Order Code IB89140
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
Updated September 18, 2002
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Past Settlement Efforts
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique
1984 Proximity Talks
1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise
1988-89 Talks
March 1990 - April 1992
“Set of Ideas”
Confidence-Building Measures
Developments, 1997-2001
1997 Talks
1999-2001 Proximity Talks
Developments, 2002
Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
Policies of Greece and Turkey
European Union Membership
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
U.S. Policy
LEGISLATION
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Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations
SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974.
the focus of intense crisis prevention efforts.
Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population,
On December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not
live in the southern two thirds of the island.
to deploy the missiles on Cyprus.
Turkish Cypriots live in the “Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus” (recognized only by
The prospect of Cyprus’s European
Turkey), with about 30,000 Turkish troops
Union accession triggered heightened interna-
providing security. U.N. peacekeeping forces
tional attention to Cyprus and complicated
maintain a buffer zone between the two.
settlement efforts. The U.N. hosted inconclu-
Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S.
sive talks between Clerides and Denktash in
support, has promoted negotiations aimed at
July and August 1997. Denktash demanded
creating a federal, bicommunal, bizonal repub-
that the TRNC be recognized as a state equal
lic on Cyprus. The two sides would pledge
to the Greek-Cypriot side in a confederation.
not to move toward union with any other
He concluded a declaration of partial integra-
country. This reflects concerns that Greek
tion with Turkey to parallel Cyprus’s integra-
Cypriots would like to unite with Greece and
tion with the EU.
that Turkish Cypriots seek to partition the
island, linking the north to Turkey.
In June 1999, the G-8 group of industrial-
ized countries and Russia suggested that the
The Secretary General’s April 5, 1992
Secretary General invite the parties to negotia-
“Set of Ideas” is a framework for negotiations
tions in fall 1999. Clerides and Denktash
for an overall settlement. The Security
participated in five rounds of U.N.-mediated
Council implied Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
proximity (indirect) talks beginning in Decem-
Denktash’s responsibility for their failure and
ber 1999. On November 8, 2000, the Secretary
called for confidence-building measures
General gave the two leaders his “observa-
(CBMs). Glafcos Clerides was elected
tions” on substance and procedure. In reac-
president of the Republic of Cyprus in
tion, Denktash withdrew from talks until two
February 1993. Subsequent talks focused on
separate states are recognized. Denktash and
CBMs. Denktash failed to return to talks on
Clerides met on Cyprus on December 4, 2001,
June 14, 1993. Both sides eventually accepted
and agreed to hold direct talks beginning
CBMs in principle, but did not agree on Sec-
January 16, 2002. They have met many times
retary General’s proposed method for record-
since January 2, and talks continue.
ing clarifications.
Members of Congress have urged the
A January 4, 1997 confirmation that
Administration to be more active, although
Greek Cypriots would acquire Russian S-300
they have not proposed an alternative to the
missiles prompted the United States to deplore
U.N.-sponsored talks. Some Members seek
the purchase and Turkey to threaten military
increased pressure on Turkey to withdraw its
action to prevent deployment and to bond
troops from Cyprus.
closer to Turkish Cyprus. The missiles were
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Talks between (Greek) Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader
Rauf Denktash continue. On September 6, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan met
separately and jointly with the two leaders in Paris and asked them to work on certain issues
and to meet him again in New York on October 3-4. He noted that “though serious
differences remain, the elements of a comprehensive settlement that would meet the basic
needs of both sides do, in fact, exist.” He believed “that the gaps dividing the parties can
be bridged.” Clerides observed, however, “there appears to be no way of approach” on the
issues of sovereignty and whether there will be a new state or a continuation of the Republic
of Cyprus. He claimed that if they were unable to agree, then the Secretary General “will
express his views on how to overcome differences.” Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis
Kasoulides said that he did not expect the Secretary General to do that at the October
meeting. Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis remarked that the November 3 national
elections in Turkey “make talks and decisions difficult.” On September 16, Denktash
submitted a new document, purportedly revising his ideas of April 29 (See Developments,
2002, below), strengthening central government authority to address some of Clerides’
objections but retaining the concept of a new partnership state.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been
divided since 1974. The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic origin, and 19% of
Turkish ethnic origin. (Less than 5% of the population is Maronites, Armenians, Roman
Catholic Latins, and others.) At independence, the republic’s constitution defined elaborate
power-sharing arrangements. It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president; each elected by his own community. The Treaty of Alliance among the
Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help
defend the island. The two sides aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots
favored union with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots preferred partition of the island
(taksim) and uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’ success as a new republic lasted from 1960-63. After President Makarios
proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations
between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating
into enclaves in larger towns. In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national
institutions and began to administer their own affairs. Intercommunal violence occurred in
1963-64, and again in 1967. On both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including
that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot community. Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have
been a buffer between the two communities.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios,
replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis. Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August
25, was in control of more than 36% of the island. The military intervention (often called
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an invasion) had many byproducts. Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the Cypriot
population and related refugee and property problems. The Athens junta fell, civilian
government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military
command to protest NATO’s failure to prevent Turkey’s action, and Turkey’s civilian
government entered an extended period of instability. U.S. relations with all parties suffered.
