Order Code RS21283
August 7, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security: Intelligence Support
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Both House and Senate versions of legislation to establish a Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) (H.R. 5005 and S. 2452) include provisions for an
intelligence analysis function within the new department. Neither, however, proposes
the transfer to DHS of existing government intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Both envision the intelligence element utilizing the products of other agencies to provide
warning of terrorist attacks, assessments of vulnerability, and recommendations for
remedial actions at the federal, state, and local levels and by the private sector. The
House bill provides somewhat more latitude for DHS analysts to fuse intelligence and
law enforcement information; the Senate version would have DHS depend more on
analysis by CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. This report does not address provisions in
the proposed legislation governing the sharing of intelligence with state and local
officials. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.
Introduction
The Bush Administration’s legislative proposal for a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) released July 16, 2002 was incorporated in H.R. 5005, introduced on June
24, 2002 by Representative Armey. Title II of the bill, Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, as subsequently amended and passed by the House on July 26,
includes provisions to establish an Intelligence Analysis Center to provide intelligence
support to the homeland security effort and to identify priorities for measures to protect
key sources and critical infrastructures. In the Senate, Senator Lieberman introduced
legislation (S. 2452) to establish a Department of National Homeland Security on May
2, 2002. The original version of S.2452 did not address the intelligence function, but
subsequent amendments in the nature of a substitute include provisions establishing a
Directorate of Intelligence as an integral part of the new department.
The House version would establish an Intelligence Analysis Center headed by the
Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; the Senate bill
would establish a Directorate of Intelligence. The House approach seeks to promote
closer ties between intelligence analysts and those responsible for assessing vulnerabilities
of key U.S. infrastructure. The Senate approach seeks to provide better intelligence
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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support to all parts of the new Department and ensure that intelligence has an independent
position among DHS elements.1 Both House and Senate bills envision an intelligence
entity focused on receiving and analyzing information2 from other government agencies
and using it to provide warning of terrorist attacks and for addressing vulnerabilities
throughout the country that terrorists could exploit. Neither, however, would transfer
major intelligence agencies to the DHS, although DHS elements, including Customs and
the Coast Guard, do collect information that is crucial to analyzing terrorist threats. There
are a number of issues remaining and undoubtedly modifications to current legislative
language will be proposed, but many observers believe that the two bills do not contain
irreconcilable approaches to intelligence support to the counterterrorist effort.
Background
Better intelligence is held by many observers to be a crucial factor in preventing
future terrorist attacks. In particular, concerns have been expressed that no part of the
federal government has been in a position to “connect the dots” between diffuse pieces
of information acquired separately by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. For
example, data collected abroad by intelligence agencies about terrorist groups out to
attack the U.S. has not been evaluated by analysts having direct access to information
about visitors to this country who have violated immigration or other laws. For many
years the sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information was deterred by
organizational policies and statutory prohibitions. Beginning in the early 1990's,
however, much effort has gone into improving interagency coordination.3 In addition,
a number of statutory obstacles have been removed by the USA-Patriot Act of 2001 and
other legislation.4 Nevertheless, no one agency currently has direct statutory
responsibility for looking at all intelligence and law enforcement information that might
relate to potential terrorist threats to the homeland.
Under either the House or Senate proposal, DHS would not duplicate the collection
effort of intelligence agencies; it would not have its own agents, satellites, or signals
intercept sites. The intelligence entity within DHS would have, however, the
responsibility for acquiring and reviewing information from the agencies of the
Intelligence Community, from law enforcement agencies, and unclassified publicly
available information (known as open source information or “osint”) from books,
periodicals, pamphlets, the Internet, media, etc. S. 2452 is explicit that, unless otherwise
directed by the President, DHS will “have access to, and United States Government
agencies shall provide, all reports, assessments, analytical information, and information,
1 For background on DHS organizational issues, see CRS Report RL31493, Homeland Security:
Department Organization and Management, by Harold C. Relyea.
2 Some writers distinguish between information and intelligence; the former being unanalyzed
information the latter being the result of analysis. In practice, however, the terms are often used
interchangeably and the distinction will not be observed in this report.
3 For background on this issue, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement:
Countering Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best, Jr.
4 See CRS Report RL31377, The USA Patriot Act: A Legal Analysis, by Charles Doyle; and CRS
Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory
Framework, by Elizabeth Bazan.

