Order Code IB96019
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Haiti: Issues for Congress
Updated October 18, 2002
Maureen Taft-Morales
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
From Aristide to Preval and Back Again
Congressional Concerns
Holding of Democratic Elections
Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance
Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business
Security and Human Rights Concerns
Narcotics Trafficking
Legislation in the 106th Congress
LEGISLATION
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
CHRONOLOGY

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Haiti: Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
Congress continues to express concern
Because of this controversy, the opposi-
about a number of developments in Haiti,
tion boycotted the November 26, 2000
especially the stalled democratic process there
national elections, and international donors,
and increased violence and human rights
including the United States, withheld election
violations.
aid. Aristide won the elections and was inau-
gurated on February 7, 2001. President Aris-
Since the virtual withdrawal of U.S.
tide has pledged to enact political, judicial,
troops and the inauguration of Rene Preval as
and economic reforms. Negotiations between
President in February 1996, Congress has
Lavalas and the opposition alliance Conver-
been concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti
gence, mediated by the Organization of Amer-
be effective and that Haitian leaders pursue
ican States, have stalled.
democratic reforms, including the holding of
free and fair elections, adopt sound economic
International organizations have been
policies, improve security conditions in Haiti,
increasingly concerned about Haiti’s inability
and fully investigate reported human rights
to resolve its impasse. The U.N.’s secretary
abuses.
General withdrew the U.N. mission in Haiti in
February 2001 and issued reports expressing
Concern over political stability increased
concerns about the Haitians’ failure to find a
as Haiti operated without a fully functioning
compromise and the current lawlessness and
government. An April 1997 election dispute
fear of political violence.
remained unresolved, the prime minister
resigned in June1997, and a successor could
In 2002, the OAS passed two resolutions:
not be agreed upon. President Preval
January’s established an OAS Mission in Haiti
dissolved the Haitian Parliament in January
and called on the Haitian government to
1999 and ruled by decree after that. This
“restore a climate of security” that is necessary
political paralysis also contributed to eco-
for resuming negotiations. The one passed on
nomic stagnation, preventing major reforms
Sept. 4 strengthened the mission and sup-
from being finalized and impeding access to
ported normalization of Haiti’s relations with
over $500 million in international assistance.
international financial institutions.
In July 1999, President Preval signed a
The Foreign Operations Appropriations
new electoral law that effectively annulled the
bill for FY2002 prohibits assistance to Haiti
disputed April 1997 elections and called for
except through regular notification proce-
new legislative and local elections. After
dures; no other conditions on aid to Haiti are
three postponements and international expres-
in the law. It also allows Haiti to purchase
sions of concern about Haiti’s failure to set a
defense articles and services for the Haitian
date, elections were held on May 21, 2000.
Coast Guard. Assistance to Haiti for FY2000
But the tabulation of election results was
was $78 million; for FY2001, $72 million; the
tainted by charges of electoral irregularities
estimate for FY2002 is $30 million. The
noted by domestic and international observers.
request for FY2003 is $47 million.
The electoral council nonetheless affirmed
those results, which favored former President
Aristide’s Lavalas party.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On September 4, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed a resolution to
strengthen democracy in Haiti. Invoking the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the
resolution strengthens the Special OAS mission to Haiti and urges the Haitian government
to comply fully with previous OAS resolutions and government commitments, including
ensuring a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and fair elections. The
resolution acknowledges the Haitian government’s “constitutional electoral prerogatives,”
freeing the government to hold elections in 2003 without a prior agreement with the
opposition on those elections. The resolution also supports normalization of economic
cooperation between the government of Haiti and international financial institutions, urging
the resolution of the financial and technical obstacles that have precluded such
normalization.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Congress has followed events in Haiti closely during this decade, but especially since
September 19, 1994, when about 20,000 U.S. military forces, under code name Operation
Uphold Democracy, entered Haiti as the lead force in a multi-national force to restore
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide had been elected President in December 1990 in
elections that were considered democratic, and he took office in February 1991. He was
overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, and lived in exile until the United
States negotiated his return three years later. During President Aristide’s second period in
office, Rene Preval was elected as his replacement in December 1995 elections, and was
inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996. In January 1999 he dissolved
the legislature and ruled by decree for the rest of his term. Having won questionable
elections in November 2000, Aristide was inaugurated for his second term as President on
February 7, 2001. As election disputes from 2000 remain unresolved, political turmoil has
increased, and human rights conditions worsened.
From Aristide to Preval and Back Again
The Haitian military regime agreed to relinquish power after 3 years of diplomatic
pressure and economic sanctions by the United States, and members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations (U.N.). Faced with the imminent threat of
a U.S. invasion, they signed an agreement calling for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S.
troops, a legislatively approved amnesty for the military, the resignation of the military
leadership, and the return of President Aristide. Shortly after the initial entry of the
multinational forces, President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, and within
a few months, on March 31, 1995, the U.S.-led operation gave way to the U.N. peacekeeping
operation, called the U.N. Mission in Haiti or UNMIH.
