Order Code IB92117
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance,
Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
Updated October 10, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
1997-1998 Crises
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy
Nuclear Program
Chemical Weapons
Biological Weapons
Ballistic Missiles
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
War Crimes Trial
Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees
Support for International Terrorism/September 11
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property
Reparations Payments
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
Jordan
Turkey
Iran/Persian Gulf States
Syria/Lebanon/Egypt
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW)
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch
Costs of Containment

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Iraq: Weapons Threat, Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy
SUMMARY
In recent years, the United States has
dismantling and monitoring Iraq’s but was
been unable to maintain an international
unable to finish verifying Iraq’s claim that it
consensus for strict enforcement of all appli-
has destroyed all its WMD or related equip-
cable U.N. Security Council resolutions on
ment. Iraq’s refusal of full cooperation with
Iraq, but it has largely succeeded in preventing
UNSCOM eventually prompted U.S.-British
Iraq from reemerging as an immediate strate-
military action in December 1998. All inspec-
gic threat to the region. In the wake of the
tors withdrew and Iraq has been unmonitored
September 11 attacks, there is heightened U.S.
since, leaving uncertainty as to the degree to
concern about the potential threat posed by
which Iraq has rebuilt its WMD programs.
Iraq, and the Bush Administration has empha-
sized regime change as the cornerstone of U.S.
On November 10, 1994, as required, Iraq
policy.
accepted the U.N.-designated land border with
Kuwait (confirmed by Resolution 833) as well
The exact means to implement that
as Kuwaiti sovereignty. Iraq has failed to
objective has not been announced, whether it
account for more than 600 Kuwaitis still
be through international sanctions and diplo-
missing from the war, as well as for Kuwaiti
macy, military action, or covert action. The
property taken. Iraq initially rejected a 1991
regime change policy is not openly supported
U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program to
by many other governments, particularly if it
address humanitarian needs, but it later ac-
involves major military action. However,
cepted a revised version of that plan, which
many governments support U.S. action
has been operational since December 1996.
through the United Nations to enforce Secu-
rity Council resolutions requiring Iraqi disar-
Iraq is deemed non-compliant in other
mament of its mass destruction weapons
areas, especially human rights issues. A U.S.-
(WMD) programs, and the Bush
led no-fly zone has provided some protection
Administration appears to be tailoring its
to Kurdish northern Iraq since April 1991.
policy to that objective.
Since August 1992, a no-fly zone has been
enforced over southern Iraq, where historically
Part of the debate over U.S. policy
repressed Iraqi Shiites are concentrated. The
centers on whether Iraq’s WMD programs can
zone was expanded in August 1996, but Iraq
be ended through a reintroduction of U.N.
nonetheless maintains a substantial ground
weapons inspectors. During 1991-1998, a
presence in the south. Iraq has openly chal-
U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
lenged both no-fly zones since December
(UNSCOM) made considerable progress in
1998.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In a September 12 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implied that U.S.
military action would be taken against Iraq if the United Nations did not act to implement
existing U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq. Four days later, Iraq said that it would
allow the return of U.N. weapons inspectors without conditions. On October 1, 2002, Iraq
agreed to practical arrangements for new inspections, which will likely not begin until a new
U.N. Security Council resolution is adopted, outlining a more intrusive inspection regime.
Congress is debating legislation, including compromise language agreed to with the White
House (H.J.Res.114 and S.J.Res.46) that would authorize the President to use force against
Iraq, and several alternatives that would provide more limited authorities.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990) authorized the use of force
to expel Iraq from Kuwait. After the war (January 16 - February 28, 1991), a ceasefire was
declared in Security Council Resolution 686 (March 2, 1991). The primary ceasefire
resolution is Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), requiring Iraq – in return for
a graduated easing of sanctions – to end its weapons of mass destruction programs, recognize
Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property, and end support for
terrorism. Iraq accepted the resolution. Iraq is required by Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991)
to end repression of its people. In forty reviews (at 60-day intervals) of Iraqi compliance
from the end of the Gulf war in 1991 until August 20, 1998, the U.N. Security Council
maintained the comprehensive international sanctions on Iraq’s imports and exports imposed
by Security Council Resolution 661 (August 6, 1990). (See CRS Report RL30472, Iraq:
Oil-for-Food Program; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.)
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
During 1991-1998, a U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to verify that Iraq had ended all its prohibited
WMD programs and to establish a long-term monitoring program of WMD facilities
(Resolution 715, October 11, 1991). The monitoring program, accepted by Iraq in
November 1993, consisted of visitations and technical surveillance of about 300 sites. Under
Resolution 1051 (March 27, 1996), UNSCOM inspected (at point of entry and at end-use
destination) Iraq’s imports of any dual use items.
Confrontations over access to suspected WMD sites began almost as soon as UNSCOM
began operations in April 1991, prompting adoption of Resolution 707 (August 15, 1991)
requiring unfettered access to all sites and disclosure by Iraq of all its WMD suppliers.
During March 1996 - October 1997, Iraq impeded inspectors from entering Iraqi security
service and military facilities, and it interfered with some UNSCOM flights. These actions,
which were not resolved by a March 1996 side agreement between UNSCOM and Iraq
governing pre-notification of inspections of defense and security sites, prompted Resolution
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1060 (June 12, 1996) and other Council statements (such as on June 13, 1997) demanding
Iraqi cooperation. Resolution 1115 (June 21, 1997) threatened travel restrictions against
Iraqi officials committing the infractions, and Resolution 1134 (October 23, 1997) again
threatened a travel ban and suspended sanctions reviews until April 1998.
1997-1998 Crises. Six days after that vote, Iraq barred American UNSCOM
personnel from conducting inspections, and on November 13, 1997, it expelled the
Americans. Resolution 1137 ( November 12, 1997), imposed travel restrictions on Iraqi
officials. (On November 13, 1997, the House adopted H.Res. 322, backing unilateral U.S.
military action as a last resort. The Senate did not act on a similar resolution, S.Con.Res. 71,
because some Senators wanted it to call for the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein.)
