Order Code IB92075
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Updated October 7, 2002
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Syrian Politics and External Relations
Economy and Foreign Affairs
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian and Israeli Roles in Lebanon
Relations with Iraq
Oil from Iraq
Military Equipment to Iraq
Arms Proliferation
Terrorist Activity
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
Narcotics Traffic
Syria’s Human Rights Record and Related Issues
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
Specific Sanctions against Syria
Recent Congressional Action
Alternatives and Implications

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Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
SUMMARY
U.S.-Syrian relations have warmed some-
relations between the United States and Syria:
what in recent years as a result of the collapse
the course of Arab-Israeli talks; questions of
of the Soviet Union, Syria’s participation in
arms proliferation; Syrian connections with
the allied coalition against Iraq in 1991, and
terrorist activity and previous involvement in
Syrian agreement to participate in Arab-Israeli
narcotics traffic; Syria’s human rights record;
peace talks. Some Members of Congress
Syria’s role in Lebanon; and a warming trend
remain wary, however, of ties with Syria.
in Syrian relations with Iraq. A variety of
Several legislative initiatives have sought to
U.S. legislative provisions and executive
make any relaxation of aid and trade restric-
directives prohibit direct aid to Syria and
tions conditional on further changes in Syrian
restrict bilateral trade relations between the
policies.
two countries. Syria has reportedly cooper-
ated with the United States in investigating
Syria, governed by President Hafiz
Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization in
al-Asad from 1970 until his death in June
the aftermath of the September 11 attacks but
2000, is a prominent player in the Middle East
has been unwilling to sever connections with
scene. Within the region, a number of border
some other terrorist organizations.
disputes, problems of resource allocation, and
political rivalries have caused frequent ten-
On April 18, 2002, similar bills were
sions between Syria and its neighbors. In
introduced in the House (H.R. 4483) and
particular, the Syrian Golan Heights territory,
Senate (S. 2215), that would impose further
which Israel occupied in 1967, has been one
U.S. sanctions against Syria unless it halts
of the most intractable issues in the
support for international terrorism and takes
Arab-Israeli dispute.
other specified actions. On June 24, President
Bush said “Syria must choose the right side in
Syria participated in U.S.-sponsored
the war against terror by closing terrorist
bilateral peace talks with Israel between 1991
camps and expelling terrorist organizations”
and 1996, when talks were suspended. A few
(such as the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim organi-
months after the election of Israeli Labor Party
zation Hizballah and two Palestinian Muslim
leader Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel,
fundamentalist groups).
Syrian-Israeli talks resumed briefly under U.S.
auspices in December 1999 and January 2000
An issue for U.S. policy makers is the
but stalled again as the two sides disagreed
degree to which the Administration should go
over the sequence of issues to be discussed. A
in seeking to enlist Syrian support for U.S.
March 26, 2000 meeting in Geneva, Switzer-
endeavors in the Middle East. Many U.S.
land, between then Presidents and Asad failed
observers believe removal of legislative sanc-
to produce an agreement on restarting the
tions should be contingent on evidence of
talks. Prospects are uncertain in the aftermath
improvements in Syria’s human rights record,
of President Asad’s death on June 10, 2000,
a clear renunciation of terrorism, and reversal
and further progress will probably have to
of other policies injurious to U.S. interests.
wait as Asad’s successor, his son Dr. Bashar
Others favor quiet diplomacy aimed at encour-
al-Asad, continues to consolidate his position.
aging Syria to play a constructive and respon-
An array of bilateral issues continue to affect
sible role in the Middle East.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On April 18, 2002, similar bills were introduced in the House (H.R. 4483) and Senate
(S. 2215), that would impose further U.S. sanctions against Syria unless it halts support for
international terrorism, ends its occupation of Lebanese territory, stops development of mass
destruction weapons, and ceases illegal imports of Iraqi oil. Hearings on H.R. 4483 were
held by the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and
South Asia, on September 18, 2002. At the hearings, several witnesses expressed the view
that the additional sanctions contained in H.R. 4483 are needed to put pressure on Syria to
stop supporting terrorist groups and alter other policies that have a destabilizing effect on
the Middle East region, such as the Syrian troop presence in Lebanon, illicit oil imports from
Iraq, and attempts to develop mass destruction weapons. A State Department representative
told the Subcommittee that the Administration believes imposing new sanctions on Syria at
this time “would severely limit our ability to address a range of important issues” with the
Syrian government; he noted that Syrian cooperation in the U.S. struggle against Al Qaeda
had been substantial and had helped save American lives.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Syrian relations, frequently strained by longstanding disagreements over regional
and international policy, have warmed somewhat as a result of several developments: the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria’s participation in the allied coalition against Iraq in
1990-91, and Syrian agreement to participate in Arab-Israeli peace talks. This thaw in
bilateral relations led some Members of Congress to inquire whether U.S. Administrations
had made any private commitments to Syria, such as an undertaking to relax economic
sanctions, in return for Syrian support on regional issues. Several legislative proposals have
sought to condition relaxation of aid and trade restrictions on further changes in Syrian
policy. Recent U.S. Administrations, though not inclined to lift sanctions on Syria at this
time, tend to believe it is in U.S. interests to encourage Syria to play a positive role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process. The issue for U.S. policy makers is the degree to which the
United States should work for better relations with Syria in an effort to enlist Syrian
cooperation on regional issues.
Syrian Politics and External Relations
The death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad on June 10, 2000 removed one of the
longest serving heads of state in the Middle East and a key figure in the affairs of the region.
