Order Code RL31383
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance
for Colombia and Neighbors
Updated July 10, 2002
K. Larry Storrs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance
for Colombia and Neighbors
Summary
Congress is considering President Bush’s requests for new funding and
additional authority to provide assistance to Colombia and six regional neighbors in
a continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative launched in 2001. These requests
will be influenced by the first round election, on May 26, 2002, of Alvaro Uribe to
become the President of Colombia in August 2002.
On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003 budget request that
would provide $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with $731
million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI). This request includes $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439
million in ACI funding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train
and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern
Colombia. It also includes $186.6 million in ARI funding for Peru (with $135
million in ACI funds); $132.6 million in ARI funding for Bolivia (with $91 million
in ACI funds); and $65.1 million for Ecuador (with $37 million in ACI funds).
Lesser amounts were requested for Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela.
On March 21, 2002, the Bush Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002
Supplemental for counter-terrorism purposes that included a request for $4 million
of State Department international narcotics control (INC) funding for Colombia
police post support, $6 million of FMF funding for Colombia and $3 million for
Ecuador for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining funding for counter-kidnapping
training in Colombia. Also included in the submission were requests to broaden the
authorities of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003
assistance and unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian
government’s “unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and
other threats to its national security.”
Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative is President Bush’s request in
2001 for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA)
to give duty free or reduced-rate treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador
and Colombia. The House passed H.R. 3009 in late 2001 to extend the ATPA
through 2006, and the Senate passed the ATPA extension on May 23, 2002, as part
of an omnibus trade bill including trade promotion authority and trade adjustment
assistance. Resolution of differences in conference is pending.
The FY2002 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (H.R. 4775, H.Rept.
107-480) was approved by the House on May 24, 2002, with slight modifications to
the President’s requests relating to the Andean region. The Senate version of the bill
was reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 22, 2002 (S. 2551,
S.Rept. 107-156), with less authority and more restrictions. The Senate approved
H.R. 4775 amended on June 7, 2002, after incorporating the text of S. 2551 into the
House measure, with differences to be resolved in conference.
Contents
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Past Request for FY2002 Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Hold on Certain FY2002 Funding for Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Request for FY2003 Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Request for Emergency FY2002 Supplemental Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Pending Request for Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) . . 6
Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Funding and Requests for Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Funding and Requests for Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Funding and Requests for Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Funding and Requests for Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Funding and Requests for Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Funding and Requests for Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Funding and Requests for Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Major Legislative Activity in 2002
on Andean Regional Initiative Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
National Defense Authorization, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Request
and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts . . . . . . . 31
Appendix C. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2003 Request
by Purpose and Functional Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors
In 2002, Congress is considering President Bush’s request for additional funding
and additional authority to provide assistance to Colombia and six regional neighbors
in a continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative that was launched in 2001.1 The
region has been viewed as important primarily because it produces virtually all of
the world’s cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin. Moreover, the stability of
Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia’s longstanding guerrilla
insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are both believed to be largely
funded by “taxes” on illegal narcotics cultivation and trade.
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative
Past Request for FY2002 Assistance
The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) was launched in April 2001, when the
Bush Administration requested $882.29 million in FY2002 economic and
counternarcotics assistance, as well as an extension of trade preferences and other
measures, for Colombia and six regional neighbors (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil,
Panama, and Venezuela). Of this amount, $731 million was designated as
International Narcotics Control (INC) assistance in a line item in the budget request
known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). A central element of the
program has been the training and equipping of counternarcotics battalions in
Colombia.
According to the Administration, the distinctive features of the program,
compared to Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000,2 are that a larger portion
1 This report draws from CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, which
provides more background on the ARI and covers congressional action in 2001.
2 “Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations approved by the 106th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425, P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in
Colombia and neighboring countries. There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which
the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this
and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001. For more detail, see CRS Report
RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001). For
(continued...)
CRS-2
of the assistance is directed at economic and social programs, and that more than half
of the assistance is directed at regional countries experiencing the spill-over effects
of illicit drug and insurgency activities. Another aspect of the initiative was
President Bush’s request for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade
Preferences Act (ATPA) expiring in December 2001, that would give duty free or
reduced-rate treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. This
was a central topic when President Bush met with Andean leaders at the Summit of
the Americas meeting in Canada in April 2001.
In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration
spokesmen set out three overarching goals for the region that could be called the
three D’s – democracy, development, and drugs. The first goal was to promote
democracy and democratic institutions by supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption
measures, human rights improvement, and the peace process in Colombia. The
second was to foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization
through alternative economic development, environmental protection, and renewal
of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third was to significantly reduce
the supply of illegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication,
interdiction and other efforts.3 Under consideration by the Congress in 2001, critics
of the initiative argued that it overemphasized military and counter-drug assistance,
and provided inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in
Colombia. Supporters argued that it continued needed assistance to Colombia, while
providing more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.
By the end of 2001, Congress approved, in the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115), $625 million for the ACI, $106
million less than the President’s ACI request. Also included were a series of
conditions and certification requirements relating to human rights and to the
controversial aerial eradication spraying (also known as aerial fumigation) program
to destroy illicit coca crops, and an alteration of the cap on military and civilian
contractors serving in Colombia.
As detailed in the February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration
has allocated $782.82 million in FY2002 assistance to the ARI, of which $645
million was for the ACI account, including $20 million transferred from the general
International Narcotics Control account.4 While the House passed H.R. 3009 in late
2001 to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act through 2006, action in the Senate
was not completed.
2 (...continued)
the latest figures on aid to Colombia, as well as past assistance, see CRS Report RS21213,
Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003.
3 See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact
Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing
on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available at the following web site
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
4 See CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative: FY2002 Assistance for Colombia
and Neighbors, for details on the aid conditions and levels of assistance.
CRS-3
Hold on Certain FY2002 Funding for Colombia. Until April 30, 2002,
all assistance provided to the Colombian armed forces under the FY2002 and prior
foreign operations appropriations acts was on hold, awaiting the Secretary of State’s
certification to Congress that the armed forces were meeting three human rights
conditions, as required by Section 567(a) of the FY2002 Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-115).5 On April 30, the Secretary of State made the
certification. In a May 1, 2002 press statement regarding the certification, the
Department of State noted that “Despite some real progress, both we and the
Government of Colombia recognize that the protection of human rights in Colombia
needs improvement....[and] we are committed to continue working with the
Government of Colombia on concrete measures it should take to make further
progress in improving the human rights performance of its Armed Forces, including
ending military-paramilitary collaboration.” This certification releases 60% of
FY2002 assistance for the Colombian armed forces. Under Section 567 (a), as of July
1, 2002, the Secretary of State must again certify that these human rights conditions
are being met in order to release the remaining 40% of the assistance for the armed
forces.
Three human rights organizations argued, however, that the situation in
Colombia did not justify the certification. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the Washington Office on Latin America issued a joint statement
with three specific objections: (1) although some low-ranking Colombian military
officers have been suspended for human rights violations, the Colombian Armed
Forces “have refused to act on notorious cases such as that of General Rodrigo
Quiñones;” that information claiming progress regarding military cooperation with
civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities was provided by the Colombian Attorney
General’s office “which has over the past several months fired human rights
prosecutors and put obstacles in the way of investigating high-ranking members of
the Armed Forces;” and, that the certification “provides no evidence of arrests or
actions against key paramilitary leaders or high-ranking members of the Armed
Forces credibly alleged to have collaborated with paramilitary groups.” (See
[http://hrw.org/press/2002/05/colombia0501.htm] for the statement, and go to
[http://hrw.org/press/2002/02/colombia0205.htm] for these groups lengthy analysis
of the situation in Colombia, issued on February 5, 2002.)
Under other provisions of P.L. 107-115, about $17 million in funds for the
purchase of chemicals for the aerial coca fumigation programs are on hold until the
Secretary of State reports to the appropriations committees that such fumigation is
being carried out under EPA regulatory controls applicable in the United States, that
the chemicals and their manner of application do not pose unreasonable risks to or
result in adverse effects on people or the environment, that the spray is in accordance
with Colombian law, and that compensation procedures are in place for damages.
5 These criteria are (1) that the Colombian Commander General is suspending soldiers and
officers credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided
or abetted paramilitary groups; (2) that the Colombian armed forces are cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts
any members credibly alleged to be involved in such offenses; and (3) that the Colombian
armed forces are taking steps to sever links with paramilitary groups and to execute
outstanding orders for the capture of their members.
