Order Code RL31533
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Persian Gulf:
Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002
August 12, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The Persian Gulf:
Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002
Summary
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States have expanded the
security challenges facing the United States in the Persian Gulf region, although no
major confrontations or crises have occurred in the Gulf since 1998. Since U.N.
weapons inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the United States has feared Iraq
might reconstitute its banned weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In the
aftermath of September 11, the Bush Administration has expressed particular concern
that Iraq might join forces with Islamic terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or with
other anti-U.S. groups, and might provide these groups with WMD expertise or
technology.
Iran’s tacit cooperation with the United States against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan after September 11 had appeared to forecast an improvement in U.S.-
Iran relations. However, the expected improvement did not materialize because of
Iran’s stepped up support to Palestinian and other groups that are using violence
against Israel. There is substantial U.S. concern about Iran’s WMD programs and
the potential for Iran to transfer that technology or materiel to the terrorist groups it
supports, although Iran has not been politically close to Al Qaeda. The lack of
tangible moderation in Iran’s policies has led U.S. officials to lose hope that engaging
Iran’s President Mohammad Khatemi would be productive.
The September 11 attacks have shaken U.S. relations with some of the Gulf
states, particularly Saudi Arabia; those relations previously had been on relatively
sound footing. Fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were of Saudi origin,
as is Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden himself. Some of the funding for the
September 11 attacks apparently was transferred from financial institutions in the
United Arab Emirates, and several Islamic charities operating in the Gulf and the
broader Islamic world have been accused of providing funds to Al Qaeda and other
terrorist movements. However, the Gulf states, despite public sentiment that
sympathizes with some aspects of Al Qaeda’s anti-U.S. views, have been supportive
of the U.S. military effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Several of them have
allowed U.S. combat missions to be launched from their territory. The Bush
Administration has credited the Gulf states with helping shut down some of the
financial networks used by Al Qaeda.
The United States is applauding and encouraging political reform initiatives by
some of the Gulf states that it hopes will encourage greater support for U.S. and
Western values over the longer term. At the same time, greater political openness in
the Gulf has made Gulf governments more aware of popular sympathy for the
Palestinians in the context of ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence. That sentiment
could complicate future defense cooperation between the United States and the Gulf
states and has already contributed to Gulf state opposition to possible large scale U.S.
military action against Iraq.
This report will be updated, as warranted.

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Contents
Threats and U.S. Interests in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Contain and End the Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Congressional Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Iran: Continued Concerns Limit Rapprochement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Bush Administration, September 11, and Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Persian Gulf Monarchies: Coping With Internal and External Threats . . . . . 9
Domestic Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Leadership Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Political Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Economic Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Gulf Foreign Policy and Defense Cooperation with the United States . . . . 15
Defense Agreements and U.S. Forces in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
U.S. Arms Sales and Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Excess Defense Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Foreign Military Sales, FMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Joint Security/ “Cooperative Defense Initiative” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Prospects and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix 1. Gulf State Populations, Religious Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix 2. UNSCOM Accomplishments and Unresolved Issues . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix 3. No Fly Zones in Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix 4. Map of the Persian Gulf Region and Environs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
List of Tables
Table 1. Gulf Oil Exports (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Table 2. Comparative Military Strengths of the Gulf States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Table 3. U.S. Troops in Iraq Theatre/ Host Nation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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The Persian Gulf:
Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002
The Persian Gulf region, rich in oil and gas resources but with a history of
armed conflict that has necessitated occasional U.S. military action, remains crucial
to United States interests. This report, which will be revised periodically, discusses
U.S. efforts to manage both longstanding Gulf security interests as well the new
challenges highlighted by the September 11 attacks on the United States. The report
is derived from a wide range of sources, including press reports, unclassified U.S.
government documents, U.N. documents, observations by the author during visits to
the Gulf, and conversations with U.S, European, Iranian, and Gulf state officials,
journalists and academics. For further reading, see CRS Issue Brief IB92117, Iraqi
Compliance With Ceasefire Agreements; CRS Issue Brief IB94049, Iraq-U.S.
Confrontations; CRS Issue Brief IB93033, Iran: Current Developments and U.S.
Policy; and CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Post-War Issues and U.S.
Relations.
Threats and U.S. Interests in the Gulf
Iran, Iraq, and the six Gulf monarchy states that belong to the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman) possess about two thirds of the world's proven reserves of oil.
The countries in the Gulf produced over 28% of the world’s oil supply in 2001,
according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are
first and second, respectively, in proven reserves. Iraq, which is relatively
unexplored and in which new energy exploration is barred by U.N. sanctions, might
ultimately be proven to hold more oil than does Saudi Arabia. Iran and Qatar,
respectively, have the second and third largest reserves of natural gas in the world;
gas is an increasingly important source of energy for Asian and European countries.
Difficulties in the discovery and transportation of oil and gas from the Central
Asian/Caspian Sea countries ensure that the Gulf will almost certainly be a major
source of energy well into the 21st century, although many experts increasingly see
the Central Asia/Caspian countries and Russia as energy sources likely to rival the
Gulf. Each of the Gulf states, including Iran and Iraq, appears to have an economic
interest in the free flow of oil, but past political conflict in the Gulf and broader
Middle East has caused oil prices to rise sharply and has increased hazards to
international oil shipping. Despite that economic interest, Iran and Iraq have
sometimes, and without success, attempted to organize or been willing to join oil
embargoes to protest U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Both Iran and Iraq have threatened U.S. security interests directly and indirectly.
Iran and Iraq fought each other during 1980-1988, jeopardizing the security of the

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Gulf states, and each has fought the United States, although in differing degrees of
intensity. Iran and the United States fought minor naval skirmishes during 1987-88,
at the height of the Iran-Iraq war — a war in which the United States tacitly backed
Iraq. During one such skirmish (Operation Praying Mantis, April 18, 1988) the
United States fought a day long naval battle with Iran that destroyed almost half of
Iran’s largest naval vessels. On July 3, 1988, the United States mistakenly shot down
an Iranian passenger aircraft flying over the Gulf (Iran Air flight 655), killing all 290
aboard. To liberate Kuwait from Iraq, which invaded and occupied Kuwait on
August 2, 1990, the United States deployed over 500,000 U.S. troops, joined by
about 200,000 troops from 33 other countries. That war (Operation Desert Storm,
lasting from January 16 until February 27, 1991) resulted in the death in action of
148 U.S. service personnel and 138 non-battle deaths, along with 458 wounded in
action. The Gulf war reduced Iraq's conventional military capabilities roughly by
half, but Iraq is still superior to Iran and the Gulf states in ground forces. Iran faces
financial limitations, but there are no mandatory international restrictions on its
imports of advanced conventional weapons, and Iran has been slowly rearming since
1990.
In addition to their conventional forces, both Iran and Iraq have developed
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Iraq's missile, chemical, nuclear,
and biological programs, begun during the Iran-Iraq war, were among the most
sophisticated in the Third World at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. During the
1991 Gulf war, Iraq fired 39 enhanced Scud missiles at Israel, a U.S. ally, and about
50 enhanced Scud missiles on targets in Saudi Arabia. One Iraqi missile, fired on
coalition forces on February 25, 1991 (during Desert Storm) hit a U.S. barracks near
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 military personnel and wounding 97. During the
Iran-Iraq war, Iraq fired enhanced Scud missiles at Iranian cities,1 and it used
chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Kurdish guerrillas and civilians. Iran's
WMD programs, which are not under U.N. restrictions as are those of Iraq, have
made significant strides during the 1990s with substantial help from Russia, China,
North Korea, and other countries. Since July 1998, Iran has conducted four tests of
its Shahab-3 (Meteor) ballistic missile (800-900 mile range), which could enable Iran
to threaten Israel, Turkey, and parts of Central and South Asia. The latest of the tests,
in May 2002, appears to have been successful.
Both Iran and Iraq are on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, although
annual State Department reports on international terrorism (“Patterns of Global
Terrorism”) have consistently deemed Iran a larger terrorist threat than Iraq. The
Islamic regime in Iran, which came to power in February 1979, held American
diplomats hostage during November 1979-January 1981, and the pro-Iranian
Lebanese Shia Muslim organization Hizballah held Americans hostage in Lebanon
during the 1980s. Since then, Iran has supported groups (Hizballah and the
Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) that oppose the U.S.-
sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process and carry out terrorist attacks against Israelis.
Some pro-Iranian groups have sought to destabilize some of the Gulf states, although
1The missiles were supplied by Russia but Iraq enhanced their range to be able to reach
Tehran, which is about 350 miles from the Iraq border. The normal range of the Scud is
about 200 miles.