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities
separate in two sovereign states or two states in a loose confederation. In February 1975,
they declared their government the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC). In 1983,
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
(TRNC) — a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of independence. Turkish
Cypriots have a constitution and a 50-seat parliament. Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots. He
ruled out a merger with Turkey, and pledged cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’ interests and
reestablishing a central government. They foundered on definitions of goals and ways to
implement a federal solution. Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities. Greek Cypriots emphasized the three freedoms —
movement, property, and settlement. Greek Cypriots envision a society with free movement
of people; Turkish Cypriots prefer two nearly autonomous societies with limited contact.
They also differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots want their
internationally recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots,
who would then join a Cypriot republic. For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would join,
for the first time, in a new federation. These views could affect resolution of property,
citizenship of Turkish settlers, and other legal issues. Since 1974, there have been several
formal sets of U.N.- sponsored direct negotiations as well as indirect talks:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting. Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each administration’s control over territory
will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights;
3)freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and
functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique. Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha; to
abstain from actions which might jeopardize the talks, accept the principle of
demilitarization, and eschew union in whole or part with any other country.
1984 Proximity Talks. After the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC,” both sides
proposed confidence-building measures and resolution through a comprehensive framework.
Proximity or indirect talks were conducted through U.N. representatives on constitutional
arrangements, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of international treaties and
guarantees dating from 1959-1960.
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1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise. In January 1985, Denktash and
Kyprianou met in New York. The Turkish Cypriots accepted a draft U.N. document; Greek
Cypriots considered it a basis for negotiations, but did not want to sign. The U.N. modified
the document in light of objections. Greek Cypriots accepted an April 1985 version; Turkish
Cypriots did not. Greek Cypriots opposed a March 1986 revision and called for an
international conference or a new summit to revitalize the process.
1988-89 Talks. After futile informal direct talks, Cypriot President Vassiliou and
Denktash submitted papers that hardened positions. In April 1989, Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar discouraged the parties from writing positions and proposed separate meetings to
draft an agreement outline on a noncommittal basis. Denktash criticized the new approach
as substituting proximity talks for direct talks, but the U.N. believed the parties had agreed
to “separate and periodic joint meetings.” In June, Perez de Cuellar circulated draft ideas for
an outline of an agreement. Turkish Cypriots argued that the U.N. had gone beyond its good
offices role and stated that only a document drafted by the parties would be acceptable.
March 1990 - April 1992. Security Council Res. 649, May 13, 1990, reaffirmed the
Secretary General’s right to make suggestions. It referred to the federal solution as
bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial aspects — the
first U.N. reference to bizonality, a key concept for the Turkish Cypriots. In June 1991,
Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting. On August 2, President Bush
announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus. The
Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range of agreement first. The Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers were unable to find common ground. On October 8, the Secretary
General reported that a conference was not possible and blamed Denktash’s assertion that
each side possessed sovereignty, differing from U.N. resolutions attributing that
characteristic solely to the Republic.
“Set of Ideas.” Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s April 1992 report suggested a
bizonal federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international
personality and sovereignty. A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house. 7:3
ratio would prevail in the federal executive. Each state would be guaranteed a majority of
the population and of land in its area. Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty
of Alliance would withdraw. In June, Boutros-Ghali presented a “non-map.” A new U.N.
draft provided for a separate referendum by each community within 30 days of an agreement,
an 18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees consistent with
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek Cypriot
embargo, free movement, a time-table for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their
property, three constitutions (one for each community and one for the central government),
a 7:3 ratio in the executive, vice-presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an
island-wide referendum on EC membership, and the return of Varosha and about 30 villages
to Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation. Greek
Cypriots would get Morphou, home of about 11,000 Turkish Cypriots. Denktash said that
they and Turkish Cypriots to be displaced from other areas total 40,000 or about one-quarter
of the Turkish Cypriot population. Vassiliou estimated that 82,000 Greek Cypriots would
be able to return home and that Denktash’s 40,000 figure was inflated.
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On August 21, Boutros-Ghali reported that his map provided for two federated states,
the return of many Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot retention of the coastline and
traditional villages. He said that Denktash’s territorial proposals were not close to the
“non-map” and that arrangements would be made for displaced Turkish Cypriots. Vassiliou
was depicted as ready to negotiate an agreement based on the map. Denktash accepted the
right of return and right to property, provided practical difficulties were taken into account.
Boutros-Ghali concluded that an agreement was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw
territorial adjustment in line with his map. Denktash said the report was unacceptable.
Security Council Res. 774, August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map. The
Secretary General’s November 19 report implied Denktash’s responsibility for the lack of
progress. A February 14, 1993, election in Cyprus produced a new president, Glafcos
Clerides, and a delay. Clerides accepted the set of ideas only “in principle.”