CRS-4
The Administration will lose authority to continue aerial fumigation spraying in
Colombia after June 10, 2002, unless and until alternative development programs
have been put in place. According to State Department officials, these matters are
still under study.
According to press accounts on May 10, 2002, a certain unspecified amount of
FY2002 counternarcotics assistance for Colombia was suspended pending an
investigation of reports that some funds were missing.
Current Request for FY2003 Assistance
On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003 budget request for the
Andean region that would provide about $979.8 million for the Andean Regional
(ARI) Initiative, including $731 million in counternarcotics assistance under the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), with some ACI funds being used for social and
economic programs. The FY2003 request is similar to the FY2002 request, except
that the Administration is requesting $98 million in Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) for Colombia to train and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect the
Cano-Limon oil pipeline in northeastern Colombia. The request marked a sharp
break with previous policy towards Colombia, as it was the first request for military
assistance provided specifically for a purpose other than counternarcotics operations.
The Administration is also requesting $1 million each for Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama,
and Peru in FY2003 FMF funding.
Requested FY2003 foreign operations funding of $979.8 million for ARI,
including $731 million for ACI, is to be distributed as follows in descending order:6
! Colombia: $537 million in ARI funding, including $439 million in
ACI funding and $98 million in FMF funding.
! Peru: $186.6 million in ARI funding, including $135 million in ACI
funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Bolivia: $132.6 million in ARI funding, including $91 million in
ACI funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Ecuador: $65.1 million in ARI funding, including $37 million in
ACI funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Brazil: $29.5 million in ARI funding, including 12 million in ACI
funding.
! Panama: $20.5 million in ARI funding, including $9 million in ACI
funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Venezuela: $8.5 million in ARI funding, including $8 million in ACI
funding
Proponents of the Administration’s request argue in the context of the post-
September 2001 war on terrorism that Colombia and the region should be supported,
6 Other funding, for Department of Defense activities in the Andean Region, is requested as
part of the DOD counternarcotics account, which funds DOD counternarcotics activities
worldwide. A breakdown of intended allocations of that account does not become
publically available until after DOD funds are appropriated.
CRS-5
and they have urged the Administration to seek expanded authority to provide
support for an expansion of activities.7 On March 6, 2002, the House passed H.Res.
358 expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that “the President, without
undue delay, should transmit to Congress for its consideration proposed legislation,
consistent with United States law regarding the protection of human rights, to assist
the Government of Colombia protect its democracy from United States-designated
foreign terrorist organizations and the scourge of illicit narcotics.”
Critics argue that the new request would expand the U.S. military role in
Colombia, now strictly limited to counternarcotics, into a problematic
counterinsurgency one. Critics who emphasize human rights considerations argue
that such a role would inevitably involve tolerance of the linkages between the
Colombian military and paramilitary groups which are responsible for gross
violations of human rights. (A particular concern is the lifting of human rights
conditions concerning paramilitary groups in the FY2002 supplemental request, see
below.) Others, who believe U.S. military power should not be committed unless it
can be effective, warn that the proposed assistance falls far short of that required to
have any significant effect on the situation in Colombia. Many also worry that the
United States is slowly being drawn into a Vietnam-like morass, providing assistance
to a government that does not have the credibility and political will to pay for and
successfully wage its own war, and conclude a just peace.
Current Request for Emergency FY2002 Supplemental Aid
On March 21, 2002, the Bush Administration requested $27.1 billion in
Emergency FY2002 Supplemental Assistance, which was mostly to support
Department of Defense and Homeland Security counter-terrorism efforts, but would
also provide $38 million in additional funding and authorities relating to Colombia
and the Andean Region. Included in this submission was a request for $4 million of
INC funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of FMF funding for
Colombia for infrastructure security and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism
equipment and training, and $25 million of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and
Demining funding for a counter-kidnapping program for members of Colombia’s
police and armed forces.
The submission also included a request for up to $100 million in Department
of Defense funding for defense articles, services, and training to be used worldwide
“to support foreign nations in furtherance of the global war on terrorism, on such
terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine . . . “ and for $30
million to assist “indigenous” forces. Although the request contained no indication
that the Administration intended to use any of these funds for Colombia or any other
ARI country, critics feared the precedent that would be set by granting such
7 For critical comments, see statements on the Center for International Policy’s Colombia
Project web site [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/] under CIP Analyses, under U.S.
Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses) and under U.S. Government
Information (especially Legislators). For supportive comments, see statements on the same
web site under U.S. Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses), and U.S.
Government Information (especially statements from Officials and Legislators).
CRS-6
assistance. Such funds, they argued, could be used by the Department of Defense to
carry out foreign security assistance programs free of the congressionally mandated
controls on State Department programs.
The supplemental submission proposes to broaden the authorities of the Defense
and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and unexpended
Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government’s “unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national
security.” According to the Administration’s explanation, these provisions “would
allow broader authority to provide assistance to Colombia to counter the unified
‘cross-cutting’ threat posed by groups that use narcotics trafficking to fund their
terrorist and other activities that threaten the national security of Colombia.”
Such a change would allow the Administration to expand the scope of U.S.
assistance, particularly military assistance, to Colombia, allowing State and Defense
department funds to assist the Colombian government to counter any threat to its
national security. The immediate, and widely discussed, effect of this change would
be to allow the U.S. government to broaden the circumstances under which it
currently shares intelligence with Colombian security forces, providing intelligence
not only for counterdrug operations, but also for military operations against the
Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries. The change would also permit the Plan
Colombia helicopters and other equipment that the United States has provided to be
used for such purposes.
As proposed by the Administration, the “Leahy Amendment” conditions in the
foreign operations and defense appropriations legislation forbidding assistance to
military and police units credibly alleged to engage in gross violations of human
rights would continue to apply, as would the current caps of 400 each on the number
of U.S. civilian contractors and U.S. military personnel supporting “Plan Colombia”
activities in Colombia. (The new proposed military activities, i.e., infrastructure
protection and anti-kidnapping assistance, are not, however, “Plan Colombia”
activities.) Except for those two specifically mentioned conditions, however, the
Administration’s proposal states that funding would be provided “notwithstanding
any provision of law.” That statement would lift conditions like those of Section 567
of P.L. 107-115, the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which has
stiffer provisions regarding human rights violations by security forces, and also
requires the armed forces to address the continuing links of some of its members with
illegal rightist paramilitary groups. It would also lift P.L. 107-115 conditions
regarding aerial fumigation spraying and alternative development.
For further discussion on U.S. policy towards Colombia, see the section on
Colombia, and for discussion on the progress of legislation, see the section on Major
Legislative Activity, both below.
Pending Request for Extension of Andean Trade Preference
Act (ATPA)
Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative was President Bush’s request
in 2001 for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act
CRS-7
(ATPA) that expired in December 2001, that would give duty free or reduced-rate
treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. The countries are
looking for parity with Central American and Caribbean preferences, provided in the
U.S.-Caribbean Trade Partnership Act approved in 2000, in order to prevent a
diversion of trade and investment from the Andean region to Central America or the
Caribbean.8 The House passed H.R. 3009 in late 2001 to extend the ATPA through
2006, and the Senate passed the ATPA extension on May 23, 2002, as part of an
omnibus trade bill including trade promotion authority and trade adjustment
assistance. Resolution of differences in conference is pending. Without
congressional action the Act expired on December 4, 2001, but on February 15, 2002,
the Administration implemented a 90-day deferral of duties to stay increased tariff
burdens. When President Bush met with Andean leaders during his trip to Peru on
March 23, 2002, extension of the Andean Trade Preferences Act was a major topic
of discussion.
Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries
The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven
countries in the broadly defined Andean region9, or what the Administration has
called the Andean Ridge: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela. The ARI built on the Clinton Administration’s 2000 “Plan Colombia”
legislation, which sought to address the increasing cultivation of coca and heroin
crops in Colombia through the creation of a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade, and sharply increased assistance for eradication and alternative development
programs in the country’s two southern provinces of Putumayo and Caquetá, the
region where illegal coca production and a leftist guerrilla presence was expanding
most rapidly. The ARI expanded assistance to help counter possible spill-over
effects in six nearby countries: Peru and Bolivia, where past successes in reducing
cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in eradicating crops in
Colombia; Ecuador, the most exposed neighbor because of its border with
Colombia’s Putumayo province; and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, where the threat
is primarily confined to common border areas with Colombia. In early 2002, there
is increased concern among Colombia’s neighbors as the Colombian conflict
escalates following the breakdown of peace talks between the government and the
country’s largest leftist guerrilla group.10
8 For information on ATPA see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:
Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J.F. Hornbeck. For information on the U.S.-
Caribbean Trade Partnership Act and other regional free trade agreements, see CRS Issue
Brief IB95017, Trade and the Americas, by Raymond J. Ahearn.