Following President Aristide’s return, Haiti took steps to hold democratic elections,
with substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most
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first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held on June 25, 1995. Although
deadly violence, which marred past Haitian elections, did not occur, election observers
alleged that there were numerous irregularities, including ballot burning in some places.
Several rerun or runoff elections were held subsequently, from July to October, 1995.
Pro-Aristide candidates won a large share of the parliamentary and local government seats.
Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian constitution prevented
Aristide from running for a second consecutive term. Rene Preval, an Aristide supporter,
won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter turnout of only 28%, and with many
parties boycotting the election.
Rene Preval was inaugurated as President of Haiti on February 7, 1996. Preval was
trained as an agronomist in Belgium in the late 1960s, and he lived and worked in the United
States in the early 1970s. He returned to Haiti in the mid-1970s and worked for several
businesses, after which he opened a bakery in 1983. With the fall of the Duvalier
dictatorship in 1986, Preval was active in several civic groups, particularly Respect for the
Constitution, and he also worked with Father Aristide’s Family Is Life orphanage. In 1991,
he served as Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Aristide’s government, until Aristide
was overthrown. In March 1993, he joined Aristide in Washington, D.C. Preval returned
to Haiti in October 1994, and served as the director of the internationally-funded Economic
and Social Assistance Fund from March 1995 until he was elected President of the country.
As President, Preval launched his “Democratization by Capitalization” program to
privatize government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital. Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws on September 25 and 26, 1996 allowing the release of $226
million in foreign aid through the International Monetary Fund. Protests against the
associated austerity measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the
proposed economic austerity program was Aristide. In January 1997 he formed a new party,
Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year 2000. Prime Minister Rosny
Smarth barely won a parliamentary no-confidence vote on March 26, but bowed to pressure
from opponents of the government’s unpopular economic reform and resigned on June 9.
He cited the Electoral Council’s mishandling of the April elections as a reason for his
resignation, saying he did not want to be associated with fraud.
By the end of 1997, Haiti’s failure to form a new government had already cost the
nation $162 million in assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, and tens of
millions from other sources. On July 15, 1998, then President Preval nominated Jacques-
Edouard Alexis, his education minister at the time, to be prime minister. The nomination
process was stalled for months, however, by bureaucratic procedures. On January 11, 1999,
Preval declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired, even though elections had not
been held to replace them. He then installed Alexis as Prime Minister, members of his
Cabinet, and an electoral council by decree, and began ruling by decree. He continued to do
so through the end of his term in February 2001.
In elections boycotted by most of the opposition, Aristide was elected president again
in November 2000. He signed an agreement with outgoing President William J. Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms. According to the White
House, no new promises were made by the United States. The Bush Administration accepted
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the reforms set forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make.
Aristide took office again on February 7, 2001.
The dispute stemming from irregularities in the May 2000 elections remains unresolved.
At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders singled out Haiti as
a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked the Organization of
American States (OAS) to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis. The OAS has
been mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the opposition
alliance Convergence, but negotiations remain stymied.
Tensions and violence in Haiti have increased dramatically since Aristide resumed
office. Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party and the opposition
coalition Convergence have reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent revenge. Human
Rights Watch said that while Aristide called for a peaceful response to a December 2001
attack on the National Palace, his supporters were allowed to commit “serious acts of
violence with apparent impunity.” On January 15, 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed
a resolution establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for an independent
investigation into the palace attack and ensuing violence. The resolution also called for the
Haitian government to do all it could to “restore a climate of security that is a necessary
condition for resuming OAS-sponsored negotiations,” including prosecuting anyone found
to be involved in the December violence. Another OAS resolution passed in September
further strengthened the mission to “support, monitor, and report on implementation” of OAS
resolutions pertaining to Haiti, and on commitments previously made by the Haitian
government, including strengthening democratic institutions, forming a new Provisional
Electoral Council, and developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament program.
It also called for Haiti to proceed with elections in 2003.
Congressional Concerns
In the last few years, Congress has been concerned about a number of developments in
Haiti, with attention shifting from one area to another as the situation changed. From 1991
to 1994, Congress expressed concern over the flow of Haitian refugees and ways to restore
the democratic process to Haiti during the period of the military regime. Later, following
the military action in September 1994, Congress was concerned with the cost and safety of
U.S. troops in Haiti, and the holding of democratic elections to select a new parliament and
a replacement for Aristide. Following the inauguration of President Preval in 1996,
Congress was concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti be effective. Congress also expressed
concern that Haiti’s political stalemate stymied reform and economic development, and that
various election disputes be resolved in a transparent manner. Since Aristide’s return to
office in February 2001, other ongoing concerns include the improvement of security and
human rights conditions in Haiti, and the reduction of illegal trafficking of narcotics
through Haiti.
