Order Code RL31466
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security Department:
U.S. Department of Agriculture Issues
Updated September 6, 2002
Jean M. Rawson
Specialist in Agriculture Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Homeland Security Department:
U.S. Department of Agriculture Issues
Summary
In his June 6, 2002, announcement of his intent to create a Department of
Homeland Security, the President proposed that the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
(USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) – including the Plum
Island Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory – be transferred into the new
department’s Office of Border and Transportation Security. APHIS is responsible
for protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases and posts inspectors
at about 125 ports of entry around the country. Border inspection activities account
for an estimated 60% of APHIS’s staff and 30% of its budget. The remaining
resources are devoted to a wide range of domestic activities, e.g., coordinating animal
disease and plant pest control and eradication programs in the states, providing
technical trade dispute advice and resolution, and enforcing animal cruelty laws, to
name just a few.
The House Select Committee on Homeland Defense reported out its amended
version of the President’s proposal on July 19, 2002 (H.R. 5005), and the full House
passed it on July 26. It reflects changes concerning the APHIS provisions that the
House Agriculture Committee recommended (H. Res. 449): 3,200 APHIS border
inspection personnel would be transferred, and the USDA Secretary would retain
considerable authority over their activities and funding. Plant and animal quarantine
functions, as well as all other APHIS program activities, would remain in USDA.
H.R. 5005, as amended, retains the provision to transfer the Plum Island lab to the
new department. Comparable legislation in the Senate, S. 2452, differs from the
House bill in that it would transfer border inspection and quarantine functions,
authorities, employees and assets to the new department, and it does not propose
transferring the Plum Island facility. The Senate suspended its consideration of S.
2452 before the August recess, and recommenced consideration on September 4,
2002.
The changes that the House Select Committee made substantially address the
concerns of the U.S. agriculture community, which feared that transferring all of
APHIS out of USDA would seriously hamper the agency’s considerable domestic,
non-border activities. Agriculture interests still express concern that the Senate
proposal would weaken APHIS’s quarantine operations and limit the ability of border
personnel to be assigned to certain other critical projects as needed. The issue of
Plum Island is still under debate, as the House and Senate measures still differ on its
transfer. Supporters maintain that the new department needs the lab’s foreign animal
disease diagnostic capabilities to detect potential bioterrorism, while opponents argue
that the lab’s research on behalf of the U.S. livestock sector would be hampered by
its top-secret designation.
This report covers the background and policy issues related to current
reorganization proposals and will be updated as necessary.
Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Recent USDA and Congressional Actions Related to APHIS Mission and
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Border protection, homeland security, and APHIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Interest group positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
List of Tables
APHIS Program Areas, Staff Years, and FY2001 Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Homeland Security Department:
U.S. Department of Agriculture Issues
Background
As part of its initial proposal for a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Bush Administration recommended that all federal agencies
having inspection or security responsibilities at U.S. borders and ports of entry be
unified into the Office of Border and Transportation Security within the new
department. The border security division would be comprised of the U.S. Customs
Service (from the Treasury Department), the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and Border Patrol (from the Justice Department), the U.S. Coast Guard and the
Transportation Security Administration (from the Transportation Department), the
Federal Protective Service (from the General Services Administration), and the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture). Legislation introduced in both chambers on May 2, 2002, predating the
President’s proposal, would transfer a somewhat different list of border security
agencies to a new homeland security department, and the Senate measure, S. 2452,
would transfer only APHIS’s user-fee supported border inspection activities
(Agricultural Quarantine Inspection, or AQI), not the entire agency.
In FY2001 approximately $355.4 million (in appropriations and user fees) and
3,500 staff supported APHIS AQI activities at U.S. borders and ports of entry. This
represents about 30% of the agency’s total budget for that year ($1.168 billion,
including user fees and transfers from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for
funding of emergency pest and disease management programs), and 60% of the
agency’s staff. The majority of the agency’s funding was used by the other 40% of
the staff to conduct APHIS’s non-border programs. The following table shows the
agency’s staffing and funding for its border inspection activities (under the Pest and
Disease Exclusion program area), and for its responsibilities under four other
program areas.
