Order Code IB10084
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority
for Trade Agreements): Background and
Developments in the 107th Congress
Updated September 17, 2002
Lenore Sek
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Early Presidential Authority to Cut Tariffs
Nontariff Barriers and Fast-Track Authority
Stalemate on Fast-Track Renewal
Developments During the 107th Congress
The President’s Legislative Agenda (May 10, 2001)
House Approval of H.R. 3005, Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001
Provisions of H.R. 3005 as Passed by the House
Senate Approval of H.R. 3009, Trade Act of 2002
House Vote (H.Res. 450) Following Senate Approval of Trade Package
Conference and Floor Votes on the Conference Report
LEGISLATION
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
CHRONOLOGY
CRS Products

---

IB10084
09-17-02
Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track Authority for Trade
Agreements): Background and Developments in the 107th Congress
SUMMARY
One of the major trade issues in the 107th
difference, however, is the so-called Dayton-
Congress was whether or not Congress would
Craig amendment, which would allow the
approve trade promotion authority (formerly
removal from an implementing bill any provi-
called fast-track authority) for the President to
sions to amend U.S. trade remedy laws.
negotiate trade agreements with expedited
procedures for implementing legislation.
An important issue before the House vote
Under this authority, Congress agrees to
was how labor and the environment should be
consider legislation to implement the trade
designated as negotiating objectives. Now,
agreements (usually nontariff trade agree-
with a comprehensive trade bill approved by
ments) under a procedure with mandatory
the Senate, a leading issue is trade adjustment
deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate.
assistance (TAA) for displaced workers. A
The President is required to consult with
key question is the level of federal subsidy for
congressional committees during negotiation
health premiums for workers.
and notify Congress at major stages.
Following Senate passage, House Ways
The President was granted this authority
and Means Committee Chairman Thomas
almost continuously from 1974 to 1994, but
sought a rule that, he argued, would strengthen
the authority lapsed and has not been renewed.
the position of the House in the conference.
In a departure from usual practice, he recom-
On December 6, 2001, the House passed
mended a rule (H.Res. 450) that includes the
TPA bill H.R. 3005 by a vote of 215-214.
House-approved TPA bill, reauthorization of
The bill covers tariff and nontariff agreements
Andean preferences and the Generalized
entered into by June 1, 2005. For expedited
System of Preferences, TAA, and other provi-
procedures to apply to legislation to imple-
sions. On June 26, 2002, the House approved
ment a trade agreement, the agreement would
the rule with another one-vote margin: 216-
have to “make progress” toward meeting the
215.
outlined negotiating objectives and satisfy
other specified conditions. The President
Conferees were appointed on June 26
would have to consult with congressional
(House) and on July 12 (Senate). The Presi-
bodies, including the newly established Con-
dent was pressing for a final TPA bill before
gressional Oversight Group. Congress could
the August recess. Conferees reached an
withdraw expedited procedures if consultation
agreement on the trade package late July 25.
requirements were not met.
The House approved the conference report for
H.R. 3009 (H.Rept. 107-624) by a 215-212
On May 23, 2002, the Senate passed
vote around 3:30 A.M. on July 27. The Sen-
H.R. 3009, “the Trade Act of 2002,” which
ate approved the conference report for H.R.
included TPA provisions in title XXI. Title
3009 by a 64-34 vote on August 1, 2002. The
XXI had many, but not all, of the same provi-
President signed the bill (P.L. 107-210) on
sions as the House TPA bill. A controversial
August 6, 2002.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