The late President Asad, a former air force commander and minister of defense who came
to power in a bloodless coup in November 1970, was elected to his fifth 7-year presidential
term on February 10, 1999. Hardworking, ascetic, and usually cautious, the late President
exercised uncontested authority through his personal prestige and his control of the ruling
Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba’th) Party, the armed forces, and the intelligence apparatus,
which form the triple pillars of the regime. Asad also had strong support among members
of his Alawite religious sect (a small Islamic sect), which comprises approximately 12% of
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the population but is disproportionately represented in the country’s political and military
institutions. Through alliances with key leaders in the region, particularly those of Iran,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and his de facto control of Lebanon, Asad made Syria a leading
force in the region. During the last decade of Asad’s leadership, Syria held sporadic peace
talks with Israel but has not yet accepted the terms Israel was willing to offer (see below).
The late President’s son and
Syria in Brief
successor, Dr. Bashar al-Asad, held no
official position in the government or
Population (2001): 16,728,808 (Growth: 2.54%)
Ba’th party at the time of the elder
Area: 185,180 sq km (71,498 sq mi, slightly larger
than North Dakota)
Asad’s death. Most observers believe
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 90.3%; Kurds, Armenians,
the late President had been grooming
others 9.7%
the 35-year old Bashar for eventual
Religious Sects: Sunni Muslim 74%; Alawite, Druze,
succession but had planned on a longer
Ismaili 16%; Christian 10%; Jewish (less than 0.01%)
period of apprenticeship. A western
Literacy (1997): 71% (M-86%, F-56%)
educated ophthalmologist who held the
GDP (2000): $19.3 billion
rank of colonel in the Syrian army, Dr.
External Debt (2000): $22 billion, including up to
$12 billion to Russia (inherited from Syria’s debt to the
Bashar al-Asad headed the Syrian
former Soviet Union)
Computer Society and was instrumental
Inflation (2000): 1.5%
in bringing the internet to Syria,
Unemployment (2000): 9% (Some estimates are as
although access is still drastically
high as 20%)
curtailed in Syria’s tightly controlled
Armed Forces (2001): personnel, 321,000;
society; he also spearheaded an anti-
tanks, 4,700 (including ca. 1,200 in storage);
corruption campaign. The new
combat aircraft, 589
president initially permitted somewhat
freer discussion of political issues;
however, probably under conservative
pressure, the government has curtailed the activities of several discussion groups that
emerged after Bashar became president, and President Bashar himself warned reformists
against attacking the interests of the Ba’th Party or the legacy of the late President Hafiz al-
Asad (see below).
Economy and Foreign Affairs. For much of its existence, Syria has faced
economic difficulties and problems in its foreign relations. The economy, long based on
agriculture and commerce, is dominated by an inefficient public sector, excessive central
planning, and administrative controls, despite some limited efforts toward economic reform
since 1991. Revenue has increased with the advent of oil production (approximately 500,000
barrels per day of which about 300,000 is consumed domestically); however, at present
production rates, Syria’s oil reserves will be exhausted in 10-12 years. Moreover, diminished
foreign aid, fluctuating oil prices, drought, and a regional recession have contributed toward
continuing economic stagnation.
Several economic reforms have been undertaken in Syria since early 2000. In April and
May 2000, the late President Hafiz al-Asad approved laws to permit foreign ownership of
land used for business enterprises, relax restrictions on acquiring foreign currencies, and ease
corporate taxation. In his inaugural address on July 17, President Bashar al-Asad called for
“steady, yet gradual, steps toward introducing economic changes” and specifically mentioned
“removing bureaucratic obstacles to the flow of domestic and foreign investments.”
President Bashar has supported further measures, including abolition of multiple currency
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exchange rates, expansion of free trade zones, and tentative approval of draft laws to
establish a stock market and permit private banks as long as they are at least 51% Syrian
owned. On March 18, 2001, the Syrian parliament passed a banking secrecy law designed
to pave the way for establishment of private banks. Appointment of a new cabinet on
December 23, 2001, with new ministers in the economic portfolios is being interpreted by
some analysts as an indication that the Syrian President will try to carry out further economic
reforms.
Syria’s relations with its neighbors have been marred in the past by border problems
(with Turkey and Israel), disputes over water sharing (with Turkey and Iraq), and political
differences (sometimes with Jordan and–until recently–with Iraq, which is governed by a
rival wing of the Ba’th Party); Iraq, in particular, resented Syrian support for Iran during the
Iraq-Iran war of 1980-1988 and Syrian support for the allied coalition that expelled Iraq from
Kuwait in 1991. Syrian relations with all three neighbors have improved, however, since the
late 1990s. Most recently, tensions with Turkey began to diminish in late 1998 after Syria
agreed to expel leaders of a dissident Turkish group, the Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK), which
has carried on an insurgency against the Turkish government since 1984. Syrian-Turkish
trade increased from almost nil in 1998 to $724 million in 2000 and is projected at $1 billion
in 2001. On June 19, 2002, Syria and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement,
described in press reports as dealing mainly with joint training.
On October 8, 2001, the United Nations General Assembly elected Syria to a non-
permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. U.S. officials had earlier expressed concern
about Syria’s candidacy as long as it was not in full compliance with U.N. resolutions on Iraq
(see below). In keeping with long-standing policy, the United States did not disclose its vote.
After the U.N. election, a State Department spokesman said the United States expects Syria
to meet its obligations to respect human rights and fulfill all Security Council resolutions.
