Order Code IB95024
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:
Political Developments and Implications
for U.S. Interests
Updated September 25, 2002
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Political Situation
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict
Civil and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia
Economic Conditions, Blockades and Stoppages
Russian Involvement in the Region
Military-Strategic Interests
Russia’s Bases in Georgia
Caspian Energy Resources
The Protection of Ethnic Russians and “Citizens”
The Roles of Turkey, Iran, and Others
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
Aid Overview
U.S. Security Assistance
Trade and Investment


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Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:
Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
The United States recognized the inde-
promote non- proliferation, Trade and Devel-
pendence of all the former Soviet republics by
opment Agency aid, Overseas Private Invest-
the end of 1991, including the South Caucasus
ment Corporation insurance, Eximbank fi-
states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.
nancing, and Foreign Commercial Service
The United States has fostered these states’
activities. The current Bush Administration
ties with the West, including membership in
appealed for a national security waiver of the
the Organization on Security and Cooperation
prohibition on aid to Azerbaijan, in consider-
in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’s Partnership
ation of Azerbaijan’s assistance to the interna-
for Peace (PFP), in part to end the dependence
tional coalition to combat terrorism. In De-
of these states on Russia for trade, security,
cember 2001, Congress approved foreign
and other relations. The United States pur-
appropriations for FY2002 (P.L.107-115) that
sued close ties with Armenia to encourage its
authorizes the President to waive Sec. 907
democratization and because of concerns by
under certain conditions through December
Armenian-Americans and others over its fate.
2002. President Bush exercised his waiver
Close ties with Georgia have evolved from
authority on Jan. 25, 2002. In the South
U.S. contacts with former Soviet Foreign
Caucasus, U.S. policy goals have been to
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgia’s
buttress the stability and independence of the
president for the last decade. Growing U.S.
states through multilateral and bilateral con-
private investment in Azerbaijan’s oil
flict resolution efforts and to provide humani-
resources strengthened U.S. interests there.
tarian relief. U.S. aid has also supported
The United States has been active in diplo-
democratization, free market reforms, and
matic efforts to end conflicts in the region,
U.S. trade. The Bush Administration supports
many of which remain unresolved.
U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan’s en-
ergy sector as a means of increasing the diver-
Faced with calls in Congress and else-
sity of world energy suppliers, and encourages
where that the Administration develop policy
building multiple energy pipeline routes to
for assisting the Eurasian states of the former
world markets. In the aftermath of the Sep-
Soviet Union, then-President Bush proposed
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
the FREEDOM Support Act in early 1992.
States, the three South Caucasus countries ex-
Signed into law in 1992, P.L. 102-511 autho-
pressed support for U.S.-led operations in
rized funds for the Eurasian states for humani-
Afghanistan against al Qaeda and other terror-
tarian needs, democratization, creation of
ist groups. U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
market economies, trade and investment, and
visited all three countries in mid-December
other purposes. Sec. 907 of the Act prohibited
2001. As part of the U.S. global anti-terror-
most U.S. government-to-government aid to
ism campaign, the U.S. military in April-May
Azerbaijan until its ceases blockades and other
2002 began providing security equipment and
offensive use of force against Armenia. This
training to help Georgia combat terrorist
provision was partly altered over the years to
groups in the Pankisi Gorge area and
permit humanitarian aid and democratization
elsewhere in the country.
aid, border security and customs support to
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On September 18, 2002, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham joined the presidents
of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey at Azerbaijan’s Sangachal Caspian Sea port to celebrate
the start of construction of an oil pipeline from Sangachal to Turkey’s Ceyhan
Mediterranean Sea port. Abraham hailed the pipeline as “one of the most important energy
undertakings” in the world. In a letter to the celebrants, President Bush stated that the
pipeline would enhance global energy security “through a more diverse supply of oil for
global markets” strengthening regional and global economic growth and the sovereignty
and independence of the region (see below, Energy).

According to the Georgian media, the United States is offering to facilitate talks to help
Georgia and Russia resolve their tensions over the Pankisi Gorge, where Russia alleges that
Chechen and international terrorists are harbored that threaten Russia (see below, Russian
Involvement).

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are
The Caucasus States: Basic Facts
located in the South Caucasus region of the
former Soviet Union. This region borders Area: The region is slightly larger than Syria:
Armenia is 11,620 sq. mi.; Azerbaijan is
Turkey, Iran, the Black and Caspian Seas, and 33,774 sq. mi.; Georgia is 26,872 sq. mi.
Russia’s northern slopes of the Caucasus Population: 17.4 million, similar to Australia;
Mountains (termed the North Caucasus). Armenia: 3.8 m.; Azerbaijan: 8.1 m.; Georgia:
Historically, the South Caucasus states served as 5.5 m. (World Bank estimates for 2001)
a north-south and east-west trade and transport GDP: $10.2 billion; Armenia: $1.9 b.;
“land bridge” linking Europe to the Middle East Azerbaijan: $5.3 b.; Georgia: $3.0 b. (World
and Asia, over which the Russian Empire and Bank estimates for 2000)
others at various times endeavored to gain
control. In ancient as well as more recent times,
oil and natural gas resources in Azerbaijan attracted outside interest. While Armenia and
Georgia can point to past periods of autonomy or self-government, Azerbaijan was not
independent before the 20th century. After the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, all three
states declared independence, but by early 1921 all had been re-conquered by Russia’s Red
(Communist) Army. They regained independence when the Soviet Union collapsed in late
1991. (For background, see CRS Report RS20812, Armenia Update; CRS Report 97-522,
Azerbaijan; and CRS Report 97-727, Georgia.)
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
In the ten years since achieving independence, the South Caucasus states have had
difficult experiences in developing fully sovereign and independent states and robust
democratic and free market systems. Persistent regional conflicts undermine these efforts.
