

Issue Brief for Congress

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Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations

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Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations

SUMMARY

In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement they negotiated in Dayton, OH. The following day the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized for one year the multilateral NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the U.N. Charter's Chapter VII. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This authorization been renewed annually. In March 1998, the NATO allies agreed that SFOR will remain in Bosnia until significant progress, according to specified benchmarks, has been made in the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

During 1996, the United States stationed about 16,500 troops in Bosnia, and roughly 6,000 support personnel in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. All NATO nations contributed personnel, along with 18 non-NATO nations, for an IFOR total of about 54,000 troops. SFOR is now a smaller force of about 18,000 troops. The U.S. contingent has been reduced to 3,160 in Bosnia, and with about 1,000 additional personnel in Italy, Hungary, and Croatia supporting NATO operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo..

SFOR continues the mission of monitoring and enforcing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords, e.g., demilitarized zones and weapon cantonment. These efforts have been credited a success. With SFOR's duration now dependent upon progress in implementing the Dayton Accords, NATO commanders have lent greater assistance to civilian authorities, local and international, in their efforts to create a stable political environment. SFOR has stepped up efforts to detain war crimes suspects, provided logistical support for internationally monitored elections, and provided limited assistance for refugee resettlement. SFOR now has paramilitary police units – the Multi-national Special Unit (MSU) - to respond to civil disturbances.

Contrary to some initial expectations when NATO deployed to Bosnia, the IFOR/SFOR operations have been notably free of hostile casualties. U.S. forces have sustained only one hostile fatality, a soldier who picked up an unexploded munition.

From FY1992 through FY2002, approximately \$12.99 billion has been appropriated for Bosnia-related operations.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

NATO defense ministers have announced that in keeping with the plan to consolidate the Balkan operations under one headquarters, the troop level in Bosnia will be reduced to 12,000 by the end of 2002. Arrangements will be made for quick reaction reinforcement between Bosnia and Kosovo, should the need arise.

The European Union has proposed, and the U.N. Security Council has approved, the creation of a European Union Police Mission (EUPM) to Bosnia. To begin in January 2003, the EUPM would comprise about 550 personnel

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents no longer provide a separate accounting for these operations. The FY2002 DOD appropriations conference report (H.Rept. 107-350) did note that \$2.13 billion was appropriated for both Balkan operations, a reduction without comment of \$600 million from the Administration's request

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

U.S. Military Operations

U.S. and Allied Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping (IFOR/SFOR)

IFOR/SFOR Mission. While steadfastly refusing to contribute ground forces to UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, the Clinton Administration, beginning in February 1993, maintained a commitment to provide them to oversee implementation of an overall peace settlement. With the 1994 peace negotiations at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton OH, Administration officials began to lay out their rationale and initial planning for U.S. participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR) for Bosnia. Administration officials argued that U.S. participation with ground forces was necessary for two main reasons: 1) the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb negotiators all made U.S. ground force participation a condition of their accepting any peace settlement; and 2) U.S. participation was necessary for the United States to maintain a leadership position in NATO. President Clinton subsequently emphasized a moral responsibility to aid in ending the savagery of the Bosnian conflict.

On December 14, 1995, the Presidents of Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia signed a peace agreement in Paris. In brief, the military elements of the agreement, in addition to establishing IFOR and granting it full authority and freedom of movement to enforce the agreement, calls for: 1) withdrawal of forces behind cease-fire lines within 30 days, with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) of four kilometers; 2) withdrawal of heavy weapons and personnel to barracks; 3) provision of information on personnel, weaponry, and landmines; 4) arms reduction negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE). All these objectives have been completed, with the exception of the arms reduction process which the OSCE continues to oversee.

To enforce the military provisions of the Dayton agreements, NATO sent the Intervention Force or (IFOR), which comprised approximately 54,000 ground troops in Bosnia proper. That force designation lasted until December 20, 1996, when it was changed to Stabilization Force (SFOR). This reflected the decision by NATO's members that the Bosnia deployment should not have a specified end-date, but rather that its duration would be tied to successful accomplishment of Dayton Peace Accord provisions. Though the SFOR operations have U.N. Security Council authorization, there is no "dual-key" command relationship with the United Nations.