In November 1997 and February 1998, Russia and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan,
respectively, brokered temporary compromises that enabled UNSCOM to resume
inspections. The February 23, 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement provided for access to eight
“presidential sites” by UNSCOM inspectors and diplomatic observers. Security Council
Resolution 1154 (March 2, 1998) accepted that agreement, threatening “the severest
consequences” if Iraq reneged. Iraq allowed presidential site inspections (1,058 buildings)
during March 26-April 3, 1998, the travel ban on Iraqi officials was lifted, and sanctions
reviews resumed.
Iraq subsequently refused to implement an UNSCOM plan for completing its work and,
in August 1998, barred UNSCOM from inspecting previously inspected facilities. The
Senate and House passed a resolution, S.J.Res. 54 (P.L. 105-235, signed August 14, 1998),
declaring Iraq in “material breach” of the ceasefire. The Security Council adopted
Resolution 1194 (September 9, 1998) demanding full unfettered inspections access and
suspending sanctions reviews. On October 30, 1998, the Security Council offered an easing
of sanctions if Iraq fulfilled WMD and other outstanding requirements, but Iraq demanded
an immediate end to sanctions and it ceased cooperation with UNSCOM (but not the IAEA).
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1205 (November 5, 1998), deeming the Iraqi
action a “flagrant violation” of the February 1998 U.N.-Iraq agreement. On November 14,
1998, with the United States about to launch airstrikes, Iraq pledged cooperation, narrowly
averting U.S. air strikes but prompting President Clinton to openly declare a U.S. policy of
regime change.
Operation Desert Fox and Aftermath. After a month of testing Iraq’s cooperation,
UNSCOM said on December 15, 1998 that Iraq refused to yield known WMD-related
documents and that it was obstructing inspections. All inspectors withdrew and a 70-hour
U.S. and British bombing campaign followed (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19,
1998), directed against Iraqi WMD-capable facilities and military and security targets. After
almost one year of negotiations, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1284 (December
17, 1999) by a vote of 11- 0 (Russia, France, China, and Malaysia abstained), providing,
subject to a vote of the Security Council, for the suspension of most sanctions if Iraq “fully
cooperates” with a new WMD inspection body (UNMOVIC, U.N. Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission). The resolution calls for inspectors to determine within 60 days
of reentering Iraq what WMD elimination tasks remain. Under Resolution 1284, Iraq’s
revenues would be subject to undefined financial controls, exports of dual use items to Iraq
would still require U.N. approval, and arms exports would remain banned. In January 2000,
the Security Council selected as head of UNMOVIC former IAEA director Hans Blix, who
developed an organizational plan and reported that, as of August 2000, UNMOVIC is ready
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to begin activities in Iraq. In the absence of agreement with Iraq to resume on-the-ground
inspections, UNMOVIC’s 63 inspectors – all employees of the United Nations and not their
individual governments – review documents and imagery and interviews informants and
reviews civilian contracts for goods purchased by Iraq to determine whether certain items
(“Goods Review List” items) are not included. Such items are subject to review.
“Axis of Evil” and U.S. Policy. Amid a growing debate over whether to expand the
post-September 11 “war on terrorism” to Iraq and amid fears that Iraq could provide WMD
expertise to terrorist groups, on November 26, 2001, and again in his January 29, 2002 State
of the Union message, President Bush threatened unspecified action against Iraq to prevent
its re-emergence as a threat. In the latter speech he described Iraq as part of an “axis of evil”
along with Iran and North Korea, and he continues to say that U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s
regime. One month prior to the State of the Union speech, the House passed H.J.Res. 75 on
December 20, 2001, by a vote of 392-12. The resolution called Iraq’s refusal to readmit
U.N. inspectors a “material breach” of its international obligations and a mounting threat to
peace and security. The resolution, not taken up in the Senate, did not explicitly authorize
U.S. military action.
The Administration’s call for a change of regime is predicated largely on the belief that
Iraq is rebuilding banned WMD capabilities. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said in late July
2002 that Iraq is rebuilding biological capabilities in mobile vehicles and is building some
WMD facilities underground. Similar assertions were made in a British intelligence
assessment, released by Prime Minister Blair on September 24, 2002, and a CIA assessment,
released in October 2002. These assessments say Iraq has reconstituted its WMD programs,
particularly its biological program, although the assessments do not indicate that Iraq has
made any major nuclear weapons breakthroughs since inspections ended in 1998. The
British dossier said Iraq had tried to buy fissile material from “Africa,” that Iraq could deploy
chemical weapons against its internal opponents within 45 minutes of an order to do so, and
that it is developing missiles with ranges of up to 1,000 km. There are allegations of illicit
Iraqi imports of conventional military equipment, including from Belarus, Ukraine, and the
former Yugoslavia, possibly shipped through Syria.
In a September 12, 2002 speech before the United Nations, President Bush implicitly
threatened U.S. military action, unilateral if necessary, if the United Nations did not enforce
existing resolutions on Iraq. Iraq, seeing international support for the President’s decision
to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations, sent a letter to the United Nations on September
16 pledging to admit UNMOVIC inspectors without conditions, reversing a position taken
during several meetings with the United Nations in 2002: March 7, May 1-3, and July 4-5
(in Vienna). On October 1, 2002, Iraq and UNMOVIC reached agreement on practical
arrangements for new inspections, although inspections of presidential sites would still be
subject to the February 1998 side agreement with Secretary General Annan. The Bush
Administration called the agreement insufficient and continues to seek a new Security
Council resolution specifying consequences if Iraq does not fully comply and imposing other
conditions to ensure Iraq is fully disarmed by the inspections. UNMOVIC director Blix said
after meeting with the Bush Administration on October 4 that inspections would not begin
until the Council adopted a new resolution clarifying his mandate. France and Russia
oppose authorizing force without a second vote of the Council, and they want to ease or
eliminate some of the more intrusive aspects of the U.S. draft, such as the proposal to have
armed guards accompany the inspectors. As U.N. negotiations continue, Congress is
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debating a resolution (S.J.Res. 46 and H.J.Res. 114) that would authorize the use of U.S.
armed forces against Iraq, as well as several alternative resolutions. (For information on the
resolution, see CRS Report RL31596, Authorization of Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against
Iraq: Side-by-Side Comparison of Selected Legislative Proposals.)