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including unevaluated information, relating to the plans, intentions, capabilities, and
activities of terrorists and terrorist organization....”5 While arrangements involving broad
categories of information are envisioned by S. 2452, regardless of whether such
arrangements exist, the bill stipulates that “all agencies ... shall promptly provide
information....” The Administration has expressed concern that this language could result
in DHS being flooded with large volumes of immaterial information, making it more, not
less, difficult for DHS analysts to identify pertinent information.
In the House version, DHS analysts would be charged with using this information
to produce “infrastructure vulnerability assessments,” “identifying priorities for protective
and support measures by [DHS], by other executive agencies, by State and local
governments, by the private sector, and by other entities.” Intelligence would supply the
evidentiary basis for enabling the DHS to fulfill its responsibility for “public advisories
relating to terrorist threats, and (in coordination with other executive agencies) providing
specific warning information to State and local government personnel, agencies, and
authorities, the private sector, other entities, and the public, as well as advice about
appropriate protective actions and countermeasures.”
Both the House and Senate versions envision the intelligence elements initially
staffed by analysts from other intelligence and law enforcement agencies assigned on
reimbursable details. Service in DHS would be considered a positive factor for selection
to positions of greater authority within all supporting agencies. Personnel security
standards would be established in conjunction with Intelligence Community standards.
Both bills would make DHS responsible for ensuring that any material received is
protected from unauthorized disclosure and handled and used only for the performance
of official duties. Intelligence information would be transmitted, retained, and
disseminated consistent with policies established under the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) to protect intelligence sources and methods.6 Information from
law enforcement agencies would be transmitted, retained, and disseminated in accordance
with the Attorney General’s authorities on sensitive law enforcement information.7
5 The language provides for a presidential exception that might arise because of particularly
sensitive information; some observers also argue that the President has a constitutional authority
to control the dissemination of intelligence information.
6 The DCI’s authority for protecting intelligence sources and methods is set forth in 50 USC 403-
3(c)(6).
7 The Attorney General’s authorities for safeguarding law enforcement information are diffuse;
see, e.g., 18 USC 2511 (interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications
prohibited, exceptions); 18 USC 2517 (authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire,
oral, or electronic communications); 21 USC 190(e) (public disclosure of significant foreign
narcotics traffickers and required reports, exclusions of certain information).

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Issues Under Discussion
DHS Role in the Intelligence Community. The U.S. Intelligence Community,
consisting of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and some 14 other agencies,8 provides
information in various forms to the White House and other federal agencies (as well as
to Congress). In addition, law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), also collect information for use in the federal government9. Neither
H.R. 5005 nor S. 2452 would make fundamental alterations in existing roles and missions
of intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Within the Intelligence Community, priorities for collection (and to some extent for
analysis) are established by the DCI,10 based in practice on inter-agency discussions.
Being “at the table” when priorities are discussed, it is suggested, helps ensure equitable
allocations of limited collection resources. Both bills would make the intelligence office
of the DHS a member of the Intelligence Community and thus give DHS a formal role
when intelligence collection and analysis priorities are being addressed and also facilitate
access to intelligence community databases and other analytical resources. Some argue
that such a move would entail participation in extensive Intelligence Community staffing
and would require more personnel resources than currently envisioned for DHS in this
area, thereby detracting from the intended focus on terrorist threats.
This legislation to establish DHS envisions an intelligence center having an integral
role within DHS. DHS will not itself become an intelligence agency like the CIA; rather
the Intelligence Analysis Center/Directorate of Intelligence will be a component division
that is a part of the Intelligence Community and that will function in a support and
advisory role to other DHS elements. A similar situation has long existed in the State
Department which has a Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), also a component of
the Intelligence Community, charged with providing intelligence input to the foreign
policymaking process. Although INR has had to strive to avoid letting policy goals of the
Department influence its intelligence judgments, most observers credit INR with having
performed responsibly over the years. Being a component of the Intelligence Community
has allowed INR to have direct and close access to intelligence data and analysis as well
as to influence the establishment of collection and analysis priorities.
Both bills would also place the DHS intelligence element within the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).11 The NFIP is a collection of programs whose
budgets are developed by the DCI and presented to the President for review and
forwarding to Congress as components of annual budget submissions. Although DHS
intelligence budgets are likely to be far smaller than those of the major technical
collection agencies, participation in NFIP processes arguably would permit the DHS to
help ensure that counterterrorist intelligence missions are appropriately considered.
8 Defined by 50 USC 401a(4). (Membership in the Intelligence Community has changed over
the years; in 2001 the Coast Guard acquired the status of a member of the Intelligence
Community pursuant to section 105 of P.L. 107-108, the FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act.)
9 28 USC 533 provides information collecting authority to the Justice Department and the FBI.
10 50 USC 403-3(c)(2).
11 50 USC 401a(6).