9 Panama and Brazil are not normally considered to be part of the Andean region; Bolivia
is an Andean country but it does not share a border with Colombia. For usage of the term
“Andean Ridge” see citations under Plan Colombia on the State Department’s International
Information Programs web site [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
10 For more information on the reactions of Colombia’s neighbors to events in Colombia,
as of mid-2001, see Judith A. Gentleman. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes:
Patterns of State Response. Publication of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
(continued...)
CRS-8
The region is important to the United States not only because it includes the
three major drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually
all the world’s cocaine and 60% of the heroin seized in the United States are
produced, but also two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador) which
supply significant quantities of oil to the United States and are members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While the designated
countries have diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading
partner by far for all of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) the Andes mountain range that runs through
South America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration,
but the countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration
pact. The ARI countries are some of the most heavily populated in Latin America,
including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and
eighth (Ecuador) most populous. Although Colombia and Venezuela have largely
European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have
significant indigenous populations.
Colombia
Colombia’s spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by
four parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation
and processing, and contributes to the government’s difficulty in exerting control
throughout the nation. With a population of 40.3 million, Colombia is the third most
populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico, with a largely mixed
race (mestizo) population. It is known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for
continuing violence, including guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and
persistent drug trafficking activity. Negotiated settlements were achieved with some
of the guerrilla groups in the 1980s, but fell apart by 1990 when former guerrilla
leaders and members participating in political activities were assassinated. Recent
administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist
paramilitary (or “self-defense”) forces, both associated with many groups of
independent drug traffickers.
President Andres Pastrana was elected and inaugurated in 1998 for a four year
term largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with
the guerrillas, strengthening the Colombian military and counternarcotics forces, and
seeking international support for these efforts and other reforms to address the
country’s unusually serious economic difficulties.11 Months after he was
inaugurated, Pastrana’s administration initiated peace talks with the country’s largest
guerrilla group, of some 17,000 - 20,000 combatants, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), and subsequently participated in more informal
10 (...continued)
College, and the Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, University of Miami. July 2001.
This can be accessed on the web through publications on Latin America at [http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm].
11 For information on the multi-faceted conditions in Colombia, see CRS Report RL30330,
Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options, by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS-9
tripartite talks with representatives from the smaller 3,000 - 5,000 member National
Liberation Army (ELN) and civil society groups.
In 1999, President Pastrana, with U.S. assistance, developed a $7.5 billion plan
called Plan Colombia, with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion from
international donors, but funding from Colombia and the international community
fell far short of those goals. In response to Colombian requests, the Clinton
Administration developed and the U.S. Congress approved a $1.3 billion package of
assistance in 2000, also called Plan Colombia assistance. Some $860.2 million or
67% of this assistance was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9 million for
helicopters, training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army counternarcotics
battalions. This plan was targeted mainly at Colombia and expenses for big ticket
items were weighted toward support for counternarcotics activities, although there
was funding for alternative development and governance programs (mostly to support
counternarcotics objectives) and human rights programs, and conditions to encourage
an improvement in the military’s human rights performance.12
In August 2002, President Pastrana will turn power over to president-elect
Alvaro Uribe, who won the multi-candidate presidential election of May 26, 2002.
Uribe promised more aggressive action to combat drug trafficking and terrorism in
his campaign, and he won in a largely unprecedented landslide, with over 50% of the
vote so that a runoff election was not necessary. Since his election, Uribe has visited
the United States and met with U.N. and U.S. officials, and requested U.N. assistance
in resolving the conflict in the country. He has also appointed a largely moderate and
technocratic cabinet with representation from various parties.
Uribe is likely to take office amid a still escalating conflict with the FARC,
intensified by Pastrana’s decision on February 20, 2002, the day after the FARC and
the government had exchanged cease-fire proposals, to terminate the peace talks with
that group. Pastrana’s decision was prompted by the FARC’s hijacking of an airliner
and kidnapping of a Colombian Senator on the plane, the fifth national legislator to
be taken in eight months. The decision took place in the midst of an intensification
of guerrilla actions, including infrastructure sabotage. Days later, FARC kidnapped
another Colombia Senator who was also a presidential candidate with a small
following.
Uribe will most likely face decisions concerning the continuation of the U.S.-
supported “Plan Colombia” eradication and alternative development program in
Putumayo and Caquetá, which is highly controversial in both Colombia and the
United States. The eradication spraying by the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade
in Putumayo beginning in December 200013 caused social and political turmoil in
Colombia, with critics alleging it destroyed legal crops as well as illicit coca, and
12 For information on U.S. “Plan Colombia” assistance in FY2000-FY2001, including all
Congressional action and congressionally imposed conditions, see CRS Report RL30541,
Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001), by Nina M.
Serafino. This report also contains charts detailing U.S. assistance to Colombia since 1989.
13 The two Army counternarcotics battalions funded by Plan Colombia were trained and
operating by the spring of 2001. The first commenced operations in December 2000.
CRS-10
caused people and animals to suffer ill health. Another problem is the Colombian
government’s failure to deliver much of the promised $800 worth of farming inputs
to the 38,000 families in 33 municipalities who signed voluntary eradication pacts.
According to accounts in early 2002, less than a third of those families have received
any compensation and many are still growing coca. Reports also indicate that many
Putumayo farmers do not intend to voluntarily eradicate coca before the July 2002
deadline14 This has led many, including U.S. government officials, to conclude that
the alternative program is, at best, in great difficulty.
In a February 2002 report, the U.S. General Accounting Office pointed out that
AID’s expansion of alternative development projects to coca-growing areas in 2001
face “serious obstacles,” most importantly inadequate security in coca-growing
areas, where the Colombia government lacks control, and the government has
“limited capacity to carry out sustained interdiction operations.”15 The GAO report
cast doubt whether AID would be able to fulfill its goal of achieving dramatic
reductions of 11,500 hectares (almost 29,000 acres) in coca cultivation in 2002
through voluntary eradication of coca crops. Another difficulty is that the soil in
Putumayo has been found to be too poor to support the number currently farming in
that province if all were growing legal crops. The State Department reportedly has
decided to shift some funds from alternative development to infrastructure projects
that would provide jobs elsewhere.16
Some policymakers argue, however, that neither the eradication nor the
alternative development program should be abandoned, but that they should be given
the time and conditions necessary to work. In its response to the GAO, incorporated
as an appendix to the GAO report, AID pointed out that alternative development
programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own, and that the Colombia
program was designed to support the aerial eradication program and to build “the
political support needed for aerial eradication efforts to take place.” It claimed that
the 84,000 hectares (over 207,000 acres) of coca that were sprayed in Colombia in
2001 represented a level unprecedented in new eradication programs. Despite this,
the State Department announced in March 2002 that coca cultivation in Colombia
had increased 25% in 2001, although in December 2001 the Colombian government
had estimated a 25% drop in cultivation that year.17
14 Susannah A. Nesmith. Anti-drug Crop Plan in Doubt, Study Says Cocaine Growers in
Colombia Seen with Few Choices. The Boston Globe. April 4, 2002. p A24.
15 U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO-02-291. Drug Control: Efforts to Develop
Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face
Serious Obstacles. February 2002.
16 T. Christian Miller. In Colombia, Anti-drug Plan Has Come a Cropper. Los Angeles
Times. March 29, 2002. p 1.
17 See Reuters dispatch. Colombia’s Coca Up, U.S. Says. The New York Times. March 9,
2002, p. A5, and Letter to the editor by Robert S. Weiner. The Colombian Coca Crop. The
Washington Post. March 13, 2002, p. A28. The State Department attributed one-third of
the increase to the inclusion of a area that had not been surveyed in 2000 because of cloud
cover.
