Order Code RL31266
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism:
Policy Issues and Options
Updated July 26, 2002
Ben Canada
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism:
Policy Issues and Options
Summary
Congress is presently debating how the structure and responsibilities of a new
Department of Homeland Security will impact state and local preparedness for
terrorism. Both H.R. 5005 and S. 2452 would consolidate state and local assistance
programs into the new department. The department would also be responsible for
coordinating the development and implementation of federal, state, and local
response plans.
At present, Congress authorizes several federal agencies to conduct programs
designed to help state and local responders enhance their preparedness for terrorist
attacks, particularly attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. These programs
cover a range of activities, including emergency planning; training and equipment;
response to chemical and biological attacks; law enforcement; and public health.
As Congress determines the responsibilities of a new Homeland Security
Department, it might consider a range of policy issues frequently mentioned by state
and local emergency managers and analysts. Such issues include:
Amount and Uses of Federal Financial Assistance—Observers have urged
Congress to increase levels of financial and technical assistance available to states
and localities. Some observers have also asked for more flexibility with federal
funds.
Preparedness Standards and Evaluation—Nongovernmental organizations
working with FEMA have developed voluntary standards for emergency
preparedness. Some observers have urged Congress to support the use of standards
by instructing FEMA to undertake more research on preparedness standards and
provide more assistance to governments attempting to meet standards.
Mutual Aid Compacts—Compacts are not uncommon, but some observers
believe states and localities need to formalize and update their compacts. Compacts
may present an opportunity for states and localities to share such costly resources as
hazardous materials response teams and specialized equipment.
Joint Training Exercises—Observers argue that more joint training exercises are
needed to adequately prepare local, state, and federal responders for terrorist attacks.
Communications Infrastructure and Other Equipment—First responders may
need specialized equipment to respond to a terrorist attack, including an interoperable
communications system.
Model Plans and Best Practices—The federal government could promote best
practices in emergency management, as well as preparedness practices used at critical
sites, such as chemical stockpile sites and nuclear power plants.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Preparedness Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Present Condition of State and Local Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
State Capability Assessment for Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Congressional Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
National Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Selected Policy Issues and Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Amount and Uses of Federal Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Amount of Funding Needed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Range of Eligible Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Distribute Funds to States or Localities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Potential Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Preparedness Standards and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Using Preparedness Standards and Assessments? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Potential Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Mutual Aid Compacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Use of Compacts? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Potential Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Joint Training Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Are More Exercises Needed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Communications Infrastructure and Other Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Standardization of Emergency Communications Infrastructure . . . . . 20
Establishing Standards for Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Potential Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Model Plans and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Defining the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Promote Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Related CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix: State and Local Preparedness Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

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Abbreviations Used in this Report
AHA
American Hospital Association
CAR
Capability Assessment for Readiness
CEM
Comprehensive Emergency Management
CSEPP
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
DHS
Department of Homeland Security (proposed)
EMAC
Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMAP
Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EMS
Emergency Medical System
EMT
Emergency Medical Technician
NACO
National Association of Counties
NEMA
National Emergency Management Association
NGA
National Governor’s Association
NLC
National League of Cities
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
OHS
Office of Homeland Security
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction

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State and Local Preparedness for Terrorism:
Policy Issues and Options
Introduction
While the federal government has resources at hand for responding to terrorist
attacks, the proximity of state and local responders ensures they will almost always
be the first to arrive at the site of an attack. For this reason, the preparedness of state
and local governments has become a salient national issue.
In debating H.R. 5005 and S. 2452, Congress is considering how the structure
and responsibilities of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will address
state and local preparedness for terrorist attacks.1 Both the House and Senate bills
propose incorporating federal preparedness programs into the DHS, including such
activities as coordinating federal, state, and local response plans; providing technical
assistance and training; and distributing financial assistance. In addition to these
congressional proposals, the Bush Administration has requested $37.7 billion for
homeland security in the FY2003 budget, of which states and localities would be
allocated $3.5 billion in a new program called the “First Responder Initiative” and
roughly $1.5 billion for bioterrorism preparedness.2
Preparedness is one of four phases of comprehensive emergency management
(CEM). The other three phases are response, recovery, and mitigation. CEM offers
emergency managers a framework for classifying and planning not only preparedness
activities, but all emergency management activities. Preparedness involves a wide
range of activities such as developing flexible response plans, training and equipping
responders, and assessing a community’s vulnerabilities.3
In the past, Congress has addressed the preparedness phase of emergency
management by authorizing several training and grant programs designed to help
states and localities enhance their response capabilities, particularly for terrorist
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Existing federal programs
1For more information of how the Department of Homeland Security proposals could affect
state and local preparedness, see CRS Report RL31490, The Department of Homeland
Security: State and Local Preparedness Issues, by Ben Canada.
2For more information on the First Responder Initiative, see CRS Report RL31475, First
Responder Initiative: Issues and Options, by Ben Canada. Also see U.S. Office of
Homeland Security, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation, Feb. 2002, pp. 10-
11, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.html],
visited Feb. 25, 2002.
3William L. Waugh, Jr., Terrorism and Emergency Management (New York: Marcel
Dekker, Inc., 1990), pp. 15-17.

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CRS-2
cover a range of activities, including emergency management and planning; training;
equipment acquisition; law enforcement; and public health.4
The possibility of terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction
presents a unique challenge to state and local officials. WMD may be defined as
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, conventional explosives, or
any device capable of causing mass casualties. Adequately coping with a WMD
attack requires first responders to have special equipment and extensive training.5
Such attacks would be more likely to overwhelm state and local response capabilities
than attacks not involving WMD. Since preparing for WMD attacks is an
institutional and financial challenge for states and localities, federal assistance for
preparedness currently focuses on providing the planning, equipment, and training
necessary to respond to a WMD attack. Officials from all levels of government,
however, have asked Congress to evaluate these assistance programs, suggesting they
are administered in a disorganized fashion.6
As Congress debates the DHS legislation (H.R. 5005 and S. 2452) and the
FY2003 budget, it might consider a range of policy issues identified by state and
local emergency managers, including the lack of national preparedness standards,
inadequate medical community preparedness, informal mutual aid compacts, lack of
joint training exercises, inadequate communications systems and other equipment,
and lack of model response plans. Consideration of some of these selected issues
could assist Congress in determining suitable duties and responsibilities for the new
Department of Homeland Security.
This report provides information and analysis intended to be useful to Congress
on legislation and oversight related to state and local emergency preparedness.
Specifically, it provides a brief overview of the present condition of state and local
preparedness, analyzes selected issues in federal policy, and presents some of the
policy options available to Congress in addressing those issues.
This report focuses on selected federal policies and activities that directly affect
states and localities, or that, if enacted, would directly affect them. It is not a
comprehensive discussion of all federal policy issues involved with state and local
preparedness. Relevant issues not discussed in this report include intelligence
sharing between federal agencies and state and local governments, and the role of
specialized National Guard response units. The report does not directly address other
phases of emergency management: response, recovery, and mitigation. Although
these other phases are briefly discussed in the report, they are not its subject.
4For a listing of programs, see CRS Report RL31227, Terrorism Preparedness: Catalog of
Selected Federal Assistance Programs, coordinated by Ben Canada.
5For the purposes of this report, “first responders” refers to local, and possibly state, public
safety officials, including firefighters, emergency medical technicians, law enforcement
officers, and public health officials.
6U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations, GAO Report GAO-01-822, Sept. 2001, pp. 97-98.

