Order Code IB97004
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Japan-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 107th Congress
Updated October 2, 2002
Richard P. Cronin, Coordinator
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Japan Cooperation and Interdependence
Cooperation Against Terrorism: Response to the Attacks in New York and
Washington
U.S.-Japan-China Relations
Diverging Korean Peninsula Priorities?
Kyoto Protocol
The Whaling Issue
Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees
Security Issues
Issue of U.S. Bases on Okinawa
Burden Sharing Issues
Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines
Cooperation on Missile Defense
Economic Issues
Japanese Political Developments
Current Situation
Background - The Political System’s Inertia
U.S. Policy Approaches
1) Emphasize Alliance Cooperation
2) Emphasize U.S. Trade and Economic Objectives
LEGISLATION

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Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
The United States has long worked
Korean ballistic missiles and a rising China,
closely with Japan to build a strong, multifac-
Tokyo has started to bolster its self-defense
eted relationship based on shared democratic
capabilities even as it increases cooperation
values and mutual interest in Asian and global
with the United States under revised defense
stability and development. Although the Bush
cooperation guidelines agreed to in September
Administration came into office with an
1997. Japan is also participating in joint
avowed determination to promote closer
research and development of a ballistic missile
alliance relations, the failure of the govern-
defense capability, but has not made a deci-
ment headed by Prime Minister Junichiro
sion about acquisition or deployment.
Koizumi’s inability to overcome economic
stagnation that has lasted more than a decade
The large and long-standing U.S. trade
has started to lower U.S. regard for a country
deficit with Japan has been a perennial source
which still remains an important military ally.
of friction. The deficit reached a record $81.3
billion in 2000, but dropped sharply to $69
U.S.-Japan relations are of concern to
billion in 2001 because of a shrinking Japa-
Members and Committees with responsibili-
nese economy (-0.5% GDP growth in 2001)
ties or interests in trade and international
and the U.S. economic slowdown.
finance and economics, U.S. foreign policy,
ballistic missile defense (BMD), and regional
Congress has reacted critically to alleged
security issues. The latter include North Ko-
steel dumping by Japan, and the 106th
rean nuclear and missile proliferation, China’s
Congress enacted legislation assigning coun-
emergence as a potential U.S. military adver-
tervailing duty and antidumping receipts to
sary, and U.S. military bases in Japan, whose
firms that have been injured by dumped and
importance has been underscored once again
subsidized imports.
by their role in facilitating the operations of
U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
The Bush Administration has paid some-

what less attention to the trade deficit than did
In October 2001 the Koizumi
the Clinton Administration, while issuing
government gained parliamentary passage in
increasingly pointed requests that Japan deal
October 2001 of legislation permitting the
vigorously with its huge problem of bad bank
despatch of Japanese ships and transport
loans, which are a drag on the economy, and
aircraft to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-
follow-through on structural reforms. How-
area logistical support to U.S. forces engaged
ever, on March 5 the Administration imposed
in the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan.
additional “safeguards” tariffs on certain steel
This was achieved despite constitutional
imports from Japan and a number of other
objections from both within and outside of the
countries under Section 201 of U.S. Trade
ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led
Law, on grounds that a surge in imports has
coalition. Because of a constitutional ban on
damaged or has the potential to damage U.S.
military action not strictly for self-defense,
firms. Japan promptly filed a request with the
Japanese ships and aircraft were restricted to
World Trade Organization (WTO) for consul-
non-combat support.
tations with the United States over the deci-
sion, the initial step in filing a WTO com-
Due to its own concerns about North
plaint.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On September 17, 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il held a one-day summit in Pyongyang. At the meeting, the first ever
between the leaders of the two countries, Koizumi and Kim appeared to break longstanding
stalemates in several issues and agreed to restart bilateral normalization talks in October,
despite Kim’s surprise revelation that 8 of 14 Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean
agents in the 1970s and 1980s are dead. The summit boosted Koizumi’s public approval by
more than 20%, to over the 60% level, giving the Prime Minister a new burst of political
adrenalin.
In mid-September the Bank of Japan surprised the markets and the public by
announcing a plan to use central bank funds to buy up stocks held by banks whose fallen
value threatened the bank’s balance sheets. Subsequent reports cast doubt on how extensive
the purchases would be, and under what terms, but the move represented a significant policy
reversal. At the end of the month, after returning from Pyongyang, Koizumi replaced the
head of the Financial Services Agency (FSA), which has responsibility for overseeing the
resolution of the bad loan problem, with the current Minister of State for Economic and
Financial Affairs, Heizo Takenaka, a former academic who has argued for more radical
approaches to dealing with the bad loan problem. Koizumi also pledged to “bring an end”
to the banking system’s non-performing loan problem by 2005. Japanese banks and their
allies in the LDP and the economic bureaucracy are expected to resist Koizumi’s plans.
Observers appeared confused as to whether they should regard the two developments as
indicators of Japanese government concern about further weakness of the financial system
or a greater commitment to reform. At the G-7 meeting in Washington during September 27-
28, Japan’s finance minister seemed himself to be uncertain about what the developments
portended, to the reported annoyance of U.S. Treasury Secretary O’Neill and other officials.
Regarding trade matters, on August 23, the Japanese Foreign Trade Ministry
announced that it would not retaliate against U.S. section 201 measures on steel imports,
defusing what was potentially a very contentious issue in U.S.-Japan trade relations.
Japanese Foreign Trade Minister Takeo Hiranuma pointed to exclusions of some 40% of
Japanese steel exports to the United States from the original section 201 measure as the
primary reason for pulling back on retaliation. In an unprecedented move, the Bank of
Japan announced on September 18 that it would buy shares of stocks held by Japanese
commercial banks in an effort to shore up the latter’s balance sheets and to halt the slide in
the Japanese stock market. Critics charge that the move reduces the banks’ incentive to deal
with non-performing loans and to undertake fundamental restructuring.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Japan Cooperation and Interdependence
The United States and Japan have long sought to promote economic cooperation, an
open global trading system, and regional stability and security. In economic terms, the two
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countries have become increasingly interdependent: the United States is by far Japan’s most
important foreign market, while Japan is one of the largest U.S. markets and sources of
foreign investment in the United States (including portfolio, direct, and other investment).