IB10084
09-17-02
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The President signed H.R. 3009 (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002. The Senate had
approved the conference report for H.R. 3009 (H. Rept. 107-624) by a vote of 64-34 on
August 1, 2002. The House had approved the conference report for H.R. 3009 by a 215-212
vote early in the morning of July 27. For more information on topics covered in the
conference report, see the following CRS products: CRS Report 97-817 (agriculture); CRS
Report RL31450 (Andean trade preferences);CRS Report RS21078 (trade adjustment
assistance); CRS Report RL31178 (labor issues); CRS Report RL31192 (expedited
procedures); and CRS Report 97-389 (Generalized System of Preferences).
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Constitution gives Congress the primary power over trade policy: Article 1
empowers Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign nations” and “to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” For 145 years, Congress exercised this power through
frequent enactment of tariff acts, setting in detail duty rates for individual imports. Since
Congress was elected by local interests that often benefitted from protection against imports,
there were incentives for keeping tariffs at high levels.
Early Presidential Authority to Cut Tariffs
By virtue of his constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs, the President technically
has the authority to negotiate and enter into agreements with foreign countries, including
those dealing with trade and tariff policy. The President, however, has no authority to
impose duties unless Congress delegates that authority. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act of 1934 made a major change in these legislative and executive roles. Under the 1934
Act, Congress authorized the President to negotiate reciprocal reductions of tariffs, within
a limited range and time period, and to implement them by proclamation without the need
for implementing legislation. Because the President was accountable to a broader
constituency than Members of Congress, the President could negotiate reciprocal reductions
in tariffs (within the limits allowed) without the political liability faced by Members.
For the next several decades, Congress extended the President’s tariff-cutting authority
several times. Under this authority, the President negotiated reductions in tariff levels
multilaterally in five rounds under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. After
agreements were reached at these rounds, the President proclaimed the lower tariffs under
the authority Congress had delegated.
Nontariff Barriers and Fast-Track Authority
The sixth round of multilateral trade negotiations, called the Kennedy Round (1964-67),
involved negotiations on nontariff as well as tariff barriers. Congress had extended
presidential tariff-cutting authority for the Kennedy Round by the Trade Expansion Act of
CRS-1

---

IB10084
09-17-02
1962. That authority did not include negotiation of nontariff barriers. Nonetheless, the
Administration reached agreements on two nontariff barriers: (1) the American Selling Price
(ASP), which was an artificially high import valuation based on domestic producers’ prices;
and (2) a code, or set of rules, on antidumping. Although the 1962 Act authorized (as did
the 1934 Act) the President to negotiate a reduction of “any existing duty or other import
restriction,” the general view at the time was that by entering into the antidumping
agreement, the President had overstepped his delegated power. Congress subsequently not
only did not enact legislation to implement it, but actually enacted a provision which would
nullify any provision of the antidumping agreement inconsistent with the U.S. antidumping
law.
The decision by Congress not to approve the ASP or antidumping agreements showed
that there was a dilemma regarding negotiations on nontariff barriers. Trading partners
wanted assurance that U.S. negotiators could reach a deal with likelihood of approval back
home. By then, tariff levels had been reduced through prior rounds, and nontariff barriers
were becoming increasingly important in restricting trade. Without an advance grant of
authority from Congress, U.S. negotiators were concerned they would have no credibility in
future trade talks.
In the early 1970s, in anticipation of a seventh round of multilateral negotiations that
was sure to include nontariff barriers, President Nixon submitted legislation for a new type
of negotiating authority. The proposed legislation would have granted to him proclamation
authority for nontariff barriers much like the previously granted authority for tariffs. He
proposed that he be able to reach a nontariff agreement, submit it to Congress, and unless
Congress legislatively disapproved the agreement, the President would put the changes into
effect by proclamation. There would be no need for implementing legislation. The Nixon
proposal was passed in the House.
That proposal, however, was stopped in the Senate. Senate Members and staff reached
a different, substantially new arrangement with the Administration. Under this compromise,
which was enacted in the Trade Act of 1974, Congress gave the President temporary
authority to negotiate nontariff trade agreements. Congress specified negotiating objectives.
The President was required to consult with appropriate congressional committees before and
during the negotiation and to notify Congress at least 90 days before entering into the
agreement. The President had to submit implementing legislation, along with a statement
of administrative action to be taken and reasons why the agreement serves the interests of
U.S. commerce. Once the bill was submitted, Congress was to follow an expedited
legislative procedure. This procedure included mandatory deadlines, no amendments, and
limited debate. The authority to negotiate nontariff trade agreements with an expedited
procedure for implementing legislation became commonly known as fast-track authority.
At the time the compromise was approved, there was little if any controversy about the
procedural restrictions. The 1974 Act gave Congress an enlarged role in trade negotiations
through the consultation and notification requirements.
The negotiating authority in the 1974 Act enabled the Administration to negotiate the
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1974-79). After the Round was completed,
there was an important development in the role of Congress regarding the implementation
of the Round’s results. When it was time to construct the implementing legislation, Senate
staff argued that Congress should have an active part in that process. The result was that
CRS-2