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Political Situation
Armenia. Armenia appeared somewhat stable until 1998. Then-President Levon Ter-
Petrosyan had been effective in orchestrating a major victory for his ruling and other pro-
government parties in 1995 legislative races, in obtaining approval for a new constitution
granting him enhanced powers, and in orchestrating his reelection in 1996. Nonetheless, he
was forced to resign in 1998, reporting that his endorsement of OSCE peace proposals had
not been supported by others in his government. Former Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan
won 1998 presidential elections. Armenia’s last parliamentary elections were held in May
1999, and produced a plurality for the ruling Unity bloc coalition. Illustrating the ongoing
challenges to stability faced by Armenia, in October 1999, gunmen entered the legislature
and opened fire on deputies and officials, killing Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan and
Speaker Karen Demirchyan, and six others. The killings may have been the product of
personal and clan grievances. Abiding by the constitution, the legislature met and appointed
Armen Khachatryan as speaker (a member of the ruling Unity bloc), and Kocharyan named
Sarkisyan’s brother the new prime minister. Political infighting intensified until May 2000,
when Kocharyan appointed former Soviet dissident Andranik Margaryan the new prime
minister. Kocharyan has co-opted several opposition party officials into his government in
order to increase political stability. He has announced that he will run again in the 2003
presidential election, which will take place alongside the next parliamentary elections. (See
also CRS Report RS20812, Armenia Update.)
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has had three presidents and other acting heads of state since
independence, and has suffered several coups or attempted coups. A constitutional
referendum in 1995 granted Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev sweeping powers. He has
concentrated power in his office, arrested many of his opponents, and taken other measures
to keep the opposition weak. Aliyev’s health problems and age have raised the question of
political succession. Observers believe he is grooming his son Ilkham to be his successor;
in November 2001, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party elected Ilkham to be deputy party
chairman. However, President Aliyev maintains that he will stand for re-election in 2003.
The 1995 legislative and 1998 presidential elections were marred by irregularities, according
to international observers. In late June 2000, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE) approved Azerbaijan’s membership, conditioned on its compliance with
commitments, including holding a free and fair legislative election. OSCE and PACE
observers to the November 5, 2000, legislative election judged it “seriously flawed,” though
they said it showed some progress compared to previous elections. U.S. Helsinki
Commission observers saw virtually no progress. Although international observers also
judged January 2001 legislative run-off elections as seriously flawed, PACE admitted both
Azerbaijan and Armenia as members later in the month. In January 2002, PACE adopted a
resolution that criticized Azerbaijan’s human rights record and called on Azerbaijan to
release political prisoners. U.S. State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher on August
26, 2002, stated that “there appear to have been widespread irregularities, such as the voter
list fraud, multiple voting, [and] ballot box-stuffing” during a constitutional referendum held
two days previously, and concluded that “this referendum ... did very little to advance
democratization or to lay the groundwork for presidential elections in the fall of 2003 that
can meet international standards.”
Georgia. Georgia experienced political instability during the early 1990s, and a fragile
stability in the second half of the decade. President Eduard Shevardnadze has survived
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several coup attempts and has prevailed over political rivals both within and outside of his
Citizens’ Union Party (CUG). According to some critics, U.S. policy has relied too heavily
on personal ties with Shevardnadze (and with Aliyev in Azerbaijan), and his replacement
could bring instability and setbacks to U.S. interests. The OSCE reported that legislative
races in October-November 1999 in Georgia appeared mostly fair, but a lack of transparency
in the electoral law and irregularities in voting marred full compliance with OSCE standards.
In the April 2000 presidential elections, Shevardnadze received 80% of 1.87 million votes
cast. The OSCE reported that the election did not meet democratic standards. Shevardnadze
refused to relinquish his control over mayoral appointments, though he permitted local city
council elections in mid-2002. Political instability has increased in 2001-2002. Reformist
Justice Minister Mikheil Saakashvili and Tax Minister Mikheil Machavariani resigned in
August 2001, citing the lack of progress on economic and anti-corruption reforms.
Shevardnadze fired his entire cabinet in November 2001 after mass protests against a police
raid on a private television station. Former supporter Zurab Zhvania also resigned as
legislative speaker, condemning Shevardnadze’s civil rights record. Shevardnadze’s stated
intention not to seek another term in 2005 has fueled speculation about possible successors.
His naming of State Secretary Avtandil Dzhorbenadze at the end of June 2002 to head the
CUG was viewed by many Georgians as an attempt to designate an heir.
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
U.S. and international efforts to foster peace and the continued independence of the
South Caucasus states face daunting challenges. The region has been the most unstable in
the former Soviet Union in terms of the numbers, intensity, and length of its ethnic and civil
conflicts. The ruling nationalities in the three states are culturally rather insular and harbor
various grievances against each other. This is particularly the case between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, where discord has led to the virtually complete displacement of ethnic
Armenians from Azerbaijan and vice versa. The main languages in the three states are
mutually unintelligible (also, those who generally consider themselves Georgians –
Kartvelians, Mingrelians, and Svans – speak mutually unintelligible languages). Few of the
region’s borders coincide with ethnic populations. Attempts by territorially-based ethnic
minorities to secede are primary security concerns in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Armenia and
Azerbaijan view NK’s status as a major security concern. The three major secessionist areas
— NK, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia — have failed to gain international recognition, and
receive major economic sustenance from, respectively, Armenia, Russia, and Russia’s North
Ossetia region. Also, Georgia’s Ajaria region receives backing from Russia for its autarchic
stance toward the Shevardnadze government.
The South Caucasus states, because of ethnic conflicts, have not yet been able to fully
partake in peace, stability, and economic development over a decade since the Soviet
collapse, some observers lament. Countries are faced with on-going budgetary burdens of
arms races and caring for refugees and displaced persons. Other costs of ethnic conflict
include threats to bordering states of widening conflict and the limited ability of the region
or outside states to fully exploit energy resources or trade/transport networks.
Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. Since 1988, the separatist conflict in Nagorno
Karabakh (NK) has resulted in 15,000 deaths, about 1 million Azerbaijani refugees and
displaced persons, and about 300,000 Armenian refugees. About 20% of Azerbaijan,
including NK, is controlled by NK Armenian forces. Various mediators have included
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Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, the United Nations, and the OSCE. The OSCE began the “Minsk
Group” talks in 1992. A U.S. presidential envoy was appointed to these talks. A
Russian-mediated cease-fire was agreed to in May 1994 and was formalized by an armistice
signed by the ministers of defense of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the NK
army on July 27, 1994 (and reaffirmed a month later). Moscow talks were held by the sides,
with token OSCE representation, along with Minsk Group talks. The OSCE at its December
1994 Budapest meeting agreed to send OSCE peacekeepers to the region under U.N. aegis
if a political settlement could be reached. Russia and the OSCE merged their mediation
efforts. The United States, France, and Russia co-chair meetings of the Minsk Group.