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Iran’s support for these groups has diminished since Iran’s relatively moderate
President Mohammad Khatemi came into office in 1997 and subsequently improved
relations with the Gulf states. U.S. law enforcement officials say Iranian operatives
were involved in the June 1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia of the Khobar Towers
housing complex for U.S. military officers, in which 19 U.S. airmen were killed.
Iraq publicly supports Palestinian violence against Israel, but reports indicate that,
over the past decade, Baghdad has had limited contact with the groups that are most
active in violence and terrorism against Israel. According to publicly available
information, neither Iran nor Iraq has been linked to the September 11 attacks,
although press reports say that some Al Qaeda activists fleeing Afghanistan have
transited or taken refuge in both countries.
Both countries have been accused by successive U.S. administrations as
systematic violators of human rights. Iraq has long been considered by the U.S.
Government as a gross violator of human rights based on its treatment of dissidents
and ethnic minorities, and the Clinton Administration began pressing for a war
crimes tribunal for Saddam Husayn and eleven other Iraqi officials. U.S. and U.N.
human rights reports have accused Iran of numerous human rights abuses, although
not to the degree cited for Iraq.
The Gulf states face internal threats not attributable to Iran or Iraq. All six Gulf
states — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman,
and Qatar — are hereditary monarchies. They allow limited formal opportunity for
popular participation in national decisionmaking, although several, particularly
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, are opening up their political processes and earning U.S.
official praise. Kuwait has had a vibrant, elected parliament for over four decades,
although female suffrage is still banned there. Some of the Gulf states, including
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, are undergoing leadership
transitions, and Bahrain's leadership passed to a new generation in March 1999, when
the long serving Amir (ruler) died suddenly. The September 11 attacks have
heightened U.S. concerns about radical Islamic activists operating in the Gulf states.
These activists, who might be linked to or sympathetic to Al Qaeda, do not currently
appear to threaten the stability of any of the Gulf regimes, although the networks
could be planning acts of terrorism against U.S. forces and installations there. See
Appendix 1 for information on the religious and ethnic composition of the Gulf
states.
Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Contain and End the Threat
In May 1993, shortly after taking office, the Clinton Administration articulated
a policy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. The Administration explained the
policy as an effort to keep both Iran and Iraq strategically weak simultaneously, in
contrast to past policies that sought to support either Iran or Iraq as a counterweight
to the other. Iraq’s refusal to fully comply with post-Gulf war U.N. Security Council
resolutions kept the United States and Iraq at odds, and in October 1998 the Clinton
Administration publicly added a dimension to U.S. policy that went beyond
containment – promoting the change of Iraq’s regime. The emphasis of Bush
Administration policy toward Iraq, particularly after September 11, has been regime

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change, although there appears to be a lack of consensus within the Administration
over how to achieve that objective.
Administration efforts to keep Iraq strategically weak and politically isolated
have undergone several adjustments since the Gulf war ended in 1991. During 1991-
1997, the United States and its allies relied largely on U.N. weapons inspections
(UNSCOM), chartered by U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991) to
eliminate and prevent the rebuilding of Iraq’s WMD capabilities. U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including 661 (August 6, 1990), which imposed a
comprehensive embargo on Iraq, prohibit it from importing conventional weaponry.
Iraq accepted U.N. weapons inspections by the U.N. Special Commission on
Iraq (UNSCOM) as long as Iraq believed that it would soon obtain a ruling from
UNSCOM that all its WMD programs had been ended. Under Resolution 687 (April
3, 1991), such a ruling would open Iraq to the unrestricted exportation of oil. In
1997, Iraq apparently determined that it would not obtain a favorable U.N. Security
Council decision to ease sanctions, and it reduced its cooperation with UNSCOM.
Beginning in October 1997, Iraq obstructed the work of UNSCOM teams
(designating certain sites “off-limits,” attempting to alter the composition of
inspection teams) to the point where UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq (December 15,
1998). In response to Iraq’s non-cooperation, the United States and Britain
conducted a 70 hour bombing campaign (Operation Desert Fox, December 16-19,
1998) against Iraq’s WMD-capable factories and other military installations. Since
then, there have been virtually no independent WMD inspections in Iraq, with the
exception of a few International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visits to monitor
Iraq’s compliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. See
Appendix 2 for information on the accomplishments of UNSCOM.
The United States has had to rely on its own intelligence capabilities to
determine whether Iraq is rebuilding WMD. The latest unclassified report to
Congress by the Central Intelligence Agency, released in January 2002 and covering
January - June 2001, says that Iraq is rebuilding facilities that could be used for
prohibited WMD manufacture, but the report stops short of presenting hard evidence
that Iraq has reconstituted its banned WMD programs.2 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
said in July 2002 that the United States has evidence that Iraq is using mobile
facilities to develop biological weapons and has placed some WMD munitions and
programs in deep, underground facilities.
To ensure that Iraq cannot use its still formidable conventional forces against
its neighbors, the United States and Britain patrol “no fly zones” over northern and
southern Iraq (see Appendix 3) in the “Northern Watch” and “Southern Watch”
operations, respectively.3 Together, the zones cover approximately 62% of Iraq’s
2Central Intelligence Agency. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction And Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001. January 2002.
3In January 1997, following a U.S. confrontation with Iraq in August 1996, France ended
its participation in Northern Watch. It ceased participating in Southern Watch following
(continued...)

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territory. The enforcement of the zones is not specifically authorized by U.N.
Security Council resolutions, but they were set up by the United States, France, and
Britain to monitor Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 688 (April 5, 1991), which
demands that Iraq cease repressing its people. See Appendix 3 for a map of the no
fly zones over Iraq.
The Bush Administration, in the aftermath of September 11, has linked Iraq
policy to the overall war on terrorism. In his January 29, 2002 State of the Union
message, President Bush called Iraq part of an “axis of evil,” along with North Korea
and Iran. He identified the key threat as Iraq’s potential to transfer WMD technology
to terrorist groups. Administration policy has two major aspects:
! planning for a change of regime. This aspect of Administration policy has
generated the most controversy, with reported options ranging from stepped
up U.S. covert action within Iraq to an all-out ground invasion conducted by
over 250,000 U.S. troops. On August 10-11, senior Administration officials
met with six major Iraqi opposition groups that might play roles in a post-
saddam regime. The outcome of the debate within the Administration and
Congress might hinge on the results of the U.N.-Iraq weapons inspections
talks, the strength of the anti-Saddam opposition inside Iraq, considerations
of U.S. military casualties from a frontal assault, the willingness of the Gulf
monarchies to host a large U.S. invasion force, and the degree of European
support or opposition for U.S. plans. Discussions of possible war against Iraq
appear to have contributed to Iraq’s decision in early 2002 to re-enter a
dialogue with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan on the restart of inspections
in accordance with U.N. Resolution 1284 (December 17, 1999). That
resolution created a new inspection body, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification,
and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM, and slightly
eased the conditions under which Iraq would obtain sanctions relief if it
cooperated with the new inspection body. Three rounds of talks thus far in
2002 have not yielded agreement on the reentry of U.N. inspectors into Iraq,
although in August 2002 Iraq offered new talks with UNMOVIC on the restart
of inspections, and the United Nations is attempting to clarify the Iraqi offer
to determine whether or not such talks would be productive.

! modifying sanctions to build international support for U.S. policy.
Immediately after it took office, the Bush Administration claimed that
international enforcement of the sanctions regime on Iraq was deteriorating
because some countries viewed it as too punitive of the Iraqi people. To
counter this criticism and attempt to shore up international enforcement, the
Administration announced a “smart sanctions” proposal. Under that proposal,
the regulations governing the U.N.-sponsored “oil-for-food” program – a U.N.
supervised program under which Iraq sells its oil and uses the proceeds to buy
needed goods – would be changed to ease the flow of civilian goods to Iraq.
The major element of the proposal, the easing of the regulations governing
3(...continued)
Operation Desert Fox (December 1998).

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the export of civilian goods to Iraq, was agreed to in U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1409 (May 14, 2002).
Congressional Views. Congress has generally supported the Administration
throughout the various confrontations with Iraq, and has sometimes urged even
stronger action against Iraq than the Administration appeared ready to take. Congress
led the Administration in adding to U.S. containment policy a more ambitious
dimension -- promoting the overthrow of Saddam Husayn. Congressional sentiment
for a strategy of overthrow of Saddam Husayn was encapsulated in the Iraq
Liberation Act, which passed the House on October 5, 1998 (360-38) and the Senate
on October 7 (unanimous consent). The Act gave the President the discretion to
provide up to $97 million in defense articles and services to Iraqi opposition
organizations designated by the Administration. The President signed the bill into
law (P.L. 105-338) on October 31, 1998, the same day Iraq cut off all cooperation
with UNSCOM. Some in Congress criticized the Clinton and the Bush
Administrations for refusing to provide lethal military equipment under the Act as
contrary to congressional intent, but both administrations asserted that the Iraqi
opposition is not ready to use such equipment effectively.
On the other hand, some Members do not appear enthusiastic about a large scale
ground offensive against Iraq. A congressional resolution, H.J.Res. 75, which passed
the House on December 20, 2001, called Iraq’s WMD capabilities a mounting threat
to the United States, but did not authorize military action against Iraq. In press
statements and other appearances during 2002, some congressional leaders have said
that a ground attack on Iraq would need congressional authorization, and some have
questioned whether other options, such as sanctions, less robust covert or military
options, containment, or deterrence could reduce the threat from Iraq successfully
without requiring a major offensive.

Iran: Continued Concerns Limit Rapprochement
The May 1997 election of a reformist, Mohammad Khatemi, as Iran’s President
prompted the United States to attempt to end twenty years of mutual acrimony that
had occasionally led to confrontation. However, Khatemi operates within a power
structure established by the 1979 Islamic revolution, an establishment that is deeply
suspicious of the United States and controls the coercive arms of the state (military,
police, and judiciary). The establishment curbed Khatemi’s ability to improve
relations with the United States and has slowed the momentum of internal reform to
the point at which U.S. officials no longer believe that engaging Khatemi’s
government would prove productive.4
Even before Khatemi’s election raised U.S. hopes for internal change in Iran,
U.S. foreign policy experts had been arguing that improved relations with Iran could
help the United States accomplish several goals, including: containing Saddam
Husayn's Iraq; reducing the threat to the United States and to the Arab-Israeli peace
process posed by Islamic terrorist groups; easing Iran's opposition to a large U.S.
4 Kessler, Glenn. U.S. Changes Policy on Iran. Washington Post, July 23, 2002.