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian-Israeli negotiations remain deadlocked over Syria’s demand that Israel withdraw
unconditionally from the Golan Heights, a 450-square mile portion of southwestern Syria
that Israel occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The late President Asad said he
accepted the principle of “full withdrawal for full peace” and would establish peaceful,
normal relations with Israel in return for Israeli’s withdrawal from Golan (and from southern
Lebanon as well). Israeli governments have differed over the question of withdrawal, but all
have demanded a prior Syrian commitment to establish full diplomatic relations and agree
to security arrangements before any withdrawal takes place.
Furthermore, Syria and Israel disagree over what would constitute full withdrawal,
because of slightly differing boundary lines defined in the past. Israel regards the boundary
as the international border established in 1923 between what was then the British-controlled
territory of Palestine and the French-controlled territory of Syria, while Syria believes it
should be the line where Syrian and Israeli forces were deployed on the eve of the June 1967
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war. The latter boundary line, among other things, would give Syria access to the
northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee (also known as Lake Kinneret or Lake Tiberias).
After a hiatus of almost 4 years, teams headed by then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar’a held two rounds of talks in Washington
and West Virginia in December 1999 and January 2000, respectively, at the invitation of then
President Clinton. Further talks, however, failed to materialize as the parties disagreed over
the sequence of discussions. Syria wanted to address border issues before dealing with other
topics, while Israel wanted to concentrate first on security, water, and future bilateral
relations. A meeting in Geneva between then Presidents Clinton and Hafiz al-Asad in March
2000 produced no agreement; Israeli territorial proposals conveyed by Clinton were
unacceptable to Asad, who insisted on full Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 border. In his
inaugural address in July 2000, President Bashar al-Asad stated that “we are in a hurry for
peace, because it is our option,” but added that “we are not prepared to concede territory.”
Other Syrian officials have reiterated this position.
President Bush, welcoming the new Syrian Ambassador on March 13, commented that
“Syria and the United States share a commitment to achieving a comprehensive, just, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 342
and 338, and the land-for-peace principles of the landmark Madrid Conference [of October
1991]. The Syrian Ambassador responded that “(w)e confirm our commitment to the peace
process to achieve a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace that is based on United Nations
relevant resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, and the land for peace principle...”
Syrian spokesmen, however, have increasingly criticized Israeli policies since the
outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian clashes in late September 2000 and the election of the hard-
line Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in February 2001. At an Arab summit conference
on March 28, 2001, the Syrian President described Israelis who voted for Prime Minister
Sharon as “more racist than the Nazis.” On May 5, when welcoming Pope John Paul II to
Damascus, Asad condemned Israel for what he described as violations of the sanctity of
Muslim and Christian holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Without mentioning Israel
or the Jewish people by name, Asad went on to condemn those who “try to kill all the
principles of divine faiths with the same mentality of betraying Jesus Christ ... in the same
way that they tried to commit treachery against the Prophet Muhammad.” (Asad made no
public comments after a subsequent meeting with the Pope in Rome on February 21, 2002.)
On January 19, 2002, Syria’s representative to the United Nations described the demolition
of Palestinian homes in the Israeli-occupied Gaza territory by Israeli military units as “not
much different from the scene of the World Trade Center.” Each of these comments drew
rebukes from the U.S. State Department, and Secretary of State Colin Powell described
Syrian remarks comparing the Gaza house demolitions with the September 11 terrorist
attacks as “hysterical.”
At an Arab summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, Syria joined other Arab states
in endorsing a peace initiative by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah involving full
Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since 1967 in return for normal relations
with Israel in the context of a comprehensive peace. In elaborating on Syria’s position,
President Bashar al-Asad described the initiative as a “first step” and said “what is required
is a mechanism” to implement the plan. He also demanded that Israel commit itself publicly
to returning occupied Arab lands and maintained that “for us, terrorism comes from Israel.”
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Meanwhile, Syria abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1397 (March 12, 2002) and
boycotted the vote on a follow-on resolution (Resolution 1402, March 30), both calling for
cessation of violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Syria objected to the resolutions
on grounds that they did not meet Arab concerns and did not condemn Israeli attacks on
Palestinians. An unnamed Syrian official described President Bush’s June 24 speech on the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as “written from a completely Israeli perspective” and said it
would not solve the problems it sought to address.
Syrian and Israeli Roles in Lebanon
Syrian Army units moved into large parts of northeastern and central Lebanon shortly
after civil strife began in that country in 1975. Syrian forces have remained there since 1976,
ostensibly under an Arab League peace-keeping mandate; most sources estimate current
Syrian military strength in Lebanon at 30,000-35,000. Meanwhile, Israel occupied a portion
of Lebanon between 1982 and 1985 in an operation designed to root out armed Palestinian
guerrillas from southern Lebanon. From 1985 until May 2000, Israel maintained a 9-mile
wide security zone in southern Lebanon, enforced by Israeli military patrols and an
Israeli-funded Lebanese militia called the Army of South Lebanon (ASL). At an Arab
League sponsored meeting at Taif, Saudi Arabia in October 1989, the Lebanese Parliament
agreed on a revised formula for power sharing within the Lebanese government; it also
adopted a plan for reestablishment of central authority and phased Syrian redeployment to
the eastern Biqa’ (Bekaa) Valley within two years of the agreement’s implementation, after
which Lebanon and Syria would agree on the ultimate status of Syrian forces in eastern
Lebanon.
