Order Code IB10091
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues
Updated July 25, 2002
Carl E. Behrens
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
International Nonproliferation Structures and Organizations
The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA
IAEA Inspections
Enforcement
NPT “Discrimination”
The Nuclear Bargain: Atoms for Peace
The Nuclear Bargain: Disarmament
Proliferation Motives
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy
Nuclear Cooperation and Export Controls
Nonproliferation Legislation
Sanctions
Federal Organization for Nonproliferation
Funding Nonproliferation Programs
Nuclear Proliferation in Specific Regions
India and Pakistan
The Middle East and Israel
Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Gone But Not Forgotten
Iran’s Nuclear Program
China
North Korea’s Noncompliance with its NPT and IAEA Obligations
Russian Nuclear Weapons and Weapons Material

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Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues
SUMMARY
The United States has been a leader of
proliferators, is another current focus of
worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of
nonproliferation activities. In the longer term,
nuclear weapons. To this end, the interna-
the major question is fulfilling the pledge in
tional community and many individual states
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by
have agreed to a range of treaties, laws, and
the nuclear weapons states, including the
agreements, known collectively as the nuclear
United States, to pursue complete nuclear
nonproliferation regime, aimed at keeping
disarmament, in the face of skepticism about
nations that do not have nuclear weapons from
the possibility, or even the wisdom, of achiev-
acquiring them.
ing that goal.
The nonproliferation regime has also
The terrorist attacks of September 11
been concerned with preventing terrorists
added the suddenly more realistic threat of an
from obtaining a nuclear weapon or the mate-
even more unimaginable assault with a nu-
rials to craft one. The attacks on New York
clear explosive. While terrorists have not
and Washington September 11 added a new
been ignored in nonproliferation efforts,
level of reality to the threat that terrorists
particularly with regard to Russian nuclear
might acquire a nuclear weapon and explode
materials, the major focus has been on pre-
it in a populated area.
venting nation states from developing weap-
ons capabilities. While many features of the
Other nonproliferation concerns include
nonproliferation regime, such as export con-
a number of regional crisis points: the India-
trols and monitoring, are applicable to the
Pakistan arms race, North Korea, and the
terrorist threat, some shift in focus may be
Middle East, primarily Iraq, Iran, and Israel.
necessary.
There is concern about China’s actions in
expanding its nuclear force, and of Chinese
Numerous U.S. agencies have programs
and Russian activities that may encourage
related to nuclear nonproliferation, but the
proliferation in the other regions.
major activities are carried out by the Depart-
ments of State, Defense, and Energy. DOE’s
Disposing of plutonium and highly en-
program is part of the National Nuclear Secu-
riched uranium from dismantled Russian
rity Administration, which is responsible for
nuclear weapons, while preventing it from
the management of the U.S. nuclear weapons
falling into the hands of terrorists or other
program.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Administration’s FY2003 budget request, released in February 2002, included
increases in funding for nonproliferation activities in the Defense Department (DOD), State
Department (DOS) and the Department of Energy (DOE). The FY2003 request for the
Defense Department’s Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program was $416.7 million,
compared to $400.2 million for FY2002. The request for the DOS’s Nonproliferation, Anti-
Terrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) Program was $372.4 million, compared with
$313.5 million appropriated for FY2002 (in H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115). DOE’s Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs received $803.6 million in the FY2002 Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act (H.R. 2311/P.L. 107-66) and an additional $226.0
million in the FY2002 Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R.
3338/P.L. 107-117) for a total of $1.0296 billion. The request for FY2003 was $1.1136
billion.
On July 10 the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
recommended funding DOE’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs at $1.167 billion. The
full Appropriations Committee was scheduled to report the bill on July 18, but the markup
was cancelled until after the August recess. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported
the Energy and Water bill on July 24 with funding of $1.125 billion for DOE’s Nuclear
Nonproliferation Programs.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy
One of the enduring nightmares of the post-Cold War world has been that terrorists
might obtain a nuclear weapon, or the materials to craft one. For many, this nuclear
nightmare was tempered by disbelief that terrorist organizations would be capable of
exploding a nuclear device in a populated area, and merciless enough to carry out such an
assault. The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon cast serious
doubt on such reassuring considerations.
While attention may have been redirected to the terrorist threat, other concerns about
the proliferation of nuclear weapons have not been diminished. The United States has long
been a leader of worldwide efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional
nations, as well as to nongovernmental entities. Since the 1950s these nonproliferation
efforts have built up a broad international structure, including treaties, international
organizations with inspection mechanisms, and other agreements, complemented by wide-
ranging domestic legislation.