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Overview of Emergency Preparedness
Even before the attacks of September 2001, emergency managers and analysts
were calling for a national strategy that emphasized preparedness of state and local
governments, and integration of resources available at all levels of government. The
Gilmore Commission reiterated this argument in its first report, calling for a national
strategy that respects the traditional public safety role of states and localities and that
clearly defines federal activities to support state and local responders.7
The following section provides a brief overview of emergency preparedness
practices that states and localities undertake to prepare for all disasters, including
terrorist attacks. An understanding of these practices will be useful in analyzing the
federal policy issues discussed in this report.
Preparedness Activities. State and local officials, as well as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), advocate an “all-hazard approach” to
emergency preparedness that stresses using existing institutions and plans to respond
to all disasters, including acts of terrorism.8 Preparedness activities can incorporate
the resources of local, regional, state, and federal agencies, as well as the medical
community, relief organizations, and the private sector. Activities that comprise an
effective preparedness strategy include the following:
! risk assessment;
! response capability assessment, improvement, and maintenance;
! emergency planning;
! training and exercises; and
! incorporation of local, regional, state, and federal resources.9
One scholar of emergency management emphasizes the importance of risk
assessment as part of preparedness for terrorism. It is necessary to identify persons,
structures, or locations in a community that are potential targets. In addition, risk
assessment can include assessing the vulnerability of a community’s infrastructure,
such as power, water, communications, and transportation corridors.10
Inadequate preparation could lead to lack of a clear response structure,
inefficient use of intergovernmental resources, and, ultimately, increased loss of life
and property. Emergency planners typically assume that local resources would be
overwhelmed in the event of a major terrorist attack and would require additional
regional, state, and possibly, federal resources. Thus, the Gilmore Commission,
7Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, First Annual Report to The President and The Congress,
Dec. 1999, pp. ix-x.
8U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency
Operations Planning, SLG-101, Sept. 1996, p. iii.
9Waugh, Terrorism and Emergency Management, pp. 29-31.
10Ibid., pp. 82-83.

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which Congress created in 1998, emphasized the need for intergovernmental
coordination:11
Response to an attack must be layered and sequential: Local entities will respond
first, supplemented as necessary by State capabilities. When local capabilities
are exceeded, the response shifts to the State (perhaps multi-state) level. The
Federal response should come only after local and State capabilities are
exceeded.12
Observers generally encourage states and localities to incorporate private
businesses in emergency planning. They argue that private sector participation can
enhance preparedness by identifying potential hazards at business sites (such as
hazardous materials) and clarifying the role and responsibilities of private entities
during an emergency. State and local emergency managers can also be helpful to
private businesses in developing and exercising evacuation plans.13
Present Condition of State and Local Preparedness
Since the attacks of September 2001, government studies, witnesses at
congressional hearings, and national surveys have suggested that states and localities
are generally prepared to respond to emergencies, but may need to modify existing
response plans and activities to better prepare for terrorist attacks involving WMD.
This section provides an overview of the conclusions of some of these sources.
State Capability Assessment for Readiness. In September 2001, FEMA
published the results of its Capability Assessment for Readiness process (CAR). The
CAR is a self-assessment, conducted by states and territories in 2000, that evaluates
capabilities in 13 emergency management functions (EMFs). FEMA concluded that,
in general, states were effectively prepared to respond to disasters, although all states
had certain functions in which they needed to improve.14 The results of the CAR
indicate that states generally have adequate laws, administrative structures, financial
structures, and communications to handle emergencies. The CAR also suggests,
11The Gilmore Commission was formally known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The name
“Gilmore Commission” comes from the name of the Chairman, former Governor James
Gilmore of Virginia. The commission was charged with assessing the capabilities of
federal, state, and local governments for responding to terrorist incidents involving weapons
of mass destruction. Congress authorized the commission in Section 1405 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (P.L. 105-261). See the commission web
site at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/], visited Jan. 29, 2002.
12Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress,
Dec. 2000, pp. 3-4, 23.
13William A. Anderson and Shirley Mattingly, “Future Directions,” in Thomas E. Drabek
and Gerard J. Hoetmer, eds., Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for Local
Government (Washington: International City Management Association, 1991), p. 323.
14U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, State Capability Assessment for Readiness,
Report to Senate Committee on Appropriations (Washington: Sept. 2001), p. vi.

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however, that states are generally less prepared in such EMFs as hazard identification
and risk assessment, resource management, and logistics and facilities.
Although the CAR was intended to measure states’ general capability to respond
to disasters, some of the attributes measured in the CAR process can be used to
assess their capability to respond to terrorist attacks involving WMD. Four specific
WMD-defense attributes reported by states are their capability to: 1) acquire
appropriate equipment for WMD response; 2) address WMD attacks in emergency
operations plans; 3) develop procedures for responding to WMD attacks; and 4)
regularly exercise their WMD response plan. In all but the fourth attribute, the
national average was “marginally capable,” meaning that states generally had limited
capacity and needed to make significant improvements. The national average for
states’ capability to regularly exercise their WMD response plan, however, was
“generally capable,” meaning that states generally maintained a baseline proficiency,
but still needed to improve. Although the CAR reports a national average for all
states, there were significant differences in capabilities among states in each
measured attribute.15
Congressional Testimony. Witnesses at congressional hearings have also
testified on the present condition of state and local preparedness. Amy E. Smithson
of the Stimson Center asserted that states and localities across the nation already had
many of the necessary institutions and resources to provide effective response to
terrorist attacks involving WMD. “The bedrocks of chemical and biological disaster
preparedness already exist at the local and state levels,” said Smithson, referring to
the approximately 650 hazardous materials teams nationwide with specialists trained
to respond to some WMD incidents. Smithson argued, however, that better
intergovernmental coordination was needed and that state and local capabilities need
to be further enhanced.16
Other witnesses have testified about weaknesses they found in state and local
preparedness. A primary concern has been the ability of state and local governments
to respond to WMD incidents. Janet Heinrich of the U.S. General Accounting
Office, for example, said, “[W]e found emerging concerns about the preparedness of
state and local jurisdictions, including insufficient state and local planning for
response to terrorist events ....”17 A number of witnesses have expressed similar
views and presented other concerns, including the lack of joint federal-state-local
15Ibid., pp. 129-130.
16Statement of Amy E. Smithson, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government
Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and
Intergovernmental Relations, A Silent War: Are Federal, State, and Local Governments
Prepared for Biological and Chemical Attacks?, hearings, 107th Cong., 1st sess., Oct. 5,
2001.
17Statement of Janet Heinrich, U.S. General Accounting Office, in House Committee on
Government Reform hearings, Oct. 5, 2001.

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training exercises, the lack of standardized communications equipment, and the lack
of private-sector involvement in emergency planning.18
National Surveys. Surveys of states and localities conducted after the
September 2001 attacks support the belief that states and localities are generally
prepared for emergencies, but may need to modify existing emergency management
institutions and activities to prepare for acts of terrorism involving WMD. The
National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) conducted surveys of state-
level preparedness following the September 2001 attacks. NEMA found that every
state had a response plan and an emergency preparedness coordinating body in place
before the attacks.19 At least 14 states, however, have since created new preparedness
offices or coordinator positions, and at least 18 states have created advisory panels
to address terrorism preparedness.20
Surveys by the National League of Cities (NLC) and National Association of
Counties (NACO) show similar results at the local level. Before September 2001,
the vast majority of cities and counties had disaster response plans in place. The
surveys, however, revealed a disparity in preparedness between urban localities and
rural localities. Whereas approximately 80% of urban cities and counties address
WMD attacks in their response plans, less than half of small cities and rural counties
do so. This disparity also applies to terrorism training. Whereas approximately 57%
of large cities had received terrorism training in the past year, approximately half as
many small cities had received terrorism training.21
18For examples, see statements in following hearings: House Committee on Government
Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and International
Relations, How Effectively are Federal, State and Local Governments Working Together to
Prepare for a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Attack?, hearings, 107th Cong., 2nd sess.,
March 1, 2002; Senate Committee on Public Works and Environment, First Responder
Initiative, hearings, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 2002; Senate Committee on
Appropriations, Homeland Security, hearings, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10, 2002.
19The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-499, Title
III) required each state to create a State Emergency Response Commission, which, in turn,
created emergency planning districts and designated Local Emergency Planning
Committees. Although the state and local committees created by the act were designed to
prepare communities for chemical accidents, states and localities may use them to prepare
for all hazards. For more information, see CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws:
Summaries of Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, coordinated
by Martin R. Lee, p. 80.
20National Emergency Management Association, “Trends in State Terrorism Preparedness,”
Executive Summary, Dec. 2001, available at NEMA web site: [http://www.nemaweb.org].
21National League of Cities, “Terrorism Preparedness Survey,” Sept. 21, 2001, available on
the NLC web site at [http://www.nlc.org], visited Oct. 2, 2001; and National Association of
Counties, “Counties Secure America: A Survey of Emergency Preparedness of the Nation’s
Counties,” Dec. 2001, available on the NACO web site at [http://www.naco.org], visited
Jan. 3, 2002.

