Order Code RL31339
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
Updated August 16, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
Summary
In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, President Bush
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. The
President identified the key threat from Iraq as its development of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and the potential for Iraq to transfer WMD to the terrorist
groups it sponsors. In recent statements, the President and other senior officials have
said the United States needs to ensure that Saddam Husayn cannot be positioned to
pose a major and imminent threat to U.S. national security. The President’s
subsequent statements have left observers with the clear implication that the
Administration is leaning toward military action to achieve the ouster of Iraq’s
President Saddam Husayn and his Ba’th Party regime, although the President says no
decision has been made on the means of achieving regime change.
Regime change has been official U.S. policy since October 1998. Even before
that, U.S. efforts to oust Saddam have been pursued, with varying degrees of
intensity, since the end of the Gulf war in 1991. These efforts primarily involved
U.S. backing for opposition groups inside and outside Iraq. According to several
experts, past efforts to change the regime floundered because of limited U.S.
engagement, disorganization of the Iraqi opposition, and the efficiency and
ruthlessness of Iraq’s several overlapping intelligence and security forces.
Previously, major U.S. military action to change the regime had been ruled out as too
costly and risky and not necessarily justified by the level of Iraq’s violations of its
post-war obligations.
Most experts believe that, should the Bush Administration decide to take action
to overthrow Iraq’s regime, nothing short of the direct use of U.S. armed force would
guarantee Saddam’s downfall. Supporters of military action believe that the threat
posed by a government headed by Saddam Husayn and in possession of substantial
arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is so great that the United States
must move, with unilateral military action if necessary, to change the regime.
Advocates of military action add that U.S. action would lead to a regime that
forswears WMD, respects the human rights and economic well-being of its people,
and serves as a model for broader democratization in the Arab world.
Opponents of military action maintain that there is little international support
for unilateral U.S. military action to change Iraq’s regime, that doing so could
destabilize the Middle East, and that action could lead to numerous U.S. casualties
and a long-term presence in Iraq. Others believe that the threat from Saddam’s
regime is manageable through means currently in place, such as containment, or
through stepped-up covert action. Some believe the United States should focus its
efforts, in concert with other members of the U.N. Security Council, to obtain Iraq’s
compliance with long-standing U.N. requirements, such as the mandate that Iraq fully
cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors. U.N. inspectors have not been inside Iraq
since December 1998, when a U.S.-Iraq confrontation over inspections led to their
withdrawal.

Contents
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
An Opposition Coalition Emerges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Iraqi National Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Kurds/KDP and PUK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
SCIRI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Fragmentation of the Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Iraqi National Accord (INA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Rebuilding an Opposition Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Iraq Liberation Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Continued Debate Over Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pre-September 11 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Policy Post-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
WMD Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Regime Chance Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Containment/Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Congressional Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition (Appropriated Economic
Support Funds, E.S.F.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime
The United States has been attempting to change Iraq’s regime since the 1991
Persian Gulf war, although achieving this goal was not declared policy until 1998.
In November 1998, amid a crisis with Iraq over U.N. weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) inspections, the Clinton Administration stated that the United States would
seek to go beyond containment to promoting a change of regime. Bush
Administration officials have emphasized regime change as the cornerstone of U.S.
policy toward Iraq. This paper discusses past and current U.S. efforts to oust Saddam
Husayn and the current debate over the implementation of that policy.
Past Attempts to Oust Saddam
Prior to the launching on January 16, 1991 of Operation Desert Storm, an
operation that reversed Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George
H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. Within days of the end
of the Gulf war (February 28, 1991), opposition Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and
Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime's defeat and the hope
of U.S. support, launched significant rebellions.1 The revolt in southern Iraq reached
the suburbs of Baghdad, but the well-trained and loyal Republican Guard forces had
survived the war largely intact, having been withdrawn from battle prior to the U.S.
ground offensive, and the Guard defeated the Shiite rebels by mid-March 1991. The
Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” established in April 1991, were able
to carve out an autonomous zone in northern Iraq, and remain largely free of
Baghdad’s rule today.
According to press reports, about two months after the failure of the Shiite
uprising, President George H.W. Bush forwarded to Congress an intelligence finding
stating that the United States would undertake efforts to promote a military coup
against Saddam Husayn; a reported $15 million to $20 million was allocated for that
purpose.2 The Administration apparently believed -- and this view apparently still
is shared by many experts and U.S officials -- that a coup by elements within the
current regime could produce a favorable new government without fragmenting Iraq.
Many observers, however, including neighboring governments, feared that Shiite and
Kurdish groups, if they ousted Saddam, would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal groups, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
1Shiites constitute about 65% of Iraq's population but historically have been repressed and
under-represented in governing bodies by the members of the Sunni Muslim sect. Kurds,
who are not Arabs, constitute about 20% of the population of about 20 million.
2Tyler, Patrick. “Plan On Iraq Coup Told to Congress.” New York Times, February 9, 1992.

