Order Code RL30153
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy,
and Implementation
Updated July 18, 2002
John D. Moteff
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Critical Infrastructures:
Background, Policy and Implementation
Summary
The nation’s health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution
of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, processes and
organizations across which these goods and services move are called critical
infrastructures (e.g. electricity, the power plants that generate it, and the electric grid
upon which it is distributed). Computers and communications, themselves critical
infrastructures, are increasingly tying these infrastructures together. There has been
growing concern that this reliance on computers and computer networks raises the
vulnerability of the nation’s critical infrastructures to “cyber” attacks.
In May 1998, President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive No. 63.
The Directive set up groups within the federal government to develop and implement
plans that would protect government-operated infrastructures and called for a
dialogue between government and the private sector to develop a National
Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would protect all of the nation’s critical
infrastructures by the year 2003. While the Directive called for both physical and
cyber protection from both man-made and natural events, implementation focused
on cyber protection against man-made cyber events (i.e. computer hackers). Those
advocating the need for greater cyber security felt that this was a new vulnerability
not fully appreciated by system owners and operators in either the private or public
sectors. However, given the impact of the September 11 attacks on the
communications, finance, and transportation infrastructures, physical protections of
critical infrastructures is receiving greater attention.
PDD-63 was a Clinton Administration policy document. Following the events
of September 11, the Bush Administration released two relevant Executive Orders
(EOs). EO 13228, signed October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland
Security. Among its duties, the Office shall “coordinate efforts to protect the United
States and its critical infrastructure from the consequences of terrorist attacks.” EO
13231 (Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age), signed October 16,
stated the Bush Administration’s policy and objectives for protecting the nation’s
information infrastructure. These are similar to those stated in PDD-63 and assumes
continuation of many PDD-63 activities. E.O. 13231, however, focuses entirely on
information systems. E.O. 13231 also established the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. The mission of the Board is to “recommend and
coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructures.”
On June 6, 2002, President Bush, along the lines of congressional efforts to do the
same, proposed the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security. The
Department would assume and integrate offices and agencies from other departments
responsible for implementing various aspects of homeland security. The President’s
proposal identified four primary areas of responsibility that he suggested should
constitute major divisions within the new Department. One of these would be
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. The Boards, Councils, and
advisors established in the above mentioned E.O.s remain in effect.

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Contents
Latest Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . 3
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Implementation of PDD-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Selection of Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators . . . 8
Identifying and Selecting Sector Coordinators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council . . . . . 10
Selection of Agency CIAOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Internal Agency Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
National Critical Infrastructure Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Restructuring by the Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Pre-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Post-September 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Roles and Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Privacy/Civil Liberties? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Congressional Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
List of Tables
Table 1. Lead Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Lead Agencies as Proposed in the National Strategy for Homeland Defense
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. Sector Coordinators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table A.1. National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

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Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy,
and Implementation
Latest Developments
One June 6, President Bush announced that the Administration would propose
the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security. On June 18, the
Administration presented establishing legislation. It is beyond the scope of this
report to track the developments and issues associated with this proposal in total.
However, the President’s proposal does seek to establish, within the new Department,
a division for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Issues and
developments regarding this element of the proposal (i.e. Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection) and how it complements or supersedes existing activities
in these two areas, are discussed in this report (see Section on Department of
Homeland Security).
On July 16, 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released a National Strategy
for Homeland Security. The draft legislation above captured much of the activities
and responsibilities assigned to the Department of Homeland Security by the
National Strategy. However, the National Strategy elaborates further on some of
those responsibilities and introduces a few more. Information contained in the
National Strategy that is relevant to the discussions in the report is incorporated in
the appropriate sections.
The House Select Committee on Homeland Security is about to mark up its
version (H.R. 5005) of the President’s proposal, after having received input from a
number of the permanent committees. The Senate Government Affairs Committee,
too, is about to mark up a version of S. 2452. (See Congressional Actions).
Introduction
Certain socio-economic activities are vital to the day-to-day functioning and
security of the country; for example, transportation of goods and people,
communications, banking and finance, and the supply and distribution of electricity
and water. These activities and services have been referred to as components of the
nation’s critical infrastructure. Domestic security and our ability to monitor, deter,
and respond to outside hostile acts also depend on some of these activities as well as
other more specialized activities like intelligence gathering and command and control
of police and military forces. A serious disruption in these activities and capabilities
could have a major impact on the country’s well-being.1
1 As a reminder of how dependent society is on its infrastructure, in May 1998, PanAmSat’s
(continued...)

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CRS-2
These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets,
processes, information, and organizations forming what has been called the nation’s
critical infrastructures. The country’s critical infrastructures are growing increasingly
complex, relying on computers and, now, computer networks to operate efficiently
and reliably. The growing complexity, and the interconnectedness resulting from
networking, means that a disruption in one may lead to disruptions in others.
Disruptions can be caused by any number of factors: poor design, operator error,
physical destruction due to natural causes, (earthquakes, lightening strikes, etc.) or
physical destruction due to intentional human actions (theft, arson, terrorist attack,
etc.). Over the years, operators of these infrastructures have taken measures to guard
against and to quickly respond to many of these risks.2 However, the growing
dependency of these systems on information technologies and computer networks
introduces a new vector by which problems can be introduced.3
Of particular concern is the threat posed by “hackers” who can gain
unauthorized access to a system and who could destroy, corrupt, steal, or monitor
information vital to the operation of the system. Unlike someone setting off a bomb,
hackers can gain access to a critical site from a remote location4. The ability to detect
and deter their actions is still being developed. While infrastructure operators are
also taking measures to guard against and respond to cyber attacks, there is concern
that the number of “on-line” operations is growing faster than security awareness and
the use of sound security measures.
Hackers range from mischievous teenagers, to disgruntled employees, to
criminals, to spies, to foreign military organizations. While the more commonly
reported incidents involve mischievous teenagers (or adults), self-proclaimed
“electronic anarchists”, or disgruntled (former) employees, the primary concern are
criminals, spies, military personnel, or terrorists from around the world who appear
to be perfecting their hacking skills and who may pose a potential strategic threat to
the reliable operations of our critical infrastructures.5
1 (...continued)
Galaxy IV satellite’s on-board controller malfunctioned, disrupting service to an estimated
80-90% of the nation’s pagers, causing problems for hospitals trying to reach doctors on
call, emergency workers, and people trying to use their credit cards at gas pumps, to name
but a few.
2 Following September 11, these protections will undoubtedly be reexamined.
3 Efforts to integrate the computer systems of Norfolk Southern and Conrail after their
merger in June, 1999 caused a series of mishaps leaving trains misrouted, crews
misscheduled, and products lost. See, “Merged Railroads Still Plagued by IT Snafus,”
Computerworld, January 17, 2000,pp 20-21.
4 See, Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared, Washington Post. Thursday June 27, 2002
ppA1,A10. Among the topics discussed in the article, is a man in Australia who was able
to remotely gain access to the digital control system of a sewage treatment plant to cause
raw sewage to leak into the surrounding environment.
5 The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency testified before the Senate Committee on
(continued...)

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CRS-3
Prior to September 11, critical infrastructure protection was synonymous with
cyber security to many people. Recent policies, and implementation of those
policies, also focused on cyber security. Consequently, much of this report discusses
cyber related activities and issues. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11,
and the subsequent anthrax attacks, demonstrated the need to reexamine physical
protections and to integrate physical protections into an overall critical infrastructure
policy.6 To the extent this happens, this report will capture it. However, specific
protections, physical or cyber, associated with individual infrastructures is beyond
the scope of this report. For CRS products related to specific infrastructure
protection efforts, see For Additional Reading.
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection
This report takes as its starting point the establishment of the President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) in July 1996.7 Its tasks
were to: report to the President the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats
to the nation’s critical infrastructures (focusing primarily on cyber threats);
recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation plan for protecting
critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals to
increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect
recommendations.
The PCCIP released its report to President Clinton in October 1997.8
Examining both the physical and cyber vulnerabilities, the Commission found no
immediate crisis threatening the nation’s infrastructures. However, it did find reason
to take action, especially in the area of cyber security. The rapid growth of a
computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of potential hackers), the
inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the easy
availability of hacker “tools” (available on many websites), and the fact that the basic
tools of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) are the same essential
technologies used by the general population indicated to the Commission that both
the threat and vulnerability exist.
5 (...continued)
Governmental Affairs (June 24, 1998) that a number of countries are incorporating
information warfare into their military doctrine and training and developing operational
capability. It should be noted that the U.S. military is probably the leader in developing
both offensive and defensive computer warfare techniques and doctrine.
6 Besides loss of life, the terrorist attacks of September 11 disrupted the services of a number
of critical infrastructures (including telecommunications, the internet, financial markets, and
air transportation). In some cases, protections already in place (like off-site storage of data,
mirror capacity, etc.) allowed for relatively quick reconstitution of services. In other cases,
service was disrupted for much longer periods of time.
7 Executive Order 13010.Critical Infrastructure Protection. Federal Register. Vol 61. No.
138. July 17, 1996. pp. 3747-3750.
8 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations:
Protecting America’s Infrastructures, October 1997.