A new round of peace talks opened in Moscow in 1997. The presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia recognized a step-by-step peace proposal as a basis for further discussion,
leading to protests in both countries and to Ter-Petrosyan’s forced resignation. Armenian
Foreign Minister Varden Oskanyan instead called for the withdrawal of NK forces from areas
of Azerbaijan as part of a simultaneous and comprehensive settlement of NK’s status that
excluded it as part of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan rejected a new Minsk Group proposal in late
1998 embracing elements of a comprehensive settlement, citing vagueness on the question
of NK’s proposed “common state”status. At U.S. urging, Kocharyan and Aliyev met in April
1999 and agreed to stepped-up presidential talks. The assassinations of Armenian political
leaders in late 1999 set back the peace process.
In 2001, the two presidents met in Paris in January and March and in Key West, Florida,
in April. In Key West, no documents were signed and the two presidents talked mainly
through intermediaries. By some accounts, the sides discussed elements of a peace plan first
broached in 1999 that included territorial concessions and the establishment of land
corridors. Indicating the Administration’s high-level interest, the two Presidents flew to
Washington D.C. after the talks and each met with President Bush. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. Special Negotiator for NK and Eurasian Conflicts,
Rudolf Perina, has stressed that the new international environment resulting from the anti-
terrorism campaign has increased the importance of resolving regional conflicts and restoring
stability. In March 2002, the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan appointed new personal
emissaries – Araz Azimov from Azerbaijan and Tatul Markaryan from Armenia – who met
in mid-May 2002 and at the end of July 2002 with no breakthroughs. Both sides now deny
that they ever seriously discussed territorial concessions. Kocharyan attended NK’s
September 2, 2002, “independence day” celebrations, where NK “President” Arkadiy
Gukasyan declared that “we speak not only about independence but also about reunion with
Armenia.” (See also CRS Issue Brief IB92109, Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict.)
Civil and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia. Several of Georgia’s ethnic minorities
stepped up their dissident actions, including separatism, in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
South Ossetians in 1989 called for joining their territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for
independence. Repressive efforts by former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia triggered
conflict in 1990, reportedly leading to about 1,500 deaths and 50,000 displaced persons,
mostly ethnic Georgians. In June 1992, former Russian President Yeltsin brokered a
cease-fire, and a predominantly Russian military “peacekeeping” force has been stationed in
South Ossetia (currently numbering about 530). A coordinating commission composed of
OSCE, Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries was formed to promote
a settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Rapprochement remains elusive.
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Abkhazia. In late 2001, the Abkhaz conflict heated up after remaining dormant for
several years. Abkhazia’s Supreme Soviet declared its effective independence from Georgia
in July 1992. This prompted Georgian national guardsmen to attack Abkhazia. In October
1992, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) approved the first U.N. observer mission to a
Eurasian state, termed UNOMIG, to help reach a settlement. UNOMIG’s mandate has been
continuously extended and currently runs through July 2002. In September 1993, Russian
and North Caucasian “volunteer” troops that reportedly made up the bulk of Abkhaz
separatist forces broke a cease-fire and quickly routed Georgian forces. The U.N. sponsored
Abkhaz-Georgian talks, with the participation of Russia and the OSCE, that led to a
cease-fire. In April 1994, the two sides signed framework accords on a political settlement
and on the return of refugees. A Quadripartite Commission was set up to discuss
repatriation, composed of Abkhaz and Georgian representatives and emissaries from Russia
and UNHCR. In May 1994, an accord provided for Russian troops (acting as CIS
“peacekeepers”) to be deployed in a security zone along the Inguri River that divides
Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia. The Military Balance estimates that about 1,700 Russian
“peacekeepers” are deployed. The conflict resulted in about 10,000 deaths and over 200,000
refugees and displaced persons, mostly ethnic Georgians.
U.S. Special Negotiator Perina works with the U.N. Secretary General, his Special
Representative (currently Dieter Boden), and other Friends of Georgia (France, Germany,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine) to facilitate a peace settlement. There are 108
UNOMIG military observers as of July 2002, including two U.S. personnel. The UNSC
agreed that cooperation with the Russian forces was a reflection of trust placed in Russia.
Under various agreements, the Russian “peacekeepers” are to respond to UNOMIG reports
of ceasefire violations, carry out demining, and provide protection for UNOMIG’s unarmed
observers. In late 1997, the sides agreed to set up a Coordinating Council to discuss cease-
fire maintenance and refugee, economic, and humanitarian issues. Coordinating Council
talks and those of the Quadripartite Commission have been supplemented by direct
discussions between Abkhaz and Georgian representatives. Sticking points between the two
sides have included Georgia’s demand that displaced persons be allowed to return to
Abkhazia, after which an agreement on broad autonomy for Abkhazia may be negotiated.
The Abkhazians have insisted upon recognition of their effective independence as a
precondition to large-scale repatriation. A draft negotiating document prepared by the U.N.
and the Friends of Georgia was released in January 2002 that calls for Abkhazia to be
recognized as “a sovereign entity...within the state of Georgia,” but the UNSC in July 2002
criticized Abkhaz authorities for refusing to consider the draft. Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Lynn Pascoe in congressional testimony on September 24 stated that Russia is
stalling on negotiations on a political settlement of Abkhaz conflict.
Economic Conditions, Blockades and Stoppages
The economies of all three South Caucasus states greatly declined in the early 1990s,
affected by the dislocations caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, conflicts, trade
disruptions, and the lingering effects of the 1988 earthquake in Armenia. Although gross
domestic product (GDP) began to rebound in the states in the mid-1990s, the economies
remained fragile. Investment in oil and gas resources and delivery systems has fueled
economic growth in Azerbaijan in recent years. Armenia’s GDP was about $550 per capita,
Azerbaijan’s was about $700, and Georgia’s was about $1,000 (Economist Intelligence Unit,
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2001 estimates, current dollars). Widespread poverty and regional conflict have contributed
to high emigration from all three states.
Transport and communications obstructions and stoppages have severely affected
economic development in the South Caucasus and stymied the region’s emergence as an
East-West and North-South corridor. Since 1989, Azerbaijan has obstructed railways and
pipelines traversing its territory to Armenia, and for a time successfully blockaded NK.
