Order Code RS21270
Updated October 1, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Counterterrorism Research and Development:
Funding, Priority-setting, and Coordination
Genevieve J. Knezo
Specialist, Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
Even before the 2001 terrorist attacks, some experts questioned whether the
government was prepared to conduct and use research and development (R&D) to
counter terrorism. They cited inadequate planning and priority-setting and an inability
to target cross-cutting priorities and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Since
September 11, funding for counterterrorism R&D has doubled to about $3 billion
requested for FY2003 and planning and coordination mechanisms are being developed.
The President’s proposal, as passed by the House in H.R. 5005, would consolidate some
federal R&D programs in a Department of Homeland Security. S. 2794 is the Senate
version of the President’s original proposal. Alternate legislation would include more
R&D in a department is (H.R. 4660 and S. 2452). The basic R&D issues concern the
adequacy of planning/coordination mechanisms, including those in the Office of Science
and Technology Policy and Office of Homeland Security; which counterterrorism R&D
should be transferred to a new department; and how other R&D counterterrorism
activities that are not transferred should be coordinated.
Funding Trends in the FY2000-FY2003 Period
The $3 billion FY2003 budget request for counterterrorism R&D is about double the
amount appropriated for FY2002. According to the Office of Management and Budget’s
(OMB) Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002,1 about $2.905
billion – or 5.5% of the total requested for combating terrorism for FY2003 – was
requested for R&D to develop technologies to deter, prevent or mitigate terrorist acts.
This is an increase over FY2002, when appropriated funds, combined with the Emergency
Response Fund, totaled $36.468 billion, with R&D funding at $1.162 billion, or 3.2% of
the total. See Table 1.
1 OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2002, June 24, 2002, available
at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/combating_terrorism06-2002.pdf]. See also:
President George W. Bush, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation, 2002.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Table 1. Research and Development to Combat Terrorism, By
Agency, FY2000-FY2003 (Request), Dollars in Millions
Emergency
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
FY2003
Agency
Response
Actual
Actual
Enacted
Request
Fund
Agriculture
$37.3
$51.7
$83.9
$91.3
$48.4
Commerce
9.6
0
6.3
0
20.0
Energy
59.7
66.2
64.9
19.0
99.8
Environmental
unavailable
0
2.8
1.5
75.0
Protection
Agency
Health and
109.7
102.8
119.1
180.0
1,770.9
Human Services
NIH, $1.75B;
CDC, $40M;
FDA, $50M
Justice
45.2
11.4
66.1
0
36.1
National Science
unavailable
7.0
7.0
0
27.0
Foundation
National
190.0
298.9
385.5
11.0
767.2
Security
Transportation
50.7
50.2
58.3
64.0
59.3
Treasury
2.1
1.2
1.1
0
1.1
Total
$511.3
$589.4
$795.2
$366.8
$2,905.23
Sources: OMB, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, FY2001, p. 27 for column
labeled FY2000. The rest of the data is from the FY2002 OMB report, op. cit., p. 26.
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), with 60% of the total, the
largest supporter of federal counterterrorism R&D, indicates the Administration’s
emphasis on bioterrorism. In previous years the largest recipient of such funding was the
national security community. DHHS requested about $1.8 billion in FY2003 for the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) for “vaccines and ... medicines for protection against
bioterrorism” (OMB, pp. 17-18). FY2003 funding for counterterrorism R&D by the
national security community, at 26% of the total, would go largely to the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Department of Defense (DOD), for war
fighting applications and bioterrorism (OMB, p. 27). The request included $420 million
for the Biological Counterterrorism Research Program (in part for a Center for Biological
Counterterrorism at Fort Detrick), and the Biological Defense Homeland Security Support
Program, for detection of bioterror events in urban areas (OMB, p.27). The Technical
Support Working Group (TSWG), a State Department/DOD interagency forum that
identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international R&D for combating
terrorism and conducts applied R&D to develop new technologies, would receive $49
million. TSWG also receives funding transferred from other agencies (OMB, pp. 27-28).