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Selected Policy Issues and Policy Options
Even before the September 2001 attacks, but especially since, emergency
managers and analysts have identified several issues in federal policy on state and
local preparedness. On the whole, they have not called for new emergency
management institutions or response plans, but, rather, for enhancing current
institutions and plans to better address the unique threat of terrorism. Some of the
most frequently identified policy issues include:
! amount and uses of federal assistance;
! preparedness standards;
! preparedness of the medical community;
! mutual aid compacts;
! joint training exercises;
! communications systems and other equipment; and
! model response plans.
This is not a comprehensive list of policy issues, but, rather, a list of some of
those most frequently cited by emergency managers and analysts. For each of these
policy issues there is a discussion below of policy options that Congress could
consider as it debates the functions of a new Homeland Security Department. These
policy issues and options do not depend on each other, and Congress can factor in
issues of budget, federalism, and other policy concerns in choosing the direction of
federal policy. Each policy option is followed by a discussion of consequences that
could result from its adoption.
Amount and Uses of Federal Assistance
Defining the Issue. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, emergency
managers and analysts have urged Congress to increase levels of financial and
technical assistance to states and localities to enhance their preparedness for terrorist
attacks. Although public safety is traditionally a state and local function, Congress
may consider increasing assistance if it determines that the desired preparedness
improvements could overwhelm state and local resources, interfering with their
ability to provide basic services. It also may reconsider the range of eligible grant
activities and examine the potential for state and local over-dependence on federal
funds.
Amount of Funding Needed. In FY2001, Congress appropriated
approximately $367.5 million related to state and local preparedness for terrorism.22
In FY2002, Congress provided roughly $1.8 billion in assistance, most of which was
appropriated in the emergency supplemental appropriation (P.L. 107-38).23 At the
22Figure based on CRS total of selected items listed in the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget’s Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, 2001 (Washington: April
2001), pp. 21-24.
23Figure based on CRS total of selected items in FY2002 enacted budget and emergency
supplemental appropriations (P.L. 107-38).

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time of this writing, Congress was considering providing additional funding for first
responders through an FY2002 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4775/S. 2551).
Emergency managers and analysts contend that federal assistance should be
significantly increased to help states and localities enhance their capability to respond
to future terrorist attacks. Public health agencies, for example, have been
consistently cited as needing more financial resources to adequately prepare for
chemical and biological attacks. According to some emergency managers and
analysts, it is likely that existing funding levels in preparedness programs will not be
enough to match demand by state and local responders.24
The National Governor’s Association (NGA) requested $4 billion from
Congress for states alone. NGA says states will use these funds to improve
bioterrorism preparedness, emergency communications, and security of critical
infrastructure.25 Representing the local level, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
National League of Cities have requested additional funding for cities and towns,
although not a specific amount. They argue that committing more local resources to
preparedness could interfere with cities’ ability to provide basic services.26
The President’s budget proposes approximately $5.1 billion for state and local
preparedness. Of these funds, $3.5 billion are proposed for a new program called the
First Responder Initiative.27 The Administration proposes that FEMA administer this
program, which would distribute funds to states using a population-based formula.
States would have discretion in using the first 25% of funds, but would be required
to pass on 75% of the funds to local governments or regional organizations.
Recipients could use the funds for activities in four basic categories: emergency
planning, training, equipment, and exercises. Arguably, S. 2664 (Jeffords) most
closely parallels the Administration’s proposed grant program. Other similar
proposals include S. 2038/H.R.4059 (Clinton, McNulty) and S. 2077 (Collins).
The Administration’s request also includes roughly $1.5 billion to help public
health agencies and hospitals better prepare for bioterrorist attacks.28
24Greg Seigle, “‘First Responders’ to Terrorism Seek Federal Strategy, Equipment,”
Government Executive, Daily Briefing, March 6, 2002.
25National Governor’s Association, “NGA Releases State Homeland Security Survey
Results,” press release, Dec. 2001, available on the NGA web site at [http://www.nga.org],
visited Jan. 3, 2002.
26See U.S. Conference of Mayors, A National Action Plan for Safety and Security in
America’s Cities, Dec. 2001, p. 8, available on the USCM web site at
[http://www.usmayors.org], visited Jan. 15, 2002; and National League of Cities, “City
Leaders Demand a Full Partnership in Homeland Security,” press release, Dec. 6, 2001,
available on the NLC web site at [http://www.nlc.org], visited Jan. 8, 2002.
27For more information on the proposed First Responder Initiative, see CRS Report
RL31475, First Responder Initiative: Issues and Options, by Ben Canada.
28U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
Year 2003, Feb. 2002, pp. 17-20, 138-139, 315-317.

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Range of Eligible Activities. Whether or not Congress increases assistance,
it could re-evaluate the range of eligible activities for which states and localities can
use federal funds. At present, all federal preparedness grants are categorical,
meaning that recipient governments may only use the funds for specific activities.
Although this affords recipients little flexibility, it allows Congress to target funds
to selected needs. At present, Congress authorizes several categorical grant programs
for such activities as:
! emergency management and planning;
! training;
! equipment;
! law enforcement; and
! public health and medical community.29
If Congress determined that states and localities needed greater flexibility in the
use of funds, an alternative would be to consolidate the existing categorical programs
into a block grant.30 The Administration’s proposal for the First Responder Initiative
is consistent with this policy option, since it would provide states and localities
federal funds for a wide range of activities. An emergency preparedness block grant
could give states and localities considerable discretion in committing federal
resources to self-identified needs and to improve their unique preparedness plans.
On the other hand, providing recipients with more flexibility could result in a smaller
percentage of federal funds used specifically for terrorism preparedness.
Were Congress to expand the range of eligible grant activities, one approach
would be to authorize recipients to use funds for hazard mitigation activities.
Whereas preparedness involves planning, training, and equipping for disaster
response, hazard mitigation involves reducing the possibility of disaster or reducing
the extent of damage when a disaster strikes. Activities can include protective
construction methods and altering public travel patterns. These activities
complement preparedness activities and would assist governments in executing a
comprehensive emergency management plan. At present, Congress authorizes
FEMA to distribute mitigation funds through its Hazard Mitigation Grants Programs
(HMGP) and Project Impact.31 The Bush Administration has proposed replacing the
HMGP with a pre-disaster mitigation program that would be funded at $300 million.
In any mitigation program, Congress could clarify in legislation whether the grants
could be used to address man-made as well as natural disasters.
Distribute Funds to States or Localities? Organizations representing
state and local governments and emergency managers have generally approved of
Administration and congressional proposals to increase funding to states and
29For a listing of existing programs, see CRS Report RL31227, Terrorism Preparedness: A
Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs, coordinated by Ben Canada.
30For more information on block grants, see CRS Report RL30818, Block Grants: An
Overview, by Eugene Boyd and Ben Canada.
3 1 For more i nf ormation, see FEMA’s Proj ect Impact web site:
[http://www.fema.gov/impact/] and Hazard Mitigation Grants Program web site:
[http://www.fema.gov/mit/hmgp/], visited Jan. 15, 2002.