The centerpiece of this structure is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under
the terms of the NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states — the United States, the
United Kingdom, Russia, France and China — agreed “not in any way to assist” any non-
weapons state to acquire nuclear weapons. They also agreed to reduce and eventually
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eliminate their own nuclear arsenals. The non-weapons states agreed not to develop nuclear
weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect their nuclear
facilities and materials to ensure that peaceful nuclear technology is not diverted to military
purposes. The NPT also guarantees non-weapons states access to peaceful nuclear
technology. Since the end of the cold war, participation in the NPT has been almost
universal. Except for India and Pakistan, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities and
1998 tests of nuclear explosives are a principal nonproliferation concern, only Israel and
Cuba have not signed the NPT.
Beyond the NPT, the United States relies on various positive and negative incentives
to persuade countries that may be interested in nuclear weapons not to acquire them. For
countries facing security threats, the United States has provided security guarantees in the
form of alliances that address the underlying motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. Both
Japan and Germany, for example, had nuclear weapons programs during the Second World
War and might have continued to pursue nuclear weapons after the war if the United States
had not included them as allies. After the Cold War, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
relinquished their nuclear capabilities to ensure good relations with the West.
Another important nonproliferation tool is technology denial. The United States and
other suppliers of nuclear technology try to prevent countries such as Iran, Iraq, India, North
Korea, Pakistan, and Israel that are trying to develop nuclear weapons from buying the
equipment they need to produce nuclear weapons. One potential problem after the Cold War
could result from loose controls on nuclear technology, materials, and expertise in Russia and
the former Soviet republics. The concern is that countries seeking nuclear weapons might
circumvent international technology controls by purchasing or stealing materials and/or
expertise from inadequately secured facilities in the former Soviet Union. The United States
has spent over $3 billion since the end of the Cold War helping those countries improve
security for nuclear assets.
Sanctions are another way the United States has tried to deter and punish proliferators.
Sanctions cut off U.S. aid, economic assistance, military cooperation, and technology access
to countries that violate nonproliferation agreements or take steps, such as testing nuclear
weapons, that threaten U.S. national security objectives. However, sanctions are sometimes
controversial, as in the case of India and Pakistan. The Executive Branch sometimes prefers
not to impose sanctions to avoid damaging relations with other countries, and Congress has
sometimes relaxed sanctions, as was the case with India and Pakistan after they tested
nuclear weapons.
Finally, the Department of Defense tries to deter acquisition and use of nuclear weapons
by maintaining a strong military force. If nonproliferation and deterrence fail, the Defense
Department is prepared to use military force to destroy weapons of mass destruction. The
military component of nonproliferation policy is often referred to as counterproliferation.
Nonproliferation efforts have been concerned with three major types of problems. In
the short term they focus on a number of regional crisis points: the India-Pakistan arms race,
North Korea, and the Middle East, primarily Iraq, Iran, and Israel. There is concern also
about China’s actions in expanding its nuclear force, and of Chinese and Russian activities
that may encourage proliferation in the other regions. A second problem is the disposal of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons, while
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preventing it from falling into the hands of terrorists or other proliferators. In the longer
term, the major problem is fulfilling the pledge in the NPT by the nuclear weapons states,
including the United States, to pursue complete nuclear disarmament, in the face of
skepticism about the possibility, or even the wisdom, of achieving that goal.
To these concerns has now been added a suddenly more realistic threat that terrorists,
having achieved such shocking devastation in the destruction of the World Trade Towers in
New York, may be tempted to carry out an even more unimaginable assault with a nuclear
explosive. While terrorists have not been ignored in nonproliferation efforts, particularly
with regard to Russian nuclear materials, the major focus has been on preventing nation
states from developing weapons capabilities. While many features of the nonproliferation
regime, such as export controls and monitoring, are applicable to the terrorist threat, some
shift in focus may be necessary.
International Nonproliferation Structures and
Organizations
The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime to deter further spread of nuclear weapons consists
of treaties, international organizations, and multilateral and bilateral agreements, augmented
by various unilateral actions intended to prevent further proliferation.
Major components of the regime include:
! The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in
1970. It commits non-nuclear weapons members not to acquire nuclear
weapons, and to allow international inspection of all their nuclear activities
to verify this commitment. It commits nuclear weapons states not to assist
non-weapons states to develop nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of
an end to the nuclear arms race and eventually to nuclear disarmament.
! The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an international
organization of the United Nations, established in Vienna, whose safeguards
system verifies NPT compliance. Non-weapons NPT parties negotiate
inspection agreements with the IAEA to verify the peaceful use of their
nuclear materials.
! Informal international groups, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), a committee of nuclear supplier nations that maintains multilateral
guidelines for nuclear exports, and the Zangger Committee, an NPT affiliate
that maintains a “trigger list” of nuclear items requiring safeguards. The
NSG and Zangger guidelines were strengthened in 1992, after the Gulf War
and the crisis with Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. The Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which restricts exports of
nuclear-capable missiles, is another component of the nonproliferation
structure.