The Environmental Protection Agency’s counterterrorism R&D would be increased
for “research for better techniques for cleaning up buildings contaminated by biological
agents and for work on the effects of World Trade Center dust contaminants on human
health ....” The Department of Energy’s (DOE) counterterrorism R&D includes genomic
sequencing, DNA-based diagnostics, advanced modeling and simulation, and
microfabrication technologies, and the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center. DOE-supported R&D at federal laboratories focuses on improving security;
materials used in weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons; assessing

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damage at the World Trade Center site; anthrax detection/treatment for buildings; and
detection of toxic agents in the air. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration
R&D focuses on nuclear, chemical, and biological detection and technologies.
The Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service conducts
counterterrorism-related research into plant, pest, and animal diseases. In the Commerce
Department
, R&D at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) focuses
on protecting information systems. National Science Foundation (NSF) counterterrorism
R&D focuses on infectious diseases and microbial genome sequencing related to
bioterrorism; critical infrastructure protection, including $204 million for basic research
on encryption technologies, energy processing systems, computing reliability, remediation
robotics and modeling and simulation; Disaster Response Research Teams; and a
Cybercorps Scholarship program for graduate students studying information technology.
Current Situation
Organization of the government for counterterrorism R&D priority setting and
coordination is a prominent issue. Priority-setting and coordination of federally funded
R&D depends on informal consultations among program managers and the use of
interagency committees. Some of these committees are under the auspices of the
interagency National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), which the Office of
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) manages. NSTC’s Antiterrorism Task Force has
working groups on rapid response, biological and chemical preparedness, nuclear and
conventional explosives, “vital” infrastructure, and behavioral and educational issues.
OSTP is a statutory office within the Executive Office of the President; its Director
advises the President and the organization is mandated to recommend federal R&D
budgets. OSTP’s Director chairs the National Security Council’s (NSC) Preparedness
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction R&D Subgroup, which identifies gaps and
duplication in R&D concerning chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological threats.
OSTP has worked on interagency tasks concerning anthrax detection/cleanup and the
development of policy guidelines for agency regulations to restrict access to research
using biological “select agents.” Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2, October 29,
2001, required OSTP to help develop policy for foreign student visas, access to
“sensitive” courses, and advanced technology for border control. On May 7, 2002, the
White House proposed creating an Interagency Panel on Advanced Science Security to
develop guidelines to screen foreign students and scientists who apply for visas to study
sensitive subjects at U.S. universities. Pursuant to Executive Order 13231, OSTP works
with the interagency President’s Critical Infrastructure Board to recommend priorities and
budgets for information security R&D. OSTP has obtained advice on counterterrorism
R&D from its own federally funded R&D center and from the National Academy of
Sciences, which published Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology
in Countering Terrorism,
June 2002. The report said that fragmentation in R&D can
result in missed opportunities and an inability to develop effective cross-agency programs;
that there are no clear agency homes for areas requiring R&D, such as detection of
agricultural pathogens and cybersecurity; that an Under Secretary for Technology be
included in a homeland security department; and that a Homeland Security Institute for
independent analysis and evaluation be created in the department.
The Office of Homeland Security (OHS) in the Executive Office of the President,
created on October 8, 2001 by Executive Order 13228, did not list R&D among its major

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responsibilities. The Homeland Security Council (HSC), also created then, acts to ensure
coordination of governmental homeland security activities. Its core membership includes
the heads of some agencies responsible for counterterrorism R&D, such as the Secretaries
of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Transportation, but not the OSTP Director
or the Secretaries of Commerce and of Energy. R&D is a topic of one of the interagency
HSC Policy Coordination Committees; the committee head is OSTP’s assistant director
for national security. OSTP’s Director has testified that he interacts closely with OHS.