These obstructions have had a negative impact on the Armenian economy, since it is heavily
dependent on energy and raw materials imports. Turkey has barred U.S. shipments of aid
through its territory to Armenia since March 1993. P.L. 104-107 and P.L. 104-208 mandated
a U.S. aid cutoff (with a presidential waiver) to any country which restricts the transport or
delivery of U.S. humanitarian aid to a third country, aimed at convincing Turkey to allow the
transit to U.S. aid to Armenia. According to the U.S. Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan’s
poverty-stricken Nakhichevan exclave “is blockaded by neighboring Armenia,” severing its
“rail, road, or energy links to the rest of Azerbaijan.” Iran has at times obstructed bypass
routes to Nakhichevan. Georgia has cut off natural gas supplies to South Ossetia. Russia at
times has closed its borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia because of conflict in its breakaway
Chechnya region. In 1996, the CIS supported Georgia in imposing an economic embargo
on Abkhazia, but Russia announced in 1999 that it was lifting most trade restrictions, and a
railway was reopened in mid-2000.
Russian Involvement in the Region
Russia has appeared to place a greater strategic importance on maintaining influence
in the South Caucasus region than in Central Asia (except Kazakhstan). Russia has exercised
most of its influence in the military-strategic sphere, less in the economic sphere, and a
minimum in the domestic political sphere, except for obtaining assurances on the treatment
of ethnic Russians. Russia has viewed Islamic fundamentalism as a potential threat to the
region, but has cooperated with Iran on some issues to counter Turkish and U.S. influence.
Russia has tried to stop ethnic “undesirables,” drugs, weapons, and other contraband from
entering its borders, and to contain the contagion effects of separatist ideologies in the North
and South Caucasus. These concerns, Russia avers, has led it to establish military bases in
Armenia and Georgia. The states have variously responded to Russian overtures. Armenia
has close security and economic ties with Russia, given its unresolved NK conflict and
grievances against Turkey. Georgia has objected to Russia’s actions related to the conflict
in Chechnya, its military bases in Georgia, and its support to Abkhaz separatists. Azerbaijan
has been concerned about Russia’s ties with Armenia.
Military-Strategic Interests. Russia’s armed presence in the South Caucasus is
multi-faceted, including military base personnel, “peacekeepers,” and border troops. The
first step by Russia in maintaining a military presence in the region was the signing of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty (CST) by Armenia,
Russia, and others in 1992, which calls for mutual defense consultations. Russia prevailed
on Georgia and Azerbaijan to join the CIS and sign the CST in 1993, but they withdrew from
the CST in 1999. Russia also secured permission for two military bases in Armenia and four
in Georgia. Russian forces help guard the Armenian-Turkish border. The total number of
Russian troops has been estimated at about 2,900 in Armenia and 6,200 in Georgia. Another
77,400 Russian troops are stationed nearby in the North Caucasus (The Military Balance
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2001-2002). In 1993, Azerbaijan was the first Eurasian state to get Russian troops to
withdraw, except at the Gabala radar site in northern Azerbaijan. (Giving up on closing the
site, in January 2002, Azerbaijan signed a 10-year lease agreement with Russia to permit up
to 1,500 personnel to man the site.) In January 1999, Georgia assumed full control over
guarding its sea borders, and in October 1999, most of the Russian border troops left, except
for some liaison officers. Armenia has argued that its Russian bases provide for regional
stability by protecting it from attack. Russia has said that it has supplied weapons to
Armenia, including S-300 missiles and Mig-29 fighters for air defense, to enhance Armenia’s
and NK’s security. Azerbaijan and Georgia have raised concerns about the spillover effects
of Russia’s military operations in Chechnya. In December 1999, the OSCE agreed to
Georgia’s request to send observers (currently 40-50) to monitor its border with Chechnya.
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Russia has stepped
up its claims that Georgia harbors Chechen terrorists with links to bin Laden, who use
Georgia as a staging ground for attacks into Chechnya. Georgia, which borders Chechnya,
has accepted thousands of Chechen refugees, mainly because many Chechens, termed Kists,
live in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge area. Some Russian officials initially condemned U.S. plans,
announced in early 2002, to provide military advisory assistance to Georgia. However, in
June 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin backed “temporary” U.S. aid in fighting
terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge, but stated that such aid would be ineffective unless Russian
troops took part. Late summer 2002 witnessed escalating Georgian-Russian tensions, with
Putin on July 31, 2002, accusing Georgia of permitting about 60 Chechen guerrillas to
infiltrate into Chechnya, where they attacked Russia troops. Shevardandze denied that the
guerrillas had been harbored in Georgia, and denounced alleged Russian airstrikes on
Georgian territory. In September 2002, Putin sent a letter to President Bush and other U.N.
Security Council and OSCE members asserting that Russia reserves the right of self-defense
in launching an incursion into the Pankisi Gorge to rout terrorism. The United States swiftly
expressed “unequivocal opposition” to unilateral military action by Russia inside Georgia
and called for Russia to respect U.S. security assistance efforts along with Georgia’s counter-
terrorism campaign in the Gorge.
Russia’s Bases in Georgia. In 1999 Russia agreed to provisions of the adapted
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty calling for it to reduce weaponry at its
bases in Georgia, to close its bases at Gudauta and Vaziani by July 2001, and to discuss
closing Russian military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The Treaty remains unratified by
NATO signatories until Russia satisfies these and other conditions. Russia moved some
weaponry from the bases in Georgia to bases in Armenia, raising objections from Azerbaijan.
On July 1, 2001, Georgia reported that the Vaziani base and airfield had been turned over by
Russia to Georgia. The Russian government reported that it was unable to turn over the
Gudauta base (located in Abkhazia) by the deadline, ostensibly because it had not had
enough time to build replacement facilities in Russia, and because fearful Abkhazians had
hampered the withdrawal. It reported in June 2002 that it had closed its Gudauta base, but
announced that 320 troops would remain to guard facilities and support “peacekeepers” who
would relax at the base. In August 2002, Russia stated that it needed $300 million and
eleven years to close the other two bases. Pascoe testified on September 24 that Russia is
delaying negotiations on implementing its CFE Istanbul commitments.