U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress have expressed the view that Syrian
forces should have redeployed in accordance with the Taif Agreement by 1992, and have also
criticized Syrian toleration of the presence of the pro-Iranian Hizballah militia in southern
Lebanon. Syrian officials and pro-Syrian Lebanese have countered that not all conditions
of the Taif Agreement have been met so far, and that the Lebanese armed forces are not yet
capable of maintaining internal security. Prior to May 2000, Syrian and Lebanese leader also
argued that Syrian forces should remain in Lebanon as long as Israel maintained its security
zone in southern Lebanon, and that Hizballah activity constituted legitimate resistance
activity in southern Lebanon as long as Israeli forces were present.
On May 24, 2000, Israel unilaterally withdrew its forces from the security zone in
southern Lebanon. Barak had hoped to do this in the context of an agreement with Syria that
would guarantee the security of northern Israel. On June 7, then Secretary of State Albright
noted that Israel had fulfilled its obligations by withdrawing from Lebanon and said “I think
that the Syrians should do so also.” Lebanon and Syria claim that a complete Israeli
withdrawal should have included a small enclave at the eastern end of the Israeli security
zone called “the Shib’a (Chebaa) Farms,” which they assert is part of Lebanon but Israel
considers part of the Golan Heights. (For further information, see CRS Report RL31078,
The Shib’a Farms Dispute and its Implications, August 7, 2001, by Alfred B. Prados.) The
Shib’a Farms enclave remains a source of tension, as Israeli forces periodically target
Hizballah, as well as Syrian, positions in retaliation for Hizballah raids on Israeli forces in
the Shib’a Farms area. (For further information on the Syrian role in Lebanon, see CRS
Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde R. Mark.)
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In June 2001, Syria redeployed approximately 6,000 troops that had been stationed in
Beirut and its environs, leaving only a few Syrian outposts in the greater Beirut area. It is not
clear whether these redeployments resulted in a reduction in overall Syrian strength in
Lebanon. According to press reports, some of the redeployed Syrian troops joined other
Syrian units in more distant parts of Lebanon, while others returned to Syria. Observers
variously described the Syrian move as an effort to mollify Lebanese opponents of the Syrian
troop presence, to avoid a potential confrontation with Israel, or to protect the Syrian regime
in Damascus against some internal threat. In April 2002, a further redeployment apparently
began, as additional Syrian troops reportedly moved from the central mountains of Lebanon
to the eastern Biqa’ Valley or back to Syria. On April 3, Lebanese Army radio announced
that “[a]n agreement has been reached on practical steps to redeploy units of the brother
Syrian Army to complete the Taif accord.” Some observers thought the redeployments were
designed to avoid Israeli retaliation against Syrian forces following increased friction
between Hizballah and Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area and northern Israel since
March. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, however, denied that the redeployments were
related to regional tensions and echoed the Lebanese Army statement.
Relations with Iraq
Since 1997, Syria’s relations with its former adversary Iraq have improved markedly.
The two countries have exchanged diplomatic missions, though not at the ambassadorial
level, and trade relations have expanded. In August 2001, Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad
Mustafa Mero visited Iraq in an effort to strengthen diplomatic ties and implement trade
agreements. According to news reports, bilateral trade increased from $500 million in 2000
to $1 billion in 2001. In recent years, Syria has expressed opposition to the use of military
force against Iraq and called for lifting economic sanctions, while publicly urging Iraq to
comply with pertinent U.N. Security Council resolutions. In an interview published on June
18, 2002, President Bashar al-Asad warned that any military attack on Iraq would be a
mistake and said “[n]o country in the world has the right to change the system [of
government] in another country.” An official Syrian newspaper criticized President Bush’s
speech to the United Nations on September 12 as being focused on only one issue (Iraq)
while ignoring “the fundamental issue in our region,” which it described as Israel’s
occupation of Arab territories.
Oil from Iraq. Since November 2000, there have been reports that Iraq has been
shipping between 120,000 and 200,000 barrels of oil per day through a recently reopened
550-mile pipeline through Syria. Analysts believe Syria is buying Iraqi oil at a discount of
$2 or $3 per barrel and selling its own oil at international market prices. According to a Los
Angeles Times article of January 29, 2002, Syria may be earning $50 million or more per
month from these oil transactions. Syrian and Iraqi officials have maintained that the
pipeline is only being tested for future use. Previously, after a visit to Damascus on February
27, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell told reporters that President Bashar al-Asad
had agreed to handle any oil shipments from Iraq through Syria in accordance with the U.N.-
approved oil-for-food program for Iraq. There is no evidence yet that Syria has complied
with this commitment; however, no international agreement has been reached to place these
shipments and similar illicit Iraqi oil shipments to other countries under U.N. control. Some
commentators have opined that the United States is turning a blind eye to the oil shipments
through Syria in exchange for Syria’s cooperation in providing information on the terrorist
Al Qaeda organization to U.S. intelligence (see below).
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In a statement on February 1, 2002, Syria’s delegate to the sanctions committee denied
British accusations that Syria is illicitly importing Iraqi oil and claimed that Syria is building
a new pipeline that it hopes will be put under U.N. control. On February 14, 2002, the
Washington Post quoted Syrian Ambassador to the United States Rostom Zoubi as saying
that Syria received some Iraqi oil in the process of checking the pipeline but did not pay for
it; Zoubi reportedly said Syria would apply to the U.N. Security Council to handle future
shipments through this pipeline (as well as shipments through a second more economical
pipeline they hope to build) under the U.N.-approved oil-for-food program for Iraq. On June
4, Syria’s U.N. ambassador denied that Syria is violating U.N. resolutions by purchasing
Iraqi oil and allowing civil air flights between Syria and Iraq and went on to say that
“wherever it is necessary, we are asking permission for everything.”
