Order Code IB93108
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Central Asia’s New States:
Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated August 30, 2002
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
Post-9/11
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
Russia’s Role
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Democratization and Human Rights
Security and Arms Control
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Trade and Investment
Energy Resources
Aid Overview

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Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
to integrate these states into the international
1991, the United States recognized the inde-
community so that they follow responsible
pendence of all the former Central Asian
security and other policies, and to discourage
republics and established diplomatic relations
xenophobic and anti-Western orientations that
with each by mid-March 1992. The United
threaten peace and stability. The Administra-
States also supported their admission to the
tion is concerned about human rights and civil
Organization on Security and Cooperation in
liberties problems in all the states. The Admin-
Europe (OSCE) and other Western organiza-
istration’s policy goals in Central Asia reflect
tions, and elicited Turkish support in counter-
the differing characteristics of these states.
ing Iranian influence in the region. Congress
U.S. interests in Kazakhstan include the secu-
was at the forefront in urging the formation of
rity and elimination of Soviet-era nuclear and
coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and
biological weapons materials and facilities. In
other Eurasian states of the former Soviet
Tajikistan, U.S. aid increasingly focuses on
Union, and approved the Freedom Support
economic reconstruction. U.S. energy firms
Act and other legislation for this purpose.
have invested in oil and natural gas develop-
ment in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
After the terrorist attacks on America on
Uzbekistan.
September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian
states offered overflight and other support to
Some observers call for different empha-
coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan.
ses or levels of U.S. involvement in Central
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have
Asia. Some have called for strengthening
hosted coalition troops and provided access to
conditions linking aid to progress in improv-
airbases. Since then, the United States has
ing human rights or in making adequate prog-
boosted its security assistance throughout the
ress in democratization and the creation of
region for anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics,
free markets. Some have disputed the impor-
non-proliferation, border and customs, and
tance of energy resources to U.S. national
defense cooperation programs, while also
security. Others point to civil and ethnic
increasing aid for democratization and free
tensions in the region as possibly endangering
market reforms.
U.S. lives and investments. Heightened con-
gressional interest in Central Asia was re-
U.S. policy goals in Central Asia include
flected in passage of “Silk Road” language in
fostering stability, democratization, free mar-
late 1999 (P.L.106-113) authorizing enhanced
ket economies, free trade and transport
U.S. policy attention and aid to support con-
throughout the Eurasian corridor, de-
flict amelioration, humanitarian needs, eco-
nuclearization in the non-Russian states, and
nomic development, transport (including
adherence to international human rights stan-
energy pipelines) and communications, border
dards. An over-arching U.S. priority is to dis-
controls, democracy, and the creation of civil
courage attempts by extemist regimes and
societies in the South Caucasian and Central
groups to block or subvert progress toward
Asian states.
these goals. Administration policy also aims
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
General Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, paid “routine” visits to the
Central Asian states in August 2002 to enhance military-to-military ties and to reiterate U.S.
appreciation for their support for coalition actions in Afghanistan. Perhaps indicative of
some issues discussed in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry on August 28, 2002,
refused to pledge not to refer cases involving U.S. troops – who might use Kazakh facilities
as part of Operation Enduring Freedom – to the International Criminal Court. In
Turkmenistan, Gen. Franks thanked President Saparamurad Niyazov for facilitating the
trans-shipment of much U.N. humanitarian aid received by Afghanistan. In press comments,
Franks indicated that a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan might be necessary for “a long
time.”
Citing public discontent over the pace of democratization, President Askar Akayev of
Kyrgyzstan in late August decreed the formation of a Constitutional Council to consider
revamping the political system. He suggested that the Council consider eliminating one
chamber of the legislature, increasing legislative oversight, revamping law enforcement,
expanding government transparency, and other unspecified executive and judicial branch
reforms. The decree violates existing constitutional provisions on the amendment process,
and may permit the government to control the final form of proposed changes and the mode
of enactment, presumably through a popular referendum.
On August 29, Uzbek President Islam Karimov called for major political and economic
liberalization and guarantees of press freedom (the day before, two Uzbek dissidents who
criticized official corruption and police abuse were forcibly committed to psychiatric
hospitals). Neighboring Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, on the other hand, on
August 29 stated that a strong presidential system was essential to order and stability during
the transition to democracy. Referring obliquely to U.S. public diplomacy after 9/11 and
Russia’s new media law, he asserted that Kazakhstan too should put “state interests” above
“mercenary” independent media interests.