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CRS-4
The Commission’s general recommendation was that greater cooperation and
communication between the private sector and government was needed. Much of the
nation’s critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector. As seen
by the Commission, the government’s primary role (aside from protecting its own
infrastructures) is to collect and disseminate the latest information on intrusion
techniques, threat analysis, and ways to defend against hackers.
The Commission also proposed a strategy for action:
•
facilitate greater cooperation and communication between the private
sector and appropriate government agencies by: setting a top level policy-
making office in the White House; establishing a council that includes
corporate executives, state and local government officials, and cabinet
secretaries; and setting up information clearinghouses;
•
develop a real-time capability of attack warning;
•
establish and promote a comprehensive awareness and education program;
•
streamline and clarify elements of the legal structure to support assurance
measures (including clearing jurisdictional barriers to pursuing hackers
electronically); and,
•
expand research and development in technologies and techniques,
especially technologies that allow for greater detection of intrusions.
The Commission’s report underwent interagency review to determine how to
respond. That review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998.
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63)9 set as a national goal the
ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both
physical and cyber) by the year 2003. According to the PDD, any interruptions in the
ability of these infrastructures to provide their goods and services must be “brief,
infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally detrimental to the
welfare of the United States.”10
PDD-63 identified the following activities whose critical infrastructures should
be protected: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply;
aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce;
emergency and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of
government services; public health services; electric power, oil and gas production,
and storage.11 In addition, the PDD identified four activities where the federal
9 See, The Clinton’s Administration’s Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63, White Paper, May 22, 1998, which can be found on
[http://www.ciao.gov/ciao_document_library/paper598.html].
10 Ibid.
11 The National Strategy on Homeland Security has expanded the list of critical
infrastructures identified.

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CRS-5
government controls the critical infrastructure: internal security and federal law
enforcement; foreign intelligence; foreign affairs; and national defense.
A lead agency was assigned to each of these “sectors” (see Table 1). Each lead
agency was directed to appoint a Sector Liaison Official to interact with appropriate
private sector organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a Sector
Coordinator to work with the agency’s sector liaison official. Together, the liaison
official, sector coordinator, and all affected parties were to contribute to a sectoral
security plan which will be integrated into a National Infrastructure Assurance
Plan (see Table 3 below). Each of the activities performed primarily by the federal
government also were assigned a lead agency who will appoint a Functional
Coordinator to coordinate efforts similar to those made by the Sector Liaisons.
Table 1. Lead Agencies
Department/Agency
Sector/Function
Commerce
Information and Communications
Treasury
Banking and Finance
EPA
Water
Transportation
Transportation
Justice
Emergency Law Enforcement
Federal Emergency Management
Emergency Fire Service
Agency
Health and Human Services
Emergency Medicine
Energy
Electric Power, Gas, and Oil
Justice
Law Enforcement and International
Security
Director of Central Intelligence
Intelligence
State
Foreign Affairs
Defense
National Defense
The PDD created the position of National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism. The National Coordinator reported
to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.12
Among his many duties the National Coordinator chaired the Critical
Infrastructure Coordination Group. This Group was the primary interagency
working group for developing and implementing policy and for coordinating the
federal government’s own internal security measures. The Group included high level
12 President Clinton designated Richard Clarke (Special Assistant to the President for Global
Affairs, National Security Council) as National Coordinator.

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CRS-6
representatives from the lead agencies (including the Sector Liaisons), the National
Economic Council, and all other relevant agencies.
Each federal agency was made responsible for securing its own critical
infrastructure and was to designate a Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officer
(CIAO) to assume that responsibility. The agency’s current Chief Information
Officer (CIO) could double in that capacity. In those cases where the CIO and the
CIAO were different, the CIO was responsible for assuring the agency’s information
assets (databases, software, computers), while the CIAO was responsible for any
other assets that make up that agency’s critical infrastructure. Agencies were given
180 days from the signing of the Directive to develop their plans. Those plans were
to be fully implemented within 2 years and updated every 2 years.
The PDD set up a National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The Council
was to be a panel that included private operators of infrastructure assets and officials
from state and local government officials and relevant federal agencies. The Council
was to meet periodically and provide reports to the President as appropriate. The
National Coordinator was to act as the Executive Director of the Council.
The PDD also called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. The Plan
is to integrate the plans from each of the sectors mentioned above and should
consider the following: a vulnerability assessment, including the minimum essential
capability required of the sector’s infrastructure to meet its purpose; remedial plans
to reduce the sector’s vulnerability; warning requirements and procedures; response
strategies; reconstitution of services; education and awareness programs; research
and development needs; intelligence strategies; needs and opportunities for
international cooperation; and legislative and budgetary requirements.
The PDD also set up a National Plan Coordination Staff to support the plan’s
development. Subsequently, the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO,
not to be confused with the agencies’ Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officers) was
established to serve this function and was placed in the Department of Commerce’s
Export Administration. CIAO supports the National Coordinator’s efforts to
integrate the sectoral plans into a National Plan, supports individual agencies in
developing their internal plans, helps coordinate a national education and awareness
programs, and provides legislative and public affairs support.
In addition to the above activities, the PDD called for studies on specific topics.
These included issues of: liability that might arise from private firms participating in
an information sharing process; legal impediments to information sharing;
classification of information and granting of clearances (efforts to share threat and
vulnerability information with private sector CEOs has been hampered by the need
to convey that information in a classified manner); information sharing with foreign
entities; and the merits of mandating, subsidizing or otherwise assisting in the
provision of insurance for selected infrastructure providers.
Most of the Directive established policy-making and oversight bodies making
use of existing agency authorities and expertise. However, the PDD also addressed
operational concerns. The Directive called for a national capability to detect and
respond to cyber attacks while they are in progress. Although not specifically

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CRS-7
identified in the Directive, the Clinton Administration proposed establishing a
Federal Instruction Detection Network (FIDNET) that would, together with the
Federal Computer Intrusion Response Capability (FedCIRC) begun just prior
to PDD-63, meet this goal. The Directive explicitly gave the Federal Bureau of
Investigation the authority to expand its existing computer crime capabilities into a
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The Directive called for the
NIPC to be the focal point for federal threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, early
warning capability, law enforcement investigations, and response coordination. All
agencies were required to forward to the NIPC information about threats and actual
attacks on their infrastructure as well as attacks made on private sector infrastructures
of which they become aware. Presumably, FIDNET13 and FedCIRC would feed into
the NIPC. According to the Directive, the NIPC would be linked electronically to the
rest of the federal government and use warning and response expertise located
throughout the federal government.. The Directive also made the NIPC the conduit
for information sharing with the private sector through equivalent Information
Sharing and Analysis Center(s) operated by the private sector.
While the FBI was given the lead, the NIPC also includes the Department of
Defense, the Intelligence Community, and a representative from all lead agencies.
Depending on the level of threat or the character of the intrusion, the NIPC may be
placed in direct support of either the Department of Defense or the Intelligence
Community.
13 From the beginning FIDNET generated controversy both inside and outside the
government. Privacy concerns, cost and technical feasibility were at issue. By the end of
the Clinton Administration, FIDNET as a distributed intrusion detection system feeding into
a centralized analysis and warning capability was abandoned. Each agency, however, is
allowed and encouraged to use intrusion detection technology to monitor and secure their
own systems.

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CRS-8
Implementation of PDD-63
Selection of Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security appears to maintain the role of lead
agencies as outlined in PDD-63, with the new Department acting as coordinator of
their efforts. However, the Strategy does shift liaison responsibilities for some
sectors to the new Department, and there remains some discussion about how many
sectors for which the new Department would be the primary liaison.14 The liaison
responsibilities outlined in the National Strategy are noted in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Lead Agencies as Proposed in the National Strategy for
Homeland Defense
Department/Agency (PDD-63 liaison)
Sector/Function
Agriculture
Agriculture
Food
Agriculture
Meat/Poultry
Health and Human Services
All other
Homeland Security (Commerce)
Information and Communications
Treasury
Banking and Finance
EPA
Water
Homeland Security (Transportation)
Transportation
Homeland Security (Federal Emergency
Emergency Services
Management Agency, Justice, Health and
Human Services)
Health and Human Services
Public Health
Government
Homeland Security
Continuity of Government
Individual departments and agencies
Continuity of Operations
Energy
Electric Power, Gas, and Oil
Environmental Protection Agency
Chemical Industry and Hazardous
Materials
Defense
Defense Industrial Base
Homeland Defense
Postal and Shipping
Interior
National Monuments and Icons
14 See, Ridge Says EPA Should Lose Authority to Evaluate Vulnerability of Industrial
Facilities, Inside EPA, June 25, 2002.

