Order Code IB10104
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Postal Reform
Updated July 10, 2002
Nye Stevens
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Causes of the Financial Crisis
The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970
The USPS Transformation Plan
Should the Postal Service Compete?
A Postal Reform Commission
LEGISLATION
105th and 106th Congresses
107th Congress
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Products


IB10104
07-10-02
Postal Reform
SUMMARY
The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) is in
days, and to revamp union contract talks by
severe financial straits, facing a decline in
adopting the Railway Labor Act model of
business use of the mails as alternatives such
involving the President and Congress in avert-
as e-mail, faxes, and cell phones substitute for
ing strikes.
hard copy letters. The economic slowdown
that began in 2001 has cut into advertising
Most postal stakeholders think that the
mail. On top of this, the anthrax attack of
USPS monopoly lines – first class, periodical,
October, 2001 has affected volume and added
and advertising mail – are a declining busi-
billions in costs for mail sanitization. Despite
ness, and want USPS to compete in other
three rate increases in 18 months, USPS is
markets that are growing. Competitors in
losing money at a rate of well over $1 billion
those markets resist because USPS pays no
each year, and will soon reach its $15 billion
taxes and is immune from most government
debt limit to the Treasury. It has a negative net
regulations. They think USPS should concen-
worth and mounting obligations for pensions
trate on its natural monopoly – the “last mile”
and retiree health benefits. USPS would be
in the delivery process. USPS has not had
bankrupt but for the fact that it is a govern-
much success to date in developing commer-
ment entity.
cially competitive products.
USPS, its board of governors, GAO, and
Congress has not shown much willing-
most mailers’ organizations believe that the
ness to address postal reform. While a reform
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 no longer
bill has been under development in the House
provides a viable business model. It is de-
for a half-dozen years, it has yet to emerge
pendent on rising mail volume to cover the
from committee. A bipartisan version was
ever-increasing cost of arbitrated labor settle-
introduced as H.R. 4970 in the 107th Congress,
ments and the addition of 1.7 million new
but it ran into opposition from USPS competi-
delivery points each year. The heavily regu-
tors, and Democrats refused to support it
lated process of setting rates is cumbersome
without a commitment from House leadership
and tendentious.
to bring it to the floor.
At congressional request, USPS devel-
With the legislative process arguably
oped a “Transformation Plan” that briefly
immobilized by conflicting demands from
considered, and rejected, the alternatives of
competitors, unions, mailers, and customers
privatization and a return to regular agency
reluctant to see any changes in universal
status with appropriations to cover the costs of
service or closing any of the 38,000 post
universal service. Instead, it asks Congress
offices, stakeholders are increasingly promot-
for authority to set and change rates more
ing a study commission to resolve the policy
flexibly, close post offices and processing
impasse. The Postal Reorganization Act of
centers, negotiate service agreements and
1970 arose from the recommendations of a
volume discounts for big mailers. It also
previous commission.
proposed to redefine its universal service

obligation by adjusting the number of delivery
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

IB10104
07-10-02
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
After months of bipartisan negotiations, H.R. 4970, The Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act, was introduced in the House by Representatives Dan Burton and John
McHugh. Although Democratic Representatives Henry Waxman and Danny Davis had
helped draft the bill and said they supported it, Democrats did not vote to report the bill in
a June 20 markup session of the House Government Reform Committee. They said that it
made little sense to report a bill from committee if there was no leadership commitment to
consider it on the floor. Without Democratic support, and with visible opposition from the
United Parcel Service and the Teamsters Union, the bill failed on a 20-6 vote. On June 30,
2002, USPS implemented a 7.7% rate increase, its third in 18 months.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The U.S. Postal Service is facing a financial crisis. Despite three rate increases in 2
years, it is mired in losses. Its deficit rose from $199 million in FY2000 to $1.68 billion in
FY2001. It predicted a $1.35 billion deficit for FY2002 (more than Amtrak’s) even before
anthrax was discovered in letters to several public figures. The reaction to that event both
added billions to USPS costs and cut deeply into revenues as mail was diverted, slowed
down, shunned by some, and actively discouraged by some government agencies as a
dependable means of communication.
Both the House and the Senate held hearings early in 2001 on the deteriorating financial
condition of the Postal Service. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has issued a number
of reports that portray a steadily growing sense of urgency. Among the indicators of the
crisis are the following:
! Despite desperate cost-cutting measures, a freeze on facilities, and severe
limits on productivity investments, revenues are falling twice as fast as
expenses. Net income has fallen each year since 1995.
! Mailers warn of an “economic death spiral,” as falling mail volume forces
price increases to cover fixed costs, and the price increases lead to further
drops in volume as businesses seek more cost-effective alternatives.
! The USPS debt to the Treasury is swiftly approaching its statutory $15
billion limit.
! GAO estimates major liabilities and obligations at close to $100 billion for
such items as debt to the Treasury, pension and retiree health obligations,
and workers’ compensation future benefits, all of which will need to be
borne by future ratepayers, or taxpayers, in a shrinking market. Within 8
years, USPS will need to come up with $16 billion annually for the deferred
costs of past services, before spending a single dollar on current mail
delivery.
CRS-1