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APHIS Program Areas, Staff Years, and FY2001 Funding
Program Area
Staff Years
FY2001 Funding
Pest and Disease Exclusion
(In $ million)
Inspection of passengers and cargo at ports,
2,943
48.1 appropriated +
airports, and borders (AQI)
222.7 from user fees
Overseas monitoring of foreign animal
9
4.2
diseases
Border protection through pest control
415
63.3
programs in Mexico & Central America1
Trade regulation/import-export inspection
140
7.8
SPS2 dispute resolution
37
8.9
_____
_____
3,544
355.4
Plant and Animal Health Monitoring
Domestic surveillance, detection and
844
90.4
prevention of domestic and foreign plant
and animal diseases
Emergency management – overseas and
15
5.6
domestic animal disease prevention,
preparedness and response
_____
____
859
96.0
Pest and Disease Management
Cooperative federal-state detection and
389
160.1
control programs for specified harmful pests
and diseases3
Predator and wildlife damage control and
498
51.9
methods development
____
_____
887
212.0
Animal Care
Regulation of certain facilities that handle
147
13.7
research and exhibition animals and pets;
protection of show horses
Scientific and Technical Services
Information technology infrastructure
n/a
3.0
Regulation of releases of genetically
115
11.3
engineered organisms into the environment
Methods development for controlling
79
6.7
problem plants and plant pests
Regulation and licensing of animal drugs
152
11.8
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Program Area
Staff Years
FY2001 Funding
Foreign and domestic animal disease
187
19.2
diagnostic testing; and diagnostic assistance
to U.S. livestock and poultry industries at
the Plum Island and Ames laboratories
____
_____
533
51.9
Contingency Funds for response to plant
17
2.9 appropriated +
and animal pest and disease outbreaks
335.0 transferred from
Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC)
_____
336.0
Source: FY2003 USDA Budget Explanatory Notes.
1 This includes cattle ticks, fruit flies, screwworm, and tropical bont tick.
2 Sanitary and phytosanitary disputes. These involve countries using concerns about plant pests or
animal diseases as cause to bar imports from another country.
3 This includes aquaculture protection, biocontrol, boll weevil, brucellosis, chronic wasting disease,
emerging plant pests, golden nematode, grasshopper, gypsy moth, fire ant, Johne’s disease,
noxious weeds, pink bollworm, plum pox, pseudorabies, scrapie, tuberculosis, and witchweed.
Recent USDA and Congressional Actions Related to APHIS
Mission and Security
By the end of 2001, in response to heightened security concerns after September
11, APHIS had increased inspection staff at U.S. ports of entry by 153 and added 20
veterinarians to imported and domestic disease surveillance and control programs.
An increase of 250 inspectors is the goal, according to agency officials. In addition,
according to budget documents, the agency hired 46 smuggling interdiction and trade
compliance officers and 10 investigative and enforcement officers in 2001. These
officers conduct investigatory inspections to detect the various ways that prohibited
items may be entering the country, and work with other federal agencies, state
departments of agriculture, and state and local police to provide coordinated
enforcement and prepare certain cases for criminal investigation. In January 2002,
APHIS received an additional $119 million under the supplemental defense
appropriation (P.L. 107-117), of which $105 million is to enhance pest and disease
exclusion (at the borders) and detection and monitoring (domestically and overseas).
The Secretary’s office announced on May 30, 2002, that $43 million of that money
was being released in grants to states, and through cooperative agreements with
states, to implement local emergency preparedness plans. P.L. 107-117 also provided
$14 million for increased security measures at the APHIS National Veterinary
Services Lab in Ames, Iowa. In addition, through the Agricultural Research Service
(ARS), USDA’s in-house research agency, which shares animal disease research
facilities with APHIS, the Ames lab received $50 million for construction of a bio-
containment facility to secure dangerous pathogens, and $23 million for security
upgrades at the Plum Island Animal Disease Diagnostics Lab.
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The Administration’s FY2003 budget request proposed a $767.1 million
appropriation for APHIS. Included in this was an additional $4.3 million ($3 million
is appropriated for FY2002) for APHIS to further develop and maintain a computer
link with the U.S. Customs Service, with which it shares initial import inspection
responsibilities (Customs does not release APHIS-regulated plant or animal imports
until the agency has cleared them), and with federal food safety agencies. Both the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees’ respective FY2003 funding bills
(H.R. 5263, S. 2801) would provide roughly $749 million for APHIS, an amount
$2.4 million above FY2002, but $26.2 million below the President’s request. Most
of this difference can be attributed to the Administration’s request for a one-time
$26.7 million shift in funds to cover GSA rental costs; the Committees’ proposals do
not include this. They do include an increase in funds for stepped-up border
inspections and for animal health monitoring and surveillance activities.
The FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriations act for antiterrorism
activities (P.L. 107-206) appropriated an additional $18 million for the Office of the
Secretary to transfer to APHIS and three other USDA agencies for counter-terrorism
activities, and an additional $33 million for APHIS to use for: (1) cooperative
agreements with states to prevent a number of ‘mad cow’-like diseases ($15 million);
(2) emergency preparedness ($10 million); (3) physical and operational security ($4
million); and (4) equipment needs and smuggling interdiction ($4 million).