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! The Convention on Physical Security for Nuclear Materials (1987) sets
international security standards for storing, using, and transporting nuclear
materials.
The Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA
The NPT provides the legal and institutional basis for international nonproliferation
policy. Like all international agreements, it depends for its success on the good will of its
participants, and does not guarantee that countries will not violate their commitments.
However, to reinforce the good intentions of the signatories, the NPT set up an inspection
system called safeguards, based on agreements between non-weapons states and the IAEA
that permit routine inspections. The IAEA has no enforcement power; it can only report
discrepancies to the U.N. By presenting the prospect that clandestine proliferation activities
will be detected and exposed, the inspection system is designed to deter proliferation through
international pressure, disapproval, and possible sanctions and countermeasures.
In order to prevent proliferation, IAEA inspections must be effective, and the prospect
of international disapproval strong enough to deter a non-weapons NPT member from
pursuing nuclear weapons development. Since the Gulf War, efforts to strengthen IAEA
inspection powers have been underway, culminating in May 1997 with the adoption of a
“model protocol” agreement intended to give inspectors more access to a wider array of
activities, information, and facilities.
IAEA Inspections. In the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.N. inspectors
were surprised at the scope of Iraq's nuclear weapons program and the progress Iraq had
made toward obtaining nuclear weapons despite regular IAEA inspections. A major
weakness in the existing system was that inspectors only inspected sites and facilities listed
in the safeguards agreements with the agency. The Strengthened Safeguards System adopted
at the May 1995 NPT extension and review conference gives inspectors strengthened ability
to detect clandestine nuclear activities. Strengthened safeguards include taking
environmental samples, no-notice inspections of nuclear facilities, complete access to records
to confirm that all nuclear materials have been declared, and remote and unattended
monitoring. A new modification to IAEA safeguards agreements with member states
requires an “expanded declaration” by all NPT members of nuclear-related activities such
as uranium mining. It also authorizes IAEA access to any place. However, implementation
of the strengthened safeguards system has been slow.
To persuade other countries to accept the new inspections, the United States agreed to
accept the new measures itself. In June 1998 the United States reached agreement with the
IAEA on how the model protocol would be applied in the United States. For many years the
United States has allowed the IAEA access to U.S. nuclear facilities, although the purpose
of inspecting U.S. facilities for diversion is symbolic. The new agreement includes a
provision that would allow the United States to restrict IAEA inspections to protect national
security. Senate ratification of the agreement is necessary before it can take effect.
Enforcement. Even if IAEA inspectors detect clandestine nuclear weapons activity,
the NPT contains no formal provisions for forcing a country to abandon the activity. Iraq’s
nuclear program was dismantled because U.N. forces militarily defeated Iraq after driving
it out of Kuwait in 1991. In the absence of such military force a defiant NPT signatory could
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presumably continue its activities if it were willing to resist nonmilitary international
pressures and disapproval. North Korea, in the inspection crisis prior to the 1994 Agreed
Framework that is now in effect, violated its obligations and announced that it was
withdrawing from NPT. The Security Council did not take decisive action to enforce the
NPT. North Korea reversed its decision only after being promised two nuclear power
reactors and shipments of fuel oil. (See section on North Korea, below.)
The efforts of the nonproliferation regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
have not been without critics. Some view IAEA activities as ineffectual and toothless, easy
to evade by an entity determined to develop nuclear weapons capability. Nor is the NPT
system without its critics among non-nuclear-weapons nations.
NPT “Discrimination”
Despite the successful recruitment of almost all nations into the NPT, and the agreement
in 1995 to make it permanent, a current of discontent exists about the difference in treatment
of the five declared nuclear weapons states – who get to keep their weapons – compared
with all the rest.
The Nuclear Bargain: Atoms for Peace. Part of the discontent derives from the
changed prospects of commercial nuclear power. When the NPT was negotiated, peaceful
nuclear power was viewed as a technology with great economic potential for all countries,
both industrialized and developing. Joining the NPT was a quid pro quo under which non-
weapons states renounced nuclear weapons in return for obtaining access to the technology
and materials necessary to exploit commercial nuclear power — a concept that goes back to
President Eisenhower’s 1954 "Atoms for Peace” initiative. However, since then the
economic advantage of nuclear power has declined significantly. Nuclear power is important
in many countries, but is under strong competition from other energy sources. The high
capital cost of nuclear powerplants, and the technical skills required to operate them safely
and economically, have been major barriers to use of nuclear energy by developing countries,
even where the main alternatives are coal and imported fossil fuels. This part of the NPT
bargain has thus not been very rewarding for many non-weapons states, although they
continue to receive assistance in the uses of nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture, and
scientific research.