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military presence in the Persian Gulf region; dissuading Iran of the need to acquire
weapons of mass destruction; and curbing the regional threat from the Taliban regime
in Afghanistan, which was at odds with Iran from the time it took power in Kabul in
September 1996. U.S. business interests, meanwhile, argued that improved U.S.-
Iranian relations could help open up new energy routes for Caspian/Central Asian
energy resources, benefit U.S. exporters, and end trade disputes with U.S. allies
precipitated by U.S. secondary sanctions laws.5 Others maintained that the United
States could not and should not isolate a country of over 65 million people, with a
location and resources as strategic as those of Iran.
U.S. hopes that Khatemi would quickly move to improve relations with the
United States intensified when Khatemi agreed to a special Cable News Network
interview on January 7, 1998, portrayed by Iran and CNN as an "address to the
American people." However, Khatemi offered only people-to-people contacts with
the United States, and the Clinton Administration subsequently stated that people-to-
people contacts alone would not lead to a breakthrough in relations. On June 17,
1998, in a speech to the Asia Society, then Secretary of State Albright proposed that
the two countries undertake mutual confidence-building measures that could form a
"road map" to eventually normalizing relations. On March 17, 2000, Secretary
Albright again attempted to induce Iran into a dialogue with a speech that announced
an easing of U.S. sanctions on the imports of Iranian luxury goods,6 and an
accelerated effort to resolve outstanding financial claims dating from the Islamic
revolution. The Secretary also came close to an outright apology for past U.S.
interference in Iran’s internal affairs – including the U.S.-backed ouster in 1953 of
nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq and U.S. support for the Shah of
Iran – as well as for the U.S. tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The speech
followed a July 1999 easing of the U.S. trade ban on Iran to allow commercial sales
to Iran of food and medical products.7 The renewed overture still did not prompt Iran
to accept the U.S. offer of an official dialogue, although Iran did begin broadening
its contacts with Members of Congress.8
In its attempts to forge a dialogue with Iran, the Clinton Administration asserted
that there were no substantive preconditions for the beginning of talks with Iran but
that the two sides openly acknowledge the dialogue, that both sides must be free to
raise issues of respective concern, and that the Iranian interlocutors must be
authoritative representatives of the Iranian government. The Clinton Administration
said it would use the dialogue to press U.S. concerns, which it defined primarily as
Iran’s attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction and delivery means, opposition
5The most widely known example of U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran is the Iran-Libya
Sanctions Act, P.L. 104-172, of August 5, 1996. For analysis of that and other U.S.
sanctions on Iran, see CRS Report 97-231, Iran: U.S. Policy and Options.
6The four category of goods that can be imported are caviar, dried fruit, nuts, and carpets.
7The conference report on H.R. 4461, the FY2001 agriculture appropriation (H.Rept. 106-
948), eases licensing procedures for food and medical sales to Iran and other terrorism list
countries and authorizes the President to allow the use of U.S. export credits for these sales.
8Slavin, Barbara. "Iran, U.S. Elected Officials’ Meeting First in 20 Years." USA Today,
August 31, 2000.

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to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and support for international terrorism. Some
believed that Iran’s human rights practices should also be a priority concern for the
United States.
The Bush Administration, September 11, and Iran. The Bush
Administration came into office espousing much the same policy toward Iran as the
preceding administration - offering dialogue but stressing U.S. concerns. After the
September 11 attacks, there was substantial optimism for a major breakthrough in
relations when Iran largely cooperated with the U.S. effort to defeat the Taliban and
install a new government. Some note that Iran had long wanted the Taliban ousted,
so that backing the U.S. effort was in Iran’s own interests and did not necessarily
represent a new effort to reach out to the United States or a turning away from
support for international terrorism. Immediately after the defeat of the Taliban,
revelations of an Iranian arms shipment to Palestinians linked to the Palestinian
Authority (January 2002), and indications of Iranian meddling inside Afghanistan,
reversed the warming trend and revived longstanding U.S. suspicions of Iran.
President Bush included Iran in his “axis of evil” characterization contained in the
January 29, 2002 State of the Union message. U.S. officials have since added that
there is evidence some Al Qaeda activists have been allowed to transit or take refuge
in Iran, although there is no evidence that this is official Iranian policy. Several
trends and developments in Iran concern U.S. officials:
! In the first few years of his presidency, Khatemi stated on several occasions
that Iran opposes the interim accords reached between Israel and the
Palestinians but that Iran would not actively try to derail their peace talks.
Iran did not publicly oppose Syria’s decision to renew talks with Israel in
December 1999, although those talks quickly broke down and have not
resumed. Despite these public pronouncements, Iran, according to U.S.
officials in 2002, has stepped up financial and materiel aid to anti-Israel
terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
in the context of the ongoing Palestinian uprising against Israel and its
occupation. Iran’s aid to Hizballah has continued, even at times increased,
since Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000, a withdrawal
certified by the United Nations. Hizballah asserts that the withdrawal was not
complete, as do the governments of Syria and Lebanon.
! Khatemi has not sought to curb Iran's WMD programs; all factions in Iran
appear to agree on the need to continue developing these programs. They
perceive that Iran is threatened on virtually all sides – by erstwhile adversary
Iraq and a nuclear-armed Israel to the west; by a nuclear-equipped Pakistan
and a now U.S.-dominated Afghanistan, to the east; by U.S. forces in the Gulf,
to Iran’s south; and by U.S. forces now based in Central Asia and increasingly
present in the Caucusus, to the north. U.S. government officials and reports
say Iran is actively pursuing a long-range missile program, that it is building
a chemical and biological weapons infrastructure, and that it is acquiring
expertise and technology that could be used in a nuclear weapons program.
Russia has rebuffed repeated U.S. efforts to persuade it to stop or limit work
on the civilian nuclear power reactor it is building under contract to Iran at
Bushehr, and there are increasing worries that the plant, when it becomes
operational, will produce nuclear material that could fall into the hands of

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terrorist groups for the production of a radiological “dirty” bomb. On the
other hand, there are disagreements over the degree to which Iran should
cooperate — or appear to cooperate — with international anti-proliferation
regimes. Governing bodies of several international non-proliferation regimes,
including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons
Convention, say Iran is generally fulfilling its obligations under these
agreements.
! The United States is also watching the balance of factions inside Iran to
determine whether or not more moderate forces might prevail, on the
assumption that reformist elements might eventually shift Iran’s foreign policy
course. President Khatemi has attempted to liberalize social and political life
since taking office, but conservative forces in Iran appear to have gained the
upper hand politically and are thwarting most of his internal reforms. U.S.
officials say that they doubt that Khatemi can gain the upper hand in this
power struggle, and a July 12 statement issued by President Bush indicated a
shift in U.S. policy by expressing support for Iranian reformers and Iran’s
people, not for Khatemi or his government. Since 2000, hardliners have
repeatedly closed pro-reform newspapers and imprisoned some of their
editors, although the newspapers usually reopen under new names. Some pro-
Khatemi members of parliament have been arrested or questioned over the
past year. Reformist efforts to curb the legislative powers of unelected bodies
such as the Council of Guardians have failed.
The Persian Gulf Monarchies: Coping With
Internal and External Threats
Over the past two decades, U.S. attempts to contain the threats from Iran and
Iraq have depended on cooperation with the Persian Gulf monarchies of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC).9 The September 11 attacks have added a new
dimension to U.S. relations with the Gulf states – pressing for their cooperation
against Al Qaeda activists and financial channels located in their territories. The
need for the United States to deal with all the security threats emanating from the
Gulf gives the United States a stake in the political stability of the Gulf states.
Despite the threats they face, the GCC states have proved more durable politically
than some scholars had predicted, surviving attempts to subvert them by Iraq (1970s)
and Iran (1980s and 1990s), the eight year Iran-Iraq war (September 1980-August
1988), the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait (August 1990 - February 1991),
and post-Gulf war unrest and uncertain leadership transitions in a few of the GCC
states. See Appendix 4 for a map of the Gulf region.
9For further information on the Gulf states, see CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia:
Post-War Issues and U.S. Relations; and CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain; CRS Report 95-
1071, Oman; CRS Report 98-436, United Arab Emirates: U.S. Relations and Prospective
F-16 Sale; and CRS Report 98-600, Kuwait: Current Issues and U.S. Policy.