Holding of Democratic Elections
After Aristide was restored to power in 1994, Congress was concerned that Haiti
continue to strengthen its transition to democracy, and in particular that it hold democratic
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elections in 1995 in accordance with Haiti’s 1987 Constitution. In keeping with the
arrangements for President Aristide’s return to power, Haiti pledged to hold democratic
elections, even though some of Aristide’s supporters argued that he was entitled to another
3 years because he was denied office for 3 years by the military coup.
The Clinton Administration spent $1.3 million in technical aid for the presidential
election, which was held on December 17, 1995. Although deemed to be generally free and
fair by international observers, the turnout was only about 28% and many of the parties
boycotted the elections. Rene Preval, President Aristide’s Prime Minister in 1991, received
89% of the vote, with Leon Jeune coming in a very distant second with 2.5%. Preval was
inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996.
The low turnout and the lack of competition has raised questions about the adequacy
of the elections. The official U.S. Presidential Delegation to the Haitian elections found the
election to be “another important achievement in establishing a fully functioning
democracy.” The report on the election by the International Republican Institute (IRI)
observation group, however, while praising the fact that it was an election without violence,
expressed reservations about the election because it lacked adequate participation or
competition, key elements of a fully satisfactory democratic election.
Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies were held on April
6, 1997. An assembly was elected in each of Haiti’s 565 communal sections — roughly
equivalent to U.S. towns or districts. These are the smallest administrative unit in Haiti’s
governmental structure. Communal sections are part of 133 communes, similar to U.S.
counties, which belong to nine departments, similar to U.S. states. Each communal section
assembly will choose one member to represent them at the communal level on a municipal
assembly, which will in turn select a representative to serve on a departmental assembly.
Although these assemblies, collectively referred to as territorial assemblies, are mandated in
the 1987 constitution, this was the first time Haitians were able to vote for officials at this
local level.
Many observers expressed the same concerns they had during the presidential elections:
low turnout – estimated to be 5% – and numerous irregularities. The United States decreed
the first round elections free and fair, but the Organization of American States disagreed. IRI
called the elections “another lost opportunity in Haiti’s democratic development,” citing the
extremely low turnout and the continued “breakdown in the ballot and result collection and
consolidation process.” Partial Senate results were announced in early May: two of the nine
Senate seats open were won by candidates of Famille Lavalas, former President Aristide’s
new party. The top two candidates in the other seven races were to face each other in a
runoff election.
These runoff elections were indefinitely postponed by the Electoral Council on June 12,
amid widespread charges that it had manipulated the elections in favor of Aristide’s party.
Most political parties had planned to boycott the runoff elections. The postponement
reportedly came after U.S. Ambassador William Swing told President Preval that the United
States would not recognize the runoff elections unless the Electoral Council reheld elections
in areas where the boycotting parties claimed fraud had been committed in the April
elections.
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Prime Minister Smarth said his resignation was due in part to the fraud he believes was
committed by the electoral council, to which he did not want to be party. “I cannot justify
that abuse of power,” Smarth reportedly said. “In our country, power is a sickness.” The
country was without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to name
a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy.
Preval named a new electoral council by decree in early 1999. After criticizing the
council’s new electoral law, Preval signed it on July 16, effectively annulling the April 1997
elections and seeming to pave the way for a resolution to the country’s 2-year old crisis.
The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections assistance.
The provisional electoral council’s tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible
voters, issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts on May 21. Every elected position in the country
except for president and eight Senate seats, were on the ballot. Contested in those elections
were the entire 83-seat lower house, 19 of the 27 seats in the upper house – including the two
seats won, but never occupied, by Famille Lavalas – 133 mayoral posts, and hundreds of
local consultative assemblies.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a deadlocked
government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree, a new Parliament
could be installed and international aid released. Instead, the elections brought Haiti into
another crisis. Both opposition parties and international observers have said the process used
to tabulate winning percentages were erroneous and gave Lavalas ten more first-round
victories than they should have had. Increased political violence surrounded the vote,
including the arrests or murders of many opposition activists. Elections council president
Leon Manus fled Haiti in fear of his life, reportedly saying he refused to give in to pressure
from President Preval to approve incorrect results giving Lavalas candidates 18 Senate seats;
Manus said Lavalas candidates won only eight seats and that the others should have faced
second-round runoffs. Two other council members resigned. The remaining council
members announced the disputed results as final. Despite domestic and international
objections, the remaining run-off elections were held July 30.