The Nuclear Bargain: Disarmament. Another part of the original NPT bargain was
a promise by all signatories, including the weapons states, to “pursue negotiations in good
faith” for the “cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control” (Article VI). At the time the NPT was negotiated, the first goal, an early end to the
arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, must have seemed unlikely,
nuclear disarmament unattainable in the foreseeable future, and “general and complete
disarmament” altogether utopian.
The nuclear powers did pursue negotiations over strategic arms limitations in the 1970s
and 1980s, and the abrupt end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union made
deep reductions in nuclear armaments possible. However, some non-weapon NPT states
want more progress toward the goal of nuclear disarmament.
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The major vehicle for efforts in this direction in the 1990s was a treaty banning nuclear
tests. The treaty would essentially confirm the moratorium on nuclear testing that all the
weapons states, including the United States, were observing. However, when the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally negotiated and signed, and submitted
to the Senate by President Clinton in September 1997, it was controversial (see CRS Issue
Brief IB92099, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). The Senate declined to
ratify the CTBT on October 13, 1999, by a vote of 48-51. Despite this action, U.S. delegates
to the NPT review conference in 2000 reaffirmed the commitment to negotiate total nuclear
disarmament.
Despite the uncertainty introduced by rejection of the CTBT, steps toward ending the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have continued, as called for in Article VI of the
NPT. In January 2002 the Bush Administration released the results of its “Nuclear Posture
Review,” announcing that nuclear planning would no longer address the “Russian threat,”
as left over from the Cold War, but would develop capabilities to meet a range of threats
from unspecified countries. The redirection would be accompanied by a large, unilateral
reduction in deployed nuclear weapons. However, the new policy also included development
of a controversial missile defense capability, and improving the nuclear weapons
“infrastructure” to allow resumption of testing and possible development of new weapons
more rapidly. Although the Administration statement did not indicate that such activities
were contemplated or necessary, the suggestion that they might be in the future caused
dismay in some nonproliferation circles. (For details, see CRS Report RS21133, The
Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues.)
Proliferation Motives
Peaceful nuclear power may have lost its glitter, and the prospect of complete nuclear
disarmament may be dim. On the other hand, the motives for pursuing nuclear weapons
remain unchanged. A few states facing urgent security threats might view nuclear weapons
as the best way to deter attack. Noting that all five of the permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council are nuclear weapons states, some might view them as important
for prestige. Still others might view them as effective battlefield weapons that can be used
to defeat enemies and conquer territory.
Despite these motivations, many countries have abandoned nuclear weapons and have
sought other ways to ensure their security. Germany and Japan, both major powers, are non-
weapons states. In 1991, South Africa, having made the transition to majority rule, revealed
and dismantled its clandestine program and renounced nuclear weapons. Argentina and
Brazil, both of which had secret nuclear weapons programs under military governments,
abandoned them under civilian rule and joined the NPT. Former Soviet republics Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan returned the Soviet weapons left on their territory and joined the
NPT. In these countries, nuclear weapons were seen as creating more problems than they
solved. Many hoped that this trend of the early 1990s would continue.
Interest in nuclear weapons, however, did not disappear. Besides ongoing tensions in
South Asia between India and Pakistan, tensions in the Middle East between Israel and its
Arab neighbors, and between Iraq and Iran, persist. China and Russia remain proliferation
concerns as potential sources of nuclear technology, and North Korea is still a serious
proliferation threat. A major concern is that other countries, especially those bordering
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known proliferators, might feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to counter the nuclear,
chemical, biological or conventional weapons of their neighbors.
U.S. Nonproliferation Policy
The United States has been and continues to be a leading proponent of the international
nonproliferation regime. At the domestic level is a system of export control and licensing
laws (and regulations) covering transfers of nuclear technology or materials, including
dual-use technology that can contribute to nuclear weapons development. There are also
laws requiring sanctions for violations of nonproliferation commitments, and sanctions
against non-weapons states that obtain or test nuclear weapons. These sanctions were
invoked in the case of India and Pakistan, but some were gradually suspended, and on
September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted all sanctions imposed because of the 1998 tests.
Nuclear Cooperation and Export Controls
In order to engage in international trade in nuclear technology or materials (such as
nuclear fuel), U.S. companies must obtain export licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Before an export license can be applied for, there must be in force a
bilateral agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the U.S. government and the
government of the importing nation. The conditions necessary for drawing up and approving
an agreement for cooperation, laid out in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, include a
90-day review by Congress. In several cases, congressional review of an agreement for
cooperation has been controversial; most recently, Congress allowed an agreement with
China to take effect in 1997, but it is still subject to criticism. (See section on China, below.)
Others have attracted less attention. A single agreement is in force between the United States
and the members of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM).