Caspian Energy Resources. Russia has tried to play a significant role in future oil
production, processing, and transportation in the Caspian Sea region. Russia’s oil firm
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LUKoil has investment stakes in the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC) and
other consortiums, and Transneft in an oil pipeline to Russia’s Novorossisk Black Sea port.
In an effort to increase influence over energy development, Russia’s policymakers during
much of the 1990s insisted that the legal status of the Caspian Sea be determined before
resources could be exploited. Russia has changed its stance by agreeing on seabed
delineation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, prompting objections from Iran. In September
2002, Russia and Azerbaijan signed a long-delayed delineation agreement that appears to
resolve tensions over this issue, and which enables Russia to woo Azerbaijan to ship more
of its oil through Russian pipelines.
Russian President Putin has criticized Western private investment in energy
development in the Caspian region, and appointed a special energy emissary to lobby the
region to increase its energy ties with Russia. As part of this assertiveness, Russian energy
firms have stepped-up their efforts to gain major influence over Caspian energy resources
and routes. Since September 11, 2001, Putin has appeared to ease criticism of a growing
U.S. presence in the region. At the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, the two presidents issued
a joint statement endorsing multiple pipeline routes to transport Caspian region energy,
implying Russia’s non-opposition to plans to build the Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipelines.
However, in September 2002, Foreign Minister Ivanov resurrected opposition to the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline, stating during a U.S. visit that “we will not put up with the attempts to
crowd Russia out.” While Russian energy firms have expressed interest in investing in
construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, the Russian government remains of two minds
over whether to pursue partial influence via these investments or to oppose the pipeline.
Some observers view Russia’s stepped-up pressure on Georgia during 2002 as calculated to
increase its influence, including over pipelines. About 10,000 Russian troops and dozens of
ships and aircraft conducted a military exercise in the northern Caspian Sea in August 2002,
demonstrating Russia’s armed predominance and underscoring its proposals for dividing
Caspian Sea resources among the five littoral states.
The Protection of Ethnic Russians and “Citizens”. As a percentage of the
population, there are fewer ethnic Russians in the South Caucasus states than in most other
Eurasian states. According to the 1989 Soviet census, there were 52,000 ethnic Russians in
Armenia (1.6% of the population), 392,000 in Azerbaijan (5.6%), and 341,000 in Georgia
(6.3%). These numbers have declined since then. Russia has voiced concerns about the
safety of ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan and Georgia. A related Russian interest has involved
former Soviet citizens who want to claim Russian citizenship or protection. In June 2002,
a new Russian citizenship law permitted granting citizenship and passports to most
Abkhazians and South Ossetians (they are already able to enter Russia without visas, while
Georgians are not), heightening Georgian fears that Russia seeks de facto annexations. Many
observers argue that the issue of protecting the human rights of ethnic Russians and pro-
Russian groups is a stalking horse for Russia’s military-strategic and economic interests.
Some observers have raised concerns that Russia is taking advantage of fellow-travelers and
agents in place in the South Caucasus states to oppose U.S. interests.
The Roles of Turkey, Iran, and Others
The United States has generally viewed Turkey as able to foster pro-Western policies
and discourage Iranian interference in the South Caucasus states, though favoring Azerbaijan
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in the NK conflict. Critics of Turkey’s larger role in the region caution that the United States
and NATO are liable to be drawn by their ties with Turkey into regional imbroglios. Turkey
seeks good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia and some contacts with Armenia, while
trying to limit Russian and Iranian influence. Azerbaijan likewise views Turkey as a major
ally against such influence, and as a balance to Armenia’s ties with Russia. Armenia is a
member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone, initiated by Turkey, and the two
states have established consular relations. Obstacles to better Armenian-Turkish relations
include Turkey’s rejection of Armenians’ claims of genocide in 1915-1923 and its support
for Azerbaijan in the NK conflict, including the border closing. Georgia has an abiding
interest in ties with the approximately one million Georgians residing in Turkey and the
approximately 50,000 residing in Iran, and has signed friendship treaties with both states.
Turkey and Russia are Georgia’s primary trade partners. Consistent with the U.S. focus on
the global anti-terror campaign, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia reached a tripartite security
cooperation accord in January 2002 on combating terrorism and international crime and
protecting pipelines. Turkey has hoped to benefit from the construction of new pipelines
delivering oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, though a Turkish economic downturn has
resulted in an oversupply problem for the time being.
Iran’s interests in the South Caucasus include discouraging Western powers such as
Turkey and the United States from gaining influence (Iran’s goal of containing Russia
conflicts with its cooperation with Russia on these interests), ending regional instability that
might threaten its own territorial integrity, and building economic links. A major share of
the world’s Azerbaijanis reside in Iran (estimates range from 6-12 million), which also hosts
about 200,000 Armenians. Ethnic consciousness among some “Southern Azerbaijanis” in
Iran has grown, which Iran has countered by limiting trans-Azerbaijani contacts, raising
objections among many in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani elites fear Iranian-supported Islamic
extremism and object to Iranian support to Armenia. Iran has growing trade ties with
Armenia and Georgia, but its trade with Azerbaijan has declined. To block the West and
Azerbaijan from developing Caspian Sea energy resources, Iran has insisted on either
common control by the littoral states or the division of the seabed into five equal sectors.
Iranian warships have challenged Azerbaijani oil exploration vessels in the Caspian Sea.
U.S. policy aims at containing Iran’s threats to U.S. interests (See CRS Issue Brief IB93033,
Iran). Some critics argue that if the South Caucasus states are discouraged from dealing with
Iran, particularly in building pipelines through Iran, they face greater pressure to
accommodate Russian interests. (See also below, Energy.)
Among non-bordering states, the United States and European states are the most
influential in the South Caucasus in terms of aid, trade, exchanges, and other ties. U.S. and
European goals in the region are broadly compatible, involving integrating it into the West
and preventing an anti-Western orientation, opening it to trade and transport, obtaining
energy resources, and helping it become peaceful, stable, and democratic. The South
Caucasus region has developed some economic and political ties with other Black Sea and
Caspian Sea littoral states, besides those discussed above, particularly with Ukraine,
Romania, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan shares with Central Asian states
common linguistic and religious ties and concerns about some common bordering powers
(Iran and Russia). The South Caucasian and Central Asian states have common concerns
about terrorist threats and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Energy producers Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have considered trans-Caspian transport as a means to get
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their oil and gas to Western markets. As Central Asia’s trade links to the South Caucasus
become more significant, it will become more dependent on stability in the region.