Two weeks after prominent Kazakh journalist Artur Platonov was beaten by former
police officers, another prominent journalist and human rights advocate, Sergey Duvanov,
was attacked by unknown assailants on August 28. The State Department condemned the
assault, and President Nazarbayev termed the culprits “enemies of the country.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and
South Asia. The major peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks
speak an Iranian language), and most are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims).
Most are closely related historically and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian Tsars
had conquered the last independent khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. After the
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breakup of the Tsarist empire, Central Asia
Central Asia: Basic Facts
was at first included within Soviet Russia,
Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
but by 1936 five “union republics” had
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq.
been delineated. Soviet communist rule
mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan:
resulted in massive loss of life from
190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
collectivization and purges, though
Population: 56.4 million (2001 est., Economist
economic development occurred. Upon the
Intelligence Unit), somewhat less than France;
collapse of the Soviet Union in December
Kazakhstan: 14.8 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 4.9 m.;
1991, the five republics gained worldwide
Tajikistan: 6.3 m.; Turkmenistan: 5.3 m.; Uz-
diplomatic recognition. (For overviews,
bekistan: 25.1 m.
see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS
Gross Domestic Product: $41.6 billion in 2001;
Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report
per capita GDP is about $740; poverty is rampant.
98-594, Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055,
Kazakhstan: $22.0 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $1.5 b.; Tajikis-
Turkmenistan; and CRS Report 97-1060,
tan: $1.0 b.; Turkmenistan: $6.0 b.; Uzbekistan:
$11.1 b. (EIU, current prices)
Uzbekistan.)
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized
the independence of all the former Central Asian republics. Citing the dangers they faced
from Iranian-sponsored Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were established
with all five new states by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that
the Administration devise a policy on aiding the new Eurasian states, former President Bush
sent the Freedom Support Act to Congress, which was amended and signed into law in
October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, Congressional concerns led to passage of the “Silk
Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (contained in Consolidated Appropriations for
FY2000; P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration,
humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls,
democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Post-9/11. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focuses on three inter-related
activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy development. The 9/11
attacks led the Administration to realize that “it was critical to the national interests of the
United States that we greatly enhance our relations with the five Central Asian countries,”
according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony on June 27,
2002. While then-U.S. Caspian emissary Elizabeth Jones (currently Assistant Secretary of
State) in April 2001 carefully elucidated that the United States would not intervene militarily
to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into Central Asia, this stance was effectively reversed
after 9/11. U.S. military counter-terrorism efforts were undertaken in Afghanistan, including
against terrorists harbored in Afghanistan who aimed to overthrow Central Asian
governments and who were assisting in Taliban fighting against the coalition. Added
security training and equipment were provided to the Central Asian states, supplemented by
more aid to promote democratization, human rights, and economic reforms, because the latter
aid addressed “root causes of terrorism,” according to Jones in testimony on December 13,
2001. She averred that “we rely on [Central Asian] governments for the security and well-
being of our troops, and for vital intelligence that has helped us to conduct an effective
military campaign in Afghanistan.” She stated that the United States “will not abandon
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Central Asia” after peace is achieved in Afghanistan, and repeated previous Administration
pledges that deeper ties were conditioned on “demonstrated, concrete steps toward reform.”

Immediately after 9/11, the Central Asian governments condemned the attacks, but over
the next two weeks, as U.S. attention focused on Afghanistan, none unambiguously offered
to permit overflight rights or U.S. military airbase access. At first, Turkmenistan’s foreign
minister reiterated its policy of neutrality and its friendship with the Taliban in refusing to
cooperate in a U.S.-led military campaign. Tajikistan, host to the largest Russian military
presence in Central Asia and largely dependent on Russia to police its border with
Afghanistan, was hesitant to cooperate with the United States without permission from
Moscow. However, since Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Northern
Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, they were predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing
for the Northern Alliance. These Central Asian states, along with Kyrgyzstan, also had
suffered from incursions by the IMU and other terrorists, who were harbored by the Taliban.
On September 24, 2001, Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov gave his consent for ground
transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian aid to support U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in
Afghanistan because “evil must be punished.” Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev also
offered airfields, military bases, and airspace. That evening, President Putin stated that
Russia would support U.S. efforts by providing intelligence, overflight rights for
humanitarian cargoes, access to Central Asian airbases, and support for the Northern
Alliance. The next day, Kyrgyz President Akayev indicated that he had received the backing
of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS’s) Collective
Security Treaty for U.S. use of Kyrgyz airspace for anti-terrorism in Afghanistan. Many
Uzbek officials were offended by a warning from the Taliban “foreign minister” on
September 24, 2001, against permitting U.S. use of Uzbek territory to attack Afghanistan.