However, the Administration declared that this money would become available only
upon an emergency request from the President, which he has stated he will not
provide. An emergency appropriation of $25 million for upgrading the APHIS/ARS
animal disease research lab in Ames, Iowa, will be provided, since this provision is
not contingent upon an emergency request from the President.
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002 (P.L. 107-188, H.R. 3448/S. 1765), which the President signed on June 12,
2002, authorizes appropriations of $30 million in FY2002 and such sums as
necessary in future years for: (1) increasing and improving APHIS’s border
inspection capacity; (2) increasing cooperation with state animal and human health
agencies; and (3) fully implementing the computerized, integrated tracking and
record-keeping system. The Act also authorizes FY2002 appropriations for further
upgrading of the Plum Island ($100 million) and Ames ($80 million) animal health
research laboratories, and such sums as necessary for that purpose in subsequent
years. Finally, the Act authorizes $190 million in FY2002 appropriations, and such
sums as necessary in subsequent years, for APHIS, ARS, and university research on
enhancing U.S. agricultural biosecurity and food safety.1
1Although APHIS border inspection is intended to protect U.S. agriculture overall from
incoming foreign plant and animal pests and diseases, it also has a responsibility in
protecting the safety of the Nation’s food supply – e.g., preventing meat imports from
countries where animal diseases of threat to human health, such as mad cow disease, occur.
Within USDA, APHIS and FSIS currently coordinate their food-related biosecurity
preparedness and response activities under the aegis of the Protection of the Food Supply
and Agriculture Production subcouncil of the USDA Homeland Security Council. Although
federal food safety agencies are not included in the President’s reorganization proposal,
Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge testified on June 20, 2002, that consolidating these
(continued...)
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Discussion
Border protection, homeland security, and APHIS. The Administration
stated initially that its intent in consolidating APHIS’s inspection force with that of
other agencies having border protection responsibilities was to create an unified,
expert, interdisciplinary inspection presence along all of the Nation’s land, air, and
sea borders. Supporters of the initial proposal maintained that although APHIS has
an excellent record at keeping out known animal and plant threats, the agency is not
as well prepared to counter terrorists’ attempts to breach border security or to thwart
an internal attack involving harmful pests or diseases of domestic origin. Thus,
supporters said, not only would U.S. border protection benefit from the presence of
APHIS inspectors, but U.S. agriculture also would benefit from having APHIS’s
expertise with plant pests and animal diseases as part of a more comprehensive
inspection and surveillance network.
Opponents of the original proposal argued that, in light of the administrative and
legislative steps that have already been taken to strengthen APHIS programs and
information technology, leaving the agency in place – or perhaps leaving its non-
border functions in place – would best serve both border protection and homeland
security missions. Improvement in both missions arguably could be accomplished
by building upon the current information technology infrastructure to create a
seamless computerized network that would allow consistent tracking of imports and
instant alert capability among the several relevant agencies. APHIS’s role as the first
point of inspection for FSIS- and FDA-regulated food imports, and how that role
might change if the agency’s border inspection function were no longer part of the
food and agriculture mission of USDA, remains an issue even though the House
Select Committee on Homeland Security amended the President’s original proposal
to let all APHIS non-border functions remain in USDA. Some observers also have
expressed concern that both agricultural and national security could be weakened
during the transition of APHIS personnel, equipment, operating procedures, and
information channels to a new department.
Interest group positions. The National Association of State Departments
of Agriculture (NASDA) went on record in opposition to the idea in a letter delivered
to the White House and House and Senate Agriculture Committees on June 7, 2002.
NASDA officials voiced concern that agricultural health protection could get low
priority in a department whose mission is anti-terrorism. The June 7 edition of the
Webster Agricultural Letter, a Washington-based policy newsletter, stated, “While
most agricultural interests...will support the idea of improving government’s
organization to deter terrorists, they also should argue that moving or splitting up
APHIS would weaken its ability to protect agriculture from disease and pest threats.
Much of what APHIS does has no ‘homeland security’ function anyway....” On June
20, 2002, more than 40 U.S. farm groups sent a letter to the White House and to
Congress expressing specific concerns about how APHIS’s non-border functions
1(...continued)
agencies into a single unit may be proposed later on. For further discussion of this policy
issue, see Issue Brief 10082, Meat and Poultry Inspection Issues in the 107th Congress, or
Issue Brief 10099, Food Safety and Protection Issues in the 107th Congress.
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would be handled were they part of a new department of homeland security. The
same day, the Humane Society of the United States issued a statement saying that
although it supported the idea of a consolidated homeland security department, “We
believe...that transferring animal welfare programs to the Department is an obvious
misfit and would relegate important programs to the margins of a department focused
on matters entirely unrelated to the well-being of animals.”