IB10104
07-10-02
! Liabilities continue to exceed and grow faster than assets, a condition that
GAO says would mean bankruptcy if USPS were not a government entity.
Causes of the Financial Crisis
While there are differences among the stakeholders in emphasis, the following factors
have been identified as being in part responsible for the current crisis:
! The economic slowdown that began in early 2001 has cut into USPS
revenues from the dominant business segment, and reduced advertising mail,
which accounts for 25% of revenues. After three quarters of FY2002,
overall volume is down 5.7 billion pieces compared to the previous year,
and even a rate increase did not prevent an absolute decline in revenues.
Costs continue to rise, however, since 1.7 million delivery points are added
each year, built-in wage and cost-of-living increases add $2 billion per year,
and energy prices continue to mount.
! The rate determination process is cumbersome and rigid, preventing USPS
from aligning its offerings with the variable needs of its customers. USPS
preparations for a rate case begin many months before a filing with the
Postal Rate Commission (PRC) and must estimate costs and demand nearly
2 years into the future. The adversarial process of contesting proposed rates
and classes goes on for 10 months, with exchanges of tons of paperwork and
hundreds of hours of testimony. USPS competitors are very active
participants. The emphasis is on allocating stated costs among mail classes
rather than reducing costs or encouraging demand. USPS complains that the
process gives it no opportunity to respond to competition, to vary rates with
the season or periods of low usage, to negotiate rates with big mailers, or to
price products in accordance with demand, rather than costs of service.
! Three rate increases in an 18-month period have driven some mailers to cut
volume in order to stay within set budgets, and made the comparative cost
of alternatives – such as newspapers, television, and e-mail for advertising
– more attractive.
! Competition from other providers and other media is marginalizing some of
the services that USPS provides. E-mail, fax transmission, and cell phones
without distance charges have become substitutes for written
correspondence. The Internet is becoming increasingly popular as an
alternative for financial billing and payment, which sustained USPS revenue
growth through the 1990s. USPS is already a secondary player in the
overnight express and package delivery markets, except for the most
difficult routes in Alaska and Hawaii.
! Labor costs of its 850,000 employees account for over three-fourths of
USPS expenses, not much less than was the case decades ago. In contrast,
labor costs are 56% of UPS’s expenses, and 42% of costs at FedEx, where
only the pilots are unionized. Lagging productivity growth (11% in 30
years), a backlog of 146,000 pending or appealed labor grievances that are
CRS-2

IB10104
07-10-02
pursued “on the clock,” and binding arbitration of disputes keep labor costs
high.
! Facilities are not optimally located for efficient distribution, since USPS has
been unable to close existing facilities and consolidate operations in new
locations. USPS maintains that over half its 38,000 facilities do not
generate enough revenues to cover their operating costs, and complains that
political considerations prevent it from modernizing and rationalizing its
retail and distribution system.
The American Postal Workers Union (APWU) has been a vocal proponent of another
ascribed cause for the postal financial predicament. The APWU believes that “worksharing”
discounts (for pre-sorting and adding bar codes that allow automated processing) to big
mailers have gotten out of hand, costing USPS $4 billion annually that could be saved if the
work were brought back in-house.