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CRS-9
Identifying and Selecting Sector Coordinators. The identification of
sector coordinators has proceeded with mixed results. Table 3 below shows those
individuals or groups that have agreed to act as Coordinators.
Different sectors present different challenges to identifying a coordinator. Some
sectors are more diverse than others (e.g. transportation includes rail, air, waterways,
and highways; information and communications include computers, software, wire
and wireless communications) and raises the issue of how to have all the relevant
players represented. Other sectors are fragmented, consisting of small or local
entities. Some sectors, such as banking, telecommunications, and energy have more
experience than others in working with the federal government and/or working
collectively to assure the performance of their systems.
Besides such structural issues are ones related to competition. Inherent in the
exercise is asking competitors to cooperate. In some cases it is asking competing
industries to cooperate. This cooperation not only raises issues of trust among firms,
but also concerns regarding anti-trust rules. Also, having these groups in direct
communications with the federal government raises questions about their relationship
to the federal government as governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
USC Appendix) and how the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552) applies to
them and the information that may be exchanged.
Sector coordinators have been identified for most of the major privately
operated sectors: banking and finance, energy, information and communications. In
the public sector, EPA early on identified the Association of Metropolitan Water
Agency as sector coordinator. In the area of transportation, the Association of
American Railroads has been identified as the coordinator for the rail sector. The
Department of Transportation would like to also find coordinators for air and water
transportation. FEMA has not identified a single coordinator to represent the
country’s emergency fire service providers. However, through the U.S. Fire
Administration, a component of FEMA, they have an established communication
network with the nation’s fire associations, the 50 State Fire Marshals, and other law
enforcement groups. FEMA is also responsible for continuity of government.
Again, no single coordinator has been identified, but FEMA had discussed continuity
of government issues with state and local governments in the context of the Y2K.15
Nor has the Department of Health and Human Services identified a central
coordinator for the emergency medical community. The Department of Justice,
through the NIPC, has helped to create the Emergency Law Enforcement Services
(ELES) Forum. The Forum is a group of senior law enforcement executives from
state, local, and non-FBI federal agencies.
15 The New Mexico Critical Infrastructure Assurance Council, an offshoot of the FBI’s
InfraGard efforts in the state, include the state government and other state and local
agencies. The Council is referenced in the National Plan for Information Systems
Protection. See, National Critical Infrastructure Plan, below.

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CRS-10
Table 3. Sector Coordinators
Lead Agency
Identified Sector Coordinators
Commerce
A consortium of 3 associations:
Information Technology Assn. of
America; Telecommunications
Industry Assn.; U.S. Telephone Assn.
Treasury
Rhonda McLane - BankAmerica
EPA
Assn. of Metropolitan Water Agencies
Energy
North American Electric Reliability
Council and National Petroleum
Council
Transportation
Association of American Railroads
International Airport Councils of
North America (inactive)
Health and Human Services
FEMA
U.S. Fire Administration
Justice
Emergency Law Enforcement
Services Forum
Appointment of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The
Clinton Administration released an Executive Order (13130) in July, 1999, formally
establishing the council. Just prior to leaving office, President Clinton put forward
the names of 18 appointees.16 The Order was rescinded by the Bush Administration
before the Council could meet. In Executive Order 1323117, President Bush
establishes a National Infrastructure Advisory Council (with the same acronym,
NIAC) whose functions are similar to those of the Clinton Council.
Selection of Agency CIAOs. All agencies made permanent or acting CIAO
appointments.
Internal Agency Plans. There has been some confusion about which
agencies were required to submit critical infrastructure plans. The PDD-63 directs
every agency to develop and implement such a plan. A subsequent Informational
Seminar on PDD-63 held on October 13, 1998 identified two tiers of agencies. The
first tier included lead agencies and other “primary” agencies like the Central
16 White House Press Release, dated January 18, 2000.
17 Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal
Register. Vol. 66. No. 202. October 18, 2001. pp53063-53071. The NIAC is established on
page 53069.

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CRS-11
Intelligence Agency and Veteran’s Affairs. These agencies were held to the 180 day
deadline. A second tier of agencies were identified by the National Coordinator and
required to submit plans by the end of February, 1999. The “secondary” agencies
were Agriculture, Education, Housing and Urban Development, Labor, Interior,
General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. All of these “primary” and “secondary”
agencies met their initial deadlines for submitting their internal plans for protecting
their own critical infrastructures from attacks and for responding to intrusions. The
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office assembled an expert team to review the
plans. The plans were assessed in 12 areas including schedule/milestone planning,
resource requirements, and knowledge of existing authorities and guidance. The
assessment team handed back the initial plans with comments. Agencies were given
90 days to respond to these comments. Of the 22 “primary” and “secondary”
agencies that submitted plans, 16 modified and resubmitted them in response to first
round comments.
Initially the process of reviewing these agency plans was to continue until all
concerns were addressed. Over the summer of 1999, however, review efforts slowed
and subsequent reviews were put on hold as the efficacy of the reviews was debated.
Some within the CIAO felt that the plans were too general and lacked a clear
understanding of what constituted a “critical asset” and the interdependencies of
those assets. As a result of that internal debate, the CIAO redirected its resources to
institute a new program called Project Matrix. Project Matrix is a three step process
by which an agency can identify and assess its most critical assets, identify the
dependencies of those assets on other systems, including those beyond the direct
control of the agency, and prioritize. CIAO has offered this analysis to 14 agencies,
including some not designated as “primary” or “secondary” agencies, such as the
Social Security Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Participation by the agencies has been voluntary.
In the meantime, other agencies (i.e. those not designated as primary and
secondary) apparently did not develop critical infrastructure plans. In a much later
report by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (dated March 21, 2001),
the Council, which was charged with reviewing agencies’ implementation of PDD-
63, stated that there was a misunderstanding as to the applicability of PDD-63 to all
agencies. The Council asserted that all agencies were required to develop a critical
infrastructure plan and that many had not, because they felt they were no covered by
the Directive. Also, the Council found that of the agency plans that had been
submitted, many were incomplete, had not identified their mission-critical assets, and
that almost none had completed vulnerability assessments.
According to the National Plan released in January 2000 (see below), all “Phase
One” and “Phase Two” agencies (presumably this refers to the “primary” and
“secondary” agencies mentioned above) were to have completed preliminary
vulnerability analyses and to have outlined proposed remedial actions. Again,
according to the National Plan, those remedial actions were to be budgeted for and
submitted as part of the agencies’ FY2001 budgets submissions to the Office of
Management and Budget and every year thereafter. However, given the discussion
above, the comprehensiveness of these studies and plans are in question.

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CRS-12
Neither of the Bush Administration executive orders make reference to these
critical infrastructure protection plans of the agencies.
National Critical Infrastructure Plan. The Clinton Administration, after
some delay, released Version 1.0 of a National Plan for Information Systems
Protection in January 2000.18 The Plan focused primarily on cyber-related efforts
within the federal government. A note in the Executive Summary states that a
parallel Critical Physical Infrastructure Protection Plan was to be developed and
possibly incorporated in Version 2.0, or later versions.19 Version 2.0 of the National
Plan was to cover the private sector. The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure
Protection (see below) has been coordinating the private sector’s input to this next
edition.
Version 1.0 was divided between government-wide efforts and those unique to
the national security community. The Plan (159 pages) will not be summarized here
in any detail. See Appendix for a brief synopsis.
The number of National Plans seem to be proliferating. The Bush
Administration, through the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board (see
Bush Restructuring: Post-September 11 later in this report) has been working on
a National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. This, perhaps, represents Version 2.0 of
the Clinton-released Plan. The Office of Homeland Security (see Bush
Restructuring: Post-September 11 later in this report) just released a National
Strategy for Homeland Security. Both the National Strategy on Homeland Security
and the draft legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security also call for
a comprehensive national plan to provide both physical and cyber security for the
nation’s critical infrastructures. Perhaps this is what was originally envisioned by
PDD-63.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). PDD-63 envisaged
an ISAC to be the private sector counterpart to the FBI’s National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC), collecting and sharing incident and response information
among its members and facilitating information exchange between government and
the private sector. While the Directive conceived of a single center serving the entire
private sector, the idea now is that each sector would have its own center. Progress
in forming sector ISACs has been mixed.
A number of the nation’s largest banks, securities firms, insurance companies
and investment companies have joined together in a limited liability corporation to
form a banking and finance industry ISAC. The group has contracted with an
internet service provider20 (ISP) to design and operate the ISAC. Individual firms
feed raw computer network traffic data to the ISAC. The ISP maintains a database
18 Defending America’s Cyberspace. National Plan for Information Systems Protection.
Version 1.0. An Invitation to a Dialogue. The White House. 2000.
19 Ibid. Executive Summary. p. 13.
20 The ISP is Global Integrity, a subsidiary of Science Applications International Corp.
(SAIC).