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An Opposition Coalition Emerges
Reports in July 1992 of a serious but unsuccessful coup attempt suggested that
the U.S. strategy might ultimately succeed. However, there was disappointment
within the George H.W. Bush Administration that the coup had failed and a decision
was made to shift the U.S. approach from promotion of a coup to supporting the
diverse opposition groups that had led the postwar rebellions. The Kurdish, Shiite,
and other opposition elements were coalescing into a broad and diverse movement
that appeared to be gaining support internationally. Congress more than doubled the
budget for covert support to the opposition groups to about $40 million for FY1993.3
The Iraqi National Congress
The Iraqi National Congress (INC) served as the vehicle for U.S. support. The
INC was formed when the two main Kurdish militias — the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP), headed by Masud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),
headed by Jalal Talabani — participated in a June 1992 meeting in Vienna of dozens
of opposition groups. In October 1992, the major Shiite groups came into the
coalition when the INC met in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Selected to chair
the INC’s Executive Committee was Ahmad Chalabi, a secular Shiite Muslim and
U.S.-trained mathematician who had fled Iraq to Jordan in the late 1950s, before the
Ba’th Party took power in Iraq (July 1968). He eventually chaired the Petra Bank
there, but later ran afoul of Jordanian authorities on charges of financial malfeasance.
Chalabi maintains that the Jordanian government was pressured by Iraq to turn
against him.
The INC initially appeared viable because it brought under one banner varying
Iraqi ethnicities and diverse political ideologies, including nationalists, ex-military
officers, and defectors from Iraq’s ruling Ba'th Party. The Kurds provided the INC
with a source of armed force and a presence on Iraqi territory. Its constituent groups
nominally united around a platform that appeared to match U.S. values and interests,
including human rights, democracy, pluralism, the preservation of Iraq’s territorial
integrity, and compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iraq.4 However,
many observers doubted its commitment to democracy, because most of its groups
have an authoritarian internal structure, and because of inherent tensions among its
varied ethnic groups and ideologies.
The Kurds/KDP and PUK. The INC platform assured the Kurds substantial
autonomy within a post-Saddam Iraq, although some fear the Kurds would seek
outright independence. Turkey, which has a sizable Kurdish population in the areas
bordering northern Iraq, particularly fears that independence for Iraq’s Kurds would
likely touch off an effort to unify into a broader “Kurdistan.” Iraq’s Kurds have been
fighting intermittently for autonomy since their region was incorporated into the
3Sciolino, Elaine. “Greater U.S. Effort Backed To Oust Iraqi.” New York Times, June 2,
1992.
4The Iraqi National Congress and the International Community. Document provided by INC
representatives, February 1993.