Two days later, Uzbek President Karimov permitted U.S. use of Uzbek airspace against
Afghan-based terrorists for “humanitarian and security purposes” if Uzbekistan’s security
was guaranteed. This condition was met with a U.S.-Uzbek agreement signed on October
7 and a Joint Statement issued on October 12, 2001.
The United States and Kazakhstan signed a memorandum of understanding on July 10,
2002, permitting U.S. military aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airport in Almaty for emergency
military landings. The accord was needed in part because military flights out of Kyrgyzstan’s
Manas Airport, 120 miles away, can be disrupted by harsh weather. Sensitive to some
Kazakh, Russian, and Chinese concerns, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry stressed that there
would be no “permanent” presence of U.S. military personnel. A few days later, the United
States and Kazakhstan reached another agreement providing increased U.S. military training
and equipment for the Kazakh armed forces (see also below, Security).
While a consensus appears to exist among most U.S. policymakers and others on these
interests, there are various views on the types and levels of U.S. involvement in the region.
Many of those who endorse continued or enhanced U.S. support for Central Asia argue that
political instability and the growth of terrorist groups in Central Asia can produce spillover
effects both in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as Turkey, and
worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist
regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related technology in the region.
They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends,
that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the United States is in
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the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and respect for human
rights. They stress that U.S. leadership in world aid efforts to foster reform will help
alleviate the social distress exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups to gain new
members. Although many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia
in the region, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the
independence of the states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.
Some views of policymakers and academics, who previously objected to a more forward
U.S. policy toward Central Asia, may appear less salient given post-9/11 or other recent
developments. They argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region
and that developments there were largely marginal to U.S. interests. They advocated limited
U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests.
They discounted fears that an anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway
to overturn secular regimes or otherwise harm U.S. interests. They questioned the existence
of sizeable oil and gas resources in these new states and whether the energy could be
economically developed and delivered to Western markets. Other still topical arguments
include whether the United States should continue to try to foster democratization among
cultures some view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Some observers urge reducing
or cutting off most aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing
that such aid provides tacit support for these regimes, and might even unwittingly be fueling
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. These observers
reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism, nonproliferation, regional cooperation,
trade, and investment outweigh concerns over democratization and human rights. Some
point to civil problems in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew major
involvement that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible
members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western
organizations. The United States has supported these integrative goals through bilateral aid
and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as Turkey.
These and other means are used to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic
fundamentalists — who use repression or violence to oppose democratization — from
attempts to gain influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some
trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development
aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their
foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns
of other Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.)
Russia’s Role. The events of 9/11 may weaken Russia’s influence over the Central
Asian states, though long-term impacts depend on the duration and scope of U.S. and
coalition presence in the region, Russia’s countervailing polices, and the fate of Afghanistan.
Prior to 9/11, the Putin Administration had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region
while opposing the growth of U.S. and other influence. On the other hand, while calling
Central Asia an important or even “vital” interest of the United States, U.S. Administrations
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had generally deferred to Russia on regional security issues and had refused major U.S.
military assistance to the states to combat terrorism. After 9/11, Uzbekistan reaffirmed its
more assertive policy of lessening its security dependence on Russia by granting conditional
overflight rights and other support, nudging a reluctant Putin regime to accede to a U.S. and
coalition presence in the region in keeping with Russia’s own support to the region to combat
the Taliban. Russia’s other reasons for permitting the increased U.S. and coalition presence
included its interests in boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hope of
regaining influence in a post-Taliban Afghanistan by continuing to support the Northern
Alliance. Russia cooperated with Central Asia in supporting U.S. and coalition efforts,
including by quickly sending military equipment and advisors to assist the Northern Alliance
in attacks on the Taliban. On September 19, 2001, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
indicated that the nature of support given by the Central Asian states to the U.S.-led coalition
was up to each state, and President Putin reiterated this point on September 24, 2001, giving
Russia’s accedence to cooperation between these states and the United States.