The U.S.-Japan alliance and the American nuclear umbrella give Japan maneuvering room
in dealing with its militarily more powerful neighbors. The alliance and access to bases in
Japan also facilitates the forward deployment of U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific,
thereby undergirding U.S. national security strategy.
Japanese leaders and press commentators generally welcomed the election of George
W. Bush and indications that the new administration would emphasize alliance relations and
also be less inclined to pressure Japan on economic and trade issues. Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, Japan generally disproved the concerns of some commentators that
Japan might not be prepared to respond fully enough or quickly enough to the Bush
Administrations’s bid for closer security cooperation and coordination.
On the other hand, Japanese hopes for a relaxation of U.S. trade and economic policy
pressure have been partially disappointed. On June 13, the Japanese government announced
that it would delay taking retaliatory action against U.S. steel exports that it had originally
indicated it would take by June 18. The action would have been in response to the Bush
Administration’s March 5 decision to impose additional tariffs on imported selected steel
products. The Administration’s decision was the result of a Section 201 investigation and
the United States International Trade Commission’s determination that steel imports
seriously injured or threatened to seriously injure U.S. steel producers.
Relations periodically have been strained by differences over trade and economic issues,
and, less often, over divergent foreign policy stances. Strains arising from trade issues
peaked about 1995, after several years of conflict over the Clinton Administration’s efforts
– with mixed results – to negotiate trade agreements with numerical targets. Although the
end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union called into question some of the
strategic underpinnings of the alliance among both the American and Japanese public, both
countries have continued to view their interests as best served by maintaining and even
strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance.
President George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi set the tone
for relations at a summit meeting at the Camp David presidential retreat on June 30, 2001.
President Bush indicated strong support for the Japanese Prime Minister’s economic and
financial reform program, while Prime Minister Koizumi pledged to pursue cooperation
across a broad front and couched his concerns about the Administration’s abandonment of
the Kyoto Treaty and its ballistic missile defense program in positive terms.
President Bush visited Tokyo during February 16-19, 2002, as part of an East Asian tour
that also included South Korea and China. The President held extensive talks with Prime
Minister Koizumi on issues such as alliance relations, cooperation against terrorism, and
Japan’s continuing economic slump, and addressed a joint session of the Japanese Diet
(parliament). The President publicly praised Prime Minister Koizumi’s economic reform
program, but reportedly spoke bluntly about U.S. concerns in private.
Cooperation Against Terrorism: Response to the Attacks in New York and
Washington. The New York attacks especially shocked Japan, which had a large
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commercial presence in the World Trade Center and adjacent buildings and suffered the loss
of more than 20 nationals. Prime Minister Koizumi strongly condemned the attacks and took
a number of steps to protect U.S. personnel and assets in Japan and position his country to
support the Bush Administration’s anti-terrorist campaign, overcoming resistance not only
from the opposition Democratic Party (DP) but also from Old Guard rivals in his own Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) and his pacifist-inclined coalition partner, the New Komeito.
On October 30, 2001, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet (parliament) cleared two
bills giving unprecedented post-World War II authority to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) to protect U.S. bases and sensitive Japanese facilities in peacetime, and enable Japan
for the first time to “show the flag” in a non-combat role in support of U.S. and allied
military operations in the Indian Ocean area. Legislation valid for a period of two years, and
extendable, allows the SDF to provide “rear area” support consisting of intelligence sharing,
medical care, fuel and water, and military supplies to U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. The
legislation was implemented in the form of a “Basic Plan” adopted by the Cabinet on
November 16, 2001. In an effort to reconcile the terms of Japan’s “no-war” constitution
with U.S. expectations, Maritime SDF vessels are allowed under the legislation to transport
nonlethal supplies to U.S. forces, but not arms and ammunition. Despite these limits, several
of the measures are seen by critics as going beyond past interpretations of the constitutional
ban on “collective defense” activities.
On November 5, 2001, three ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces
(MSDF) departed Sasebo naval base destined for the Indian Ocean, to provide logistical
support to U.S. forces there. The first three ships are part of a six- or seven-ship flotilla
consisting of four destroyers, two fleet oilers, and a minesweeper (to ferry supplies) that the
Japanese government will send to the region under a “basic plan” that has been formulated
to respond to U.S. requests for anti-terrorist assistance. The plan, which is limited to a period
of one year, also includes the despatch of four Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) C-130
transports to carry supplies from the United States as far as Singapore. Naval transport duties
will likely involve transporting fuel from Bahrain to the U.S. fleet and from Australia to
Diego Garcia. Due to objections from within the ruling coalition, the Koizumi government
decided not to send a destroyer equipped with the U.S. Aegis air defense radar and fire
control system, which reportedly the United States had informally requested.
As of late April 2002, all but two of the deployed ships, an oiler and a destroyer, had
returned to Japan. However, the Japanese Cabinet decided on May 17, 2002, to extend the
life of the Basic Plan until November 17, 2002. Reportedly, the United States has asked
informally for the despatch of an Aegis destroyer so that a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser can rotate
into the Persian Gulf in the event of a conflict with Iraq, but consideration was put on hold
after accusations were raised that officials in the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSF)
had informally asked U.S. counterparts to make the request. Opposition and ruling party
Diet Members have raised objections previously that establishing a wartime data link
between U.S. and Japanese ships would violate the current interpretation of the Constitution
that “collective security” are unconstitutional. Additionally, the government – as of mid-
June 2002 – is seeking Diet approval for three controversial bills giving it broader crisis
management and emergency response authority to deal with various situations involving
armed attack on Japan or emergency situations in which an attack is anticipated. The
prognosis for the legislation remains uncertain.