SFOR's mission, as defined by NATO HQ, is "to provide a continued military presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, stabilize and consolidate the peace, and thus contribute to a secure environment and provide and maintain broad support for civil implementation plans." To accomplish this mission, NATO has identified key military and supporting tasks, as follows. Key military tasks are:

- ! Maintain a deterrent military presence.
- ! Prevent major hostilities or removal of weapons from cantonment.
- ! Operate the Joint Military Committees.
- ! Contribute to a secure environment for civil organizations to carry out their responsibilities.
- ! Ensure force protection and freedom of movement.
- ! Ensure compliance with the cease-fire and the demilitarized Zone of Separation.
- ! Monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Accords.
- ! Enforce the rules and procedures covering Bosnia-Herzegovina airspace.

Among key supporting tasks, to be undertaken within the capabilities and at the discretion of SFOR, are:

- ! Provide, on a case-by-case basis, support to the High Commissioner.
- ! Support the implementation of the arbitration decision concerning the contested Brcko Corridor. Support the conduct of elections and installation of elected officials.
- ! Support the return of displaced persons, but not forcibly return them or guard specific locations.
- ! Support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Police Task Force.

Supporting tasks have become the primary focus for SFOR operations, given that the military provisions of the Dayton Accords continue to be observed. The International War Crimes Tribunal requested and received protection for its investigators and for suspected war crimes sites. SFOR also agreed to detain suspected war criminals, if encountered, but until late 1997 declined to participate in pursuit operations. This refusal to take more effective action to apprehend suspected war criminals led to continued criticism from the War Crimes Tribunal and human rights advocates. Those who favor greater action have stressed the importance of supporting the International War Crimes Tribunal and the destabilizing influence of Karadzic and other Serb and Croat extremists. Since that time, SFOR has played a more active role in detaining indicted suspects, and additional detentions and

voluntary surrenders, perhaps encouraged by NATO's greater involvement, have resulted in over half of those indicted for war crimes currently being in custody. Former Bosnian Serb leaders Karadzic and Mladic, however, remain at large. .

Duration of NATO Bosnia Operations. In late 1996, the lack of progress in civilian reconstruction and continued friction among the ethnic factions, including within the Muslim-Croat Federation, led to the widespread belief that some NATO military force would be required beyond IFOR's December 20, 1996 mandate. These concerns led NATO's political leaders to authorize the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December, 1996, to last until June 1998. By the end of 1997, there was little optimism that Bosnia would have a viable national state or economy by that time. This generally accepted assessment was supported by GAO reports: *Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton Agreement's Goals*, GAO/NSAID-97-132, May 1997, and its update (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-216, July 17, 1997). Fragile government institutions and continued ethnic antagonisms lead most observers to believe that an international military force of substantial size will be necessary in Bosnia for perhaps years, if further internecine warfare is to be averted. Some, such as the former High Representative Carl Bildt, have suggested the permanent stationing of NATO troops in Bosnia because they believe the region's conflict to be the single greatest threat to contemporary European security, and hence should be a long-term NATO concern. While not accepting this position, in March 1998, NATO foreign ministers re-authorized SFOR, and tied the duration of its deployment to the achievement of specified benchmarks of success in implementing the Dayton Accords.

NATO's decision to extend its presence in Bosnia without specifying a withdrawal date, and President Clinton's commitment of U.S. troops to this effort has led to concern over the potential length of Bosnia operations. For both IFOR and SFOR, political concern over a potentially limitless duration led to establishing so-called "deadlines" for withdrawal. However, as each deadline has approached, the lack of progress toward political stability in Bosnia raised fears that withdrawal would result in renewed warfare, and consequently NATO has approved the continuation of operations. While establishing specific withdrawal dates may have allayed some concerns, it may also have permitted those opposed to the Dayton Accords to believe the NATO commitment to their enforcement to be limited, and the resumption of armed conflict need only be postponed rather than abandoned. NATO leaders now hope that tying withdrawal to demonstrable political and administrative progress will encourage more widespread cooperation in implementing the Accords. Those who endorse an extended SFOR believe that a return to ethnic warfare in Bosnia holds greater dangers for U.S. security interests than the prospect of continued U.S. deployments in the region. They also point out that Bosnia is a type of mission for which NATO is supposedly shaping its forces after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, and the inability or unwillingness to bring a lasting peace to Bosnia would bring NATO's credibility into question.