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newly formed Iraqi state after World War I. In 1961, the KDP, then led by founder
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Masud Barzani’s father, began an insurgency that has
continued until today, although interrupted by periods of autonomy negotiations with
Baghdad. Masud Barzani’s brother, Idris, was killed during the Iran-Iraq war. The
PUK split off from the KDP in 1961; the PUK’s members are generally more
educated, urbane, and left-leaning than those of the KDP. Together, the PUK and
KDP have about 35,000-50,000 fighters. A small Kurdish Islamic faction, the
Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), is headed by Shaykh Ali Abd-al Aziz.
Based in Halabja, Iraq, the IMIK has publicized the effects of Baghdad's March 1988
chemical attack on that city.
SCIRI. Several outside experts had concerns about the alliance between Iran
and another INC component, the Iraqi Shiite Islamic fundamentalist group called the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was set up in
1982 to increase Iranian control over Shiite opposition groups in Iraq and the Persian
Gulf states. Its leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was the late Ayatollah
Khomeini’s choice to head an Islamic Republic of Iraq. Hakim and his family, most
notably his brother Abd al-Aziz, were leaders of the Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party,
which allegedly was responsible for a May 1985 attempted assassination of the Amir
of Kuwait and the December 1983 attacks on the U.S. and French embassies in
Kuwait. SCIRI has about 5,000 fighters organized into a “Badr Corps” (named after
a major battle in early Islam) that conducts forays from Iran into southern Iraq to
attack the Iraqi military and officials there. Although Iran has improved relations
with Iraq over the past few years, Iran's Revolutionary Guard – which is politically
aligned with Iran’s hard line civilian officials – reportedly continues to provide the
Badr Corps with weapons and other assistance. However, many Iraqi Shiites view
SCIRI as an Iranian creation and SCIRI/Badr Corps operations in southern Iraq have
not been known to spark broad popular unrest against the Iraqi regime. SCIRI has
periodically distanced itself from the INC and has publicly refused to attend
opposition meetings in the United States or accept U.S. assistance.
The Fragmentation of the Opposition
The differences within the INC led to its near collapse in the mid 1990s. In
May 1994, the KDP and the PUK began clashing with each other over territory,
customs revenues levied at border with Turkey, and control over the Kurdish
enclave’s government based in Irbil. The PUK lined up support from Iran while the
KDP sought and received countervailing backing from its erstwhile nemeses, the
Baghdad government. The infighting contributed to the defeat of an INC offensive
against Iraqi troops in March 1995; the KDP pulled out of the offensive at the last
minute. Although it was repelled, the offensive did initially overrun some of the less
well-trained and poorly motivated Iraqi units on the front lines facing the Kurds.
Some INC leaders have pointed to the battle as an indication that the INC could
succeed militarily in the future if it were given additional resources and training.
The Iraqi National Accord (INA). The infighting in the INC caused the
United States to briefly revisit the “coup strategy” by renewing ties to a separate

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group, Iraq National Accord (INA).5 Headed by Dr. Iyad Alawi, the INA consists of
military and security defectors who were perceived as having ties to disgruntled
officials currently serving within their former organizations. The INA’s prospects
appeared to brighten in August 1995 when Saddam's son-in-law Husayn Kamil al-
Majid — architect of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs — defected to
Jordan, suggesting that Saddam's grip on the military and security services was
weakening. Jordan's King Hussein agreed to allow the INA to operate from there.
However, the INA became penetrated by Iraq's intelligence services and, in June
1996, Baghdad dealt it a serious setback by arresting or executing over 100 INA
sympathizers in the military. Alawi claims that the INA continues to operate
throughout Iraq, and it apparently has rebuilt itself to some extent since the June 1996
arrests.
Iraq's counteroffensive against the opposition was completed two months later.
In late August 1996, the KDP asked Baghdad to provide armed support for its capture
of Irbil from the rival PUK. Iraq took advantage of the request to strike against the
INC base in Salahuddin, northern Iraq, as well as against remaining INA operatives
throughout northern Iraq. In the course of its incursion in the north, Iraq reportedly
executed two hundred oppositionists and arrested as many as 2,000 others. The
United States evacuated from northern Iraq and eventually resettled in the United
States 650 oppositionists, mostly from the INC.

Rebuilding an Opposition Strategy
For the two years following the opposition’s 1996 setbacks, the Clinton
Administration had little contact with the opposition. In those two years, the INC,
INA, and other opposition groups attempted to rebuild their organizations and their
ties to each other, although with mixed success. On February 26, 1998, then
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified to a Senate Appropriations
subcommittee that it would be "wrong to create false or unsustainable expectations"
about what U.S. support for the opposition could accomplish.
Iraq's obstructions of U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections
during 1997-98 led to growing congressional calls for overthrowing Saddam Husayn.
A formal congressional push for a regime change policy began with a FY1998
supplemental appropriation (P.L. 105-174, signed May 1, 1998) that, among other
provisions, earmarked $5 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for the
opposition and $5 million for a Radio Free Iraq, under the direction of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The radio service began broadcasting in October
1998, from Prague. Of the ESF, $3 million was devoted to an overt program to
coordinate and promote cohesion among the various opposition factions, and to
highlighting Iraqi violations of U.N. resolutions. The remaining $2 million was used
to translate and publicize documented evidence of alleged Iraqi war crimes; the
documents were retrieved from the Kurdish north, placed on 176 CD-ROM diskettes,
and translated and analyzed by experts under contract to the U.S. government.
5An account of this shift in U.S. strategy is essayed in Hoagland, Jim. “How CIA’s Secret
War On Saddam Collapsed.” Washington Post, June 26, 1997.