In addition to NRC’s licensing and regulation role, the Department of Energy (DOE)
also participates in export controls. DOE authorizes the transfer of nuclear technology to
countries having agreements for nuclear cooperation with the United States via “subsequent
arrangements,” the details of which are spelled out in Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. In general, NRC deals largely with licensing hardware, while DOE licenses
information and knowledge, under regulations defined in 10 CFR Part 810.
Finally, the Department of Commerce also is involved in regulating exports of dual-use,
nuclear-related commodities under the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979.
That law expired and successive Congresses have not passed new legislation, although there
have been several attempts to do so. Commerce continues to play a role in export regulation,
however.
Nonproliferation Legislation
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 88-703, as amended) established rules for
nuclear commerce which have become the international norm. The Atomic Energy Act
requires that a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement be negotiated between the United
States and any foreign country before major nuclear technology can be exported to that
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country. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-242) strengthened those earlier
rules and established the requirement of full scope safeguards as a condition of supply. This
means that any country except the five NPT weapon-states that wants to import nuclear
technology from the United States must accept IAEA safeguards on all of its nuclear
facilities. This requirement has been adopted by all major nuclear suppliers except China.
Sanctions. In order to deter or punish proliferators, Congress has passed many laws
imposing sanctions on countries that proliferate and those who assist them. The Arms
Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act contain provisions that cut off U.S.
assistance to countries that illegally acquire nuclear weapons or the means to make them.
These sanctions were imposed on Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s when it was caught
smuggling uranium enrichment equipment from Europe and the United States. However, the
Pakistan sanctions were waived by Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush to allow continued
U.S. aid to Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Aid was finally cut off in
1990 when President Bush did not provide the required certification that Pakistan did not
possess nuclear weapons.
In 1994 Congress passed the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, which requires
sanctions against countries that aid or abet the acquisition of nuclear weapons or
unsafeguarded nuclear weapons materials, or non-nuclear weapons countries that obtain or
explode nuclear devices. Sanctions include: cutoff of U.S. assistance, stringent licensing
requirements for technology exports, and opposition to loans or credits from international
financial institutions. These sanctions were imposed on India and Pakistan following their
nuclear tests in May 1998, but were gradually relaxed. Legislation passed in the 106th
Congress extended the President’s authority to relax sanctions on India and Pakistan for a
year, and the Senate passed a bill suspending sanctions on the two countries for 5 years. The
FY2000 Department of Defense Appropriations bill (P.L. 106-79) extended the authority to
suspend sanctions. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush lifted all
remaining sanctions on India and Pakistan in response to support of U.S. operations in
Afghanistan.
Critics of sanctions argue that they mainly punish U.S. firms and are often undercut by
foreign countries that continue to trade with proliferators. Supporters of sanctions argue that
they send a strong signal to proliferators and to other countries that proliferation has negative
consequences and will disrupt “business as usual.”
Federal Organization for Nonproliferation
The Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce; the intelligence
community; and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are all involved in the
formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policy.
! The National Security Council is the hub of nonproliferation policy, with the
primary task of reconciling nonproliferation policy with foreign, trade, and
national security policies.
! The State Department, in consultation with the Energy Department,
negotiates U.S. agreements for nuclear cooperation and represents U.S.
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nonproliferation interests with other states and international organizations
such as the IAEA.
! The Department of Defense is responsible for counterproliferation strategy
and policy, and also administers programs to help Russia guard and control
its nuclear weapons complex.
! The Department of Energy provides expertise in nuclear weapons to support
nonproliferation policy and diplomacy, largely through its national
laboratories. It issues permits for the export of nuclear information and
knowledge under so-called Part 810 regulations. DOE also administers some
programs to control fissile materials in the former Soviet Union.
! The Nuclear Regulatory Commission licenses nuclear exports subject to
concurrence by the Department of State.
! The Department of Commerce oversees licensing of dual-use exports as
mandated by Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, which
requires controls on “all export items, other than those licensed by the NRC,
which could be, if used for purposes other than those for which the export
is intended, of significance for nuclear explosive purposes.”
! The Central Intelligence Agency has a Nonproliferation Center that
coordinates intelligence aspects of nonproliferation policy.
Several interagency working groups coordinate the various responsibilities for
nonproliferation policy.
Funding Nonproliferation Programs
As indicated above, the major nonproliferation activities are carried out by the
Departments of State, Defense and Energy. The tables below present the funding
appropriated for FY2001 and the FY2002 budget request for these activities.
Table 1. State Department Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining
and Related (NADR) Programs
($ million)

FY2002
FY2003
Request
Export Control Assistance
17.0
36.0
Science Centers
37.0
52.0
IAEA Voluntary Contribution
49.0
50.0
CTBT Preparatory Commission
20.0
18.2
KEDO
90.5
75.0
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Antiterrorism Assistance
38.0
64.2
Terrorist Interdiction Program
4.0
5.0
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
14.0
15.0
Other
44.0
57.0
Total, NADR Program
313.5
372.4
Not all the activities of the NADR program are concerned with nuclear nonproliferation.