CRS-11
The current U.S. policy focus on counternarcotics programs has become
increasingly controversial for reasons beyond implementation difficulties. On the
one hand, this focus is viewed by some policymakers and analysts as insufficient to
provide the support needed by a friendly democracy under siege by powerful armed
forces fueled by drug money. Proponents of the Administration’s requests, in keeping
with the sense of the House resolution (H. Res. 358) mentioned above, argue in that
in the context of the global war on terrorism, Colombia and the region should be
supported with counter-terrorism assistance before the situation becomes even more
dangerous, particularly when the guerrillas have demonstrated little willingness to
negotiate peace.18 They favor expanding the scope of military assistance to
strengthen the ability of Colombian security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and
to expand their control throughout rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationale and
support for paramilitary groups. Those who favor an expanded military approach do
not necessarily favor continuing the eradication and alternative development
programs under current circumstances, however. Some argue that these programs,
particularly the forced aerial eradication, contribute to a counterproductive distrust
of, if not hostility toward, the Colombian government, alienating people whose
support is needed for counterinsurgency operations. Some also argue that substantial
assistance should be provided to improve civilian government institutions and
expand their presence throughout Colombia.
Some analysts and policymakers who would like to expand military aid
nonetheless argue that further military assistance should not be provided until the
armed forces have adhered to current conditions on assistance requiring that they
break ties to the paramilitary groups and end human rights abuses. They fear that
paramilitary groups, with their alleged ties to drug production and trafficking, may
become influential in Colombia’s national politics. This, they argue, is itself a
significant threat to U.S. security interests. In addition, some also believe that any
expansion of U.S. involvement should await a greater commitment by Colombia’s
government and elites to the war effort, including a larger budget for the Colombian
military.
Opponents of military aid attribute the problems of the counter-drug program
to what they view as its emphasis on a repressive and military approach to curbing
drug production. They would halt aerial fumigation spraying of coca crops and
counter-drug aid to the Colombian army, arguing that coca farmers cannot be
expected to abandon coca farming voluntarily until adequate economic alternatives
are in place. They fear that forcing such farmers to give up coca growing will only
drive many to the ranks of the armed groups or to become displaced persons
dependent on the state, perpetuating Colombia’s current economic difficulties and
violence. Instead, many urge that current policy be replaced by one that focuses
largely on economic and social aid to combat the conflict’s root causes, curbs the still
18 For supportive comments, see statements on the same web site under U.S. Military and
Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses), and U.S. Government Information
(especially statements from Officials and Legislators). For critical comments, see
statements on the Center for International Policy’s Colombia Project web site
[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia] under CIP Analyses, under U.S. Military and Police
Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses) and under U.S. Government Information
(especially Legislators).
CRS-12
rampant human rights abuses by paramilitary groups, provides vigorous support for
a negotiated end to the fighting in Colombia, and increasingly emphasize illicit drug
demand reduction in the United States. They also maintain that the emergency
supplemental proposal, in particular, with its request for authority to provide
assistance to help Colombia counter its many threats, would involve the United
States in a major guerrilla conflict of indeterminate duration, i.e., in a
counterinsurgency campaign.19
Funding and Requests for Colombia.
! Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received
$860.3 million. Of that, $424.9 was State Department funding and
$91.8 was Department of Defense funding to assist Colombian
military anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and the
training and equipping of the Colombian counternarcotics battalions.
The remaining $435.4 was State Department funding for assistance
to the Colombian police, economic and alternative development
assistance, assistance for displaced persons, human rights,
administration of justice and other governance programs.
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $380.50
million (rather than the $399 million requested), with $243.50
million in counternarcotics assistance, and $137 million in economic
and social programs.
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Colombia
would receive $4 million of INC funding for police post support in
areas of weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding for
counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding
for counter-kidnapping training.
! Under the FY2003 request, Colombia would receive $537 million in
ARI funding, including $439 million in ACI funding, and $98
million in FMF funding to train and equip a Colombian army
brigade to protect an oil pipeline in the country.
Peru
Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the fifth most populous
country in Latin America, with 27.5 million inhabitants (45% indigenous, 37%
mestizo, and 15% of European descent). Peru’s new President, Alejandro Toledo,
was inaugurated on July 28, 2001, following two-round presidential elections in
April and June 2001. His election and inauguration ended a period of political
uncertainty since the constitutionally questionable third term re-election in June 2000
of President Alberto Fujimori. Although President Fujimori had considerable
19 Christopher Marquis. U.S. to Explore Aid to Colombia, Citing Threat of Terrorism. The
New York Times. March 3, 2002. p A6.
CRS-13
support during his presidency (1990-2000) for restoring the economy, defeating the
guerrilla insurgency, and reducing drug trafficking activity, he was criticized for
corruption, human rights violations, and authoritarian tendencies. He suddenly
resigned and fled into exile in November 2000, following allegations of corruption
associated particularly with security chief Vladimiro Montesinos. Acting President
Valentin Paniagua governed during a transition period that included the well regarded
presidential elections.
President Toledo, a longtime anti-Fujimori opposition leader, was elected on
June 3, 2001, with 53% of the vote, against former left-leaning Peruvian President
Alan Garcia with 47%.20 President Toledo has promised to end corruption and to
stabilize the economy, and most observers worry that the expectations of the
populace, especially poor, indigenous groups, are almost impossible to achieve. The
President has labeled drug trafficking a national security problem for Peru and has
established a drug czar for the country to better coordinate counternarcotics
initiatives. When President Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the two Presidents
agreed to enhance cooperation on counternarcotics and counter-terrorism issues.
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the
circumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a
Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary
woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the
small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities. As a result of this
accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia was
suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released the
report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that
“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in
the accident. President Bush indicated during his March 2002 trip to Peru that talks
were continuing on appropriate procedures before the renewal of the anti-drug
surveillance flights.
Peru is viewed as a success story in counternarcotics efforts because six years
of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication
efforts, and alternative development programs have reduced coca production by 70%.
However, coca production remained constant in 2001 and there are reports of rising
prices for coca and increased growing of poppies. Peruvian spokesmen have worried
about spillover effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia into Peru, and a
possible increase in coca production. They have denounced illicit plantings of coca
and poppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC
guerrillas in Colombia. Responding to press reports that FARC forces have
penetrated into Peruvian territory, Peruvian officials stated in early 2002 that there
are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but they concede that they may cross
temporarily into border areas. Because of these threats, Peru has moved military
bases from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished,
to the border with Colombia. The March 20, 2002 bombing of a shopping center
near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, three days before President Bush’s visit to Peru,
20 For more details, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, by Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS-14
raised fears of a resurgence of guerrilla groups. At the conclusion of the presidential
visit, the two Presidents agreed to cooperate on counternarcotics and counter-
terrorism issues.
Funding and Requests for Peru.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Peru received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the
Peruvian National Police, and benefitted from regional interdiction
funding .
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million
(rather than the $206.15 million requested), with $119.87 million in
economic and social programs, and $75 million in counternarcotics
aid.
!
Under the FY2003 ARI request, Peru would receive $186.6
million, including $119.6 million in economic and social programs,
and $67 million in counternarcotics and security assistance. Peru is
not mentioned in the FY2002 supplemental request.
Bolivia
Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but its significant gains in
reducing illegal coca production could be threatened, in part, by success in
controlling production in Colombia. With a population of 8.3 million (roughly 55%
indigenous, and 45% mestizo and European), Bolivia is the eleventh most populous
country in Latin America. President Jorge Quiroga assumed the presidency on
August 7, 2001, when President Hugo Banzer, whom he served as vice president,
resigned because of cancer, and he could not, by law, run for reelection.
In the presidential and legislative elections of June 30, 2002, the outcome was
uncertain for 10 days as votes from remote and weather-affected areas were counted
to determine the two leading candidates from which the Congress would elect the
new President, given the fact that no candidate came close to achieving a majority.
The leading candidate, with 22.5% of the vote, was businessman Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) who was President
from 1993 to 1997 and initiated many of Bolivia’s free market reforms. In the
contest for second place, Manfredo Reyes of the New Republican Force (NFR), four-
time mayor of Cochabamba, was initially leading. However, final results gave
second place to Evo Morales of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) with
20.94% of the vote. He is a leader of coca growers in Bolivia and wants to end U.S.-
supported coca eradication efforts in the country.
With a large indigenous population, Bolivia experienced a significant social
revolution under one party in the 1950s with sweeping land reform, universal
suffrage, rural education, and nationalization of the country’s important tin mines.
A period of military control ran from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s and was
followed by a series of ineffective and largely corrupt governments with linkages to
drug traffickers. Beginning in the mid-1990s, reformist governments in Bolivia
CRS-15
carried out major privatization programs and reforms, and put the country on a sound
economic footing. Bolivia is actively involved with the Andean Community, and is
an associate member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.