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Reflecting congressional views that the overt coordination program would do
little to challenge Iraq’s regime, a provision of the FY1999 omnibus appropriation
(Section 590 of H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-277, signed October 21, 1998), earmarked $8
million in ESF to the opposition, with the stipulation that at least $3 million in ESF
be given directly to the INC and at least another $2 million be used for opposition
activities inside Iraq itself. The provision also appeared to indicate that many in
Congress believed that the INC was the most effective vehicle to implement the
regime change policy. The remaining $3 million went to the opposition-led INDICT
(International Campaign to Indict Iraqi War Criminals) organization for publicizing
Iraqi war crimes issues. The $2 million for use inside Iraq was spent on
humanitarian projects mainly in the Kurdish north, according to the State
Department. Another $10 million in ESF for the opposition was provided by the
FY2000 foreign aid law (passed by reference in P.L. 106-113, signed November 29,
1999). Of that amount, $2 million was earmarked for war crimes issues.
Iraq Liberation Act
The clearest indication of congressional support for a more active U.S.
overthrow effort was encapsulated in another bill introduced in 1998 – the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA, H.R. 4655, P.L. 105-338, signed into law October 31, 1998).
The ILA gave the President authority to provide up to $97 million in defense articles
(and $2 million in broadcasting funds) to opposition organizations to be designated
by the Administration. The Act’s passage was widely interpreted as an expression
of congressional support for the concept, advocated by INC chairman Ahmad Chalabi
and some U.S. experts, such as General Wayne Downing, to promote an insurgency
by using U.S. airpower to protect opposition-controlled enclaves. President Clinton
signed the legislation despite reported widespread doubts within the Clinton
Administration about the chances of success in promoting an insurgency inside Iraq.
In mid-November 1998, President Clinton publicly articulated that regime change
was a component of U.S. policy toward Iraq; that statement of policy is a provision
of the Iraqi Liberation Act.
The signing of the ILA and the declaration of the overthrow policy came at the
height of the one-year series of crises over U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq, in
which inspections were repeatedly halted and restarted after mediation by the United
Nations, Russia, and others. On December 15, 1998, U.N. inspectors were
withdrawn for the final time, and a three-day U.S. and British bombing campaign
against suspected Iraqi WMD facilities followed (Operation Desert Fox, December
160-19, 1998).
Further steps followed Operation Desert Fox. The bombing followed In January
1999, career diplomat Frank Ricciardone was named as the State Department’s
“Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” – the chief liaison with the opposition. On
February 5, 1999, after consultations with Congress, the President issued a
determination (P.D. 99-13) that the following organizations would be eligible to
receive U.S. military assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act: the INC; the INA;
SCIRI; the KDP; the PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK); and the
Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM), which is led by Sharif Ali bin al-
Hussein, a relative of the Hashemite monarchs that ruled Iraq from the end of World

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War I until 1958. The IMIK and the MCM, in particular, are considered small
movements that cannot contribute much to an overthrow effort.
In May 1999, in concert with an INC visit to Washington, the Clinton
Administration announced it would draw down $5 million worth of training and
“non-lethal” defense equipment under the ILA. In late 1999, three opposition
members began civil administration training at Hurlburt air base in Florida and, in
June 2000, the Clinton Administration announced that another 145 oppositionists
would undergo similar training. The Defense Department-run courses have provided
civil affairs training, including instruction in field medicine, logistics, computers,
communications, broadcasting, power generation, and war crimes issues. However,
the Clinton Administration asserted that the opposition was not sufficiently organized
to merit U.S. provision of lethal military equipment or combat training. These
limitations reflected divisions within and outside the Clinton Administration over the
effectiveness and viability of the opposition, and over the potential for the United
States to become militarily embroiled in civil conflict in Iraq.
Continued Debate Over Policy
During 1999-2000, U.S. efforts to rebuild and fund the opposition did not end
the debate within the Clinton Administration over the regime change component of
Iraq policy. In hearings and statements, several Members of both parties expressed
disappointment with the Clinton Administration’s decision not to give the opposition
lethal military aid or combat training. Many took those decisions as an indication
that the Clinton Administration was skeptical of the overthrow strategy in light of
past failures to oust Saddam Husayn. Opponents of the Clinton Administration
overthrow policy maintained that the Iraqi opposition would not succeed unless
backed by direct U.S. military involvement and that direct U.S. military action was
risky and not justified by the threat posed by Iraq. Other critics suggested the United
States focus instead on rebuilding containment of Iraq by obtaining re-entry into Iraq
of the U.N. weapons of mass destruction inspectors that had been absent from Iraq
since December 15, 1998.