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The Question of “Raw” Intelligence. There has been some discussion in the
media regarding the extent to which DHS will have access to “raw” intelligence or only
to finished analytical products. This issue appears not to be completely resolved. There
may be some uncertainty regarding the definition of “raw” intelligence. A satellite
photograph standing by itself might be considered “raw” data, but it would be useless
unless something were known about where and when it was taken. Thus, satellite
imagery supplied to DHS would under almost any circumstances have to have some
analysis included. The same would apply to any signals intercepts. Reports from human
agents present special challenges. Some assessment of the reliability of the source would
have to be provided, but anything that would identify a specific individual would normally
be retained within a very small number of intelligence officials; the further such sensitive
information is spread, the greater the danger of unauthorized disclosure and harm to the
source. It is highly unlikely that “raw” reports identifying a human source would be made
available to DHS except under very rare circumstances. The Administration has,
however, expressed concern that language in the Senate version could be read to require
that source-identifying information go directly to the new Department.
The Role of CIA’s Counterterrorist Center. H.R. 5005 appears to assume that
DHS will receive the same types of reporting from all intelligence sources that are
routinely received by intelligence analysts in CIA or other agencies, although it does not
specifically address the question of the extent of DHS access. On the other hand, the most
recent version of S. 2452, even though it includes provisions mandating DHS access to
information, including “unevaluated intelligence,” appears to assume that CIA’s
Counterterrorist Center (CTC)12 would “have primary responsibility for the analysis of
foreign intelligence relating to international terrorism.” The bill provides that the DCI,
the Attorney General, and heads of other agencies will ensure that all intelligence and
other information relating to international terrorism is provided to the CTC. The DCI
would further ensure that this information is analyzed by the Counterterrorist Center. In
the most significant change in the Senate version, the Intelligence Directorate would
apparently not analyze information collected by intelligence agencies, but rather would
fuse information from non-intelligence agencies with “appropriate analytical products,
assessments, and warnings relating to threats of terrorism” from the CIA’s CTC. A
separate sub-paragraph, however, states that nothing “shall be construed to prohibit the
Directorate from conducting supplemental analysis of foreign intelligence.”
There are various considerations in either approach. Providing a full flow of
intelligence and law enforcement data to DHS will require larger numbers of trained and
experience analysts (who tend to be in short supply). There is, inevitably, an increased
risk of compromising classified information that goes with any increase in the number of
those with access to it. There may be some duplication of effort, which will be costly.
Those who support giving the DHS responsibilities for analyzing foreign intelligence
in conjunction with law enforcement information argue that it is important for one set of
12 The CTC was established in CIA’s Operations Directorate in 1986 by then DCI William Casey
with Duane Clarridge as its first head; for its origins and the problems it encountered in its early
years, see Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New
York: Scribner, 1997); for a more recent description, see Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S.
Foreign Policy (Washington: Brookings, 2001). The CTC has, as yet, no statutory charter.

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analysts to sift evidence from all intelligence, law enforcement, and other sources to seek
out linkages and identify potential threats. They suggest that requiring DHS to rely only
on published products from CIA would restrict DHS analysts from undertaking
comprehensive data mining and other research efforts. These observers caution that
having agencies responsible for foreign intelligence–and especially CIA’s Operations
Directorate– deeply and routinely involved in the analysis of law enforcement data–much
of which will concern U.S. persons–could eventually raise issues about civil liberties.
The CTC would in any event retain its current responsibilities for analysis of international
terrorist activities throughout the world. The inevitable degree of duplication of effort
would be justified, it is argued, by the importance of the stakes involved and by the fact
that analytical efforts are–relatively–inexpensive in comparison to collection.
Open Source Information (Osint). Information from unclassified
sources–books, pamphlets, periodicals, Internet sources, television and radio programs–is
arguably an important resource for gaining information about terrorist groups and the
larger political movements with which they are associated. There are different views
regarding the emphasis to which intelligence agencies should give to open source
information. DCI George Tenet in prepared testimony for the Senate Government Affairs
Committee on June 27, 2002, stated that “In every possible case, we will provide
intelligence at the lowest permissible level of classification, including ‘sensitive, but
unclassified.’” Pointedly, he did not include open source information. DHS thus might
become responsible for collecting and analyzing osint without support from intelligence
agencies; the Senate bill explicitly makes reference to the Intelligence Directorate having
timely and efficient access to open source information.
There has been a longstanding discussion of the role of intelligence agencies in
collecting and analyzing osint. Some observers argue that the Intelligence Community
should devote more resources to exploiting information that is available publicly,
collecting materials that do not circulate widely, and assigning a significant analytical
effort to monitoring osint. Others argue that the fundamental responsibility of intelligence
agencies is secret information and that an extensive osint effort would detract from that
assignment. It is unclear whether DHS will be charged with a comprehensive osint
collection effort or whether intelligence agencies will assume this function.
Conclusion
Both House and Senate bills for creating a homeland security department recognize
the crucial importance of intelligence to the counterterrorist effort. Both bills propose an
analytical office within DHS that will be able to draw upon all the information gathering
resources of other government agencies and of the private sector. Both envision the DHS
intelligence entity working closely with other DHS offices, other federal agencies, state
and local officials, and the private sector to devise strategies and programs to protect U.S.
vulnerabilities and to provide warning of specific attacks. Both provide for maintaining
the security of classified and sensitive information and require its use only for official
purposes. The success of a DHS intelligence entity would, however, be largely dependent
upon the quality of leadership, the skills of analysts, and the cooperation provided by
federal, state, local, and private agencies.

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