Military Equipment to Iraq. During 2002 there have been increasing reports that
Syria has become a conduit for shipments of military equipment from eastern European
countries to Iraq. Alleged suppliers include Ukraine, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Serbia. In late April 2002, three recent Iraqi military defectors told a British
newspaper (The Guardian, April 29, 2002) that the first of three arms consignments bound
for Iraq had arrived in the Syrian port of Latakia on February 23. The defectors said the
shipment came from the Czech Republic and contained anti-aircraft missiles, rockets, and
guidance systems for SCUD surface-to-surface missiles. According to an article by one of
Israel’s foremost military journalists in the Israeli newspaper Haaritz on July 15, 2002, Syria
is facilitating the transhipment to Iraq of Russian-made jet engines and refurbished tank
engines, Czech anti-aircraft guns, radar, and engines bought from the Ukraine for Russian-
manufactured MiG-29 fighter aircraft and other equipment from Hungary and Serbia. A
leading U.S. defense expert told a congressional committee on July 31 that deliveries of
military equipment to Iraq through Syria have “become significant since mid-2001," mainly
consisting of spare parts and weapons assemblies for MiG and Sukhoy combat aircraft, for
armored equipment, and for ground-based air defense weapons. He commented that so far
these shipments have probably had “only a limited impact on the overall readiness of Iraqi
forces.”
Both the Czech and Hungarian governments denied that they had exported military
equipment to Syria in recent years, although the Czech spokeswoman did not role out the
possibility of smuggling. In an interview quoted by Associated Press on July 16, Syrian
Ambassador to Washington Mikhail Wehbe accused Israel of fabricating the Haaritz story
in an effort to damage U.S.-Syrian relations.
Arms Proliferation
On June 25, 1998, the Clinton Administration reportedly said Syria has an active
chemical weapons program and has armed missiles, combat aircraft, and artillery projectiles
with the nerve gas sarin. Also, in February 1998, a Syrian-Russian joint commission
reportedly discussed bilateral cooperation in economic and military fields, including “the use
of nuclear energy for development purposes.” In May 1999, the two countries reportedly
signed a 10-year agreement for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power. An Israeli
press article on September 15, 1999, averred that Syria is developing a longer-range SCUD
type surface to surface missile, and a year later Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak expressed
concern over reports that Syria had successfully tested a longer-range SCUD-D missile,
which Barak said would put all of Israel within range of Syrian missiles. On July 2, 2001,
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the Syrian Minister of Defense denied an Israeli report that Syria had fired a SCUD missile
toward the Israeli border.
In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, Undersecretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba
as rogue states that support international terrorism (see below) and are pursuing the
development of mass destruction weapons. He said that Syria has a stockpile of nerve agent
sarin and is trying to conducting research and development on the more toxic nerve agent
VX; that Syria has produced small amounts of biological warfare agents; and that Syria is
pursuing further development of its surface-to-surface missiles. He concluded that
“[k]eeping WMD out of terrorist hands must be a core element of our nonproliferation
strategy.” A leading member of the Syrian parliament accused the United States of a double
standard by tolerating Israeli programs to develop mass destruction weapons but warning
various Arab states against such programs.
Russian officials have talked of reviving former Syrian-Soviet military links and helping
Syria modernize its inventory of older Soviet equipment, much of which is now obsolescent.
On April 2, 1999, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on three Russian firms–Tula
Design Bureau, Volsky Mechanical Plant, and Central Research Institute for Machine Tool
Engineering–for supplying antitank weapons to Syria. The Administration also determined
that the Russian government was involved in the transfer but waived sanctions against the
Russian government on grounds of national interest. News agencies have reported that Syria
is seeking a $2 billion arms package including fighter jets (SU-17s or MiG-29s), T-80 tanks,
and antitank and antiaircraft weapons from Russia; reports continue to mention the SA-10
(S-300) air defense system. Current status of the package is uncertain. A defense journal in
November 2001 mentioned reports that Syria is receiving up to 16 advanced SU-27 fighters
from Russia.
U.S. officials are concerned that Syrian acquisition of additional weapons including
improved missiles will cause further regional tensions, increase potential threats to Israel,
and undermine arms control efforts. Syria resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its
attempts to resupply its armed forces.
Terrorist Activity
Allegations of Syrian involvement with terrorist groups have been a longstanding point
of contention between Washington and Damascus. Some observers believe Syria was
involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks by Shi’ite Muslim militants in
Lebanon, although others have blamed Iran, which had closer ties with the group responsible
for this atrocity. Syrian intelligence was implicated in an abortive attempt to place a bomb
on an El Al airliner in London in 1986, after which the United States withdrew its
ambassador to Syria for a year. Initial reports indicated that the destruction of the Pan
American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 was the work of a
Palestinian group headquartered in Damascus and responsive to Syria; however, subsequent
international police investigations led the international community to charge Libya with
responsibility. Syria agreed to expel PKK leaders in late 1998 at Turkey’s insistence (see
above), and the State Department believes Syria has “generally upheld its agreement with
Ankara not to support the Kurdish PKK.”