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In regard to economic assistance measures, on November 14 the Japanese government
announced an emergency grant of $300 million to Pakistan covering refugee relief and other
needs for a period of two years – a quantum increase over the $40 million initially committed
in October. Japan also has announced that it will contribute $1 billion to the IMF to fund
low interest loans for regional states supporting the U.S.-led anti-terrorist campaign in
Afghanistan. Japan joined the U.S. as co-host of an Afghan reconstruction meeting in
Washington on November 20, and hosted a donors meeting in Tokyo that began on January
21, 2002, at which it pledged $500 million for reconstruction aid over the next two years. In
May 2002 the Japanese government committed about $187 million in grant aid for three
projects being carried out by non-government organizations (NGO) covering well-drilling
in Northern Afghanistan, the rehabilitation of a hospital in Kabul, and mechanical mine
clearing around Kabul airport.
U.S.-Japan-China Relations. Tokyo has watched with unease the course of U.S.-
China relations, but its own relations with Beijing have been anything but smooth, and at
present Japan seems to view China’s rising power with deepening concern. Japanese
officials grow uncomfortable when U.S.-China relations are too close, and also when they
deteriorate. Japan’s own relations with China have been increasingly strained in recent years
as a result of conflicting claims to disputed islands and related Chinese intrusions into what
Japan considers its 200 mile economic zone and Japan’s concerns about China’s rising power
and influence. For its part, China has objected to the granting of a visa for a visit to Japan by
former Taiwanese president Lee Teng Hui, has complained about the treatment of Japan’s
past aggression in Japanese textbooks, and bitterly opposed an August 12, 2001 visit to the
Yasukuni War Shrine, in Tokyo, by Prime Minister Koizumi. The Yasukyuni complex
enshrines the names of Japan’s war dead, including a handful of convicted war criminals.
China strongly objects to the development of closer U.S.-Japan security relations, which
Beijing sees as part of an informal containment strategy. Recently, Tokyo and Beijing also
have engaged in trade confrontation.
Sino-Japanese relations took an upturn as a result of Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to
Beijing on October 8, 2001. The agenda included a visit by Koizumi to the Marco Polo
Bridge, near Beijing, the site of a manufactured incident that triggered Japan’s 1937 invasion
of China. During the visit Koizumi conveyed the fullest apology for past wrongs ever
delivered by a Japanese Prime Minister. Relations remain strained, however, over military
issues, including Japanese concern about fast-rising Chinese defense budgets and Chinese
objections to the rising profile of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.
Diverging Korean Peninsula Priorities? Koizumi’s September 17, 2002 trip to
Pyongyang was a significant departure from Tokyo’s recent stance toward North Korea and
potentially puts it at odds with the Bush Administration’s hard-line policy. For years,
Japanese policymakers sought to move slowly and deliberately on normalizing relations with
North Korea, due to North Korea’s launching of a long-range Taepodong Missile over Japan
in August 1998, Pyongyang’s development and deployment of medium-range Nodong
missiles capable of reaching Japan, new revelations about kidnappings of Japanese citizens
by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s, and incursions by North Korean espionage
and drug-running ships into Japanese waters. This cautious approach often created tension
between Tokyo and the Clinton Administration, which along with South Korea’s Kim Dae
Jung followed a policy of engaging North Korea. Japanese officials and commentators from
across the political spectrum generally welcomed the Bush Administration’s policy of using
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public accusations and warnings to pressure North Korea to, among other demands, allow
international inspections of its nuclear facilities and agree to verifiable curbs to its missile
program, including missile exports. (For more on U.S. policy toward North Korea, see
IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations, by Larry Niksch.)
At Koizumi’s summit with Kim Jong-il, the two leaders agreed to restart normalization
talks and parallel negotiations on security issues. The talks are due to begin in October. Kim
issued an unprecedented admission of and apology for North Korea’s kidnapping of 14
Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s. The North Korean government also revealed that 8 of
these abductees had died. The kidnapping issue has been, and remains, Japan’s top priority
in its relations with North Korea. Kim also pledged to unilaterally extend his country’s
moratorium on missile testing beyond 2003 and issued a vague promise to comply with
international agreements related to nuclear issues. Koizumi reportedly raised with Kim a
number of other security-related matters that are of particular interest to the United States.
For his part, Koizumi apologized for its colonization of the Korean Peninsula from
1910-1945 and offered to provide North Korea with a large-scale economic aid package,
much as it gave South Korea economic assistance when Tokyo and Seoul normalized
relations in 1965. Reportedly, Japanese officials are discussing a package on the order of
$5-$10 billion. Significantly, Koizumi has said the economic assistance will not begin until
after relations are normalized, a process he has linked to progress on the kidnapping issue
and the bilateral security talks.
Koizumi’s decision to travel to Pyongyang – which was made before consulting the
United States – and restart the normalization talks increased the pressure on the Bush
Administration to relaunch U.S.-North Korean security negotiations, which had not been
held since the Clinton Administration left office. Following his return to Japan, Prime
Minister Koizumi publicly urged President Bush to resume a dialogue with North Korea. A
week later, the White House announced that it would send a high-level envoy to North Korea
in early October. The summit also places Japan squarely in the forefront of diplomatic
approaches toward Pyongyang, and potentially reduces the United States’ influence over
these efforts. If the Japan-North Korea normalization and security talks proceed rapidly, the
United States will be forced to coordinate its North Korea policy much more closely with
Tokyo than it has in the past.
Kyoto Protocol. Japan is the fourth leading producer of so-called greenhouse gases
after the United States, the Russian Federation, and China. Under the Kyoto Protocol, which
Japan has signed but not officially ratified, Japan is obligated to reduce its emissions 6%
below its 1990 levels. Japanese industry shares many of the concerns of U.S. industry about
the cost and feasibility of achieving these reductions by the target date of 2012, but the
Japanese government, which places a high value on its support of the protocol, expressed
extreme dismay over the announcement by President George W. Bush that the United States
would back away from the protocol. On April 18 and 19, 2001, the upper and lower houses
of the Japanese Diet adopted resolutions expressing regret at the U.S. action, and calling on
Japan to ratify the protocol at an early date. Environmental minister Yoriko Kawaguchi
declared on April 27, 2001, that the pact would be “meaningless” without the participation
of the United States, the producer of 25% of the world’s greenhouse gases.