---

IB10084
09-17-02
Congress took a draft bill through a “mock” legislative process, with committee
consideration, amendments, and conference committee. The President then submitted
legislation based on the final draft bill. Although not formally outlined in any document, the
executive and legislative branches thus agreed on a process that allowed congressional
involvement in crafting legislation to ensure expedited procedures once a bill was submitted.
The 1974 Act granted fast-track authority to the President for agreements reached over
the next 5 years. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39) extended the authority
another eight years. After a brief lapse, the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
(P.L. 100-418) renewed the President’s fast-track authority for agreements reached through
May 1993 (the latter two years of that renewal depended on whether the President requested
the two-year extension and Congress did not pass a disapproval resolution). The 1988 Act
was subsequently amended (P.L. 103-49) to extend fast-track authority for Uruguay Round
agreements reached before April 16, 1994. After that, the President’s trade negotiating
authority expired and has not been renewed.
Fast-track authority had been instrumental in negotiating and implementing five major
trade agreements. Two of those five agreements were multilateral agreements reached during
the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round negotiations in the GATT. The other three
agreements were free trade agreements: the U.S.-Israel free trade agreement, which was
negotiated under special authority in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-573); the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement; and the North American Free Trade Agreement. No
agreement has been disapproved under fast-track procedures.
Stalemate on Fast-Track Renewal
During the 104th Congress (1995-1996), President Clinton proposed an extension of
fast-track authority for agreements reached before December 31, 1999, with a two-year
extension beyond that date if the President requested the extension and Congress did not pass
a disapproval resolution. The President’s intent was to use fast-track authority to extend the
North American Free Trade Agreement to Chile. Democrats supported the President’s
proposal. A Republican-supported alternative was approved by the House Ways and Means
Committee on September 21, 1995. This bill, H.R. 2371 (H.Rept. 104-285, Part 1), listed
five principal negotiating objectives, but omitted objectives related to labor and
environmental standards. H.R. 2371 would have limited fast-track implementation to
provisions that are “directly related” to the specified principal negotiating objectives, unlike
previous fast-track authorizations, which provided for fast-track consideration of provisions
that are “necessary and appropriate” in the President’s discretion to negotiate trade
agreements that include areas that are not specified in the fast-track authorization. Under the
proposal, if negotiators went beyond the mandated objectives, fast-track implementation
could be denied. The bill did not reach floor vote. Disagreement over the inclusion of labor
and environmental issues was a major reason why fast-track authority was not renewed in
the 104th Congress.
A major push to enact fast-track legislation occurred during the 105th Congress (1997-
1998). In the first half of 1997, President Clinton did little on a fast-track bill because of
attention to the budget and other priorities. In spite of warnings from both Democrats and
Republicans, he waited until after Labor Day to submit a proposal to Congress. He
CRS-3

---

IB10084
09-17-02
submitted his proposal on September 16, 1997. The proposal was met with criticism by both
Democrats and Republicans. Many Democrats opposed the proposal because it did not
include labor and the environment in the core objectives. Many Republicans said that they
did not want to include labor or the environment in the agreement at all.
Two weeks later, on October 1, 1997, the Senate proceeded more quickly. The Finance
Committee reported out S. 1269 (S.Rept. 105-102). The bill included labor and the
environment only as they related to trade, and limited fast-track to provisions that were
necessary for the implementation of the agreement, not “necessary or appropriate.” In early
November, the Senate approved a motion to proceed to floor consideration, but stopped there
to wait for the House to act.
On October 8, 1997, the House Committee on Ways and Means approved H.R. 2621
(H.Rept. 105-341, Part 1), which was similar to the bill in the Senate. The committee vote
was 24-14, with only 4 of the 16 Democrats on the Committee voting for the bill.
Republicans wanted President Clinton to assure at least 60-80 votes on the floor, but this was
never attained. Labor interests had been lobbying hard, and few Democrats wanted to
support the measure. Some Democratic Members urged a floor vote to try to get the
undecided Members to commit. House Speaker Gingrich agreed, and set the floor vote for
November 7 then delayed it to Nov. 9. President Clinton lobbied hard, but there were not
the votes for passage, and House Speaker Gingrich and President Clinton agreed to hold off
on the floor vote. House Speaker Gingrich reportedly said that the vote was about 5-25 votes
short of passage.
The following year, on July 1, 1998, the Senate Finance Committee voted 18-2 to
approve S. 2400 (S.Rept. 105-102), a comprehensive trade bill that included essentially the
same fast-track provisions that the Committee had approved the year before (S. 1269) plus
other trade programs such as trade preferences for sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean and
renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences. (Democrats in the House had opposed
the idea of a comprehensive bill the year earlier.) S. 2400 did not reach the Senate floor.
On July 23, 1998, House Speaker Gingrich announced that a vote would be scheduled
on fast-track legislation that September. President Clinton and some Democratic Members
opposed a vote that close to the November elections. They wanted the vote postponed until
the next year. Some Republicans claimed that the Democrats did not want to vote for trade
authority against their labor supporters just before an election. Democrats claimed that the
Republicans scheduled the vote to get agriculture and business support and to hurt the
Democrats. On September 25, 1998, the House voted down fast-track bill H.R. 2621 by a
vote of 180-243. The vote was along strongly partisan lines. Some observers had wondered
if the bill’s defeat would hurt the international markets, but that did not happen. Some also
wondered whether the vote might hurt prospects for fast-track legislation in the future, since
it might be hard for Members to reverse their votes.
During the 106th Congress (1999-2000), there was little done on fast-track renewal. In
1999, the Senate Finance Committee considered the idea of another omnibus trade bill with
fast track provisions, but decided to split up the proposals and didn’t act on fast-track. With
the presidential election in 2000, there was virtually no activity on fast track that year.
CRS-4