Of those that are:
! The Export Control Assistance program helps countries in the former Soviet
Union, in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and other areas develop their
ability to control exports of materials involved in proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD);
! The Science Centers program supports two facilities in Moscow and Kiev
to redirect activities of former Soviet Union experts in WMD;
! Anti-Terrorism Assistance is largely a training program in Europe, the
former Soviet Union, Near East Asia and other areas;
! The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Preparatory
Commission mainly supports an International Monitoring System for
detecting nuclear explosions;
! The IAEA Voluntary Contribution supports activities, particularly nuclear
inspections, that are vulnerable to the agency’s chronic funding crisis;
! The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) funds
activities under the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea (see below),
and,
! The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund provides funding for quick
response to unanticipated or unusually difficult nonproliferation needs.
Table 2. Defense Department Former Soviet Union Cooperative Threat
Reduction Programs
($ million)

FY2002
FY2003 Request
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination – Russia
133.4
70.5
Weapons Storage Security – Russia
55.0
40.0
Weapons Transportation Security – Russia
9.5
19.7
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Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production –
41.7
0.0*
Russia
Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination – Ukraine
50.0
6.5
WMD Infrastructure Elimination – Ukraine & Kazakhstan
12.0
17.8
WMD Proliferation Prevention – Former Soviet Union
0.0
80.0
Other (Including Biological and Chemical Weapons
98.6
222.2
programs)
Total, FSU Threat Reduction
400.2
416.7
*Program transferred to Department of Energy International Nuclear Safety program (See Table 3 below).
As in the State Department, not all CTR activities are directed to nuclear
nonproliferation objectives. A new program for FY2003, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation Prevention – FSU, is aimed at enhancing the capability of non-Russian FSU
countries to combat illicit trafficking in WMD materials across borders. For a detailed
discussion of the CTR program, see CRS Issue Brief IB98038, Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security and Control Issues.
Table 3. DOE Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs
($ million)

FY2002
FY2003
Request
Nonproliferation and Verification R&D
286.5
283.0
Nonproliferation and International Security
133.0
132.0
International Materials Protection, Control and Accounting
293.0
233.0
(MPC&A)
International Nuclear Safety
20.0
64.0
HEU Transparency Implementation
14.0
17.0
Fissile Materials Disposition
302.4
384.0
Adjustments
(22.9)
0.6
Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
1,026.6
1,113.6
Proliferation R&D activities are aimed at techniques to monitor nuclear explosions,
remotely detect the early stages of a nuclear weapons program, improve detection of foreign
nuclear materials, and develop expertise in the areas of chemical and biological weapons.
Nonproliferation and International Security programs, formerly called “Arms Control,” are
concerned with international safeguards, export controls, treaties and agreements, and
nonproliferation in Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union. The last activity
includes two programs dealing with the problem of employing former Soviet nuclear
weapons experts. The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program is a cooperative
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arrangement between DOE laboratories and science and engineering institutes in Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) involves efforts to
develop commercial activities in 10 formerly secret cities in Russia where nuclear weapons
activities were carried out.
The MPC&A program is concerned with reducing the threat posed by unsecured
Russian weapons and weapons-usable material. The mission of the fissile material disposal
program is to dispose of plutonium from dismantled weapons both in the United States and
in Russia. This program is currently under review and subject to considerable controversy,
as described below in the section on Russia. The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
Transparency Implementation program, also described below, finances the agreement with
Russia to use HEU from dismantled Soviet weapons for fuel for nuclear power reactors.
The nuclear safety program has been aimed at correcting specific safety deficiencies in
Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors. With this mission largely achieved, the program
will focus on safety issues in other countries. In addition, a program to eliminate production
of plutonium in Russia was transferred from the Defense Department to DOE’s nuclear
safety program in FY2003. Three plutonium-producing reactors at two sites in Russia also
produce power for civilian consumption, and U.S. efforts have been aimed at redesigning the
plants so that any plutonium produced could remain unseparated. The program has been
redirected to replacing the plants with fossil-fueled generating capacity and shutting down
the reactors by 2006 and 2007.
Nuclear Proliferation in Specific Regions
India and Pakistan
The undeclared nuclear arms competition between India, Pakistan, and China reached
a turning point on May 11, 1998, when India announced an underground test of three nuclear
explosive devices, and followed it two days later with claims of two more. Declaring that
China, with whom India had a border war in 1962, was “encircling” India militarily, in part
by providing its bitter rival Pakistan with nuclear weapons capability and missile weaponry,
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee defended the test as necessary to correct the
“deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for
some years past.” India has refused to sign the NPT, and has been a bitter critic of what it
calls discrimination between the five weapons states and non-weapons states.