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
By the end of 1991, the United States had recognized the independence of all the former
Soviet republics. The United States pursued close ties with Armenia, because of its
profession of democratic principles, and concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over
its fate. The United States pursued close ties with Georgia after Shevardnadze, formerly a
pro-Western Soviet foreign minister, assumed power there in early 1992. Faced with calls
in Congress and elsewhere for a U.S. aid policy for the Eurasian states, then-President Bush
sent the FREEDOM Support Act to Congress, which was signed with amendments into law
in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511).
Focusing on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh
(NK) region, the FREEDOM Support Act’s Sec. 907 prohibits U.S. government-to-
government assistance to Azerbaijan, except for nonproliferation and disarmament activities,
until the President determines that Azerbaijan has taken “demonstrable steps to cease all
blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NK.” U.S. aid was at first
limited to that supplied through international agencies and private voluntary and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A provision in P.L. 104-107 eased the prohibition
for FY1996, by stating that “assistance may be provided for the Government of Azerbaijan
for humanitarian purposes, if the President determines that humanitarian assistance provided
in Azerbaijan through NGOs is not adequately addressing the suffering of refugees and
internally displaced persons.” Further easing was provided for FY1998 by P.L. 105-118,
which permitted humanitarian aid, support for democratization, Trade and Development
Agency (TDA) guarantees and insurance for U.S. firms, Foreign Commercial Service (FCS)
operations, and aid to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In FY1999 (P.L.
105-277) and thereafter, changes included approval for Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) activities and Export-Import Bank financing. Notwithstanding the
exceptions, the State Department argued that Sec.907 still restricted aid for anti-corruption
and counter-narcotics programs, regional environmental programs, and programs such as
good business practices, tax and investment law, and budgeting. The Defense Department
argued that Sec. 907 restricted military assistance to Azerbaijan, including for anti-terrorism
measures and energy pipeline security.
The events of 9/11 at least temporarily altered congressional attitudes toward Sec.907.
In a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2001, Secretary of State
Powell requested a national security waiver for Sec. 907, arguing that it severely constrained
the U.S. ability to provide support to Azerbaijan in the war against terrorism. A waiver to
Sec.907 was added to the Senate version of Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002
(H.R.2506) and retained by the conferees. Days after H.R.2506 was signed into law
(P.L.107-115), President Bush on January 25, 2002 issued Presidential Determination 2002-
06, exercising the waiver. The White House stated that the waiver serves to “deepen [U.S.]
cooperation with Azerbaijan in fighting terrorism and in impeding the movement of terrorists
into the South Caucasus,” and to deepen security cooperation with Armenia. The waiver also
helps advance “a new web of U.S. security relationships with both Armenia and Azerbaijan”
to deter them from renewing hostilities and to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the NK
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conflict, according to the White House. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2003, S.
2779, reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 24 (S.Rept. 107-219), contains the
usual exclusions, with no mention of a waiver (see also below, Aid and Security).
U.S. policy toward the South Caucasus states includes promoting the resolution of NK,
Abkhaz, and other regional conflicts. Successive U.S. Special Negotiators have served as
co-chair of the Minsk Group of states mediating the NK conflict and taken part in the Friends
of the U.N. Secretary General consultations and efforts of the Secretary General’s special
representative to settle the Abkhaz conflict. Shevardnadze received assurances during his
October 2001 U.S. visit of continued U.S. support for resolution of the Abkhaz conflict and
for Georgia’s territorial integrity. At the US-Russia Summit in May 2002, the two sides
pledged to cooperate on conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, including in Abkhazia,
and reaffirmed their commitment to Georgia’s territorial integrity.
In the wake of 9/11, U.S. policy priorities have shifted toward global anti-terrorist
efforts. In the South Caucasus, the United States obtained quick pledges from the three states
to support U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan, including overflight rights and
Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s offers of airbase support and “whatever [else is] necessary.” The
State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 highlighted U.S. support for
Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s efforts to halt the use of their territories as conduits by
international mujahidin and Chechen guerrillas for financial and logistic support for Chechen
and other Caucasian terrorists.
Some observers argue that developments in the South Caucasus region are largely
marginal to global anti-terrorism and to U.S. interests in general. They urge great caution
in adopting policies that will heavily involve the United States in a region beset by ethnic and
civil conflicts. Earlier arguments against significant U.S. involvement – that the oil and
other natural resources in the region are not commercially viable because of development and
export costs and inadequate amounts, or will not be available to Western markets for many
years – are losing credibility (see below, Energy Resources). Other observers believe that
U.S. policy now requires more active engagement in the South Caucasus. They point to
weakness and instability in these states caused by warfare, crime, smuggling, terrorism, and
Islamic extremism, and urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain
extremism and bolster independence. Some argue that improved U.S. relations with these
Eurasian states also would serve to “contain” Russian and Iranian influence, and that
improved U.S. ties with Azerbaijan would benefit U.S. relations with other Islamic countries,
particularly Turkey and the Central Asian states. Many add that the energy and resource-rich
Caspian region is a central U.S. strategic interest, including because Azerbaijani and Central
Asian oil and natural gas deliveries would lessen Western energy dependency on the Middle
East. They also point to the prompt cooperation offered by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Georgia in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 events.
Aid Overview
The United States is the largest bilateral aid donor by far to Armenia and Georgia, and
the two states are among the four Eurasian states that have received more than $1 billion in
U.S. aid FY1992-FY2002 (the others are Russia and Ukraine). See Tables 1 and 2. U.S.
assistance has included FREEDOM Support Act programs, food aid (U.S. Department of
Agriculture), Peace Corps, and security assistance. Armenia and Georgia have regularly
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ranked among the top world states in terms of per capita U.S. aid, indicating the high level
of concern within the Administration and Congress. Foreign Operations Appropriations for
FY1998 (P.L. 105-118) created a new South Caucasian funding category and earmarked
$250 million of $770 million in aid to this category. FY1999 appropriations (P.L. 105-277)
sustained this category, with Congress earmarking $228 million of $847 million in
FREEDOM Support Act aid, and in FY2000-FY2002 (though without an earmark). Besides
bilateral aid, the United States contributes to multilateral organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that aid the region. (See also CRS Issue
Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.)