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CRS-10
Domestic Stability
Many of the Gulf monarchies face potential threats to political stability.
Although some, such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have experienced open unrest
since the 1991 Gulf war, the Gulf governments appear to be firmly in power. Several
are undergoing leadership transitions, while others are gradually opening up their
political processes. Since September 11 the United States has heightened its
attention to public attitudes in the Gulf in light of surveys and reports that many Gulf
citizens are sympathetic to at least some of the goals of radical Islamic movements
such as Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is viewed by some in the Gulf
as a revolutionary Islamic figure who is valiantly fighting to overcome U.S. influence
over the Islamic world.10 Bin Laden supporters and other Islamic activists present in
the Gulf do not appear to pose a major challenge to the other Gulf regimes at this
time, but some U.S. officials are concerned that Al Qaeda, defeated in Afghanistan,
might turn its attention to destabilizing pro-U.S. Arab governments in the Gulf or
elsewhere.
Leadership Transition. Still governed by hereditary leaders, several of the
GCC states are coping with current or imminent leadership transitions. Although few
observers forecast bloody succession struggles in any of the Gulf states, succession
uncertainties have already begun to cloud political or economic reform efforts under
way or planned.
! In Saudi Arabia, King Fahd suffered a stroke in November 1995 and, although
still holding the title King, he has yielded day-to-day governance to his half-
brother and heir apparent, Crown Prince Abdullah. Abdullah is the same age
as Fahd (about 78) but he appears to be in reasonably good health. Abdullah
has been more willing than Fahd to question U.S. policy in the region and U.S.
prescriptions for Saudi security, which, together with his image of piety and
rectitude, could account for his relative popularity among the Saudi tribes and
religious conservatives.
! In Bahrain, the sudden death of Amir (ruler) Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa on
March 6, 1999 led to the accession of his son, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, who
was commander of Bahrain’s Defense Forces. In February 2002, he formally
changed Bahrain into a kingdom and took the title King instead of Amir.
King Hamad has moved decisively to try to address the grievances that caused
Bahrain’s unrest in the mid-1990s, as discussed below.
! The UAE is in transition from the ailing Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-
Nuhayyan, ruler of the emirate of Abu Dhabi who helped found and became
President of the seven-emirate UAE federation in 1971. His eldest son,
Crown Prince Khalifa, is the likely successor, and Khalifa has been assuming
a higher profile in the UAE over the past few years. Khalifa’s formal
succession could become clouded if the rulers of the other six emirates of the
UAE federation, or even factions within Abu Dhabi itself, oppose him as
10For more information on bin Laden, see CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern
Groups and State Sponsors, 2002. February 13, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman.

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CRS-11
leader. However, the UAE is well placed to weather this transition because
it has faced the least unrest of any of the Gulf states, its GDP per capita
($22,000 per year) is the highest in the Gulf, and there are few evident schisms
in the society.
! The reform-minded ruler of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani,
overthrew his father in a bloodless coup in June 1995. Although the Amir
accused his father and other GCC states of attempting a countercoup in early
1996, the Amir and his father reconciled to some extent in late 1996. The
Amir’s reform agenda has garnered wide support and there has been little
evidence of unrest. However, there are indications that, prior to September
11, Al Qaeda activists were present in or transited Qatar.
! In Kuwait, virtually the entire top leadership – Amir Jabir al-Ahmad Al-
Sabah, Crown Prince/Prime Minister Sa’d al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, and Deputy
Prime and Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad Al-Sabah – is ailing. This has
created significant delays in making key political economic decisions, such as
allowing foreign investment in the energy sector, and fostered an image of
political stagnation. There are several younger potential successors with
significant experience in government, but they have not sought to persuade the
existing leaders to step down. Islamic fundamentalist opposition to the ruling
Al Sabah family is contained within the context of Kuwait's elected National
Assembly, and virtually no anti-regime violence has occurred there since the
Gulf war.
! With the exception of an alleged Islamist plot in 1994 that led to a few
hundred arrests, Oman has seen little unrest since Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al
Said took power from his father in 1970. Qaboos is about 63 years old and in
good health, but the royal family in Oman is relatively small and there is no
heir apparent or clear successor, should he pass from the scene unexpectedly.
Like his colleagues in Qatar and Bahrain, Qaboos has undertaken numerous
reforms, although at a more gradual pace than the other two.
Political Liberalization. Some of the Gulf leaders are gradually opening the
political process, in part to help them cope with the challenges of modernization and
globalization. The Gulf leaders undertaking these steps hope that political
liberalization will ensure stability, although some fear that this process could backfire
by providing Islamic extremists a platform to challenge the incumbent regimes.
Since the 1991 Gulf war, the United States has encouraged the Gulf states to open
their political systems, although U.S. officials imply that political liberalization is
clearly subordinate to defense and security issues on the U.S. agenda for the Gulf.
U.S. officials also stress that they are not pressing the Gulf states to adopt a U.S. or
European concept of democracy, but rather to widen popular participation within
their own traditions. U.S. diplomats are pressing for adherence to the rule of law,
economic transparency, judicial reform, and the opening of the media. The Bush
Administration is promoting these reforms with U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) programs as well as those funded by the State Department’s
Near East Bureau and its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

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CRS-12
! Kuwait has traditionally been at the forefront of political liberalization in the
Gulf, but it has not moved forward on this front in the past few years. In
response to popular pressure after liberation, Kuwait revived its elected
National Assembly in October 1992, after six years of suspension. Kuwait’s
Assembly still has more influence in decisionmaking and more scope of
authority than any representative body in the GCC, with the power to review
and veto governmental decrees. However, on two separate occasions in 1999,
a long awaited effort by the government to institute female suffrage was
rebuffed by a coalition of conservative tribal deputies and Islamists in the
National Assembly. The U.S. Administration expressed support for the
government’s effort. The government has not aggressively renewed the push
for female suffrage since.
! In March 1999, Qatar held elections to a 29-member municipal affairs council.
In a first in the Gulf, women were permitted full suffrage and 6 women ran for
the council, but all six lost. In late 1998, the Amir of Qatar announced that a
constitution would be drafted providing for an elected National Assembly to
replace the appointed 35-member consultative council in place since
independence in 1971. The draft constitution was presented to the Amir in
early July 2002; its approval would pave the way for elections to a one-
chamber assembly, to be held in 2004. Thirty of the seats are to be elected,
with the remaining fifteen appointed. The constitution will also provide for
an independent judiciary. Qatari officials say the assembly’s proceedings will
be public.
! On September 14, 2000, Oman held the first direct elections to its 83-seat
Consultative Council. The electorate consisted of 115,000 men and women
elites in their districts, far short of a genuine popular electorate. However, the
process represented a clear contrast with past elections (1994 and 1997) in
which a smaller and more select electorate chose two or three nominees per
district and the Sultan then selected the final membership. Two women were
elected to the Council in the September 2000 elections. Qaboos also formed
a 53-seat State Council to serve, in part, as a check and balance on the elected
Consultative Council. Its members tend to be somewhat older than those in
the Consultative Council; many are former government officials. In October
2000, Qaboos named five women to the State Council, up from four in the
previous State Council.
! The new King of Bahrain has largely abandoned his late father’s refusal to
accommodate opposition demands to restore an elected national assembly. In
February 2002, Bahrain held a referendum on a new “national action charter”
that will establish an elected, 40-member national assembly. Those elections
will be held in October 2002, and election preparations are already under way.
There will also be an appointed upper body of the same size which, according
to some observers, is intended to check the influence of the Shia Muslims that,
because of Bahrain’s majority Shia population, are expected to dominate the
elected assembly.

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CRS-13
In the other Gulf states, political liberalization has been somewhat slower.
Saudi Arabia expanded its national consultative council to 90 seats from 60 in 1997,
and again to 120 seats in 2001, but it continues to rule out national elections or the
appointment of women to the Council. On the other hand, within the past few years,
the Saudi government has parted with tradition by naming two women to high
ranking government positions, and it now allows women to observe the proceedings
of the Council. The UAE has not moved to broaden the authority of its forty seat
advisory Federal National Council, and has undertaken few, if any political reforms,
although some observers say the press has become increasingly open. The wife of
UAE President Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan al-Nuhayyan said in January 1999 that
women will participate in the political life of the UAE in the future. A few weeks
after that statement, Shaykh Zayid appointed a woman to be undersecretary of the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the first woman to hold such a high-ranking
government post.
Despite the move toward political openness in some of the Gulf states, the
United States believes that the Gulf states continue to rely heavily on repression and
denial of internationally recognized standards of human rights to maintain political
stability. Even the moves toward political liberalization in the Gulf states do not give
Gulf citizens the right to peacefully change their government, and the foreign workers
on which their economies rely have virtually no political rights at all. Almost all the
Gulf states are cited by human rights organizations and U.S. human rights reports for
arbitrary arrests, religious discrimination, suppression of peaceful assembly and free
expression, and the denial of popular ability to peacefully change the government.
Saudi Arabia actively prohibits the practice of non-Muslim religions on its territory,
even in private, with limited exceptions. Qatar prohibits public non-Muslim worship
but tolerates it in private. In Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, and Oman, there are
functioning Christian churches and congregations. Small Jewish communities in
some Gulf countries are generally allowed to worship freely.
Economic Reform.11 At the same time the Gulf states are coping with
political change, some are taking steps to reform their economies and to shore up
their key asset, energy resources, by inviting foreign investment in that sector. As
noted in Table 1 below, oil export revenues constitute a high percentage of GDP for
all of the states of the Gulf, including Iran and Iraq. The health of the energy
infrastructure of the Gulf producers is also a key concern of the United States – Gulf
petroleum comprises almost one quarter of the United States’ approximately 10
million barrels per day (mbd) net imports.
11For further information on the GCC economies, and trade and investment policies and
practices, see CRS Report RL30383, U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Trade and
Investment: Trends and Implications. December 3, 1999, by Joshua Ruebner.