When elected in 1997, President Banzer set a goal in his “Dignity Plan” of
eliminating illegal coca cultivation and narco-trafficking during his five year term.
In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics efforts, the United States has provided
significant interdiction and alternative development assistance and it has forgiven all
of Bolivia’s debt for development assistance projects, and most of the debt for food
assistance. Bolivia, like Peru, has been viewed by many as a counternarcotics
success story, with joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful
eradication efforts, and effective alternative development programs reducing illegal
coca cultivation to the lowest level in five years, with a net reduction of
approximately 70% between 1996 and 2001.
Since mid-2001, however, the program has suffered reverses, according to the
State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy report (INCSR) for
2001. Although Quiroga had promised to carry out the Dignity Plan program, he has
relented after violent protests by coca growers in the Yungas and the Chapare
regions. The latter was once the country’s primary illegal coca-growing region. Much
of the illegal commercial crop had been eliminated there, but some has been
replanted. The INCSR states that coca cultivation in Bolivia, which had dropped
steadily from 48,600 hectares (120,000 acres) in 1995 to 14,600 hectares (36,000
acres) in 2000, had risen again to 19,900 hectares (49,000 acres) as of June 1, 2001.
The General Accounting Office, in its February 2002 report (GAO-02-291)21,
notes that U.S. and Bolivia officials attribute the Quiroga government’s faltering
commitment to crop elimination to a weakened governing coalition. Their statements
also point to the possibility that, with the approach of the June 2002 elections, some
members of the coalition may be fashioning political arrangements with the well-
organized cocaleros (coca growers), who have their own political party. In addition,
critics, and even some who have supported the program, claim that while eradication
has been successful in dramatically reducing coca cultivation, it has hurt the overall
economy.
Funding and Requests for Bolivia.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction
assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance.
!
Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $122.96
million (rather than the $143.48 million requested), with $74.46
million in economic and social assistance, and $48.50 million in
counternarcotics aid.
21 Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia
Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, op. cit., p 25.
CRS-16
!
Under the FY2003 ARI request, Bolivia would receive $132.6
million, including $82.6 million in economic and social programs,
and $50 million in counternarcotics and security programs. Bolivia
is not mentioned in the FY2002 supplemental request.
Ecuador
On Colombia’s southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s
neighbors because it is situated adjacent to southern Colombian areas that are
guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas With a population of 13.2
million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country in Latin America. While
roughly 65% of the population is mixed race mestizo, about a quarter is indigenous.
Ecuador is led by President Gustavo Noboa, the former Vice President who took
office in January 2000, after an uprising by elements of the military and indigenous
groups. He is the fifth president in five years, with several of the previous Presidents
leaving office as a result of corruption charges. The country experienced
hyperinflation and depression in the late 1990s, leading to dollarization (the
establishment of the dollar as the official currency) in early 2001. Since then the
economy has rebounded, with a growth rate of 5.9% in 2001, and a projected growth
rate of 4.5% for 2002.
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory
for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians
are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug
cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small
cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a
constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with
Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings
in Ecuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnapping people in
Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations.22 Ecuador reinforced its
northern border with Colombia in early 2002 as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations
intensified following the breakdown of the peace talks, and Ecuador was said to be
seeking additional international assistance.23
Funding and Requests for Ecuador.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which
$12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million
was for alternative development assistance. Another $61.3 million
has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating
Location in Manta, Ecuador for counternarcotics aerial surveillance.
22 For more information, see CRS Report RS20494, Ecuador: International Narcotics
Control Issues, by Raphael Perl.
23 See Ecuador Wants Money to Strengthen Border; Guerrilla Infiltration Concern Grows
After Military Action Against FARC, Financial Times, March 8, 2002, p. 10.
CRS-17
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $46.86 million
(rather than the $76.48 million requested), with $31.85 million in
economic and social programs, and $15 million in counternarcotics
aid.
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador
would receive $3 million of FMF funding for counter-terrorism
equipment and training.
!
Under the FY2003 ARI request, Ecuador would receive $65.1
million, including $43.1 million in economic and social programs,
and $22 million in counternarcotics and security assistance. Under
the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador would
receive an unspecified amount of FMF funding for counter-terrorism
equipment and training.
Brazil
Brazil’s isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms
Colombia’s southeastern border. With a population of 174.5 million, Brazil is the
largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of its 174.5 million
inhabitants concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and
along the Atlantic coast. The country is led by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso
who is approaching the end of his second and final term. He is credited with leading
the country into a period of growth after ending years of inflation with his Real Plan
and also weathering a financial crisis with IMF assistance in late 1998 and 1999.
New presidential elections are approaching in October 2002, with the governing
coalition splitting apart, raising doubts about the government’s ability to carry out
needed reforms and to maintain current economic policy. Brazilians have long been
concerned about the sparsely populated territory in the huge Amazon region, and they
have been fearful historically of foreign designs and intervention in this territory.
Brazil is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a growing transit area for
cocaine moving from the Andean Ridge to Colombia. In an effort to exercise control
over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project
called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese,
and it has offered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United
States. It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and
policemen, with air force and navy support, and has launched Operation Cobra with
heightened vigilance to deal with spillover effects from Colombia. Press accounts
suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging indigenous communities
in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to Colombian traffickers, and
FARC incursions along the border. In one example in late 1998, the FARC captured
a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into Brazilian
territory, before recapturing the city. In another example, a plane from Suriname
with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered when it was forced to make an
emergency landing in Brazil. In another more recent example, FARC forces crossed
CRS-18
into Brazil in early March 2002 and exchanged gunfire with Brazilian military
forces.24
Funding and Requests for Brazil.
! Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,
but under ARI allocations for FY2002 Brazil would receive $18.63
million (rather than the $26.18 million requested), including $6
million for counternarcotics and security, and $12.63 million for
economic and social development.
! Under the FY2003 ARI request, Brazil would receive $29.5 million,
including $12 million for counternarcotics and security, and $17.5
million for economic and social programs. Brazil is not mentioned
in the FY02 supplemental request.
Venezuela
Venezuela, Colombia’s eastern neighbor, is the United States’ fourth largest
supplier of crude oil. With a population of 23.9 million (of largely mestizo stock),
Venezuela is the sixth most populous country in Latin America. The country is
presently led by President Hugo Chavez, a former disgruntled military leader and a
populist, who was initially elected in late 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the
constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the
people. During 1999, at Chavez’s request, Venezuelan voters approved the creation
of a National Constituent Assembly, elected members of the new assembly, and
approved the newly written constitution which lengthened the presidential term and
expanded presidential powers. On July 30, 2000, in a so-called mega-election,
President Chavez easily won election to a new six year term of office.25 Because of
his previous attacks on the legislature and other institutions, many observers fear that
he has authoritarian tendencies somewhat like those of former President Fujimori in
Peru.
Chavez has established close ties with Fidel Castro and other leftist leaders, and
he often employs anti-U.S. rhetoric. He has denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-
dominated military strategy, he has denied the United States overflight rights over
Venezuela territory, and there have been reports that he has friendly relations with
Colombian guerrillas. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, Chavez criticized U.S. military action in Afghanistan, saying that the United
States was “fighting terror with terror,” and he visited Libya, Iran, and Iraq,
prompting President Bush to exclude him from his March 2002 meeting with Andean
24 See Brazil: Incidents with FARC on Border with Colombia Viewed, BBC Monitoring
Americas, March 9, 2002.
25 For more details, see CRS Report RS20978, Venezuela under Chavez: Political
Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan; and Scott Wilson, “Chavez’s
Unfinished Revolution; Venezuelan’s Accomplishments Fall Short of His Rhetoric,”
Washington Post, May 21, 2001, p. A1.
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leaders in Peru.26 In recent months Chavez’s popular support has fallen and there
have been street demonstrations against him, calls for his resignation by retired and
active duty military officials, and disputes with the national oil monopoly over his
appointments. In late March 2002, a Colombian military official claimed that the
FARC guerrillas had a camp in Venezuelan territory from which they launched an
attack, but Venezuela has rejected this claim and demanded clarification.27
After massive opposition protests and military pressure, President Chavez was
removed from office on April 12, 2002, and business leader Pedro Carmona was
designated as head of an interim government, but Chavez returned to power on April
14, 2002 following street protests and dissatisfaction with Carmona’s hardline anti-
democratic measures. Criticism of the United States for appearing to recognize the
Carmona government and for having had contacts with opposition groups make it
likely that tensions between the United States and Venezuela will continue.
Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring
Colombia to the United States and Europe. In 2001, some coca fields were located
and eradicated, and processing labs were detected and destroyed. Despite various
policy disagreements with the United States, the Chavez government has cooperated
with the United States in counternarcotics efforts.
Funding and Requests for Venezuela.
! While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under the final ARI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela
would receive $5.5 million (rather than the $10.5 requested),
including $5 million in counternarcotics and security aid, and the
remainder in economic and social development programs.
! For Venezuela, $8.5 million was requested in ARI funding, all but
$500,000 of which is ACI funds. Venezuela is not mentioned in the
FY02 supplemental request.
Panama
Panama is separated from Colombia along its southern border by the difficult
and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the “Darien Gap.” Here,
the 16,000 mile Pan American highway (stretching from Alaska to the tip of southern
Chile) is interrupted for a 60 mile stretch. A part of Colombia until 1903, Panama
is now the twentieth most populous country in Latin America, with a population of
2.8 million (of largely mestizo and West Indian origins).
Panama’s history has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the
transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the country, where the
26 See Peter Slevin, Political Crisis in Venezuela Worries White House, Washington Post,
February 23, 2002, p. A18.
27 See Fabiola Sanchez, Chavez Demands Colombia Clarify Claim, Associated Press Report,
April 2, 2002.
CRS-20
major cities are located. It is led by President Mireya Moscoso, elected and
inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing with economic difficulties in Panama, and
with Panama’s new responsibilities for the Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal
on the last day of 1999. Despite considerable effort in the period leading up to the
U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal
military presence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes.28 This
forced the United States to develop the Forward Operating Locations in El Salvador,
Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities. Panama has
been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and by Colombian
paramilitary groups. There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being
founded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception
that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected. Shipments of
small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as
well.
Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment
point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a
major site for money-laundering activity. In recent years Panama has cooperated
with the United States in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant
amounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering
legislation. In early 2002, a comprehensive U.S.-Panama maritime anti-drug
agreement entered into force.
Funding and Requests for Panama.
! While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under allocations for FY2002, Panama is to receive
$13.50 million (rather than the $20.5 million requested), including
$8.5 million in economic and social development funding, and $5
million for counternarcotics and security programs.
! For FY2003, the Bush Administration has requested $20.5 million
in ARI funding, including $9 million in ACI and $1 million in FMF
monies. Panama is not mentioned in the FY02 supplemental
request.
Major Legislative Activity in 2002
on Andean Regional Initiative Issues
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
House Action. On May 9, 2002, the Appropriations Committee began to
mark up the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, granting the
President some of the requested authorities relating to Colombia but denying some
28 For more detail, see CRS Report RL30981, Panama-U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan
and M. Angeles Villarreal.
CRS-21
of the other authorities. On May 15, the committee forwarded the bill to the House
(H.R. 4775, H.Rept. 107-480), where it was passed, amended, on May 24.
Provisions regarding Colombia remained as in the Committee-reported bill. On May
23, 2002, the House rejected, 192-225, an amendment offered by Representatives
McGovern and Skelton that would have deleted the Committee language authorizing
expanded U.S. military activities in Colombia.
Committee Action. As passed by the House Appropriations Committee, H.R.
4775 retains the full $38 million ($35 million for Colombia and $3 million for
Ecuador) requested for the ARI countries, but modifies assistance for Colombia and
the conditions on that assistance. The bill apparently leaves the $25 million for anti-
kidnapping funds under Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NATD)
Funding (as the President’s request is fully funded with no changes suggested), but
shifts $6 million for infrastructure security from the FMF account to the INC account,
where $4 million is also provided for assistance to police posts.
As the President requested, the bill provides authority to expand the use of
FY2002 and previous year funding from the Department of State (Section 601) and
Department of Defense (Section 307) for Colombia well beyond counternarcotics
operations, although the authorizing language is slightly different from the
President’s proposed use of funds against “all threats” to Colombia’s national
security. (The language of Sections 601 and 307 is identical.) Instead, the
Committee provided that funds would be available “to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations designated as terrorist
organizations...and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
situations, including undertaking rescue operations.” The specified terrorist groups
are the two leftist guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN, and the rightist
paramilitary forces of the AUC.
The Committee did not include the President’s language requesting permission
to use the funds “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” except the Leahy
Amendment and the personnel caps on Plan Colombia activities. It did, however,
specify that the new authorities are “in addition to authorities currently available to
provide assistance to Colombia.” Under this provision, all current conditions on aid
to Colombia for previously appropriated funds would continue to apply. The
conditions would not apply, however, to the funding provided under this bill.
The Committee added a requirement for an “Andean Security Strategy” report
within 30 days of the bill’s enactment. The report would outline U.S. “policy and
strategy to assist Colombia as well as to achieve a robust security environment in the
Andean region.” Six specific points are to be addressed: (1) the United States’ key
objectives in providing aid to Colombia; (2) a timetable and cost estimate for
achieving those objectives; (3) the U.S. role in assisting Colombian efforts to provide
security within the country; (4) how U.S. strategy in Colombia relates to a region-
wide Andean strategy; (5) a strategy, timetable, and cost estimates for assisting
Colombia’s efforts “to contain and eliminate the threat which the United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC)” poses to Colombia’s national security; and, (6) strategies to
help Colombia reach a negotiated political solution to its conflicts and to help it
design and implement a comprehensive strategy to deal with “the underlying socio-
political sources of the insurgencies and paramilitary counter-insurgency.”
CRS-22
The Committee report (H.Rept. 107-480) makes other references to Colombia.
In the report, the Committee recommended that, in view of “the troubling situation
facing many internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia” up to $10 million be
made available from INL or other funds to meet emergency IDP needs. Regarding
new authorities, the Committee report noted that although the new authorities are
intended to be used against terrorist organizations identified through the State
Department’s processes, “the Committee recognizes that in certain emergency
situation[s], such as kidnappings, the use of United States assets may be required
before the affiliation of the perpetrators has been determined.” The Committee stated
that it expects the authority to continue through FY2003 “unless the new government
of Colombia fails to commit itself to the counterdrug and security policies of the
Pastrana administration. It also noted “that these authorities will continue to be in
effect in the event a continuing resolution is necessary for a portion of 2003.”
The Committee refused the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense be
given discretion to decide on the uses of two new pots of money in the bill totaling
$130 million requested to assist foreign nations and indigenous forces with defense
articles, services, and training. (Although Colombia was not specified as a potential
recipient of these funds, they could conceivably have been used there.) “The primary
responsibility of the Secretary of State for foreign assistance, and in particular
military assistance, is well established,” according to the report. “Existing provisions
of law ... already provide sufficient authority for the purposes identified in the
President’s request.”
The House did include in two DOD funding accounts, however, counter-
terrorism monies which could be used for Colombia, although Colombia is not
specifically mentioned in regards to either. In language relating to the Department
of Defense’s Defense-wide Operations and Maintenance account, $420 million is
earmarked for payments to cooperating nations for military support provided to the
United States military in connection with the war on terrorism. (The language
specifically mentions Pakistan, Jordan, and the Philippines as recipients.) Section
312 provides that $100 million from the DOD’s Defense Emergency Reserve Fund
“may be made available to reimburse foreign nations for the costs of goods, services,
or use of facilities provided in direct support of the operations by U.S. military forces
in the global war against terrorism...” upon written notification to and approval of the
appropriations committees.
Floor Action. On May 23, 2002, the House considered the McGovern/Skelton
amendment that would have stricken the additional authorities in the bill that permit
U.S. assistance to go beyond strictly counter-narcotics purposes and to engage in
counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism activities as well. Proponents argued that the
new authorities would unnecessarily involve the United States in the internal affairs
of Colombia with an uncertain outcome, while proponents argued that broader
authority was necessary to provide the Colombian government with needed counter-
narcotics, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism assistance. The amendment was
rejected by a vote of 192-225.
Senate Action. On May 22, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported
its version of the supplemental appropriations bill, S. 2551, without a report, and then
filed the report, S.Rept. 107-156, on May 29, 2002. On June 7, 2002, the Senate
CRS-23
approved H.R. 4775, after incorporating the text of S. 2551 into the House measure,
thereby retaining the provisions reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
During floor action, Senators Graham and DeWine introduced but later withdrew an
amendment (S.Amdt. 3569) to permit the use of Department of Defense funds for
counter-terrorism purposes.