In accord with long-standing U.S. policy, the Bush Administration generally views a
democratizing Russia as able to play a traditional stabilizing role in Central Asia, though
emphasizes that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and other
involvement. Assistant Secretary of State Jones most recently reiterated this policy on
February 11, 2002, stating that “our goal with the Russians is to make sure they understand
that ... we’re not trying to take over Central Asia from them, but we have ... international
common interests that we will be transparent about as they play out in Central Asia.” While
some observers continue to warn that Russia seeks to reabsorb Central Asia into a new
empire, most discount Russia’s capabilities, if not intentions, because of what they view as
Russia’s deep economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder. Virtually all U.S. analysts
agree, however, that Russia’s actions should be monitored to ensure that they do not infringe
on the independence of other Eurasian states.
Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic
ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic
concerns have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a
buffer to Islamic extremism. By the late 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by
Central Asia caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin may be
seeking to reverse. About 10-12,000 Russian border troops still defended “CIS borders” in
Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In late 1999, the last Russian
military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the Collective
Security Treaty, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness. Russia justified a 1999 military
base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.
In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January
2000, then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign
efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. The members of
the Collective Security Treaty at a May 2001 summit approved the creation of rapid reaction
forces, including a Central Asian force composed of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik country-
based battalions and a headquarters in Bishkek aimed to counter Islamic extremism but also
apparently aimed to counter U.S. and NATO security influence.
Soon after 9/11, Russia demonstrably reversed the policy of drawing down its military
presence in Central Asia by increasing its troop presence in Tajikistan by a reported 1,500.
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In mid-June 2002, Russia also signed military accords with Kyrgyzstan extending leases on
military facilities to fifteen years, opening shuttered Kyrgyz defense industries, and training
Kyrgyz troops. Most significantly, Kyrgyzstan also agreed that its Kant airfield outside its
capital of Bishkek could be used as a base for the Central Asian rapid reaction forces. In
signing the accords, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov rationalized that they marked
Russia’s help – along with U.S. and coalition forces and China – in combating terrorism and
were necessary for Russia to monitor the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. He
declared that the accords marked Russia’s intention to maintain a military presence in the
region. According to some reports, Ivanov also convinced Kyrgyz authorities to announce
that all U.S. and coalition use of the Manas airport had to end by mid-2003.
Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial
influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and
by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory. At the same time, Russia has
avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia’s motives in the post-9/11
environment vis-a-vis a Western role in energy development in the Caspian remain complex
and it does not appear that a coherent regional energy policy is being followed. The Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has softened but not reversed its attitude against construction of
the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline post-9/11, and the Russian government generally remains less
willing than are Russian energy firms to accept a role for Western energy firms in the region.
Perhaps indicating still-conflicting views within Russia, in late 2001, Russia’s LUKoil and
Yukos oil companies indicated that they might want to participate in the consortium planning
to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. However, LUKoil brusquely announced in May 2002
that it would not participate; leading some observers to speculate that elements in the Russian
government quashed the overture. During Turkmen President Niyazov’s Moscow visit in
January, 2002, President Putin called for Central Asian states to form a Eurasian Gas
Alliance to balance production and consumption and “export through a single channel.”
Russia’s media speculated that Putin proffered the alliance to protect Russia’s influence over
the world gas market against the possibility of more U.S. energy influence in the region.
The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has in
practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the
“reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” Ethnic Russians residing in Central Asia have
had rising concerns about employment, language, and other policies or practices they deem
discriminatory and many have emigrated, contributing to their decline from 20 million in
1989 to 6.6 million in 2001. They now constitute 12% of the population of Central Asia,
according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Remaining Russians tend to be elderly or
low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become a majority.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
The presidents of four out of five of the Central Asian states have been in power since
independence, and were previous communist party heads or officials during the Soviet
period. They have remained in place by orchestrating extensions of their terms and by
limiting political freedoms. U.S. policymakers have warned, however, that political
repression ultimately harms stability. The lack of obvious successors to the present leaders
raises concern among many observers. Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled that
President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution set
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a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming him
president for life. Nazarbayev too in 2000 gained some official powers for life. A
referendum in early 2002 extended Karimov’s term to 2007. Belying this appearance of
stability, Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999 by explosions that
Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (see below), and Karimov’s, Niyazov’s, and Akayev’s
regimes faced popular protests during 2002 (For Kyrgyzstan, see below, Democratization).
Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups,
convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the
Central Asian states. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support national
identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and Islam.
Among the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan), some promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude, however, that in
the foreseeable future the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region
of shared identities and aspirations.