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CRS-14
Table 1. Gulf Oil Exports (2001)
Total Oil
Oil Exports
Oil
GDP
Country
Exports
to U.S.
Revenues
(billion
dollars,
(mbd)
(mbd)
as % GDP
2000)
Iran
2.6
0
45%
99.0
Iraq
2.0
0.78
100%
15.0
Kuwait
1.8
0.26
50%
33.4
Saudi Arabia
7.4
1.66
40%
185.0
Qatar
0.8
negligible
30%
12.4
U.A.E.
2.1
negligible
33%
58.0
Oman
0.9
0
40%
17.7
Bahrain
0.02
0
30%
6.9
Total
17.82
2.70
N/A
N/A
Source: DOE, Energy Information Agency (EIA), OPEC Revenue Fact Sheet. Some
figures from supporting EIA data.
A sharp oil price decline in 1997-98 prompted the Gulf monarchy states to
reevaluate their longstanding economic weaknesses, particular the generous system
of social benefits they provide to their citizens. However, the strong expectation in
these countries of continued benefits led the Gulf regimes to look to other ways to
reform their economies. Rather than cut benefits, institute or raise taxes, or
dramatically reduce their defense budgets, some of the Gulf states have chosen to try
to reduce economic vulnerability by attracting international capital to the energy and
other sectors. Qatar invited foreign investors to develop its North Field, the world’s
largest non-associated gas field, which now has customers in Asia and sells some
liquified natural gas (LNG) to the United States.
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have begun discussions with Western oil companies,
including several American firms, about further developing their oil and gas reserves,
International firms bring technology and capital that are now in short supply to the
Gulf's state-owned oil companies, such as Saudi Aramco and Kuwait Petroleum
Company (KPC). However, sensitivity about a possible loss of sovereignty have
complicated these efforts. The Kuwaiti government has not obtained National
Assembly approval for opening the energy sector to foreign investment, and, as a
result, “Project Kuwait,” a plan under which foreign investors would develop
Kuwait’s northern oil fields, has not moved forward. Similarly, Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah’s initiative to open the Kingdom’s gas reserves to foreign development, has
stalled. Saudi Arabia and eight foreign firms signed a preliminary agreement in June
2001 to develop three Saudi gas fields; two of the three would be led by Exxon
Mobil. However, the agreement has not been finalized. Factors contributing to the
delay reportedly include obstructions by Saudi officials who do not want Saudi
Aramco to lose influence, and differences between Saudi Arabia and the foreign
investors on commercial terms of the deal.

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CRS-15
As part of the process of attracting international investment, the Gulf states are
starting to open their economies. The Gulf states have passed laws allowing foreign
firms to own majority stakes in projects, and easing restrictions on repatriation of
profits. U.S. officials have recognized progress by the GCC states in eliminating the
requirement that U.S. firms work through local agents, and protecting intellectual
property rights of U.S. companies. Oman was admitted to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in October 2000, and Saudi Arabia, the last GCC state not a
member of that body, is in negotiations to join it. Some Saudi officials blame the
United States for insisting on terms of entry that are too strict, and U.S. officials say
that Saudi Arabia is seeking terms that are overly generous and which would allow
it to avoid required reforms. In 1994, all six GCC countries relaxed their
enforcement of the secondary and tertiary Arab boycott of Israel, enabling them to
claim that they no longer engage in practices that restrain trade (a key WTO
condition).
Gulf Foreign Policy and Defense Cooperation with the
United States
Even with a weakened Iraq, most experts believe the GCC countries cannot face
their security challenges alone or in concert, should either Iran or Iraq turn toward
aggression. The GCC countries have chosen to ally with the United States and, to a
lesser degree, other outside powers. Although their combined forces might be
equipped as well as or better than Iran or Iraq (see Table 2 below), the GCC
countries suffer from a shortage of personnel willing to serve in the armed forces or
commit to a military career, and they lack much combat experience.

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CRS-16
Table 2. Comparative Military Strengths of the Gulf States
Naval Units
Defense
Patriot
Military
Surface-Air Combat
Budget
Country
Tanks
Firing
Personnel
Missiles
Aircraft
(billion
Surface
Sub-
Units
dollars)
Combatants marines
201,000 (incl. 1,055 (incl. 33 batteries, 348
Saudi
75,000 Saudi
315 M-1A2
(about half I- (incl. 174
34
0
20
27.2
Arabia
National
Abrams)
Hawk)
F-15)
Guard)
5
411 (incl. 330
UAE
64,500
(I-Hawk
101
18
0
--
3.9
Leclerc)
batteries)
Oman
43,400
153
2 batteries
40
13
0
--
2.4
385 (incl. 218
82 (incl.
10 batteries
Kuwait
15,500
M-1A2
40 FA-
10
0
5
3.3
(incl. 4 Hawk)
Abrams)
18)
75 SAM’s
Qatar
12,300
35
(incl. 12
18
7
0
--
1.5
Stinger)
34 (incl. 11 (incl. 1
Bahrain
11,000
106
2 batteries
0
--
.315
22 F-16)
frigate)
1,500
launchers
Iraq
424,000
2,200
(incl. SA-
316
6
0
--
1.4
2,3,6,7,8,9,13,
14,16)
Iran
513,600
1,565
76 batteries,
283
66 (incl. 10 6 (incl.
--
9.1
(incl. I-Hawk)
Hudong)
3 Kilo)
plus some
plus 40
Stinger
Boghammer
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-2002. (Note: Figures shown
here do include materiel believed to be in storage)
Iraqi aircraft figures include aircraft flown from Iraq to Iran during 1991 Gulf war. Patriot firing unit figures
do not include firing units emplaced in those countries by the United States. Six U.S. Patriot firing units are
emplaced in Saudi Arabia, according to Teal’s World Missiles Briefing.

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CRS-17
In return for providing protection to the Gulf states, the Administration and
Congress have expected these states to provide tangible diplomatic and material
support to all aspects of U.S. policy in the Middle East, including U.S. policy toward
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. However, the Gulf states often try to remain within
a broader Arab consensus, and strains have widened since the latest Palestinian
uprising began in September 2000. In the aftermath of the 1993 Israeli-PLO mutual
recognition, the GCC states participated in the multilateral peace talks, but only
Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman hosted sessions of the multilaterals. As noted above, in
1994 the GCC states ceased enforcing the secondary and tertiary Arab League
boycott of Israel, and Oman and Qatar opened low-level direct trade ties with Israel
in 1995-1996. A regional water desalination research center was established in
Oman as a result of an agreement reached at the multilaterals. In November 1997,
at a time of considerable strain in the peace process, Qatar bucked substantial Arab
opposition and hosted the Middle East/North Africa economic conference, the last
of that yearly event to be held. Diplomats from all six Gulf states met with Israeli
diplomats during reciprocal visits or at the margins of international meetings.
Gulf state criticism of U.S. policy has increased as the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process collapsed during 2000-2002. After the Palestinian uprising began in
September 2000, Oman closed its trade office in Israel and ordered Israel’s trade
office in Muscat closed. Qatar announced the closure of Israel’s trade office in Doha,
although observers say the office has been tacitly allowed to continue functioning at
a low level of activity. (Qatar did not open a trade office in Israel). Even though the
Gulf states resent PLO leader Yasir Arafat for supporting Iraq in the Gulf war, the
Gulf states have bowed to public sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians by giving
financial assistance to Palestinian families that have lost members to Israeli military
operations or in the course of perpetrating violence against Israelis. Although all the
Gulf leaders have expressed sharp disagreement with Bush Administration policy
that they believe is too heavily tilted toward Israel, the Gulf states have not, as was
feared, taken steps to reduce defense cooperation with the United States. Saudi
Crown Prince Abdullah has tried to guide and support U.S. policy on this issue; he
engineered Arab League approval of a vision of peace between Israel and the Arab
states at the March 2002 Arab summit.
The Bush Administration faces disagreements with the Gulf states on policy
toward Iraq, even though the Gulf states have historically been the most threatened
by Iraq. Disagreement is particularly sharp on the possibility that the United States
might mount a military offensive to change Iraq’s regime. The Gulf states say they
do not see the threat from Iraq as sufficiently clear to justify steps to change Iraq’s
regime, although they do not appear to oppose U.S. covert action or limited military
action to remove Saddam Husayn. The Gulf states agree with the United States that
Iraq should readmit U.N. weapons inspectors and otherwise comply with all
applicable U.N. resolutions, although the Gulf states also have tended to push for
relatively lenient criteria for judging Iraqi compliance and for lifting international
sanctions. Partly in an effort to defuse U.S. talk of military action against Iraq, Saudi
Arabia arranged a move toward reconciliation between Iraq and Kuwait at the March
2002 Arab League summit, and the leaders adopted resolutions opposing a U.S.
military attack on Iraq. Also that month, the Gulf leaders reportedly rebuffed U.S.
efforts to elicit their support for robust action against Iraq when Vice President
Cheney visited the Gulf. On the other hand, some experts and U.S. officials believe