Some of those opposing extended operations in Bosnia question whether the Dayton Accords are, in fact, a workable basis for Bosnia's future, and suggest they are rather a settlement internationally imposed with little indigenous support. There has been a widespread concern in Congress about the United States being drawn into a military commitment without a foreseeable end. Reflecting this, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) contained several "sense of the Congress" provisions, and established extensive reporting requirements for both the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding Bosnia operations. Among these provisions are:

- ! A sense of the Congress that: 1) U.S. ground forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely, and that the President should work with SFOR nations to allow the U.S. to withdraw its ground forces; 2) a NATO-led force, without U.S. ground troops, might be suitable for continued operations, and the United States might supply intelligence and logistical support, and a “ready reserve force in the region”. Semiannual presidential reports providing: 1) the expected duration of deployment; 2) the percentage of Dayton Accord “benchmarks” achieved and the time for completion of those remaining; 3) the status of the paramilitary police force; 4) a detailed discussion of the specific missions undertaken by U.S. forces, including cost estimates and an assessment of the risks involved; 5) a joint assessment by the Secretaries of Defense and State of the planning for European assumption of SFOR operations.
- ! A detailed report from the Secretary of Defense on the effect of Bosnia operations on the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, with particular attention to Southwest Asia and Korea.

Costs. Each nation contributing to IFOR/SFOR bears the cost of its own deployment and operations. This summary covers DOD’s incremental costs incurred since U.S. troops deployed to Bosnia in December 1995. Prior to IFOR/SFOR, DOD carried out air support and maritime intercept operations in conjunction with U.N. peace-keeping efforts and the U.N. arms embargo. FY1996 saw the introduction of U.S. ground forces into Bosnia, and the consequent increase in incremental costs reflected in Table 1. The term “incremental costs” refers to those costs over and above those of normal day-to-day peacetime operations.

These costs have been covered through a combination of DOD annual budget appropriations, supplemental appropriations, transfers between budget accounts, and re-programmings within DOD Operations & Maintenance and Military Personnel accounts. To remain within the limits of the balanced budget agreement, the supplemental appropriations have been sometimes offset by reductions in other elements of the DOD budget (e.g. National Reconnaissance Office excess funds, savings from inflation overestimates). The Administration requested that the FY1998/FY1999 funding for Bosnia be “emergency” appropriations, which under the balanced budget agreement raised the cap on both defense spending and total discretionary spending. The Administration justified this on the grounds that Bosnia costs were not included in the calculations for the balanced budget agreement. For the previous three years, however, Congress had directed that the costs of military operations in Bosnia be provided within the annual caps for defense spending. Departing from this position, the FY1999 DOD Authorization Act granted the emergency appropriations status. It capped spending of FY1999 funds for Bosnia operations at \$1,858,600,000, thus prohibiting DOD from exceeding Administration-projected expenditures without congressional action. The FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) provided the Administration’s full supplemental request for Bosnia operations as an emergency appropriation. Funding for Bosnia for FY2000 and FY2001 was provided through normal appropriations to the Overseas Contingency Operations Fund, as indicated in Table 1.

Beginning with the FY2002 budget, both the Bosnia and Kosovo operations are no longer funded through the Overseas Contingency Fund, but rather through the individual

service budgets. Consequently, published DOD budget documents no longer provide a separate accounting for these operations. The FY2002 DOD appropriations conference report (H.Rept. 107-350) did note that \$2.13 billion was appropriated for both Balkan operations, a reduction without comment of \$600 million from the Administration's request.

Table 1. DOD Incremental Cost of Bosnia Operations FY1992-2002

(in \$ millions)

	SFOR/IFOR	Other Bosnia-Related Operations*	Total
FY1992	—	5.8	5.8
FY1993	—	138.8	138.8
FY1994	—	292.0	292.0
FY1995	—	347.4	347.4
FY1996	2,231.7	288.3	2,520.0
FY1997	2,087.5	195.0	2,282.5
FY1998	1,792.8	169.9	1,962.7
FY1999	1,382.5	155.4	1,537.9
FY2000	1,381.7	101.2	1,482.9
FY2001 (appropriated)	1,400.0	N/A	1,400.0
Total	10,276.2	1,720.8	11,997.0

Source: Department of Defense

* Other Bosnia-related Operations include: *Able Sentry* (Macedonia preventative deployment), *Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Forge* (air support), *Sharp Guard* (maritime intercept), and *Provide Promise* (humanitarian relief).