Committee Action. The Senate Appropriations Committee substantially
altered the President’s request on Colombia. In the State Department portions of the
supplemental bill, funding is specifically provided for Colombia in the INC and FMF
accounts. Colombia is also mentioned in the Committee report (S.Rept. 107-156)
under the Migration and Refugee Assistance account as one of the countries suffering
a refugee crisis that threatens humanitarian and national security interests. Although
the Administration had not requested refugee assistance, the Committee added $50
million to the bill for that purpose. (The House added $10 million but did not
mention Colombia.) No mention is made in the bill of the $25 million in anti-
kidnapping funding requested for Colombia in the NATD account language, although
the amount appropriated by the committee bill for that account could conceivably
fully or nearly fully fund the Administration request. (The Committee added $10
million to the President’s request but also suggested changes in allocations.) The
report notes that “Bolivia has made great strides in reducing coca cultivation” and
that the Bolivian government has requested human rights training, and counter-
terrorism training and assistance, for its police forces. “The Committee urges the
State Department to seriously review these requests.”
The Senate Appropriations Committee bill would broaden authority for U.S.
military activities in Colombia, but not to the same extent as requested by the
President or as passed by the House. Under Section 603(a), the Committee
authorized the use of counterdrug funds (i.e., those appropriated by this bill for
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) assistance, FY2002 ACI funds appropriated in
P.L. 107-115, and unexpired balances from previous year funds from foreign
operations acts) “to support the Colombian Government’s unified campaign against
narcotics trafficking and against paramilitary and guerrilla organizations designated
as terrorist organizations in that country.” There is no similar authority in the bill for
funds provided for other than counternarcotics purposes. According to the report,
“the Committee has broadened current authority to permit the use of U.S. equipment,
and U.S.-trained counternarcotics battalions” to support the unified campaign.
The bill includes all human rights conditions contained in P.L. 107-115 and the
existing personnel caps on U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors and adds
new conditions under Section 603(b). Section 603(c) specifies the provisions of
previous laws that remain applicable: Sections 556, 567, and 568 of P.L. 107-115;
Section 8093 of the DOD FY2002 appropriations act; and Section 3204(b)(1), as
amended, of P.L. 106-246. These provisions apply to funds appropriated under
Section 603(a) as well as funds made available elsewhere in the act for assistance to
the Colombian Armed forces and the Colombian National Police.
As summarized by report (S.Rept. 107-156), the new Section 603(b)(1)
conditions “include a commitment by the newly inaugurated President of Colombia
to implement significant budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed
Forces, and to expend substantial additional Colombian financial and other resources
CRS-24
to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the
effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. The Committee intends
that the reforms and additional resources will result in a better educated, higher paid,
professionally trained military which respects human rights.” Section 603(b)(2)
provides that no U.S. military personnel or civilian contractors employed by the
United States “will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance
made available under this Act or any other Act.”
The bill also requires a detailed report from the President on his policy
objectives, the operations necessary and the cost to the United States, Colombia, and
any other participating country to achieve those objectives, and on benchmarks to
measure progress towards those objectives. The President’s report is also to include
information on and a time frame regarding the expected reduction in the amount of
cocaine and heroin entering the United States as a result of the ACI, and a statement
on the mission and objectives of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors
employed by the United States in connection with ACI assistance, and threats to their
safety in Colombia.
In the State Department portions of the bill, the FMF language provides
authority for funds to establish, train, and equip a Colombian Army brigade dedicated
to providing security to civilian prosecutors in operations to collect evidence and
execute arrest warrants against leaders of paramilitary organizations. No amount is
specified for that purpose. The language also provides authority for assistance to the
Colombian armed forces to protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline, but with a cap of
$3.5 million (instead of the requested $6 million), and two conditions. Obligation
of the pipeline protection funding is contingent upon a report from the Secretary of
State to the Appropriations Committee that an appropriate amount from the
Colombian government’s oil revenues from that pipeline will be spent on primary
health care, basic education, microenterprise, and similar activities and programs to
improve the lives of the people of Arauca department. It is also contingent on written
promises from the private sector partners using the pipeline, Occidental Petroleum
and Repsol, that they will refund a portion of the funds based on their respective
shares in pipeline. (The refunds would be placed in the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative account for use without any further appropriation by Congress.)
The INC account language, also in the State Department portions of the bill,
specifies that $2.5 million is appropriated for the Colombian National Park Service
for training and equipment for park rangers. S.Rept. 107-156 notes that the State
Department proposes using $4 million from this account to “extend the presence of
Colombia’s police forces to rural areas previously under guerrilla or paramilitary
control.” It states that the Committee “has also provided not less than $2,500,000 for
training and equipment for law enforcement officers to protect Colombia’s biological
reserves and national parks, which are increasingly vulnerable to coca growers and
illegal loggers.”
Like the House, the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include authority
or funding for the Secretary of Defense to use $130 million to assist foreign nations
and indigenous forces with defense articles, services, and training. It also did not
specifically provide funding for reimbursing foreign nations for counter-terrorism
assistance, which the House did. However, in language similar to that of the House,
CRS-25
the Committee also earmarked $420 million in the Department of Defense’s Defense-
wide Operations and Maintenance account for payments to cooperating nations for
military support provided to the United States military in connection with the war on
terrorism. Colombia was not specifically mentioned, however.
Floor Action. The Senate considered the Supplemental FY2002
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4775) providing counter-terrorism assistance on June 3-7,
2002, after incorporating the Senate measure (S. 2551) into the House bill. The
Senate approved H.R. 4775 on June 7, 2002, retaining the Committee-reported
provisions relating to the Andean region, which provided less authority and more
restrictions than the House approved measure. During the floor debate, Senators
Graham and DeWine introduced amendment (S.Amdt. 3569) to give the President
greater latitude to use Department of Defense funds for counter-terrorism purposes,
but then withdrew the amendment to facilitate passage of the broader package on
grounds that the issue would be resolved in conference.
Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2002-FY2003
(Action commenced in 2001; to be completed in 2002)
House Action. The House International Relations Committee reported out
H.R. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirements on Colombia and a
prohibition on the issuance of visas to supporters of illegal armed groups in
Colombia. The bill was passed by the House on May 16, 2001, without additions
or modifications in that area. The required reports relate to the elimination of
Colombian opium, the effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador, alternative development
and resettlement programs, and the Colombianization of counternarcotics activities.
Committee Action. H.R. 1646 was introduced by Representative Hyde on
April 27, 2001, with two reporting requirements concerning the elimination of
Colombian opium poppy crops and the effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador (see
below for details). The measure was referred to the House Committee on
International Relations. When the Committee marked up the bill on May 2, 2001,
it adopted by voice vote two amendments offered by Representative Delahunt: the
first imposed reporting requirements on Department of State activities and on the
“Colombianization” of counternarcotics activities; the second prohibited the issuance
of visas to supporters of Colombian illegal armed groups (see below for details). The
bill was reported out amended (H.Rept. 107-57) by the Committee on May 4.
Floor Action. After floor consideration on May 10 and 16, 2001, with no
additional amendments on Colombia or the Andean region, H.R. 1646 was approved
by the House on May 16, and sent to the Senate on May 17, with the following
provisions relating to the Andean Regional Initiative:
! Reporting Requirement Concerning Elimination of Colombian
Opium. Sec. 204 requires the Secretary of State, through the Bureau
of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit, not later
than 60 days after enactment, a report that outlines a comprehensive
strategy to address the crisis of heroin in the United States due to
opium originating from Colombia, including destruction of opium
at its source.
CRS-26
! Reporting Requirement Concerning Effect of Plan Colombia on
Ecuador. Sec. 211 requires the Secretary of State, through the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, to submit,
not later than 60 days after enactment, a report that outlines a
comprehensive strategy to address the spillover effect of Plan
Colombia on Ecuador.
! Reporting Requirement on Department of State Activities in
Colombia. Sec. 213 (a) requires the Secretary of State to submit
within 180 days of enactment, and every 180 days thereafter, a report
on State Department funded and authorized activities in Colombia
to promote alternative development, recovery and resettlement of
internally displaced persons, judicial reform, the peace process, and
human rights. This report would include summaries of activities
undertaken during the previous 180 days, estimated timetables for
the next period, an explanation of any delays in meeting planned
timetables, and an assessment of steps to be taken to correct such
delays.