Despite Iraq’s professions of cooperation, military action against Iraq is still a
possibility. The Washington Post reported on May 24, 2002, that top U.S. uniformed
military leaders see major risks and difficulties in a large U.S. ground offensive, which could
require up to 250,000 U.S. troops, intended to overthrow Saddam and install a new
government. To varying degrees, European and Arab governments, as well as Turkey, have
indicated opposition to unilateral U.S. military action, although they have said they would
be supportive if the United Nations authorized force. President Bush says he has not decided
on whether to authorize a U.S. military offensive against Iraq, and some congressional
leaders have indicated concerns about the costs, risks, and justification for a major offensive
against Iraq. A Washington Post report of June 16, 2002 said that in early 2002, President
Bush, either as a prelude to or alternative to a ground offensive, authorized stepped up covert
action by the CIA and U.S. special forces to destabilize Saddam.
The following summarizes the status of disarmament efforts in Iraq and outstanding
issues.
Nuclear Program
During 1991-1994, despite Iraq’s initial declaration that it had no nuclear weapons
facilities or unsafeguarded material, UNSCOM/IAEA uncovered and dismantled a
previously-undeclared network of about 40 nuclear research facilities, including three
clandestine uranium enrichment programs (electromagnetic, centrifuge, and chemical isotope
separation) as well as laboratory-scale plutonium separation program. Inspectors found and
dismantled (in 1992) Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons development program, and they
found evidence of development of a radiological weapon (“dirty bomb”), which scatters
nuclear material without an explosion. No radiological weapon was ever completed, but
Iraq might have tested such a device. UNSCOM removed from Iraq all discovered nuclear
reactor fuel, fresh and irradiated. Following the defection of Hussein Kamil (Saddam’s
son-in-law and former WMD production czar) in August 1995, Iraq revealed it had launched
a crash program in August 1990 to produce a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible by
diverting fuel from its reactors for a nuclear weapon. The IAEA report of December 1, 1995
said that, if Iraq had proceeded with its crash program, Iraq might have produced a nuclear
weapon by December 1992.
The IAEA, before it ceased work in Iraq, said that Iraq’s nuclear program had been
ended and that it had a relatively complete picture of Iraq’s nuclear suppliers. A May 15,
1998 Security Council statement reflected a U.S.-Russian agreement to close the nuclear file
if Iraq cleared up outstanding issues (nuclear design drawings, documents, and the fate of
some nuclear equipment). An IAEA report of July 1998 indicated that some questions still
remained, and the United States did not agree to close the file. In January 2002, as it has in
each of the past 3 years, IAEA inspectors verified that several tons of uranium remained
sealed, acting under Iraq’s commitments under the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In May 2000, the IAEA destroyed a nuclear centrifuge that Iraq had stored in Jordan in 1991.
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The IAEA says that the absence of an inspections program creates uncertainty about
Iraqi nuclear activities. The United States believes that Iraq retains the expertise (about
7,000 scientists and engineers) and intention to rebuild its nuclear program, and
Administration officials have asserted it is doing so. Some press reports indicate Iraq is
trying to buy equipment abroad that could be used to make weapons grade nuclear material.
On September 6, 2002, the New York Times reported that IAEA/UNMOVIC inspectors have
noted from commercial satellite photos construction and other alterations at some Iraqi
nuclear -related sites that could suggest banned nuclear activity by Iraq. The CIA
assessment, mentioned above, says that Iraq would likely not be able to produce a nuclear
weapon until the latter half of the decade, unless it acquires fissile material from abroad.
Chemical Weapons
UNSCOM destroyed all chemical weapons materiel uncovered — 38,500 munitions,
480,000 liters of chemical agents, 1.8 million liters of precursor chemicals, and 426 pieces
of production equipment items — and the destruction operation formally ended on June 14,
1994. However, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas bombs, and
4,000 tons of chemical precursors, remains unknown. Iraq refused to yield an Air Force
document, found in July 1998 by UNSCOM, that could explain their fate, although Iraq
allowed UNSCOM to take notes from it. In February 1998 UNSCOM discovered that shells
taken from Iraq in 1996 contained 97% pure mustard gas, indicating it was freshly produced.
The primary remaining chemical weapons questions center on VX nerve agent, which
Iraq did not include in its initial postwar declarations and of which no stockpile was ever
located. By 1995 UNSCOM had uncovered enough circumstantial evidence to force Iraq to
admit to producing about 4 tons of VX, but UNSCOM believed that Iraq had imported
enough precursor — about 600 tons — to produce 200 tons of the agent. In late June 1998,
UNSCOM revealed that some unearthed missile warheads, tested in a U.S. Army lab,
contained traces of VX, contradicting Iraq’s assertions that it had not succeeded in stabilizing
the agent. Separate French and Swiss tests did not find conclusive evidence of VX. About
170 chemical sites were under long-term monitoring. Iraq has not signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention that took effect April 29, 1997. The CIA assessment says Iraq has
renewed chemical weapons production and probably stocked a few hundred tons of agent.
Biological Weapons
Biological weapons is the area with more outstanding and unresolved issues than any
other weapons area, according to UNSCOM, which called Iraq’s biological declarations
neither credible nor verifiable. Iraq did not initially declare any biological materials,
weapons, research, or facilities, and no biological weapons stockpile was ever uncovered.
UNSCOM focused its investigation initially on the major biological research and
development site at Salman Pak, but Iraq partially buried that facility shortly before the first
inspections began. In August 1991, Iraq admitted that it had a biological weapons research
program. In July 1995, Iraq modified its admission by acknowledging it had an offensive
biological weapons program and that it had produced 19,000 liters of botulinum, 8,400 liters
of anthrax, and 2,000 liters of aflatoxin, clostridium, and ricin. In August 1995, Iraq
confessed to having produced 191 biological bombs, of which 25 were missile warheads,
loaded with anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin for use in the Gulf war, but Iraq claims to have
destroyed the bombs after the Gulf conflict. UNSCOM monitored 86 biological sites during
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1994 -1998. UNSCOM discovered and dismantled the Al Hakam facility, south of Baghdad,
on June 20, 1996.