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CRS-13
of network traffic and analyzes it for suspicious behavior and provides its customers
with summary reports. If suspicious behavior is detected, the analysis may be
forwarded to the federal government. Anonymity is maintained between participants
and outside the ISAC. The ISP will forward to its customers alerts and other
information provided by the federal government. The ISAC became operational in
October, 1999.
The telecommunications industry has agreed to establish an ISAC through the
National Coordinating Center (NCC). The NCC is a government-industry
partnership that coordinates responses to disruptions in the National Communications
System. Unlike the banking and finance ISAC that uses a third party for centralized
monitoring and analysis, each member firm of the NCC will monitor and analyze its
own networks. If a firm suspects its network(s) have been breached, it will discuss
the incident(s) within the NCC’s normal forum. The NCC members will decide
whether the suspected behavior is serious enough to report to the appropriate federal
authorities. Anonymity will be maintained outside the NCC. Any communication
between federal authorities and member firms will take place through the NCC, this
includes incident response and requests for additional information21.
The electric power sector, too, has established a decentralized ISAC through its
North American Electricity Reliability Council (NAERC). Much like the NCC,
NAERC already monitors and coordinates responses to disruptions in the nation’s
supply of electricity. It is in this forum that information security issues and incidents
will be shared. The National Petroleum Council is still considering setting up an
ISAC with its members.
In January, 2001, the information technology industry announced its plans to
form an ISAC. Members include 19 major hardware, software, and e-commerce
firms, including AT&T, IBM, Cisco, Microsoft, Intel, and Oracle. The ISAC will be
overseen by a board made up of members and operated by Internet Security Systems.

The country’s water authorities intend to develop an appropriate ISAC model
for their sector.
Much like the communications and the electric power sectors, the emergency
fire services sector ISAC will be integrated into the responsibilities of an existing
organizational body; FEMA’s U.S. Fire Administration, headquartered in
Emmitsburg, MD. The ISAC will staffed by leading fire experts who will assess
NIPC threat intelligence and help prepare warnings for distribution to the nation’s
fire fighting community. In turn, local fire departments, as first responders in many
instances, can provide information through the U.S. Fire Administration that may be
helpful to NIPC in its intelligence analysis function.

In addition to these individual sectors setting up or contemplating ISACs, the
private sector has formed a Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security to
21 Federal agencies sit on the NCC, including the NSA. One could assume that knowledge
of incidents discussed in the NCC could find its way to federal investigatory authorities
without formally being reported.

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CRS-14
share information and strategies and to identify interdependencies across sectoral
lines. The Partnership is a private sector initiative and has filed as a 501(c)(6)
organization. A preliminary meeting was held in December 1999 and five working
groups were established (Interdependencies/Vulnerability Assessment, Cross-Sector
Information Sharing, Legislation and Policy, Research and Development, and
Organization). The working groups meet every other month. The federal
government is not officially part of the Partnership, but the CIAO acts as a liaison
and has provided administrative support for meetings. Sector Liaison from lead
agencies are considered ex officio members. Some entities not yet part of their own
industry group (e.g. some hospitals and pharmaceutical firms) or not specifically
designated as belonging to a critical infrastructure (the chemical industry) are
participating in the Partnership.
Also, besides the efforts of the lead agencies to assist their sectors in considering
ISACs, the NIPC offers private sector firms from across all industries a program
called INFRAGARD. The program includes an Alert Network. Participants in the
program agree to supply the FBI with two reports when they suspect an intrusion of
their systems has occurred. One report is “sanitized” of sensitive information and the
other provides more detailed description of the intrusion. The FBI will help the
participant respond to the intrusion. In addition, all participants are sent periodic
updates on what is known about recent intrusion techniques. The NIPC is working
to set up local INFRAGARD chapters that can work with each other and regional FBI
field offices. In January, 2001, the FBI announced it had finished establishing
INFRAGARD chapters in each of its 56 field offices.
It should also be noted that the FBI has had since the 1980s a program called the
Key Assets Initiative (KAI). The objective of the KAI is to develop a database of
information on “key assets” within the jurisdiction of each FBI field office, establish
lines of communications with asset owners and operators to improve physical and
cyber protection, and to coordinate with other federal, state, and local authorities to
ensure their involvement in the protection of those assets. The program was initially
begun to allow for contingency planning against physical terrorist attacks. According
to testimony by a former Director of the NIPC, the program was “reinvigorated” by
the NIPC and expanded to included the cyber dimension.22
22 Testimony by Michael Vatis before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Technology and Terrorism. Oct. 6, 1999. The above mentioned Washington Post article
(Cyber Acts by Al Qaeda Feared, Thursday June 27, 2002) quotes an spokesman for the
electric utility industry as suggesting that industry is reluctant to share that information out
of concern that it will not be kept confidential.

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CRS-15
Restructuring by the Bush Administration
Pre-September 11.
As part of its overall redesign of White House organization and assignment of
responsibilities, the in-coming Bush Administration spent the first 8 months
reviewing its options for coordinating and overseeing critical infrastructure
protection. During this time, the Bush Administration continued to support the
activities begun by the Clinton Administration.
The Bush Administration review was influenced by three parallel debates. First,
the National Security Council (NSC) underwent a major streamlining. All groups
within the Council established during previous Administrations were abolished.
Their responsibilities and functions were consolidated into 17 Policy Coordination
Committees (PCCs). The activities associated with critical infrastructure protection
were assumed by the Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness PCC. At the
time, whether, or to what extent, the NSC should remain the focal point for
coordinating critical infrastructure protection (i.e. the National Coordinator came
from the NSC) was unclear. Richard Clarke, himself, wrote a memorandum to the
incoming Bush Administration that the function should be transferred directly to the
White House.23
Second, there was a continuing debate about the merits of establishing a
government-wide Chief Information Officer (CIO), whose responsibilities would
include protection of all federal non-national security-related computer systems and
coordination with the private sector on the protection of privately owned computer
systems. The Bush Administration announced mid-year its desire not to create a
separate federal CIO position, but to recruit a Deputy Director of the Office of
Management and Budget that would assume an oversight role of agency CIOs. One
of reason’s cited for this was a desire to keep agencies responsible for their own
computer security.24
Third, there was the continuing debate about how best to defend the country
against terrorism, in general. Some include in the terrorist threat cyber attacks on
critical infrastructure. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the
Hart-Rudman Commission) proposed a new National Homeland Security Agency.
The recommendation built upon the current Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) by adding to it the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, Customs Service, and
other agencies. The Commission recommended that the new organization include
a directorate responsible for critical infrastructure protection. While both the Clinton
and Bush Administration remained cool to this idea, bills were introduced in
Congress to establish such an agency.
23 Senior NSC Official Pitches Cyber-Security Czar Concept in Memo to Rice. Inside the
Pentagon. January 11, 2001. p 2-3.
24 For a discussion of this and the status of federal CIO legislation, see CRS Report
RL30914, Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO): Opportunities and Challenges, by
Jeffery Siefert.

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CRS-16
Post-September 11.
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks President Bush signed two
Executive Orders relevant to critical infrastructure protection. E.O. 13228, signed
October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland Security, headed by the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.25 Its mission is to “develop and
coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the
United States from terrorist threats and attacks.” Among its functions is the
coordination of efforts to protect the United States and its critical infrastructure from
the consequences of terrorist attacks. This includes strengthening measures for
protecting energy production, transmission, and distribution; telecommunications;
public and privately owned information systems; transportation systems; and, the
provision of food and water for human use. Another function of the Office is to
coordinate efforts to ensure rapid restoration of these critical infrastructures after a
disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.
Finally, the EO also established the Homeland Security Council. The Council,
made up of the President, Vice-President, Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health
and Human Services, and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Directors of
FEMA, FBI, and CIA and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security.
Other White House and departmental officials could be invited to attend Council
meetings.26 The Council advises and assists the President with respect to all aspects
of homeland security. The agenda for those meetings shall be set by the Assistant to
President for Homeland Security, at the direction of the President. The Assistant is
also the official recorder of Council actions and Presidential decisions.
The second Executive Order (E.O. 13231) signed October 16, 2001, stated that
it is U.S. policy “to protect against the disruption of the operation of information
systems for critical infrastructure...and to ensure that any disruptions that occur are
infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least damage
possible.”27 This Order also established the President’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board. The Board’s responsibility is to “recommend policies and
coordinate programs for protecting information systems for critical infrastructure...”
The Order also established a number of standing committees of the Board that
includes Research and Development (chaired by a designee of the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology), Incident Response (chaired by the designees of
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense), and Physical Security (also
chaired by designees of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense). The
Board is directed to propose a National Plan (i.e. the National Plan to Secure
Cyberspace, mentioned above) on issues within its purview on a periodic basis, and,
in coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, review and make
25 President Bush selected Tom Ridge to head the new Office.
26 For more information on the structure of the Homeland Security Council and the Office
of Homeland Security, see CRS Report RL31148. Homeland Security: The Presidential
Coordination Office, by Harold Relyea.
27 Executive Order 13231—Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age. Federal
Register. Vol. 86. No. 202. Oct. 18, 2001.