Central Asia’s borders, described as among the world’s most convoluted, fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential
instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries
and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More
ethnic Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in
Turkmenistan. Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and a million or
more in Afghanistan. Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The
fertile Ferghana Valley was divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan,
leaving large numbers of people outside their “national” borders. Criss-crossing mountains
thwart Tajikistan’s integrity. Akayev has faced widespread popular criticism over a border
demarcation agreement with China that ceded some territory, and Tajikistan and China
continue to wrangle over borders.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty”
with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in
1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese
border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic
Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them
to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In May 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). According to the newspaper of the Chinese
Liberation Army, the SCO at its meeting in June 2002 in St. Petersburg discussed how the
members would “bear the brunt” if the U.S. military gets a “firm hold” in Central Asia. The
official declaration and reports of the meeting stressed anti-terrorism cooperation but offered
no mention of support for the U.S. and coalition efforts in Afghanistan, reflecting the SCO’s
opposition to a U.S. regional presence, according to some observers.
The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which
by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of
suspects, including political dissidents. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh
(former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
the plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social
movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six
receiving the death sentence. The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic
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terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and
Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and Jama
Namanganiy. Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), led by Yuldashev and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldashev,
Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldashev defense
minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established. In November 2000, the
Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were tried in
absentia. The absent Yuldashev and Namanganiy were given death sentences and the absent
Solikh, 15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process during
the trial. Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in
the IMU. Yuldsashev too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings but warned that
more might occur if Karimov does not step down.
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU, led by Yuldashev, as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens
U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the
current government in Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on
Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by terrorist
Osama bin Laden, according to the State Department, and it stressed that the “United States
supports the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the
violent actions of the IMU.” The Bush Administration supports Uzbekistan’s efforts to
combat terrorism but stresses that such efforts should not include human rights abuses.
Reportedly, besides the IMU, nearly a dozen Islamic extremist groups in Uzbekistan are
attracting increasing popular support. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, IMU
forces assisting the Taliban against U.S. and coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major
losses, and Namanganiy may have been killed, but the IMU remains a regional threat.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group.
They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in
south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air
and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999.
According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of
Kyrgyzstan’s security forces. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan in August 2000, in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading
thousands of Kyrgyz to flee the area. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but Kyrgyz
forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000, reporting
the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.
Civil War in Tajikistan. State Department officials served as observers at the
U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after a peace
settlement, indications of the Administration’s efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the
Eurasian states. The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the
effects of the Tajik civil war. The United States supported the presence of U.N. observers
in Tajikistan, and urged Russian-CIS “peacekeeping” forces to cooperate fully with them and
to abide by international law. U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S.
closure of its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan,
because of inadequate security. Beginning in 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled
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back and forth to Dushanbe. A site will be identified where a secure chancery can be built.
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and groups – largely consisting of members of
Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power – tried
to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia,
launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000
casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to
Afghanistan. These United Tajik Opposition (UTO) rebels variously received help from Iran
and the IMU. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of
Russian and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops. After the two sides agreed to a
cease-fire, the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in
Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali
Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement,
under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to
the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were largely met, including the return of
refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of
elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded. UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, and a
small U.N. Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building (UNTOP) was set up to facilitate aid. The
CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain
under a 25-year basing agreement.
Democratization and Human Rights
A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S.
democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral
laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of
governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the
United States has worked with the ex-Communist party officials who have led in four of the
five states (except Tajikistan) since before independence, recognizing that they may continue
to hold power for some time.
Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the
states by former Soviet and ex-Communist party elites, gradual transitions to more
nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-
scale and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the
Central Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would
pursue democratization, but all have fallen short by varying degrees. During Nazarbayev’s
1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership
recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and
economic reform. During his December 2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in
a joint statement with President Bush. In March 2002, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz
Komilov and Secretary Powell signed a “Strategic Partnership” accord pledging Uzbekistan
to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press.
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According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
2001, presidential power in all the Central Asian states overshadows legislative and judicial
power, and that they have lost ground in democratization. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are
generally viewed as the most repressive, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan permit some
limited free expression and other rights. Tajikistan experienced many conflict-related human
rights abuses in the course of its 1992-2000 civil war, but during its fragile peace there have
been a few human rights improvements. In most of the states, religious freedom is
threatened by repression against nonfavored faiths, missionaries, and pious Muslims who
tend to be viewed as extremists. Unfair elections and unseemly extensions of presidential
terms in Central Asia increase political alienation and frustration among the populations and
contribute to the formation of clandestine groups seeking to overthrow the regimes.