According to UNSCOM, Iraq imported a total of 34 tons of growth media for producing
biological agents during the 1980s, of which 4 tons remain unaccounted for. UNSCOM
lacked information on Iraq’s development of drop tanks and aerosol generators for biological
dissemination, as well as the fate of the biological munitions. No evidence linking the
October 2001 anthrax-related terrorism in the United States to Iraq has been announced.
White House spokespersons said in late December 2001 that the anthrax used in the attacks
appeared to be from a domestic source, such as a U.S. military laboratory. Press reports in
2002 say Iraq has been developing unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to deliver
biological or chemical weapons. The CIA assessment says that Iraq has reactivated its
biological program and that most elements of the program are larger and more advanced than
they were before the Gulf war.
Ballistic Missiles
U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 requires the destruction of all Iraqi ballistic
missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. UNSCOM accounted for 817 of 819
Soviet-supplied Scud missiles, 130 of which survived the Gulf war, as well as all 14 declared
mobile launchers and 60 fixed launch pads. U.S. analysts believe Iraq might be concealing
as many as 12 Scud-like missiles. UNSCOM’s October 1998 report said it had been able to
account for at least 43 of the 45 chemical and biological (CBW) warheads Iraq said it
unilaterally destroyed in 1991. (The warheads were unearthed in mid-1998.) An additional
30 chemical warheads were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. UNSCOM also
accounted for all but 50 conventional Scud warheads, and said it made progress establishing
a material balance for Scud engine components. Unresolved issues include accounting for
missile program documentation, 300 tons of special missile propellant, and indigenous
missile production (30 indigenously-made warheads and 7 missiles).
In December 1995, after Jordan reported seizing 115 Russian-made missile guidance
components allegedly bound for Iraq, UNSCOM said Iraq had procured some missile
components since 1991, a violation of sanctions. (That month, UNSCOM retrieved
prohibited missile guidance gyroscopes, suitable for a 2,000 mile range missile, from Iraq’s
Tigris River, apparently procured from Russia’s defense-industrial establishment.)
UNSCOM also had evidence that Iraq, after the Gulf war, conducted secret flight tests and
conducted research on missiles of prohibited ranges. Iraq is making progress in developing
permitted-range missiles – the Ababil and Samoud programs – according to the January 2002
CIA report to Congress and, prior to Desert Fox, UNSCOM had been monitoring about 63
missile sites and 159 items of equipment, as well as 2,000 permitted missiles. In early May
2002, the United States presented to the U.N. Security Council evidence that Iraq is
developing missiles of ranges beyond the permitted 150 km.
Human Rights/War Crimes Issues
U.S. and U.N. human rights reports since the Gulf war have repeatedly described Iraq
as a gross violator of human rights. In 1994, the Clinton Administration said it was
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considering presenting a case against Iraq to the International Court of Justice under the 1948
Genocide Convention. U.N. Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der Stoel’s February 1994 report
said that Convention might be violated by Iraq’s abuses against the Shiite “Marsh Arabs” in
southern Iraq, including drainage of the marshes where they live. In February 2002, Iraq
allowed the U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq, Andreas Mavromatis of Cyprus, to visit
Iraq, the first such visit since 1992.
War Crimes Trial. U.N. Security Council Resolution 674 (October 29, 1990) calls
on all states or organizations to provide information on Iraq’s war-related atrocities to the
United Nations. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1992, (P.L. 102-138,
October 28, 1991, section 301) stated the sense of Congress that the President should propose
to the U.N. Security Council a war crimes tribunal for Saddam Hussein. Similar legislation
was later passed, including H.Con.Res. 137, (passed the House November 13, 1997);
S.Con.Res. 78, (passed the Senate March 13, 1998); and a provision of the Iraq Liberation
Act (P.L. 105-338, signed October 31, 1998).
A U.S. Army report on possible war crimes was released on March 19, 1993, after
Clinton took office. Since April 1997, the Administration has supported INDICT, a private
organization that publicizes alleged Iraqi war crimes and seeks the arrest of 12 alleged Iraqi
war criminals, including Saddam and his two sons. Although apparently lacking
international support, in August 2000 then U.S. Ambassador-At-Large for War Crimes David
Scheffer said that the United States wanted to see an Iraq war crimes tribunal established,
focusing on “nine major criminal episodes.” These include the use of chemical weapons
against Kurdish civilians at Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurds) and the forced
relocation of Kurds in the “Anfal” campaign (February 1988, in which an estimated 50,000
to 182,000 Kurds died); the use of chemical weapons against Iran; post-war crimes against
humanity (the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs); war crimes against Kuwait (including oil field
fires) and coalition forces; and other allegations. In FY2001 and again in FY2002, the State
Department contributed $4 million to a U.N. “Iraq War Crimes Commission, “ to be spent
if a U.N. tribunal for Iraq war crimes is formed. (For more information on U.S. funding for
Iraqi war crimes issues, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.)
Resettlement of Iraqi Refugees
Desert Storm and postwar rebellions against Saddam created a flood of Iraqi refugees,
including 39,000 Iraqis in a camp in Saudi Arabia (Rafha). Of that pool, about 14,000 were
ex-soldiers (and their family members) that participated in postwar rebellions or had
surrendered to coalition forces. The Bush Administration (1989-1993) agreed to participate
in a multinational resettlement program recommended by UNHCR. The total admitted to
the United States under the program were about 29,000 Iraqis, of which about 3,800 were
ex-soldiers and their families. About 5,000 Iraqis remain in Saudi Arabia as refugees, and
the United States is not accepting any more. The FY1994 defense authorization (P.L.