Confidence-Building Measures. On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a reduction of Turkish troops in
exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control of
Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on
foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.-supervised
island-wide census; cooperation in U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha and
reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under U.N. control but unused since 1974.
Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash wanted to retain about
20% and/or have a U.N. security circle around it and an end to the Greek Cypriot embargo
of northern Cyprus. Greek Cypriots sought to avoid recognizing the TRNC. Denktash
claimed that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots, and would
not return to New York. U.N. representatives concluded that Turkish Cypriots were
ill-informed on CBMs and Turkey’s support for them had been communicated to the U.N.,
but not to the Turkish Cypriots. Boutros-Ghali concluded that the Turkish Cypriots had
undertaken a campaign of disinformation. U.N. experts determined that both sides would
benefit from the CBMs, with relatively greater benefits for Turkish Cypriots because of their
smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them.
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle. He later contended that
a March 21 U.N. draft unbalanced equities in the CBMs. Clerides said that he would accept
the March 21 text if Denktash would. The Secretary General’s May 30 report, made known
on June 1, insisted that the March draft had not destroyed balance. Boutros-Ghali blamed
the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of political will for the lack of agreement. On May 31, Denktash
had said that he would accept the CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated.
Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document. Boutros-Ghali’s June 28 letter
to the Security Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement
CBMs based on the March paper and clarifications, and said that he intended to address an
identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and request the Security
Council to endorse the March 21 paper. Neither side accepted this procedure.
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Developments, 1997-2001
On January 4, 1997, Cyprus signed a contract to purchase Russian S-300 (SA-10)
anti-aircraft missiles with a 90-mile range, i.e., able to reach southern Turkey, at a cost of
about $400 million, to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by Greece.
The U.S. State Department said that the decision “introduces a new and destabilizing
element” that “threatens to take the arms buildup on Cyprus to a new and disturbing
qualitative level....” Turkish officials said that they would not allow the weapons to be
deployed. The State Department declared that any threat to use force was unacceptable. On
January 20, Turkish President Demirel and Denktash signed a joint defense declaration,
stating that any attack on the TRNC would be considered an attack on Turkey.
1997 Talks. In 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for indirect talks
followed by open-ended, face-to-face talks between Clerides and Denktash. His Special
Representative on Cyprus began proximity or indirect talks. As goodwill gestures, Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots exchanged visits to holy sites and held bicommunal events and
business and professional meetings. Greek planes did not overfly Cyprus during joint
Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises in May 1997 and for the next five months. Turkish
planes did not overfly Cyprus for as long as Greek aircraft did not do so.
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and
in Switzerland, August 11-15. Before the talks, Denktash said that he would not sign any
documents until the European Union (EU) suspended its accession negotiations with the
(Greek) Cypriot government as the sole representative of Cyprus. (See European Union
Membership, below.) Denktash said that a settlement was not possible without political
equality and sovereignty, the accession process stopped, and the delivery of missiles
withdrawn. He refused to sign a joint declaration at the end of the talks. The U.N. Security
Council President said that the Turkish Cypriots’ preconditions had impeded progress.
Greece terminated its moratorium on military flights over Cyprus before joint exercises
with Cypriot forces on October 10, 1997. Turkey ended its parallel moratorium on October
14. During the exercises, Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus,
but neither side fired. Greece charged that Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister’s
plane. In October, Turkey conducted exercises in northern Cyprus, including the mock
destruction of missile launchers.
After the December 12, 1997 EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus,
Denktash informed the U.N. that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and that he would only
participate in talks between states having equal status. On December 27, the TRNC
suspended all bicommunal activities except religious pilgrimages.
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on
January 24, 1998. The S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. The Cypriot
government said that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or substantial progress
toward a settlement, then it would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel issued a communique
calling for negotiations only between sovereign, equal states. They said that the special
relationship between Turkey and the TRNC would be enhanced in every field.
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On June 16, Greece sent four F-16 fighter planes and one C-130 cargo plane to the
Paphos air base. Turkey responded on June 18 by sending six F-16’s to northern Cyprus.
Cypriot troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July with a test-firing. The Cypriot
press claimed that Secretary of State Albright had asked President Clerides to reconsider the
S-300 purchase, to store the missiles outside of Cyprus, or to replace the order with one for
shorter range SA-15s.
On August 31, Denktash proposed the creation of a Cyprus Confederation based on (1)
a special relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),
(2) a special relationship between Greece and the Greek Cypriot government, (3)
establishment of a Confederation between the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot government, (4)
the 1960 Treaty of Guarantees, (5) the Confederation may, if the parties agree, pursue
accession to the EU. The Greek Cypriot government declared the proposal to be
“unacceptable.” The U.S. Administration, the U.N., and others reiterated that the basis for
a settlement is a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
On December 29, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. The EU,
United States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided a face-saving context for his decision. A
December 14 letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council
reported that his Special Representative was continuing shuttle talks and that he perceived
a “flexible approach by both sides.” On December 22, the Security Council approved
S/Res/1217, to renew the UNFICYP mandate, and S/Res/1218, requesting the Secretary
General to work on measures to build trust and cooperation.