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970
Postal Service management, its board of governors, GAO, and most stakeholders assert
that the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 no longer provides a viable business model for
a successful postal enterprise at the turn of the century. That Act had taken postal affairs out
of the direct control of either Congress or the President. It made USPS an independent
establishment of the executive branch, directed by a postmaster general selected by, and
serving at the pleasure of, a part-time board of governors appointed by the President with the
consent of the Senate. USPS was permitted to operate using business principles, and charged
with generating enough revenues to support the costs of the service it provides by allocating
those costs among the many users of the postal system. That allocation has been
accomplished through periodic rate cases before the Postal Rate Commission (PRC), a five-
member regulatory commission that considers cost data and the conflicting views of
competitors, unions, and users of the many classes of mail in a 10-month adjudicative
process leading to new rates and classification requirements.
The legal and regulatory framework established by the Act served reasonably well for
nearly three decades. Delivery service and customer satisfaction improved, USPS survived
without general appropriations since 1983, rising mail volumes covered the costs of adding
new routes and delivery points each year, and prices rose generally in line with inflation.
Postal issues came to be perceived as minor enough that postal service committees and
eventually even subcommittees disappeared from the congressional organization chart.
However, few who are familiar with postal affairs believe that Congress can ignore the
current state of the enterprise. USPS admits that its business model no longer works in the
21st century, and Comptroller General David Walker testified bluntly on May 13, 2002 before
a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee that the institution’s current course is
“unsustainable.” At a minimum, the approaching debt limit will require some action from
Congress.
CRS-3

IB10104
07-10-02
The USPS Transformation Plan
When GAO placed the long-term outlook for USPS on its High Risk List in the spring
of 2001, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs asked USPS to prepare a
comprehensive plan to address its financial, operational, and workforce challenges, along
with a time frame and key milestones for achieving positive results. USPS eventually came
to welcome the opportunity to lay before Congress a comprehensive statement of what it
needed to make its business successful.
USPS released its Transformation Plan in April, 2002 with a substantial public relations
effort. The plan contains 400 pages of historical and analytical information about changes
in the postal business in the United States and throughout the world, and presents three
alternative futures for USPS. It rejects the option of returning to government agency status,
and depending on Congress to provide appropriations to maintain universal service as the gap
between costs and revenues continues to widen. It also dismisses the prospect of
privatization as likely to lead to substantial layoffs, and inevitably leading to cuts in services
and geographic coverage that do not pay for themselves. The option USPS favors is called
the “Commercial Government Enterprise,” preserving government ownership but allowing
USPS to operate under more businesslike conditions than what the 1970 Postal
Reorganization Act provides.
While it lacked (as GAO pointed out) a detailed action plan, milestones, and concrete
legislative recommendations, the transformation plan did propose a number of significant
departures from the status quo. The following are among those likely to require
congressional approval:
! An aggressive effort to “optimize the retail network” and “redesign the
postal logistics network,” which would entail lifting the moratorium on
closing post offices, streamlining the process for more closures, and
reducing the number of processing centers.
! Negotiating service agreements and volume discount prices with the biggest
mailers, exploring seasonal discounts and premiums, and phasing in new
rates on a more predictable basis.
! Revamping contract talks with the unions to escape binding arbitration,
moving eventually to a mediation process like that in the Railway Labor Act,
which involves the President and Congress in averting strikes and
encouraging reasonable settlements with the public’s interest paramount.
! Redefining universal service by adjusting service levels and the number of
delivery days to a more affordable level.
! Changes in the incentive structure to permit USPS to retain any excess
earnings, and remove the limit on executive pay tied to the federal executive
schedule.
CRS-4