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Since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries which the State
Department identifies as supportive of international terrorism (see below). According to the
State Department’s April 2001 report on terrorism, Syria continued to provide safehaven and
support to several Palestinian terrorist groups maintaining camps or facilities in Damascus
or in Lebanon’s eastern Biqa’ (Bekaa) Valley. Moreover, Syria has continued to facilitate
resupply of the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim militia Hizballah, which has conducted raids against
Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and sometimes against northern Israel (see above). The
State Department adds that Syria appears to have maintained its long-standing ban on attacks
launched from Syrian territory or against Western targets. Syria, on its part, maintains that
it is prepared to expel militant Palestinian and other groups if provided with direct evidence
of their involvement in terrorist activity. On the other hand, Syria acknowledges its support
for Palestinians pursuing armed struggle in Israeli occupied territories and for Shi’ite Muslim
militias resisting the former Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon; Syria claims that
such operations constitute legitimate resistance activity, as distinguished from terrorism.
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks on the United States. On September 11, 2001,
Syria’s official radio reported that President Bashar al-Asad had sent a cable to President
Bush “in which he condemned the terrorist attacks that targeted innocent civilians and vital
centers in the United States.” According to the broadcast, President Asad offered
condolences and called for “international cooperation to eradicate all forms of terrorism and
guarantee the protection of basic human rights, notably the right of humans to live in security
and peace wherever they are.” The Syrian government regards most Islamic fundamentalist
organizations as destabilizing, and in the early 1980s Syria harshly suppressed local Muslim
fundamentalists who had carried out terrorist acts against Syrian government officials. Since
the September 11 attacks, a number of reports indicate that Syria has cooperated with the
United States in investigating Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization and persons
associated with it. In June 2002, press articles reported that Syria has provided the United
States with information gained from the interrogation of a key figure in the September 11
planning, Muhammad Hayder Zammar, who was extradited from Morocco to Syria, where
he faced pending charges. In mid-June, President Bashar al-Asad told reporters that Syria
had provided information to the United States in recent months on a planned Al Qaeda
operation that would have killed U.S. soldiers had it succeeded. On June 18, U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State William Burns told a congressional panel that “the cooperation the Syrians
have provided in their own self-interest on Al Qaeda has saved American lives.”
On the other hand, Syria remains unwilling to sever its ties with Hizballah and with
militant Palestinian organizations such as Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) that have
carried out suicide bombings in Israel and the West Bank. In a speech on April 4, 2002,
President Bush noted that “Syria has spoken out against Al Qaeda. We expect it to act
against Hamas and Hizballah, as well.” In his speech on June 24, President Bush said
nations committed to peace must halt the flow of money, equipment, and recruits to terrorist
groups seeking the destruction of Israel, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah.
President Bush added that “Syria must choose the right side in the war on terror by closing
terrorist camps and expelling terrorist organizations.” In a subsequent interview published
on July 1, President Bashar al-Asad said Syria supports “the Lebanese national resistance,
including Hizballah ... politically and in the media because the brothers in the Lebanese
resistance do not need military support from Syria.” Regarding Palestinian groups, Asad said
“their work is limited to political and media activities” and “their offices in Damascus
provide political representation to the 400,000 Palestinians living in Syria ...”
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Narcotics Traffic
For some years, the United States classified Syria as a transit country for the drug trade
and a suspected site for refining small amounts of narcotics. On November 10, 1997,
however, then President Clinton informed Congress of his decision to remove Syria (and
Lebanon) from a list of major drug producers or traffickers (see below), citing the
effectiveness of joint eradication efforts by these two countries. State Department officials
said the decision was taken on its own merits after a standard review process and “it would
be an error to read something more into it.” President Clinton warned, however, that the two
countries could be reinstated on the list if evidence should so warrant. In a letter to the
President on November 14, 1997, 24 Members of Congress questioned the President’s
decision and noted that it had not been discussed with Congress. Bills were introduced in
both the 105th and 106th Congress to reverse the President’s decision but were not enacted.
Syria’s Human Rights Record and Related Issues
Syria has been under a state of emergency tantamount to martial law since 1963, except
for a brief interval in 1973-1974. In its annual 2001 report to Congress on human rights
practices (published in April 2002), the State Department commented that the human rights
situation remained poor, and the government continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights,
although there were improvements in a few areas. It notes that citizens do not have the right
to change their government and that there is no organized political opposition. According
to the report, serious abuses include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without trial; fundamentally
unfair trials in the security courts; an inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and,
at times, political influence; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights; denial of freedom of
speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of censorship restrictions; denial of
freedom of assembly and association; some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on
freedom of movement.”
In November 2000, the government declared a general pardon for non-political
prisoners and an amnesty for 600 political prisoners as well; the State Department believes
this is the first time the Syrian government has acknowledged holding prisoners for political
reasons. The current number of political detainees is unknown; Amnesty International
estimated the number at 1,500 in July 2000 (before the November 2000 releases). Another
140 were reportedly released late in 2001. But two Syrian members of parliament were
sentenced to 5-year jail terms in 2002 for hosting discussion forums without permission, and
at least eight other prominent dissidents had been arrested and sentenced to jail as well as of
late August 2002.
Syria supports freedom of religion and women’s rights to a greater degree than do many
Middle East governments. Aside from Lebanon, Syria is the only Arab- speaking country
whose constitution does not establish Islam as the state religion, although it does require that
the President be a Muslim. In accordance with the largely secular philosophy of the ruling
Ba’th Party, the country’s Christian community and tiny Jewish minority (see below) have
been free to practice their religion without interference; some Christians have held high-level
positions in the government and armed forces. Syrian law specifies equal rights for women;
government policies stipulate equal pay for similar work; the government discourages
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conservative religiously based restrictions on women; and women serve in governmental and
diplomatic posts. (Twenty-six women won seats in the most recent parliamentary elections.)