103-160) stated the sense of the Senate that there be no admissions of Iraqi ex-soldiers unless
they are certified to have assisted coalition forces after defecting and have not committed any
war crimes; the Clinton Administration said these criteria were met. In the wake of the
September 1996 northern Iraq crisis, 5,900 Kurds who worked for U.S. relief operations or
U.S.-affiliated NGO’s in northern Iraq, as well as 650 opposition activists, were resettled in
the United States under the Attorney General’s parole authority.
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Support for International Terrorism/September 11
Resolution 687 required Iraq to end support for international terrorism, and Iraq made
a declaration to that effect to the U.N. Security Council. FBI Director Robert Mueller said
in early May 2002 that, after an exhaustive FBI and CIA investigation, no direct link has
been found between Iraq and any of the September 11 hijackers, although some still assert
that hijacker Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in April 2001. An article
in the March 25, 2002 edition of The New Yorker, as well as other press articles, allege that
Al Qaeda members have relocated to northern Iraq, associating there with Kurdish Islamist
groups, and have contact with Iraqi intelligence. Senior U.S. officials said in late September
2002 that there is intelligence that some high ranking Al Qaeda members had had contacts
with Baghdad and that Iraq had helped Al Qaeda train with chemical weapons at some point
in the past. Others believe that Baghdad has little contact with Al Qaeda because it differs
with Iraq’s secular ideology and would hurt Iraq’s efforts to improve relations with Egypt
and other moderate Arab states that are threatened by Al Qaeda. French terrorism
investigators say they have found no evidence of Iraq-Al Qaeda linkages. The CIA told
Congress on October 7, 2002 that Iraq would likely not conduct a terrorist attack using WMD
against the United States unless there were U.S. military action against Iraq.
Iraq remains on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and according to the State
Department’s reports on international terrorism (most recently the report for 2001, issued
May 21, 2002), continues to harbor the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation
Front of Abu Abbas. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died (committed suicide or was killed) as
Iraqi police went to arrest him for alleged contacts with foreign governments opposed to
Baghdad. Iraq says it is paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers $25,000, and
some press reports say Iraq is cultivating Palestinians that might unleash anti-U.S. or anti-
Israel terrorism in the event of a U.S.-led war against Iraq. (See CRS Report RL31119,
Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002.)
Iraq-Kuwait Issues
Resolution 1284 requires reports on the issues discussed below. However, in contrast
to Resolution 687, Resolution 1284 does not make the easing of any sanctions contingent
upon Iraqi compliance on these Kuwait-related issues.
Border Issues/Kuwaiti Sovereignty. Resolution 687 required Iraq to annul its
annexation of Kuwait, directed the U.N. Secretary-General to demarcate the Iraq-Kuwait
border, and established a demilitarized zone 10 kilometers into Iraq and 5 kilometers into
Kuwait. Resolution 773 (August 26, 1992) endorsed border decisions taken by the
Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (established May 2, 1991) that, in
November 1992, finished demarcating the Iraq-Kuwait border as described in an October
1963 agreement between Iraq and Kuwait. The border took effect January 15, 1993. The
new line deprived Iraq of part of Umm Qasr port and a strip of the Rumaylah oil field, which
straddles the border. On March 18, 1993, the Commission determined the sea border,
allowing both countries access to the Gulf. Resolution 833 (May 27, 1993) demanded that
Iraq and Kuwait accept the final border demarcation. On November 10, 1994, Iraq formally
recognized Kuwait in a motion signed by Saddam Hussein. At the Arab summit in Beirut
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(March 27-29, 2002), Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to Kuwait’s territorial integrity and
pledged to cooperate to determine the fate of missing Kuwaitis (see below), earning a Arab
statement of opposition to a U.S. attack on Iraq and a step toward reconciliation with Kuwait.
The 32-nation U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established by
Resolutions 687 and 689 April 9, 1991), continues to monitor border violations. The United
States contributes 11 personnel to the 197 observers in UNIKOM, which is considered a
U.N. peacekeeping operation. Under Resolution 806 (February 5, 1993), passed after Iraqi
incursions into the demilitarized zone in January 1993 (and other incidents), a 908-member
Bengali troop contingent supplements the observer group. Kuwait furnishes two-thirds of
UNIKOM’s $51 million annual budget. The United States contributes about $4.5 million
per year to UNIKOM.
Kuwaiti Detainees and Property. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687
require Iraq to account for Kuwaiti and other nationals detained in Iraq during the Persian
Gulf crisis. Of an initial 628 Kuwaiti cases, 608 are unresolved (ICRC figure as of May
2000), as are the cases of an additional 17 Saudi nationals. Iraq has admitted to having
arrested and detained 126 Kuwaitis, but did not provide enough information to resolve their
fate. Only three cases have been resolved since 1995. Since January 1995, Iraq and Kuwait
were meeting every month on the Iraq-Kuwait border, along with U.S., British, French, and
Saudi representatives, but Iraq has boycotted the meetings since Operation Desert Fox. In
February 2000, retired Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov was appointed to a new post
(created by Resolution 1284) of U.N. coordinator on the issue of missing Kuwaiti persons
and unreturned property. Iraq has not yet allowed him to visit Iraq, and in April, June, and
August 2000, as well as in March, April, and June 2001, the Security Council has issued
statements of concern about the lack of progress. In April 2002, Iraq offered to receive a
U.S. team to discuss the case of missing Gulf war Navy pilot Michael Speicher, but Defense
Department officials declined on doubts of the benefits of a visit.
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 686 and 687 require Iraq to return all property
seized from Kuwait. In the first few years after the cease-fire, Iraq returned some Kuwaiti
civilian and military equipment, including U.S.-made Improved Hawk air defense missiles,
and a June 2000 Secretary General report and a June 19, 2000 Security Council statement did
note that Iraq had returned “a substantial amount of property.” However, since 1994, U.S.
officials have accused Iraq of returning to Kuwait some captured Iranian equipment that was
never part of Kuwait’s arsenal and of using Kuwaiti missiles and armored personnel carriers
during Iraq’s October 1994 troop move toward the Kuwait border. The United Nations and
Kuwait say Iraq has not returned extensive Kuwaiti state archives and museum pieces, as
well as military equipment including eight Mirage F-1 aircraft, 245 Russian-made fighting
vehicles, 90 M113 armored personnel carriers, one Hawk battery, 3,750 Tow anti-tank
missiles, and 675 Russian-made surface-to-air missile batteries. Iraq claims the materiel was
left behind or destroyed when Iraq evacuated Kuwait. U.N. Secretary General Annan said
at the conclusion of the July 4-5, 2002 inspections talks that agreement had been reached on
a “mechanism” for Iraq to return Kuwait’s state archives (six truckloads of documents) to
Kuwait. The United Nations is trying to finalize arrangements for the return.