In September, thousands of protesters shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans
called for the resignation of the Lavalas-controlled legislature. The OAS tried to broker an
agreement between Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail. Presidential elections were held
on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian government refused to address the contested
election results, the United States and other international donors withheld election assistance
and refused to send observers to the election, and opposition parties boycotted them.
Aristide won the election and took office on February 7, 2001. His inauguration was
attended by few, if any, heads of state. The United States was represented only by its
ambassador.
President Aristide pledged to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms,
including correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections. Efforts to resolve the dispute
frustrated the international community. In July 2001, in talks mediated by the OAS, the
Aristide government and the opposition alliance Convergence agreed to hold new elections
for local and most parliamentary seats but could not agree on a schedule for those new
elections. In July 2002 the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held as well,
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although all the OAS member states recognize Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head of state,
and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000 elections “have never been the
subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas mandate.” Negotiations have also been
interrupted repeatedly by episodes of violence. Another attempt in July 2002 by the OAS and
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to mediate further negotiations ended with the OAS
representative saying a new approach was needed.
The OAS passed Resolution 822 on September 4 that breaks the political impasse by
recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral prerogatives.” In other words, it
removes the obstacle of having to negotiate before elections can be held. The resolution, a
consensus resolution negotiated by member states and voted for by Haiti, says legislative and
local elections will be held in 2003, on a date to be set by a new Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP). An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP” is to be
established by November 4, 2002.
Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance
Congress has been concerned about the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance to
Haiti, despite recognition of the great needs of the poorest country in the hemisphere. The
Clinton Administration provided approximately $100 million in foreign assistance to Haiti
each year from FY1996 - FY1999. Aid decreased after that, with $78 million in FY2000,
and $72 million in FY2001. The Bush Administration estimates FY2002 aid to be $30
million, and requested a modest increase to $47 million for FY2003.
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of conditions
on this assistance over the years. It has conditioned aid upon the holding of free and fair
democratic elections, the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for human rights
abuses, and full cooperation in narcotics interdiction efforts. Congress has also required that
all assistance be approved under special notification requirements, prohibiting any funding
to Haiti except through regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
Acting under this provision, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee have at times placed holds on aid to Haiti.
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Haiti, FY1996-2000
(dollars in millions)
FY1999
FY2000
Program
FY1996
FY1997
FY1998
(est.)
(req.)
Development Assistance
14.116
24.346
0.900
—
—
Econ. Support Funds (ESF)
45.263
53.547
65.052
73.500
70.000
P.L. 480 Food Assistance
Title I (loans)
—
—
—
—
—
Title II (grants for emergency/
29.275
12.535
34.908
25.579
26.432
humanitarian purposes)
Title III (grants)
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
—
Interntl. Narcotics Control
—
—
—
—
—
Peace Corps
0.671
1.032
1.118
1.236
1.380
For. Military Financing Grants
—
—
—
—
—
Interntl. Milit. Ed. Train. (IMET)
0.169
0.275
0.290
0.300
0.300
TOTAL
99.494
101.735
112.268
110.615
98.112
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Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills for 1996-1999 with
conditions on aid to Haiti under variations of the Dole amendment. The bills limited all
foreign aid to Haiti, except humanitarian and electoral assistance, unless there were progress
in investigations of extrajudicial and political killings, and other conditions. The FY2000
foreign aid bill (see “Legislation” below) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to
Haiti, and required the president to regularly report to Congress on the Haitian government’s
progress in areas of concern to Congress. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for
FY2001 shifted conditions, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free
and fair elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. The only conditions in FY2002 foreign aid
appropriations law (P.L. 107-115) regarding Haiti continue to require notification to
Congress prior to provision of any aid. It also continues to allow the Haitian government to
purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular
notification procedures.
Once the Haitian parliament passed legislation guiding economic policy reform,
including privatization of the many inefficient state-run enterprises (see below), the Agency
for International Development (AID) and the international financial institutions were able
to release most of the non-project assistance that had been on hold. Funds moved more
slowly than originally intended, however, because the lack of expertise in the Haitian
government made the negotiating and carrying out of programs more difficult. Prime
Minister Smarth’s resignation, the failure to replace him for a year and a half, and Preval’s
dissolution of parliament caused further delays in both the execution of economic reforms
and the delivery of international aid.
The Bush Administration says aid to the government will not be renewed until President
Aristide fulfills his promises of political, economic and judicial reforms. U.S. assistance is
being provided through non-government organizations. Supporters of this policy argue that
providing aid to the government would permit the government to avoid resolving its political
dispute and making other promised reforms. They also argue that hard economic reforms,
such as privatization of inefficient government enterprises, not just foreign aid, are necessary
to revive the economy. They argue that not much progress was made in Haiti, when massive
assistance was provided earlier. They also note that assistance is still provided to Haiti for
basic programs in health, education, food security, and environmental projects, through non-
governmental organizations.
