Order Code RS20851
Updated October 28, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Naval Transformation: Background and
Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Department of the Navy (DoN) has several efforts underway to transform U.S.
naval forces to prepare them for future military challenges. The Navy is organizing
these efforts under a newly announced conceptual framework called Sea Power 21. Key
elements of naval transformation include a focus on operating in littoral waters,
network-centric operations, use of unmanned vehicles, new-design ships requiring
much-smaller crews, directly supporting Marine expeditionary operations from sea
bases, novel naval formations, and new ship-deployment cycles for increasing ship-
utilization rates. Naval transformation poses several potential issues for Congress. This
report will be updated as events warrant.
Introduction and Issue for Congress
This report focuses on the transformation of U.S. naval forces – the Navy and the
Marine Corps, which are both contained in the Department of the Navy (DoN).1
Background
What is defense transformation? The Bush Administration has identified
transformation as a major goal for the Department of Defense, and has stated that defense
programs will be assessed in terms of their potential for contributing to defense
transformation.2 But what is defense transformation?
1 For a discussion of Army and Air Force transformation efforts, see CRS Report RS20787,
Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress, by Edward F.
Bruner. Washington, 2001. (Updated periodically) 6 p.; and CRS Report RS20859, Air Force
Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom. Washington,
2001. (Updated periodically) 6 p.
2 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report.
Washington, 2001. (September 30, 2001) 71 p.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Several definitions of defense transformation have emerged, many of them since
early 2001. Some of these definitions are more official than others, and some are more
precise or demanding than others. For purposes of this report, defense transformation can
be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military
weapons, concepts of operations, and organization that are prompted by significant
changes in technology or the international security environment. Defense transformation
can lead to major changes in the ways in which wars are fought. In contrast to
incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization
efforts, defense transformation is more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms
of change.
By most accounts, there have been a few or several such transformations in recent
decades or centuries. More recent examples that are sometimes cited include Germany’s
creation in the 1930s of the concept of rapid blitzkrieg-style warfare, and the U.S. Navy’s
creation at the same time of long-distance, aircraft carrier-centered naval warfare as a
replacement for battleship-centered operations. Some military analysts believe that recent
new technologies – including advanced information technologies (IT) for networked
operations, distributed sensors, unmanned vehicles, and precision-guided munitions –
have set the stage for a new defense transformation. They also believe that U.S. military
forces must transform themselves if they are to be adequately prepared for 21st-Century
military challenges, particularly so-called asymmetric challenges, in which adversaries
avoid competing head-on against current U.S. military strengths.
Transformation advocates believe that a key asymmetric challenge in the next 10 to
25 years will be the development of so-called anti-access or area-denial capabilities –
capabilities intended to prevent U.S. military forces from gaining access to the ports,
airfields, bases, staging areas, and littoral (near-shore) sea areas that the United States
now depends on to mount military operations in distant military theaters. Systems for
countering U.S. naval forces in littoral areas could include advanced diesel-electric
submarines, mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, air-defense systems, and potentially weapons
of mass destruction.
Key transformation advocates include retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski,
former President of the Naval War College and head of DoD’s new Office of Force
Transformation;3 Andrew Marshall, the long-time director of DoD’s Office of Net
Assessment;4 Andrew Krepinevich, a protégé of Marshall’s who is now the Executive
Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).5
3 For a recent example of Cebrowski’s views on transformation, see Cebrowski, Arthur. New
Rules, New Era. Defense News, October 21-27, 2002: 28.
4 For articles about Andrew Marshall, see Ricks, Thomas E. Warning Shot. Wall Street Journal,
July 15, 1994: A1, A5; and Winik, Jay. Secret Weapon. Washingtonian Magazine, April 1999:
45-55.
5 For a recent example of a CSBA report with recommendations for implementing defense
transformation, see Kosiak, Steven, Andrew Krepinevich, and Michael Vickers. A Strategy for
a Long Peace. Washington, CSBA, 2001. (January 2001) 80 p.