On June 20, 1999, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and
Russia urged the Secretary General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiations, without
preconditions. On June 22, the Secretary General declared his readiness to do so. On June
29, the Security Council passed S/Res/1250, calling upon the two leaders to support a
comprehensive negotiation with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to negotiate in
good faith until a settlement is reached, with full consideration of all U.N. resolutions and
treaties. S/Res/1251 said that the goal is a Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises
two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot annual military exercise from October 2-7,1999, no Greek
planes landed at the Paphos air base; there were no incidents involving Greek and Turkish
planes; and Turkey’s objections to the exercise were milder than in previous years.
1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Secretary General Annan and his Special Advisor on
Cyprus, Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto began proximity or separate, indirect talks with
Clerides and Denktash in New York from December 3 to 14. In U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1283 (December 15, 1999), the Council reaffirmed “all its relevant resolutions
on Cyprus,” without specifying that a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single
sovereignty on the island is its goal. On December 15, the Secretary General submitted an
addendum, noting that the governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Britain concurred with
UNFICYP’s extension. He also stated, “The Government of Turkey has indicated that it
concurs with ... the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that UNFICYP can operate
on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties and that the
Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work with them to develop
modalities of UNFICYP’s operation in northern Cyprus.” The Turkish Cypriots interpreted
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the wording as a move toward recognition of their state, and the Greek Cypriots were upset
with this Turkish Cypriot view. A second round of proximity talks was held in Geneva,
January 31-February 8, 2000.
Bicommunal contacts among political parties, journalists, businessmen, and
environmentalists resumed. On May 26, the Secretary General noted “two positive
developments”: an increase in contacts between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and Turkish-
Cypriot measures easing visits of Greek Cypriots and Maronites to the north.
The Cypriot and Greek governments succeeded in preventing an addendum similar to
that of December 1999 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1303, June 15, 2000. Denktash
linked his attendance at talks to measures that, he asserted, would prove that UNFICYP
needs Turkish Cypriot cooperation to fulfill its mission. He constrained UNFICYP activities
in the north and, on June 30, Turkish forces set up a three-man checkpoint outside Strovilia,
a small Greek Cypriot village in the no-man’s land separating the Turkish-Cypriot-
administered area and a British base, which is an UNFICYP crossing point between north
and south, thereby blocking UNFICYP access.
A third round of talks was held from July 24 to August 4. At the outset of the fourth
round of talks, September 12 to 26, Secretary General Annan said that he had concluded that
the equal status of the parties “must and should be recognized” explicitly in a comprehensive
settlement, noting that in the negotiations each represents its side and no one else, as the
political equal of the other. Clerides boycotted the talks for two days in protest until assured
that they would take into account U.N. resolutions that call for a federal solution. Denktash
was pleased with Annan’s remarks.
During Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises from October 19 to 23, Greek and
Turkish planes engaged in mock dogfights. Greek planes landed at Paphos air base for the
first time since it became operational in January 1998, and Greek Cypriot National Guard
TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missiles deployed at Paphos locked onto Turkish F-16 fighter planes.
Turkish planes landed on the island during Turkish-Turkish Cypriot exercises in November.
A fifth round of proximity talks was held from November 1 to 10. On November 8, the
Secretary General gave the two leaders his “assessment.” Media leaks and statements by the
parties suggest that he called for one sovereign, indissoluble, common state with a single
international legal personality; common state law would overrule regional law; political
equality would be defined as effective “participation” in government, not numerically;
component states would be to a great extent self-governed; the return of an “appreciable
amount of territory” to Greek Cypriots, with as little dislocation of Turkish Cypriots as
possible and return of as many Greek Cypriots as possible; and a security regime including
an international military force, police, and a political mechanism. Clerides welcomed the
Secretary General’s views. Denktash rejected them and, at a November 24 “summit” with
Turkey’s President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, and other high
officials, announced his withdrawal from the talks because no progress could be made until
two separate states are recognized. Turkey supported his decision. (Denktash later said that
he was not asking the Greek Cypriots to recognize his state politically but rather to
acknowledge that his state exists.) Denktash refused to participate in a sixth round of
proximity talks in January 2001, labeling the Secretary General’s November 2000 assessment
an unacceptable precondition.
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After meeting Denktash on August 28, the Secretary General expressed hope that
proximity talks would continue “not too far into the future.” His adviser, Alvaro de Soto,
visited Cyprus from August 29-September 5. On September 5, he said that Annan had
invited the two leaders to hold separate meetings with him on September 12 in New York.
De Soto hoped that the meetings would be followed by separate working meetings with him.
Clerides accepted. Denktash did not because “The necessary foundation has not been
established.” Denktash proposed a secret face-to-face meeting with Clerides, but de Soto did
not think it was a good idea.