Critics argue that aid to the government is necessary to support the fragile democracy
in a time of severe need, and to prevent instability and massive migration from the island.
They stress that Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with annual per
capita income of only $225, and argue that withholding aid to the government is contributing
to the continuing deterioration in Haitians’ quality of life. In a November 2001 letter to
President Bush, the Congressional Black Caucus said that “it is wrong to impose an
inflexible policy which conditions US relations and aid, be it loans or grants, entirely on a
country’s political process.” The Caucus called for a review of U.S. policy toward Haiti and
the removal of its “blockade” of aid to Haiti.
Other Foreign Assistance. In addition to the former Clinton Administration and the
Bush Administration, representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank have criticized Haiti’s continued failure to resolve the political impasse under President
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Aristide, despite extensive efforts on the part of the OAS and other international players.
Since 2000 other conditions have continued to grow worse as well. Human rights conditions
have deteriorated following President Aristide’s announcement of a “zero tolerance” policy
for “criminals.” According to AID, the executive branch has moved steadily to consolidate
power at the expense of the judicial and legislative branches of government. The
international community has responded by greatly reducing or eliminating assistance to Haiti.
Because of the questioned legitimacy of the spring and fall 2000 elections, the international
community initially withheld about $600 million in aid. Over a two year period, donor grants
to Haiti declined by over 50%, from $357 million in FY1999 to about $160 million in
FY2001. During the same period, gross loan disbursements declined by over 66%. The
World Bank closed its office in Haiti, primarily because of the government’s failure to
adhere to IMF targets. Much of this international aid has expired or been redirected
elsewhere. Most funding will have to be renegotiated even if the Haitian government
resolves the election dispute and carries out other promised reforms.
The Inter-American Development Bank has six undisbursed loans to Haiti, totaling
about $199 million. Although the loans were approved by the IDB between1996 and1998,
the Haitian parliament did not approve four of them until December 2000; two have still not
been ratified. The Haitian government is seeking the release of the loans, but several issues
remain unresolved. These include the question of the legitimacy of the parliament.
Furthermore, Haiti is in arrears with the IDB, precluding further disbursement of loans. The
Haitian government also had not met conditions required by the loans prior to disbursement.
OAS Resolution 822, passed in September 2002, supports “normalization of economic
cooperation” between the Haitian government and the international financial institutions,
urging the parties “to resolve the technical and financial obstacles that preclude such
normalization.”
Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business
Haiti is the poorest nation in the hemisphere; Haitian unemployment is as high as 80%.
Haiti’s per capita income is $250 – much less than one-tenth of the Latin American average,
according to an August 1998 World Bank report, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty
Reduction. “The overwhelming majority of the Haitian population are living in deplorable
conditions of extreme poverty,” says the report, pointing to a long history of political
instability, corruption, misuse of public funds, and lack of governance as a key factor in that
poverty.
Congress has been concerned that Haiti follow sound economic practices and that U.S.
business play a role in Haiti’s economic recovery and development. U.S. and international
lending institutions have urged Haiti to enact reforms to reduce the role of government and
to encourage domestic and foreign investment. Privatization of nine government-operated
para-statal enterprises (electricity, telephone, seaports, airports, two financial institutions, and
cement, flour and vegetable oil factories) has been seen as a key reform to reduce
government expenditures and stimulate investment. Other proposed reforms funded by AID
or other institutions were measures to strengthen budget and monetary policy, to modernize
the investment and commercial codes, and to improve banking practices. During his first
term, President Aristide agreed to privatize some of the government enterprises, but backed
off when political opposition arose. This decision prompted the resignation in October 1995
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of his Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, and the suspension of assistance by the international
financial institutions.
Former President Preval’s privatization of government enterprises drew public protests
against that and other aspects of economic reform. Preval’s “Democratization by
Capitalization” program called for increasing agricultural production through the partial sale
of four state-run businesses: Electricity of Haiti (EDH), the Telecommunications Service
(TELECO), the Minoteri (a flour mill), and the Haitian Cement Co. The Haitian Parliament
passed President Preval’s privatization and administrative reform proposals on September
25 and 26, 1996, paving the way for the release of some $226 million in foreign aid through
the International Monetary Fund. Smarth’s resignation in June 1997 and the lack of a fully
functioning government since then caused further delays in the economic reform program.
The stalemate also stymied the passage of important legislation.