---

IB10084
09-17-02
Developments During the 107th Congress
A major issue during the first session of the 107th Congress was how labor and the
environment should be treated in trade agreements. Some Members supported fast-track
reauthorization, but only with strong labor and environmental provisions that could be
enforced with sanctions. They maintained that high domestic labor and environmental
standards put U.S. producers at a competitive disadvantage, and that increased trade with
countries with lax standards may lead to pressure to lower U.S. standards. Other Members
supported labor and environmental provisions but not necessarily with enforcement by
sanction. They wanted the President to have discretion on how to enforce those provisions.
Yet other Members favored excluding labor and the environment completely and limiting
the authority for fast-track implementation to provisions that relate strictly to removal of
trade barriers. They were concerned that, if trade agreements allowed trade sanctions to be
used to enforce environmental and labor rules, such sanctions might be used as protectionist
barriers.
Some Members viewed the U.S.-Jordan free trade agreement (FTA) as a model for how
to address labor and the environment in future agreements. The FTA includes provisions on
labor and the environment in the main text of the agreement, unlike the side agreements of
the NAFTA. It allows a party to call on the agreement’s dispute settlement provisions where
the other party fails to effectively enforce its national labor and environmental laws in a
manner affecting trade between the parties. Other Members, however, opposed the U.S.-
Jordan FTA model. A few Members have suggested the U.S. approach could be patterned
after the Canada-Chile free trade agreement, which includes monetary penalties for violation
of labor and environment provisions. Other Members and USTR Zoellick emphasize there
is no one-size-fits-all model and support a “toolbox” approach that offers a variety of
solutions from which to choose. These many different approaches are seen in the
Administration’s position, a proposal by the New Democrats, and various bills in the House
and in the Senate.
The President’s Legislative Agenda (May 10, 2001)
From its start, the Bush Administration has made trade negotiating authority a priority
of its overall trade policy. During his February 27 State of the Union address, President Bush
said, “Each of the previous five Presidents has had the ability to negotiate far reaching trade
agreements. Tonight I ask you to give me the strong hand of presidential trade promotion
authority, and to do so quickly.”
The Administration also introduced a new phrase to replace the term “fast-track
authority.” During his confirmation hearing on January 30, 2001, U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) nominee Robert Zoellick said that he would promptly follow up with the Senate
Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee “to consider how to
reestablish trade promotion authority [italics added] for the President, based on the fast-track
precedent and the broadest possible support.” The term “trade promotion authority”is now
widely used interchangeably with “fast-track authority.”
On May 10, 2001, President Bush provided Congress with an outline of his 2001
legislative agenda for international trade, with trade negotiating authority (TPA) the top
CRS-5