On December 4, Clerides and Denktash met for the first time since August 1997. De
Soto also was present. The two leaders agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions,
all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement is achieved.
Clerides became the first Cypriot president to travel to the north since 1974 on December 5,
when he attended a dinner at Denktash’s his residence . Denktash reciprocated by visiting
Clerides’ private home for dinner on December 29.
Developments, 2002
On January 16, 2002, Clerides and Denktash met in de Soto’s presence and agreed to
hold intensive peace talks beginning January 21 at the Nicosia airport, a U.N. base. Ground
rules provide that there will be no final agreement until all issues are agreed upon.
On April 29, Denktash presented a “non-paper” of his views on a solution, proposing
a Partnership State to be founded by the two now-existing states on Cyprus. Each partner
would retain authority over its domestic affairs. Together, they would set up a 12-member
Council consisting of two presidents and five representatives from each side. Each president
would chair the Council for 2 years. Council members would hold portfolios for foreign
affairs, economy, and EU relations. A joint parliament would have an equal number of
members from each side. Denktash insists that the Turkish security guarantee continue. The
situation would be reviewed in 5 years, when new authorities could be given to the
partnership. Clerides responded to all points in the document. His spokesman charged that
Denktash’s positions completely contravened U.N. Security Council resolutions.
On May 2, 2002, the President of the U.N. Security Council stated that Council
members regretted that more progress had not been made. They called on the two sides to
set down on paper areas of common ground “with the aim of establishing the component
parts of a comprehensive settlement” and “where differences remain, to narrow and remove
those through a process of negotiation focused on compromise formulations.” “They urged
both sides, and in particular the Turkish side, to cooperate fully with the Secretary General’s
Special Adviser.” Secretary General Annan visited Cyprus, May 14-16, and met separately
and jointly with Clerides and Denktash. Annan asked them to focus on the core issues of
governments (meaning structures and powers), security, territory, and property. Annan
looked to Greece and Turkey for sustained and constructive support. On May 17, Denktash
reported that they were trying to accelerate the process, but maintained that there was still
time until December.
According to disclosures by both sides, security issues were discussed in May and June.
According to Denktash, the Greek Cypriots want the U.N. to be a guarantor, while he wants
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it to observe. Turkish Cypriot reports said that the Greek Cypriots conveyed views on
territory, retaining an earlier proposal to reduce the Turkish Cypriot area to 24%. Denktash
responded that “the territorial issue cannot be discussed with percentages” because it is
related to sovereignty, his overriding demand. Denktash proposed that ideas from the
Belgian constitution be discussed; Clerides offered to discuss it in its entirety.
After a briefing by de Soto on July 9, the President of the U.N. Security Council said
that the members “expressed disappointment that ... progress remained disappointingly slow
.... They noted in this regard that the Turkish Cypriot side has been less constructive in its
approach so far and has declined to support resolving the core issues ....”
On August 27, Denktash warned that if that there is no settlement by the end of the year,
then he would “consider giving to Turkey ... our foreign affairs and defense ministries and
monetary matters under a protocol until Turkey enters the EU.” He added that no decision
had been made. He later described possible Turkish-Turkish Cypriot cooperation as similar
to that which the Greek Cypriots would have with the EU.
Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
(Greek Cypriot positions are on the left; Turkish Cypriot positions are on the right.)
Sovereignty and Powers
Greek Cypriots say that bicommunal, bizonal
The Turkish Cypriots say that each
federation of two states with one sovereignty
community should form a sovereign state as
should be established. A new federal
equals and join in a “partnership state,”which
constitution should come first, specifying the
would have a single international legal
powers of the central government and those
personality.
of the self administered states.
Presidency
The President will be elected by a common
A rotating presidency will prevent one
vote from Greek Cypriots and Turkish
community retaining control of the office.
Cypriots, but must have votes from the other
Each community separately must elect its
community.
own representative to fill the office of
president or vice president.
Territory
The Greek Cypriots accepted the map in the
The Turkish Cypriots rejected the map
U.N. set of ideas, subject to marginal
included in the U.N. set of ideas. Denktash
changes. Turkish Cypriot territory on the
will not discuss territory before Turkish
island must fall under 29+% (optimally to
Cypriot sovereignty is accepted, adding that
24%) to allow the maximum number of
Turkish Cypriots have a “right” to more than
Greek Cypriot refugees to remain under
33% of the island.
Greek Cypriot administration.
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Security/Turkish Troops/Guarantees
The island should be demilitarized. A
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whereby
permanent U.N. force should oversee
Turkey rightfully protects the Turkish
implementation of a settlement accord. No
Cypriot community, must not be diluted.
Turkish guarantee.
Turkish troop presence may be reduced if
Turkey retains its Treaty rights. Agrees that
island should be demilitarized. A U.N. force
may stay after a settlement, but without
permanent status which would contradict
sovereignty.