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CRS-17
recommendations on that part of agency budgets that fall within the purview of the
Board.
The Board is to be chaired by a Special Advisor to the President for
Cyberspace Security.28 The Special Advisor reports to both the Assistant to the
President for National Security and the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security. Besides presiding over Board meetings, the Special Advisor may, in
consultation with the Board, propose policies and programs to appropriate officials
to ensure protection of the nation’s information infrastructure and may coordinate
with the Director of OMB on issues relating to budgets and the security of computer
networks.
Finally, the Order also established the National Infrastructure Advisory
Council. The Council is to provide advice to the President on the security of
information systems for critical infrastructure. The Council’s functions include
enhancing public-private partnerships, monitoring the development of ISACs, and
encouraging the private sector to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of
critical information and telecommunication systems.
In many respects, the Bush Administration policy statements regarding critical
infrastructure protection are a continuation of PDD-63. The fundamental policy
statements are the essentially the same: the protection of infrastructures critical to the
people, economy, essential government services, and national security. Also, the
goal of the government’s efforts are to ensure that any disruption of the services
provided by these infrastructures be infrequent, of minimal duration, and
manageable. The infrastructures identified as critical are essentially the same. There
is to be an interagency group (the Homeland Security Council and the President’s
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board in EO 13228 and 13231, respectively,
replaces the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group of PDD-63) to develop
policies and coordinate activities. Functional areas of concern are similar (i.e.
research and development, response coordination, intelligence, etc.). The President
shall be advised by a Council made up of private sector executives, academics, and
State and local officials. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO) and
the National Infrastructure Protection Center (at the FBI) are left in place, as are the
liaison efforts between lead agencies and the private sector and State and local
governments, and the structures set up for information sharing.
There are two primary differences, however. First, the Office of Homeland
Security has overall authority for coordinating critical infrastructure protection
against terrorist threats and attacks. Those responsibilities associated with
information systems of critical infrastructures are delegated to the President’s Critical
Infrastructure Protection Board. Furthermore the Board’s responsibilities for
protecting the physical assets of the nation’s information systems are to be defined
by the Assistant to President for National Security and the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security. While PDD-63 focused primarily on cyber security, it gave
the National Coordinator responsibility to coordinate the physical and cyber security
28 President Bush designated Richard Clarke.

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CRS-18
for all critical infrastructures. It would appear from the proposed structure of the
Department of Homeland Security (see below) that this separation may continue.
Second, the “National Coordinator” is now a Special Advisor to the President
rather than a member of the National Security Council staff. However, the Special
Advisor still reports to Assistant to President for National Security in addition to the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. It is not clear what additional
authority or influence the new position grants the individual serving as Special
Advisor.
Department of Homeland Security.
On June 8, President Bush announced his intention to propose a separate new
Department of Homeland Security and on June 18, forwarded to Congress draft
legislation that would establish this department along the lines proposed by the Hart-
Rudman Commission and subsequent bills introduced in Congress (see
Congressional Actions). The proposed plan does not nullify the above mentioned
E.O.s. In fact, the Administration stressed that coordination and advice at the White
House level is still needed. However, according to the draft legislation, many of the
different agencies and programs within various departments with anti-terrorist
functions, would be integrated into the new Department of Homeland Security.
The proposed legislation identifies four primary functional areas that would
constitute Divisions within the new Department: Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Countermeasures; Border and Transportation Security; and Emergency Preparedness
and Response. Section 201 of the legislation outlines the responsibilities of the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division. These are:
!
receive and analyze information and intelligence to understand threats and
detect potential threats;
!
assess vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructures;
!
integrate information and intelligence analysis with vulnerability assessments
to set protective priorities and support protective measures;
!
develop comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical
infrastructures;
!
take or seek to effect necessary measures to protect.
Section 202 of the bill transfers NIPC (except for the Computer Investigations
and Operations Section), CIAO, FedCIRC, the National Infrastructure Simulation
and Analysis Center (NISAC)29, the Computer Security Division of NIST’s
29 The NISAC was established in The USA Patriots Act (P.L. 107-056), Section 1062. The
Center builds upon expertise at Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratory in modeling
(continued...)

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CRS-19
Information Technology Laboratory, and the National Communication System
(NCS)30 to the new Department.
Section 203 of the bill ensures the Secretary of the new Department shall have
access to all threat and vulnerability analyses. Section 204 exempts from the
Freedom of Information Act information concerning infrastructure vulnerabilities
(and other vulnerabilities) provided voluntarily to the Department by non-federal
entities. The exemption follows the information should it leave the Department.
In a more detailed discussion of the reorganization released by the
Administration (The Department Of Homeland Security, June 2002), an organization
chart shows the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division further
divided into an Threat Analysis Section and an Infrastructure Protection Section, with
the latter being divided again into Physical Assets and Telecommunications and
Cybersecurity.
According to the document, the Threat Analysis function would fuze and
analyze information and intelligence from multiple sources to provide early warning
of potential attacks. In this regard the Department is to be a full partner and
consumer of all intelligence-gathering agencies, although it will not, itself, become
a domestic intelligence agency. The threat analysis and warning function would
coordinate and, as appropriate, consolidate federal lines of communications with state
and local public safety agencies and with the private sector. The Department will
administer the Homeland Security Advisory Systems and be responsible for public
alerts.
The document defines critical infrastructure as those assets, systems, and
functions vital to our national security, governance, public health and safety,
economy, and national morale. It lists the following infrastructures: food, water,
agriculture, health systems and emergency services, energy (electrical, nuclear, gas
and oil, dams), transportation (air, road, rail, ports, waterways), information and
telecommunications, banking and finance, postal and shipping, and national
monuments and icons. The infrastructure protection function will be responsible for
assessing sector vulnerabilities (in which the NIASC will assist), coordinating the
29 (...continued)
and simulating infrastructures and the interdependencies between them.
30 The NCS is not really a single communication system but more a capability that ensures
that disparate government agencies can communication with each other in times of
emergencies. To make sure this capability exists and to assure that it is available when
needed, an interagency group meets regularly to discuss issues and solve problems. The
NCS was initially established in 1963 by the Kennedy Administration to ensure
communications between military, diplomatic, intelligence, and civilian leaders, following
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Those activities were expanded by the Reagan Administration to
include emergency preparedness and response, including natural disaster response. The
current interagency group includes 22 departments and agencies. The private sector, who
own a significant share of the assets needed to ensure the necessary connectivity, is
involved through the National Security Telecommunication Advisory Committee
(NSTAC). The National Coordinating Center, mentioned earlier in this report, and which
serves as the telecommunications ISAC, is an operational entity within the NCS.

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CRS-20
national plan, and directing or coordinating protective actions (which would be tiered
to correspond to the perceived level of threat). Cybersecurity is singled out as being
an especially high priority concern (hence its separation from physical asset
protection). According to the document, the remaining agencies being transferred to
this division will support the cybersecurity function. It is not clear what capability
is available to the new Department to support the physical security function.

In the context of critical infrastructure protection, the proposed legislation
basically facilitates a reorganization. Many of the policies, objectives, missions, and
responsibilities complement those already established (e.g. vulnerability assessments,
national planning, communication between government and private sector, improving
protections, and drawing particular attention to cybersecurity). If anything, it adds
at least two new players to those responsible for developing, coordinating and
implementing policy and action, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Under-Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection. It does not create, as yet, and aside from the Department and Division
themselves, any new operational entities related to infrastructure protection.
However, the National Strategy for Homeland Security does expand the
infrastructures to receive attention. Not only are economic vitality and national
security of concern, but also public health and safety and national morale. As a
result, agriculture, food, postal and shipping services, the chemical industry, and
national monuments and icons are now included in the list of infrastructures that will
be assessed.