Pakistan said after the Indian tests that it was being dragged into a nuclear arms race,
and two weeks later claimed to have set off five nuclear blasts of its own. The United States
responded by imposing sanctions on both countries and by engaging in intensive diplomacy
over the next several years. (President Bush lifted all sanctions on both countries relating
to the nuclear tests, following the terrorist attacks of September 11.) Neither India nor
Pakistan has resumed testing, but relations between them have remained tense, fed by the
volatile armed confrontation in the border state of Kashmir. At the end of 2001, during a
confrontation between the two countries following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament,
the nuclear element of the conflict was cause of major alarm.
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The Middle East and Israel
The ongoing confrontation between Islamic Middle East countries and Israel has long
had a nuclear undercurrent. Israel has not signed the NPT, and has made no official
acknowledgment of a weapons program. It is widely considered to have developed nuclear
weapons capability, although it has not conducted a nuclear explosion. Israel's nuclear
program has stimulated calls for an "Islamic bomb." Among Israel's neighbors, Iraq and Iran
have been the focus of nuclear activity. Iraq, before its defeat in the Gulf War in 1991,
actively pursued nuclear weapons development, despite having signed the NPT. Iran
declares it has no nuclear weapons program, but the United States claims that it does.
Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Gone But Not Forgotten. Before the 1991
Gulf War, Iraq had an extensive covert nuclear weapons program that was built under the
guise of legitimate nuclear research and development. As a member of the NPT, Iraq had
allowed inspections of declared facilities by the IAEA, but successfully concealed the true
nature of its nuclear program. After the war, U.N. Resolution 687 established a Special
Commission and gave it authority to locate and remove Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.
The U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) conducted extensive investigations of
Iraq’s nuclear program that revealed a multi-billion dollar effort to build nuclear weapons.
UNSCOM and the IAEA then eliminated Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure and put in place a
permanent monitoring system to warn of renewed nuclear activities.
UNSCOM continued its efforts to eliminate chemical and biological weapons programs
in Iraq, with frequent crises and obstructions delaying the process. IAEA has several times
declared that the nuclear weapons program has been dismantled, and several U.N. members
have tried to get the nuclear portion of the U.N. mission declared completed, but U.S.
opposition has so far prevented that.
Iran’s Nuclear Program. Top U.S. officials have warned repeatedly that Iran has
a program to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran has reportedly attempted to purchase nuclear
materials from the former Soviet Union and nuclear equipment from many countries. The
relatively effective embargo of nuclear sales to Iran is undermined by Russia’s efforts to
complete a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, which had been started by Germany in the 1970s
under the former Shah of Iran. The revolutionary government that overthrew the Shah in
1979 abandoned the project, then unsuccessfully tried to get Germany to revive it. Russia's
MINATOM agency has contracted to finish the plant with one of its own reactor designs, but
progress has been slow.
Iran is a member of the NPT and allows inspections of its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, many observers suspect that Iran, which possesses substantial reserves of oil
and natural gas, is using its civilian nuclear program as a pretense to establish the technical
basis for a nuclear weapons option.
China
China has long been a nonproliferation concern. Until 1992 it refused to join the NPT,
even as one of the privileged five nuclear weapons states. It was widely viewed as the major
supplier of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, and also as a
supplier of aid and technology to Iran, although Chinese officials continue to deny helping
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either country's weapons program. India, in justifying its own nuclear weapons tests, cited
China's help to Pakistan as a major motive in developing nuclear weapons capability.
China gradually took steps to join the international nonproliferation community. In
1985, the United States negotiated a nuclear cooperation agreement that would facilitate the
export of U.S. nuclear power reactors to China. Congress, however, attached conditions to
the agreement, including a requirement that the President certify to Congress that China was
abiding by its nonproliferation commitments before the agreement could go into effect. The
certification was not made, largely because of evidence of China's aid to Pakistan. Finally,
during the October 1997 visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, President Clinton
announced that he would certify that China had met the requirements necessary to activate
the agreement. Among actions cited by President Clinton was a written Chinese agreement
not to participate in any new nuclear projects with Iran. The certification was submitted to
Congress on January 12, 1998. It was required to lie before Congress for 30 days of
continuous session before the agreement could take effect. Opposition to the President's
action was expressed by some Members of Congress, but the agreement went into effect in
March 1998 after the 30 days elapsed.
China's past involvement in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, and India's accusation
that it needed to test nuclear explosives because it was being "encircled" by China, made
China a major player in the nuclear escalation in Southeast Asia. In addition, China in recent
years has been expanding and modernizing its own nuclear arsenal, and has been involved
with allegations of spying on U.S. weapons technology facilities in the Department of
Energy.