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The Whaling Issue. Members of Congress and Executive branch officials have
criticized Japan’s decision to continue and expand whaling activities, which it claims are
essential for scientific research and support of traditional lifestyles in several coastal
communities. In 1986, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) implemented a
moratorium on the commercial killing of large whales. Under the provisions of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Japan subsequently issued permits
allowing its whalers to kill several hundred minke whales annually in the Antarctic and
northwest Pacific for scientific research. Since the IWC dictates that research be done in a
non-wasteful manner, the meat from these whales is sold for human consumption in Japan.
Although the IWC has passed several resolutions asking Japan to curtail its research whaling,
in 2000 Japan announced that it was expanding its northwest Pacific hunt to also target
sperm and Bryde’s whales, due to concerns that increasing whale populations might threaten
fish harvests. Because the sperm whale is on the U.S. list of endangered species, the Clinton
Administration announced restrictions on Japanese fishing in U.S. waters in September 2000.
In lieu of additional sanctions, which could have been imposed under U.S. law, the United
States and Japan convened a panel of experts to resolve the dispute over Japan’s scientific
research whaling program. This panel met initially in early November 2000, proposing that
the Scientific Committee of the IWC hold a workshop on scientific research on whale
feeding habits. On July 26, 2001, the IWC adopted a U.S.-Japan joint proposal for a full-
fledged study of what types of fish and in what quantities are eaten by different species of
whales. Japan generated additional international criticism in late February 2002 when it
notified the IWC that it planned to double its annual take of minke whales in the North
Pacific from 50 to 100, and to also take 50 sei whales, which are listed by the United States
as an endangered species. (Prepared by Eugene H. Buck, CRS Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.)
In May 2002 Japan and the United States clashed at a meeting of the International
Whaling Commission in Japan’s former whaling port of Shimonoseki. Following a
peremptory rejection of a request by Japan to allow the taking of 25 minke whales by what
the Japanese described as “aboriginal peoples” in four communities in northern Japan, the
Japanese delegation blocked a consensus vote on a U.S.-Russian motion to allow Alaskan
Inuit peoples and Indian tribes to continue to kill 61 bowhead and gray whales annually. A
revised U.S. plan to allow the taking of 11 bowhead whales for five years by the Inuit failed
narrowly to gain the needed three-quarters majority. Japanese officials charged the United
States, which has consistently opposed Japanese requests to expand coastal whaling, with
reflecting a “double standard,” while the leader of the U.S. delegation decried Japan’s action
as “the most unjust, unkind and unfair vote that was ever taken” by the IWC. In late June
2002, however, Japan reversed its position and offered to support a quota for Alaskan
whaling if the United States could schedule an IWC meeting before the end of the year, while
also warning that conflict could erupt again if the United States opposed Japanese whaling
at the scheduled 2003 meeting.
Claims of Former World War II POWs and Civilian Internees. Congress has
also indicated intense interest in another issue in which the U.S. and Japanese governments
have been in essential agreement. A number of surviving World War II POWs and civilian
internees who were forced to work for Japanese companies during the war have filed suits
in Japan and California seeking compensation of $20,000 for each POW or internee. Former
POWs and civilian internees had been paid about $1.00-2.50 for each day out of internment
from seized Japanese assets by a congressionally established War Claims Commission
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(WCC) in 1948. Numerous suits have been filed in California against Japanese firms with
wartime or pre-war roots, including Mitsui & Co., Nippon Steel, and Mitsubishi Company
and their subsidiaries. The suits allege that these companies subjected POWs and internees
to forced labor, torture, and other mistreatment.
Thus far, the Japanese courts and the U.S. Court of Claims have dismissed the suits on
grounds that Japan’s obligations to pay compensation were eliminated by Article 14 of the
1951 Multilateral Peace Treaty with Japan. The State Department and Department of Justice
support the position of the Japanese government, but a number of Members of Congress have
sided with the plaintiffs. The issue has received intensified attention in the 107th Congress
as a consequence of a decision in December 2000 by Kajima corporation, a giant
construction company, to pay $4.6 million into a fund for 986 mainland Chinese who had
been forced to perform labor in a notorious Kajima-run camp in northern Japan.
A number of bills and amendments introduced in the 107th Congress seek to block the
executive branch from upholding the supremacy of the Peace Treaty in civil suits. On July
18 and September 10, 2001, the House and Senate respectively adopted similar amendments
to H.R. 2500, the Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary appropriations bill for FY2001,
that would prohibit use of funds for filing a motion in any court opposing a civil action
against any Japanese individual or corporation for compensation or reparations in which the
plaintiff alleges that as an American prisoner of war during WWII, he or she was used as a
slave or forced labor. In a move that generated controversy, the provisions were dropped by
conferees. The conference report to H.R. 2500 was agreed to in the House on November 14,
2001, and the Senate on November 15; and signed into law by the President on November
28 (P.L. 107-77). (See Legislation section, below.) The conference report explains that the
provision was dropped because the adamant opposition of the President would have
jeopardized the bill, but some Senators expressed reservations, charging that the provision
had been the victim of a questionable “parliamentary tactic.”
On July 10, 2002, lawyers for the State Department argued in a California appeals court
that a 1999 California law which allows victims of World War II forced labor to sue
Japanese multinational companies that operate in California should be struck down on
grounds that it interfered with U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. government has long
maintained that the terms of the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan bars such claims. (For further
background, see CRS Report RL30606, U.S. Prisoners of War and Civilian American
Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by
Japan, by Gary K. Reynolds.)
Security Issues
(This section written by Larry Niksch)
Japan and the United States are military allies under a Security Treaty concluded in
1960. Under the treaty, the United States pledges to assist Japan if it is attacked. Japan
grants the U.S. military base rights on its territory.
Issue of U.S. Bases on Okinawa. Another issue is that of the impact of the heavy
U.S. military presence on the island of Okinawa. Large-scale protests erupted in Okinawa
in September 1995, following the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen.
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The 29,000 U.S. military personnel on Okinawa comprise more than half the total of 47,000
U.S. troops in Japan. In a September 1996 referendum, the Okinawan people approved a
resolution calling for a reduction of U.S. troop strength on the island. The U.S. and Japanese
governments concluded an agreement worked out by a Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) on December 2, 1996, under which the U.S. military will relinquish some
bases and land on Okinawa (21% of the total bases land) over 7 years, but U.S. troop strength
will remain the same. Alternative sites are to be found for training and the stationing of U.S.
forces. Japan is to pay the costs of these changes.