As a reflection of continued congressional support for the overthrow effort, a
provision of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, signed
November 6, 2000) earmarked $25 million in ESF for “programs benefitting the
Iraqi people,” of which at least: $12 million was for the INC to distribute
humanitarian aid inside Iraq; $6 million was for INC broadcasting; and $2 million
was for war crimes issues. According to the appropriation the remaining $5 million
could be used to aid the seven groups eligible to receive assistance under the ILA.
Taking note of congressional sentiment for INC distribution of aid inside Iraq, on
September 29, 2000 the Clinton Administration reached agreement with the INC to
provide the organization with $4 million in FY1999 ESF (one half the total earmark
available) to develop an aid distribution plan and to gather information in Iraq on
Iraqi war crimes. Three days before it left office, the Clinton Administration issued
a required report to Congress that noted that any INC effort to distribute aid in areas
of Iraq under Baghdad’s control would be fraught with security risks to the INC, to
Iraqi recipients of such aid, and to any relief distributors with which the INC

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contracts.6 On February 2, 2001, the Bush Administration confirmed that, shortly
after President Bush took office, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) granted the INC a license to proceed with the information gathering
portion of the humanitarian aid distribution plan.
Bush Administration Policy
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq changed after the September 11
terrorist attacks, even though little or no hard evidence linking Iraq to those attacks
has come to light. The shift toward a more assertive policy first became clear in
President Bush’s State of the Union message on January 29, 2002, when he
characterized Iraq as part of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea.
Pre-September 11 Policy
Throughout most of its first year, the Bush Administration continued most
elements of Clinton Administration policy. With no immediate consensus within the
new Administration on how forcefully to proceed with an overthrow strategy,
Secretary of State Powell focused on strengthening containment of Iraq, which the
Bush Administration said had eroded substantially in the year prior to its taking
office. Secretary Powell visited the Middle East in February 2001 to enlist regional
support for a so-called “smart sanctions” plan – a modification of the U.N. sanctions
regime to ensure that no weapons-related technology reaches Iraq. His plan offered
to alter the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program by relaxing U.N. restrictions on
exports to Iraq of civilian equipment and needed non-military technology.7 The
United States asserted that this step would alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people.
Powell, who has sometimes openly expressed skepticism about the opposition’s
prospects, barely raised the regime change issue during his trip or in his March 7,
2001 testimony before the House International Relations Committee, at which he was
questioned about Iraq.8 After about a year of negotiations among the Security
Council permanent members, the major feature of the smart sanctions plan – new
procedures that virtually eliminate U.N. review of civilian exports to Iraq – was
adopted on May 14, 2002 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1409).
Even though several senior officials had been strong advocates of a regime
change policy, many of the questions about the wisdom and difficulty of that strategy
that had faced previous administrations were debated in the Bush Administration.9
Aside from restating the U.S. policy of regime change, the Bush Administration said
6U.S. Department of State. Washington File. Clinton Sends Report on Iraq to Congress.
January 17, 2001.
7For more information on this program, see CRS Report RL30472, Iraq: Oil For Food
Program
, July 10, 2001, by Kenneth Katzman.
8Perlez, Jane. Powell Goes on the Road and Scores Some Points. New York Times, March
2, 2001.
9One account of Bush Administration internal debates on the strategy is found in, Hersh,
Seymour. The Debate Within. The New Yorker, March 11, 2002.