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localities. Some organizations representing local governments, however, such as the
U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM) and National Association of Counties, argue
that the majority of federal preparedness funds goes to states, leaving little for
localities. These organizations have urged Congress to distribute preparedness funds
directly to localities, arguing that local governments are better attuned to
preparedness needs.32 A USCM survey showed that 87% of city mayors believed the
channeling of federal funds through states would ultimately “hamper” city
preparedness efforts.33
Organizations representing states, however, contend that state coordination of
federal assistance is crucial to improving preparedness. One state emergency
manager, representing the National Emergency Management Association, testified
that
[a]ll efforts to increase emergency management capacity building must be
coordinated through the states to ensure harmonization with the state emergency
operations plan, ensure equitable distribution of resources, and to synthesize
resources [for mutual aid compacts].... Also, the Stafford Act, which governs the
way disaster assistance is allocated, firmly and successfully uses states and
Governors as the managers of federal disaster relief funds for local
governments....34
To address this concern, Congress could consult with state and local officials
to determine what level of government could use federal resources most effectively
and efficiently. Alternatively, it could instruct an appropriate federal agency, such
as FEMA or GAO, to evaluate which level of government has the greatest need based
on risk assessment and available financial resources.
Potential Consequences. One potential consequence of increasing federal
assistance is that states and localities could become overly dependent on federal
funds. Emergency management is traditionally a state and local activity
supplemented by federal resources. Were Congress to increase funding for state and
local preparedness, recipient governments might begin to regard federal grants as a
permanent and predictable source of funding. If, in the future, Congress decided to
decrease financial assistance for preparedness, states and localities could then have
difficulty compensating for decreasing federal grants.
To address this concern, Congress could include a matching requirement or
maintenance-of-effort provision in federal programs. Among other purposes, these
32See statement of Mayor Martin O’Malley, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on Appropriations, Homeland Security, hearings, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., April 10,
2002.
33U.S. Conference of Mayors, “Homeland Security: Mayors on the Frontline,” June 2000,
available at: [http://www.usmayors.org/70thAnnualMeeting/madison_061302.asp], visited
June 19, 2002.
34Statement of Woodbury Fogg, on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Public Works and Environment, First
Responder Initiative, hearings, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 2002.

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provisions are intended to ensure that recipient governments do not become overly
dependent on federal funds.35 Alternatively, Congress could limit the use of funds
to only short-term activities, such as training exercises and capital purchases, and
prohibit the use of funds for salaries, maintenance, and other recurring expenses.
Were Congress to give states and localities more flexibility in their use of
federal funds, it might impede its ability to oversee the efficiency and effectiveness
of federal programs. Grant programs that give recipients a high degree of flexibility,
such as block grants, are often hard to evaluate and can make congressional oversight
difficult. On the other hand, categorical grant programs with a narrow range of
eligible activities and specific objectives offer recipients little flexibility, but are
easier to evaluate.36
Preparedness Standards and Evaluation
Defining the Issue. Preparedness standards are specified activities and levels
of competence that state and local responders are encouraged to achieve and
maintain. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA), and FEMA have worked together to develop
voluntary standards; encourage states and localities to assess their competency based
on those standards; and undergo an accreditation process. Standards have been
developed for most emergency management functions, from broad functions like
response planning to specific functions like response to hazardous materials
incidents. Some emergency managers and analysts have encouraged Congress to
support nationwide standards, which they believe could better prepare states and
localities for not only terrorist attacks but all emergencies.
Using Preparedness Standards and Assessments? Congressional
support of such standards would use federal resources to better prepare existing state
and local institutions for acts of terrorism. To improve preparedness in this manner,
Congress could encourage states and localities to adopt standards and authorize
FEMA to increase its financial and technical assistance available to states and
localities for meeting preparedness standards. Congress could also direct FEMA to
coordinate and support ongoing research on standards and assessments, which is
currently being conducted by such nongovernmental organizations as the National
Fire Protection Association. In 1999, the Gilmore Commission emphasized the need
for research on preparedness standards, concluding,
... that national standards for responders at all levels, particularly for planning,
training, and equipment, are critical, and [we recommend] that more emphasis
be placed on research, development, testing, and evaluation in the adoption of
such standards.37
35For more information on matching requirements and maintenance-of-efforts provisions,
see CRS Report RL30778, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Concepts for
Legislative Design and Oversight, pp. 6-8.
36Ibid., pp. 14-17.
37Gilmore Commission, First Annual Report, p. xi.

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Existing Standards, Assessments, and Accreditation Processes
The National Fire Protection Association’s code 1600 establishes standards for emergency
planning and capabilities. The code organizes the standards into 13 emergency management
functions. It is designed to apply to any public or private entity that is required to develop
emergency response plans by legislation, regulation, or agency policy. While the standards are
voluntary, they are commonly accepted standards and would likely be the standards applied in any
legal action involving a government's emergency response.
FEMA's Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR) is a self-assessment process for state-level
emergency management agencies to use to evaluate their own readiness. The CAR process is
presently being pilot-tested for use at the local level. The process, which is organized around the
same 13 emergency management functions used in NFPA 1600, is intended to help states develop
strategic goals to improve their readiness. While governments can conduct the assessment on their
own, they are encouraged to work with the FEMA regional office.
The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP), which is administered by the
National Emergency Management Association, is a structured, independent evaluation process that
requires agencies seeking accreditation to undergo FEMA’s Capability Assessment for Readiness
(CAR) process. EMAP, however, requires documentation and outside review to ensure the agency
has effectively undergone the self-assessment. Accreditation is meant to provide a means of
identifying agencies that meet national standards and offers a strategy for continuous improvement.
An alternative would be to require standards by conditioning the receipt of
federal funds on satisfying preparedness standards set forth by FEMA.38 As long as
funding was included that would allow the recipient to comply with the requirements,
Congress would avoid creating an unfunded mandate.39 Congress established a
precedent for such action in Title VI of the Stafford Act, which provides funding to
states for emergency preparedness activities. Under the Stafford Act, Congress gives
the FEMA director discretion in placing conditions on the use of grant funds,
including the method of purchase, quantity of items, and specifications of equipment.
States must also satisfy specified requirements, such as developing statewide
response plans, appointing a full-time state emergency manager, and reporting to the
FEMA director on a regular basis.40
FEMA officials, as well as Director of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, have
expressed support for nationwide standards for all first responders. FEMA officials,
however, have stated that any grant funds they award to responders should not be
contingent on satisfying those standards. Rather, the Administration hopes to
encourage states and localities to adopt common standards for equipment, training,
mutual aid, and other aspects of emergency management. Bruce Baughman, Director
38For more information on conditioning federal grants, see CRS Report 30778, Federal
Grants to State and Local Governments: Concepts for Legislative Design and Oversight,
by Ben Canada.
39For more information on unfunded mandates, see CRS Report RS20058, Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act Summarized, by Keith Bea and Richard S. Beth.
4042 U.S.C. 5196(b).

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of FEMA’s Office of National Preparedness, states that he hopes the nationwide
standards will be prepared by October 2002.41
The Administration proposal for the DHS (H.R. 5005) gives the department
standard-setting responsibilities.42 The department’s Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures division (CBRN) would establish
guidelines for state and local response to WMD events.43 The Administration’s
report on the DHS states that the Emergency Preparedness and Response division
(EPR) would “develop and manage a national training and evaluation system to
design curriculums, set standards, evaluate, and reward performance in local, state,
and federal training efforts.”44 The Senate bill, S. 2452, also addresses standard
setting by authorizing a Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response to
establish training and equipment standards for state and local first responders, as well
as federal authorities.45
Potential Consequences. Although FEMA and some nongovernmental
organizations are working to implement voluntary standards, congressional support
could expedite, and better ensure, that states and localities institutionalize the
standards. One congressional witness testified on institutionalizing standards:
The prerequisite for institutionalization is standards, and all of the response
disciplines—fire, police, EMS, hospital care providers—expressed an abundance
of frustration over the absence of standards and protocols to guide them.
Standards command the attention of rescue and healthcare personnel because
they are the backbone of accountability.46
While implementing standards could provide potential benefits, Congress might
want to consider some potential effects that could result from requiring state and
local preparedness standards.
Were Congress not only to support standards but also to require recipients of
federal grants to meet specified standards, states and localities could be deterred from
accepting federal funds. It is possible that some governments might decline federal
preparedness grants and maintain their existing standards or other contingency plans
since, even with federal assistance, meeting the standards could prove prohibitively
expensive. This consequence might be more likely in smaller localities that rely
41Bridgette Blair, “FEMA Seeks National Rules for Emergency Response,” Federal Times,
March 11, 2001, p. 10.
42For more information on the DHS and standard setting, see CRS Report RL31490, The
Department of Homeland Security: State and Local Preparedness Issues, by Ben Canada.
43H.R. 5005, sec. 301(4).
44U.S. President (Bush), Department of Homeland Security, p. 11. H.R. 5005, however,
does not contain an explicit provision that instructs the EPR division to conduct such
activities.
45S. 2452, sec. 103(a)(3)(F).
46Statement of Amy Smithson, Ph.D., Henry L. Stimson Center, in House Committee on
Government Reform, hearings , Oct. 5, 2001.