IFOR/SFOR Force Components. The U.S. original IFOR contingent was built around 13,000 personnel from the 1st Armored Division from Germany, while SFOR's core element has rotated every six months, primarily among elements of the 1st Armored Division, 1st Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 1st Cavalry Division, and the 10th Mountain Division, augmented by several thousand combat support troops from the United States and Europe.

DOD has scheduled the major unit rotations for SFOR through May 2005, should the deployment last that long. Six of the eight 6-month long rotations will be commanded by National Guard Divisions, and all will include National Guard and/or Army Reserve units. National Guard units will come from Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, South Carolina, and Texas. The parent units involved are listed below. Those without state National Guard designations are active duty units. Additional National Guard Brigades will be assigned for the later deployments from April 2003 onward.

10/01-04/02 – 29th Infantry Division (Virginia NG), 155th Armored Brigade (Mississippi NG), 49th Armored Division (Texas NG)
04/02-10/02 – 25th Infantry Division, 116th Cavalry Brigade (Idaho NG), 76th Infantry Brigade (Indiana NG), 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)
10/02-04/03 – 28th Infantry (Pennsylvania NG), 218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina NG)
04/03-10/03 – 35th Infantry Division (Kansas NG)
10/03-04/04 – 34th Infantry Division (Minnesota NG)
04/04-10/04 – 38th Infantry Division (Indiana NG)
10/04-04/05 – 42nd Infantry Division (New York NG)

The current U.S. SFOR contingent in Bosnia is about 3,100. U.S. forces are headquartered in the Tuzla area in eastern Bosnia. British forces are headquartered in central Bosnia at Gornii Vakuf, and French forces in Mostar. Other national contingents are subordinated to these three major commands, all of which serve under NATO LANDCENT commander, who is based in Sarajevo. The full Stabilization Force numbers about 18,300 troops. On June 6, NATO defense ministers announced that in keeping with the plan to consolidate the Balkan operations under one headquarters, the troop level in Bosnia will be reduced to 12,000 by the end of 2002.

Some have called for the United States to press for the withdrawal of its troops, and to encourage the European NATO allies to assume full, or at least greater, responsibility for Bosnia operations, with the U.S. supplying intelligence, logistical, and support — but no ground troops. They believe that the United States is carrying a disproportionate share of the peacekeeping burden in the Balkans. The NATO allies have responded that by pointing out that non-U.S. forces currently comprise almost 80% of SFOR. They further emphasize that continued U.S. presence in the Balkans is fundamental to the continuance of the operations. The Bush Administration has indicated, however, that, although there will be no unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Balkans, consultations regarding continued U.S. participation will be undertaken with the NATO allies.

In May, NATO Defense Ministers are expected to approve a NATO HQ recommendation that the peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia be merged under one headquarters. It is anticipated that this would allow a consolidation of logistical support and a reduction in overall NATO forces in the region. Arrangements will be made for quick reaction reinforcement between areas, should the need arise.

An issue related to the question of burden-sharing in peacekeeping operations is the European Union's (EU) effort to create a 60,000 strong European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) to undertake low-intensity military operations. EU member nations have earmarked units for the force, and established a 2003 deadline for it to be mission-capable. The ERRF is to be used for low-intensity missions that NATO is unwilling to undertake. Although this initiative would appear to address the concerns of those in the United States who wish to see Europe assume greater responsibility for military operations, it has nevertheless engendered considerable controversy between the United States and its allies. Controversial elements of the controversy are that the ERRF would still require some NATO assets (e.g., intelligence, communications) to function, and that not all NATO members are EU members and could oppose ERRF use of NATO assets. Formal arrangements between the EU and NATO remain under negotiation.

The United States' reaction to the ERRF has been ambivalent. Though applauding European efforts to improve their military capabilities, U.S. officials have voiced strong objections to an independent planning staff, believing this would undermine the primacy of NATO, and thereby reduce U.S. influence in European security affairs.