In testimony to Congress on June 27, 2002, Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner
referred to Central Asia in stating that “even while we ramp up our military cooperation with
governments that have troubling human rights records, we also see this as an opportunity to
enhance our engagement and impact on issues of democracy and human rights.” He also
repeated past Administration vows that “any deepening and broadening of our cooperation
will depend on continual progress in respecting human rights and democracy.” In Congress,
conferees on H.R.4775 (H.Rept.107-593; the third emergency supplemental for FY2002;
P.L.107-206 ) called for added Foreign Military Financing (FMF) aid to Uzbekistan to be
conditioned on a report by the Secretary of State that it is making progress in meeting its
human rights commitments under the “Strategic Partnership” agreement.
Security and Arms Control
Since 9/11, U.S. and coalition action in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to halt the
export of terrorism from Afghanistan has greatly increased the security of Central Asia. The
development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-9/11 facilitated the cooperation of
the states in OEF. Reportedly, such pre-9/11 ties included Uzbek permission for U.S.
clandestine efforts against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. According to Assistant Secretary of
Defense Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each [Central
Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.” Kyrgyzstan,
he relates, is a “critical regional partner” in OEF, providing basing for combat and combat
support units at Manas International Airport for U.S., French, Italian, Norwegian, Canadian,
and South Korean forces. Uzbekistan provides a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-
Khanabad and a base for German units at Termez, and a land corridor to Afghanistan for
humanitarian aid via the Friendship Bridge at Termez. It has also leased to the coalition IL-
76 transport airlift for forces and equipment. Kazakhstan has provided overflight rights and
expedited rail transhipment of supplies. Turkmenistan has permitted blanket overflight and
refueling privileges for humanitarian flights in support of OEF. Tajikistan has permitted use
of its international airport in Dushanbe for U.S., British, and French refueling and basing.
While the Administration has rejected the idea of permanent military bases in these states,
Crouch stated in June 2002 that “for the foreseeable future, U.S. defense and security
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cooperation in Central Asia must continue
Cumulative Obligations FY1992-FY2001 for
to support actions to deter or defeat
Central Asian Security Programs
terrorist threats” and to build effective
(Freedom Support Act and Other Funds)
(million dollars)
armed forces under civilian control.
USDA-ARS Collaborative Research Program
4.63
U.S. Department of Health & Human
A small but increasing amount of
Services - BTEP
2.35
U.S. security assistance was provided to
DOE Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
4.28
the region pre-9/11, and much more after
DOE Materials Protection, Control
and Accounting (MPC&A)
32.09
9/11 (see box and Table 2). All the states
DOE Export Control Programs (Nuclear)
3.55
receive FMF and International Military
DOE Arms Control Support
33.13
Education and Training (IMET)
DOS International Military Exchanges
assistance, and in FY2002 become
and Training (IMET)
9.82
DOS NADR/Counterproliferation
2.96
eligible to receive Excess Defense
DOS Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
2.97
Articles (EDA) on a grant basis. Sizeable
DOS Warsaw Initiative (FMF)
26.75
amounts of comprehensive threat
DOD Warsaw Initiative
2.21
reduction (CTR) aid have been provided
DOS Science Centers
18.24
to Kazakhstan to eliminate its nuclear
DOS Export Control and Border Security
15.38
DOS Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
5.59
weapons and facilities. U.S. Central
DOD-Comprehensive Threat Reduction
180.13
Command in 1999 became responsible for
DOD Customs Border Security and
U.S. military engagement activities,
Counterproliferation
2.30
planning, and operations in Central Asia.
DoD/FBI Counterproliferation
3.15
It states that its peacetime strategy focuses
NSF / Civilian R&D Foundation (CRDF)
6.59
Total Security Programs
356.12*
on PFP, Marshall Center (the defense
Source: Coordinator’s Office, State Department and CRS
educational coordinator for PFP), and
calculations
IMET programs to foster “apolitical,
*See Table 2 for FY1992-FY2002 totals.
professional militaries capable of
responding to regional peacekeeping and
humanitarian needs” in the region. USCENTCOM Commanders visited the region regularly,
setting the stage for more extensive military ties post-9/11. Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld visited the region in December 2001 and April-May 2002.
Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states
except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994. Tajikistan decided to join PFP before
9/11, and signed accords on admission in February 2002. At the signing, a NATO press
release stated that “Central Asia remains an important component of the security and stability
of the Euro-Atlantic area and the security of Central Asia has a direct bearing on the security
of Europe,” hailed “Tajikistan's courageous decision to support the international coalition,”
and declared that “support from Tajikistan, as well as other Central Asian Partners [is] of key
importance” to combating terrorism. Central Asian officers and troops have participated in
PFP exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops participated in exercises in
Central Asia in 1997, 1998, and 2000. Many in Central Asia viewed these exercises as
“sending a message” to Islamic extremists and others in Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere
against fostering regional instability. Central Asian PFP command exercises termed
“Regional Cooperation” were held in Germany in mid-2001.
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included
elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet
Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States
has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear
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technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in
reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their
air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the
last of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and
transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The
SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994 and most silos were blown up in 1995-1996. In
December 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for
the “safe and secure” dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related
purposes. In June 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed an extension accord to
destroy six remaining silos at the Leninsk testing ground in the Kyzyl-Orda region.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines,
and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation
concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and
plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining
and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. In 1997 and
1999, U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor
and eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to
eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in
May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and
decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep
Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. aid has been used to
eliminate active anthrax spores and other hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an
island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly
serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has
greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan,
although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating
commercial ties. However, corruption is stifling the emergence of the rule of law, as
exemplified by allegations that both Nazarbayev and Niyazov have siphoned energy revenues
into bank accounts they control. U.S. energy companies have committed to invest billions
of dollars in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, but have experienced repeated
contractual violations and other unforeseen risks. Currency convertibility problems in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan stymie investment, business growth, and trade.
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U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian
states. Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June
2000, so that Jackson-Vanik trade provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no
longer apply. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term
insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and
bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on
insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or
insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. The Central Asian American Enterprise Fund,
authorized by Congress to lend up to $150 million, has been bedeviled by convertibility
problems and major defaults on its joint venture loans and has halted operations.
All the states of the region possess large-scale resources that could yield export
earnings, but major investments are needed to revamp, develop, or market these resources
in most cases. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but
need added foreign investment in production and transport. Uzbekistan’s cotton and gold
production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has moderate
energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral reserves, is a
major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of the world’s
largest aluminum processing plants (exporting over $300 million worth in 1999) and is a
major cotton grower.
Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central
Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the
West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas
transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia,
promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and
opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give
it undue influence over the region. President Bush’s May 2001 National Energy Policy
report suggests that greater oil production in the Caspian region could not only benefit
regional economies, but also help mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends
U.S. support for building Baku-Ceyhan oil and gas pipelines, coaxing oil companies
operating in Kazakhstan to use the oil pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states
to provide a stable and inviting business climate for energy development. It avers that the
building of the pipelines will enhance energy supply diversification, including for Georgia
and Turkey. In late August 2002, U.S. Coordinator of Assistance to Eurasia William Taylor
resurrected U.S. support (dropped during Taliban rule) for construction of a gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and possibly to India. While touted by
Niyazov, energy firms have so far viewed such a route as too risky.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as
a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Oil resources, DOE reports, are
comparable to those of the North Sea, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan rank
among the top countries in terms of proven and probable gas reserves. DOE reports
estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves in
Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be exploited by Chevron-Texaco and
Kazakhstan in a consortium during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and Russia’s LUKoil later joined).
In April 2001, the joint venture announced that Tengiz reserves were much higher than
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previously thought. In July 2002, another consortium led by Italy’s Agip oil firm reported
findings from its test wells and research that Kazakhstan’s Kashagan offshore Caspian oil
field had between 7-9 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves and up to 38 billion barrels in
probable reserves, comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are
over 630,000 barrels per day, compared to 3 million bd for Russia.
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets.
In a strategy similar to one Russia has used in other CIS and in Eastern Europe, where it
restricted energy supplies until given commercial concessions, Russia’s restrictions on
Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996 after the consortium admitted
LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another consortium. Russian shareholders have
a controlling interest, 44 percent, in the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC), which
completed construction in late 2001 on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk – the region’s first new large-capacity pipeline – that initially
carries 560,000 barrels per day, and eventually will carry 1.3 million barrels per day.
President Bush hailed the opening of the pipeline as an example “that the United States,
Russia, and Kazakhstan are cooperating to build prosperity and stability in this part of the
world.” He stated that the CPC project also “advances my Administration’s National Energy
Policy by developing a network of multiple Caspian pipelines ... [that] help diversify U.S.
energy supply and enhance our energy security.”