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predominately on volunteer fire and rescue squads, which typically have limited
financial resources, and in states and localities that believe they are at little risk of
terrorist attacks. On the other hand, considering the nationwide salience of the issue
of terrorism preparedness and the fact that many states are experiencing significant
budget difficulties, states and localities would likely be eager for federal assistance.47
Another potential consequence is that mandated standards could discourage
innovative state and local planning. Each state has unique communities, which might
require unique planning arrangements. If states and localities have flexibility in
preparing for terrorist attacks and other emergencies, there is potential for innovative
ideas that may benefit other areas. One state-level emergency manager addressed this
issue in his testimony before the House Government Reform Committee:
We would ask that not only would the national strategy respect the principals of
federalism, but would allow for state and local governments to address unique
communities and constituencies. In particular, state and local governments are
often called “laboratories of democracy” because of their ability to experiment
quickly with policy and to find true best practices that would work for other state
and local jurisdictions as well as the federal government.48
Mutual Aid Compacts
Defining the Issue. Mutual aid compacts are agreements between different
units of government to provide assistance in the event that an emergency overwhelms
one government’s response capability. They can enhance preparedness by pooling
resources of several governments and overcoming legal and administrative problems
created by multi-jurisdictional boundaries.49 Since state and local governments
commonly participate in compacts, public officials have not identified it as a
significant gap in federal policy, but some observers have urged Congress to support
compacts and encourage states and localities to better utilize their compacts, and test
them in training exercises.
There are two main types of compacts: regional (or intrastate) and interstate
compacts. Emergency managers and analysts have suggested that regional compacts,
in particular, can enhance preparedness. One cited benefit is that response teams for
chemical or biological incidents, which are expensive to train and equip, can be
shared by multiple localities. One analyst conducted an extensive series of
interviews with state and local emergency managers and reported that, since
proximity of resources is a crucial element in response, they generally relied on local
and regional resources during a response. Some of the interviewees had “major
reservations about the ability of federal and even state assets to arrive in sufficient
47Jason White and John Nagy, “State Budget Snapshot Not a Pretty Picture,” Stateline.org,
Oct. 12, 2001, available at [http://www1.stateline.org], visited Oct. 16, 2001.
48Statement of Woodbury Fogg, Director, Office of Emergency Management, State of New
Hampshire, in House Committee on Government Reform hearings, Oct. 5, 2001.
49Waugh, Terrorism and Emergency Management, pp. 22-23.

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time to impact the outcome of a chemical terrorist attack response.”50 One state-level
emergency manager summarized some of the benefits in his testimony before
Congress: “In short, the regional approach gives us a flexible response capability,
both regionally and nationally, which can adapt to catastrophic events as they occur
and most effectively use the limited resources we share.”51
Interstate mutual aid compacts also have potential benefits. Although out-of-
state resources might not have the close proximity of local resources, a state would
require assistance if an emergency were to overwhelm its resources. The largest
interstate mutual aid compact is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC), which was developed in response to the devastation of Hurricane Andrew
in Florida in 1992.52 Congress approved the compact in a joint resolution in 1996.53
At the time of this writing, 46 states and two territories participate in EMAC.54 The
compact facilitates interstate assistance by establishing a clear procedure for
requesting assistance, removing legal obstacles, providing for reimbursement of
services, and providing a framework for flexible response.55
The State of New York implemented EMAC after joining the compact on
September 17, 2001. Even before officially joining the compact, however, the state
had decided to use EMAC procedures and documentation to accept assistance from
other states. According to one state emergency management official, New York
placed 32 requests for personnel from other states to assist with response operations,
donations management and recovery planning. All interstate assistance officially
accepted by New York State was facilitated through EMAC or special arrangements
with particular states using EMAC protocols.56
EMAC was not formally implemented in the September 11 response to the
Pentagon attacks. Arlington County, Virginia, responded to the disaster, however,
with support from other Virginia jurisdictions that were activated through that state’s
50Smithson and Levy, Ataxia, p. 227.
51Woodbury Fogg, Director, Office of Emergency Management, State of New Hampshire
(on behalf of NEMA) in House Committee on Government Reform hearings, Oct. 5, 2001.
52For more information on EMAC, see CRS Report RS21227, Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview, by Ben Canada.
53P.L. 104-321; 110 Stat. 3877. Congress first supported interstate compacts for emergency
response efforts in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, in which it encouraged states to
enter into “interstate civil defense compacts” (see P.L. 81-920; 64 Stat. 1249).
54Alabama, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Oregon have joined EMAC since
September 11, 2001.
55National Emergency Management Association, Emergency Management Assistance
Compact: Guidebook and Operating Procedures (Lexington, KY: Aug. 2000), pp. 7-11.
56New York State Office of Emergency Management, telephone conversation, April 19,
2002.

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intrastate mutual aid agreement. Arlington County also received support from nearby
jurisdictions in Maryland and the District of Columbia.57
Use of Compacts? Congress could condition the receipt of federal grants on
state governments organizing and enhancing regional mutual aid compacts to cover
every locality in their state. While most localities throughout the United States are
already signatories of regional compacts, some observers argue that states and
localities rely too often on informal agreements and should formalize their
compacts.58 Advocates assert that by formalizing compacts in a written contract,
state and local governments can better prepare for response by eliminating potential
legal and administrative obstacles. A written agreement can also help emergency
managers by providing a menu of resources available for response.59 Congress could
promote such compacts, if it concurred in this view, by conditioning federal funds on
a state’s progress toward this goal.
Another option would be to provide funding directly to regional councils for the
purpose of developing, improving, and exercising mutual aid compacts. Some
proponents of mutual aid argue that the federal government distributes the vast
majority of preparedness funds to states and localities, and very little to regional
councils. These proponents maintain that councils could effectively use federal funds
to develop mutual aid compacts, an activity some councils already undertake.60
Congress could also require, as a condition of receiving federal funds, those
states that are not members of EMAC to join the compact. This could remove legal
and administrative obstacles involved in inter-state mutual assistance to or from these
states. Congress could provide funds to member states for EMAC exercises and
simulations. It might also support research on ways of further incorporating EMAC
into federal response activities. Some proponents argue that increased use of
interstate resources could relieve the strain on federal resources not only during
response to terrorist attacks but all disasters.
The Office of Homeland Security has indicated that mutual aid will likely be
incorporated in the national strategy on terrorism preparedness, which is expected to
be released in the summer of 2002.61 Also, during the months of April and May,
FEMA sought input from first responders on possible requirements for the First
57Michael Cline, Virginia State Coordinator of Emergency Management, telephone
conversation, April 19, 2002.
58National Association of Counties, Counties Secure America: A Survey of Emergency
Preparedness of the Nation’s Counties (Washington: Dec. 2001), p. ii.
59Howard D. Swanson, “The Delicate Art of Practicing Municipal Law Under Conditions
of Hell and High Water,” North Dakota Law Review, vol. 76 (2000), pp. 496-502.
60Alliance for Regional Stewardship, Regional Emergency Preparedness Compacts:
Safeguarding the Nation’s Communities, prepared by William R. Dodge, March 2002, p. 6.
Available at: [http://www.regionalstewardship.org/Documents/REPCSReport.pdf], visited
March 27, 2002.
61White House Office of Homeland Security, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the
Nation (Washington: Feb. 2002), pp. 10, 30.