! Reporting Requirement on the “Colombianization” of U.S.
Funded Counternarcotics Activities. Sec. 213 (b) states that U.S.
policy “encourages” the transfer of counternarcotics activities in
Colombia, now carried out by U.S. businesses under agreements
with the State Department, to Colombian nationals, “in particular
personnel of the Colombian antinarcotics police, when properly
qualified personnel are available.” It also requires the Secretary of
State to report within 90 days of enactment and subsequently not
later than March 1 on the counternarcotics activities carried out by
U.S. businesses under State Department agreements. The report
must include the names of such businesses, the total State
Department payments to each business, a statement justifying the
agreement, an assessment of risks to personnel safety and potential
involvement in hostilities incurred by employees of each such
business, and a plan to provide for the transfer of these activities to
Colombians.
! Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed
Groups. Sec. 236 prohibits the issuance of visas to any alien who
the Secretary of State determines has wilfully provided direct or
indirect support to either of the two leftist guerrilla groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (the ELN), or to the rightist United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (the AUC); or “has wilfully conspired
to allow, facilitate, or promote the illegal activities of any of those
groups. A waiver is provided for cases where a visa “is necessary to
support the peace process in Colombia, for urgent humanitarian
reasons, for significant public benefit, or to further the national
security interests of the United States.”
CRS-27
Senate Action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401)
on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill on September 4, 2001, with a
requirement for a report outlining a strategy to eradicate opium in Colombia. On
May 1, 2002, the Senate approved H.R. 1646 after incorporating the text of a Senate
measure on security assistance (S. 1803) approved in December 2001.
Committee Action. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S.
1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606, similar to a provision
in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit to
appropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that
outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia.
National Defense Authorization, FY2003
House Action. As passed by the House on May 10, 2002, H.R. 4546, the
National Defense Authorization bill for FY2003, includes a provision that would
establish a cap of 500 on the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia who are
supported or maintained by Department of Defense funds. However, the Secretary
of Defense may waive the cap for national security reasons.
Committee Action. On May 1, 2002, the House Armed Services Committee
reported out H.R. 4546, the National Defense Authorization bill for FY2003. Section
1206 of the bill, added by amendment during markup, would set a cap of 500 on the
number of DOD-funded U.S. military personnel involved in operations in Colombia
at any one time. The Secretary of Defense would be allowed to waive the cap for
national security reasons. The Secretary would have to report his decision to waive
the cap to the armed services committees within 15 days. The amendment offered
by Representative Gene Taylor to set the cap at 500 was amended by the addition of
the waiver provision by Representative Saxby Chambliss. It then passed 32-26. The
cap specifically excludes personnel serving diplomatic functions or performing
emergency missions.
There is currently a cap of 400 on the number of U.S. military personnel who
can operate in Colombia in support of President Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia.” This
cap was established through the section on Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
funding in the FY2002 foreign operations appropriations act (P.L. 107-115), which
amended the original Section 3204(b)(1)(A) cap of 500 set in the “Plan Colombia”
FY2000 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 106-246). The cap specifically excludes
personnel serving diplomatic functions or performing emergency missions.
U.S. support for Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia,” provided through P.L. 106-246
and the FY2001 and FY2002 foreign operations acts, includes U.S. military support
for the training of Colombian Army Counternarcotics battalions and counternarcotics
interdiction funded by the State Department. [As long as the Department of Defense
continues to pay the salaries of participating U.S. military personnel, these personnel
presumably would be considered to be supported or maintained by DOD funding.]
The U.S. military currently also conducts a variety of counternarcotics operations in
Colombia under Department of Defense authorities and funding.
CRS-28
Floor Action. The House passed H.R. 4546 on May 10, 2002, with the
Committee-reported cap and waiver on U.S. military personnel in Colombia.
Senate Action. As passed by the Senate on June 27, 2002, H.R. 4546, as
amended by the incorporation of S. 2514 in lieu of the House version, does not
contain a cap on U.S. military personnel in Colombia. Resolution of differences in
conference is pending.
Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)29
(Action commenced in 2001; to be completed in 2002)
House Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee
ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006. On November 16, 2001,
the House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
which would offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December
31, 2006.
Committee Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means
Committee approved and ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006,
and provide duty-free treatment to selected apparel, tuna, and other products
previously excluded. The bill would also expand the conditions countries would have
to meet to remain eligible for program benefits.
Floor Action. On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009, the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which would offer expanded
trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006.
Senate Action. The Senate Committee on Finance reported out a version of
H.R. 3009 on November 29, 2001, and the Senate passed the ATPA extension on
May 23, 2002, as part of an omnibus trade bill including trade promotion authority
and trade adjustment assistance. Resolution of differences in conference is pending.
Committee Action. On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on
Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3009
(containing the substance of S. 525). This version would extend the ATPA through
February 28, 2006, and provide expanded benefits, but more limited benefits than the
House-passed version. On May 1, 2002, the Committee substitute was withdrawn
and a broader trade package was subsequently adopted as a substitute amendment.
Floor Action. Following extended negotiations between the White House and
Republican and Democratic leaders in the Senate, the Senate approved Senate
Amendment 3401, a broader trade package including ATPA extension, trade
29 For details on this legislation, see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference
Act: Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J. F. Hornbeck. More detailed and
updated information can be found on the CRS Web site in the CRS Electronic Briefing
Book, Trade at [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra1.shtml].
CRS-29
promotion (“fast track”) authority for the President, and trade adjustment assistance
for workers displaced by trade agreements. H.R. 3009 in the broadened form was
subsequently approved by a 66-30 vote.
CRS-30
Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries
(Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela)
CRS-31
Appendix B. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Request
and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts
($ millions)
ARI FY2002 Allocations
ARI FY2002 Allocations
By Purpose
By Account
Total
Total ARI
ARI
International
Country
FY2002
FY2002
Economic/
Counter-
Narcotics Control
Develop-
Child
Economic
Foreign
Request
Allocations
Social/
narcotics and
(Andean
ment
Survival and
Support
Military
Governance
Security
Counterdrug
Aid
Diseases
Fund
Financing
Initiative)
Colombia
399.00
380.50
137.00
243.50
380.50
0
0
0
0
Bolivia
143.48
122.46
74.46
48.00
81.00
12.05
19.41
10.00
0.5*
Brazil
26.18
18.63
12.63
6.00
6.00
3.93
8.70
0
0
Ecuador
76.48
46.86
31.85
15.00
25.00
6.86
0
15.00
0
Panama
20.50
13.50
8.50
5.00
5.00
4.50
0
4.00
0
Peru 206.15
194.87
119.87
75.00
142.50
14.17
23.20
15.00
0
Venezuela
10.50
5.5
0.50
5.00
5.00
0
0
0.50
0
Totals
882.29
782.32
348.82
379.50
645.00
41.51
51.31
44.5
0.50
Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary and Highlights. February 2002. The ARI does not include
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. These will range in FY2002 from an estimated $170,000 for Panama to an estimated $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared
by Nina M. Serafino, February 12, 2002.
* The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF). The small amount for Bolivia is included here, even though it was not specifically for
counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, which includes FMF for Andean Regional Initiative countries.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
CRS-32
Appendix C. Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2003 Request
by Purpose and Functional Accounts
($ millions)
ARI FY2003 Request by Purpose
ARI FY2003 Request by Account
Total ARI
Country
FY2003
Economic/
International
Foreign
Counter-narcotics
Development
Economic
Request
Social/
Narcotics Control
Military
and Security
Aid*
Support Fund
Governance
(ACI)
Financing
Colombia
537.0
164.0
373.0
439.0
0
0
98.0
Bolivia
132.6
82.6
50.0
91.0
30.6
10.0
1.0
Brazil
29.5
17.5
12.0
12.0
17.5
0
0
Ecuador
65.1
43.1
22.0
37.0
7.1
20.0
1.0
Panama
20.5
10.5
10.0
9.0
7.0
3.5
1.0
Peru 186.6
119.6
67.0
135.0
40.6
10.0
1.0
Venezuela
8.5
0.5
8.0
8.0
0
0.5
0
Totals
979.8
437.8
542.0
731.0
102.8
44.0
102.0
Source: Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy. International Affairs Function 150 Summary and Highlights, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request. The ARI totals
do not include International Military Education and Training funds, which range in the FY2003 request from $200,000 for Panama to $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared by Nina
M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, February 12, 2002.
* Includes funds previously cited under Child Survival and Diseases.