---

IB10084
09-17-02
priority. The President’s proposal for TPA stated that the authority would be used for a new
WTO round, a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, and other regional and bilateral
negotiations, including free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. The proposal listed
13 negotiating objectives. One objective would encourage the protection of children and
adherence to core labor standards in connection with international trade, and another would
encourage mutually supportive trade and environmental protection policies in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, both “in a manner consistent with U.S.
sovereignty and trade expansion.” The Administration proposed that environmental
protection, employment opportunities, and other measures be taken into account in making
decisions on negotiations. It also affirmed that Congress and advisory committees would be
consulted at key stages of each negotiation. The proposal did not include a time period for
the authority, but called for “a sufficient time” for various negotiations.
Along with the legislative agenda, the President submitted an illustrative list identifying
a “toolbox” of actions the United States could take together with trade negotiations.
Examples of toolbox actions included using labor standards in existing trade programs and
highlighting in the National Trade Estimate report measures that hurt the environment.
House Approval of H.R. 3005, Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001
On October 3, 2001, Representative Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee, introduced H.R. 3005, a bill to extend trade negotiating authority. On October
4, Representative Rangel, Ranking Member of the Ways and Means Committee, and
Representative Levin, Ranking Member of the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade,
released an alternative bill to extend trade negotiating authority, H.R. 3019. Sponsors of
H.R. 3019 said that the key differences between H.R. 3019 and H.R. 3005 were in the areas
of labor standards, environmental issues, enforcement, and the role of Congress. On October
9, the House Ways and Means Committee defeated H.R. 3019 by a 12-7 vote and approved
H.R. 3005 by a 26-13 vote.
On December 6, 2001, the House took up H.R. 3005 as amended by the Ways and
Means Committee and modified under Rules Committee Resolution H.Res. 306. The House
approved H.R. 3005 along party lines by a one-vote margin: 215 - 214.
Provisions of H.R. 3005 as Passed by the House. H.R. 3005 pertains to trade
promotion authority only. The bill’s provisions cover tariff and nontariff trade agreements
that are reached before June 30, 2005, with a two-year extension allowed under specified
conditions.
Under the section on trade negotiating objectives, the bill outlines seven general
objectives as “Overall Objectives.” Among these are the two objectives of mutually
supportive trade and environmental policies and of respect for worker rights and the rights
of children. The bill has 13 more specific “Principle Objectives.” One of these
objectives–labor and the environment–has drawn much attention. That objective calls for
the following: assurance that parties will not fail to effectively enforce their own
environmental and labor laws; recognition that parties retain wide discretion on domestic
labor and environmental matters; strengthened capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote
respect for labor standards and to protect the environment; elimination of government
CRS-6

---

IB10084
09-17-02
practices that threaten sustainable development; market access for U.S. environmental
businesses; and assurance that labor, environmental, health, or safety policies of other
countries do not discriminate against U.S. exports.
The section on objectives also directs the President to take actions that further “certain
priorities,” most of which are related to labor and environmental goals. An example of these
12 actions is that the President must seek greater cooperation between the World Trade
Organization and the International Labor Organization. Of note: this section also directs the
President to preserve the U.S. ability to enforce rigorously its trade laws.
For certain tariff agreements that generally cut tariffs by no more than half and meet
other specified conditions, the President may proclaim tariff changes without implementing
legislation.
For other tariff agreements and for nontariff agreements, the President may enter into
an agreement only if the agreement “makes progress in meeting” the Overall and Principal
Objectives, and the President satisfies the consultation/notification requirements. Expedited
legislative procedures would apply to an implementing bill with: (1) provisions approving
a trade agreement and any statement of administrative action; and (2) provisions “necessary
or appropriate” to implement an agreement, if changes in law are required to implement the
agreement.
H.R. 3005 includes consultation requirements at various stages of negotiation. (Some
requirements do not apply to tariff agreements that would be implemented through
proclamation). At least 90 days before initiating negotiations, the President would have to
notify Congress of the intent to enter into negotiations and provide specified information.
Before and after giving notice, the President would have to consult with the two revenue
committees, such other committees “as the President deems appropriate,” and the newly
established Congressional Oversight Group (COG; see next paragraph). Additional
consultation would required on certain agricultural tariff matters. During negotiations, the
USTR would have to consult closely with the revenue committees, all committees with
jurisdiction, current congressional trade advisors, and the COG. Before entering into an
agreement, the President would have to consult with the revenue committees, other
committees with jurisdiction, and the COG, and these consultations would have to include
the nature of the agreement and other specified information. The bill sets deadlines for
private sector advisory committee reports and a report by the International Trade
Commission on the agreement’s impacts.
The bill would establish a new body of congressional trade advisors, the Congressional
Oversight Group. Members of the COG would be the chair and ranking member of the
revenue committees (who would co-chair the COG), three other members (no more than two
members from the same party) from each of the revenue committees, and the chair and
ranking member of any other committees with jurisdiction for laws affected by agreements
under negotiation. Members of the COG would be official advisors to the U.S. delegation
and would consult and advise the USTR on aspects of the negotiation.
The section on implementation of trade agreements is similar to other bills and to
previous law. The President would have to notify the House and Senate at least 90 days
before entering into the agreement. Within 60 days of signing the agreement, the President
CRS-7