Other parts of the Administration’s proposal represents a major reorganization,
Many entities, some with multiple missions, are being transferred or are being split
apart, raising issues of how these functions will be reintegrated (including physical
relocation), the integrity of functions left behind, and how constituencies will react.
However, the proposed transfers associated with infrastructure protection perhaps are
less disruptive as others (e.g. Coast Guard, or U.S. Customs). CIAO, FedCIRC, and
NIASC are all relatively new organizations, with relatively narrow missions, and will
be transferred fully to the new organization. They will likely, initially at least,
perform their existing functions.
The disruption associated with transferring parts of NIPC is less clear. The
transfer leaves the Computer Investigations and Operations unit within NIPC at the
FBI, transferring the Analysis and Warning Section and the Training, Outreach, and
Strategy Section. How much synergy was developed between these three sections?
The FBI has received some criticism for its management of NIPC. According to a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report, the FBI has had trouble recruiting people
from other agencies. In the press, the FBI has been accused of being reluctant to
share information with other agencies. The GAO report stated that the Threat
Analysis and Warning function had not been well-developed (although the GAO
noted that the analysis function is a difficult problem). The GAO report also stated
that NIPC had provided valuable support to FBI filed investigations. In this
reorganization, the part of NIPC most helpful to the FBI field offices will stay at FBI.
The part that has experienced some difficulty will be transferred.

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CRS-21
Also, it has not been readily transparent the extent to which NIPC has been
concerned with the physical protection of critical infrastructure assets. NIPC
supposedly has had a role in administering the FBI’s Key Asset Initiative. However,
the program was primarily implemented through the Field Offices. The National
Strategy discusses the protection of key assets as a function of critical infrastructure
protection. Key assets are defined as those individual targets whose destruction
would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly
damage our nation’s morale or confidence. These would include assets such as
symbols or historical attractions or individual facilities that deserve special protection
because of their destructive potential or their value to the local community. But it is
not clear what role, if any, the FBI will continue to play.
Unlike the other agencies to be transferred, the Computer Security Division at
NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory and the National Communications
System (NCS) at the Department of Defense have been established for a longer time.
It is not clear what impact separating the Computer Security Division from the rest
of NIST’s Information Technology Laboratory will have on the Laboratory or the
Division. There may synergies established that a physical or budgetary
reorganization will sever. The NCS is essentially an interagency organization and
assuming that its interagency character (and its close connection to the private sector
through the NSTAC) is maintained, the impact of changing Managers (which
besides being a Member was DOD’s role within NCS) is expected to be minimal.
Whether a physical relocation will be called for has not been addressed yet by the
Administration. DOD does feel that its other communications and computer
organizations with complementary functions benefit by being in close physical
proximity. The House Science Committee in its report to the House Select
Committee on Homeland Security (see Congressional Actions) recommended not
moving the Division to the new Department.
Issues

Roles and Responsibilities. One of the issues associated with PDD-63 was
whether it duplicated, superseded, or overturned existing information security
responsibilities. Although the Directive dealt with infrastructures issues beyond just
computer systems and also considered physical protections, its implementation
focused on “cyber” threats and vulnerabilities. In this respect, it was an extension of
the government’s existing efforts in computer security. The Directive sought to use
existing authorities and expertise as much as possible in assigning responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the Directive did set up new entities that, at least at first glance,
assumed responsibilities previously assigned to others.
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13) placed the responsibility
for establishing government-wide information resources management policy with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Those policies are outlined in
OMB Circular A-130. Appendix III of the Circular incorporates responsibilities for
computer security as laid out in the Computer Security Act of 1987.31 The Computer
31 Appendix III does not apply to information technology that supports certain critical
(continued...)

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CRS-22
Security Act requires all agencies to inventory their computer systems and to
establish security plans commensurate with the sensitivity of information contained
on them. Agencies are suppose to submit summaries of their security plans along
with their strategic information resources management plan to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The agencies are to follow technical, managerial,
and administrative guidelines laid out by OMB, the Department of Commerce, the
General Services Administration, and the Office of Personnel Management and
should include (as detailed in the OMB Circular) incidence response plans,
contingencies plans, and awareness and training programs for personnel. The
Director of OMB was given the authority by the Computer Security Act to comment
on those plans.
Under PDD-63, agencies submitted plans (not dissimilar in content to those
called for in the Computer Security Act of 1987 and detailed in OMB Circular A-130
Appendix III) to the CIAO. The Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group
assembled an expert review team to review these plans (an “ad hoc” team was set up
at CIAO). It was not readily apparent who had the primary role to review and
comment of an agency’s security plan?32 Who determined whether an agency’s
obligation to creating an adequate plan have been met?
It is not yet clear if E.O. 13231 will lead to the same issues. The E.O.
specifically reaffirms OMB’s role in developing and overseeing the implementation
of government-wide information security policy (and the roles of the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence in the case of national security-
related systems). The E.O. goes on to reiterate the responsibility of the Director of
OMB (or the Assistant to the President for National Security in the case of national
security-related systems) to report to the President and the agency head any
deficiencies in security practices. The Board is instructed to assist the Director of
OMB in this function. However, the E.O. also explicitly allows the Chair (i.e. the
Special Advisor to the President), and the Board, to propose policies and programs
to “appropriate” officials to ensure the protection of information systems of critical
infrastructures. The creation of a new Department of Homeland Security introduces
at least one more player into the mix. What role will the Cybersecurity official in the
new Department of Homeland Security have in relation to the Special Advisor and
the President’s Critical Infrastructure Board ?
31 (...continued)
national security missions as defined in 44 USC 3502(9) and 10 USC 2315. Policy for these
national security systems, i.e. telecommunications and information systems containing
classified information or used by the intelligence or military community, has been assigned
by national security directives to the Department of Defense.
32 It should be noted that the General Accounting Office has reported that the oversight of
agency computer security measures to date has been inadequate. See, U.S. General
Accounting Office, Information Security. Weaknesses Continue to Place Critical Federal
Operations and Assets at Risk. GAO-01-600T. April 5, 2001.Testimony before the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on Energy and Commerce. House
of Representatives.

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CRS-23
Incident response is another area where roles and responsibilities are not defined
clearly. Among the responsibilities assigned to the Department of Commerce by
OMB Circular A-130 Appendix III is the coordination of agency computer incident
response activities to promote sharing of incident response information and related
vulnerabilities. This function has now migrated over to the General Services
Administration which has established a Federal Computer Incident and Emergency
Response Capability (FedCIRC). Consistent with OMB Circular A-130, the
Government Information Security Reform Act, passed as Title X, Subtitle G in the
FY2001 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 106-398) requires agencies to report
incidents to appropriate officials at GSA. But, PDD-63 stated and the National Plan,
Version 1.0 reiterated, that the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) will
provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the federal government’s
response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats, and monitoring
reconstitution efforts. Were the lines of authority clearly established between the
different organizations many of which are tasked with doing things that sound
similar?33 E.O. 13231 reiterates the NIPC’s involvement in incident coordination and
crisis response, in coordination with the Board, but makes no specific mention of
FedCIRC. Does moving NIPC and FedCIRC into the same department help resolve
this issue?
Also, it is not clear to what role the NIPC was to have played in coordinating
the response to physical attacks on critical infrastructures. E.O. 13228 grants the
Office of Homeland Security the leading role in responding to physical attacks on
critical infrastructures other than the physical assets of information systems. E.O.
13228 raises its own issues regarding the relationships between the Office of
Homeland Security, FEMA, and the National Security Council.34 Moving NIPC into
the new Department of Homeland Security doesn’t really resolve this issue, because
the overlap will then be between the Office of Homeland Security and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Another area in question is the future role of the CIAO. The CIAO acted as the
staff for the National Coordinator under PDD-63. E.O. 13231 makes reference to the
continued role of the CIAO in information infrastructure protection, especially in the
area of outreach to the private sector and coordination with information sharing
centers. It also is directed to provide administrative support to the new NIAC.
However, E.O. 13231 also allows the Special Advisor to create yet a different staff
within the White House. Furthermore, the E. O. authorizes a staff for the President’s
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. How are these three staffs reconciled?
33 In recent testimony to Congress, the General Accounting Office noted that the mission of
the NIPC has not been fully defined, leading to differing interpretations by different
agencies. Also, the manpower support from and information sharing with other agencies
has not materialized as envisioned. See, General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure
Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response
Capabilities. GAO-01-769, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism,
and Government Information, Senate Judiciary Committee. May 22, 2001.
34 See CRS Report RL31148. Homeland Security. Op. Cit .pp 7-8.