Displaced Persons and Property Rights
A majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees
The population exchange cannot be reversed.
must return to their homes under local Greek
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled should be
Cypriot administration; remaining refugees
compensated at the current value for the
must have the right to return. Turkish
property they occupy at the time of
Cypriots cannot be compensated for property
resettlement. Greek Cypriots unable to
they did not own in 1974. Turkish Cypriots
return to property they owned in 1974 will be
may opt to return to properties they owned in
compensated from the sale of Turkish
the south in 1974 or to be compensated for
Cypriot property in the south. The Turkish
them at 1974 values plus inflation. All
Cypriot property in the south roughly equals
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled will be
the Greek Cypriot property in the north.
c o m p e n s a t e d . T u r k i s h C y p r i o t
Deeds to Greek Cypriot properties in the
misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties
north allocated to Turkish Cypriots in the
is null and void. More recently, the
north since 1974 are legally valid. A Joint
European Union requires free movement of
Property Claims Commission should be
people and purchase of property, therefore,
formed to inventory property on both sides of
exchange of property and compensation will
the island, determine value, and seek
be on a voluntary basis.
resources to pay compensation.
Other Factors Affecting the Talks
The Cyprus talks are vulnerable to changes in the atmosphere between the two
communities and within each community and to factors not part of the talks.
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
In the south, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Clerides was elected President of the
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993 and reelected in February 1997. The next presidential
election will be held in February 2003. Tasos Papadopoulos is the candidate of his right-
wing Democratic Party (DIKO) and the Reformist Party of Working People (AKEL), a
communist party that supports accession to the EU and has engaged leftist parties of the
north. Papadopoulos, a nationalist, is controversial because of his law firm’s links with
associates of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, now on trial for war crimes.
Yiannakis Omirou is the candidate of his Social Democratic Movement (KISOS).
May 28, 2001 parliamentary elections produced a narrow victory for AKEL, which
received 34.71% of the vote and 20 seats in the 50-seat parliament. DISY dropped to second
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place with 34% of the vote and 19 seats. DIKO won 14.84% of the vote and 9 seats; KISOS,
with 6.51% of the vote, holds 4 seats. Four other parties also won seats. Dimitris
Christofias, AKEL’s leader, was elected speaker of parliament. There is no vice president.
The speaker is the second highest official in government and acts for the president when he
is absent or incapacitated.
In the north, Denktash was elected the first “President” of the TRNC in 1983, and
reelected subsequently. On April 15, 2000, Denktash won 43% of the vote to 30% for Dervis
Eroglu in the first round of the election for “President.” Eroglu withdrew on April 19, before
a second round, and Denktash was declared “President” again. In December 6, 1998,
elections for the 50-seat parliament, the National Unity Party (UBP) had won 24 seats; the
Democratic Party (DP) 13; Communal Liberation Party (TKP) 7; and CTP, 6. Dervis Eroglu
then became Prime Minister and formed a coalition with the TKP.
A banking crisis in northern Cyprus in 2000 eroded the government’s standing,
provoked domestic unrest, and prompted Denktash to criticize the government more. Eroglu
and his TKP Deputy Prime Minister, Mustafa Akinci, increasingly disagreed. Akinci
criticized Denktash’s withdrawal from the U.N. talks and non-participation in EU
membership negotiations, and Turkey’s influence over TRNC affairs. On May 19, 2001, the
National Popular Movement (UHH) announced its formation, vowing to strengthen ties with
Turkey and to struggle against “foreign forces and local collaborators.” A Denktash adviser
is a UHH founder, and Denktash supports it. On May 24, the UBP withdrew from the
coalition with the TKP. On the same day, the headquarters of a newspaper critical of
Denktash was bombed. On June 5, Eroglu formed a new government with the DP.
In June 30, 2002, local elections, UBP won 16 out of 28 mayoral posts, but the pro-
settlement, pro-EU Republican Turkish Party (CTP) won the key cities of Nicosia, Kyrenia,
and Famagusta and polled second overall.
Policies of Greece and Turkey
The “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey, have widely different approaches to the Cyprus
problem. They defend and protect their ethnic kin, and their bilateral relations, strained over
Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.
When Greece and Turkey developed a brief rapprochement in 1988, Greece accepted
that Cyprus was not strictly a bilateral Greek-Turkish issue and need not be on the agenda
of Greek-Turkish talks. After adverse public reaction in Greece, however, Cyprus resurfaced
as a contentious bilateral issue. On January 31, 1992, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met
Turkish Premier Demirel and agreed to work on a treaty of friendship and cooperation. In
Greece and Cyprus, Mitsotakis was criticized for failing to declare a Cyprus settlement a
precondition for improved ties. On November 16, 1993, the next Greek Prime Minister,
Andreas Papandreou, and Clerides agreed to a joint defense doctrine whereby their
governments would decide on the Cyprus issue jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its
defense plan, and any Turkish advance would lead to war between Greece and Turkey.
Clerides announced in April 1994 that Greece would provide air cover for Cyprus, while
Cypriot bases would be prepared to refuel Greek Air Force planes, a naval base would be set
up, and elite troops would bolster land forces. In January 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded
Papandreou. He retained the joint defense doctrine.