Syria’s Jewish community, estimated at 3,770 in early 1992, were targets of
discrimination and periodic oppression in the past; however, their situation gradually
improved under the regime of the late President Hafiz al-Asad. In 1992, then President Asad
issued an order lifting travel restrictions and real estate controls on the Syrian Jewish
community. According to the State Department human rights report published in February
1995, the Syrian government had “completed issuance of travel permits to all Jews wishing
them.” In early 1997, U.S. officials said only a few hundred Syrian Jews remained in Syria.
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
Since 1950, the United States has provided a total of $627.5 million in aid to Syria:
$34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in economic support, $155.4 million
in food assistance, and $61 thousand in military training assistance. Most of this aid was
provided during a brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979.
Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and
electrification, and health and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since
1981, when the last aid programs were closed out. At present, a variety of legislative
provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade.
Principal examples follow. (For a more comprehensive list of sanctions applicable to Syria,
see CRS Report RL30644, Syria: Sanctions and Aid, August 20, 2000.)
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L.
94-329]. Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance
to countries that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by
this ban until 1979, as explained below.)
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat.
515] required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress
before licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries
determined to have supported acts of international terrorism (Amendments adopted in 1985
and 1986 re-lettered Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7
million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called “terrorism list.” This list is prepared
annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support
for acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first
prepared in 1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, published in April 1999. Syria’s inclusion on this list
in 1979 triggered the above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions
under P.L. 96-72.
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Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section
509(a) of this act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to
prohibit export of items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of
international terrorism, thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban
was reaffirmed by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 — see
below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for
assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this Act
[100 Stat. 1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on
income or war profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting
international terrorism. [26 USC 901].
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101- 222].
Section 4 amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional
notification and licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of
dollar value, to countries on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their
military capability or enhance their ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribed conditions for removal of a country from the terrorism list:
prior notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
chairmen of two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite
notification, the President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly
indicate it is no longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification
must be provided 45 days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list.)
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S.
defense articles and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance
with the Arab boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver,
but no such waiver has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in
Syria’s case because of other prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132] requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (Section 325) or lethal
military equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President
to waive this provisions on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to
third countries that sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in
Section 549 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by
reference in H.R. 4811, which was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on
November 6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens
or resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the
terrorism list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in
consultation with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation
prohibits such transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist
acts in the United States.” (31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996,
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p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996, the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
reportedly protested to then President Clinton over the Treasury Department’s implementing
regulation, which he described as a “special loophole” for Syria. Several subsequent
measures were introduced in previous Congresses to forbid virtually all financial transactions
with Syria but were not enacted.
Section 434 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526,
passed by reference in H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, November 6, 2000) bars arms sales to any
country not in compliance with U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq. This ban
would be applicable to Syria if Iraq exports oil to Syria without U.N. permission. In practice,
the issue would be moot because of similar sanctions already in effect against Syria.
Specific Sanctions against Syria
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign
assistance appropriations enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S.
aid. The most recent ban appears in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2002
(P.L. 107-115, January 10, 2002). Section 507 bars the obligation or expenditure of funds
appropriated under this act for any direct assistance or reparations to seven specified
countries, including Syria. Section 523 also prohibits indirect assistance or reparations to
seven specified countries including Syria; however, it provides for a presidential waiver,
which has been exercised routinely on grounds that withholding funds to multilateral
development banks and other international organizations and programs under this limitation
would be contrary to the national interest. Section 527 bans bilateral aid to countries
identified as supporting international terrorism. Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, amended by Section 431 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994), requires the United States to withhold a
proportionate share of contributions to international organizations for programs that benefit
eight specified countries or entities, including Syria. Section 512 of H.R. 5526 (P.L. 106-
429), sometimes known as the Brooke Amendment after an earlier version of this provision,
bans assistance to any country in default of to the United States for over a year. As of
December 31, 1998 (latest figures available), Syria owed the United States $238 million,
mainly in loans under the Commodity Credit Corporation or from the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) remaining from the period when Syria received U.S.
assistance.
Drawing on appropriate legislation, U.S. Administrations have imposed detailed trade
restrictions on exports to Syria. Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, trade controls were instituted after Syria was designated as a country supporting
international terrorism in 1979, and further controls were imposed after Syrian intelligence
was implicated in an abortive airline bombing in 1986. At present, the Department of
Commerce list 31 categories of exports requiring a validated license for shipment to Syria;
these include aircraft, vessels, most vehicles, parts, machine tools, computer equipment, and
other high technology goods. (Routine exports like foodstuffs are exempt from these
controls.) Moreover, the Commerce Department generally denies export licenses for dual
use equipment or to military end-users in Syria. According to news reports, Syria and other
countries on the terrorism list were not covered by the Clinton Administration’s decision on
September 16, 1999, to remove export controls on encryption hardware and software. In
2000, Syria ranked 99th among U.S. trading partners, with $149.6 million in U.S. imports
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from Syria (mainly mineral oils and fuels, antiques, apparel, spices) and $219.0 million in
U.S. exports to Syria (mainly cereals, machinery, appliances and parts, tobacco). These
figures represent a moderate increase over 1999 levels ($95.0 million in U.S. imports from
Syria and $172.7 million in U.S. exports to Syria).