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There was another bureaucratic issued raised by PDD-63. Prior to the Computer
Security Act of 1987, the Reagan Administration established the National
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee.35 The
Committee consists of 22 civilian and defense agencies. The National Security
Agency was named National Manager. The Committee was tasked with setting
operating policies governing the nation’s telecommunications system, its classified
information systems, and “other sensitive information.” The Computer Security Act
of 1987 was enacted in part out of congressional concern that the Committee might
over-classify government-held information36. Did PDD-63, and does the Bush
Administration’s E.O.s, by couching critical infrastructure protection in national
security terms and combining DOD and NSA professionals with civilian
professionals in operative functions, whether in an interagency entity or in a civilian
Department of Homeland Security, blur the distinction between classified and
unclassified (or national security and civilian) systems which was a primary focus of
the Computer Security Act of 1987?37
Costs. An estimate of the amount of money spent by the Federal government
on critical infrastructure protection is included in the President’s Annual Report to
Congress on Combating Terrorism. The Bush Administration estimated that it
requested $2.6 billion for critical infrastructure protection for FY2002. This is an
estimate based on inputs supplied to OMB from the agencies. According to the
report, spending on critical infrastructure protection has been increasing over for the
last 4 years. Funding for most critical infrastructure protection activities is located
in larger accounts and not readily visible in either agency budgets or in congressional
appropriations. The estimate includes both physical and cyber protections. In the
previous year’s report, critical infrastructure protection activities were broken down
further (e.g. system protections, training). The 2001 report does not break activities
down further.
Many of the agencies’ activities are part of on-going administrative duties.
These activities, if not previously done (which appears to be the case in many
agencies), will require the reallocation of personnel time and effort, presumably at
the expense of other activities or supported by additional resources. The resources
required to meet PDD-63 requirements are supposed to be part of the agencies’
internal plans. Some of the costs will not be known until after vulnerability
assessments are done and remedial actions determined.38 Also, each agency must
develop and implement education and awareness training programs. Agency costs
35 National Security Decision Directive, NSDD-145. September 17, 1984.
36 House Report 100-153(I).
37 This point is made by the Electronic Privacy Information Center in its report, Critical
Infrastructure Protection and the Endangerment of Civil Liberties (1998) and can be found
on the Center’s webpage at [http://www.epic.org/security/infowar/epic-cip.html].
38 The Government Information Security Reform Act (Title X, Subtitle G in the FY2001
Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-398) requires agencies to report deficiencies in their
information security programs as part of their performance review and to include in their
report, how much it will cost to correct the deficiency. This, however, applies only to
protection of information systems, and not to other critical assets of the agency.

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CRS-25
may not be insignificant. According to OMB, the IRS alone estimated a vulnerability
analysis of its systems will cost $58 million.39 The Plan outlines efforts at the
Department of Energy to improve its network security. Total costs were expected to
be $80 million ($45 million for operational security measures). There are also those
expenditures associated with the PDD-63 initiatives, such as the education and
training programs (Federal Cyber Service).
In addition, the Bush Administration has begun assessing the technical, fiscal,
and political feasibility of developing a parallel but separate government-only
information network (dubbed Govnet). The purpose of the network would be to have
increased security without hampering the operations of the commercial network. If
the Bush Administration decides to pursue a separate government information
network, additional resources would be required.40
Potential private sector costs are also unknown at this time.41 Some sectors are
already at the forefront in both physical and computer security and are sufficiently
protected or need only marginal investments. Others are not and will have to devote
more resources. The ability of certain sectors to raise the necessary capital may be
limited, such as metropolitan water authorities which may be limited by regulation,
or emergency fire which may function in a small community with a limited resources.
Even sectors made up of large well capitalized firms are likely to make additional
expenditures only if they can identify a net positive return on investment.
Affecting these business decisions will be issues of risk and liability. As part
of its outreach efforts, the CIAO has helped the auditing, accounting, and corporate
directors communities identify and present to their memberships the responsibilities
governing board of directors and corporate officers have, as part of their fiduciary
responsibilities, in managing the risk to their corporation’s information assets. The
Institute of Internal Auditors, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
the Information Systems Audit and Control Association and the National Association
of Corporate Directors have formed a consortium and held “summits” around the
country in an outreach effort. The main point of their discussion can best be summed
up by the following expert from a paper presented at these summits:
“The consensus opinion from our analysts is that all industries and companies
should be equally concerned about information technology security issues
because it is an issue that has an enormous potential to negatively impact the
valuation of a company’s stock...it must be the responsibility of corporate
leaders to ensure these threats are actually being addressed on an ongoing basis.
39 Conversation with OMB officials, 11 February, 1999.
40 See, “Secure Network Proposal Stirs Debate Among Telecom Companies” in the Oct. 15,
2001 Daily Briefing on the GovExec.com web page:
[http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1001/101501tj1.htm].
41 The cyber security market is estimated at $10 billion in products and services (see
“Picking the Locks on the Internet Security Market.” Redherring.com. July 24, 2001). This
probably includes, however, some government expenditures. It also does not include
physical security measures.

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CRS-26
At the same time, the investment community must keep the issue front and
center of management.”42
There is also the question of downstream liability, or third party liability. In the
denial-of-service attacks that occurred in early 2000, the attacks were launched from
“zombie” computers; computers upon which had been placed malicious code that
was subsequently activated. What responsibility do the owners of those “zombie”
computers have to protect their systems from being used to launch attacks elsewhere?
What responsibility do service providers have to protect their customers? According
to some, it is only a matter of time before the courts will hear cases on these
questions.43
Costs to the private sector may also depend on the extent to which the private
sector is compelled to protect their critical infrastructure versus their ability to set
their own security standards. The current thinking is the private sector should
voluntarily join the effort. However, given the events of September 11, the private
sector may be compelled politically, if not legally, to increase physical protections.
But, what happens if a sector does not take actions the federal government feels are
necessary? The National Strategy for Homeland Security stated that private firms
will still bear the primary responsibility for addressing public safety risks posed by
their industries. The Strategy goes on to state that in some cases, the federal
government may have to offer incentives for the private sector to adopt security
measures. In other cases, the federal government may need to rely on regulation.
Information Sharing. The information sharing considered necessary for
critical infrastructure protection—internal to the federal government, between the
federal government and the private sector, and between private firms—raises a
number of issues.
In the past, information flow between agencies has been restrained at least three
reasons: a natural bureaucratic reluctance to share, technological difficulties
associated with compatibility, and legal restraints to prevent the misuse of
information for unintended purposes. However, in the wake of September 11, and
the apparent lack of information sharing that was exposed in reviewing events
leading up to that day, many of these restraints are being reexamined and there
appears to be a general consensus to change them. Not to downplay the importance
and the difficulties in address these issues, the rest of this section will focus on issues
associated with sharing information between the federal government and the private
sector.
Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and
operated by the private sector, implementing PDD-63 relies to a large extent on the
ability of the private sector and the federal government to share information.
However, it is unclear how open the private sector and the government will be in
42 From an paper entitled Information Security Impacting Securities Valuations, by A.
Marshall Acuff, Jr., Salomon Smith Barney Inc.
43 See, “IT Security Destined for the Courtroom.” Computer World.. May 21,2001. Vol 35.
No. 21.

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CRS-27
sharing information. The private sector primarily wants from the government
information on potential threats which the government may want to protect in order
not to compromise sources or investigations. In fact, much of the threat assessment
done by the federal government is considered classified. For its part, the government
wants specific information on vulnerabilities and incidents which companies may
want to protect to prevent adverse publicity or reveal company practices. Success
will depend on the ability of each side to demonstrate it can hold in confidence the
information exchanged. According to the GAO testimony cited earlier, there is little
or no formalized flow of information yet from the private sector to the federal
government, in general, or the NIPC specifically.44
This issue is made more complex by the question of how the information
exchanged will be handled within the context of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). The private sector is reluctant to share the kind of information the
government wants without an exempting it from public disclosure under the existing
FOIA statute. However, the non-government-organizations that actively oppose
government secrecy are reluctant to expand the government’s ability to to hold more
information as classified or sensitive.45 More recently, the environmental community
has become concerned that without careful crafting of any exempting language, firms
can shield from disclosure information they would otherwise be obliged to disclose
to the public, or worse, be able to prevent the information from being used in any
legal proceedings, by claiming it to be related to critical infrastructure protection.
This has become a particular issue within the right-to-know community concerned
with risks associated with toxic releases from plants using or producing toxic
chemicals. The Administration now including the chemical industry as a critical
infrastructure.
The National Strategy for Homeland Security makes reference to this issue. The
Strategy assigns the Attorney General to convene a panel to propose legal changes
necessary to provide reasonable assurance to the private sector that good faith
disclosures about vulnerabilities and preparedness do not expose firms to liability,
drops in share value or loss of competitive advantage. The Clinton Administration
studied this issue as well, but never released an official position.
Finally, the information exchanged between private firms within the context of
the Sector Coordinators and the ISACS raises antitrust concerns, as well as concerns
about sharing information that might unduly benefit competitors.
Privacy/Civil Liberties? The PPCIP made a number of recommendations
that raised concerns within the privacy and civil liberty communities. These included
allowing employers to administer polygraph tests to their computer security
personnel, and requiring background checks for computer security personnel. The
PPCIP also recommended allowing investigators to get a single trap and trace court
order to expedite the tracking of hacker communications across jurisdictions, if
possible. Another area of concern is the monitoring network traffic in order to detect
intrusions. Traffic monitoring has the potential to collect vast amount of information
44 Op. Cit. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection.
45 Op. cit. EPIC