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Reparations Payments
The U.N. Security Council has set up a mechanism for compensating the victims of
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (individuals, governments, and corporations), using 25% (reduced
from 30% in December 2000) of the proceeds from Iraqi oil sales. As of June 21, 2002 –
following an award of $4.5 billion to Kuwait’s government and state-owned oil industry –
the Compensation Commission (UNCC) has approved claims worth about $43.6 billion, of
a total asserted value of $320 billion claims submitted. Following an April 2002 payout of
about $1 billion, which included $800 million in payments to Kuwait, the UNCC has paid
out about $14.8 billion. Awards to U.S. claimants thus far total over $666 million. In
September 2000, the UNCC governing council approved an award to Kuwait of $15.9 billion
for oil revenues lost because of the Iraqi occupation and the aftermath of the war (burning
oil wells), although current payment schedules will provide only a small fraction of that
award (about $50 million) until 2003. In June 2001, the UNCC approved $243 million in
payments to all of Iraq’s immediate neighbors (except Turkey) for studies of Gulf war
environmental damage. Of this amount, $5 million was approved for Iraq’s legal expenses
to counter the expected environmental reparations claims. Kuwait was awarded $700 million
in October 2002 to cover the cost of removing Iraqi mines laid in the Gulf war.
Several legislative proposals (“Iraq Claims Act”) to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets (about
$2.2 billion) in the United States (separate from the U.N. compensation process) were not
enacted, because of differences over categories of claimants that should receive priority. In
the 107th Congress, H.R. 1632 proposes to distribute Iraq’s frozen assets primarily to U.S.
victims of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Some might argue that this group of claimants is
covered under the U.N. process discussed above and that the frozen assets in the United
States should be used for those with claims resulting from events prior to the Iraqi invasion.
(See CRS Report 98-240, Iraq: Compensation and Assets Issues.)
U.S. Policy, Sanctions, and the Oil-for-Food Program
As international concerns for the plight of the Iraqi people have grown, the United
States has had increasing difficulty maintaining support for international sanctions. The oil-
for-food program, established by Resolution 986 (April 15, 1995) and in operation since
December 1996, has been progressively modified to improve Iraq’s living standards, and the
United States has eased its own sanctions to align them with the program. Of the Security
Council permanent members, the United States has set the highest standards for full Iraqi
compliance that would trigger a lifting of sanctions. The United States rules out direct
dialogue with Iraq on the grounds that Iraq’s level of compliance does not justify talks. (See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-For-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.)
“Smart Sanctions” Initiative. During a February 2001 trip to the Middle East,
Secretary of State Powell presented a U.S. plan to facilitate exports of civilian equipment to
Iraq in exchange for measures to ensure that no militarily useful goods reach Iraq. The
Administration portrayed its initiative as an effort to rebuild containment by narrowing
differences within the Security Council and limiting sanctions erosion. France, Russia, and
China have generally sought to ease sanctions in order to give Iraq incentives to cooperate
with the international community. After a year of debate within the Council on the U.S. plan,
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on May 14, 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1409, providing for goods to be
exported to Iraq without Sanctions Committee scrutiny. This largely removes the
opportunity for Sanctions Committee members to place contracts for Iraq on “hold.”
Military items remain banned outright and GRL items are subject to export after review by
UNMOVIC. The new export procedures were placed into effect in late July 2002, and the
amount of contract “holds” have begun to fall.
Formally, comprehensive U.S. trade sanctions against Iraq have been in place since
Iraq’s 1990 invasion (Executive Order 12722 of August 2, 1990, Executive Order 12724 of
August 6, 1990, and the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Section 586 of P.L. 101-513). Since
then, U.S. trade regulations have been amended to align them with the oil-for-food program.
(A summary of the regulations governing transactions with Iraq is provided in CRS Report
RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program.) U.S. imports of Iraqi oil have soared since 1999
and reached a high of about 970,000 barrels per day in May 2001 — nearly half of Iraq’s oil
exports. That figure has fallen to about 500,000 barrels per day in August 2002 as Iraq’s
export volumes have declined to about 1.2 million barrels per day. In the 107th Congress, S.
1170, introduced July 12, 2001, would bar U.S. imports of Iraqi oil. The measure was
adopted by the Senate on April 18, 2002, as an amendment to an energy bill (H.R. 4), but it
is opposed by the Bush Administration on the grounds that the imports are part of a U.N.-
supervised program.
Prior to the oil-for-food program, funds for civilian goods and the implementation of
U.N. resolutions on Iraq were drawn from frozen Iraqi assets transferred — or direct
contributions — to a U.N. escrow account pursuant to Resolution 778 (October 2, 1992).
Total U.S. transfers to the escrow account, which matched contributions from other
countries, reached $200 million, the maximum required under Resolution 778. These
transfers were being repaid to the United States from proceeds of the oil-for-food program.
Resolutions 1284 and 1302 (June 8, 2000) suspended reimbursements until the end of 2000;
about $173 million was due back to the United States. Repayments resumed in 2001.
Iraq’s Illicit Trade with Its Neighbors
As regional fears of Iraq have eased and sympathy for the Iraqi people has grown, the
United States has had difficulty persuading regional governments to enforce the sanctions
regime. Improving sanctions enforcement by Iraq’s neighbors was dropped from the U.S.
targeted-sanctions proposals adopted in Resolution 1409 because of regional resistance. See
CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, Sanctions, and Illicit Trade.