The SACO agreement provides for the relocation of the U.S. Marine air station (MAS)
at Futenma, adjacent to a densely populated area, to another site on Okinawa. Attempts to
select a site failed until late 1999, partly because of local opposition. A new site, Nago, in
northern Okinawa was announced by the Japanese government in November 1999. A
complication has emerged, however, in the form of a demand by the mayor of Nago and
other groups in Okinawa to put a 15-year time limit on U.S. use of the base.
The bases controversy worsened in 2001 due to allegations of sexual assaults and arson
by several U.S. military personnel. The Okinawa Prefectural Assembly in February 2001
passed a resolution calling for a reduction of U.S. forces on the island. Senior Japanese
officials indicated that Japan would seek changes in the implementation of the U.S.-Japan
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which specifies procedures for transfer of custody to
Japan of U.S. military personnel and dependants accused of crimes. Okinawa’s governor,
elected in 1998 as a moderate on the bases issue, now endorses calls for a 15-year time limit
on the replacement base for Futenma and a reduction in the number of Marines on Okinawa.
The Bush Administration and Pentagon officials have said they are opposed either to
changing the SOFA or to agreeing to a time limit on the basing of U.S. forces on Okinawa.
On July 29, 2002, the Japanese government met with representatives of the Okinawa
prefectural government and concerned municipalities and reached consensus on details of
a planned dual civil-military facility to replace the Futenma Marine Air Station. The
Japanese government has determined that the facility would be constructed offshore by
reclaiming land on coral reefs near Camp Schwab, an existing Marine base, and would be
2,500 meters in length. Left unresolved was the demand by the Okinawa prefectural
government and local communities that the use of the base by U.S. forces be restricted to a
period of 15 years, a limitation that, as noted above, the U.S. government deems
unacceptable.
Burden Sharing Issues. The United States has pressed Japan to increase its share
of the costs of American troops and bases. Under a host nation support (HNS) agreement,
Japan has provided about $2.5 billion annually in direct financial support of U.S. forces in
Japan, about 77% of the total estimated cost of stationing U.S. troops. During negotiations
for a new HNS agreement covering the period after March 2001, the Japanese government
proposed a reduction in its contribution of about $70 million. The Clinton Administration
objected to any reduction, arguing that a substantial Japanese HNS contribution is important
to the strength of the alliance. A new agreement, signed in September 2000, provides for a
reduction of HNS by slightly over 1% annually through 2006.
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Revised Defense Cooperation Guidelines. President Clinton and then-Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto issued a Joint U.S.-Japan Declaration on Security on April 17,
1996, affirming that the security alliance would remain relevant for the 21st Century. U.S.
and Japanese defense officials agreed on a new set of defense cooperation guidelines on
September 24, 1997, replacing guidelines in force since 1978. The guidelines grant the U.S.
military greater use of Japanese installations in time of crisis. They also refer to a possible,
limited Japanese military role in “situations in areas surrounding Japan” including
minesweeping, search and rescue, and surveillance. The Japanese Diet passed initial
implementing legislation in late May 1998.
The crises often mentioned are Korea and the Taiwan Strait. Japan has barred its Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) from operating outside of Japanese territory in accordance with
Article 9 of the 1947 constitution, the so-called no war clause. Japanese public opinion has
strongly supported the limitations placed on the SDF. However, Japan has allowed the SDF
since 1991 to participate in a number of United Nations peacekeeping missions. Japan’s
current Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has advocated that Japan be able to participate
in collective self-defense, but he said he would not seek a revision of Article 9. The Bush
Administration says it will seek agreements with Japan which would upgrade Japan’s role
in implementing the 1997 defense guidelines, including crises in “areas surrounding Japan.”
Cooperation on Missile Defense. The Clinton Administration and the Japanese
government agreed in August 1999 to begin cooperative research and development over the
next 5-6 years on four components of the U.S. Navy Theater Wide (NTW) theater missile
program. Proponents of missile defense justify it based on North Korea’s missile program,
but China has strongly opposed the program.
Japanese officials, starting with Prime Minister Koizumi, have expressed serious
reservations about the May 1, 2001 announcement by the Bush Administration that the
United States would proceed with the development and deployment of a national missile
defense (NMD) system regardless of the consequences for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty with the former Soviet Union. The Japanese government has expressed
concern over Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s reported efforts to eliminate the
distinction between NMD and Theater Missile Defense (TMD). The Bush Administration
reportedly wants Japan to expand the scope of its research to include developing radar and
weapons control systems designed for the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air defense system, which is
seen by U.S. supporters as the most appropriate building-block for developing a near-term
NMD system. Notwithstanding these concerns, Japanese defense policymakers seem highly
interested in acquiring a national missile defense capability, and have increased funding for
expanded participation in the R&D effort. The defense agency also has budgeted for two
new destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar and fire control system (the Japanese navy has
four at present), including upgrades compatible with the later acquisition of a ballistic missile
defense system. (See CRS Report RL31337. Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile
Defense: Issues and Prospects, by Richard P. Cronin.)
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Economic Issues
(This section written by William Cooper)
Despite Japan’s long economic slump, trade and other economic ties with Japan remain
highly important to U.S. national interests and, therefore, to the U.S. Congress. The United
States and Japan are the world’s two largest economies, accounting for around 40% of world
gross domestic product (GDP), and their mutual relationship not only has an impact on each
other but on the world as a whole. Furthermore, their economies are bound by merchandise
trade, trade in services, and foreign investments.
Japan is the United States’s third largest merchandise export market (behind Canada and
Mexico) and the second largest source for U.S. merchandise imports. Japan also is the
United States’s largest market for exports of services and the second largest source of
services imports. The United States is Japan’s most important trading partner for exports and
imports of merchandise and services. Japan is the second largest source of foreign direct
investment in the United States and the fifth largest target for U.S. foreign direct investment
abroad; the United States is Japan’s largest source of foreign direct investment and its largest
target of foreign direct investment abroad.