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Responder Initiative, including requiring states to join EMAC and requiring localities
to participate in regional compacts.62
Potential Consequence. State and local officials have not suggested that
there are adverse consequences to developing mutual aid compacts. Supporting the
formalization and enhancement of mutual aid compacts, however, might impose an
administrative and financial burden on states and localities. To address this situation,
Congress might consider allowing preparedness grants to be used for compacts, or
instruct federal agencies to increase the availability of technical assistance in
developing compacts. Opponents might argue, however, that such an instruction
would divert federal resources from other state and local needs.
It is possible that distributing preparedness funds directly to regional councils
for the purposes of developing compacts could be controversial. The role and
responsibilities of regional councils vary considerably. In areas where regional
councils are limited to a strictly advisory role, state and local officials might consider
the development of mutual aid more appropriate for state and local governments. It
is also possible that not all regional councils have the technical expertise to develop
mutual aid compacts.
Joint Training Exercises
Defining the Issue. Joint training exercises are simulated response exercises
that involve federal, state, and local responders. Joint training can improve
emergency preparedness by allowing responders from different agencies and different
levels of government to become familiar with others’ capabilities and practices. It
can also give emergency managers and elected officials an opportunity to rehearse
response scenarios using a range of intergovernmental resources.
The conclusions of the After Action Report for the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing offer some evidence of the importance of joint training. The report noted
that the response effort was initially weakened by the lack of coordination and
communications from the responding local, state, and federal agencies.63 Proponents
believe training exercises can prevent the types of problems local, state, and federal
emergency managers experienced in the early stages of response in Oklahoma City.
In 2000, FEMA participated in over 200 state-level terrorism preparedness
exercises each year. According to GAO, that number is up from approximately 25
in FY1996 and continues to rise. Many of the exercises are “tabletop exercises,” in
which participants discuss how their agency would respond to a particular type of
62U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “First Responder Initiative Grant Process,”
Federal Register, vol. 67, no. 73, April 9 ,2002, p. 18621.
63Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management, After Action Report, Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building Bombing: Lessons Learned, July 1996, available at
[http://www.onenet.net/~odcem/archives/fema/1048/aar-contrib.htm].

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incident. Some exercises are more demanding “full-scale exercises,” which require
responders to be deployed in the field and involve extensive evaluations.64
In addition to these exercises, there have been a limited number of nationwide
exercises in recent years involving emergency managers and elected officials from
around the nation. In May 2000, for example, FEMA and the Department of Justice
conducted the TOPOFF (top officials) exercise, the largest joint training exercise of
its kind. TOPOFF simulated WMD attacks in three locations across the nation. The
Justice Department rated the exercise as a success, claiming to draw useful lessons
from it.65 In congressional testimony, a spokesman for NEMA(National Emergency
Management Association) concurred with the Justice Department that the exercise
was useful, but that similar exercises were necessary “to ensure that valuable federal,
state, and local relationships and trust are built before a disaster.” The Justice
Department is currently planning for TOPOFF II, which is scheduled to be conducted
in FY2002.66
While FEMA officials believe exercises are an essential component of
preparedness, they argue that response to natural disasters can be just as valuable as
WMD training exercises. Floods, hurricanes, and wildfires test the capabilities of
federal, state, and local responders and may lead to improved response to terrorist
attacks.
Are More Exercises Needed? Despite these activities, some emergency
managers and analysts believe that the federal government does not coordinate or
fund enough joint training exercises, leaving a gap in federal policy. In a survey by
the Gilmore Commission, 80% of responding localities stated they had not
participated in an exercise with federal agencies. Additionally, a majority of
localities reported that they had never held a WMD response exercise. The Gilmore
Commission and other observers have encouraged Congress to instruct FEMA to
coordinate more joint exercises and to provide more funding to states and localities
to fund the exercises.67
Should Congress determine more joint training exercises are needed, it could
direct FEMA to coordinate more exercises involving first responders and officials
from all levels of government. Exercises could be structured to test and evaluate
existing state and local response plans as well as mutual aid compacts. FEMA might
also provide technical assistance to states and localities for exercise development.
Such assistance could be useful to governments developing new exercises for WMD
response or enhancing existing exercises.
64U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make
Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response, GAO Report GAO-01-15, Mar.
2001, pp. 17-19.
65U.S. Department of Justice, Office for Domestic Preparedness web site, at
[http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/exercises/state.htm], visited Nov. 23, 2001.
66Statement of Woodbury Fogg, Director, Office of Emergency Management, State of New
Hampshire, House Committee on Government Reform hearings, Oct. 5, 2001.
67Gilmore Commission, Third Annual Report, pp. 18-21.

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The Bush Administration has emphasized exercises as a core component of its
proposed First Responder Initiative. Developing and conducting exercises is listed
as one of four basic activities for which recipients may use federal funds. The Office
of Homeland Security states that the new program, if enacted, would “... supplement
a coordinated, regular exercise program to improve response capabilities, practice
mutual aid, and assess operations improvement and deficiencies.”68
Potential Consequence. There is arguably no adverse consequence in
supporting joint training exercises. Holding exercises, however, particularly full-
scale exercises, can be prohibitively costly for state and local governments.
Some state and local officials might disapprove of requirements for exercises.
Officials in rural communities, for example, might argue that such requirements
would divert resources from preparing for more likely natural disasters to preparing
for less likely terrorist attacks. Should Congress decide to promote exercises, it
might instruct FEMA to conduct exercises in rural communities (or communities
considered “low risk”) less frequently than in urban communities.
Communications Infrastructure and Other Equipment
Defining the Issue. According to emergency managers and analysts, the lack
of a policy on emergency communications infrastructure is a significant issue in
federal policy. Observers have stated that an interoperable communications
infrastructure (a system that may be used by multiple jurisdictions) is one of the most
urgent equipment needs. The president of the International Association of Fire
Chiefs testified before Congress on this need, stating, “In major incidents where the
responding emergency personnel involved come from different jurisdictions or
agencies, each using its own radio frequencies, the issue of radio communications
among and between responding agencies remains a challenge.”69 The American
Hospital Association (AHA) has also emphasized the need for standardized
communications infrastructure, stating, “Recent disasters have demonstrated that
different organizations may use different media and/or different frequencies in their
communications. Unable to communicate with one another, precious time can be
lost at the start of a mass casualty incident.”70 The Bush Administration has
frequently expressed its support for federal funding for interoperable
communications. In June 2000, it stated that interoperable communications would
be a top priority of the proposed Department of Homeland Security.71
Communications equipment, however, is not the only equipment need identified
by observers. Emergency responders use a wide range of specialized equipment to
68White House Office of Homeland Security, Securing the Homeland, p. 11.
69Statement of Chief John M. Buckman III, president, International Fire Chiefs Association,
in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Homeland Security, hearings, 107th
Cong., 1st. sess., Oct. 11, 2001.
70American Hospital Association, Hospital Preparedness for Mass Casualties, p. 21.
71Office of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security, p. 12.

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rescue and treat victims as well as protect themselves from injury. Obtaining and
maintaining necessary equipment may enhance the ability of first responders to
handle WMD incidents. Some have criticized the process by which states and
localities obtain WMD-response equipment and the lack of standards for such
equipment.
In June 1999, GAO reported that some states and localities were purchasing
equipment for their jurisdictions without performing a risk assessment, which could
identify the most useful equipment. In its report, GAO emphasized the importance
of risk assessment, stating, “... [A] critical component of establishing and expanding
programs to combat terrorism is an analytically sound threat and risk assessment
using valid inputs from the intelligence community and other agencies.” Concerning
equipment standards, GAO observed that federal, state, and local governments have
little consensus on the types of equipment needed to respond to WMD incidents.72
Standardization of Emergency Communications Infrastructure.
Some observers have suggested that the federal government should assist states and
localities in providing an interoperable communications system that would allow
responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another as well as
with out-of-state jurisdictions. Some emergency managers and analysts believe that
the federal government should research cost-effective means of procuring common
bandwidths and equipment that would enable multi-jurisdictional communication.73
The Administration expects that roughly one-third of the First Responder funds, if
authorized, would be used for communications equipment.74 If Congress determines
interoperable communications are a crucial asset, it could stipulate that
communications equipment purchased with federal funds must meet a set of
established standards.
Establishing Standards for Equipment. According to GAO, an FBI-
directed commission has developed a list of standardized equipment for response to
WMD incidents that is intended to promote standardization among responders at all
levels of government. The NFPA has also developed criteria for evaluating
equipment. Both the FBI and NFPA lists are voluntary, leaving states and localities
discretion in choosing equipment types, manufacturers, and quantities.75
Congress could require states and localities receiving federal funds to purchase
only equipment meeting specified standards. FEMA already has such authority in its
existing grant programs. Title VI of the Stafford Act gives FEMA discretion in
72U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency
Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs, GAO report GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 1999,
pp. 1, 4-5.
73For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RL31375, Meeting Public Safety
Spectrum Needs, by Linda K. Moore.
74White House Office of Homeland Security, Securing the Homeland, budget tables.
75Ibid., p. 4.