---

IB10084
09-17-02
would have to describe to Congress any changes to law necessary under the agreement. The
President would be required to submit the agreement, a statement of administrative action,
a draft implementing bill, and other specified information (no deadline for submission). H.R.
3005 includes a procedure that would disallow expedited procedures for an implementing
bill, if the President did not give notice or consult as required.
Senate Approval of H.R. 3009, Trade Act of 2002
On December 12, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee approved its version of H.R.
3005 on an 18-3 vote. The version of H.R. 3005 approved by the Senate Finance Committee
was similar to the House-passed version in most respects, but it did have some differences
regarding negotiated changes to trade remedy law, investor-government disputes, dispute
panel action, and small businesses.
On May 10, 2002, Senators Baucus and Grassley introduced a trade legislation package
as a manager’s amendment (S.Amdt.3401) in the form of a substitute to H.R. 3009. About
six months earlier (November 16, 2001), the House had approved H.R. 3009 as a bill to
reauthorize the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The Senate Finance Committee had
amended and approved H.R. 3009 on December 14, 2001. The Baucus-Grassley amendment
included trade promotion authority as contained in the version of H.R. 3005 that was
reported out of the Senate Finance Committee. It also included reauthorization of the Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, with health insurance subsidies for workers who
lose their jobs because of an increase in imports. It further provided for a 5-year
reauthorization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, as well as
reauthorization of ATPA.
A number of amendments to the manager’s amendment were proposed, and a number
were approved. Probably the most controversial was S.Amdt.3408, which was sponsored
by Senators Dayton and Craig. This amendment would allow a point of order to be raised
against any provision of an implementing trade bill receiving TPA consideration, if that
provision would weaken any U.S. trade remedy law. A motion to table the Dayton-Craig
amendment was defeated 38-61, and the amendment passed on a voice vote. Supporters of
the amendment claim that the amendment is necessary to ensure that U.S. safeguards,
antidumping and countervailing duty laws are not undermined during trade negotiations in
the WTO and other fora. The Bush Administration strongly opposed the Craig-Dayton
amendment., claiming that the amendment would tie the hands of U.S. negotiators by
restricting their ability to negotiate.
On May 23, 2002, the Senate approved the Baucus-Grassley trade package by a 66-30
vote. TPA provisions were Title XXI of the approved H.R. 3009.
The TPA provisions approved in the House (H.R. 3005) and in the Senate (Title XXI
of H.R. 3009) have the same seven overall objectives, but the Senate bill has an eighth on
small businesses. They have the same 13 principal objectives, but the Senate bill adds four
more objectives on child labor, human rights, border taxes, and textile trade. Both bills call
for the President to take almost the same 12 actions to maintain U.S. competitiveness.
The two bills have almost identical language on the President’s authority to proclaim
tariff changes and to negotiate trade agreements with expedited legislative procedures for an
CRS-8

---

IB10084
09-17-02
implementing bill. They have essentially the same deadlines for entering into an agreement
for expedited approval procedures. They both state that a trade agreement must “make
progress in meeting” negotiating objectives and describe similar kinds of provisions that an
implementing bill may have. A major difference, however, is a provision in the Senate bill,
called the Dayton-Craig amendment, which would allow any implementing bill provision
amending U.S. trade remedy laws to be stricken from that bill.
Both bills have similar language regarding notification and consultation before and
during negotiations. They both have special provisions on negotiations on textiles and
agriculture (the Senate bill also includes fish and shellfish). They have much the same
language on consultation with Congress before entering into an agreement, but a major
difference on notification and reporting of proposed changes to trade remedy laws.
Both versions have some similarities on the President’s submission of the trade
agreement and other documents to Congress, and both allow withdrawal of expedited
procedures for lack of consultation. The Senate bill adds language on reporting changes to
trade remedy laws, procedural action in the Senate, and disclosure of oral or written
agreements with other governments. It also adds that expedited procedures will not apply
if an Administration report on dispute strategy is not submitted in a timely manner, or if part
of a trade agreement was not disclosed to Congress.
The two bills are almost identical on establishing a Congressional Oversight Group.
They both provide for adjustment to the pre-notification requirements where negotiations are
underway, require a plan by the President to address enforcement, and state that
congressional trade-related activities could increase. Additional sections in the Senate bill
would require the ITC to report on agreements implemented under expedited procedures in
the past, and would direct the USTR to seek an advocate in the WTO for small- or medium-
sized businesses.
House Vote (H.Res. 450) Following Senate Approval of Trade
Package
Following Senate passage of H.R. 3009, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Thomas sought a rule that, he argued, would strengthen the position of the House in the
conference. In a departure from usual practice, he recommended a rule (H.Res. 450) that
includes the House-approved TPA bill, reauthorization of Andean preferences and the
Generalized System of Preferences, TAA, and other provisions. The House had previously
approved some language in the Thomas rule (e.g., TPA) but not other language (e.g., TAA).
Almost all House Democrats oppose the Thomas rule: some reasons they give are the higher
TAA benefits and support for U.S. trade remedy laws in the Senate bill.
On June 19, 2002, the House Rules Committee reported out the Thomas rule. On June
26, 2002, the House approved the rule with another one-vote margin: 216-215.
Conference and Floor Votes on the Conference Report
Disagreement over the structure of the conference committee delayed conference action.
Senate leadership had different views on the number of Senate conferees: Senate Majority
CRS-9