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CRS-18
the Gulf states would go along with U.S. military action, including providing basing,
if the United States would ensure that a stable and more peaceful Iraq would result.
The September 11 attacks introduced new, but apparently manageable, frictions
in U.S. relations with the Gulf states. The revelation that fifteen of the nineteen
September 11 hijackers were of Saudi origin led to additional strain in U.S.-Saudi
relations – which had already been tense because of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute --
and to speculation that U.S. forces might be asked to leave the Kingdom. There were
also reports that the hijackers had used financial networks based in the UAE in the
September 11 plot. The Saudis reportedly have been offended by U.S. press articles
that equated Saudi human rights practices to those of the Taliban, and that discuss
Saudi funding of religious schools in Pakistan that were linked to the Taliban and Al
Qaeda. There have been reports that some Bush Administration officials, weighing
these and other criticisms of Saudi Arabia, now view the Kingdom as more an
adversary than a friend of the United States.
Publicly, the Administration has responded to these reports by stressing that all
the Gulf states strongly condemned the September 11 attacks, and have responded,
to varying degrees, to U.S. requests that they shut down financial networks used by
Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Virtually all of the Gulf states have at least tried
to identify bank accounts of known or suspected terrorists or Islamic charities
allegedly funding terrorist organizations, although they have been hesitant to actually
begin freezing such accounts. The Gulf leaders defend Islamic charities as needed
vehicles to help poor Muslims, and they have challenged some U.S. assertions that
these funds are used for terrorism. During a visit to the Gulf in April 2002, Treasury
Secretary Paul O’Neill praised Gulf state cooperation, particularly that of the UAE,
with the United States on terrorism financing issues. Some Gulf states have made
arrests of alleged Al Qaeda operatives; Saudi Arabia arrested seven Al Qaeda
suspects in June 2002. Saudi Arabia said in August 2002 it is holding about 16 Al
Qaeda fighters of Saudi origin captured transiting Iran and turned over to Saudi
Arabia by the Iranian government.
Defense Agreements and U.S. Forces in the Gulf. In the aftermath of
the 1991 Gulf war, the Gulf states, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, renewed or
formalized defense agreements with the United States. The agreements provide not
only for facilities access for U.S. forces, but also for U.S. advice, training, and joint
exercises; lethal and non-lethal U.S. equipment prepositioning; and arms sales. The
pacts do not formally require the United States to come to the aid of any of the Gulf
states if they are attacked, according to U.S. officials familiar with their contents.
Nor do the pacts give the United States automatic permission to conduct military
operations from Gulf facilities — the United States must obtain permission on a case
by case basis.
The September 11 attacks offered a new opportunity to put into practice the
longstanding defense cooperation with the Gulf states. The Gulf states were asked,
and most agreed, to host U.S. forces performing combat missions in Afghanistan in
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda).
Saudi Arabia did not offer to allow U.S. pilots to fly missions in Afghanistan from
Saudi Arabia, but it did permit the United States to use the Combined Air Operations
Center at Prince Sultan Air Base, south of Riyadh, to coordinate U.S. air operations

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CRS-19
over Afghanistan. Published accounts indicate that the other Gulf states did allow
such missions to fly from their territory, and they allowed the United States to station
additional forces for OEF. Qatar publicly acknowledged the U.S. use of the large Al
Udaid air base in OEF, and Bahrain publicly deployed its U.S.- supplied frigate naval
vessel in support of OEF.
A baseline number of U.S. military personnel in the Gulf theater of operations
is listed in Table 3 below, although the numbers may vary greatly in times of a crisis
in the Gulf or nearby. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the numbers of U.S.
troops in several of the Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Bahrain, have been
appreciably higher than those listed in the table. The following is a brief overview
of U.S. operations and presence in each of the six GCC states:
! Concerned about internal opposition to a U.S. presence, Saudi Arabia has
refused to sign a formal defense pact with the United States. However, it has
entered into several limited defense procurement and training agreements with
the United States.12 U.S. combat aircraft based in Saudi Arabia fly patrols of
the no fly zone over southern Iraq, but Saudi Arabia does not permit
preplanned strikes against Iraqi air defenses - only retaliation in case of
tracking or firing by Iraq.
! Bahrain has hosted the headquarters for U.S. naval forces in the Gulf since
1948, long before the United States became the major Western power in the
Gulf. (During the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. presence was nominally based
offshore.) Bahrain signed a separate defense cooperation agreement with the
United States on October 28, 1991. In June 1995, the U.S. Navy reestablished
its long dormant Fifth fleet, responsible for the Persian Gulf region, and
headquartered in Bahrain. No U.S. warships are actually based in Bahraini
ports; the headquarters is used to command the 20 or so U.S. ships normally
in the Gulf. About 850 U.S. Air Force personnel deployed to Shaykh Isa air
base for duties in OEF.
! An April 21, 1980 facilities access agreement with Oman provided the United
States access to Omani airbases at Seeb, Thumrait, and Masirah, and some
prepositioning of U.S. Air Force equipment. The agreement was renewed in
1985, 1990, and 2000. In keeping with an agreement reached during the 2000
access agreement renewal negotiations, the United States is funding the $120
million cost to upgrade another base near al-Musnanah. When completed in
2003, the base will be able to handle even the largest U.S. aircraft.13
! On September 19, 1991, Kuwait, which sees itself as the most vulnerable to
Iraqi aggression, signed a 10-year pact with the United States (renewed in
2001 for another 10 years) allowing the United States to preposition enough
equipment to outfit a U.S. brigade. Joint U.S.-Kuwaiti exercises are held
12For more information on these agreements, see CRS Report 94-78, Saudi Arabia: U.S.
Defense and Security Commitments. February 3, 1994, by Alfred Prados.
13Sirak, Michael. USA looks to Expand Bases in Oman and Qatar. Jane’s Defence Weekly,
April 17, 2002.

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CRS-20
almost constantly, meaning that about 4,000 U.S. military personnel are in
Kuwait at virtually all times. The United States opened a Joint Task Force
headquarters in Kuwait in December 1998 to better manage the U.S. forces in
Kuwait. With few limitations, Kuwait allows the United States to conduct
airstrikes on Iraq from its territory and to station additional air and ground
forces in Kuwait during times of crisis, as happened during OEF. The United
States has spent about $170 million since 1999 to upgrade the two Kuwaiti air
bases that host U.S. aircraft – Ali al-Salem and Ali al-Jabir, and to upgrade the
headquarters of U.S. Army troops in Kuwait. The U.S. prepositioning site is
expected to move to southern Kuwait, at Arifjan, in the near future; the site is
being expanded and can hold more equipment than the current site at Camp
Doha. Relocating there also places U.S. equipment further from Iraq and
thereby adds some strategic depth to the U.S. presence.
! Qatar is building an increasingly close defense relationship with the United
States, possibly to ensure that its neighbors do not try to encroach on its huge
natural gas reserves. It signed a defense pact with the United States on June
23, 1992, and has thus far accepted the prepositioning of enough armor to
outfit one U.S. brigade, and the construction of a facility (As-Saliyah site) that
could accommodate enough equipment to outfit at least two U.S. brigades.
The United States is currently helping Qatar expand a large air base (Al
Udaid) at a cost of about $1 billion, and U.S. aircraft began using the base
during OEF. Press reports say the United States is building an air operations
center at Al Udaid that would supplement or eventually supplant the one in
Saudi Arabia. Over 2,000 U.S. Air Force personnel deployed to Al Udaid in
OEF.
! The UAE did not have close defense relations with the United States prior to
the 1991 Gulf war. The UAE then determined, however, that it wanted a
closer relationship with the United States, in part to deter and balance out
Iranian naval power. On July 25, 1994, the UAE announced it had signed a
defense pact with the United States. The UAE allows some U.S.
prepositioning, as well as U.S. ship port visits at its large man-made Jebel Ali
port. It also hosts U.S. refueling aircraft participating in the southern no fly
zone enforcement operation (al-Dhafra air base). Concerned about a
perceived loss of sovereignty, the UAE also insisted on a clarification of the
defense pact's provisions on the legal jurisdiction of U.S. military and other
official personnel in the UAE; the issue was resolved in 1997.

---

CRS-21
Table 3. U.S. Troops in Iraq Theatre/ Host Nation Support
Country
U.S. Forces/Equipment Hosted
Host Nation
U.S. Aid
(Pre-September 11)
Support, 1999
(FY2003
(Millions)
Request)
Saudi Arabia
- About 5,000, mostly Air Force
$2.16 direct
$25,000 IMET
- Combined Air Operations Center at
$78.29
Prince Sultan Air Base
indirect
- About 160 U.S. aircraft
$80.44: Total
- No U.S. combat flights in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF)
Kuwait
- About 3,600, roughly equally
$172.09 direct
divided between Air Force and Army
$4.90 indirect
- Joint Task Force/Kuwait
$176.99: Total
- About 40 U.S. aircraft
- Armor for one brigade (Camp Doha)
- U.S. combat flights in OEF
UAE
- About 370, mostly Air Force
$0.06 direct
$350,000 IMET
- Port facilities at Jebel Ali
$14.62
- Some U.S. support aircraft
indirect
$14.68: Total
Qatar
- About 50, mostly Army
$0.00 direct
- Some Air Force equipment at Al
$11.00
Udaid Air Base, U.S. use of Al Udaid
indirect
in OEF
$11.00: Total
- Armor to outfit at least one brigade
at As-Saliyah site
Oman
- About 200
$0.00 direct
$20 million
- Some Air Force equipment, access
$34.91
FMF; $750,000
to air bases at Seeb, Thumrait,
indirect
IMET;
Masirah, and Musnanah
$34.91: Total
$150,000
NADR
- Use of facilities in OEF
Bahrain
- About 1,400, mostly Navy
$1.25 direct
$450,000 IMET
- Fifth fleet headquarters
$0.15 indirect
- Facilities used in OEF
$1.40: Total

Turkey
1,805 Air Force (Northern Watch)
N/A
$17.5 million
About 24 aircraft (Northern Watch)
FMF; $2.8
million IMET;
$600,000
NADR
Afloat in the Gulf
About 13,000 mostly Navy; 1 aircraft
N/A
carrier plus about 10 associated ships,
with about 70 aircraft. 2 U.S. ships
help enforce Iraq embargo.
Sources: Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and By Country,
Department of Defense, Responsibility Sharing Report, March 2001.
Note: Direct support refers to financial payments to offset U.S. costs incurred. Indirect refers to in-kind support
such as provision of fuel, food, housing, basing rights, maintenance, and the like. IMET is International Military
Education and Training funds; FMF is Foreign Military Financing; NADR is Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs.