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CRS-28
on who is doing what on the network. What, if any, of that information should be
treated as private and subject to privacy laws? While recognizing a need for some
of these actions, the privacy and civil liberty communities have questioned whether
proper oversight mechanisms can be instituted to insure against abuse.
The USA Patriot Act (i.e. the anti-terrorism bill passed October 26, 2001 as P.L.
107-56), passed in the wake of the September 11 attacks, contained a number of
expansions in government surveillance, investigatory, and prosecutorial authority
about which the privacy and civil liberties communities have had concern. Most of
these issue are beyond the scope of this report.46 However, included in the Act is the
authority for investigators to seek a single court order to authorize the installation and
use of a pen register or a trap and trace device anywhere in the country in order to
“record or decode electronic or other impulses to the dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information used in the processing or transmitting of wire or electronic
communications...”47 The law also defines a “computer trespasser” as one who
accesses a “protected computer” without authorization and, thus, has no reasonable
expectation to privacy of communications to, through, or from the protected
computer.48 The law goes on to stipulate the conditions under which someone under
the color of law may intercept such communications.
The issue of allowing firms to conduct background checks, polygraph tests, and
monitor personnel who have access to critical infrastructure facilities or systems lay
dormant during the Clinton Administration. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security resurrects it. The Strategy tasks the Attorney General to convene a panel
with appropriate representatives from federal, state, and local government, in
consultation with the private sector, to examine whether employer liability statutes
and privacy concerns hinder necessary precautions. It is not clear if the
Administration meant to include in the private sector representation labor and civil
liberty groups.
Another issue is to what extent will monitoring and responding to cyber attacks
permit the government to get involved in the day-to-day operations of private
infrastructures? The PCCIP suggested possibly modifying the Defense Production
Act (50 USC Appendix, 2061 et seq) to provide the federal government with the
authority to direct private resources to help reconstitute critical infrastructures
suffering from a cyber attack. This authority exists now regarding the supply and
distribution of energy and critical materials in an emergency. Suppose that the
computer networks managing the nation’s railroads were to “go down” for unknown
but suspicious reasons. What role would the federal government play in allocating
resources and reconstituting rail service?
46 See CRS Report RS21051.Terrorism Legislation: Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act of 2001,by Charles Doyle and Terrorism and Civil Liberties, by Charles
Doyle in the Legal Issues/Law Enforcement section of the CRS Terrorism Briefing Book.
47 See Section 216 of P.L. 107-56.
48 See Section 217 of P.L. 107-56.

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CRS-29
In a related matter, the National Strategy for Homeland Security also mentions
that the Department of Homeland Security will undertake a study to evaluate
mechanisms through which suspicious purchases of dual-use equipment and
materials can reported and analyzed. Examples of dual-use equipment and materials
included fermenters, aerosol generators, and protective gear. To some extent, this
type of monitoring has been going in the area of explosives, fertilizer purchases, etc.
The government also maintains a list of equipment that requires export licenses that
include some of these same articles. This study would imply the possibility of
expanding the monitoring of these transactions.
Congressional Actions
Congress’s interest in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure spans its
oversight, legislative, and appropriating responsibilities. Prior to September 11,
much of the congressional activity regarding critical infrastructure protection
focused on oversight. Legislatively, a few bills were introduced relating to critical
infrastructure protection. H.R. 1158 would establish a National Homeland Security
Agency along the lines recommended by the Hart-Rudman Commission. In a related
effort, H.R. 1292, the Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 called for the
President to develop a Homeland Security Strategy that protects the territory, critical
infrastructure, and citizens of the United States from the threat or use of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber or conventional weapons. H.R. 1259 would
enhance the ability of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to improve
computer security (NIST). Among its actions, the bill would authorize NIST, in
consultation with other appropriate agencies, to assist agencies in responding to
computer intrusions, to perform evaluation and tests of agency security programs and
to report the results of those test to Congress, and to establish a computer security
fellowship program. H.R. 2435 (similar to H.R. 4246 introduced in the 106th
Congress) would exempt information related to cyber security in connection with
critical infrastructure protection from FOIA. Its counterpart in the Senate is S. 1456.
S. 1407 would support a National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (this
was included in the USA Patriot Act). H.R. 3394 would authorize funding for NSF
to support basic research in computer and network security, to establish computer and
network security centers, and to support institutions of higher learning in establishing
or improving computer and network security programs at all levels. The bill also
authorizes funding for NIST to establish a program that would support computer
security programs at institutions of higher learning that have entered into partnerships
with for-profit entities and to support fellowships at those institutions in computer
security.
Since September 11, a number of bills have been introduced to increase physical
protections of various infrastructures: H.R. 2060, H.R. 2795, S. 1546 (agroterrorism),
S. 1608 (waster water facility security), S. 1593 (R&D related to security at waste
water facilities), H.R. 3178, H.R. 3227 (radiological contamination R&D), H.R. 2925
(P.L. 107-69, protection of dams and related facilities), S. 1214 and S. 1215 (port
security), H.R. 2983 (security at nuclear facilities), S. 1447 (aviation security). For
more information on these and other activities related to the security (primarily
physical security) of specific infrastructures, see the Prevention: Security
Enhancements section of the CRS Terrorism Briefing Book.

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Congress is now taking up the proposed reorganization. H.R. 5005 is the
Administration’s version in House. The House has appointed a Select Committee on
Homeland Security who will be responsible for reporting the bill to the House. A
number of House Committees have offered recommendations to the Select
Committee. The one primarily affecting Infrastructure Protection was a
recommendation by the House Science Committee not to transfer the Computer
Security Division from NIST. The Science Committee, along with the Armed
Services Committee also suggested moving the Department of Energy’s Energy
Security and Assurance Program to the new Department. Also, a discussion draft
of the Select Committee’s mark provided a much more elaborate provision (Subtitle
C in Title VII of H.R. 5005) on FOIA exemptions, similar to the bills that have been
introduced in the House and Senate.
The Senate Government Affairs Committee is expected to release an amended
version of S. 2452, introduced prior to the Administration’s proposal, and reported
last month. The reported version included a Directorate of Critical Infrastructure that
would have many of the same responsibilities included in the other bills.

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CRS-31
Appendix
Essentially, the Plan identified 10 “programs” under three broad objectives (see
Table 3, below). Each program contained some specific actions to be taken,
capabilities to be established, and dates by which these shall be accomplished. Other
activities, capabilities, and dates were more general (e.g. during FY2001).
Table A.1. National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 1.0
Goal: Achieve a critical information systems defense with an initial operating
capability by December 2000, and a full operating capability by May 2003...that
ensures any interruption or manipulation of these critical functions must be
brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally
detrimental to the welfare of the United States.
Objectives
Programs
Prepare and
ID critical infrastructures and interdependencies and address
Prevent
vulnerabilities
Detect and
Detect attacks and unauthorized intrusions
Respond
Develop robust intelligence and law enforcement capabilities
consistent with the law
Share attack warnings and information in a timely manner
Create capabilities for response, reconstitution, and recovery
Build
Enhance research and development in the above mentioned areas
Strong
Foundations
Train and employ adequate numbers of information security
specialists
Make Americans aware of the need for improved cyber-security
Adopt legislation and appropriations in support of effort
At every step of the process ensure full protection of American
citizens’ civil liberties, rights to privacy, and rights to protection
of proprietary information

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CRS-32
For Additional Reading
CRS Report RS21026, Terrorism and Security: Issue Facing the Water
Infrastructure Sector, by Claudia Copeland and Betsy Cody.
CRS Report RS21050, Hazardous Materials Transportation: Vulnerability to
Terrorists, Federal Activities and Options to Reduce Risks, by Paul Rothberg.
CRS Report RS20272, FEMA's Mission: Policy Directives for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, by Keith Bea.
CRS Report RL30735, Cyberwarfare, by Steven Hildreth.
CRS Report RL30861, Capitol Hill Security: Capabilities and Planning, by Paul
Dwyer and Stephen Stathis.
CRS Report RL31148, Homeland Security: The Presidential Coordination Office,
by Harold Relyea.
CRS Report RL31150, Selected Aviation Security Legislation in the Aftermath of the
September 11 Attack, by Robert Kirk.
CRS Report RL31151, Aviation Security Technology and Procedures: Screening
Passengers and Baggage, by Daniel Morgan.
CRS Report RL31202, Federal Research and Development for Counter Terrorism:
Organization, Funding, and Options, by Genevieve J. Knezo.
CRS Report RL31465, Protecting Critical Infrastructure from Terrorist Attack: A
Catalog of Selected Federal Assistance Programs, Coordinated by John Moteff.

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