IB10104
07-10-02
! Expanded freedom to use its assets for entering related markets and
developing new products without skeptical scrutiny from the PRC.
Many of the initiatives proposed in the transformation plan could be undertaken under
USPS’s existing authorities, and it suggested that others could be negotiated with a PRC that
had become more cooperative in the wake of the terrorist attacks. However, Congress would
need to act in both the short and the long term to achieve the most significant changes. One
change that was urged immediately was the removal of annual appropriations language that
restricts post office closings and mandates no reduction from the service levels that prevailed
in 1983.
At the May 13, 2002 subcommittee hearing of the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee called to discuss the plan, reaction was somewhat subdued. The postmaster
general said that gaining more flexibility in pricing its services was the “number one priority”
in the transformation plan. Members generally complimented USPS on a good-faith effort
to set forth its needs, but raised questions about several key facets of the plan: whether it was
“fair to competitors;” whether opening new businesses would divert attention from its core
mission; whether closing post offices was politically realistic; and whether now is the right
time for long-term decisions, since the world of communications continues on such a rapid
pace of change.
Should the Postal Service Compete
USPS itself, its unions, and many mailers’ organizations believe that the survival of the
Postal Service depends on the institution’s ability to compete in active or developing
markets, because the services it provides under its statutory monopoly are a declining
business. Another school of thought, however, rejects the notion that USPS should compete
with private sector companies who are able to provide services within the market economy.
There are several thrusts to the argument. One relates to fairness. USPS has many
advantages stemming from its governmental status. It pays no federal, state, or local taxes
on its income, sales, purchases, or property. Unlike private sector companies, It is immune
from most forms of regulation, such as zoning, land use restrictions, motor vehicle
registration, parking tickets, and antitrust. It is also able to borrow money at the lowest
possible rate because it does so through the U. S. Treasury. Understandably, companies
facing competition from USPS feel that they are at a great disadvantage.
A second argument is based on concepts of economic efficiency. Because of its indirect
subsidies such as freedom from taxation and regulation, and because its goal is to break even
rather than earn a competitive rate of return, USPS has less incentive than private sector
entities to use capital and labor resources efficiently. Subsidies make government products
and service seem artificially cheap, resulting in an over-allocation of resources that could be
used to produce greater benefits elsewhere in the economy. Economic theory maintains that
such a mis-allocation reduces national economic welfare below that achieved by a
competitive market. When private sector companies produce and sell a product or service,
there is some benefit to society from the taxes that result, a benefit not gained when the
government produces the same product or service.
CRS-5

IB10104
07-10-02
Finally, there is substantial evidence that USPS is not a very adept competitor. GAO
has issued several reports of failed commercial ventures by USPS. In 1997, for example,
USPS had discontinued or was losing money on 15 of 19 new products, resulting in a net loss
of $85 million. UPS and FedEx have both established profitable delivery networks in
markets where USPS tries to compete but is now a relatively minor player.
One policy prescription leading from this diagnosis is that USPS should stick to its
monopoly business and not seek to grow at the expense of private sector competitors.
Indeed, some would like to see the postal monopoly reduced to “the last mile” of delivery,
opening up collection, sorting, and transportation to market competition.
A Postal Reform Commission
A number of postal observers believe that political power is so thoroughly dispersed
among stakeholders that only an independent blue-ribbon commission, rather than the
legislative process, can devise a contemporary solution to today’s postal crisis. The
Association for Postal Commerce, the Mailers Council, GAO, and some Members of
Congress are among those calling on the President to create a commission to study and make
recommendations on the future organization and function of the Postal Service. There is an
important precedent. In 1967, President Johnson appointed Frederick R. Kappel (the chief
executive of AT&T) to chair a Commission on Postal Organization that eventually devised
the framework for the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970. Murray Comarow, who was
executive director of the Kappel commission, agrees that the legislative process cannot
achieve genuine reform. He cautions against a commission made up of stakeholders,
however, because it is likely to mirror the intransigent interests that have fought to a draw
on Capitol Hill. A 1977 commission with union and mailer representatives broke down in
disagreement and its report was ignored. The Kappel commission was composed of eminent
individuals with no close ties to postal stakeholders.
LEGISLATION
105th and 106th Congresses.
Representative John McHugh used his chairmanship of the House Government Reform
Subcommittee on the Postal Service to develop and promote comprehensive postal reform
legislation that was given the number H.R. 22 in both the 105th and 106th Congresses. The
theory behind the bill was that USPS needed freedom to engage more competitively in
growing markets, but on a leveled playing field, while having an enhanced degree of
supervised flexibility in its monopoly markets. It would have weakened the control now held
by the Postal Rate Commission. The bill avoided controversial issues such as binding pay
arbitration and closing post offices that lose money. With only belated support from USPS
and its board, however, and opposition from such influential stakeholders as UPS and the
APWU, the bill passed the subcommittee but no further action was taken by the Government
Reform Committee.
Representative Henry Waxman, ranking minority member of the House Government
Reform Committee, introduced H.R. 2535 in the 106th Congress. The bill would have
CRS-6