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CRS-22
U.S. Arms Sales and Security Assistance. A key feature of the U.S.
strategy for protecting the Gulf has been to sell arms and related defense services to
the GCC states. Congress has not blocked any U.S. sales to the GCC states since the
Gulf war, although some in Congress have expressed reservations about sales of a
few of the more sophisticated weapons and armament packages to the Gulf states in
recent years. Some Members believe that sales of sophisticated equipment could
erode Israel’s “qualitative edge” over its Arab neighbors,14 if the Gulf states were to
join a joint Arab military action against Israel. Others are concerned that some U.S.
systems sold to the Gulf contain missile technology that could violate international
conventions or be re-transferred to countries with which the United States is at odds.
Few experts believe that, absent a major Arab-Israeli war, the Gulf states would seek
conflict with Israel. Even if they were to do so, successive administration have
maintained that the Gulf states are too dependent on U.S. training, spare parts, and
armament codes to be in a position to use sophisticated U.S.-made arms against
Israel.15 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1994-95 (P.L. 103-256, signed
April 30, 1994) bars U.S. arms sales to any country that enforces the primary and
secondary Arab League boycott of Israel. The Administration has waived the
application of this law to the Gulf states every year since enactment.
Most of the GCC states are considered too wealthy to receive U.S. security
assistance, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and excess defense articles
(EDA). Only Bahrain and Oman – the two GCC states that are not members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – receive significant
amounts of U.S. assistance, which in Oman’s case will include Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) in FY2003. Saudi Arabia is receiving a nominal amount of
International Military Education and Training funds (IMET) in FY2002 and FY2003
to lower the costs to the Saudi government of sending its military officers to U.S.
schools. The move is intended to preserve U.S.-Saudi military-to-military ties over
the longer term, amid fears of recent erosion in those ties.
Excess Defense Articles. Bahrain and Oman are eligible to receive EDA
on a grant basis (Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act) and the UAE is eligible
to buy or lease EDA. In 1998-99, Oman received 30 and Bahrain 48 U.S.-made M-
60A3 tanks on a "no rent" lease basis. The Defense Department subsequently
transferred title to the equipment to the recipients. Since July 1997, Bahrain has
taken delivery of a U.S. frigate and an I- HAWK air defense battery as EDA.
Bahrain is currently seeking a second frigate under this program.
Foreign Military Sales, FMS. Some of the major U.S. arms sales (foreign
military sales, FMS) to the Gulf states, either in progress or under consideration,
include the following.16
14Towle, Michael. "Senators Say They Now Support F-16 Sale." Fort Worth Star-
Telegram. August 25, 1998.
15Ratnam, Gopal and Amy Svitak. "U.S. Would Keep Tight Rein on Missile Sold to
Bahrain." Defense News, September 11, 2000.
16Information in this section was provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) in Security Assistance Program Summaries (unclassified) for each of the Gulf
(continued...)

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CRS-23
! The UAE historically has purchased its major combat systems from France,
but UAE officials now appear to believe that arms purchases from the United
States enhance the U.S. commitment to UAE security. In March 2000, the
UAE signed a contract to purchase 80 U.S. F-16 aircraft, equipped with the
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM), the HARM (High
Speed Anti-Radiation Missile) anti-radar missile, and, subject to a UAE
purchase decision, the Harpoon anti-ship missile system. The total sale value
is estimated at over $8 billion, including a little over $2 billion worth of
weapons, munitions, and services.17 The aircraft are in the process of being
manufactured; deliveries have not begun. Congress did not formally object
to the agreement, although some Members initially questioned the inclusion
of the AMRAAM as a first introduction of that weapon into the Gulf region.
The Clinton Administration satisfied that objection by demonstrating that
France had already introduced a similar system in an arms deal with Qatar.
On July 18, 2002, the Administration notified Congress it would upgrade the
UAE’s 30 AH-64 Apache helicopter gunships (bought during 1991-94) with
the advanced “Longbow” fire control radar. The UAE is evaluating the Patriot
PAC-III theater missile defense system, as well as a Russian equivalent, to
meet its missile defense requirements.
! Saudi Arabia is still absorbing about $14 billion in purchases of U.S. arms
during the Gulf war, as well as post-war buys of 72 U.S.-made F-15S aircraft
(1993, $9 billion value), 315 M1A2 Abrams tanks (1992, $2.9 billion), 18
Patriot firing units ($4.1 billion) and 12 Apache helicopters. Few major new
U.S. sales are on the horizon, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) says Saudi Arabia is not, at this point, considering ordering any more
F-15's. In July 2000, the United States proposed a sale to Saudi Arabia of up
to 500 AMRAAM missiles and related equipment and services, at an
estimated cost of $475 million, to outfit their F-15s. Congress did not attempt
to block the sale.
! Based on comments from Kuwaiti officials in July 2002, a long-stalled
agreement to sell Kuwait 16 Apache helicopters, equipped with the Longbow
fire control system, is imminent. A U.S. offer to sell Kuwait 48 U.S.-made
M109A6 "Palladin" artillery systems, (worth about $450 million) was
withdrawn in July 2000. The sale had languished for about two years because
of opposition from several members of Kuwait’s National Assembly, who
believed that the purchase primarily represented an attempt to curry political
favor with the United States. According to DSCA, Kuwait is considering
purchasing additional F/A-18 aircraft to complement its existing fleet of 40
of those aircraft. Kuwait also bought 5 Patriot firing units in 1992 and 218
M1A2 Abrams tanks in 1993.
16(...continued)
states. July - September 2000.
17 See CRS Report 98-436, United Arab Emirates: U.S. Relations and F-16 Aircraft Sale.
Updated June 15, 2000, by Kenneth Katzman and Richard F. Grimmett. Transmittal notices
to Congress, No. DTC 023-00, April 27, 2000; and 98-45, September 16, 1998.

---

CRS-24
! In 1998, Bahrain purchased 10 F-16s from new production at a value of about
$390 million; delivery began in early 2001. In late 1999, the Administration,
with congressional approval, agreed to sell Bahrain up to 26 AMRAAMs, at
a value of up to $69 million, but delivery has been delayed by the war in
Afghanistan, according to DSCA. Among the more controversial sales to a
Gulf state, in August 2000 Bahrain requested to purchase 30 Army Tactical
Missile Systems (ATACMs), a system of short-range ballistic missiles fired
from a multiple rocket launcher. The Defense Department told Congress the
version sold to Bahrain would not violate the rules of the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR),18 an effort to allay congressional concerns that the
the sale would facilitate the spread of ballistic and cruise missiles in the
Gulf.19 In addition, the Administration proposed a system of joint U.S.-
Bahraini control of the weapon under which Bahraini military personnel
would not have access to the codes needed to launch the missile.20 Bahrain
accepted that control formula, and delivery is to begin in July 2003. In March
2002, President Bush issued Presidential Determination 2002-10 designating
Bahrain a “major non-NATO ally,” a designation that will open Bahrain to a
wider range of U.S. arms that can be sold to it in the future.
! Although Qatar has traditionally been armed by France and Britain, the
Foreign Minister said in mid-1997 that it is "probable" that Qatar will buy
arms from the United States in the future. No major U.S. sales seem
imminent, but DSCA says that Qatar is expressing interest in a few U.S.
systems including the Patriot (PAC-III), the M1A2 Abrams tank, a Low
Altitude Surveillance System (LASS), and the Harpoon system. The United
States has told Qatar it is eligible to buy the ATACM system (see above)
because the Administration has approved Bahrain for purchases of that
system, but Qatar has not requested to purchase the ATACM to date.
! Oman has traditionally purchased mostly British weaponry, reflecting British
influence in Oman’s military, and the British military’s mentoring and
advisory relationship to Qaboos. In October 2001, in an indication of waning
British influence, the United States announced that Oman will buy 12 F-16
A/B aircraft, at an estimated value of $1.1 billion. However, with its funds
limited over the past few years, Oman has had to refurbish British-built
aircraft already in its possession. Oman does not appear to be considering the
purchase of any other major U.S. systems at this time, although it has
requested some items be supplied as EDA, including patrol boats to combat
smuggling.
18The MTCR commits member states not to transfer to non-member states missiles with a
range of more than 300 km, and a payload of more than 500 kilograms. Turkey, Greece,
and South Korea are the only countries to have bought ATACMs from the United States.
19Ratnam, Gopal and Amy Svitak. "U.S. Would Keep Tight Rein on Missile Sold to
Bahrain." Defense News, September 11, 2000.
20Ibid.