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placing conditions on the use of grant funds, including the method of purchase,
quantity of items, and specifications of equipment.76
To improve the process by which equipment is selected, appropriate federal
agencies might increase technical assistance to states and localities to conduct risk
assessments. Assessments could help governments use federal funds more
efficiently, since not every locality will need to obtain the highest-capability
equipment. It is likely, however, that some communities do not have the
administrative capacity to undertake their own risk analysis, and would seek
additional federal resources.
Potential Consequence. Mandating equipment standards could prove costly
to state and local governments even if additional federal resources were available.
The acquisition and maintenance of specialized equipment, including new
communications infrastructure, could pose a significant financial burden. This
consequence may be more likely in smaller localities, or rural localities that rely
predominately on volunteer fire and rescue squads. It is likely that any effort to
standardize would need to consider the impact on such communities.
Model Plans and Best Practices
Defining the Issue. Many emergency managers and analysts believe
promoting model plans and best practices in emergency preparedness would
complement any other policy initiatives undertaken and could be beneficial to states
and localities. This option arguably has no adverse consequences and also presents
a cost-effective means of assisting states and localities.
Promote Best Practices. FEMA could expedite its role in identifying and
promoting “model” state and local emergency plans that could serve as examples for
others to follow. The Gilmore Commission recommended this policy option, citing
several states that have developed excellent response plans that could be used as
models for other states. The commission further suggested that FEMA and NEMA
develop a model state plan that contained certain standard features, but remained
flexible enough to fit individual states’ circumstances.77
In addition to model response plans, Congress could emphasize “best practices”
in areas such as regional mutual aid compacts, medical community preparedness, and
joint training exercises. States and localities that have excelled in these activities
could serve as examples for other governments across the nation. Observers of
emergency management have called for Congress to support state and local efforts
in these areas. NEMA, for example, has stated, “Interstate and intrastate mutual aid
assistance must be recognized and supported by the federal government as an
expedient, cost-effective approach to disaster response and recovery.”78
7642 U.S.C. 5196(b).
77Gilmore Commission, Second Annual Report, pp. 24.
78National Emergency Management Association, “White Paper on Domestic Preparedness,”
(continued...)

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The Senate proposal for the DHS would promote best practices. S. 2452
(Lieberman) proposes a national information clearinghouse that would be charged
with collecting and distributing information on best practices in state and local
emergency management. Under this bill, the clearinghouse would be maintained by
the new Department of Homeland Security.79
Preparedness activities undertaken in communities with special facilities, such
as nuclear power plants and chemical stockpiles are also of interest to Congress.
Since 1980, it has required all nuclear power plants to have emergency response
plans as a condition of license.80 The subsequent regulations list specific components
for such plans, including:
! clear assignment of responsibilities to state and local response agencies;
! arrangements for mutual assistance;
! procedures for notifying government agencies and the public of emergency;
! means of controlling radiological exposure; and
! periodic exercises and evaluations of response capability.81
Congress also requires U.S. Army facilities with chemical stockpiles to have
preparedness plans. Under the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program (CSEPP), these plans must not only incorporate the U.S. Army and FEMA,
but also state and local response agencies. FEMA encourages CSEPP communities
to take a comprehensive approach to planning for a chemical accident and develop
plans that address the unique needs of each community. CSEPP communities
typically test their preparedness plans in periodic exercises.82
Because some of the potential dangers of a nuclear or chemical stockpile
accident are similar to the dangers of a WMD attack (e.g., radiological exposure),
activities in such communities with special facilities may be relevant to current
efforts and help identify the most efficient and effective preparedness plans. Other
states and localities could be encouraged to follow those examples as they prepare
for potential WMD attacks.
Conclusion
The unprecedented terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have prompted
policymakers at all levels of government to consider how to prepare for possible
78(...continued)
October 1, 2001, available on the NEMA web site at [http://www.nemaweb.org].
79S. 2452, sec. 402(b) and 402(c)(4). Also see CRS Report RL31490, The Department of
Homeland Security: State and Local Preparedness Issues, by Ben Canada.
80P.L. 96-295; 94 Stat. 783.
8110 C.F.R. 50.47(b). For more information on this issue see the CRS Electronic Briefing
Book on Terrorism, “Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response,” by Mark Holt, available
at [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter138.html].
82For more information, see FEMA’s CSEPP web site at
[http://www.fema.gov/pte/csepp1.htm], visited Dec. 13, 2001.

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future attacks. Congress might address any, or all, of these policy issues as it seeks
ways to enhance existing emergency response institutions and plans to better prepare
for future attacks. Should Congress consider legislation on state and local
preparedness, it would have a wide range of options to consider.
Related CRS Products
CRS Report RL31490, The Department of Homeland Security: State and Local
Preparedness Issues, by Ben Canada.
CRS Report RL31510, Proposed Transfer of FEMA to the Department of Homeland
Security, by Keith Bea.
CRS Report RL31475, First Responder Initiative: Issues and Options, by Ben
Canada.
CRS Report RL31227, Terrorism Preparedness: A Catalog of Federal Assistance
Programs, coordinated by Ben Canada.
CRS Report RL31375, Meeting Public Safety Spectrum Needs, by Linda K. Moore.
CRS Report RL31125, Recovery from Terrorist Attacks: A Catalog of Selected
Federal Assistance Programs, coordinated by Ben Canada.
CRS Report RS20071, United States Fire Administration: An Overview, by Len
Kruger.
CRS Report RS21073, Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces: Fact Sheet, by Ben
Canada.
CRS Terrorism Briefing Book: [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter1.shtml].

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Appendix: State and Local Preparedness Bills
This appendix lists bills introduced in the 107th Congress specifically related to
state and local emergency preparedness. The title, sponsor, and a description of the
provisions relating to state and local preparedness are provided for each bill. Bill
provisions not directly related to state and local preparedness have been omitted.
National Strategy Proposals
H.R. 525 (Gilchrest). Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001.
Bill establishes the President's Council on Domestic Preparedness and requires it to
establish voluntary minimum guidelines for preparedness programs.
H.R. 1292 (Skelton). Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001. Bill directs the
President to develop a comprehensive strategy for homeland security under which
federal, state, and local government organizations coordinate and cooperate to meet
security objectives. It directs the President to conduct a comprehensive threat and
risk assessment to identify specific homeland security threats and implement a
resulting strategy as soon as practicable.

H.R. 3026 (Gibbons). Office of Homeland Security Act of 2001. Bill
establishes the Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the
President. Among other activities, the bill establishes a center within the office to
disseminate information learned from homeland security exercises.
H.R. 5005 (Armey). Homeland Security Act of 2002. Bill was introduced on
behalf of the Administration. It establishes a new Department of Homeland Security,
which would, among other things, consolidate training and financial assistance
programs for state and local governments into a single department.
S. 1449 (Graham); H.R. 3078 (Hastings). To establish the National Office for
Combating Terrorism. Bill proposes a National Office for Combating Terrorism
within the Executive Office of the President. The new office will develop a National
Terrorism Prevention and Response Strategy and coordinate its implementation. The
office will also oversee state and local government programs and activities as part of
the strategy.
S. 1453 (Smith). Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2001. Bill establishes
an Office of National Preparedness within FEMA. Instructs the executive director
to develop a national strategy for terrorism preparedness and provide technical
assistance to state and localities.
S. 2061 (Bond). National Response to Terrorism and Consequence Management
Act of 2002. Bill authorizes FEMA to coordinate the preparedness efforts of states
and localities. In doing so, FEMA would provide technical assistance and grants.
Bill would also provide more funding for Urban Search and Rescue task forces and
provides for removal of civil liability barriers that prohibit donations of equipment
to responder units.