IB10104
07-10-02
provided some rate making flexibilities for competitive products, negotiated rate agreements,
and phased-in rates. According to USPS, however, the increased authority would be
“nominal” and would leave unchanged PRC authority over the pricing of noncompetitive
(monopoly) products, such as letter mail and addressed advertising mail. The bill also would
establish a national commission to review and report on the present practices and
organizational structure of USPS, with an emphasis on promoting efficiency in mail
collection, processing, and delivery. The bill was not considered by the committee.
Representative Philip Crane has introduced legislation to privatize USPS in the last
several Congresses, including H.R.2589 in the 106th Congress. It would have converted
USPS to a totally private corporation, owned by its employees, leaving many of the
implementation details, such as the role of the PRC, to the President and a Postal
Privatization Commission. H.R. 2589 was referred to the Committee on Government
Reform and no further action was taken. The bill has not been re-introduced in the 107th
Congress.
Representative Duncan Hunter has introduced legislation designed to reduce USPS
presence in commercial markets. His Postal Service Core Business Act of 1999 (H.R. 198
in the 106th Congress) would prevent USPS from marketing any new non-postal products and
require it to discontinue any commercial non-postal products introduced since 1994. The bill
cited such examples as photocopying, wrapping and packaging, notary public services, and
sale of office supplies. The bill was not acted on in the 106th Congress and has not been re-
introduced in the 107th.
107th Congress.
While Congress has been increasingly concerned about deterioration in USPS’s
finances, there has been little legislative activity in the 107th Congress. The House Postal
Service Subcommittee was not reconstituted in the 107th Congress (Representative McHugh
was term-limited as chairman), and formal congressional oversight was devoted largely to
the anthrax crisis. In a House Government Reform Committee held hearing on April 4,
2001, Chairman Dan Burton and ranking minority member Waxman invited postal
stakeholders to participate in a broad range of discussions aimed at the development of a
bipartisan consensus bill, and these discussions proceeded for more than a year.
On June 20, 2002, Representatives McHugh and Burton introduced H.R. 4970, the
Postal Accountability and Reform Act. The bill was essentially a marriage of the former
H.R. 22 with elements promoted by Representatives Waxman and Danny Davis, including
the formation of a reform commission, and enhancing the role of the Postal Rate
Commission. The PRC would be renamed the Postal Regulatory Commission, and be given
substantial powers to monitor, investigate, and control the activities of the Postal Service
within broad parameters, rather than being limited to considering rate requests. The principal
changes that would be made by H.R. 4970 include the following:
! dividing postal operations between “competitive” and “market dominant”
products. Competitive products would include Express Mail, Priority Mail,
packages up to 70 pounds, and international mail. Market dominant
products are traditional letter mail, advertising mail, periodicals, catalogs,
CRS-7

