March 2001” [http://www.christian-aid.org.uk].) The report
blames foreign companies for assisting the government of Sudan’s war effort by helping
“build Sudan’s oil industry, offering finance and technological expertise and supplies.”
According to press reports and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government of
Sudan has doubled its military budget since it began exporting oil. Some observers believe
that because of these new oil revenues, the government may not be interested in negotiating
seriously to end the war.
Members of Congress and Sudan advocacy groups have called on the Bush
Administration to impose capital market sanctions on companies involved in the oil industry
of Sudan. The Sudan Peace Act, passed by the House in October 2000, contained a sense
of Congress language for such measures. On April 26, 2001, Representative Payne
introduced H.Con.Res. 113 (for more see legislation section). On June 5, 2001,
Representative Tom Tancredo introduced H.R. 2052, the Sudan Peace Act. On June 13,
2001, the House amended and passed (422-2) H.R. 2052. H.R. 2052 is similar to H.R. 931,
introduced in March by Representative Tancredo. H.R. 2052 condemns the government of
Sudan, calls for the appointment of a Special Envoy, and requires foreign companies doing
business in Sudan to disclose their activities to the public if they seek access to U.S. capital
markets. The amendment, which passed by voice vote, prohibits companies engaged in oil
exploration and production related activities in Sudan from “raising capital in the United
States.” Companies are also prohibited from trading securities “in any capital market in the
United States.” The Bush Administration opposes the disclosure as well as the capital
market sanction provisions of the Sudan Peace Act. (Washington Post, August 15, 2001)
Human rights groups and Sudan advocacy groups have launched a concerted campaign
to pressure oil companies involved in Sudan. Since late 1999, a divestment campaign has
been underway targeting Talisman Energy. As of April 2001, several U.S. institutions have
divested from Talisman Energy, including the State of New Jersey, the State of California
Public Employees Retirement System, the State of Texas Teachers Pension Plan, and the
State of Wisconsin (late April 2001).
Sudan: Religious Persecution and Slavery
Of the estimated Sudanese population of more than 35 million, Sunni Muslims
comprise 70%; animists 25%; and Christians 5%. The NIF government in Khartoum views
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itself as the protector of Islam in Sudan. Political opponents are viewed as anti-Islam and
the civil war in southern Sudan is considered a jihad, or Holy War. For the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army (SPLA), the war is to free southerners from political domination and
religious persecution. According to the 2002 State Department human rights report,
in prisons and juvenile detention facilities, government officials and government-
supported Islamic NGO’s pressured and offered inducements to non-Muslim inmates to
convert. Some persons in the government-controlled “Peace” camps for Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) reportedly were subject to forced labor and at times pressured
to convert to Islam. Children, including non-Muslim children, in camps for vagrant
minors are required to study the Koran, and there is pressure on non-Muslims to convert
to Islam. There are credible reports that some boys in vagrant camps and juvenile homes
have been circumcised forcibly. There were credible reports that some children from
Christian and other non-Muslim families who were captured and enslaved were forced
to convert to Islam.
The NIF government’s practice of ‘holy war’ is reflected in attacks on civilians in the
south. Some attackers are wooed in part by the tradition that during a jihad they can keep
their booty. The result reportedly has been widespread institutionalized slavery and massive
dislocation. Captured slaves reportedly are forced to attend Quranic schools, change their
names, and sometimes indoctrinated to fight their own people. Through the government plan
of “forced acculturation,” thousands of children are abducted and forcibly converted to Islam
or face harsh beatings and torture. According to the State Department’s 2001 human rights
report,
there were reports that during raids on civilian settlements, government and government-
allied militias abducted persons, particularly women and children. In the last 15 years,
between 5,000 and 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted; between
10,000 and 12,000 persons, most of whom are Dinka, remained unaccounted for at year’s
end. Although reliable statistics generally are unavailable, observers believe that the
number of abductions increased during the year. Observers believe that some of the
abductees were sold into slavery, while others were used as forced labor or drafted into
the military.
Since 1995, an estimated 40,000 slaves have been redeemed by Christian Solidarity
International (CSI), according to press accounts and CSI.
The United States has repeatedly condemned the Khartoum government and in some
cases the SPLA for human rights abuses. But American complaints have had little success
in convincing the government to improve human rights conditions. The State Department’s
March 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights reiterated criticisms of Sudan:
The Government’s human rights record remained extremely poor, and although there
were some improvements in a few areas, it continued to commit numerous, serious
abuses. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government peacefully.