---

IB10084
09-17-02
Leader Daschle wanted 3 conferees, while Senate Minority Leader Lott wanted at least 5
conferees. The final decision was for 3 conferees from the Senate. Also, House Ways and
Means Committee Chairman Thomas and Senate Finance Committee Baucus disagreed who
was next on rotation to be chairman of the conference committee. An agreement was
reached that Chairman Thomas would be chairman of the trade conference committee, and
Chairman Baucus would be co-chairman.
Conferees reached an agreement on the trade package late in the evening of July 25. On
the morning of July 26, the House Rules Committee approved a waiver (H.Res. 507) to allow
same-day consideration of conference reports to accompany H.R. 3009 and two other bills.
The conference report for H.R. 3009 (H.Rept. 107-624) was filed in the evening of July 26.
The House approved the conference report by a 215-212 vote around 3:30 A.M. on July 27
and then recessed for summer break. The Senate approved the conference report by a 64-34
vote on August 1, 2002, and adjourned for summer recess the following day. The President
signed the bill (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-210, H.R. 3009
To extend the Andean Trade Preference Act, to grant additional trade benefits under that
Act, and for other purposes. Introduced October 3, 2001; reported, amended, by the
Committee on Ways and Means (H.Rept. 107-290) November 14, 2001. Passed/agreed to
in House by voice vote November 16, 2001. Reported by Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Baucus with an amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Rept. 107-126)
December 14, 2001. Passed Senate with an amendment by 66 - 30 vote May 23, 2002.
House agreed to Senate amendment with amendment pursuant to H.Res. 450 by 216-215
vote May 26, 2002. House conferees appointed Jule 26, 2002. Senate conferees appointed
July 12, 2002. Conferees reach agreement July 25, 2002. Conference report (H.Rept.
107-624) filed July 26, 2002. Conference report brought up for consideration in the House
under the provisions of H.Res. 509, and House agrees to conference report by a vote of 215-
212 on July 27, 2002. Senate agrees to conference report by a vote of 64 - 34 on August 1,
2002. Signed into law August 6, 2002.
H.Res. 306 (Reynolds)
Providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 3005) to extend trade authorities
procedures with respect to reciprocal trade agreements. Reported as an original measure
(H.Rept. 107-323) and approved by a vote of 224 - 202 on December 6.
H.R. 1446 (English)
Standard Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001. A bill to provide permanent trade
negotiating authority. Introduced April 4, 2001; referred to Committees on Ways and
Means; and Rules. The bill would extend fast trade procedures permanently if a newly
established Commission on Labor and the Environment submitted a report to the President
and Congress, and the President received prior authorization from Congress, before the start
of negotiations. It would exempt agreements under the WTO.
CRS-10

---

IB10084
09-17-02
H.R. 2149 (Crane, et. al.)
Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001. A bill to extend trade authorities procedures
with respect to reciprocal trade agreements. Introduced June 13, 2001; referred to the
Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to
be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
H.R. 3005 (Thomas, et. al.)
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001. A bill to extend trade authorities
procedures with respect to reciprocal trade agreements. Introduced October 3, 2001.
Reported (amended) by the Committee on Ways and Means (H.Rept. 107-249, Part 1)
October 16, 2001. On December 6, 2001, Rules Committee Resolution H.Res. 306 reported
to House. H.Res. 306 provided that the amendment recommended by the Committee on
Ways and Means now printed in the bill, modified by the amendment printed in the H.Rept.
107-323, be considered as adopted. December 6, 2001, passed House by recorded vote: 215
- 214. Referred to the Senate Finance Committee December 12, 2001; markup session held.
Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably (S.Rept.
107-139) December 18, 2001.
H.R. 3019 (Rangel, et. al.)
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2001. A bill to provide fast-track
trade negotiating authority to the President. Introduced October 4, 2001; referred to
Committee on Ways and Means and Committee on Rules.
S. 136 (Gramm)
Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority Act. A bill to amend the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 to extend trade negotiating and trade agreement implementing
authority through the end of 2004. Introduced January 22, 2001; referred to Finance
Committee.
S. 599 (Roberts, et al.)
Permanent Trade Promotion Authority and Market Access Act of 2001. A bill to amend
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 to establish permanent trade
negotiating and trade agreement implementing authority. Introduced March 22, 2001;
referred to Finance Committee.
S. 1104 (Graham/Murkowski, et al.)
Trade Promotion Act of 2001. A bill to establish objectives for negotiating, and
procedures for implementing, certain trade agreements. Introduced June 26, 2001; referred
to Finance Committee.
S. 2062 (Durbin)
Comprehensive Trade Negotiating Authority Act of 2002. A bill to provide fast-track
trade negotiating authority to the President. Introduced March 21, 2002; referred to Finance
Committee.
CRS-11