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 (P.L.107-115) earmarked $90 million
in FREEDOM Support Act aid for Armenia and recommended the same for Georgia. It
sustained the South Caucasus funding category, calling for funds (unspecified) to be used for
confidence-building measures in support of the resolution of regional conflicts, especially
in Abkhazia and NK. It permitted the President to waive Sec. 907 if he determines that aid
to Azerbaijan is necessary to support U.S. efforts to counter terrorism and support U.S. and
allied forces, will enhance Azerbaijan’s border security, and will not undermine peace efforts
in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The waiver is valid through December
2002. The law includes reporting requirements on U.S. aid to Azerbaijan and on the status
of NK peace talks. To ensure Armenia’s security, Congress earmarked no less than $4
million in FMF and the conferees directed not less than $300,000 in IMET.
The waiver of Sec.907 has permitted U.S. advisory economic assistance to the
Azerbaijani government, as well as added security aid (see below). In March 2002, the TDA
awarded a $1 million grant to the Ministry of Economic Development to help it prepare to
join the World Trade Organization, and in April 2002, the Commodity Credit Corporation
guaranteed $10 million in credit by the International Bank of Azerbaijan for exports of U.S.
agricultural goods. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department has considered providing debt and
budget advisory aid to the Azerbaijani government.
U.S. Security Assistance
The United States has provided some security assistance to the region, and bolstered
such aid after 9/11 (see box and Table 2). In Georgia, Congress in 1997 directed setting up
a Border Security and Related Law Enforcement Assistance Program, and some of this aid
has been used by Georgia to fortify its northern borders with Russia and Chechnya. The
United States has committed millions of dollars to facilitate the closure of Russian military
bases in Georgia. Congress initiated the Security Assistance Act of 2000 (P.L.106-280) that
authorized nonproliferation, export control, border, anti-terrorism, and other security aid for
the South Caucasus states and earmarking such aid for Georgia. In 1997, a U.S.-Azerbaijan
Bilateral Security Dialogue was inaugurated to deal with joint concerns over terrorism, drug
trafficking, international crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). The United States has signed many other agreements with the South Caucasus
countries on military cooperation, combating WMD proliferation, and securing nuclear
materials. Indicative of proliferation problems, as much as four pounds or more of highly
enriched uranium-235, other radioactive materials, and uranium diffusion equipment and
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centrifuges reportedly are
Cumulative Budgeted Funds FY1992-FY2001 for
unaccounted for and may be
South Caucasian Security Programs
missing from a former lab in

(Freedom Support Act and Agency Funds)
Abkhazia.
(million dollars)
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
3.02
The Azerbaijani and
DOE Materials Protection Control and Accounting
0.21
Georgian presidents have stated
DOS International Military Exchanges and Training
2.46
that they want their countries to
DOS NADR / Counterproliferation
2.0
join NATO; much greater
DOS Nonproliferation/Disarmament Fund (NDF)
3.45
progress in military reform,
DOS Science Centers
13.1
however, will likely be required
DOS Export Control / Border Security
24.1
DOS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
2.28
before they are considered for
DOS Warsaw Initiative (FMF)
21.49
membership. All three states
DOD Warsaw Initiative (PFP)
1.3
joined NATO’s Partnership for
DOD-CTR Chain of Custody
5.94
Peace (PFP). Azerbaijani and
DOD Customs Border Security/Counterproliferation 2.67
Georgian troops serve as
DOD/FBI Counterproliferation
1.44
peacekeepers in the NATO-led
U.S. Customs Service / Georgia Border Security
53.57
operation in Kosovo. The
Military Relocation (U.S. Dept. Of State & DTRA)
23.8
“Cooperative Partner” PFP
NSF / Civilian R & D Foundation (CRDF)
9.88
amphibious assault landing and
TOTAL SECURITY PROGRAMS
170.71*
Source: State Department, Coordinator’s Office
natural disaster response
*FY2002 supplemental spending is not included. See Table 2 for FY1992-
exercises were held on Georgia’s
FY2002 totals.
Black Sea coast in June 2001,
involving 4,000 mostly U.S.,
Georgian, and Turkish troops. Follow-on “Cooperative Best Effort 2002” PFP exercises
were held at the former Russian Vaziani airbase in Georgia in June 2002, involving 600
troops from 15 countries.
Until waived, Sec. 907 had prohibited much U.S. PFP aid to Azerbaijan (including
Foreign Military Financing or FMF), and by U.S. policy similar aid had not been provided
to Azerbaijan’s fellow combatant Armenia. The waiver enabled both Armenia and
Azerbaijan to participate in the “Best Effort” exercises. The waiver has permitted an
increase in the U.S. security assistance program to Azerbaijan, which is focused on border
security and anti-terror programs. A U.S.-financed center for de-mining opened in Armenia
in March 2002. Similarly, the State Department announced in July 2002 that 25 U.S. Special
Operations troops are assisting U.S. nongovernmental organizations in training troops in
Azerbaijan in de-mining. In April 2002, President Bush issued Presidential Determination
2002-15, making Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan eligible to receive U.S. arms exports
and services in order to “strengthen the security of the United States.”
As part of the U.S. global anti-terrorism campaign, a $64 million Georgia Train and
Equip Program (GTEP) began in May 2002 with the deployment of up to 150 Special
Operations Forces and other troops. They are providing training to Georgian military,
security, and border forces to help them combat Chechen, Arab, Afghani, al Qaeda, and other
terrorists who allegedly have infiltrated Georgia. Some refurbishment of Georgian military
facilities also will be carried out, but U.S. officials say there are no plans to establish a
permanent U.S. military presence in Georgia. The leader of Georgia’s breakaway Abkhaz
region, Vladislav Ardzinba, has rejected reports that the region might host terrorists and
warned that U.S. training could increase Georgia’s revanchism. Reports that al Qaeda and
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other terrorists may be currently in Abkhazia (and elsewhere in Georgia) create dilemmas for
a U.S. policy that holds governments responsible for terrorists operating on their territories.