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DoN Transformation Efforts.
Sea Power 21 Transformation Framework. DoN is now organizing its
transformation efforts under a newly announced conceptual framework called Sea Power
21, which is built around three main components:
! Sea Strike, which refers to the ability of naval forces to project precise
and persistent offensive power from the sea;
! Sea Shield, which refers to the ability of naval forces to not only defend
themselves at sea, but to contribute to homeland defense, project an
overland defensive shield to help protect overseas U.S. allies and friends,
and provide a sea-based theater and strategic defense against ballistic
missiles; and
! Sea Basing, which refers to the ability of naval forces to operate at sea,
as sovereign entities, free from concerns of access and political
constraints associated with using land bases in other countries.
Under the Sea Power 21 framework, these three components are to be supported and
bound together by ForceNet, which will combine the various computer networks that
U.S. naval forces are now fielding into a master computer networking architecture for
tying together U.S. naval personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations. An additional part
of Sea Power 21 is a Global Concept of Operations under which various types of naval
formations – carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups (i.e., amphibious ships
combined with surface combatants and attack submarines), missile defense surface action
groups, and modified Trident submarines carrying cruise missiles and special operations
forces – are to be used for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.
Under the Sea Power 21 framework, Sea Trial refers to the Navy’s process for
developing new operational concepts and technologies, Sea Warrior refers to the Navy’s
efforts to train its personnel for operating a transformed force, and Sea Enterprise refers
to the Navy’s efforts to improve its organization, processes, and business practices so as
to generate savings that can be invested in transformation.6
Transformation Centers, Exercises, and Experiments. Many DoN
transformation activities efforts take place at the Navy Warfare Development Command
(NWDC), which is located at the Naval War College at Newport, RI, and the Marine
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), which is located at the Marine Corps Base at
Quantico, VA. These two organizations generate ideas for naval transformation and act
as clearinghouses and evaluators of transformation ideas generated in other parts of DoN.
NWDC and MCWL oversee major exercises, known as Fleet Battle Experiments (FBEs)
and Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs), that are intended to explore new naval
operational concepts. The Navy and Marine Corps also participate with the Army and Air
Force in joint exercises aimed at testing transformation ideas.
Key Features of Naval Transformation. Table 1 below summarizes several
key features of U.S. naval transformation.
6 For a detailed and authoritative discussion of the Sea Power 21 framework authored by the
current Chief of Naval Operations, see Clark, Vern. Sea Power 21, Projecting Decisive Joint
Capabilities. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2002: 32-41.

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Table 1. Key Features of U.S. Naval Transformation
Previous U.S. naval forces
Transformed U.S. naval forces
Plan for stand-alone, mid-ocean
Plan for joint operations in littoral
operations against Soviet naval forces
waters against land- and sea-based
forces of regional adversaries
Platform-centric operations
Network-centric operations
Manned platforms only
Significant use of unmanned vehicles
Manpower-intensive ships; people
Ships with smaller (“lean,” optimal)
treated as a “free good”
crews; cost of personnel fully recognized
Multiple aircraft sorties per target
Multiple targets per aircraft sortie
Bases, logistic “piles” established ashore
Marine expeditionary operations ashore
for Marine expeditionary operations
supported directly from sea bases
Stealth mostly in submarines and SEALs
Stealth spreads to aircraft, surface ships
Primary reliance on carrier battle groups
Use of more novel, flexible formations,
and amphibious ready groups
such as expeditionary strike groups
Traditional ship-deployment cycles
New ship-deployment cycles for
increased ship-utilization rates
Traditional business practices
Streamlined, reformed practices
The shift in the focus of Navy planning away from the Cold War scenario of
countering Soviet naval forces in mid-ocean waters and toward the post-Cold War
scenario of operating in littoral (near-shore) waters to counter the land- and sea-based
forces of potential regional aggressors began in late 1992 with the publication of a Navy
document entitled ... From the Sea. In retrospect, this shift can be recognized as a major
element of Navy transformation that has led to numerous changes in naval concepts of
operation, training, and equipment. Among other things, it moved the focus of Navy
planning from a geographic environment where it could expect to operate primarily by
itself to one where it would likely operate in a joint manner, alongside other U.S. forces.
The concept of network-centric operations, also called network-centric warfare
(NCW), is a key feature of transformation for all U.S. military services. The concept,
which emerged in the late 1990s, involves using computer networking technology to tie
together personnel, ships, aircraft, and installations in a series of local and wide-area
networks capable of rapidly transmitting critical information. Many in DoN believe that
NCW will lead to changes in naval concepts of operation and significantly increase U.S.
naval capabilities and operational efficiency. Key NCW efforts include the Navy’s
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) network for air-defense operations, the Naval
Fires Network (NFN) for gun and missile fire support operations, the IT-21 investment
strategy, which is creating a corporate intranet for Navy ships at sea, and the above-