---

IB10084
09-17-02
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. Trade Act of 2002. Conference report to accompany H.R. 3009,
July 26, 2002. H.Rept. 107-624. 107th Congress, 2nd session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
2002. 266 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Rules. Report to accompany H.Res. 450, June 19,
2002. H.Rept. 107-518. 107th Congress, 2nd session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2002. 74
p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Bipartisan Trade Promotion
Authority Act of 2001. Report together with additional and dissenting views to
accompany H.R. 3005, October 16, 2001. H.Rept. 107-249, Part 1. 107th Congress, 1st
session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2001. 83 p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act
of 2002. Report together with additional views to accompany H.R. 3005, February 28,
2002. S.Rept. 107-139. 107th Congress, 2d session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2002. 69 p.
——. Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act. Report to accompany H.R. 3009, December
14, 2001. S.Rept. 107-126. 107th Congress, 2d session. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 2002.
56 p.
CHRONOLOGY
1934 – In the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress begins a policy of
delegating authority to the President to negotiate tariff agreements within limits and to
implement the new tariff levels by proclamation.
01/03/75 – The Trade Act of 1974 is enacted. Under the Act, Congress continues to delegate
to the President the authority to negotiate tariff agreements and implement them by
proclamation. Congress also delegates to the President the authority to negotiate
nontariff trade agreements subject to consultation and notification requirements. For
nontariff agreements reached by specified deadlines, Congress agrees to consider such
agreements under an expedited (“fast track”) procedure.
04/16/94 – After almost continual reauthorization since 1975, the President’s trade
negotiating authority expires.
09/25/98 – The House disapproves H.R. 2621 by a largely partisan vote of 180-243. The
Administration opposed the vote.
05/10/01 – President Bush outlines his 2001 legislative agenda for international trade. He
places trade promotion authority (TPA) at the top of the agenda.
12/06/01 – The House passes H.R. 3005 by a 215-214 vote along party lines.
CRS-12

---

IB10084
09-17-02
05/23/02 – The Senate approves TPA under title XXI of H.R. 3009 by a 66-30 vote.
06/26/02 – The House approves by a vote of 216-215 a rule (H.Res. 450) offering alternative
language for H.R. 3009 that includes the House-approved TPA bill, reauthorization of
Andean preferences and the Generalized System of Preferences, TAA, and other
provisions.
07/27/02 – The House approves the conference report for H.R. 3009 (H.Rept. 107-624) by
a 215-212 vote.
08/01/02 – The Senate approves the conference report for H.R. 3009 by a 64-34 vote.
08/06/02 – The President signs the bill (P.L. 107-210).
CRS Products
CRS Report 97-817, Agriculture and Fast Track Trade Legislation, by Geoffrey S. Becker
and Charles E. Hanrahan.
CRS Report RL31450, The Andean Trade Preference Act: A Comparison of House and
Senate Versions of H.R. 3009, by J. F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report RS21004, Fast-Track Negotiating Authority for Trade Agreements and Trade
Promotion Authority: Chronology for Major Votes, by Carolyn C. Smith.
CRS Report 97-389, Generalized System of Preferences, by William H. Cooper.
CRS Report RS21078, Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers: Legislation in the 107th
Congress, by Paul J. Graney.
CRS Report RL31192, Trade Agreement Implementation: Expedited Procedures and
Congressional Control in Existing Law, by Richard S. Beth.
CRS Report RL31178, Trade Promotion Authority (Fast-Track): Labor Issues (Including
H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019), by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report RL31445, Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority: A Comparison of Bills
Approved by the House (H.R. 3005) and by the Senate (Title XXI of H.R. 3009), by
Lenore Sek and William H. Cooper.
CRS Report 97-896, Why Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as
Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather than as Treaties, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.
CRS-13

---