Trade and Investment
The Bush Administration and others maintain that U.S. support for privatization and the
creation of free markets directly serve U.S. national interests by opening new markets for
U.S. goods and services, and sources of energy and minerals. Among U.S. economic links
with the region, bilateral trade agreements providing for normal trade relations for products
have been signed and entered into force with all three states. Bilateral investment treaties
providing national treatment guarantees have entered into force. OPIC has signed
agreements that are in force with the three states on financing and insuring U.S. private
investment. The Export-Import Bank has signed agreements with Armenia and Georgia for
financing U.S. exports. Peace Corps volunteers teach small business development, English
language skills, and health awareness in Armenia. With U.S. support, in June 2000 Georgia
became the second Eurasian state (after Kyrgyzstan) to be admitted to the World Trade
Organization. P.L.106-476, signed into law on November 9, 2000, stated that the President
may determine that Title IV should no longer apply to Georgia and proclaim that its products
will receive permanent nondiscriminatory (normal trade relations - NTR) treatment. Citing
“due regard for the findings of the Congress,” President Clinton on December 29, 2000,
determined and proclaimed such permanent normal trade relations. Armenia and Azerbaijan
currently receive conditional NTR treatment subject to a presidential determination (see also
CRS Issue Brief IB93107, Normal-Trade-Relations).
Energy Resources and Policy. The U.S. Energy Department reports estimates of
11 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, and estimates of 11 trillion cubic feet of proven
natural gas reserves in Azerbaijan. Many problems remain to be resolved before Azerbaijan
can fully exploit and market its energy resources, including project financing, political
instability, ethnic and regional conflict, and the security and construction of pipeline routes.
U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central Asian and South Caucasian
states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the West, supporting U.S.
private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes by
encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia, promoting Western energy
security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of
pipelines that transit Iran. In 1998, the Clinton Administration set up the post of Special
Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy to
coordinate policies and programs of TDA, OPIC, the Department of Energy, and other
agencies (this post was retained but downgraded to Senior Advisor for Caspian Basin Energy
Diplomacy by the Bush Administration; the current advisor is Steven Mann).
On May 17, 2001, President Bush announced his national energy policy, in the form of
a report drawn up by Vice President Cheney. It recommended that the President direct U.S.
agencies to support building the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, expedite use of the pipeline by
oil companies operating in Kazakhstan, support constructing a Baku-Ceyhan gas pipeline to
export Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz gas, and otherwise encourage the Caspian regional states to
provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy and infrastructure development.
Another consequence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was greater
Administration concern about the vulnerability of the United States to possible disruptions
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of energy supplies from the volatile Middle East or other regions. The attacks have
intensified the Administration’s commitment to develop Caspian energy and the Baku-
Ceyhan pipeline as part of a strategy of diversifying world energy supplies.
U.S. companies are shareholders in about one-half of twenty international production-
sharing consortiums, including the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC),
formed to exploit Azerbaijan’s oil and gas fields. In 1995, Aliyev and the AIOC decided to
transport “early oil” (the first and lower volume of oil from AIOC and other fields) through
two Soviet-era pipelines in Georgia and Russia to ports on the Black Sea, each with a
capacity of around 100-115,000 barrels per day. The trans-Russia “early oil” pipeline began
delivering oil to the port of Novorossiisk in late 1997. The trans-Georgian pipeline began
delivering oil to Black Sea tankers in early 1999.
The Clinton Administration launched a campaign in late 1997 stressing the strategic
importance of the Baku-Ceyhan route as part of a “Eurasian Transport Corridor.” In
November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the “Istanbul
Protocol” on construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Estimates suggest
that the 1,000-mile pipeline (carrying a million barrels per day) may cost $3 billion. In mid-
2002, the project received a major boost when the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development announced that it would provide $300 million in financing and the U.S.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) also said it would provide $300 million in
loan guarantees. In August 2002, the BTC Company was formed to construct, own, and
operate the oil pipeline, and it awarded construction contracts for a completion date of early
2005 (it includes the U.S. firms Unocal and Amerada Hess; U.S. construction firms include
Bechtal and Petrofac). In September 2001, Georgia signed an accord with Azerbaijan to build
a pipeline to import natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz offshore field, and to permit
remaining gas to be piped to Turkey. BP-Amoco has led negotiations between Azerbaijan
and Turkey on building a BTC gas pipeline, estimated to cost $1 billion.
Congressional interest in the South Caucasus states have been reflected in hearings,
legislation, and the creation of a Senate Subcommittee for Central Asia and the South
Caucasus. Conferees on Omnibus Appropriations for FY1999 (P.L. 105-277) stated that they
“believe that the development of energy resources in the Caspian Sea region is important for
the economic development of the countries involved, as well as regional stability,” endorsed
“alternatives to a pipeline through Iran,” and supported “an east-west energy corridor to assist
in developing the region’s energy resources.” The “Silk Road Act” language in P.L. 106-113
authorized enhanced policy and aid to support economic development and transport needs
in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Congressional action to lift aid sanctions on
Azerbaijan aims to facilitate regional cooperation on anti-terrorism, conflict resolution, and
energy development.
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Table 1. FY2001 Obligations, the FY2002 Estimate, and the FY2003
Foreign Assistance Request
(in millions of dollars)
FY2002 Estimate
FY2001
Including Emergency
FY2003
Central Asian Country
Obligations
Supplementals
Request*
Armenia
117.19
103
77.683
Azerbaijan
36.85
54.9
52.98
Georgia
121.7
123
97.492
Total
275.74
280.9
228.155
Sources: USAID and State Department. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency budgets.
*FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds (does not include Defense or Energy Department
funding).
Table 2: U.S. Government FY1992-FY2002 Budgeted Assistance to the
South Caucasus, by Category (FREEDOM Support Act and Agency
Budgets)
(millions of dollars)
Programs
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Total
Percent
Democracy Programs
146.64
70.56
115.93
333.13
11.86
Market Reform Programs
299.51
39.37
185.34
524.22
18.67
Security Programs
29.39
23.75
193.58
246.72
8.79
Humanitarian Programs
723.45
192.48
601.64
1,517.57
54.05
Cross-sectoral/other
133.43
14.43
38.43
186.29
6.63
Total
1,332.42
340.59
1,134.92
2,807.93
100
Source: Coordinator’s Office, State Department, and CRS calculations. FY2002 data are estimates.
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