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and did little to promote that outcome throughout most of its first year. During his
confirmation hearings as Deputy Secretary of Defense, a reported strong advocate of
overthrow, Paul Wolfowitz, said that if there were a real option to overthrow
Saddam Husayn, “I would think it was worthwhile,” although he also stated that he
did not yet see a “plausible plan” for changing the regime. Like its predecessor, the
Bush Administration declined to provide the opposition with lethal aid, combat
training, or a commitment of direct U.S. military help. It eliminated the separate
State Department position of “Coordinator for the Transition in Iraq,” further casting
doubt on its enthusiasm for the overthrow strategy. The Bush Administration also
refused to back the INC plan to rebuild its presence inside Iraq by distributing
humanitarian aid. However, these possibilities were left open pending the outcome
of a policy review.
Possibly signaling skepticism about the value of the INC in an overthrow plan,
there were some indications that the Bush Administration began to build ties to
opposition elements other than the INC, such as ex-military officers or ex-Ba’th Party
officials. In March 2001, a senior official seemed to suggest to journalists that covert
options were under consideration, saying that, “The INC has a role to play, but there
may be other things we want to do.”10 Some viewed the outreach to non-INC figures
as a signal that the Bush Administration might be considering returning to the “coup
strategy” pursued on several occasions in previous administrations.
Many in Congress, on the other hand, continued to support the INC as a viable
and immediately available vehicle for achieving regime change. Partly in deference
to congressional sentiment, according to several observers, the Bush Administration
continued to expand its ties to the INC. In August 2001, the INC began satellite
television broadcasts into Iraq, from London, called Liberty TV. The station was
funded by the ESF aid appropriated by Congress, with start-up costs of $1 million
and an estimated additional $2.7 million per year in operating costs.11
Policy Post-September 11
Bush Administration policy toward Iraq became notably more assertive after
September 11, stressing regime change far more than containment. Almost
immediately after the U.S.-led war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
began in early October 2001, speculation began building that the Administration
might try to change Iraq’s regime through direct use of military force as part of a
“phase two” of the war on terrorism. Some in the Administration are said to believe
that Iraq might have had a connection to the September 11 attacks or the subsequent
anthrax mailings, although many press reports have downplayed such connections.
Those who see a direct Iraqi connection tend to attach significance to official Czech
accounts of a purported April 2001 meeting in Prague between September 11
hijacking leader Mohammad Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer. Others point to
a recent report that an Islamic group linked to Al Qaeda and operating in Northern
Iraq, called the Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), has links to the Iraqi
10Sipress, Alan. Powell Defends Stand on Iraq. Washington Post, March 8, 2001.
11 Sipress, Alan. U.S. Funds Satellite TV to Iraq. Washington Post, August 16, 2001.

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government.12 On the other hand, Baghdad does not control Northern Iraq and some
U.S. officials, speaking on background, have said they cannot verify this report.13
WMD Threat Perception. Other U.S. officials maintain that Iraq’s purported
commitment to developing WMD – coupled with its support for terrorist groups to
which Iraq might transfer WMD – constitute an unacceptable potential threat to the
United States and that major U.S. military action could be justified. This view was
represented in President Bush’s January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, in
which he named Iraq, along with North Korea and Iran, as part of an “axis of evil”
against which, according to the President, the United States might act preemptively.
In the aftermath of the speech, senior Administration officials said that the
President’s characterization was meant to identify the perceived threat, but did not
necessarily imply that military action against any of the three states, including Iraq,
was imminent. In making a case for possible military action, senior U.S. officials
have asserted a WMD threat as follows:
! Iraq has worked to rebuild its WMD programs in the nearly 4 years since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told journalists in
July 2002 that Iraq was using mobile facilities to hide biological weapons
research and had placed some WMD facilities underground. Some U.S.
officials say it could be only a few years before Iraq develops a nuclear
weapon. Some outside experts, including former U.N. weapons inspector
Scott Ritter, question the Administration assertions, saying that there is little
evident WMD rebuilding by Iraq.
! Iraq has used chemical weapons against its own people (the Kurds) and
against Iraq’s neighbors (Iran). The implication of this assertion is that Iraq
would not necessarily be deterred from using WMD against the United States
or its allies. Others note that Iraq has not used such weapons against
adversaries, such as the United States, that have the capability of destroying
Iraq’s government in retaliation. Under the U.S. threat of massive retaliation,
Iraq did not use WMD against U.S. troops in the 1991 Gulf war. Some
believe that Saddam Husayn, faced with the prospect of defeat and removal
from office, might unleash Iraq’s WMD capabilities against U.S. forces or
against Israel as a desperate measure.
! Even if U.N.-Iraq talks to resume WMD inspections succeed (three rounds of
talks have been held thus far in 2002), inspections will not likely ensure that
Iraq is free of WMD. According to the Administration’s argument, Iraq will
likely obstruct new inspections to prevent the inspectors from discovering
Iraq’s WMD programs. Some outside experts, including former UNSCOM
Chairman Rolf Ekeus, counter that inspections, even if not fully unfettered,
would suppress Iraq’s ability to reconstitute its WMD. Those taking this
position maintain that the inspections (1991-1998) accounted for and
dismantled a large portion of Iraq’s WMD programs, although substantial
12 Goldberg, Jeffrey. The Great Terror. The New Yorker, March 25, 2002.
13U.S. Uncertain About Northern Iraq Group’s Link to Al Qaida. Dow Jones Newswire,
March 18, 2002.