Government security forces and progovernment militias continued to act with impunity
and were responsible for extrajudicial killings. There were reports of government
responsibility for disappearances. There were at least eight confirmed abductions of NGO
workers by government forces and progovernment militias during the year. Government
security forces regularly beat, severely flogged, harassed, arbitrarily arrested and
detained, and kept in incommunicado detention opponents or suspected opponents of the
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government. Reports of torture were less frequent than in previous years primarily in
response to increased critical scrutiny by the international community.
Aerial bombardment of civilian targets has emerged as one of the most serious human
rights issues in U.S.-Sudanese relations. In 2000, the government of Sudan bombed civilian
targets 167 times, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), a Washington-
based NGO. In November 2000, the government dropped several bombs at a market in Yei,
killing an estimated 18 people and wounding dozens. The State Department has condemned
such attacks by the government of Sudan on a number of occasions, but to no avail. The
government claims that it is targeting the military bases of the SPLA and that the SPLA
deliberately surrounds its bases with civilians. But human rights groups and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Sudan argue that the government is
destroying hospitals, schools, and feeding centers. Media have reported that in February
2002, government helicopter gunships killed 17 civilians and wounded scores of people at
a U.N. feeding center in Bieh, Upper Nile province; that in May 2002, over a dozen people
were killed and over 50 wounded after government war planes dropped 16 bombs in Rier,
Upper Nile.
The United States and Sudan
Relations between the United States and Sudan continue to deteriorate because of
Khartoum’s human rights violations, its war policy in the south, and its support for
international terrorism. In 1967, Sudan broke diplomatic relations with the United States
because of American support for Israel in the Arab-Israel war. Relations were restored after
several months. In 1973, the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission were
assassinated in Khartoum by members of the Black September group, who were tried and
sentenced to life imprisonment in Sudan. Relations were further strained when Sudanese
President Nimeri commuted the sentences of the assassins. In response, Washington recalled
its new ambassador. In the mid-1970s, in the face of Soviet expansion in the Horn of Africa
and the fall of Ethiopia into the Soviet sphere of influence, relations with the Nimeri regime
began to improve. Nimeri’s support during Operation Moses, in which an estimated 7,000
Ethiopian Jews were airlifted to Israel through Sudan, further strengthened U.S.-Sudanese
relations, but later contributed to the ouster of Nimeri from power. Relations became
strained once again when the democratically elected government of Sadiq el-Mahdi was
ousted in a military coup in 1989. Since the military takeover, human rights abuses by the
military junta have become a major source of tension between the two countries. The war in
the south has also been a thorny issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations.
Another issue in U.S.-Sudanese relations is Sudan’s role in support of international
terrorism. Some Members of Congress have been instrumental in pushing a tougher Sudan
policy and played a key role in the decision to put Sudan on the list of states that sponsor
terrorism and to appoint a special envoy for Sudan. The State Department rejected
congressional calls for a special envoy in December 1993. The Department argued that a U.S.
special envoy would undermine regional and former President Carter’s peace efforts. In a
December 6, 1993 letter to Members of Congress, the Administration said the appointment
of a special envoy “would send the erroneous impression that the U.S. is becoming directly
involved, since Khartoum has made it clear that it rejects a role by the U.S. in the peace
process.” However, persistent pressure by some Members of Congress led to a reversal of
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State’s position in early 1994, at the insistence of the National Security Council (NSC) at the
White House. The Clinton Administration appointed former Representative Harry Johnston
in late 1999. The Bush Administration appointed former Senator John Danforth in
September 2001.
The Bush Administration and Current Policy Debate
In late 2000, Washington defeated efforts to lift United Nations sanctions on Sudan and
prevented Sudan from becoming Africa’s representative in the United Nations Security
Council. Senior U.S. officials met with Sudanese government officials in 2000 to inform
Sudanese officials what it would take to improve relations. U.S. security officials also spent
several months in Khartoum talking with Sudanese security officials on terrorism. President
Bush has mentioned Sudan twice in his speeches in the last 2 months, condemning human
rights violations by the Bashir government. In early March 2001, Secretary of State Colin
Powell told members of the House International Relations Committee that Sudan is a priority
to him and the Administration.
Advocates of a tough U.S. policy towards the NIF government seem prominent in the
policy debate and appear to have the sympathy of senior Administration officials and
Members of Congress from both parties. In recent months, senior congressional leaders
joined Sudan advocates in condemning the government of Sudan. At a recent press
conference on Capitol Hill, Majority Leader Richard Armey (R-TX), Representative Charles
Rangel (D-NY), and the NAACP announced the formation of a bipartisan Sudan Caucus.