Because of the significance of the U.S. and Japanese economies to one another,
domestic economic conditions strongly affect their bilateral relationship. As a result, Japan’s
continuing economic problems and the recent deceleration of U.S. economic growth have
become central bilateral issues. Except for some brief periods, Japan has incurred stagnant
or negative economic growth since 1991. In 2000, real GDP increased 1.5% but declined
0.5% in 2001. However, during the first quarter 2002, the GDP increased 1.4% (5.7% on an
annualized basis) leading Prime Minister Koizumi to tell President Bush on June 26 that the
Japanese economy was showing signs of recovery. Independent analysts remain skeptical
of the long-term prospects for the Japanese economy given other indicators showing
weakness including declining business investment and an unemployment rate of 5.4% in
May 2002. (For more information on Japan’s economic problems, see CRS Report RL30176,
Japan’s “Economic Miracle”: What Happened?.)
Economists and policymakers in Japan and in the United States have attributed Japan’s
difficulties to a number of factors. One factor has been the bursting of the economic
“bubble” in the early 1990s, which saw the value of land and other assets collapse. The
bursting of the asset bubble led to the collapse of Japan’s banking sector and to persistent
deflation, both of which have dampened domestic demand. Analysts have also pointed to
ineffective fiscal and monetary policies and to structural economic problems as impediments
to a full economic recovery in Japan.
Riding on very high popularity poll ratings, Prime Minister Koizumi’s government
announced a multipoint economic reform plan in June 2001. The plan included not only
steps to deal with bad loans, but also with the reforming fiscal policies, restructuring Japan’s
social security system, and reducing the government’s involvement in businesses. Koizumi
warned the Japanese people that the economic reforms would require adjustments for several
years that would be painful but would put Japan on course for economic growth in the long-
term. However, the Koizumi government later appeared to be retrenching. For example,
recent official announcements on government spending indicate that the government will
likely exceed its self-imposed 30 trillion yen ceiling on new government debt. Banking
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reform also remains a problem. On March 29, 2002, the Koizumi government announced a
package of new deregulation reforms with an emphasis the social sphere– medical care,
education, labor and public services. The reforms are to be implemented over a three-year
period. In an unprecedented move, the Bank of Japan announced on September 18 that it
would buy shares of stocks held by Japanese commercial banks in an effort to shore up the
latter’s balance sheets and to halt the slide in the Japanese stock market. Critics charge that
the move reduces the banks’ incentive to deal with non-performing loans and to undertake
fundamental restructuring.
If Japanese economic problems are occupying the center of U.S.-Japanese economic
ties, some long-standing trade disputes continue to irritate the relationship. The U.S.
bilateral trade deficit with Japan reached $81.3 billion in 2000, breaking the previous record
of $73.9 billion set in 1999. (See Table 1.) However, in 2001, the U.S. trade deficit
declined 15%, primarily because of the slowdown in the U.S. economy, and the deficit has
continued to shrink in 2002.
Table 1. U.S. Trade with Japan, 1996-2002
($ billions)
Year
Exports
Imports
Balances
1996
67.5
115.2
- 47.7
1997
65.7
121.4
- 55.7
1998
57.9
122.0
- 64.1
1999
57.5
131.4
- 73.9
2000
65.3
146.6
- 81.3
2001
57.6
126.6
-69.0
2001*
35.6
76.1
-40.5
2002*
29.9
68.7
-38.9
*Jan.-July data.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. FT900. Exports are total exports valued on
a f.a.s .basis. Imports are general imports valued on a customs basis.
In addition, Japan has raised concerns over U.S. actions to restrict steel imports from
Japan and other countries. U.S. steel workers and producers have cited a surge in steel
imports after 1997 as a reason for financial problems they face. They have claimed that
foreign dumping, government subsidies, and general overcapacity in the world steel industry
have strained their ability to compete.
The 107th Congress is considering a number of proposals to impose direct quotas on
steel imports and to revise U.S. trade remedy (countervailing duty, antidumping and escape
clause) laws. In the meantime, the Bush Administration submitted a request to the U.S.
International Trade Commission to investigate whether the surge in imports constitutes a
substantial cause or threat of “serious injury” to the U.S. industry under the section 201
(escape clause) statute on June 22, 2001. On December 20, the Commission issued its
determination that domestic steel producers were being seriously injured or are threatened
by serious injury from imports of a number of steel products, including some from Japan.
On March 5, President Bush announced that the government would impose higher tariffs on
imports of selected steel products. On March 6, the Japanese government called the decision
regrettable. On March 20, Prime Minister Koizumi’s government requested formal
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consultations with the United States through the WTO, stating that the U.S. action was not
in compliance with WTO rules and that the problems of the U.S. steel industry were due to
its lack of international competitiveness and not imports. The Japanese government
threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. steel exports worth $5 million by June 18.
However, on June 13, the government announced it would delay action. On August 23 the
Japanese Foreign Trade Ministry announced that it would not retaliate against U.S. section
201 measures against on steel imports, defusing what was potentially a very contentious issue
in U.S.-Japan trade relations. Japanese Foreign Trade Minister Takeo Hiranuma pointed to
exclusions of some 40% of Japanese steel exports to the United States from the original
section 201 measure as the primary reason for pulling back on retaliation.
The United States and Japan have agreed to discuss problems in auto trade under a new
framework. The United States has also been pressuring Japan to reform government
regulations of key industries, such as telecommunications, in order to stimulate long-term
economic growth and increase market opportunities for U.S. exporters and investors.
At their June 30, 2001 summit at Camp David, President Bush and Prime Minister
Koizumi agreed to establish a sub-cabinet level forum – the “U.S.-Japan Economic
Partnership for Growth” – to discuss economic issues of mutual concern, such as overall
economic policies and deregulation, and persistent sector-specific concerns including autos
and autoparts, insurance, and flat-glass. The forum includes business representatives and
other non-government experts as well as government officials.