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mentioned ForceNet program. A related program is the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI), which is creating a network to link together DoN installations.7
Many analysts believe that unmanned vehicles will be another central feature of U.S.
military transformation. DoN in coming years will likely acquire a variety of unmanned
air, surface, underwater and ground vehicles.8
Future Navy ships are to have much smaller crews than today’s ships. Personnel-
related costs are a major contributor to the total life-cycle cost of Navy ships, and new
technologies for automated ship operation and damage control permit the design of ships
with so-called “lean” or optimal manning. Current Navy ship-acquisition programs
related to this goal include the DD(X) destroyer9 and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).10
The advent of air-launched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and associated
targeting systems now permits U.S. strike aircraft, including Navy carrier-based strike-
fighters, to attack multiple targets during a single sortie – a major reversal from the
previous situation of having to use multiple aircraft sorties to attack a single target.11 As
a result, naval aviation officials believe that a carrier air wing in coming years might be
able to attack more than 1,000 separate target aim points during a 24-hour period, a
several-fold increase over the older figure. The Navy argues that its planned CVNX-1
aircraft carrier is central to naval aviation transformation.12
Within the Navy’s Sea Power 21 transformation framework, the Marine Corps is
using the term sea basing in a more specific way, to refer to a new operational concept
under which the Marines would not establish bases and logistic “piles” ashore to support
Marine expeditionary operations, but would instead support such operations directly from
sea bases. A key program related to this concept is the Maritime Prepositioning Force of
the Future (MPF[F]), which would replace the Corps’ current maritime prepositioning
7 For a discussion of NCW, CEC, NFN, IT-21, ForceNet, and NMCI, see CRS Report RS20557,
Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. Washington, 2002. 6 p. (Updated periodically)
8 For more on naval unmanned vehicle programs, see CRS Report RS21294, Unmanned vehicles
for U.S. Naval Forces: background and issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington,
2002. (Updated periodically) 6 p.
9 For more on the DD(X) destroyer, see CRS Report RS21059, Navy DD(X) Future Surface
Combatant Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington,
2002. (Updated periodically) 6 p.
10 For more on the LCS, see CRS Report RS21305, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS):
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2002. (Updated
periodically)
11 For more on air-launched PGMs, see CRS Report RL30552, Missiles for Standoff Attack:
Air-launched Air-to-Surface Munitions Programs, by Christopher Bolkcom. Washington, 2000.
(Updated periodically) 25 p.
12 For more on the CVNX, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVNX aircraft carrier program:
background and issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2002. (Updated
periodically) 6 p.

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ships with new-design ships capable of supporting Marine expeditionary operations in this
manner.
For many years, submarines and naval special operations forces (called SEALs for
Sea, Air, and Land) were the primary naval forces employing stealth. DoN plans to
spread the use of stealth in naval forces to aircraft and surface ships through programs
such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF),13 the DD(X) destroyer, and the LCS.
The Navy in the past has relied on carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious
ready groups (ARGs) as its standard or “canonical” ship formations. As mentioned
earlier, as part of its new Global Concept of Operations, the Navy plans to begin using
more novel formations – such as expeditionary strike groups, missile defense surface
action groups, and modified Trident submarines carrying cruise missiles and special
operations forces – for forward presence, crisis response, and warfighting operations.14
The Navy is beginning to experiment with new ship-deployment concepts – such as
multiple crewing and long-duration deployments with crew rotation – that could achieve
a significant reduction in Navy stationkeeping multipliers, which are the numbers of Navy
ships of a certain kind that are needed to keep one such ship on station in an overseas
operating area. Such new ship-deployment concepts, if implemented widely, could permit
a Navy of fewer ships to maintain a given level of naval forward presence.15
DoN is pursuing a variety of strategies to improve its processes and business
practices so as to generate savings that can be used to help finance Navy transformation.
As mentioned earlier, under the Sea Power 21 framework, these efforts are referred to
collectively as Sea Enterprise.
Issues for Congress
In assessing current DoN transformation efforts, potential questions for Congress
include the following: Are current DoN transformation efforts inadequate, excessive, or
about right? Does DoN have an adequate roadmap for guiding its transformation efforts?
Is DoN placing too much or too little emphasis on certain components of transformation?
Is DoN achieving a proper balance between transformation and potentially competing
program goals, such as maintaining near-term readiness and near-term equipment
procurement? Are DoN transformation efforts adequately coordinated with those of the
Army and Air Force? Is there sufficient consensus on the definition of transformation,
and over which programs or efforts might qualify as transformational? Is transformation
being abused as an all-purpose tool for justifying or opposing certain programs?
13 For more on the JSF, see CRS Report RL30563, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program:
Background, Status, and Issues, by Christopher Bolkcom. Washington, 2002. (Updated
periodically) 6 p.
14 For more on the modified Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident
Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. Washington, 2002. (Periodically updated) 6 p.
15 For more on potential new ship-deployment cycles, see CRS Report RS20338, Navy Ship-
Deployment Cycles: Potential New Methods – Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke. Washington, 2002. (Periodically updated) 6 p.

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