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S. 2452 (Lieberman); H.R. 4660 (Thornberry). National Homeland Security
and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002. Bill establishes a Department of National
Homeland Security, which, among other duties, would be charged with coordinated
emergency preparedness among federal, state, and local governments.
Block Grants
S. 2038 (Clinton); H.R. 4059 (McNulty). Homeland Security Block Grant Act
of 2002. Bill would designate FEMA to administer a block grant for a wide range
of homeland security activities. Funds would be distributed using a population-based
formula. Qualifying metropolitan cities and urban counties would receive 70% of
funds and states would receive 30%. As a condition of receiving funds, states would
have to submit a statewide preparedness plan. Eligible activities would include
emergency planning, developing mutual aid compacts, and procuring
communications equipment, among others. Recipients would have to submit annual
reports detailing the use of funds.
S. 2077 (Collins). Securing Our States Act of 2002. Bill proposes that FEMA
distribute funds to states for such activities as enhancing infrastructure security,
hiring additional law enforcement officers, and developing emergency notification
systems. Funds would be distributed using a population-based formula. States
would have to redistribute 75% of funds to local jurisdictions or regional
organizations. States must submit a preparedness plan to receive funds and must
report to FEMA.
S. 2664 (Jeffords). Bill would create a block grant that FEMA would distribute
to states on a formula basis. The bill proposes a wide range of eligible activities
focusing on emergency planning, equipment, training, and exercises, similar to the
Administration proposal. It would require recipients to provide a 25% match and
require states to distribute 75% of funds to local governments. States and localities
would have to have to ensure that they would maintain pre-existing levels of
expenditures on preparedness activities. States would also be required to submit
annual reports to the FEMA Director and report to Congress on the outcome of
preparedness exercises.83
Grants for Preparing for Weapons of Mass Destruction
H.R. 2333 (Burr). National Disaster Medical System Act. Bill establishes the
National Medical Disaster System. It requires such a system to be a coordinated
effort by federal agencies working in collaboration with states. The bill also directs
the HHS Secretary to plan HHS activities to assist state and local governments when
state medical resources are overwhelmed in response to an emergency.
H.R. 3176 (C. H. Smith). Hazardous Agent Emergency Uniform Response
Act. Bill directs the HHS Secretary to develop protocols for responding to public
health emergencies resulting from the release of dangerous biological agents or
chemicals.
83S. 2664, sec. 5.

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H.R. 3255 (Menendez). Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (BioPAct) of 2001.
Bill creates grant programs for states and localities to increase hospital and provider
capacity, training, and resources for treating bioterrorism and improve coordination,
training, and equipment of emergency responders.
H.R. 3269 (Watson). To provide for the development of state medical disaster
response plans regarding terrorist attacks that use biological or chemical weapons.
Bill requires the HHS Secretary to develop criteria for state medical disaster plans,
review state plans, and report to Congress.
H.R. 3458 (Shadegg). Bill directs the HHS Secretary to contract with a
nonprofit organization for the collection and dissemination of WMD response
material. Information would be available to state and local officials. Bill also creates
an emergency medicine alert network for use at the federal and state level.
S. 1486 (Edwards); H.R. 3242 (Blagojevich). Biological and Chemical
Weapons Preparedness Act of 2001. Bill establishes goals for first responder public
health agencies to achieve in responding to biological or chemical attacks. It also
authorizes block grants and competitive grants to help states and localities achieve
goals and directs HHS Secretary to provide technical assistance and develop
performance measures to evaluate state and local plans.
S. 1508 (Corzine). Biological and Chemical Attack Preparedness Act. Bill
requires states, in consultation with local governments, to develop public health
disaster plans for responding to biological or chemical attacks. Directs the HHS
Secretary to establish standards, approve, and oversee implementation of the plans.
It requires each plan to designate hospitals which will have procedures in place to
treat residents in the event of an attack. Also requires the Secretary, through the
director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, to award grants to hospitals,
healthcare providers, and State or local government entities to fund the
implementation of preparedness plans.
S. 1520 (Bayh); H.R. 3153 (Blagojevich). State Bioterrorism Preparedness
Act. Bill authorizes the HHS secretary to provide grants to states to improve
preparedness for biological or chemical attacks. It requires states to submit
preparedness plans to HHS, provides grants to states for training exercises that
simulate terrorist attacks, and directs the HHS Secretary to develop a list of best
practices of states in the area of WMD preparedness. The bill also proposes the
development of a national emergency communications system.
S. 1765 (Frist); H.R. 3448 (Tauzin). Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (became P.L. 107-188). Law creates a block
grant for states to develop bioterrorism response plans. Grant amounts based on
population and states must submit a plan within six months after receiving funds.
Grants for Emergency Planning and Personnel
H.R. 3161 (Larson). Municipal Preparation and Strategic Response Act. Bill
directs FEMA to provide grants to local governments and emergency response units
to develop plans for coordinated response to emergencies, and to provide grants to

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police and fire departments for counterterrorism training. The bill also requires each
state to have an emergency official serve as a liaison to FEMA.
H.R. 3185 (Green); S. 1617 (Dodd). Staffing for Adequate Fire and
Emergency Response Act of 2001. Bill proposes amendments to the Workforce
Investment Act of 1998 authorizing the Secretary of Labor to make matching grants
for up to 75% of the costs of projects to hire firefighters. States, localities, tribal
organizations, and regional consortia of governments are eligible.
Grants for Equipment
H.R. 1547 (Andrews). To establish a grant program in the Department of
Defense to assist states and local governments in improving their ability to prevent
and respond to domestic terrorism. Bill would authorize the Secretary of Defense to
make grants to states and political subdivisions to purchase response equipment.
H.R. 3025 (Forbes). To expand the program under which state and local
governments may procure law enforcement equipment through the Department of
Defense to include the procurement of counterterrorism equipment. Bill expands the
program under which state and local governments procure law enforcement
equipment through the Department of Defense to include the procurement of
counterterrorism equipment.
Communications
S. 1631 (Jeffords). Amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act to require the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to conduct and report to specified congressional committees on
a study to determine the resources needed for development of an effective nationwide
communications system for emergency response personnel, which shall include a
review of the use of the digital or analog spectrum as a key component to meeting the
urgent communications needs of such personnel.
Intelligence Sharing
H.R. 3285 (Weiner); S. 1615 (Schumer). Federal-Local Information Sharing
Partnership Act of 2001. Bill removes legal barriers to allow intelligence officials
to share relevant information with state and local officials. Also requires state and
local officials to follow guidelines for information usage as set by the U.S. Attorney
General.
H.R. 3825 (Chambliss). Homeland Security Information Sharing Act. Bill
instructs the President to develop procedures and criteria that federal agencies will
use in determining what information to share with state and local officials, and when
it should be shared. Also instructs federal agencies, including intelligence agencies,
to coordinate efforts to provide states and localities with appropriate information.

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National Guard
H.R. 3154 (Maloney). To require the Secretary of Defense to establish at least
one Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team in each State. Bill requires
the Secretary of Defense to establish at least one National Guard Civil Support Team
(specializing in response to weapons of mass destruction) in each state as well as an
additional team under the direction of the National Guard Bureau.
S. 1993 (Carnahan). A bill to authorize ... a Weapons of Mass Destruction
Responder Training Facility.... Bill authorizes the Secretary of the Army to construct
a training facility at Fort Leonard Wood in Missouri that would be used to train
National Guard Civil Support Teams and other Department of Defense units.

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