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Turkish governments argue that the Cyprus problem is not acute because Turkish
Cypriot security has been ensured since 1974, and that dialogue is the appropriate channel
for resolution. Turks support their armed forces on the island and agree that they should not
withdraw until Turkish Cypriots’ rights are guaranteed effectively. Prime Minister Bulent
Ecevit, who also had held the office in 1974, argues that the Cyprus problem was solved
then. Turkey provides aid annually to the TRNC. In January 2001, a 3-year, $350 million
aid package was announced to help the TRNC overcome a major financial crisis. It also
brought increased Turkish supervision of the Turkish Cypriot economy.
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on “lesser” issues, excluding Cyprus
and the Aegean, that eventually led to many bilateral accords. The rapprochement
accelerated after earthquakes in both countries produced mutual sympathy and good will.
Greece’s decision to allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December
confirmed a change in relations. In January 2000, George Papandreou made the first official
visit by a Greek Foreign Minister to Turkey in 37 years. Then Turkish Foreign Minister
Ismail Cem visited Greece in February. The two met often. On November 2, 2000,
Papandreou asserted that the most basic precondition for a full rapprochement is the solution
of the Cyprus problem based on U.N. Security Council resolutions. On March 12, 2002,
Athens and Ankara began exploratory talks on significant issues concerning the Aegean Sea.
European Union Membership
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into
force in 1988. On July 4, 1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership, stating that it would
welcome Turkish Cypriot participation in technical negotiations. Turkish Cypriots objected
because EC acceptance of the application recognized the Republic’s government and not
their own. Greece’s EC membership and Turkey’s lack thereof led Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to view increased EC involvement in Cyprus as favoring Greek Cypriots.
The EU was to fix a date for Cyprus membership accession negotiations in January
1995. The EU preferred a prior intercommunal solution, but was willing to begin
negotiations without one. In December 1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs
union and some Europeans demanded that the veto be lifted before Cyprus’s application was
raised. On March 6, 1995, the EU separately ratified the customs union accord and
scheduled accession talks with Cyprus. At Greece’s insistence, the Republic is the EU’s
interlocutor. Turkey said that if Greek Cypriots were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus
government, then Turkey would integrate with the “TRNC” to the same degree. Denktash
asserted that if Cyprus becomes an EU member while Turkey is not a member, then it would
weaken Turkey’s guarantees and mean surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.
On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with
Cyprus would open in 1998. On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit and
Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of
partial integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel that of Cyprus and the EU.
Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they “legitimize” an accession process
initiated “illegally” by the Greek Cypriots.
Clerides said that Turkish Cypriots could participate as full members of the negotiating
team for accession if they accept the idea of EU membership and if their participation did not
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suggest recognition of the TRNC. On September 25, 1997, then Greek Deputy Foreign
Minister Papandreou said that Greece would block the EU’s expansion eastward if Cyprus
were not accepted because it is divided. France withdrew its objection to accession talks
with a divided Cyprus when Greece withdrew its objection to talks with East European
candidates. On June 12, 1998, at an EU summit, however, France reiterated its opposition.
On November 9, the French, German, Dutch, and Italian foreign ministers warned of
“particular difficulties” linked to accession talks with a divided island. Greece again warned
that it would block EU expansion if Cyprus were excluded on these grounds. On November
10, the EU began substantive accession negotiations with Cyprus.
On May 14, 1999, then Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared, “It is
clear that Cyprus can become a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not
solved.... “ On July 10, he said that Greece would not object to Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy if assured that Cyprus’s accession would go ahead even without a resolution.
Greece later said that it would not veto Turkey’s candidacy if Turkey met conditions relating
to acceptance of borders in the Aegean and Cyprus’ EU accession. Turkey rejects linkage
between the Cyprus issue and its candidacy.
The EU summit’s conclusions on December 10, 1999, “underline(d) that a political
settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has
been achieved by the completion of accession negotiations, the ... decision on accession will
be made without the above (i.e., a settlement) being a precondition. In this the Council will
take account of all relevant factors.” Greece had insisted that Cyprus be allowed to join the
EU without preconditions and expressed satisfaction. Turkey focused on the reference to “all
relevant factors,” suggesting that the EU could consider a settlement or lack thereof at that
time as a factor in its decision-making. Greeks argue that the phrase refers to overall EU
membership criteria. The summit also affirmed Turkey’s EU candidacy.
In February 2001, Clerides suggested that Denktash’s intransigence may make Cyprus’s
entry into the EU easier because it will enable Cyprus to show it is not to blame for the lack
of a settlement. On April 5, Foreign Minister Kasoulides said that if Denktash accepts that
Cyprus’s accession is inevitable, then he may change his approach to a settlement because
it would be better for Turkey if a settlement were achieved before accession. If Cyprus enters
the EU before a settlement, then Greek Cypriots will vote on Turkey’s own accession.