Jordan. Since 1992, despite Jordan’s economic linkages with Iraq and its vocal stand
against a U.S. attack on Iraq, the United States has considered Jordan’s compliance with the
U.N. sanctions regime on Iraq satisfactory. In October 2000, Jordan dismissed Lloyd’s
International from its role as inspector of goods bound for Iraq and arriving in Jordan at the
port of Aqaba, a role enshrined in an agreement between Jordan and the United States in
1993. Recognizing Jordan’s economic need, the Sanctions Committee “takes note of”
Jordan’s purchases of discounted Iraqi oil and oil products, which is exchanged for
Jordanian goods (approved under the oil-for-food program) and write-downs in Iraqi debt to
Jordan. This relationship was renewed in November 2001 at a level of about $500 million
for the year, which translates into about 100,000 barrels per day of Iraqi oil exports to Jordan.
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Every year since FY1994, foreign aid appropriations laws (P.L. 103-87, P.L. 103-306,
P.L. 104-107, P.L. 104-208, P.L. 105-118, P.L. 105-277, P.L. 106-113, P.L. 106-429, and
P.L. 107-115), have denied U.S. aid to any country that does not comply with the sanctions
against Iraq, though these laws do not mention Jordan specifically. The Administration has
routinely waived sanctions in order to provide aid to Jordan, which is a key U.S. ally in the
Middle East peace process. (See CRS Issue Brief IB93085, Jordan: U.S. Relations and
Bilateral Issues). In December 2001, Jordan approved a project to build an oil pipeline from
Iraq to Jordan, to be operational by 2005.
Turkey. Turkey, also generally opposed to a U.S. attack on Iraq, estimates that it has
lost $35 billion as a result of the sanctions. The Turkish government now regulates and taxes
the illicit importation of about $400 million per year in Iraqi energy products by Turkish
truck drivers returning from Iraq. That truck traffic resumed in January 2002 at a low level
after a 4-month shut down by Iraq - an Iraqi effort to punish the Kurds who earn customs
revenue from the trade. U.S. sanctions against Turkey for this trade have been waived each
year. In April 2000, Iraq and Turkey agreed to increase bilateral trade to about $2.5 billion
per year, roughly pre-war levels. Turkey returned an Ambassador to Iraq in January 2001.
Iran/Persian Gulf States. In enforcing the embargo, two U.S. ships lead a
Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that conducts maritime searches in the Persian Gulf
to prevent the smuggling of oil and other high-value exports. The United States has asserted
that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard often helps Iraq smuggle out the oil exports in exchange for
“protection fees,” although Iran does sometimes stop illicit shipments. From its high of
about $600 million in 2000, smuggling through this route has fallen substantially since early
2001, indicating that Iraq may be increasingly using the pipeline to Syria (see below). In
June 2002, U.S. military officials attributed the drop-off in part to more robust enforcement
techniques by the MIF. It should be noted that Iraq receives only half the export value after
paying the Revolutionary Guard and smugglers.
Iranian-Iraqi relations have improved since 1995, and Iran publicly opposes a U.S.
attack on Iraq. The two exchanged 6,000 prisoners from the Iran-Iraq war in April 1998 and
smaller batches of prisoners and remains since. In early October 2000, the two agreed to
abide by the 1975 Algiers Accords that delineated their border, and Iran’s Foreign Minister
visited later in the month, a sign of accelerating rapprochement. Iraq’s Foreign Minister
visited Iran in January 2002, and Iran released over 600 Iraqi prisoners still held.
The Gulf states, despite the threat they have faced from Iraq, publicly oppose a
unilateral U.S. attack, although it is widely believed they could change their positions if the
United States moved forward. The Gulf states are allowing the United States to build up its
forces in the region and enhance basing and storage facilities that might be used in the event
of military conflict. In April 2000, the UAE and Bahrain reopened embassies in Baghdad,
leaving Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as the only two Gulf monarchies without diplomatic
relations with Iraq. As noted above, Kuwait and Iraq, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, took
steps to reconcile at the Arab League summit in Jordan (March 27-28, 2002). In June 2002,
Saudi Arabia opened a border crossing with Iraq for goods to reach Iraq under the “oil-for-
food” program.
Syria/Lebanon/Egypt. Syria and Iraq began a warming trend in relations by
reopening their border in 1997; this trend has accelerated since the July 2000 accession of
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Bashar Assad to the presidency of Syria. Since late 1998, the two countries have benefitted
from the reopening of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline, closed since 1982, and Iraq has been
sending about 180,000 - 250,000 barrels per day of oil through the line, under a “swap”
arrangement in which Syria uses the oil domestically and exports an equivalent extra amount
of its own oil. In May 2001, Iraq and Syria reopened diplomatic missions in each others’
capitals.
Lebanon, which is under the heavy influence of Syria, restored diplomatic relations with
Iraq October 23, 1998, after a 4-year break. As a sign of warming Iraqi-Egyptian relations,
Iraqi-Egyptian trade under the oil for food program and other trade has now reached $1.7
billion annually. On January 18, 2001, the two countries signed a “free trade agreement,”
although under the condition that it goes into effect when sanctions are lifted. In November
2000, Iraq and Egypt upgraded their interest sections to embassies.
Protecting/Supporting Iraq’s Opposition
The post-September 11 debate on Iraq encompasses the questions of the role for the
Iraqi opposition in a U.S. military action against Iraq and in a post-Saddam Iraq. During
August 9 and 10, 2002, senior members of six major Iraqi opposition groups visited
Washington for meetings with senior U.S. officials. Several opposition groups are planning
a meeting in Europe for early October 2002 that might declare a provisional Iraqi government
in exile, although there is substantial debate among opposition groups and within the Bush
Administration about whether it would be productive to declare a provisional government
in advance of Saddam’s overthrow. On September 26, 2002, the Washington Post reported
that the United States would draw down the remaining $92 million worth of defense articles
and services authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31, 1998) for
the opposition. The drawdown would reportedly include articles and services that would
help about 1,000 oppositionists support any U.S. military action against Iraq, and would
constitute lethal military aid, even though the proposed drawdown does not apparently
include actual weaponry. Since mid-2002, the State Department has invited Iraqis to
participate in a “Future of Iraq Project,” budgeted at $5 million, to discuss post-Saddam
governance and reconstruction needs. For a discussion of the opposition, as well as U.S.
assistance to it, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
Military Action and Long-Term Containment
The current U.S. military posture in the Persian Gulf is focused on containing Iraq.