Recent Congressional Action
On April 18, 2002, similar bills were introduced in the House (H.R. 4483) and the
Senate (S. 2215)–both entitled The Syria Accountability Act of 2002–that would impose
additional U.S. sanctions against Syria unless it halts support for international terrorism, ends
its occupation of Lebanese territory, stops the development of mass destruction weapons, and
ceases illegal imports of Iraqi oil. Sanctions would include a ban on any dual use item; a ban
on financial assistance including loans and credit to U.S. businesses dealing with Syria; and
prohibition of programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in or with respect
to Syria. In addition, under the House bill, the President would be required to impose two
or more of a menu of six other sanctions, including a ban on all exports to Syria except food
and medicine, a ban on U.S. businesses operating or investing in Syria, a ban on landing in
or overflight of the United States by Syrian aircraft, reduction of diplomatic contacts with
Syria, restrictions on travel by Syrian diplomats in the United States, and blocking of
transactions in Syrian property. The menu in the Senate bill is similar but does not include
the ban on landing and overflights by Syrian aircraft. In press interviews on September 3 and
4, a U.S. State Department official said the Bush Administration disapproves of the proposed
legislation; the official was quoted as saying it would restrict the President’s maneuverability
in dealing with Middle East affairs. A hearing on H.R. 4483 scheduled for September 12
was postponed; consultations between Congress and Administration officials on this measure
were reportedly underway in mid-September.
Hearings on H.R. 4483 were held by the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, on September 18, 2002. At the hearings,
several witnesses expressed the view that the additional sanctions contained in H.R. 4483 are
needed to put pressure on Syria to stop supporting terrorist groups and alter other policies
that have a destabilizing effect on the Middle East region, such as the Syrian troop presence
in Lebanon, illicit oil imports from Iraq, and attempts to develop mass destruction weapons.
A State Department representative told the Subcommittee that the Administration believes
imposing new sanctions on Syria at this time “would severely limit our ability to address a
range of important issues” with the Syrian government; he noted that Syrian cooperation in
the U.S. struggle against Al Qaeda had been substantial and had helped save American lives.
On May 14, President Bush signed H.R. 3525,the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), which bans non-immigrant visas to any alien from
any country that sponsors international terrorism unless the Secretary of State and other
senior U.S. officials certify that such alien does not pose a threat to U.S. national security.
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Alternatives and Implications
Debate has continued within U.S. Administrations and Congress over the lengths to
which the United States should go in seeking to enlist Syrian support for U.S. endeavors in
the Middle East. According to one theory, normal bilateral relations should be contingent
upon improvements in Syria’s human rights record, a clear renunciation of terrorism and
narcotics trafficking, and reversal of other policies deemed inimical to U.S. interests.
Advocates of this view are particularly concerned over any possibility that the
Administration has made promises to ease sanctions (for example, removing Syria from the
terrorism list) to obtain Syrian cooperation in regional affairs. They tend to discourage
bilateral contacts such as visits by Syrian officials, which they see as a potential vehicle for
trapping a U.S. Administration into premature concessions. They favor continued legislation
to ensure that relaxation of sanctions can occur only with congressional approval.
Those who support this first approach see little prospect for a long-term relationship
with the Syrian regime, which they consider basically antithetical to U.S. interests and
values. They see Syria’s alignment with the coalition and agreement to attend peace talks
as tactical moves that offered Syria an end to regional isolation, a free hand in Lebanon, and
access to financial support from the Gulf states. They point to Syria’s lack of flexibility on
Arab-Israeli issues, periodic bellicose pronouncements from Damascus, unwillingness to
consider Israeli compromise proposals on border definition, friendship with Iran (and warmer
relations with Iraq), and ongoing rearmament efforts as indications that Syria will remain a
threat to regional stability. They warn that efforts to bring about a closer relationship with
Syria’s leaders risk repeating the earlier disastrous policy of courting Saddam Hussein.
According to a second theory, quiet diplomacy aimed at encouraging Syria to play a
constructive and responsible role in regional affairs could yield benefits. Proponents of this
approach do not advocate the immediate termination of sanctions (such as removing Syria
from the terrorism list) without further action on Syria’s part; however, they support wider
contacts between diplomatic and security officials of the two countries to discuss sensitive
issues, seek common ground, and identify possible areas of cooperation. They favor a series
of small, reciprocal steps that could lead to a warmer relationship over time. Rather than
legislative sanctions, they generally prefer an arrangement under which the Administration
has the flexibility to apply or ease sanctions in accordance with the current state of bilateral
relations.
Those who favor the second approach believe that a better relationship with Syria could
enhance prospects for achieving U.S. objectives. They point to limited U.S.-Syrian
cooperation in some areas such as Syrian assistance in providing information on Al Qaeda.
More important, they see Syrian support as an essential ingredient in the search for an
Arab-Israeli settlement; previous peace efforts, like the Camp David Accords of 1978 and
the Reagan plan of 1982, have shown that a lasting solution is unlikely without Syrian
involvement. Advocates of this approach point out that the late President Asad, though a
difficult negotiator, proved generally reliable in honoring agreements once he has accepted
them. (For example, Syria has routinely observed the terms of the 1974 disengagement
agreement in the Golan region.) They believe the future course of U.S.-Syrian relations will
affect significantly the outlook for regional security and lasting peace in the Middle East.
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