In addition to OSTP and OHS, other mechanisms coordinate some counterterrorism
R&D. TSWG selects and funds applied R&D for counterterrorism technologies useful
to more than one agency. Interagency coordination may develop under the new working
group on bioterrorism prevention, preparedness, and response established by Section 108
of P.L. 107-188, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002. The group includes the DHHS and DOD secretaries and other agency heads
and is charged to recommend research on pathogens that terrorists could use.
Notwithstanding its responsibilities to help agencies set complementary and
coordinated priorities, OSTP does not have budgetary authority over federal agencies and
departments. OHS lacks budgetary authority, and there is uncertainty about its ability to
convince agencies to take recommended actions.
Policy Analysis
Counterterrorism R&D program and policy decisions respond to the requisites of
both security and the conduct of science. Given the character of today’s terrorist threats,
homeland security R&D involves virtually every scientific and technical discipline, and
major areas of application, such as weaponry, communications, health, and transportation.
The conduct of effective counterterrorism R&D compels attention to the balance between
long-range and short-term applied research and to the need to develop, test, procure, and
deploy technological responses. Some observers say that fragmentation of
counterterrorism R&D programs and policies imperils the nation’s security and requires
that core R&D be consolidated in a homeland security department. For example, the
Administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security, released in July 2002,
concluded, “To date, research and development activities in support of homeland security
have been underfunded, evolutionary, short-term in nature, fragmented across too many
departments, and heavily reliant on spin-offs from the national security and medical
sectors. Many of the involved agencies have little frontline knowledge of homeland
security and little or no experience in technology acquisition and supporting research” (p.
52). Others, such as the Brookings Institution in a July 15, 2002 report, Assessing the
Department of Homeland Security
, urge caution about moving R&D to a new department.
Some observers maintain that dividing R&D programs into security and civilian lines of
effort risks reducing communications among researchers and jeopardizing the civilian
components of such programs. They contend that advances in security-related R&D may
depend upon developments in unrelated R&D and that classification of some R&D could
inhibit progress. Other issues include how to coordinate counterterrorism R&D left
outside a new department with R&D that would be conducted in such an agency, how to
encourage industrial R&D, and how to balance the open conduct of science with a need
to limit information exchange for some R&D topics.

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Options and Implications for U.S. Policy
The existing counterterrorism R&D structure is being superceded. OHS’s National
Strategy for Homeland Security report listed 11 major initiatives for science and
technology. The House passed H.R. 5005, an amended version of the President’s
proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with specific
responsibilities for specific R&D areas and for other “emerging threats.” The Senate is
considering S. 2452, an alternative that would establish a department with broader
counterterrorism R&D functions. Creation of a new department could involve realigned
or new budget expenditures and transfer of some program responsibilities among
agencies. That option might give a single agency budget authority to orchestrate and
budget homeland security R&D – authority which neither the OSTP Director nor the OHS
Director have. However, a DHS would compete with other agencies for funding,
including those whose counterterrorism R&D functions are not transferred to a new
department. A new DHS’s relationships to OSTP and OHS and other interagency bodies
would need to be clarified.