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CRS-25
Joint Security/ “Cooperative Defense Initiative”. The United States has
encouraged the GCC countries to increase military cooperation among themselves,
building on their small (approximately 5,000 personnel) Saudi-based force known
as Peninsula Shield, formed in 1981. Peninsula Shield did not react militarily to the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, exposing the force's deficiencies. After the war, manpower
shortages and disagreements over command of the force prevented the GCC states
from agreeing to a post-Gulf war Omani recommendation to boost Peninsula Shield
to 100,000 men. Gulf state suspicions of Syria and Egypt prevented closer military
cooperation with those countries, as envisioned under the March 1991 "Damascus
Declaration." In September 2000, the GCC states agreed in principle to increase the
size of Peninsula Shield to 22,000.21 It should be noted that the GCC states have
announced similar agreements to expand Peninsula Shield in the past without
implementation, and that no timetable has been set for reaching the targeted level of
strength. In a further step, at their summit in December 2000, the GCC leaders
signed a “defense pact” that presumably would commit them to defend each other in
case of attack.
The GCC states have made some incremental progress in linking their early
warning radar and communication systems. In early 2001, the GCC inaugurated its
“Belt of Cooperation” network for joint tracking of aircraft and coordination of air
defense systems, built by Raytheon. The Belt of Cooperation is expected to
eventually include a link to U.S. systems. The project is part of the United States’
“Cooperative Defense Initiative” to integrate the GCC defenses with each other and
with the United States. Another part of that initiative is U.S.-GCC joint training to
defend against a chemical or biological attack, as well as more general joint military
training and exercises.22 The Cooperative Defense Initiative is a scaled-back version
of an earlier U.S. idea to develop and deploy a GCC-wide theater missile defense
(TMD) system that could protect the Gulf states from Iran's increasingly sophisticated
ballistic missile program and from any retained Iraqi ballistic missiles.23 The
Department of Defense, according to observers, envisioned this system under which
separate parts (detection systems, intercept missiles, and other equipment) of an
integrated TMD network would be based in the six different GCC states. That
concept ran up against GCC states’ financial constraints, differing perceptions among
the Gulf states, some level of mistrust among them, and the apparent UAE preference
for Russian made anti-missile/air defense systems.24 As noted in Table 3 above,
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have Patriot anti-missile units of their own; the other four
GCC states have no advanced missile defenses.
21"GCC States Look to Boost 'Peninsula Shield' Force to 22,000." Agence France Press,
September 13, 2000.
22Press Conference with Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), April 8, 2000.
23Under Resolution 687, Iraq is allowed to retain and continue to develop missiles with a
range of up to 150 km, which would put parts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia within range of
Iraq, even if Iraq abides completely by the provisions of the resolution.
24Finnegan, Philip. "Politics Hinders Joint Gulf Missile Defense." Defense News, March
22, 1999.

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CRS-26
Prospects and Challenges
U.S. Gulf policy faces numerous uncertainties as the Bush Administration
moves toward decisions on how to implement its policy of regime change for Iraq.
Fearing an imminent U.S. offensive, Iraq might decide to allow a resumption of U.N.
weapons inspections, a move that could further undermine international support for
major military action against Iraq. . Alternately, Iraq might accelerate efforts to
rebuild its WMD programs, hoping that doing so could deter a U.S. military attack.
Some speculate Iraq might try to develop new terrorist options to deter or retaliate for
U.S. military action.
In Iran, the Administration faces the consequences of its apparent decision to
support reformists within or outside the political structure rather than try to engage
Khatemi’s government directly. One possible consequence of the U.S. stance is that
reformers might respond by seeking to overthrow the current political system
entirely, throwing Iran into instability. Another possibility is that Khatemi’s
authority might erode further in favor of factions who fear potential hostilities with
the United States and who might want to accelerate Iran’s WMD programs. The
Bush Administration is closely watching the construction of the nuclear plant at
Bushehr. It may face a decision whether to prevent the plant from becoming
operational - either through military or other means - or whether to accept the
proliferation risks posed by the plant. Other questions remain about how to curb
Iranian support to Palestinian and other groups engaged in violence or terrorism
against Israel.
The Administration faces major questions about the course of its relations with
the Gulf states. One significant unknown is whether or not Gulf public sympathies
with the Palestinians and Iraq will cause the Gulf regimes to refuse to cooperate with
any U.S. military offensive against Iraq. The Gulf states already have faced some
internal pressure to downplay their involvement in containing Iraq, because Iraq is
increasingly perceived in the Gulf as unjustly victimized by U.S. and international
sanctions. The Iraq issue aside, the Gulf states’ long term commitment to
cooperating with the United States against Al Qaeda is also uncertain. According to
numerous but largely anecdotal accounts, Gulf publics tend to agree with Al Qaeda’s
stated grievances against the United States, although not necessarily with its terrorist
tactics.

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CRS-27
Appendix 1. Gulf State Populations, Religious
Composition
Country
Total
Number of Non-
Religious Composition
Population
Citizens
Iran
66.1 million
607,000
89% Shia; 10% Sunni; 1%
Bahai, Jewish, Christian,
Zoroastrian
Iraq
23.3 million
—
60-65% Shia; 32-37%
Sunni; 3% Christian or
other
Saudi Arabia
22.7 million
5.3 million
90% Sunni; 10% Shia
Kuwait
2.04 million
1.16 million
45% Sunni; 40% Shia;
15% Christian, Hindu,
other
United Arab
2.4 million
1.58 million
80% Sunni; 16% Shia; 4%
Emirates
Christian, Hindu, other
Bahrain
645,300
228,600
75% Shia; 25% Sunni
Qatar
769,000
516,000
95% Muslim; 5% other
Oman
2.6 million
527,000
75% Ibadhi Muslim; 25%
Sunni and Shia Muslim,
and Hindu
Source: Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, 2001. Population figures are
estimates as of July 2001. Most, if not all, non-Muslims in GCC countries are
foreign expatriates.

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CRS-28
Appendix 2. UNSCOM Accomplishments and Unresolved
Issues
Weapons Category
Accomplishments
Unresolved Issues
Overall Status: Nuclear
IAEA reports Iraq's
Questions remain about
nuclear program
nuclear design drawings,
dismantled and rendered
documents, and fate of
harmless (April and
some equipment
October 1998 reports)
Nuclear Fuel
All removed by IAEA
––
Nuclear Facilities
Dismantled by IAEA
––
Suppliers
IAEA says it has
Most of 170 technical
assembled a picture of
reports from a German
Iraq's nuclear suppliers
supplier unaccounted for
Overall Status: Chemical
Declared munitions,
Most outstanding
chemical precursors
questions involve Iraqi
destroyed by UNSCOM
production of VX nerve
agent
VX nerve agent
Iraq admits producing 4
No verification of the fate
tons
of the agent
VX precursor chemicals
191 tons verified as
About 600 tons
destroyed
unaccounted for, enough
to make 200 tons of VX
Other chemical munitions
38,500 found and
Fate of 31,600 munitions,
destroyed by UNSCOM
550 mustard shells, and
107,000 chemical casings
unaccounted for
Chemical Weapons
690 tons found and
3,000 tons unaccounted
Agents
destroyed by UNSCOM
for
Precursor Chemicals
3,000 tons found and
4,000 tons unaccounted
destroyed by UNSCOM
for
Chemical Monitoring
170 sites monitored during
No monitoring since
UNSCOM tenure
UNSCOM departure
Overall Status:
UNSCOM has obtained
UNSCOM says most work
Biological Program
Iraqi admissions that it had
remains in this category;
a biological warfare
no biological weapons
program
found by UNSCOM
Biological Agents
Iraq admitted producing
No verification of
19,000 liters of botulinum;
destruction or amounts
8,400 liters of anthrax; and
produced
2,000 liters of aflatoxin
and clostridium
Munitions
Iraq admits loading
No verification of bomb
biological weapons onto
destruction; fate of
157 bombs
additional 500 parachute-
dropped bombs unknown

---

CRS-29
Weapons Category
Accomplishments
Unresolved Issues
Agent Growth Media
Supplier records show 34
4 tons unaccounted for
tons imported
Delivery Equipment
Iraq admits testing
Fate of these systems
helicopter spraying
unknown
equipment and drop tanks
Production Facilities
Salman Pak facility buried
UNSCOM notes that
by Iraq before inspections;
biological agents can be
Al Hakam bulldozed by
produced in very small
UNSCOM
facilities
Monitoring
86 sites monitored during
No monitoring since
UNSCOM tenure
UNSCOM departure
Overall Status: Ballistic
Almost all imported
Questions about Iraq's
Missiles
missiles accounted for
indigenous missile
production remain
Imported Scud Missiles
UNSCOM says it has
Two Scuds missing by
accounted for 817 of 819
UNSCOM accounting;
Scuds imported from
U.S. and Britain believe
Russia
10-12 Scuds still
unaccounted for
Chemical/Biological
75 warheads declared. 30
Two declared chemical
Warheads
destroyed by UNSCOM,
warheads may be missing.
and at least 43 others,
Undeclared chem/bio
including 25 biological
warheads may exist
warheads, verified as
destroyed
Imported Conventional
Iraq admits importing 50
Warheads unaccounted for
Warheads
Scud warheads for high
explosives
Indigenously-produced
––
30 warheads and 7
Missiles
missiles unaccounted for
Missile Propellant
––
300 tons unaccounted for
Production Equipment
Iraq admits having 150
Fate unknown
tons of equipment
Monitoring
63 sites monitored during
Missiles of up to 150 km
UNSCOM tenure
range permitted. U.S.
reports note permitted
programs can benefit
research on prohibited-
range missiles.
Source: The information in this table is derived from reports to the U.N. Security Council by the U.N.
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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CRS-30
Appendix 3. No Fly Zones in Iraq
T u r k e y
N O R T H E R N
Z O N E
I r a n
3 6 °
S y r i a
I r a q
B a g h d a d
3 3 °
S O U T H E R N Z O N E
( E X T E N D E D )
J o r d a n
3 2 °
S O U T H E R N
Z O N E
K u w a it
S a u d i A r a b i a
A d a p te d b y C R S fro m M a g e lla n G e o g r a p h ix . U s e d w i th p e r m is s io n .
Northern No Fly Zone Established April 1991
Southern No Fly Zone (South of 32nd Parallel) Established August 1992
Southern No Fly Zone Extended to 33rd Parallel Established September 1996

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CRS-31
Appendix 4. Map of the Persian Gulf Region and Environs

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