With regard to the role of U.S. trade and businesses in Haiti, before the 1991
international embargo against Haiti, U.S. trade accounted for about 61% of Haitian imports
and 87% of the country’s exports, but by 1994 had dropped almost by half. U.S. assembly
operations were also a major source of new employment. With the return of Aristide, several
U.S. companies expressed an interest in Haiti, and the former Clinton Administration
encouraged U.S. investment. Many companies are worried that the lack of infrastructure in
Haiti, its political problems, rising insecurity, and extreme poverty make for a poor
investment climate. Haiti’s political stalemate has inhibited both public and private
investment.
Security and Human Rights Concerns
Congress has been concerned with the security and human rights conditions within the
country. In 1995, during his first term, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern
in which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses. Haiti,
with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim police force of
selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National
Police (HNP) force. The level of reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged
assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during the de facto military regime.
Since the return to civilian rule in 1994, Haiti has made progress in the protection of human
rights, but the gains made are fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with
impunity. According to the Human Rights Watch 2002 World Report, “worsening human
rights conditions” marked President Aristide’s first year back in office.
Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills for 1996-1999 with
conditions on aid to Haiti under variations of the Dole amendment. These bills limited all
foreign aid to Haiti, except humanitarian and electoral assistance, unless there were progress
in investigations of extrajudicial and political killings and other conditions. The FY2000
foreign aid bill outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including developing
indigenous human rights monitoring capacity. The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill
for FY2001 reflected a shift in congressional concern, prohibiting aid to the Haitian
government until Haiti held free and fair elections to seat a new parliament and was fully
cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. Current law (P.L.
107-115) prohibits aid to Haiti except through regular notification procedures, but contains
no other conditions on aid.
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Shortly after taking office in 1996, President Preval asked U.N. troops and police
monitors to remain in Haiti to maintain security. The U.N. maintained a presence in Haiti
for another 5 years, shifting from peacekeeping forces to civilian forces charged with police
monitoring and some human rights monitoring duties. Under pressure from China, however,
the size of the mission, and lengths of the extensions were diminished. (China has
challenged the U.N. mission there because of Haiti’s ties with Taiwan, which China
considers to be a renegade province.) The United Nations ended its mission in February
2001. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan said the mission could not function in a “climate
of political turmoil.”
Annan’s report also said that Haiti’s police force is under-equipped, “demoralized and
unmotivated” and that Lavalas had “disregarded all calls for a rectification” of the May 2000
elections. On May 18, 2001, Annan released another report expressing “concern about
lawlessness and an ever-present fear of an outbreak of major political violence ...” in Haiti.
He noted that Aristide had asked for a renewed U.N. mission but did not indicate whether
one would be provided.
Most observers agree that extensive reform of the judicial system is necessary to further
strengthen the state’s ability to maintain law and order and to continue improving respect for
human rights. In May 1998, a judicial reform bill that had languished in parliament since late
1996 was finally passed. Haiti took major steps forward in its judicial reform process and
fighting police impunity in 2000. In two major human rights cases, former Haitian soldiers
were found guilty of extrajudicial killings and given prison sentences ranging from three
years to life terms.
Over the last several years, increases in political violence renewed concerns over
security and police effectiveness. According to the State Department’s February 2002
Human Rights Practices Report, the Haitian government “continued to commit serious
abuses during the year, and its generally poor human rights record worsened.” In June 2001,
President Aristide announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals.
According to various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs. The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate. Most media outlets
practice self-censorship out of fear of retaliation. Over 20 journalists went into exile after
receiving death threats. Another, Brignol Lindor, who hosted opposition speakers on his
radio talk show, was hacked to death by members of a pro-government group after a local
Lavalas Family official announced over the radio that Lindor should be met with “zero
tolerance.”
Although the investigation into the April 2000 killing of prominent radio journalist Jean
Dominique continued, the process was slowed by a lack of cooperation from police and other
officials, according to human rights reports. An investigating judge fled the country because
of death threats. Two key suspects have died under suspicious circumstances. Lavalas
Family Senator and president of the Senate Commission on Public Security Dany Toussaint
is a suspect in the Dominique murder. On January 31, the day his Senate colleagues were
to vote whether to lift Toussaint’s immunity from prosecution as a member of the legislature,
Toussaint appeared on the Senate floor accompanied by “at least a half-dozen gun-toting
men” (Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p.A14). The Senate returned the case to the judge
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prosecuting the case, rejecting his request to lift Toussaint’s immunity and asking for more
evidence linking Toussaint to the murder.
Another spate of violence occurred in December 2001, involving an attack against the
national palace and subsequent violence targeting members of the opposition. On July 2, the
OAS released a report stating that the December attack was not an attempted coup, as the
Aristide Administration had claimed. Although the OAS did not confirm opposition claims
that the government staged the attack as a pretext for clamping down on dissent, it did say
that “[T]he political opposition did not participate in the planning or in the execution of the
attack.” The report also said that the government and Lavalas party officials armed militants
who plundered and burned the homes and offices of opposition members following the
palace attack. Violent protests have erupted around the country, with reports of increased
calls for Aristide’s removal among Haiti’s poor, usually considered Aristide’s core
supporters.