Kasoulides argued that EU membership addresses concerns at the heart of a settlement,
especially security because, if Cyprus is in the EU, then there is less potential for instability
on the island and between Greece and Turkey.
On June 16, the EU set the end of 2002 as the target date for closing negotiations with
leading applicants for membership, including Cyprus, paving the way for accession in 2004.
In November, the European Commission said that it would support any constitutional
arrangements the two sides reached in a settlement, provided that Cyprus was “able to speak
with one voice in the EU decision-making process.”
Turkish officials have repeatedly charged that the EU stance on absence of a settlement
not being an impediment to Cyprus’s accession had encouraged Greek Cypriot intransigence.
On April 16, 2002, then Foreign Minister Cem declared, “if an agreement is not reached and
one part of Cyprus joins the EU unilaterally representing the entire island.... (W)e will
certainly react strongly and actively.” On May 9, Denktash said the chances were great that
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northern Cyprus would unite with Turkey if the EU admitted Cyprus prior to a settlement.
On July 30, Denktash added that if the EU accepts the Greek Cypriots, then the negotiation
process will be closed.
On June 22, Spain, as holder of the rotating EU Presidency, called upon the leaders of
the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to intensify and expedite their talks to
achieve a settlement before the conclusion of accession negotiations between the EU and
Cyprus. The EU then would accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of
Accession.
On August 23, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou said, “it is possible for Turkey to
secure a date for commencing accession negotiations at Copenhagen in December, but it
cannot avoid its obligations on the Cyprus issue to continue the talks until the problem’s final
solution.” Papandreou has long believed that it is in Greece’s national interest for Turkey to
become European. His statement conveys a possible way to avert a “crisis” by preventing
the lack of a Cyprus settlement from impeding Turkey’s EU prospects. It also links Turkey’s
eventual EU accession to a Cyprus settlement, allowing talks to continue for some time.
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP (U.N.
Forces in Cyprus) is now 1,227, with 15 countries participating. On April 2, 1993, the
Secretary General urged a change in financing from having costs borne by UNFICYP
participating countries, contributions, and assessments to assessments. On May 27, the
Council agreed that costs not covered by contributions would be treated as U.N. expenses.
UNFICYP cost about $42.4 million for the period from July 2001 through June 2002. The
government of Cyprus contributes one-third of the cost and the government of Greece
contributes $6.5 million annually; the rest comes out of assessments.
U.S. Policy
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement.
The 1974-1978 period was marked by sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter
Administrations and Congress over Turkey’s role on Cyprus. A congressionally mandated
arms embargo was in place against Turkey until September 1978. In general, Congress still
favors measures to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and encourage concessions by
Denktash, while successive administrations have argued that pressures are counterproductive
and have preferred diplomacy. Although Members do not propose an alternative to the U.N.
talks, they advocate an active U.S. role. In response, President Reagan created the State
Department post of Special Cyprus Coordinator, and President Clinton named a Presidential
Envoy for Cyprus. The Bush Administration decided not to fill the position of Presidential
Envoy. On February 14, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote to the Cypriot
Foreign Minister, affirming that the Administration “fully supports the ongoing U.N. efforts
to achieve a comprehensive settlement” and declared “the U.S. will also remain engaged in
efforts to facilitate a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus issue.” The United States
supports the accession of Cyprus to the EU.
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Since 1978, Congress has appropriated $14 million or $15 million for scholarships,
bicommunal projects and measures aimed at reunification of the island and designed to
reduce tensions and promote peace and cooperation between the two communities on
Cyprus. Fifteen million dollars were appropriated for FY2002.
LEGISLATION
H.Con.Res. 164 (Bilirakis)
Expresses the sense of Congress that security, reconciliation, and prosperity for all
Cypriots can best be achieved within the context of membership in the EU. Introduced and
referred to the Committee on International Relations, June 19, 2001.
H.R. 2707 (Payne)
Restricts U.S. aid to Turkey until Turkey uses its influence with the Turkish Cypriot
leadership to achieve a settlement on Cyprus based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Introduced and referred to the Committee on International Relations, August 1, 2001.
H.Con.Res. 269 (Ros-Lehtinen)
Same as S.Con.Res. 28, below. Introduced and referred to the Committee on
International Relations, November 13, 2001.
S.Con.Res. 28 (Snowe)
Urges the President to undertake efforts to end restrictions on the freedoms and human
rights of the enclaved peoples (427 Greek Cypriots and 165 Maronites) in the occupied area
of Cyprus. Introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 26, 2001.
Reported favorably without amendment, with an amended preamble, and without a written
report, and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, July 12.
S.Con.Res. 122 (Snowe)
As introduced, same as H.Con.Res. 164, above. Welcomes direct negotiations between
the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders; supports membership of Cyprus in the EU and UN
efforts to facilitate a settlement. Introduced and referred to Committee on Foreign Relations,
June 19, 2002. Reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute and with an
amended preamble, and placed on the Senate calendar, August 1, 2002.
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