North Korea’s Noncompliance with its NPT and IAEA Obligations
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but delayed inspections until 1992. In February
1993, North Korea denied access by IAEA inspectors to two sites that IAEA (and U.S.
intelligence) believed held evidence of clandestine nuclear work. In March 1993, North
Korea notified the United Nations Security Council that it was withdrawing from the NPT,
which permits withdrawal after 3 months notice. It subsequently suspended its withdrawal,
but claimed to have “unique status” under the NPT, and continued to block inspections.
Former CIA Director James Woolsey and Secretary of Defense William Perry warned that
North Korea probably had enough plutonium for two bombs and that the fuel unloaded from
the 25 MW(thermal) reactor could contain enough plutonium for several more bombs.
In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea under which
North Korea would shut down, but not dismantle, its existing reactor and reprocessing plant
(needed to extract plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel), and halt construction on other
weapons-potential facilities, in return for provision of light water reactors less suited for
producing plutonium for bombs. North Korea is also receiving shipments of heavy oil to
compensate for energy that theoretically might have been generated from the reactors it
agreed to shut down. The deal requires North Korea to eventually resolve outstanding
safeguards violations, including its undeclared plutonium, before completion of the new
reactors. An international consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) was established in March 1995 to coordinate the reactor construction
project. (For details on the North Korean nuclear situation, see CRS Issue Brief IB91141,
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program).
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Russian Nuclear Weapons and Weapons Material
Russia and the United States do not have in force an agreement for peaceful nuclear
cooperation. However, U.S. aid is being extended to Russia to help maintain safety and
safeguards of the vast nuclear arsenal inherited from the former Soviet Union. (For details
on Russia's nuclear weapons complex, see CRS Issue Brief IB98038, Nuclear Weapons in
Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues.)
Disposal of Russian nuclear materials from dismantled weapons is also a
nonproliferation issue. In February 1993 the United States and Russia agreed that highly
enriched uranium from weapons would be diluted to a low enrichment level suitable for use
in commercial nuclear power reactors, and that the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC)
would buy the uranium to supply to its customers. The arrangement has been complicated
by the July 1998 privatization of USEC, but is going forward.
Disposal of plutonium from weapons is more of a problem, since the use of plutonium
in power reactors is not widespread. Eventually the large stocks of both U.S. and Russian
weapons plutonium will have to be dealt with. The Clinton Administration proposed, as a
means of disposing of U.S. surplus weapons plutonium, a "dual track" strategy of mixing
plutonium with uranium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for commercial power reactors, and
vitrification (dissolving in glass) and disposal of the plutonium unsuited for fuel and the
resulting fission products. In July 1998 the Department of Energy issued a draft
Environmental Impact Statement on the program. An agreement with Russia signed in
September 2000 set up a similar program for Russian plutonium disposal.
However, in submitting its FY2003 budget request, DOE declared that it was
eliminating the immobilization part of the two-track program for U.S. plutonium and instead
would add an “enhanced purification” stage to the MOX fuel fabrication facility so that most
of the plutonium originally destined for immobilization would instead be consumed as MOX
fuel. The original plan called for 27.6 metric tons (MT) of plutonium to be converted to
MOX and 8.4 MT of impure plutonium to be immobilized. The revision would purify 6.4
MT and convert it to MOX, and send the remaining 2.0 MT highly impure plutonium directly
to a waste disposal site.
The plan to use weapons plutonium as fuel for nuclear power reactors has raised
opposition from some nonproliferation interest groups, who argue that immobilization and
disposal is safer and less expensive than the MOX fuel option. The Russian MOX option
is particularly troubled, because Russia does not have enough power reactors in which MOX
can be used to dispose of significant amounts of plutonium, and has been asking for help to
build new ones or to use the MOX in reactors in Germany or other countries, as well as aid
in constructing a MOX fuel conversion facility. Further, Russia has declared that its ultimate
goal is to recycle plutonium from commercial power reactors, raising concerns that aiding
the disposal of weapons plutonium would encourage Russia to develop a “plutonium
economy” in its power industry.
There is less concern about the security of U.S. weapons plutonium, but efforts to
dispose of it also have run into difficulties. As part of the U.S. program, construction of a
plant to convert plutonium into MOX fuel was planned for DOE’s Savannah River Site
(SRS) in South Carolina. The plutonium is currently stored in several DOE sites, including
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the former plutonium processing facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado. DOE has agreed with
Colorado authorities to close the Rocky Flats facility by 2006, and as part of the process of
cleaning up the site has proposed starting to ship the plutonium located there to a temporary
storage facility at SRS. However, South Carolina Governor Jim Hodges has objected to
bringing the plutonium to SRS without an “ironclad” commitment for operating and funding
the MOX facility, on the grounds that without it there was a risk that the unprocessed
plutonium would be stored indefinitely in South Carolina.
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