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being
transported from South America to the United States, according to the State Department’s
March 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. The amount of cocaine
entering the United States through Haiti decreased from about 13% of all cocaine entering
the United States to 8% in 2000. The State Department presumed this was primarily due to
the difficulties traffickers experienced in moving drugs through Haiti because of poor
infrastructure or the seizure of drugs by rival traffickers. Several factors make Haiti
attractive to narcotics traffickers. Located between South America and the United States, its
coasts and border with the Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent
democratic institutions and ineffectual infrastructure have been further weakened by the
political impasse that has characterized the country since 1997. Haiti’s current legal system
is antiquated. Haitian authorities charged with controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced,
lack sufficient resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly
susceptible to corruption. According to the State Department’s report, “There are allegations
that high-ranking [Government of Haiti] officials in the government, judiciary, and police
are involved in or tolerate [drug] trafficking.”
In March of both 2001 and 2002, the Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified
as having fully cooperated with U.S. drug-control efforts, but it granted a vital national
interest waiver and said that aid to Haiti must continue. The Administration said that
although the Haitian government had “demonstrated cooperation in a limited number of
areas, especially U.S. maritime interdiction operations, Haiti failed to take other significant
counter-narcotics actions.” The Administration added that “Haitian poverty and
hopelessness” were chief catalysts in Haitian involvement in the drug trade and in illegal
migration to the United States. Cutting off aid to Haiti, including programs aimed at
attacking those catalysts, “would aggravate an already bad situation.” The Bush
Administration offered, but the Aristide government did not sign, a letter of Agreement for
Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, which would have provided training and support.
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Legislation in the 106th Congress
P.L. 106-65 (S. 1059). Congress agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 106-301)
for the FY2000 Department of Defense Authorization Act; the House on September 15, the
Senate on September 22. Section 1232 prohibits DOD funding to maintain a continuous
U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000, and requires the President to notify
Congress in writing within 96 hours of any deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti after
that date. The conference report says the provision does not prohibit periodic theater
engagement activities in Haiti under the auspices of the U.S. Southern Command. Signed
into law on October 5, 1999.
P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194, Major Legislation). The Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2000 included the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3422) as introduced
on November 17, 1999. Section 520 prohibits any funding to Haiti except through regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Section 559 (1) outlines
congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive action to support the
Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and fair; developing indigenous
human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more privatization of state-owned enterprises;
a sustainable agricultural development program; and establishing an economic development
fund to encourage U.S. investment in Haiti; (2) requires the President to submit a report to
Congress every 6 months until September 30, 2001, regarding the status of various Haitian
government efforts in areas of concern to Congress; and (3) stipulates that not more than
17% of funds appropriated by this act for Latin America and the Caribbean may be made
available to any one country in that region. Section 562 allows the Haitian government to
purchase defense articles and services for the civilian-led Haitian National Police and Coast
Guard, subject to regular notification procedures. Signed into law on November 29, 1999.
P.L. 106-429 (H.R. 4811). The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY2001
(H.R. 5526 enacted by reference.) Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except
through regular notification procedures of the Committee on Appropriations. Section 558
prohibits aid to the Haitian government until Haiti has held free and fair elections to seat a
new parliament and is fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic
through Haiti. Section 561 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and
services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures. The House
Appropriations Committee’s report (H.Rept. 106-720) expressed full support of humanitarian
assistance and the private organizations through which it is provided. The Senate Committee
on Appropriations’ report (H.Rept. 106-291) states, “Absent significant political change, the
Committee believes American aid should be suspended, except for the most urgent
humanitarian programs.” Signed into law November 6, 2000.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-115 (H.R. 2506)
The Foreign Operations appropriations bill for FY2002. Section 520 prohibits
providing assistance to Haiti except through regular notification procedures to the
Committees on Appropriations. The law contains no other conditions on aid to Haiti. Section
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554 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian
Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.
Signed into law January 10, 2002.
H.Con.Res. 382 (Lee)
Urges the President to end any embargo against Haiti and to no longer require, as a
condition of providing humanitarian and development assistance to Haiti, the resolution of
the political impasse in Haiti. Introduced April 18, 2002, referred to House Subcommittee
May 6, 2002.
H.R. 1646 (Hyde)
The Foreign Relations Authorization act for FY2002 and FY2003. Authorizes $6,000
to the Organization of American States for each fiscal year to be appropriated only for the
investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by the
government of Haiti. Passed by the House May 16, 2001. The Senate version, S. 1401,
reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations September 4, 2001, contains no such
provision.