Advocates of a tough Sudan policy favor additional sanctions, appointment of a high-profile
Special Envoy, and active U.S. engagement in peace efforts. They oppose the staffing of the
U.S. embassy in Sudan and some favor support for opposition forces. These advocates
would like the United States government to take specific measures to address slavery and
aerial bombardment of civilian targets. Some who favor a policy of engagement argue that
the policy of containment and isolation has failed to produce tangible results and that the
United States itself is now isolated.
A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues that the
United States should focus on ending the war and engage the government of Sudan in
dialogue.1 The report argues that “in the past 2 years, Sudan’s rising oil production has
shifted the balance of military power in the government’s favor at the same time that
significant internal rifts have surfaced in Khartoum.” The report contends that “in this fluid
context, the United States possesses significant leverage. Among the major powers, it is the
lone holdout in renewing a dialogue with Khartoum.” The authors of the report support the
full staffing of the U.S. embassy, a U.S.-supported peace process, and a “One Sudan, Two
Systems” formula to preserve the unity of the country. The CSIS report drew fire from
Sudan activists and has triggered a sharp debate on U.S. policy toward Sudan.
The Clinton Administration and Sudan
In May 1996, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,
reportedly called Sudan “a viper’s nest of terrorism.” The United States closed its embassy
1 U.S. Policy to End Sudan’s War. Report of the CSIS Task Force on U.S.-Sudan Policy, Feb. 2001.
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in Khartoum in February 1996 and moved the remaining embassy personnel to Nairobi
because of security concerns. Moreover, the U.S. government has imposed a series of
sanctions on the NIF regime over the years. Washington suspended its assistance program
after the NIF-led coup in 1989, placed Sudan on the list of states that sponsor terrorism in
August 1993, and supported United Nations Security Council sanctions on Sudan. The
Clinton Administration expelled one Sudanese embassy official, who had been based in New
York, for suspected links to an alleged plot to bomb the United Nations. (Goshko, John.
“Sudanese Envoy at U.N. Ordered to Leave U.S.” Washington Post, April 11, 1996. A17.)
Another Sudanese diplomat, who was a suspect in the plot, left for Sudan.
On November 22, 1996, President Clinton announced the Administration’s decision to
ban senior Sudanese government officials from entering the United States as called for in
Security Council Resolution 1054. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security
Council lifted these sanctions. The Administration actively supported allies in the region
affected by an NIF-sponsored destabilization campaign. The United States has provided an
estimated $20 million in surplus U.S. military equipment to Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
The non-lethal military assistance such as uniforms and communications equipment to the
“frontline states” was intended to support them in fending off NIF’s campaign of
destabilization. Observers interpret U.S. support to these countries as a measure to contain,
punish, and facilitate the downfall of the fundamentalist government in Khartoum.
In November 1997, the Clinton Administration imposed comprehensive sanctions on
the NIF government after an exhaustive policy review. The sanctions restrict imports or
exports from Sudan, financial transactions, and prohibit investments. In making his case for
the sanctions, President Clinton stated that “the policies and actions of the government of
Sudan, including continued support for international terrorism; ongoing efforts to destabilize
neighboring governments; the prevalence of human rights violations, including slavery and
the denial of religious freedom, constitute extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States.” (Text of the executive order can be found at the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control Web site at
[http://www.ustreas.gov/ofac/legal/sudan.html].)
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-245, H.R. 5531
Calls for a comprehensive peace in Sudan and condemns the government of Sudan for
human rights abuses. Introduced October 2, 2002. Passed House 359-8 on October 7, 2002.
Received in the Senate on October 8, 2002. Passed Senate by unanimous consent on October
9, 2002. Signed into law October 21, 2002.
H.Con.Res. 112 (Payne)
Calls for an end to slavery in Sudan. Introduced April 26, 2001.
H.Con.Res. 113 (Payne)
Condemns the government of Sudan and urges the Administration to deny foreign
companies doing business in Sudan U.S. capital market access. Introduced April 26, 2001.
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H.R. 931 (Tancredo)
Calls for a comprehensive peace solution to the war in Sudan. Introduced March 7,
2001.
H.R. 2052 (Tancredo)
Calls for a comprehensive peace in Sudan, condemns the government of Sudan,
requires foreign companies doing business in Sudan to disclose their activities to the SEC
if these companies are seeking access to U.S. capital market, and prohibits companies
engaged in the oil and gas sector in Sudan from raising capital and trading securities in any
capital market in the United States. Introduced June 5, 2001; referred to Committee on
International Relations. Passed House, amended (422-2), June 13, 2001. (Similar to H.R.
931, introduced in March by Representative Tancredo.)
S. 180 (Frist)
Calls for a comprehensive peace in Sudan and condemns the government of Sudan for
human rights abuses. Introduced January 25, 2001. Passed Senate July 19, 2001, by
unanimous consent.
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