IB10104
07-10-02
and rural mail boxes – products on which USPS has a monopoly and can
raise prices above costs without fear of losing market share;
! requiring the new regulatory commission to devise a new rate setting system
for market dominant products that would follow broad principles of
flexibility, predictability, incentives to reduce costs and maintain service
standards, and limits for price increases to no more than the annual rise in
the consumer price index;
! allowing USPS to price competitive products according to market
conditions, including discounts not available to all mailers, and to conduct
tests of new competitive products exempt from most specific pricing
requirements;
! establishing a separate competitive products fund that would have
safeguards against cross-subsidization from the market dominant category,
would borrow from private markets without federal government backing,
and would be subject to imputed federal income taxes;
! giving the Secretary of State authority to lead U.S. delegations to
international postal conventions, charging the secretary with assuring that
international agreements do not give preference to any entity including
USPS, and requiring the Customs Service to treat private carriers on an
equal basis with USPS;
! granting the Postal Regulatory Commission subpoena powers, enforcement
orders through the district courts, and broad authority to investigate and act
on complaints of unfair competition, service deficiencies, subsidization of
competitive products, or offering products or services that are “non-postal;”
and
! specifying that members of the Postal Regulatory Commission be “chosen
solely on the basis of their technical qualifications, professional standing,
and demonstrated expertise in economics, accounting, law, or public
administration.”
In implicit recognition that the bill does not address a number of issues that need
resolution before USPS can be assured a viable future, Title VII would provide for the
appointment of a “National Commission on the Future of the Postal Service,” with 11
members named by the President and congressional leaders. The commission would be
charged with studying and making recommendations on the scope of universal service, labor
relations, safety and security, and postal facilities. The commission would have 30 months
to issue its recommendations, but there is no provision for fast-track congressional
consideration of them.
H.R. 4970 has fallen victim to legislative backlogs as the 107th Congress draws to a
close. The USPS board of governors issued a letter of support for the draft, and a number
of mailers groups were active in its support. A markup, repeatedly scheduled and delayed
in the House Committee on Government Reform, finally took place on June 20, 2002.
CRS-8

IB10104
07-10-02
Committee Democrats, even though several had worked closely on development of the bill,
refused to support reporting the bill from committee without a commitment from the House
leadership that it would be brought to the floor in this session. At the markup, several
supporters criticized the influence of UPS, and of the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, which represents UPS employees. A roll call vote to report the bill gained only
six votes, all Republicans. Twenty members voted against it, and nine, all Democrats, voted
“present.” Supporters agreed that the bill is dead for the 107th Congress.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, The U.S. Postal Service’s
Uncertain Financial Outlook, Parts I and II,
hearings, 107th Cong., 1st sess., April 4 and May
16, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2001).
_________, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Financial Security of the U.S. Postal
Service,
special hearing, 107th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 8, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2002).
_________, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, The Postal Service in the 21st Century: the USPS
Transformation Plan
, hearing, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., May 13, 2002 (unpublished hearing).
_________, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, The Annual Report of the Postmaster General
and the Impact of Terrorist Attacks on Postal Operations
, hearing, 107th Cong., 1st sess.,
Sept. 20, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2002).
_________, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, The Financial Outlook of the U.S.
Postal Service,
hearing, 107th Cong., 1st sess., May 15, 2001 (Washington: GPO, 2002).
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Murray D. Comarow, “The Demise of the Postal Service?”, presented at the Joint
Conference of the National Academy of Public Administration’s Panel on Executive
Organization and Management and the Johns Hopkins Center for the Study of American
Government, June 25, 2001.
Stephen J. Entin, “The Postal Service: A Monopoly That Loses Money,” Institute for
Research on the Economics of Taxation, IRET Congressional Advisory No. 130,
Washington, June 3, 2002.
Shane Ham and Robert D. Atkinson, Opening the Mail: A Postal System for the New
Economy, Progressive Policy Institute, Washington, Dec. 4, 2001, 29 pp.
Edward L. Hudgins, ed., Mail @ the Millennium: Will the Postal Service Go Private?, (Cato
Institute, Washington, 2000), 233 pp.
CRS-9

IB10104
07-10-02
U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Postal Service: Deteriorating Financial Outlook

Increases Need for Transformation, GAO-02-355, Feb. 28, 2002. 60 pp.
U.S. Postal Service, Transformation Plan, Washington, April 2002. 78 pp. plus appendices.
(Available on USPS Web site: http://www.usps.com/strategicdirection/transform.htm)
CRS Reports.
CRS Report RL31069. Postal Service Financial Problems and Stakeholder Proposals, by
Nye Stevens.
CRS Report RS21025. The Postal Revenue Forgone Appropriation: Overview and Current
Issues, by Nye Stevens.
CRS Report RS21192. The 2002 Postage Rate Increase, by Nye Stevens.
CRS Report RL31280. The U.S. Postal Service Response to the Threat of Bioterrorism
Through the Mail, by Frank Gottron.
CRS-10