In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It
is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas
exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other Eurasian
states that had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because
of transit fee arrears and other problems. In 1998 and every year thereafter, Turkmenistan
has tried to get higher prices for its gas but has capitulated to Russia’s natural gas firm
Gazprom (or its subsidiary Itera). Putin’s talks in January, 2002 with Niyazov on long-term
gas supplies were unproductive because Niyazov balked at the low prices offered and at
Russia’s plans for Caspian Sea border demarcation. Seeking alternative export routes,
Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside
world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran’s pipeline system. Some oil is also
sent to Iran in a swap arrangement. Swiss and Chinese firms are modernizing Iran’s
infrastructure to boost its ability to process Turkmen and Kazakh oil.
Aid Overview
The Bush Administration has provided added security and other assistance to the
Central Asian states in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Some observers
characterize this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an
incentive for continued cooperation. The Administration has argued that the safer
environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military
presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic
liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources.
For much of the 1990s and until 9/11, U.S. assistance to Central Asian states was
dwarfed by that to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia (most such aid was funded from
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the FREEDOM Support Act account in Foreign Operations Appropriations, but some derived
from other program and agency budgets). The amount of aid provided to Central Asia
usually but not always tracked with the “roller coaster” of declining (FY1994-FY1997),
increasing (FY1998-FY1999), and declining (FY2000-FY2001) aid provided to the rest of
the Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. In FY1998, the previous Administration
called for added civil society assistance, particularly for the Central Asian countries and
Russia. Although congressional earmarks fenced off much of the FREEDOM Support Act
aid, Central Asia benefitted from other program and agency spending. Increased
appropriations in FY1999 for Eurasia also benefitted Central Asia. In FY2000, despite
declining FREEDOM Support Act assistance, support for Central Asia increased to $222.57
million (including other program and Agency funding). In FY2001, foreign assistance
obligated to Central Asia amounted to $248.02 million (FREEDOM Support Act and other
Agency funding). Estimated spending for FY2002, during OEF, was greatly boosted, but
requested aid for FY2003 is less. See Table 1.
The Central Asian states have been regarded as front line states during OEF, receiving
$147.883 million in added security and humanitarian aid in the emergency terrorism response
supplemental appropriation for FY2002 (P.L.107-38) to supplement other appropriated aid
for FY2002. The Administration’s third emergency supplemental request for FY2002
(P.L.107-206; H.Rept.107-593) calls for $3.5 million for Kazakhstan, $4 million for
Turkmenistan, $42 million for Kyrgyzstan, $40 million for Tajikistan, and $45.5 million for
Uzbekistan, with the larger aid amounts for the latter three states dedicated mainly to
democratic and economic reforms. Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States
contributes to international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid
Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using
it (is the aid subject to corruption or is the aid conditioned on reforms), what it should be
used for, and who should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former
Soviet Union and U.S. Foreign Assistance.)
Table 1. FY2001 Obligations, the FY2002 Estimate, and the FY2003
Foreign Assistance Request
(in millions of dollars)
FY2002 Estimate
Including the Emergency
FY2001
Terrorism Supplementals (in
FY2003
Central Asian Country
Obligations
parentheses)
Request*
Kazakhstan
75.5
84.9 (28.0+3.5)
51.36
Kyrgyzstan
36.73
91.9 (2.0+42.0)
43.255
Tajikistan
67.38
138.1 (27.383+40.0)
22.9
Turkmenistan
13.69
20.9 (7.0+4.0)
9.438
Uzbekistan
54.72
218.5 (83.5+45.5)
43.948
Total
248.02
554.3
170.901
Sources: USAID and State Department. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency budgets.
*FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds (does not include Defense or Energy Department
funding).
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Table 2: U.S. Government FY1992-FY2002 Budgeted Assistance to
Central Asia, by Category
(FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets)
(millions of dollars)
Programs
Kaz
Kgz
Tjk
Tkm
Uzb
Total
Percent
Democracy Prog.
108.85
71.04
27.92
22.09
71.21
301.11
11.35
Market Reform
241.66
151.77
13.91
27.04
69.54
503.92
18.99
Security Prog.
324.39
54.9
21.86
19.54
119.21
539.9
20.35
Humanitarian Prog.
74.36
279.23
363.94
113.17
114.0
944.7
35.61
Cross-sectoral/other
131.04
54.25
31.06
38.97
108.27
363.59
13.7
Total
880.3
611.19
458.69
220.81
482.23
2,653.22
100
Source: Coordinator’s Office, State Department, and CRS calculations. The included FY2002 data are
estimates. The third supplemental’s democracy/economy program funding of $76 million is not further broken
down so is not included.
Map: Central Asia’s New States
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