Japanese Political Developments
(This section written by Mark Manyin)
Current Situation. In the weeks after his unconventional rise to power in April 2001,
the extraordinary popularity of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi helped propel the ruling
coalition dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to significant victories in two
parliamentary elections. The key to Koizumi’s popularity was his appeal to independent
voters, who constitute a majority of the Japanese electorate and tend to back reformist
politicians. As Prime Minister, Koizumi has attempted to seize the machinery of government
away from the factions that have long dominated the LDP. Lacking a strong base within the
LDP, Koizumi’s popularity is one of the few weapons he wields against the “old guard” that
are strongholds of the “old economy” interests most threatened by Koizumi’s agenda. To
date, these groups generally have been successful in watering down most of his economic
reforms. Another factor that has helped keep Koizumi in power is the absence of any
politicians in the LDP or in Japan’s opposition parties who have the political strength to
replace Koizumi in the near future.
For most of 2001, Koizumi’s public approval rating remained well over the 70% level
despite Japan’s worsening economic situation. Koizumi’s popularity plummeted below the
40% level in the spring and summer of 2002, however, when a series of events appeared to
indicate that he had bowed to the wishes of the LDP’s powerful old guard factions. Most
significantly, Koizumi dismissed the gaffe-prone but highly popular Foreign Minister,
Makiko Tanaka, who was popular for attempting to reform the scandal-plagued Foreign
Ministry and her frequent criticisms of the LDP’s decision-making system. Koizumi’s
standing was further damaged by a series of corruption scandals among LDP leaders. The
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2002 session of the country’s parliament (the Diet) ended without passing most of Koizumi’s
major economic and security reform measures.
Koizumi’s September 17, 2002 summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has
boosted his approval ratings back over the 60% level, a development that appears to have
given the Prime Minister a new burst of political adrenalin. Two weeks after the summit, he
unveiled a new initiative to “bring an end” to the banking system’s non-performing loan
problem by 2005 and carried out a widely anticipated cabinet reshuffle that included the
appointment of reformer Heizo Takenaka, a university professor, as Financial Services
Minister. Takenaka already held the Economy Minister portfolio, a position he will retain.
Japanese banks and their allies in the LDP and the economic bureaucracy are expected to
resist Koizumi’s plans.
Background - The Political System’s Inertia. Despite over a decade of economic
stagnation, or negative growth, Japan’s political system – indeed, many of Japan’s economic
policies – have remained fundamentally unchanged. What accounts for this striking inertia?
Three features of Japan’s political system give vested interests an inordinate amount of
power in Japan: the extreme compartmentalization of policy-making; the factional divisions
of the Liberal Democratic Party; and the weakness of the opposition parties. Many of
Koizumi’s farthest-reaching reforms actually are attempts to alter the first and second of
these characteristics.
The Compartmentalization of Policy-Making. To a striking degree, Japan’s
policymaking process tends to be heavily compartmentalized. Policy debates typically are
confined to sector-specific, self-contained policy arenas that are defined by the jurisdictional
boundaries of a specific ministry. Each policy community stretches vertically between
bureaucrats, LDP policy experts, interest groups, and academic experts. Unlike in most
industrialized societies, each policy arena in Japan is so self-contained that cross-sectoral,
horizontal coalitions among interest groups rarely form. One reason for this is that
bureaucrats are paramount in most of Japan’s policy compartments. Only in matters
involving highly politicized industries such as agriculture and security policy have politicians
and interest groups become significant players in the policymaking process. Even in these
areas, responsibility for carving out the details of policy still rests with the bureaucrats, in
part because Japanese politicians often only have a handful of staffers to assist them.
Furthermore, the LDP’s policymaking organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council
(PARC), itself is segmented into specialist caucuses (often called “tribes” or zoku), so that
competing interests – such as protectionist farmers and export industries – rarely face off
inside the LDP. For this reason, the LDP often finds it difficult to make trade-offs among
its various constituencies. The result is often paralysis or incremental changes at the margins
of policy. Koizumi has attempted – thus far with limited success – to change this by
centralizing more power in the Prime Minister’s office, at the expense of the PARC and the
bureaucracies.
The Factional Nature of the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP has been the
dominant political force in Japan since its formation in 1955. It is not a political party in the
traditional sense because it has long been riven by clique-like factions that jealously compete
for influence with one another. For instance, cabinet posts, including the office of prime
minister, typically have been filled not on the basis of merit or policy principles but rather
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with a view towards achieving a proper balance among faction leaders, who act behind-the-
scenes as kingpins. Because the LDP president (who de facto becomes Japan’s prime
minister) is not the true leader of the party, he often lacks the power to resolve divisive intra-
party disputes or even to set the party’s agenda.
For over two decades, the LDP’s dominant faction has been the one founded by former
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the 1970s. It is currently headed by former Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto, who in April 2001 was surprisingly defeated by Koizumi in the selection
for LDP President due to an unprecedented revolt by reformist party members. Coinciding
with his selection as LDP President, Koizumi bucked party tradition first by resigning from
his own faction and then by giving the anti-reformist Hashimoto group only one Cabinet
post. Koizumi similarly disregarded the Hashimoto and other anti-reformist factions in his
September 30, 2002 cabinet reshuffle.
One result of the LDP’s opaque, top-down decision-making structure is that it has been
slow to adapt to changes in Japanese society. The LDP has coddled many of Japan’s
declining sectors, such as the agriculture and construction industries, which have provided
the money and manpower for the party’s political activities. Corruption has thrived in this
machine-politics system; over the past thirty years many of the LDP’s top leaders have been
implicated in various kickback scandals. Compounding the problem is that Japan’s electoral
districting system overweights rural voters compared with more reformist-minded urbanites;
each rural vote is worth an estimated 2 urban votes.
Over the past decade, a bloc of independent voters – who now constitute a majority of
the voting population – has arisen opposing the LDP’s “business as usual” political system.
Urban, younger, and increasingly female, this pool of independents has shown itself willing
to support politicians, such as Koizumi, who appear sincerely committed to reform (although
when pressed, many of these same voters oppose specific structural – and potentially painful
– economic reforms). Thus, the LDP is under severe, perhaps unmanageable, stress: to
succeed in future elections, it must become more appealing to the new generation of reform-
minded voters. Yet, if it adopts political and economic reforms, it risks antagonizing its
traditional power base.