H.R. 1642 (Waters)
Urges the President to accomplish modifications in the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative, including requiring that the eligibility requirements of the Initiative be
revised to make Haiti eligible. Introduced April 26, 2001, referred to House subcommittee
May 10, 2001.
H.R. 707 (Smith)
Amends the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act to provide certain
Hatiian nationals an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status under that Act. Introduced
February 14, 2001, referred to House subcommittee March 2, 2001.
H.R. 5650(Gilman)/S. 3123 (DeWine)
Expands certain preferential trade treatment for Haiti. Introduced Oct. 16, 2002,
referred to committees.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs. Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1997 and Supplemental for 1996.
Hearings, 104th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. 122
p. [Part 1— Jordan arms transfers; Impact of U.S. assistance to Haiti.]
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Policy Toward Haiti
Following the Withdrawal of U.N. Forces. Hearing, 105th Congress, 1st session. Dec.
9, 1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1998. 75 p.
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— Administration Actions and Political Murders in Haiti. Hearing. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1996. 54 p.
— Haiti: Human Rights and Police Issues. Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. January
4, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. 326 p.
— Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?
Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. June 20, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1996. 55 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. FBI Murder Investigation in Haiti.
Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. January 31, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1996. 111p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control. On-site Staff Evaluation
of U.S. Counter-narcotics Activities in the Bahamas, Jamaica, and Haiti–November 30-
December 5, 1998. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1999.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on International Relations. Administration Actions and
Political Murders in Haiti: Part II. Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. September
27, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1997. 87 p.
CHRONOLOGY
02/07/01 —
President Aristide is inaugurated to a second term. The Democratic
Convergence, an opposition coalition, forms an alternative government.
11/26/00 —
Former President Aristide and his party win presidential and legislative
elections boycotted by opposition.
05/21/00 —
First and second round of legislative and local elections held. Observers
07/30/00
report fraudulent counting of votes.
12/17/99 —
U.N. General Assembly creates the International Civilian Support Mission
in Haiti (MICAH) to replace U.N. peacekeeping and police-training missions
on March 15, 2000.
03/99
—
President Preval appoints new prime minister and electoral council by decree.
01/99
—
President Preval dissolves parliament and local governments and begins to
rule by decree.
06/09/97 —
Prime Minister Smarth resigns, citing a lack of public confidence in the
government and his unwillingness to be associated with electoral fraud.
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04/06/97 —
Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies are marred
by low turnout and allegations of fraud by the Electoral Council.
03/26/97 —
Prime Minister Rosny Smarth survives a legislative no-confidence vote.
12/05/96 —
The U.N. Security council approves extension for a maximum of 8 months,
until July 31, 1997, of the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
07/17/96 —
Former Army General Claude Raymond, who served during the Duvalier
dictatorship, is arrested and charged with trying to destabilize the country.
In late July 1996, two men accused of murdering Justice Minister Francois
Guy Malary in 1993 remained in prison, awaiting retrial following
expressions of outrage when they were found not guilty.
06/96
—
Emmanuel Constant, the former head of the pro-military Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), who claims to have worked
for the CIA and who fled murder charges in Haiti, is released from a U.S.
detention center in Baltimore, Maryland, while Haiti is seeking his
extradition.
06/28/96 —
The U.N. Security Council approves the extension for 5 months of a
scaled-down U.N. force, called the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
06/26/96 —
At a House International Relations Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott denies Republican charges that the Administration had
failed to aggressively pursue human rights abuses during the Aristide
presidency, and he indicates that the United States was working with other
nations to arrange for an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
06/5-15/96
President Preval visits Europe to promote international assistance,
investment, and an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
04/19/96 —
Senator Robert Dole criticizes the Clinton Administration’s Haiti policy on
the Senate floor, and releases a critical Republican congressional staff report.
04/17/96 —
The last contingent of U.S. soldiers serving as part of the UNMIH departs
Haiti.
03/20-22/96
President Preval visits Washington, D.C., and in meetings with President
Clinton, Congress, and international financial institutions, promises to
privatize government enterprises and to adhere to international human rights
standards.
02/29/96 —
The U.N. Security Council extends the UNMIH mandate, but with a force
limited to 1,200 soldiers and 300 civilian police for a period of only four
months. Canada offers to contribute additional personnel.
02/16/96 —
President Preval chooses the moderate agro-economist Rosny Smarth as
Prime Minister, and he is subsequently approved by the Haitian legislature.
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02/09/96 —
President Preval requests an extension of the United Nations Mission in
Haiti.
02/07/96 —
President-elect Rene Preval is sworn in as President, representing the first
transition from one democratically elected president to another.
12/17/95 —
In peaceful presidential elections, Rene Preval, the pro-Aristide candidate of
the Lavalas Party, wins with 89% of the vote, but turnout was only about
28% of eligible voters, and many parties boycotted the election.
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