Aside from the political controversy, there is also serious skepticism that the EU countries will be able to field an operational force in the foreseeable future, despite the 2003 target date. The skepticism is fueled by generally declining defense budgets across Europe, and equipment procurement timelines that extend to the end of the decade. Though internationally, EU political leaders have established an ambitious schedule for developing a military capability more independent of NATO, domestically national ministries of defense do not appear to be receiving the necessary resources.

Table 2 provides a comparative breakout of national ground force contributions to both IFOR and SFOR. All original IFOR participants are contributing troops to SFOR. Most have reduced their contingent's size. The largest contributors remain the United States and the United Kingdom. France has reduced its forces by about two-thirds. Germany has reduced its over all contingent by half, but for the first time has deployed forces into Bosnia. Previously German troops were stationed only in Croatia performing support missions.

Table 2. Bosnia-Herzegovina IFOR/SFOR Deployments

	IFOR March, 1996	SFOR January, 2002
Albania	—	1 infantry platoon (70)
Argentina	—	1 paramilitary police squad (10)
Australia	—	Support personnel (10)
Austria	1 transport company	Support personnel (10)
Belgium	1 transport company (300)	Support personnel (10)
Bulgaria	—	1 infantry company (190)
Canada	1 armored reconnaissance squadron 1 engineer battalion (1,000)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,500)
Czech Republic	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 engineer company	Support personnel (20)
Denmark	1 mechanized infantry battalion (800)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (330)
Egypt	1 mechanized infantry battalion	—
Estonia	—	1 infantry platoon (90)
Finland	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer company (100)
France	4 mechanized infantry battalions 1 mechanized artillery battalion 1 engineer battalion 1 helicopter squadron 1 reconnaissance squadron (10,000)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (2,280)
Germany	No troops deployed in Bosnia; IFOR support units located in Croatia (4,000)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,720)
Greece	1 transport battalion (1,000)	1 transport company (120)
Hungary	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer battalion (130)
Ireland	—	1 infantry platoon (50)
Italy	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 armored company 1 mechanized artillery battery (2,100)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,370)

	IFOR March, 1996	SFOR January, 2002
Latvia	—	Support personnel (10)
Lithuania	—	Support personnel (10)
Luxembourg	1 transport company	—
Malaysia	1 mechanized infantry battalion	—
Morocco	1 mechanized infantry battalion (650)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (270)
Netherlands	1 mechanized infantry battalion (2,000)	1 mechanized infantry battalion (1,440)
New Zealand	—	1 Support personnel (10)
Norway	1 logistics battalion	1 logistics platoon (20)
Poland	1 airborne infantry battalion	1 airborne infantry battalion (280)
Portugal	1 airborne battalion (900)	1 infantry battalion (360)
Romania	1 engineer battalion	1 engineer battalion (150)
Russia	2 airborne infantry battalions	1 airborne brigade (640)
Slovakia	—	Support personnel (10)
Slovenia	—	Support personnel (10)
Spain	2 mechanized infantry battalions	1 mechanized infantry brigade (1,210)
Sweden	1 mechanized infantry battalion	1 mechanized infantry platoon (30)
Turkey	1 mechanized infantry battalion 1 armored company (1,200)	1 mechanized infantry brigade (760)
Ukraine	1 helicopter company	—
United Kingdom	2 mechanized infantry battalions 1 mechanized armored battalion 1 armored reconnaissance company 1 artillery battalion 1 helicopter battalion 1 signal regiment (13,000)	1 armoured battle group (1,890)

	IFOR March, 1996	SFOR January, 2002
United States	2 mechanized infantry battalions 2 armored battalions 2 reconnaissance battalions 1 airborne battalion 2 mechanized artillery battalions 1 engineer brigade 1 air defense battalion 2 psy- ops companies (16,500)	1 infantry brigade-reinforced (3,100)

Source: Department of Defense

Arms Control and Military Assistance

Believing that the Bosnian Serb advantage in weaponry was a major contributing factor to the initial outbreak of hostilities, the Administration is seeking to establish a relative military parity in the region. Preferably this would be achieved through arms reduction, but the United States also led effort to bolster the Bosnian-Croat Federation through military aid and training, believing arms control efforts to be only a partial solution.