CRS-10
uncertainties remain about Iraq’s production of VX nerve agent, remaining
chemical munitions, and the biological weapons Iraq produced.
Regime Chance Scenarios. In conjunction with the presidential and other
statements on Iraq, press reports during early 2002, often quoting Administration
sources, have discussed numerous scenarios and purported U.S. planning to achieve
a change of Iraq’s regime. In broad outlines, these scenarios include the following:
! Covert Action. Some believe the United States might pursue covert
overthrow options prior to and independent of any decision to use military
force against Iraq, and whether Iraq accepts new U.N. weapons inspections.
On June 16, 2002, the Washington Post reported that, in early 2002, President
Bush authorized stepped up covert activities by the CIA and special operations
forces to destabilize Saddam Husayn. In early August 2002, the State and
Defense Departments jointly invited six major opposition groups – the INC,
the INA, the KDP, the PUK, SCIRI, and the MCM – to Washington for
meetings with senior officials, including a video link to vacationing Vice
President Cheney. The meetings were held to show unity within the
opposition and among different agencies of the U.S. government, which have
tended to favor different opposition groups. In advance of the visit, the
Defense Department agreed to fund the information gathering portion of the
INC’s activities; the State Department had refused to fund those activities,
which are conducted inside Iraq, because of strains between the INC and other
opposition groups and questions about INC use of U.S. funds. Very few
observers within or outside the Administration believe that covert action alone
will bring about a change of regime, considering Saddam Husayn’s strong grip
on the military, the security service, and Iraq’s ruling Ba’th Party.
! “Special Forces” Model. Several press reports indicate that some in the
Administration believe that the military operations that brought down the
Taliban in Afghanistan could easily be replicated in Iraq to depose Saddam
Husayn.14 According to most versions of this scenario, U.S. special operations
forces would work overtly with the Iraqi opposition to seize territory in Iraq
and precipitate the downfall of the regime. Critics of this approach maintain
that the Iraqi opposition is too weak relative to the Iraqi military (about
400,000 personnel, or ten times the size of that of the Taliban in Afghanistan)
to give this scenario a good chance of success.
! Major Offensive. Press accounts indicate that most U.S. military planners
believe that the overthrow of Saddam Husayn by the U.S. military, while
achievable, would require a major U.S. military effort. Press reports say
senior military officers believe a force of 250,000 or more U.S. troops would
be needed to ensure success and to minimize U.S. casualties. According to
press reports, senior military officers want to ensure overwhelming U.S.
military superiority to be certain of defeating Iraqi counterattacks. However,
the larger the force, the more the requirement for basing and infrastructure in
14 Slavin, Barbara. U.S. Examining Options to Deal With Hussein. USA Today, February
12, 2002.

CRS-11
neighboring countries, thus making this scenario dependent, to an extent, on
regional support for a U.S. offensive. Saying that a U.S. attack on Iraq could
destabilize the region, several Arab leaders, including King Abdullah of
Jordan and senior Saudi leaders, have indicated publicly that they would be
reluctant to host U.S. forces for this action.
! Smaller Offensive. Because of the need for regional cooperation, which might
be difficult to obtain, press accounts indicate that some U.S. officials are
pushing for a plan involving a smaller force of about 80,000, backed by air
power. A smaller force would require fewer regional staging bases and could
deploy to the region more rapidly than a larger force. Some senior military
officials, reportedly including commander of U.S. Central Command Gen.
Tommy Franks, are said to be concerned that this plan could involve too few
troops to be sure of defeating Iraq in and around major cities. One version of
this plan reportedly involves attacking Baghdad first to destabilize the regime
and then gain control of the rest of Iraq.
A major issue in the debate over any military plan appears to be over whether
Iraq’s military would quickly unravel or rebel against Saddam Husayn in the face of
U.S. military action or whether it would fight hard to defend the regime. Some
maintain that Iraqi forces would likely defect or surrender in large numbers, as
happened in the 1991 Gulf war, when faced with a militarily superior force. Others
contrast the current situation with the 1991 war and argue that Iraqi forces would
hold together and fight fiercely because they are defending Iraq itself, not an
occupation of Kuwait. Some believe the Iraqi military would quickly retreat into
urban areas and hope to inflict large numbers of casualties on American forces.
Containment/Deterrence. Some analysis suggests that the Administration
might decide not to use military force to change Iraq’s regime or reduce its WMD
capabilities. Some Members of Congress, some outside experts, and reportedly many
senior military leaders believe Iraq is currently well contained by sanctions and the
U.S./British enforced no-fly zones and that there is no need for immediate military
action against Iraq. Others believe that, even if Iraq acquires major new WMD
capabilities, it could be deterred by U.S. overall strategic superiority, presumably
including the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In an indication that major military action against
Iraq is not inevitable, in July and August 2002, President Bush and other senior
officials stressed that no decision to use force had been made, and the Administration
would consult with its allies and with Congress prior to any decision on military
action. Although skeptical that Iraq will allow full and unfettered U.N. weapons
inspections, the Administration publicly supports the dialogue between Iraq and the
U.N. Secretary-General to discuss the re-entry of inspection teams. Most experts
believe negotiations on new inspections will likely be prolonged and that these talks
could push the horizon for any U.S. military action against Iraq well into the future.
Others believe the Administration is likely, at least informally, to set a deadline for
Iraq’s readmission of the inspectors.
Congressional Reactions
Congress, like the Administration, appears to have divergent views on the
mechanisms for promoting regime change, although there appears to be widespread