The rise of unaffiliated voters helps explain the LDP’s steadily declining strength in the
Diet (the Japanese parliament) over the past decade. Since it was briefly ousted from power
in 1993 and 1994, the LDP’s lack of a majority in both houses of the Diet has forced it to
retain power only by forming coalitions with smaller parties. Today, that coalition includes
the Buddhist-affiliated New Komeito Party and the right-of-center New Conservative Party.
In October 2001, victories in bi-elections gave the LDP its first majority in the 480-seat
Lower House in years. However, the party still lacks a majority in the less powerful Upper
House. It therefore continues to depend on its two coalition partners to be assured that
legislation will pass, making radical policies that much more difficult to adopt.
The Weakness of the Opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
Koizumi’s declining popularity has given new life to the DPJ, which for months had been
on the defensive. Until Koizumi’s rise to power in April, the DPJ had been expected to do
well in the July 2001 Upper House elections, in which it ultimately gained three seats. In
contrast, the DPJ had scored significant gains during Lower House elections in 2000, when
the party increased its strength from 95 to 127 seats, largely due to the support of
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independent urban voters. The DPJ, which describes itself as “centrist,” is led by Yukio
Hatoyama, a former LDP politician whom most analysts consider to be a standard bearer
lacking the charisma and outspokenness sought by many Japanese independent voters. The
DPJ was formed in April 1998 as a merger among four smaller parties. This amalgamation
has led to considerable internal contradictions, primarily between the party’s
hawkish/conservative and passivist/liberal wings. As a result, on most issues the DPJ has
not formulated coherent alternative policies to the LDP, which perhaps explains why the
DPJ’s approval ratings have rarely surpassed 20%. Some commentators have speculated that
Koizumi may attempt to realign the Japanese political scene by bolting from the LDP and
allying with the DPJ’s more conservative wing, led by Hatoyama. In September 2002,
Hatoyama was narrowly reelected party president, barely beating left-of-center DPJ Secretary
General Naoto Kan, who resigned his position following the vote. The campaign highlighted
the inter-generational rift between the party’s older and younger members.
U.S. Policy Approaches
(This section written by Richard Cronin)
Congress cannot itself determine the U.S. approach toward Japan, but its powers and
actions in the areas of trade, technology, defense, and other policy form a backdrop against
which both the Administration and the Japanese government must formulate their policies.
Congress retains the ability to place additional pressures on Japan and other trade partners,
and on the Administration, through the legislative process. Congress can also influence
U.S.-Japan political and security relations by its decisions on the size and configuration of
U.S. forces in Japan.
Members of Congress, the Executive branch, and the wider public broadly agree across
party, ideological, and interest group lines on the need for Japan to fix its current economic
problems and further open its markets, while maintaining Japanese support for U.S.
international political and regional security policies, but they differ over what priorities to
assign to U.S. objectives and over how best to influence Japanese policies. Currently, two
schools of thought regarding U.S. approaches to Japan appear to have the most adherents.
Neither of them fully approximates present U.S. policy, but elements of both can be
discerned in an ongoing, low profile internal policy debate.
1) Emphasize Alliance Cooperation. The Bush Administration has favored
emphasizing the overall U.S.-Japan relationship more than in the first Clinton
Administration, when highly confrontational approaches to reducing Japanese trade barriers
were given highest priority. This approach seemed validated by Japan’s cooperative
response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but its continuing economic problems
have limited its wider international role. Proponents of this approach tend to see threats to
regional stability such as a rising China and threats to peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula as warranting special efforts to consolidate and expand the U.S.-Japan security
relationship. Some also argue that little more can be expected from new market-opening
initiatives, since the most serious issues have already been tackled and real future progress
can only come from basic structural reforms that Japan needs to carry out anyway to
resuscitate its economy.
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2) Emphasize U.S. Trade and Economic Objectives. A second approach
would place renewed emphasis on the promotion of U.S. trade and economic objectives, but
most especially the goal of putting more pressure on Japan to adopt policies that have the
best chance of revitalizing the stagnant Japanese economy. This perspective would rely on
pragmatism and mutual national self interest to sustain political and security ties. Many,
especially Members of Congress from steel producing regions, would also apply the full
panoply of U.S. trade law and legislate other measures to address specific problem areas.
Advocates of this approach tend to assume that Japan’s security policies will be governed
by practical national self-interest calculations that are independent of the state of U.S.-Japan
trade and economic relations. This approach is predicated on the assumption that the United
States and Japan would still have many common security interests, including the goals of
counterbalancing rising Chinese power and otherwise maintaining regional peace and
stability, regardless of any trade friction that the approach would generate.
LEGISLATION
H.Amdt. 188 (A022) (Rohrabacker)
Amends H.R. 2500. An amendment to prohibit use of funds for filing a motion in any
court opposing a civil action against any Japanese individual or corporation for compensation
or reparations in which the plaintiff in the action alleges that as an American prisoner of war
during WWII, he or she was used as a slave or forced labor. Agreed to by recorded vote:
395-33 (Roll no. 243), July 18, 2001. Dropped from the conference report to H.R. 2500,
which was agreed to in the House on November 14, 2001, and the Senate on November 15;
and signed into law on November 28 (P.L. 107-77).
H.R. 2835 (Cox)
To authorize the payment of compensation to members of the Armed Forces and
civilian employees of the United States who performed slave labor for Japan during World
War II, or the surviving spouses of such members, and for other purposes. Referred to the
House Committees on Veterans; Ways and Means; and Judiciary, October 31, 2001.
S.Amdt. 1538
Amends H.R. 2500. To provide protection to American Servicemen who were used in
World War II as slave labor. Motion to table, September 10, 2001, rejected in Senate by
yea-nay vote of 34-58; recorded vote number: 276. Adopted by voice vote, September 10,
2001. Dropped from the conference report to H.R. 2500, which was agreed to in the House
on November 14, 2001, and the Senate on November 15. Signed into law on November 28,
2001 (P.L. 107-77).
S. 1272 (Hatch)
A bill to assist United States veterans who were treated as slave laborers while held as
prisoners of war by Japan during World War II, and for other purposes. Introduced, read
twice, and referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs on July 31, 2001. Referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary by unanimous consent, June 18, 2002.
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