Priority concerns. Many farm organizations expressed concern that APHIS’s
mission to protect agriculture could lose priority in a department whose first mission
was security. The President’s initial proposal would have transferred agency’s
foreign animal disease (FAD) prevention program, which has been credited with
keeping the United States free of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease), to the new department. The
FAD program, however, focuses on helping governments in countries where FMD
and BSE exist to control and eradicate the diseases there, not on inspection at U.S.
borders. Currently, under the President’s original proposal and the amended H.R.
5005 (which the House passed on July 26, 2002), APHIS’s Plum Island Animal
Disease Diagnostics Laboratory, which has played an integral role in the FMD and
BSE prevention successes, would become part of the DHS. It could be argued that
housing the FAD program in one mission area and its supporting laboratory in
another could hamper the efficiency of the program, particularly as H.R. 5005 would
make the HHS Secretary responsible for setting the priorities of the labs in that
mission area.
Relatedly, agricultural trade groups have noted that APHIS border inspection
currently facilitates the movement of $93.5 billion annually in agricultural imports
and exports. They voice concern that the agency’s role could shift from facilitation
to a more rigid security function if it were moved out of USDA, thereby disrupting
trade. Trade groups also note that APHIS negotiations with trading partners on
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) concerns are important to the success of USDA’s
export development programs. USDA/APHIS would retain the SPS dispute
resolution function under the revised H.R. 5005. S. 2452 does not clarify whether
that function would transfer with the rest of APHIS inspection and quarantine
activities or remain in USDA. Agricultural trade groups have argued that SPS
dispute resolution could lose priority under a homeland security mission. The Senate
suspended floor action on S. 2452 just before the August recess, and recommenced
consideration beginning September 4, 2002.
Funding concerns. Agriculture groups were concerned earlier over which
department would have jurisdiction over funding for the transferred inspection
function and over the availability of Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds to
support APHIS’s emergency pest management programs. These issues have largely
been addressed by the House Agriculture Committee recommendations that the
House Select Committee adopted (H. Res. 449). The House-passed H.R. 5005
specifies that USDA is to retain control over the user fee account and periodically
transfer funds to the Department of Homeland Security to cover only the costs of the
border inspection duties incurred under the DHS mission. The USDA Secretary
would retain discretion over the use of the remaining funds in the account. Currently,
Congress also appropriates funds to support hiring additional inspectors, training
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more dogs for cargo inspection (the “beagle brigade”), and purchasing more X-ray
machines. Presumably, this would still be the case under the new organization.
Since both H.R. 5005 and S. 2452 currently propose to let all of APHIS’s non-
border activities remain in USDA, the question of the availability of CCC funds for
emergency domestic activities is moot. Since 1948, the Secretary has had the
authority (now extended under 7 U.S.C. 7772 and Sec. 10417 of the 2002 farm act,
P.L. 107-171) to make transfers to APHIS of CCC funds for emergency response to
plant and animal health threats (such as Karnal bunt of wheat, citrus canker, and
avian influenza). Use of this authority has increased significantly in recent years.
CCC transfers averaged $22 million annually in the period from 1990 to 1998, and
addressed one or two emergencies per year. In FY2001, the Secretary transferred
$335 million to respond to more than a dozen emergencies.
APHIS/ARS Labs. Under the President’s proposal and the amended H.R.
5005, the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics Laboratory on Plum Island
(Greenport, New York) would be transferred to the Science and Technology Division
in the new department. S.2452 does not contain a similar proposal. APHIS operates
the Plum Island lab jointly with USDA’s in-house research agency, the Agricultural
Research Service (ARS). Language in the House-passed H.R. 5005 would require
DHS and USDA to establish a agreement to ensure that ARS scientists would
continue to be able to use the facility as it does currently.
The Administration states that its intent in consolidating U.S. research agencies
that perform high-security research (Civilian Biodefense Research from HHS,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from the Department of Energy, and the
Plum Island Foreign Disease Diagnostics Laboratory) is to “create a single office
whose primary mission is the critical task of protecting the United States from
catastrophic terrorism.” Also, USDA has acknowledged that the Plum Island lab
needs updating and repair. Although Congress has recently approved funds for
upgrading the lab’s physical structure and security, it could be argued that locating
it in an agency whose overall mission is security could greatly enhance this effort.
Some in the agricultural research community and the U.S. livestock industry
oppose the Plum Island transfer. They point out that it has not been proposed to
move public health research laboratories into the new department and question why
it should be necessary to include an animal disease laboratory. ARS scientists at
Plum Island do research on vaccines to fight foreign animal diseases and on other
disease prevention and eradication approaches. Scientists fear that Plum Island’s
likely designation as a top-secret facility will hamper the free flow of information
necessary for research progress, and slow the availability of new technologies to the
livestock sector.