Role of Congress/Legislation
H.R. 5005, as passed by the House on July 26, 2002 (H.Rept. 107-609). would create
a Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It appears that the existing OHS would
continue; it is not clear if the existing OHS Homeland Security Council Policy
Coordination Committee on R&D would continue. The proposed DHS would have four
operational units. Most of DHS’s research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
functions would be under the jurisdiction of the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology (created by Title III), who would have responsibility to fund R&D and
develop countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons
and other “emerging terrorist” threats (but not human health-related R&D); to establish
a government-wide counterterrorism R&D strategy; and to coordinate with other agencies
to eliminate duplication and fill unmet needs. Agencies which would have selected R&D
programs transferred to DHS are DOE, DOD, the Agriculture Department, as well as
R&D performed by the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration, two
agencies transferred intact to DHS. The DHHS Secretary, in collaboration with the DHS
Secretary would set priorities for certain DHHS bioterrorism-related R&D functions. The
DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology could establish a Federally-funded
Research and Development Center (FFRDC) for independent analysis and a university-
based center for homeland security. The bill would create a Homeland Security Science
and Technology Coordination Council to establish R&D priorities within DHS; a
Homeland Security Institute to, among other things, evaluate the effectiveness of security
measures; a Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee; a
Technology Clearinghouse to encourage innovative solutions and screen proposals in
coordination with TSWG; and a science and technology national “Net Guard,” to help
information systems recover after attack (Sec. 213). The Under Secretary for Science and
Technology could use the expertise of any federal laboratory and could select a
“headquarters” laboratory. The DHS Secretary would have special authority to waive
specific procurement laws in R&D pilot projects (Sec. 731); the ability to implement a set
of liability protections for manufacturers of innovative anti-terrorism technologies (Sec.
751); and authority over DHHS strategic stockpile functions as defined in P.L. 107-188
(Sec. 905). The bill would establish a statutory relationship between the OSTP and the

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OHS (Sec. 910). OHS Director Ridge testified on July 15 that the Administration would
support “re-framing”to add an Undersecretary for Science and Technology (the provision
was not in Administration’s original bill). The Congressional Budget Office estimated
that DHS’s newly authorized R&D activities would cost about $300 million annually.
Already authorized R&D to be transferred to DHS could total almost $300 million.
A Department of National Homeland Security (DNHS), including a Directorate of
Science and Technology was proposed in S. 2452 (Lieberman), which had been reported
favorably in May. A substitute bill was filed and agreed to on July 25, 2002, by the
Committee on Governmental Affairs. The bill is under consideration in the Senate. The
Under Secretary for Science and Technology created by the bill (section 135) would have
somewhat broader responsibilities than in H.R. 5005 to establish a science and technology
strategy and to coordinate with other agencies, including OSTP; to develop “technology
roadmaps” to achieve goals; and to establish a National Emergency Technology Guard.
Selected agency functions would be transferred to the new DNHS, which would also set
priorities for, and manage in collaboration with DHHS, certain DHHS bioterrorism
countermeasures R&D under joint agreements between DNHS and DHHS. The bill
would create a Science and Technology Council, composed of federal agency officials,
to set R&D priorities and coordinate government programs. The Under Secretary would
have authority to carry out RDT&E and some prototype projects; DOE’s national
laboratories could be used to support departmental missions. An “Acceleration Fund for
Research and Development of Homeland Security Technologies,” would be authorized
at $200 million for FY2003, with interagency groups to establish its priorities. The bill
would establish a Homeland Security Science and Technology Council, under the NSTC.
To encourage technology development and deployment, the bill would create a Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency (SARPA), an Office on Risk Analysis and
Assessment, an Office of Technology Evaluation and Transition, and offices to deal with
federal laboratory functions transferred to the new DNHS. The Under Secretary of the
Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response would be given responsibility for
“select agent” registration activities (which would affect the conduct of R&D in academic
and other nongovernmental laboratories) and for DHHS strategic stockpile functions, both
mandated by P.L. 107-188 (Sec. 134). Pursuant to Sec. 133, the R&D intensive Computer
Security Division of NIST would be transferred to the Directorate of Critical
Infrastructure Protection. R&D funding in the DNHS could total about $650 million or
more. The House counterpart to the bill as originally introduced is H.R. 4660.
Resources
CRS Report RL31576. Federal Research and Development Organization, Policy, and
Funding for Counterterrorism.
CRS Report RL30153. Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation.
CRS Report RL31354. Possible Impacts of Major Counterterrorism Security action son
Research, Development, and Higher Education
.
“Department of Energy Programs in the President’s Proposal for a Department of
Homeland Security (H.R. 5005),” CRS general distribution memo by Daniel
Morgan, July 5, 2002.