On January 26, 1996, the Muslim, Croat, and Serb factions in Bosnia and the governments of Croatia, and Serbia signed an agreement, negotiated under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), stipulating a wide range of confidence-building measures they will undertake, including: exchanges of military information, restrictions on weapons and troop deployments, notification of troop movements/exercises, and establishment of a verification regime. Confidential data exchanges on military forces have taken place between the factions, and OSCE inspections are on-going.

The Dayton Agreement (Annex 1B, Article IV) also called for the signatories to begin negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to limit weapons, and to begin negotiations on voluntary reductions of military manpower. These negotiations were held between the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with manpower and equipment allocations for Bosnia-Herzegovina divided between the Bosnian-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs. An agreement was signed on June 11 1996, with weapons reductions to include tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, fixed-wing aircraft, and attack helicopters. The agreement, using the current equipment levels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the “baseline”, assigns the following upper limits on equipment categories: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — 75% baseline; Croatia — 30% baseline; Bosnia-Herzegovina — 30% baseline, to be divided on a 2 to 1 ratio between the Bosnian-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

In funding the military assistance program for the Croat-Bosnian Federation, Congress required presidential certification that all “foreign forces” have left Bosnia in accordance with the Dayton Agreement. In this instance, “foreign forces” referred essentially to the Muslim irregular troops, primarily from Iran, who had assisted the Bosnian Muslim army.

Viewed as extremists, these forces have been considered a potential threat to IFOR personnel in general, and U.S. forces particularly. On June 26 1997, President Clinton provided certification that all foreign forces had withdrawn from Bosnia. IFOR officials, however, believe that several hundred Muslim irregulars still remain, having been granted citizenship by the Bosnian Muslim government to avoid the designation “foreign forces”.

With presidential certification regarding “foreign forces” and the passage of the Bosnian Croatian-Muslim Federation legislation creating a joint ministry of defense, the way was cleared for U.S. military assistance to the federation. The U.S. transfer, valued at about \$100 million, included 46,000 M-16 rifles, 840 light antitank weapons, 1,000 M-60 machine guns, 80 armored personnel carriers, 45 M-60 tanks, 15 utility helicopters, and 6,592 tactical radios/telephones. (Department of Defense, July 7, 1996).

Presidential Decision Directive 25 – Peacekeeping Guidelines

On May 3, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) No. 25. This document was the subject of intense and protracted interagency review. Although PDD 25 is a classified document, the White House has released an unclassified summary. The document provides guidelines for deciding which U.N. peacekeeping operations the United States should support politically and for deciding whether U.S. armed forces should participate. Consequently, it provides insight on the kinds of issues the Administration may be addressing with both Congress and the United Nations regarding the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia.

Briefly, PDD 25 sets out seven criteria to aid in determining whether U.S. forces should participate in a peacekeeping operation: (1) participation will advance U.S. interests; (2) risks to U.S. personnel are “acceptable”; (3) personnel and funding are available; (4) U.S. participation is necessary for success; (5) the roles, objectives, and duration of participation for U.S. forces are clear; (6) public and congressional support exists or “can be mustered”; and (7) command and control arrangements are acceptable. If the operation presents the “likelihood” of combat, the PDD calls for this to be reflected in the operational planning along with the commitment of sufficient force and a provision for periodic reevaluation of the operation.

PDD 25 also addresses the issue of executive-congressional relations with regard to peacekeeping operations. In general, it calls for regularized consultation and briefings and an annual written report. It also suggests that the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) be amended to (1) include a “consultative mechanism” and (2) eliminate the provision requiring withdrawal of U.S. troops within 60 days unless authorized by Congress. Within Congress, however, there appears to be little current interest in opening the War Powers Resolution for amendment. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB81050, *War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance*.)

LEGISLATION

H.R. 4546 (Stump)

To authorize appropriations for FY2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes. Introduced April 23, 2002; referred to Committee on Armed Services.

S. 2225 (Levin)

To authorize appropriations for FY2003 for military activities of the Department of Defense, and for military construction, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 2003, and for other purposes. Introduced April 23, 2002; referred to Committee on Armed Services.