Currently, the United States and Britain enforce two “no fly zones” to provide a measure of
protection for Iraq’s Kurdish minority and other objects of regime repression and to contain
Iraq militarily. To enforce the no-fly zones, the two allies invoke U.N. Resolution 678
(November 29, 1990, authorizing use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait), 687 (the main
ceasefire resolution), 688 (human rights), and the Safwan Accords (the March 3, 1991
cease-fire agreements between Iraq and the coalition forces that banned Iraqi interference
with allied air operations). Resolutions 678 and 687 were written under Chapter VII of the
U.N. Charter, dealing with peace and security, and are interpreted as allowing military action
to enforce these resolutions. Resolution 688 (human rights) was not written under Chapter
VII, nor does that or any other resolution establish no fly zones.
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To justify Operation Desert Fox, the Administration cited additional justification from
Resolution 1154 (see above), which warned of “the severest consequences” for non-
compliance. Section 1095 of P.L. 102-190, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1992,
signed December 5, 1991, expressed Congress’ support for “all necessary means” to achieve
the goals of U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. (For information on the U.S. military
posture in the Gulf, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002.)
In instances of strikes on Iraq for no fly zone or other infractions, the Administration also has
cited congressional action (primarily P.L. 102-1 of January 12, 1991), authorizing military
action to expel Iraq from Kuwait.
Kurds/Operation Northern Watch (ONW). The northern no fly zone was set up
in April 1991, to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq. The zone extends north of the 36th
parallel. After the September 1996 Iraqi incursion into northern Iraq, humanitarian aspects
of ONW were ended and France ended its ONW participation. On June 18, 2002, Turkey
renewed for six months basing rights at Incirlik Air Base for the 24 American aircraft and
about 1,300 U.S. forces (plus allied forces). However, Turkey fears that ONW protects the
anti-Turkish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which takes refuge in parts of northern Iraq,
and Turkey has made repeated attacks against the PKK there since May 1997.
The two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties, the KDP led by Mas’ud Barzani and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, agreed in May 1992 to share power after
parliamentary and executive elections. In May 1994, tensions between them flared into
clashes, and the KDP turned to Baghdad for backing. In August 1996, Iraqi forces helped
the KDP capture Irbil, seat of the Kurdish regional government. With U.S. mediation, the
Kurdish parties agreed on October 23, 1996, to a cease-fire and the establishment of a
400-man peace monitoring force composed mainly of Turkomens (75% of the force). The
United States funded the force with FY1997 funds of $3 million for peacekeeping (Section
451 of the Foreign Assistance Act), plus about $4 million in DoD drawdowns for vehicles
and communications gear (Section 552 of the FAA).
Also set up was a peace supervisory group consisting of the United States, Britain,
Turkey, the PUK, the KDP, and Iraqi Turkomens. A tenuous cease-fire has held since
November 1997 and the KDP and PUK leaders signed an agreement in Washington in
September 1998 to work toward resolving the main outstanding issues (sharing of revenues
and control over the Kurdish regional government). None of these issues has been fully
resolved, but reconciliation efforts have shown substantial progress thus far in 2002. Both
parties are represented in the opposition umbrella Iraqi National Congress, but both also
maintain ties to Baghdad. On October 4, 2002, the two Kurdish factions jointly reconvened
the Kurdish regional parliament for the first time since their 1994 clashes. In June 2002, the
United States gave the Kurds $3.1 million in new assistance to help continue the
reconciliation process, amid press reports of U.S. proposals for U.S. special forces teams to
begin working with the Kurds as part of an overthrow effort against Saddam (New York
Times, July 5, 2002).
Shiite Muslims/Operation Southern Watch. Shiites constitute a majority in Iraq
but historically have been repressed. The U.S.-led coalition declared a no-fly zone over
southern Iraq (south of the 32nd parallel) to protect the Shiites on August 26, 1992
(Operation Southern Watch), although the overflights are primarily part of the U.S.
containment strategy. The United States and the United Kingdom (but not France) expanded
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the zone up to the 33rd parallel on September 4, 1996; France ended its participation entirely
after Desert Fox. In response to Iraq’s movement of troops toward Kuwait in October 1994,
Security Council Resolution 949 (October 15, 1994) demanded Iraq not deploy forces to
threaten its neighbors. The United States and Britain interpret this as authorizing military
action if Iraq enhances (numbers or quality of armament) its forces below the 32nd parallel.
Such enhancements include Iraq’s movement of air defense equipment into the zones.
During March 2000-March 2001, Iraqi air defenses fired at or near fixed radar or allied
aircraft enforcing the zones on 500 occasions, in many cases provoking U.S. strikes on the
activated missile batteries. On February 16, 2001, the United States and Britain struck
elements of that network north of the southern no fly zone, in response to Iraq’s increasing
ability to target U.S. aircraft. U.S. aircraft did not go beyond the zone. As of early October
2002, during 2002 Iraqi air defenses and related infrastructure have been bombed 48 times
in response to about 150 provocations.
Costs of Containment. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates
contributed a total of $37 billion to the $61.1 billion in incremental costs of Desert Storm,
all of which has been paid. From the end of the Gulf war until the end of FY2000, the
Defense Department has incurred about $8 billion in costs to contain Iraq and provide
humanitarian aid to the Kurds. Of that, about $1.14 billion was spent in FY2000, and just
under $100 million was spent for Operation Desert Fox. About $1.2 billion was spent in
FY2001, and a similar amount is estimated for all of FY2002. The Department of Defense,
under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5859a), assisted
UNSCOM by providing U-2 surveillance flights (suspended since the December 15, 1998
UNSCOM pullout), intelligence, personnel, equipment, and logistical support, at a cost of
about $15 million per year. (See CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement.)
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