CRS-12
agreement in Congress that regime change is desirable and an appropriate U.S.
policy. However, there is substantial disagreement over whether a major military
offensive is the most desirable option for achieving that objective. On December 20,
2001, the House passed H.J.Res. 75, by a vote of 392-12, calling Iraq’s refusal to
readmit U.N. weapons inspectors a “mounting threat” to the United States. The
resolution did not call for new U.S. steps to overthrow Saddam Husayn but a few
Members, including Representative Benjamin Gilman and Representative Dana
Rohrabacher, called for the overthrow of Saddam Husayn in their floor statements
in support of the resolution.
In early 2002, prior to the intensified speculation about possible war with Iraq,
some Members expressed support for increased aid to the opposition. In a joint
appearance with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden on
Cable News Network on February 17, 2002, House International Relations
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde said that “...supporting the underground, the
opposition, the internal opposition, is to me the procedure of choice. That is an
option that is being worked on. All of these options are under consideration.” In
early December 2001, a bipartisan group of nine Members – Senators John McCain,
Jesse Helms, Richard Shelby, Sam Brownback, Joseph Lieberman, and Trent Lott
and Representatives Henry Hyde, Benjamin Gilman, and Harold Ford Jr. – wrote to
President Bush to urge that U.S. assistance be provided to the INC for operations
inside Iraq itself. According to the letter,
Despite the express wishes of the Congress, the INC has been denied U.S.
assistance for any operations inside any part of Iraq, including liberated Kurdish
areas. Instead, successive Administrations have funded conferences, offices and
other intellectual exercises that have done little more than expose the INC to
accusations of being “limousine insurgents” and “armchair guerrillas.”
As discussion of potential military action has increased, Members have been
debating the costs and risks of an all-out U.S. effort to achieve that result. In
response to reports of accelerated Administration planning for possible military
action, on July 31 and August 1, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on U.S. policy toward Iraq. In those hearings or in related appearances or
statements, several Members, such as House Majority Leader Richard Armey,
Senator Richard Lugar, and Senator Chuck Hagel have indicated that other options
be tried or that major issues need to be addressed before military action takes place.
One such issue, discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, is the costs,
risks, and duration of reconstituting Iraq’s political structure after military action.
Others, such as Senator Joseph Lieberman, have indicated outright support for
military action.

CRS-13
Appendix. U.S. Assistance to the Opposition
(Appropriated Economic Support Funds, E.S.F.)
(Figures in millions of dollars)
INC
War
Broadcasting
Unspecified
Total
Crimes
Opposition
Activities

FY 1998
2.0
5.0
3.0
10.0
(P.L. 105-174)
(RFE/RL)
FY 1999
3.0
3.0
2.0
8.0
(P.L. 105-277)
FY 2000 (P.L. 106-
2.0
8.0
10.0
113)
FY 2001 (P.L. 106-
12.0
2.0
6.0
5.0
25.0
429)
(aid
(INC radio)
distribution
inside Iraq)
FY 2002
25.0
25.0
(P.L. 107-115)
Total
15.0
9.0
11.0
43.0
78.0
(FY1998- FY 2002)
FY2003
25.0
25.0
(request)